Social Security: A-44-03-23092

8/14/2019 Social Security: A-44-03-23092

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SOCIAL SECURITY

MEMORANDUM

Date: September 23, 2003 Refer To: 33266-23-502

To: The Commissioner

From: Inspector General

Subject: Top Management Challenges—Fiscal Year 2004

The Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 requires that we summarize for inclusion in the SocialSecurity Administration’s (SSA) Performance and Accountability Report, our perspective on themost serious management and performance challenges facing SSA. The challenges in Fiscal

Year (FY) 2004 have not changed substantially from FY 2003. However, we consolidatedseveral related areas to more effectively cover these areas. The top management issues facingSSA in FY 2004, as determined by the Office of the Inspector General, are: Social Security Number Integrity and Protection, Management of the Disability Process, Improper Payments,Budget Performance and Integration, Critical Infrastructure Protection and Systems Security, andService Delivery.

These areas are dynamic, so we encourage continuous feedback and additional studysuggestions. This flexibility enables us to meet emerging and critical issues evolving in theupcoming year. Our summary of SSA’s progress in addressing these challenges (see attached)will be included in the Fiscal Year 2004 Performance and Accountability Report.

If you have any questions or need additional information, please call me or have your staff contact Steven L. Schaeffer, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, at (410) 965-9700.

James G. Huse, Jr.

Attachment

cc:James B. LockhartLarry DyeLarry Love



TOP MANAGEMEN

CHALLENGES

FISCAL YEAR 2004



Top Management Challenges

1

he Reports Consolidation Act of 20001

requires that we summarize, for inclusion in the Social Security

Administration’s (SSA) Performance and

Accountability Report, our perspective on themost serious management and performancechallenges facing SSA.

The challenges facing SSA management inFiscal Year (FY) 2004 have not changedsubstantially from FY 2003. However, weconsolidated several related areas to moreeffectively cover these areas. For example,Social Security Number Integrity and

Protection now covers the former areas of

Homeland Security, Social Security Number (SSN) Integrity and Misuse, and Integrity of the Earnings Reporting Process. Our Service

Delivery issue area now includes HumanCapital, E-Government, and representative payee issue areas. We also eliminated theFraud Risk issue area since potentially thereare elements of fraud risk in each managementchallenge.

1 Pub. L. No. 106-531.

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) believes the management challenges facingSSA in FY 2004 are as follows.

T

TOP MANAGEMENT

CHALLENGES

Social Security Number Integrityand Protection

Management of the DisabilityProcess

Improper Payments

Budget and PerformanceIntegration

Critical Infrastructure Protectionand Systems Security

Service Delivery




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ince 1997, we have provided our perspective on these managementchallenges to Congress, SSA and other

key decisionmakers. In developing this year’slist, we considered the four initiatives the

Commissioner has identified as priorities:Service, Stewardship, Solvency, and Staff.

We also reviewed

• the most significant issues as outlined in thePresident’s Management Agenda (PMA),

• SSA’s progress in responding to the Officeof Management and Budget’s (OMB)Scorecard,

• the Inspector General’s Strategic Plan,

•

the high-risk list prepared by the GeneralAccounting Office (GAO), and

• our body of audit and investigative work.

Finally, we prepared a crosswalk to ensurethere was no disconnect or gap among thosereviewing SSA’s programs and operations.

S

Crosswalk of Presidential Management Agenda (PMA) to Commissioner Priorities, Office of the Inspector

General Management Challenges, Social Security Advisory Board, and GAO Challenges

PMA Commissioner

Priorities

OIG Major Management

Challenges

Social Security

Advisory Board

GAO Performance and

Accountability Challenge

ExpandedElectronicGovernment

Service Service Delivery

− E-Government

− Rep Payee

− Human Capital

Management of theDisability Process

Service to thePublic

Disability Reform

Service Delivery

Improve the DDS Processand Return to Work

DI—High Risk

ImprovedFinancialPerformance

CompetitiveSourcing

Budget andPerformanceIntegration

Stewardship

Solvency

Improper Payments

Critical InfrastructureProtection/Systems Security

SSN Integrity and Protection(Homeland Security andEarnings)

Budget Performance andIntegration

Social Security Number CaseHandling Quality

SSN Misuse

Supplemental SecurityIncome*

Information Security

Strategic

Managementof HumanCapital

Staffing Service Delivery

− Human Capital

Staffing

−

Hiring− Training

− Management

− Measurement

Human Capital

Crosswalk of PMA to Commissioner Priorities, OIG Management Challenges,

Social Security Advisory Board, and GAO Challenges

PMA

Commissioner

Priorities

OIG Major Management

Challenges

Social Security

Advisory Board

GAO Performance and

Accountability Challenges

ExpandedElectronicGovernment

Service Service Delivery

− E-Government

− Representative Payee

− Human Capital

Management of theDisability Process

Service to thePublic

Disability Reform

Service Delivery

Improve the DisabilityDetermination ServiceProcess and Return to Work

Disability Insurance—

High Risk ImprovedFinancialPerformance

CompetitiveSourcing

Budget andPerformanceIntegration

Stewardship

Solvency

Improper Payments

Critical InfrastructureProtection and SystemsSecurity

SSN Integrity and Protection

Budget Performance andIntegration

SSN CaseHandling Quality

SSN Misuse

Supplemental SecurityIncome

Information Security

Strategic

Managementof HumanCapital

Staff Service Delivery

− Human Capital

Staffing

−

Hiring

− Training

− Management

− Work Measurement

Human Capital—High Risk




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SOCIAL S ECURITY N UMBER

I NTEGRITY AND P ROTECTION

In FY 2002, SSA issued about 18 millionoriginal and replacement SSN cards, and SSA

received approximately $524 billion inemployment taxes related to earnings under

issued SSNs.

The SSN is the single most widely usedidentifier for Federal and State governmentsas well as the private sector. In FY 2002,SSA issued about 18 million original andreplacement SSN cards, and SSA receivedapproximately $524 billion in employmenttaxes related to earnings under issued SSNs.

Protecting the SSN and properly posting thewages reported under SSNs are critical toensuring eligible individuals receive the fullretirement, survivor and/or disability benefitsdue them.

Unfortunately, the SSN is often misused.And identity theft is not just aboutindividuals. While being the immediatevictim of identity theft and SSN misuse cancause individuals years of difficulty, it also brings cost to financial and commercialinstitutions, which is ultimately passed on toconsumers. Worse yet, SSN misuse candisguise a dangerous felon or a would-beterrorist as a law-abiding citizen. That defacto national identifier can provide acriminal the identification and seeminglegitimacy he or she needs to go aboutnefarious business, perhaps putting dozens,hundreds, or even thousands of lives in jeopardy.

Protecting the Social Security Number

To ensure the integrity of the SSN, SSA mustfocus on three stages of protection: (1) whenthe SSN card is issued, (2) during the life of the SSN cardholder, and (3) upon the SSNcardholder’s death. Furthermore, SSA mustemploy effective front-end controls in its

enumeration process. Likewise, additionaltechniques, such as data mining, biometrics,and enhanced systems controls, are critical inthe fight against SSN misuse.

To effectively combat SSN misuse, we believe SSA should

• establish a reasonable threshold for thenumber of replacement SSN cards anindividual may obtain during a year andover a lifetime,

• expedite systems controls that wouldinterrupt SSN assignment when SSAmails multiple cards to common addressesor when parents claim an improbably

large number of children,

• continue to address identified weaknesseswithin its information securityenvironment to better safeguard SSNs,and

• continue to educate SSA staff aboutcounterfeit documents.

Integrity of the Earnings Process

The integrity of the SSN is also related toSSA’s process for posting workers’ earnings.The proper posting of earnings ensures thateligible individuals receive the full retirement,survivor and/or disability benefits due them.If earnings information is reported incorrectlyor not reported at all, SSA cannot ensure alleligible individuals are receiving the correct payment amounts. In addition, SSA’sdisability programs under the DisabilityInsurance (DI) and Supplemental SecurityIncome (SSI) provisions depend on thisearnings information to determine (1) whether an individual is eligible for benefits and(2) the size of the disability payment.

SSA spends scarce resources trying to correctthe earnings data when incorrect informationis reported. The Earnings Suspense File(ESF) is the Agency’s record of annual wage




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reports for which wage earners’ names andSSNs fail to match SSA’s records. Between1937 and 2000, the ESF grew to representabout $374 billion in wages, which includedapproximately 236 million wage items with

an invalid name and SSN combination. As of July 2002, SSA had posted 9.6 million wageitems to the ESF for Tax Year 2000,representing about $49 billion in wages.

While SSA has limited control over thefactors that cause the volume of erroneouswage reports submitted each year, there arestill areas where SSA can improve its processes. SSA can improve wage reporting by educating employers on reporting criteria,identifying and resolving employer reporting problems, and encouraging greater use of theAgency’s SSN verification programs. SSAalso needs to improve coordination with other Federal agencies with separate, yet related,mandates. For example, SSA’s ability toimprove wage reporting is related to theInternal Revenue Service’s failure to sanctionemployers for submitting invalid wage data.It is also related to the complicated employer procedures the Bureau of Citizenship andImmigration Services uses to verify eligibleemployees.

Social Security Number Integrity Protection

Team

Finally, pending funding, we will beestablishing an SSN Integrity ProtectionTeam (Team) to address the escalating issueof SSN misuse. The Team is an integratedapproach that combines the talents of our auditors, investigators, computer specialists,

analysts, and attorneys. In addition tosupporting homeland security initiatives, theTeam will focus its efforts on

• identifying patterns and trends of SSNmisuse;

• locating systemic weaknesses thatcontribute to SSN misuse, such as in theenumeration and earnings-related processes;

• recommending legislative or other

corrective actions to ensure the SSN’sintegrity; and

• pursuing criminal and civil enforcement provisions for individuals misusing SSNs.

This Team will also partner with external private and public sector organizations notonly to educate, but to pursue mutually beneficial activities to prevent and detectfraudulent use of SSNs.




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M ANAGEMENT OF THE

D ISABILITY P ROCESS

SSA has tested several improvements to thedisability claims process. To date, these

initiatives have not resulted in significant improvement. In January 2003, GAO added

the modernizing of Federal disability programs, to include SSA’s disability

programs, to its high-risk list.

SSA administers the DI and SSI programsthat provide benefits based on disability.Most disability claims are initially processedthrough a network of Social Security fieldoffices and State Disability Determination

Services (DDS). SSA representatives in thefield offices are responsible for obtainingapplications for disability benefits andverifying non-medical eligibilityrequirements, which may include age,employment, marital status, or Social Securitycoverage information. After initial processing, the field office sends the case to aDDS for evaluation of disability.

The DDSs, which SSA fully funds, are Stateagencies responsible for developing medicalevidence and rendering the determination of whether the claimant is disabled or blind.After the DDS makes the disabilitydetermination, it returns the case to the fieldoffice for appropriate action depending onwhether the claim is allowed or denied. InFY 2002, over 2 million initial disabilityclaims were processed, and the average processing time was 104 days.

Once SSA establishes an individual is eligible

for disability benefits under either the DI or SSI program, the Agency turns its effortstoward ensuring the individual continues toreceive benefits only as long as SSA’seligibility criteria are met. Disability benefitswill not continue if any of the followingoccur:

• legislation or Federal regulations rescind a prior disabling condition from qualifyingfor benefits,

• a child turns 18 years old and is no longer considered disabled under adult criteria,

• an individual returns to work and hasincome over SSA’s allowable amount, or

• a continuing disability review shows theindividual is no longer disabled.

SSA’s Office of Hearings and Appeals(OHA) is responsible for holding hearingsand issuing decisions in SSA’s appeals process. OHA’s field structure consists of 10 regional offices and 140 hearing offices.

Administrative law judges (ALJ) holdhearings and issue decisions in hearing officesnationwide. In FY 2002, hearing offices processed over 500,000 cases, and theaverage processing time was 336 days.

The Appeals Council is the final level of administrative review for claims filed under SSA’s disability programs. The AppealsCouncil reviews ALJ decisions and dismissalsupon the claimant’s timely request for review.

In FY 2002, the Appeals Council processed115,467 cases, and the average processingtime was 412 days.

Over the last several years, SSA has testedimprovements to the disability claims processas a result of concerns about the timelinessand quality of customer service. Thedisability improvements combine initiativesthat have been tested and piloted and includeall levels of eligibility determination— beginning with State DDSs and going throughthe hearings and appeals processes.




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To date, these initiatives have not resulted insignificant improvements in the disabilityclaims process, and, in January 2003, GAOadded the modernizing of Federal disability programs, including SSA’s, to its 2003 high-

risk list. The Commissioner recentlyannounced several decisions on the future of SSA’s disability process. This included theCommissioner’s decisions to

• pursue the expansion of the Single-Decision Maker authority nationwide,

• end the requirements for the claimantconference in sites testing the prototypedisability process,

• evaluate the elimination of thereconsideration level of the claims processnationwide,

• make additional improvements to thehearings process, and

• implement an Electronic DisabilitySystem by 2004.

SSA reports that its short-term initiatives haveimproved the hearings process. The short-term initiatives include expedited techniquesfor the review of cases and technologyenhancements designed to improve thetimeliness of decisions. Furthermore, SSAexpects the electronic disability system to provide OHA a more efficient and effectivecase processing system when implemented.

Disability Fraud

Fraud is an inherent risk in SSA’s disability programs. Some unscrupulous people viewSSA’s disability benefits as money waiting to be taken. A key risk factor in the disability program is individuals who feign or exaggerate symptoms to become eligible for disability benefits. Another key risk factor isthe monitoring of medical improvements for

disabled individuals to ensure thoseindividuals who are no longer disabled areremoved from the disability roles.

SSA, in conjunction with our office, has takenan active role in addressing the integrity of the disability programs through theCooperative Disability Investigations (CDI) program. The CDI program’s mission is toobtain evidence that can resolve questions of fraud in SSA’s disability programs. SSA’sOffices of Operations, Disability Programs,and Disability Determinations along with theOIG manage the CDI program. There are17 CDI units operating in 16 States. FromOctober 1, 2002 through March 31, 2003, theCDI units saved SSA about $44 million byidentifying fraud and abuse in the disability program before benefits were paid.




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I MPROPER P AYMENTS

Determining and paying accurate and timely program benefits are primary commitments of SSA, along with good stewardship of the trust

fund and the General Revenue fund .

SSA is responsible for issuing benefit payments under the Old-Age, Survivors, andDisability Insurance (OASDI) and SSI programs. In FY 2002, SSA issued$483 billion in benefit payments to53.1 million beneficiaries. Considering thevolume and amount of payments SSA makeseach month, even the slightest error in theoverall process can result in millions of dollars in over- or underpayments.

Improper payments are defined as paymentsthat should not have been made or were madefor incorrect amounts. Examples of improper payments include inadvertent errors, payments for unsupported or inadequatelysupported claims, payments for services notrendered, or payments to ineligible beneficiaries. The risk of improper paymentsincreases in programs with (1) a significantvolume of transactions, (2) complex criteriafor computing payments, and/or (3) anoveremphasis on expediting payments. SinceSSA is responsible for issuing timely benefit payments for complex entitlement programsto over 50 million individuals, SSA is at-risk of making significant improper payments.

The President and Congress have expressedinterest in measuring the universe of improper payments within the Government.Specifically, in August 2001, OMB publishedthe FY 2002 PMA, which included a

Government-wide initiative for improvingfinancial performance. In November 2002,the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 was enacted, and OMB issued guidancein May 2003 on implementing this new law.

Under this law, agencies that administer programs where the risk of erroneous payments is significant2 must estimate their annual amount of improper payments andreport this information in their Performance

and Accountability Report for FYs ending onor after September 30, 2004. OMB will usethis information while working with theagencies to establish goals for reducingerroneous payments for each program.

SSA and the OIG have had on-goingdiscussions on improper payments—on suchissues as detected vs. undetected improper payments and avoidable overpayments vs.unavoidable overpayments which are outsidethe Agency’s control and a “cost of doing business.” In August 2003, OMB issuedspecific guidance to SSA to only includeavoidable overpayments in the Agency’simproper payment estimate because these payments could be reduced through changesin administrative actions. Unavoidableoverpayments that result from legal or policyrequirements are not to be included in SSA’simproper payment estimate.

In September 2003, the OIG issued an Issue

Paper on improper payments—where weanalyzed overpayments from SSA, other Federal agencies, and private sector disabilityinsurers. Based on this work, we plan toinitiate a comprehensive and statistically validreview in FY 2004 to quantify the amount of undetected overpayments SSA’s disability programs—with a focus on the four diagnosisgroups we believe (based on prior audit andinvestigative work) are problematic.Additionally, preliminary results from one of

our audits at the end of FY 2003 showsignificant overpayments—related to earnings by disabled beneficiaries—went undetected by SSA. This work and other studies—such

2 OMB defines significant overpayments as annualoverpayments that exceed both 2.5 percent of program payments and $10 million.




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as one to assess whether overpayment waiverswere appropriate—will be completed and/or initiated in FY 2004 and beyond to addressthe issue of improper payments.

SSA has undertaken many projects to identifyand improve areas where it could do more toreduce improper payments and/or recover amounts overpaid. Specifically, SSA has been working to improve its ability to preventover- and underpayments by obtaining beneficiary information from independentsources sooner and/or using technology moreeffectively. In this regard, SSA has initiatednew computer matching agreements, obtainedon-line access to wage and income data, andimplemented improvements in its debtrecovery program.

Working with SSA, we have made greatstrides in reducing benefit payments to prisoners and SSI payments to fugitive felons,and these efforts continue. However,improper payments, including those todeceased beneficiaries, students, andindividuals receiving State workers’compensation benefits, continue to drain theSocial Security trust fund.




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BUDGET AND P ERFORMANCE

I NTEGRATION

Our work has demonstrated that SSA is generally committed to the production and

use of reliable performance and financial management data, but some improvementswould further enhance SSA’s ability to

produce accurate and actionablemanagement information.

This area encompasses SSA’s efforts to provide timely, useful and reliable data toassist internal and external decisionmakers ineffectively managing Agency programs, aswell as both evaluating performance andensuring the validity and reliability of

performance, budgeting, and financial data.

To effectively meet its mission, manage its programs, and report on its performance, SSAneeds sound performance and financial data.Congress, other external interested parties,and the general public also want sound data tomonitor and evaluate SSA’s performance.SSA relies primarily on internally generateddata to manage the information it uses toadminister its programs and report to

Congress and the public. The necessity for good internal data Governmentwide hasresulted in the passage of several laws andregulations to make Government moreaccountable. The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, as amended; the Government Management Reform Act of 1994; and the

Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) were passed to create anenvironment of greater accountability withinFederal agencies.

In accordance with GPRA, SSA has set forthits mission and strategic goals in 5-year strategic plans, established yearly targets in itsannual performance plans, and reported on its performance in its annual performance

reports. Each year, we conduct audits toassess the reliability of SSA’s performancedata and evaluate the extent to which SSA’s performance plan describes its planned andactual performance meaningfully.

In addition to performance audits, we performand monitor audits of SSA’s financialstatements and other financial-related auditsof SSA’s operations. Our work includescomprehensive technical and administrativeoversight of the annual audit of SSA’sfinancial statements, performed by anindependent public accountant. We also perform reviews of the quality of single auditsconducted by State auditors and publicaccounting firms. Additionally, we conductadministrative cost audits of State DDSs,which assist SSA with its disability workload.This body of work helps assess the validityand reliability of the financial data SSA relieson to manage its programs and meet itsmission.

The integrity of SSA’s programs and thosethat rely on information from SSA depend onthe reliability and quality of the Agency’sdata. External data and data exchanges arecritical to SSA’s programs and are the focusof many of our audits. Therefore, it isimperative that SSA’s data be reliable.

Considering the critical role of the underlyingdata in all of SSA’s performance, financial,

and data-sharing activities, it is crucial thatthe Agency have clear processes in place toensure the reliability and integrity of its data.




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C RITICAL I NFRASTRUCTURE

P ROTECTION AND SYSTEMS

S ECURITY

SSA’s information security challenge is to

understand and mitigate systemvulnerabilities.

The Government has a major responsibilityfor public health and safety. Dramatic andwidespread harm would result should itssystems be compromised. Therefore, it isimperative that the Nation’s criticalinformation infrastructure, which is essentialto the operations of the economy andGovernment, be protected. These systems

include, but are not limited to the following.

• Telecommunications

• Energy

• Banking and finance

• Transportation

• Water systems

• Facility and personnel security

•

Emergency services, both Federal and private sector

Many of the Nation’s critical infrastructureshave historically been physically and logicallyseparate systems that had littleinterdependence. Through advances ininformation technology and improvedefficiency, however, these infrastructureshave become increasingly automated andinterconnected. These same advances have

created new vulnerabilities to equipmentfailures, human error, weather and other natural disasters, and physical cyber-attacks.

Addressing these vulnerabilities will requireflexible, evolutionary approaches that spanthe public and private sectors and protect bothdomestic and international security.

Presidential Decision Directive 63, issued in1998, requires that Federal agencies identifyand protect their critical infrastructure andassets. The information SSA needs toconduct its mission is one of its most valuable

assets. The Agency is depending ontechnology to meet the challenges of increasing workloads with fewer resources. A physically and technologically secure Agencyinformation infrastructure is a fundamentalrequirement.

Growth in computer interconnectivity brings aheightened risk of disrupting or sabotagingcritical operations, reading or copyingsensitive data, and tampering with critical processes. Those who wish to disrupt or sabotage critical operations have more toolsthan ever.

SSA’s information security challenge is tounderstand and mitigate systemvulnerabilities. At SSA, this means ensuringits critical information infrastructure, such asaccess to the Internet and the networks, issecure. By improving systems security andcontrols, SSA will be able to use current andfuture technology more effectively to fulfill

the public’s needs. The public will not useelectronic access to SSA services if it doesnot believe those systems are secure.

SSA addresses critical informationinfrastructure and systems security in avariety of ways. It created a CriticalInfrastructure Protection work group thatcontinually works toward compliance withPresidential Decision Directive 63. SSA hasseveral other components throughout the

organization that handle systems securityincluding the newly created Office of Information Technology Security Policywithin the Office of the Chief InformationOfficer. SSA also routinely releases outsecurity advisories to its employees and hashired outside contractors to provide expertisein this area.




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S ERVICE D ELIVERY

Given the complexity of the Agency’s programs, the billions of dollars in paymentsat stake, and the millions of citizens who relyon SSA, we must ensure that quality, timely,and appropriate services are consistently

provided to the public-at-large.

The delivery of service to the American people poses a significant challenge that SSAis compelled to address. The Agency’s goalof “service” encompasses traditional andelectronic services to applicants for benefits, beneficiaries and the general public. It alsoincludes services to and from States, other agencies, third parties, employers, and other

organizations including financial institutionsand medical providers. This goal supports thedelivery of “citizen-centered” services anduse of “E-Government,” and therefore affordsSSA opportunities to advance these levels of service. Given the complexity of theAgency’s programs, the billions of dollars in payments at stake, and the millions of citizenswho rely on SSA, we must ensure thatquality, timely, and appropriate services areconsistently provided to the public-at-large.

E-Government Challenges

The PMA also calls for improved servicedelivery through the use of E-Government increating more cost-effective and efficientways to provide service to citizens. Theincreased use of E-Government will beessential to help address the Agency’sexpected future loss of institutionalknowledge accompanied by the increasedservices expected with the aging of the baby- boom generation. Future service deliverychallenges include providing electronicservices over the Internet and telephone,24 hours a day, 7 days a week. It will be thenorm for business transactions to be processed electronically.

By 2005, SSA is expected to make 60 percentof its customer-initiated services availablethrough automated telephone services or theInternet. The Agency recently beganallowing the public to file DI claims through

the Internet to help achieve its servicedelivery goals. SSA expects to begin anation-wide roll-out of its ElectronicDisability System in 2004. There are alwaysrisks involved in conducting electroniccommerce, despite the Agency’s efforts toidentify and mitigate them. SSA will have tokeep privacy and security concerns at theforefront of its planning efforts.

Representative Payee Challenges

A specific challenge in this area ismaintaining the integrity of the representative payee process. When SSA determines a beneficiary cannot manage his/her benefits,SSA selects a representative payee, who mustuse the payments for the beneficiary’s benefit.There are about 5.3 million representative payees who manage benefit payments for 6.7 million beneficiaries. Whilerepresentative payees provide a valuableservice for beneficiaries, SSA must provide

appropriate safeguards to ensure they meettheir responsibilities to the beneficiaries theyserve.




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Since FY 2001, we have completed numerousaudits of representative payees. Our auditsidentified

• deficiencies with the financial

management of, and accounting for, benefit receipts and disbursements;

• vulnerabilities in the safeguarding of beneficiary payments;

• poor monitoring and reporting to SSA of changes in beneficiary circumstances;

• inappropriate handling of beneficiary-conserved funds; and

• improper charging of fees.

Human Capital Challenges

Many agencies, including SSA, share thechallenge to address human capital shortfalls.The critical loss of institutional skills andknowledge, combined with greatly increasedworkloads at a time when the baby-boomgeneration will require its services, must be

addressed by succession planning, strongrecruitment efforts, and the effective use of technology as previously discussed.

In January 2001, GAO added strategic humancapital management to its list of high-risk Federal programs and operations. By 2010,workloads are anticipated to increase tounprecedented volumes. Along with theworkload increase, the incredible pace of technological change will have a profoundimpact on both the public’s expectations and

SSA’s ability to meet those expectations.

At current staffing levels, SSA finds itdifficult to maintain an acceptable level of service, especially in its most complicatedworkloads. After downsizing and curtailinginvestments in human capital (people), the

Government is facing a major challenge tomeet the current and emerging needs of the Nation’s citizens.

Documents

Social Security: A-44-03-23092