Social legislation digested cases

8/14/2019 Social legislation digested cases

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-42808 January 31, 1989

ROSARIO VDA. DE SUANES, petitioner,vs.

THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES(Bureau of Public Highways), respondents.

Dante Q. Barbosa for petitioner.

Jose A. Oliveros for respondent Provincial Engineer of Batangas.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

FELICIANO,J.:

The petitioner asks the Court to review and set aside the decision dated 31 December 1975 of

the Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC) R04-WC Case No. 163691, entitled Rosario

Vda. de Suanes, claimant versus Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Highways),

respondent.

Artemio A. Suanes was a government employee for most of his life. From 1933 to 1945, he

served as market collector of the Municipal Government of the Municipality of Rosario,

Batangas. He served as a Municipal Councilor in Rosario, Batangas from 1956 to 1959. From 2

January 1964 until 30 June 1970, Artemio was a construction capatazof the Bureau of Public

Highways (BPH), Batangas Provincial Office. His Service Record1further shows that thereafter,

from 1 July 1970 up to the time of his death on 21 June 1973. Artemio Suanes was a

constructioncapataz in the Office of the Provincial Engineer, Batangas Province. The certificate

of death issued by Dr. Salvacion Altamira of the Magsino General Hospital in Lipa City,

Batangas, attributed Artemio's demise to 'Cardio-respiratory Arrest due to Cerebrovascular

Accident'.2

On 5 March 1975, petitioner, as surviving spouse of Artemio Suanes, filed with Regional Office

No. IV of the Workmen's Compensation Unit (WCU), Department of Labor, a claim for

compensation under the applicable provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No.

3428, as amended). In this claim, the decedent's illness was described as "Internal Hemorrhage

due to Hypertension.3Petitioner's claim was referred by the WCU to the BPH which, however,

controverted the claim of petitioner. In a letter dated 26 June 1975, BPH asserted that there

was "[l]ack of causative relation of the illness alleged in [petitioner's] claim with the nature of

the decedent's employment" and that petitioner had failed to comply with the requirements of

Section 24, Act No. 3428, as amended, regarding the giving of notice and subsequent filing ofclaim.

BPH, further, asked the WCU Regional Officeto dismiss petitioner's claim upon the ground that

claim had been filed against the wrong party, Artemio's employer at the time of his death being

the Provincial Engineer's Office of the Provincial Government of Batangas, rather than the BPH.


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In an Order dated 29 August 1975, the Referee of the WCU dismissed petitioner's claim "for

lack of interest, claimant having failed to appear for the scheduled hearing despite

notice.4Petitioner moved,

5on 24 September 1975, to set aside the order of dismissal, denying

that she had lost interest in the prosecution of her claim and asserting that she had left her old

address at No. 73-J Panay Ave., Quezon City having moved to a new address at 2829 Felix

Huertas St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, and that she had left her new forwarding address at her oldresidence but that apparently no one had received the WCU notice of hearing or that no one at

the old address had informed the process server of the claimant's new address.

The respondent Commission denied petitioner's Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal

upon the ground that that Motion had not been accompanied by an affidavit of merits setting

forth the facts constituting fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence as required under

the Rules of the Commission.6

Hence, the present Petition, which was filed on 15 March 1976.

Petitioner claims that respondent Commission erred in denying her Motion to Set Aside the

Order of Dismissal, since there was no law which required an affidavit of merits to be attached

to her Motion, and that she had a valid claim for death benefits considering that at the time of

her husband's death, he was a permanent employee of the BPH and considering further that

the compensable nature of his death had not been effectively controverted by the BPH. The

BPH upon the other hand, took the position that an affidavit of merits was an indispensable

requirement for setting aside the order of dismissal and that, in any case, there was no

employer-employee relationship between Artemio Suanes and the BPH at the time of the

former's death since he was then employed by the office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas

Province.

Nine years later, on 29 February 1985, this Court issued a Resolution which, after reciting very

briefly the facts described above, went on to state that:

A perusal of the copies of the Statement of Service Record in the government of

the late Artemio A. Suanes and of the Information for Membership Insurance in

the Government Service Insurance System shows that said Artemio A. Suanes

was employed as construction capataz of the Provincial Engineer's Office of

Batangas and not an employee of respondent Bureau of Public Highways,

particularly the Office of the Highways District Engineer in Batangas.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to consider the Provincial Engineer of

Batangas as IMPLEADED party respondent,to direct the Clerk of Court to

FURNISH him with a copy of the Petition for Review and to REQUIRE him to file a

comment thereon within ten (10) days from receipt. ... (Emphasis supplied)

We consider first the procedural issue of whether or not petitioner's Motion to Set Aside the

Order of Dismissal issued by the WCC Referee was properly denied simply upon the ground that

it had not been accompanied by an affidavit of merits.

We believe that this issue has to be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Section 3 of Rule 22 of

the Rules of the respondent Commission provides as follows:

Sec. 3. Time for Filing Petition; Contents and Verification.The petition under

Section I hereof must be verified, filed within thirty (30) days after the petitioner

learns-of the decision, award, or order or other proceedings sought to be set

aside and not more than three (3) months after such decision or award was

entered or such proceedings were taken, and must be accompanied with (sic)


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affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake' or excusable negligence relied

upon and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of

action or defense, as the case may be.

x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no dispute that petitioner did not attach an affidavit of merits to her Motion to Set

Aside the Order of Dismissal. It scarcely needs to be pointed out, however, that the basic

purpose of such a requirement was to enable the Commission to evaluate the merits of the

Motion or Petition to set aside the dismissal order. Petitioner did clearly allege in her Motion

the grounds she relied upon for setting aside the order dismissing her claim for failure to attend

the scheduled hearing: (a) she had failed to attend the scheduled hearing because the notice of

said hearing was sent to her old address and not to her new forwarding address and hence was

not received by her; and (b) her husband was a permanent employee of the BPH whose death

was compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. To our mind, the allegations in

petitioner's Motion constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 3 of

Rule 22 of the Commission's Rules. That petitioner's Motion was not a sworn motion is not a

fatal defect in the circumstances of this case. There is no suggestion in the record that

petitioner had not in fact changed her address or that she had not left her forwarding address

at her old residence. If the Commission felt that an affidavit of merit was absolutely

indispensable to enable it to resolve petitioner's Motion, then the Commission should have

required petitioner to supplement her Motion with an affidavit of merit or to simply verify her

Motion, instead of dismissing that Motion out of hand. We believe that there is here an

appropriate occasion for invoking the principle that rules should not be so interpreted as to

"sacrifice substantial rights in the sophisticated altar of technicalities with [consequent]

impairment of [the] sacred principle of justice,7a principle which is embodied in the Rules of

the Commission itself. Section 1 of Rule 10 of the Commission provides as follows:

Rule 10. General Rule to Govern Proceedings

Section 1. The hearing, investigation and determination of any question or

controversy in workmen's compensation cases shall be without regard to

technicalities, legal forms and technical rules on evidence. Substantial evidence

shall be sufficient to support a decision, order or award.

The next issue to be resolved relates to the legal consequences if any, of the fact that

petitioner's claim had been originally filed against "the Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of

Public Highways)' and not against the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province,

the employer of Artemio Suanes at the time of his death.

Once more, we believe that this issue should be resolved in favor of petitioner, in line with the

principle which enjoins a liberal rather than a technical view of pleading and procedure in

Workmen's Compensation cases. It is true that the petitioner's original claim (on a

mimeographed form of the Workmen's Compensation Commission) named the BPH as the

decedent's employer. However, in her Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal, petitioner

designated the Republic of the Philippines. as the respondent, while parenthetically referring to

the Bureau of Public Highways, as part of the caption which the Commission itself had adopted

in R04-WC Case No. 163691. It is appropriate to recall that the "Republic of the Philippines" or"Government of the Republic of the Philippines" is a comprehensive term which has been

defined in Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, in the following manner:

xxx xxx xxx


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The Government of the Republic of the Philippines' is a term which refers to the

corporate governmental entity through which the function of government are

exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears

from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made

effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the central Government or the

provincial or municipal branches or other form of local government.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the BPH, which is an instrumentality of the Central or National Government and the

Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas, and office under the supervision of the Chief

Executive Officer (the Governor) of the Province of Batangas, are both governmental offices

and both are embraced in the term Republic of the Philippines,' for purposes of the Workmen's

Compensation Act. The funds of the BPH and the fund of the Office of the Provincial Engineer of

Batangas, are equally government funds.

It must be recalled that the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act are extended not only

to employees in the private sector but also to all officials and employees of both the national

government and of provincial, municipal and other local governments. Section 3 of Act No.

3812, as amended, provides:

Section 3.Applicable to Government. This Act shall also be applicable to all

officials, employees and laborers in the service of the National Government and

its political subdivisions and instrumentalities: Provided, however, that officials,

laborers and employees insured with the Government Service Insurance System,and their dependents when entitled to the benefits of the said insurance system

shall, in addition to the same, be entitled to the benefits granted by this Act.'

(Italics supplied)

The BPH was quite aware of the fact that Artemio Suanes, previously an employee of the BPH,

was, just before his death, an employee of the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas

Province. The BPH conveyed this fact to the respondent Commission, when it (BPH) notified the

Commission through the Office of the Solicitor General of the filing of the claim against the

BPH. In a "third indorsement, August 6, 1975' to the WCU, the BPH said:

Respectfully returned thru the Honorable Solicitor General, Department of

Justice, Manila, to the Chief, Workmen's Compensation Section, Department of

Labor, Regional Office No. IV, Manila, the within papers relative to the claim for

compensation in R04-WC Cass No. 16391, filed by Mrs. ROSARIO VDA. DE

SUANES, widow of ARTEMIO SUANES, alleged to be a former

ConstructionCapataz under the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Batangas

City, inviting attention to the 2nd indorsement dated July 25, 1975 of the District

Engineer of Batangas City informing that the decedent was an employee of the

Batangas Provincial Engineer's Office at the time of his death.

It is informed that officials and employees of the Provincial Engineer's Office arenot under the administrative jurisdiction of this Department but under the

Executive Head of the Province to which they are assigned.

In view thereof, it is requested that steps be taken to dismiss the case against

the Republic of the Philippines (BPH) for lack of employee-employer relationship.


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xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Since both the BPH and the WCU are presumed to know the law-in this case, the Workmen's

Compensation statute including Section 3 thereof-one or the other office or the Office of theSolicitor General, should have notified the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas

Province of the filing of the claim by petitioner and referred such claim to that office. Instead,

the BPH simply asked for the dismissal of the case against the BPH 'for lack of employee-

employer relationship" and, worse, neglected to inform petitioner of the asserted lack of an

employer-employee relationship between the decedent and the BPH and where the claim

should have been filed. In fact, petitioner's claim was denied by the Referee, as already noted,

not on the ground of lack of an employer-employee relationship between the BPH and Artemio

Suanes but rather because of petitioner's failure to attend a scheduled hearing and her failure

to attach to her Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal an affidavit of merits. Both the

respondent Commission and the WCU Referee failed to inform petitioner of her error in

designating the specific employer of her deceased husband, and in effect waited for this Court

to issue its Resolution of 29 February 1985 considering the Provincial Engineer of Batangas as

having been impleaded as a party respondent.

In view of the foregoing circumstances and considering particularly that no prejudice was

sustained by the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province by the misdirecting of

petitioner's claim, we hold that the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province may

be held liable on petitioner's claim.

The respondent Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province, in his Comment dated 8 April 1985,

asserts that petitioner's claim against his office has already prescribed. The ordinary rule is thatthe statutory right to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act prescribes in ten

(10) years8counted from the time of accrual of the claim, in this case from the time of the

death of Artemio Suanes. Artemio Suanes died, as noted earlier, on 21 June 1973; the court

impleaded the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province on 29 February 1985, i.e.,

about twelve (12) years later. We do not, however, believe that petitioner's claim may be so

cavalierly defeated, given the circumstances of this case. In the first place, petitioner's original

claim was filed, again as already noted, on 5, March 1975. While this original claim designated

the wrong employer, we believe that, given the insistent demands of substantial justice in this

case, such original claim should be regarded, as we hereby so regard it, as having effectively

tolled the running of the prescriptive period. We note that the petitioner lost no time in filing

her Petition for Review with this Court on 15 March 1976 when her claim was denied by the

respondent Commission on 13 December 1975. This Court was able formally to rectify the

erroneous designation of the respondent BPH only after almost nine (9) years from filing of the

Petition for Review. Under the principle ofnuncpro tunc, we do not believe that this failure to

act earlier on the part on the Court itself may be allowed to prejudice the petitioner. The

defense of prescription must, therefore, be rejected.

Turning, finally, to the merits of petitioner's claim, there is no dispute about the fact that

Artemio's ailment supervened in the course of his employment either with the BPH or the

Office of the Batangas Provincial Engineer. It is well settled that, under the Workmen's

Compensation Act,9petitioner is accordingly relieved of the burden of proving causationbetween the illness and the employment in view of the legal presumption that said illness arose

out of the decedent's employment.10

The burden of proving non-compensability of the cause of

death is shifted to the employer. Respondent Batangas Provincial Engineer had failed to

discharge this burden. Indeed, none of the respondents even attempted to present any

evidence to rebut the presumption of compensability; all of them chose to rely upon the formal

defenses discussed above. But those defenses do not constitute evidence to overthrow the


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statutory presumption. In legal effect, no evidence was introduced by the respondents to offset

that legal presumption. The Court, therefore, is left with no alternative but to rule in favor of

petitioner's claim.11

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 31 December 1975 of respondent Workmen's Compensation

Commission is hereby REVERSED. The Petitioner is hereby AWARDED the Pl,500.00 claimed asreimbursement for the doctors, medical and hospital bills incurred in connection with the

decedent's last illness, in addition to any other applicable death benefits under Act No. 3428, as

amended. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.


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SUANES VS WCC

Facts:

The employee died on June 21, 1973. The claim for compensation was filed on March 5, 1975.

The claim, however, designated the wrong employer, who was impleaded about 12 years later.

Ruling:

The claim may not be so cavalierly defeated. Ordinarily, the statutory right to compensation

under the workmens compensation act prescribes in 10 years counted from the nature

of accrual of the claim from the time of the death of the employee. But where the

original claim designated the wrong employer, given the insistent demands substantial

justice, such original claim should be regarded as having effectively tolled the running of

the prescriptive period. The defense of prescription must therefore be rejected.

In line with ruling, the ECC has laid down the rule that

Notice in any form by the employer to the system of any compensable contingency

within 3 years from accrual of the cause of action suspends the running of the

prescriptive period.


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SUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46443 June 28, 1988

NONATO ROSALES, petitioner,vs.

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEMand The DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PADILLA,J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Employees' Compensation

Commission, dated 17 April 1977, affirming in totothe ruling of the Employees' Compensation

Department of the Government Service Insurance System, dated 23 August 1976, which denied

petitioner's claim for benefits.

Petitioner, at the time of his retirement on 31 July 1976, was an employee of the Development

Bank of the Philippines, Ilagan, Isabela, specifically, a Collateral and File Clerk. Prior to holding

said position, he held the positions of clerk-typist, clerk-stenographer and collection clerk,

respectively, in the same bank.

On 6 to 10 April 1976, petitioner was confined in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital where

his ailment was diagnosed as Rheumatoid Arthritis. Following his disability, petitioner filed on

12 August 1976 with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for employees'

compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626. His application was denied on 23 August

1976.1Petitioner twice moved to reconsider the denial of his claim with the GSIS, but the latter

denied both motions for reconsideration. On appeal to the Employees' Compensation

Commission (ECC), the order of denial was affirmed in toto.2Hence, the instant petition.

In his three-page petition, petitioner raises as errors allegedly committed by the ECC, the

following:

A. That respondent Commission have acted with grave abuse of discretion when

it declared that petitioners ailment, DIAGNOSED as 'Rheumatoid Arthritis is not

an occupational disease;

B. Likewise, respondent Commission has acted with grave abuse of discretion

when it declared that petitioner miserably failed to offer proofs substantial

enough to show that such disease arose or has aggravated in the course of his

employment due to working conditions;

C. Finally, respondent Commission has acted in excess of its jurisdiction indenying altogether petitioner's compensation benefits.

and contends that the decision of the GSIS, thru its Employees' Compensation Department, and

that of the ECC are "not in accord with the applicable decisions of this Tribunal and in violative

to (violation of) the spirit of Social Legislations which are designed for the benefit of retiring

employees of the government."3


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The petition is without merit.

Petitioner filed his claim under PD No. 626 which took effect on 1 January 1975. Under said law,

for an illness to be compensable, it must be done definitely accepted as an occupational disease

listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the

employee that the risk of contracting the same was increased by working conditions.4

The ECC denied the claim of petitioner for compensation on the ground that the

ailment, Rheumatoid Arthritis, was not an occupational disease, and that, as required by law,

petitioner failed to show proof that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his

working conditions. We quote from the assailed decision:

Perusal of the evidence on record in the instant claim will disclose the miserable

failure of the appellant to discharge the burden required of him by the new law

on employees' compensation. Much as we may postulate the Identity of

liberality, we cannot go so far as to cast favorable reflection on what is otherwise

a claim clearly lacking of support in evidence, which is mandatory requisite under

PD No. 626, as amended, for finding the ailment in question as an occupational

disease, or that, its contraction was the result of the appellants' working

conditions, it follows then that the appealed decision is in accordance with the

law and cannot be disturbed.5

In denying, petitioner's claim, the ECC properly applied PD No. 626.

In workmen's compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date on which the

claimant contracted his illness.6Thus, where an ailment supervened before the new Labor

Code took effect, the governing law is the old Workmen's Compensation Act. On the otherhand, were an ailment occured after 1 January 1975, the new law on Employees' Compensation

applies.7Applying the foregoing rules to the present case, we find nothing in the allegations as

to when petitioner contracted the disease. For failure to do so, and having filed his claim under

PD No. 626, the presumption is that he contracted the disease after the effectivity of PD No.

626 on 1 January 1975. The ECC, therefore, in rendering the assailed decision and resolution,

denying petitioner's claim, could not be faulted in applying the governing law, which is PD No.

626.

Moreover, the doctrine enunciated by this Court in Caparas vs. WCC, et al.,8cited by petitioner

in his motion for reconsideration of the ruling of the Employees' Compensation Department of

the GSIS, is not applicable in the present case. In that case, the Court granted compensation, on

the basis of the old Workmen's Compensation Act, it appearing that claimant contracted the

disease prior to the effectivity of PD No. 626.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. With costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., concur in the result.


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ROSALES VS ECC

Facts:

Petitioner, at the time of his retirement on 31 July 1976, was an employee of theDevelopment Bank of the Philippines, Ilagan, Isabela, specifically, a Collateral and File

Clerk.

Prior to holding said position, he held the positions of clerk-typist, clerk-stenographerand collection clerk, respectively, in the same bank.

On 6 to 10 April 1976, petitioner was confined in the University of Santo Tomas Hospitalwhere his ailment was diagnosed as Rheumatoid Arthritis.

Following his disability, petitioner filed on 12 August 1976 with the Government ServiceInsurance System (GSIS) a claim for employees' compensation under Presidential Decree

No. 626. His application was denied on 23 August 1976.

1

Petitioner twice moved to reconsider the denial of his claim with the GSIS, but the

latter denied both motions for reconsideration. On appeal to the Employees'

Compensation Commission (ECC), the order of denial was affirmed in toto.

and contends that the decision of the GSIS, thru its Employees' CompensationDepartment, and that of the ECC are "not in accord with the applicable decisions of this

Tribunal and in violative to (violation of) the spirit of Social Legislations which are

designed for the benefit of retiring employees of the government."3

Ruling:

The petition is without merit. Petitioner filed his claim under PD No. 626 which took effect on 1 January 1975.

Under said law, for an illness to be compensable, it must be done definitely

accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness

caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of

contracting the same was increased by working conditions.4

The ECC denied the claim of petitioner for compensation on the ground that theailment, Rheumatoid Arthritis, was not an occupational disease, and that, as

required by law, petitioner failed to show proof that the risk of contracting thedisease was increased by his working conditions. We quote from the assailed

decision:

Perusal of the evidence on record in the instant claim will disclose the miserablefailure of the appellant to discharge the burden required of him by the new law

on employees' compensation. Much as we may postulate the Identity of

liberality, we cannot go so far as to cast favorable reflection on what is otherwise

a claim clearly lacking of support in evidence, which is mandatory requisite under

PD No. 626, as amended, for finding the ailment in question as an occupational

disease, or that, its contraction was the result of the appellants' working

conditions, it follows then that the appealed decision is in accordance with the

law and cannot be disturbed. 5

In denying, petitioner's claim, the ECC properly applied PD No. 626. In workmen's compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date

on which the claimant contracted his illness.6Thus, where an ailment

supervened before the new Labor Code took effect, the governing law is the old

Workmen's Compensation Act. On the other hand, were an ailment occured


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after 1 January 1975, the new law on Employees' Compensation

applies.7Applying the foregoing rules to the present case, we find nothing in the

allegations as to when petitioner contracted the disease. For failure to do so, and

having filed his claim under PD No. 626, the presumption is that he contracted

the disease after the effectivity of PD No. 626 on 1 January 1975. The ECC,

therefore, in rendering the assailed decision and resolution, denying petitioner'sclaim, could not be faulted in applying the governing law, which is PD No. 626.

Moreover, the doctrine enunciated by this Court in Caparas vs. WCC, etal.,

8cited by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration of the ruling of the

Employees' Compensation Department of the GSIS, is not applicable in the

present case. In that case, the Court granted compensation, on the basis of the

old Workmen's Compensation Act, it appearing that claimant contracted the

disease prior to the effectivity of PD No. 626.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. With costs against petitioner. In this case, the Court considered the claimant to have contracted his ailment

after January 1, 1975 and applied the new law on Employees' Compensation inview of the absence of any allegations on when the claimant got sick.


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SUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46556 May 28, 1988

NAPOLEON O. CARIN, petitioner,vs.

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCESYSTEM,respondents.

Napoleon O. Carin for petitioner.

The Chief Legal Officer (ECC) and The Government Corporate Counsel for respondents.

PADILLA,J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Employees' Compensation

Commission, dated 15 June 1977, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance

System which denied petitioner's claim for compensation.

Petitioner Napoleon O. Carin was a Special Counsel in the Fiscal's office of Cebu City. Sometime

in October 1975, he felt a severe pain in his left leg while getting the expedientesof casesscheduled for trial on that day. Petitioners illness was subsequently diagnosed

as ostemoyelitis. As recommended by his physician, petitioner underwent surgery at the Cebu

Doctor's Hospital. He was confined therein from 1 to 5 December 1975.

On 12 May 1976, petitioner filed a claim for income benefits for his disability under Presidential

Decree No. 626, as amended, with the Government Service Insurance System. His claim was

denied by the System on the ground that the cause of his disability was neither an occupational

disease nor caused by hs employment and that the risk of contracting the same was not

increased by his working conditions. Reconsideration of the claim's denial was likewise denied.

Petitioner appealed to the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission which, on 15June 1977, issued the assailed decision. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that his illness, chronic ostemoyelitis, although not an occupational disease

as enumerated in Presidential Decree No. 626, is nonetheless compensable, anchored on the

theoretical concept of "increased risk" as defined under Rule III, Section (b) of the

implementing rules of Presidential Decree No. 626. According to petitioner, he had presented

sufficient evidence to show that his sickness arose out of, and was caused by his employment

and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by his working conditions. The evidence

consisted of a report on his sickness, ostemoyelitis, which he submitted on 12 May 1976 to the

GSIS, together with the attending physician's report showing that he was working at the time ofthe illness and the affidavit of Assistant City Fiscal Felix Barral attesting to the fact that he

(petitioner) suffered the attack or pain in his left leg at the City Fiscal's office of Cebu City while

taking the expedientes for the day's scheduled trial.


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We sustain the finding of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission that

petitioner failed to submit substantial evidence to prove that his illness was caused by his

employment or that the risk of contracting it was increased by his working conditions.1

Under the new law on employees' compensation, or Presidential Decree No. 626, in case the

sickness or illness is not an occupational disease, as in the present case, to be compensable,proof must be adduced that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working

conditions.2

The evidence presented by petitioner does not, in any way, show a reasonable connection

between his ailment and the nature of his employment nor a direct causal relation between his

employment and the illness he suffered.

Although the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in compensation claims,3still,

petitioner failed to show with substantial evidence that his illness was reasonably work-

connected, to be entitled to compensation.4

Further, petitioner's contention that the rule of compensability under Presidential Decree No.

626, as amended, is a revival of the old law on workmen's compensation or Act 3428,

particularly Section 44 thereof, which recognized the presumption of compensability, is not

meritorious.

The principle of presumption of compensability no longer obtains under the new law on

Employees' Compensation.5

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Employees' Compensation

Commission, under review, is AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


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The principle of presumption of compensability no longer obtains under the newlaw on Employees' Compensation.

5

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Employees'Compensation Commission, under review, is AFFIRMED. With costs against the

petitioner.


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SUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-47414 May 23, 1988

ELIODORO T. ISCALA, petitioner,vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Department of Education & Culture, Bureau of PublicSchools), GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SERVICE SYSTEM, and the EMPLOYEES'COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.

Victorio L. Rodriguez for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SARMIENTO,J.:

A Motion for Partial Reconsideration of our decision promulgated on December 11, 1987, was

filed by the respondent Government Service Insurance System; by way of comment, the

correspondent Republic of the Philippines (Department of Education, Culture and Sports)

categorically interposed no objection to the motion.

We find the foregoing motion to be grounded on the doctrine that when GSIS is made to pay

for compensation benefits under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, it has a right of

reimbursement from the employer, which doctrine was laid down by this Court in Corales vs.

Employees' Compensation Commission (No. L-44063, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 501) and

reiterated in a number of subsequent cases including the very recent case of Reyes vs. ECC (No.

L-43828, March 19, 1988).

WHEREFORE, it is hereby resolved to GRANT the Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

Accordingly, our decision in this case is MODIFIED in that payment of compensation by the GSIS

to the petitioner shall be without prejudice to its right of reimbursement from the Department

of Education, Culture & Sports, the employer of the deceased Nena S. Iscala. As modified, the

decision will, therefore, read as follows, the modification being in bold:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Employees'

Compensation Commission dated October 12, 1977 denying petitioner's claim

for compensation for the death of Nena Iscala is hereby SET ASIDE and the GSIS

is hereby ordered to AWARD to the petitioner such compensation as provided by

the Workmen's Compensation Act without prejudice to its right of

reimbursement from the DECS. NO COSTS.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.


17/75

ISCALA VS REPUBLIC

Facts:

A Motion for Partial Reconsideration of our decision promulgated on December 11,1987, was filed by the respondent Government Service Insurance System; by way ofcomment, the correspondent Republic of the Philippines (Department of Education,

Culture and Sports) categorically interposed no objection to the motion.

the foregoing motion to be grounded on the doctrine that when GSIS is made to pay forcompensation benefits under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, it has a right of

reimbursement from the employer, which doctrine was laid down by this Court in

Corales vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (No. L-44063, March 15,1982,112

SCRA 501) and reiterated in a number of subsequent cases including the very recent

case of Reyes vs. ECC (No. L-43828, March 19, 1988).

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby resolved to GRANT the Motion for Partial Reconsideration.Accordingly, the decision in this case is MODIFIED in that payment of compensation by

the GSIS to the petitioner shall be without prejudice to its right of reimbursement from

the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, the employer of the deceased Nena S.

Iscala. As modified, the decision will, therefore, read as follows, the modification being

in bold:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Employees'

Compensation Commission dated October 12, 1977 denying petitioner's claim for

compensation for the death of Nena Iscala is hereby SET ASIDE and the GSIS is hereby

ordered to AWARD to the petitioner such compensation as provided by the Workmen's

Compensation Act without prejudice to its right of reimbursement from the DECS. NOCOSTS.


18/75


SUPREME COURTManila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-65680 May 11, 1989

JOSE B. SARMIENTO, petitioner,vs.

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM(National Power Corporation), respondents.

Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General and The Government Corporate Counsel for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the Employees' Compensation

Commission in ECC Case No. 2134 on August 25, 1983 which affirmed the decision of the

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying the petitioner's claim for death benefits

as surviving spouse of the late Flordeliza Sarmiento.

The findings of the respondent Commission are as follows:

The record shows that the late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the

National Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At

the time of her death on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget

division. History of the deceased's illness showed that symptoms manifested as

early as April 1980 as a small wound over the external auditory canal and mass

over the martoid region. Biopsy of the mass revealed cancer known as

"differentiated squamous cell carcinoma." The employee sought treatment in

various hospitals, namely, Veterans Memorial Hospital, United Doctors Medical

Hospital and Makati Medical Center. In March 1981, a soft tissue mass emerged

on her left upper cheek as a result of which her lips became deformed and she

was unable to close her left eye. She continued treatment and her last treatment

at the Capitol Medical Center on July 12, 1 981 was due to her difficulty of

swallowing food and her general debility. On August 12, 1981, she succumbed to

cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma. She was 40 years old.

Believing that the deceased's fatal illness having been contracted by her during

employment was service-connected, appellant herein filed a claim for death

benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. On September 9, 1982,

the GSIS, through its Medical Services Center, denied the claim. It was pointed

out that parotid carcinoma is "Malignant tumor of the parotid gland (salivarygland)" and that its development was not caused by employment and

employment conditions. Dissatisfied with the respondent System's decision of

denial, claimant wrote a letter dated October 8, 1982 to the GSIS requesting that

the records of the claim be elevated to the Employees' Compensation

Commission for review pursuant to the law and the Amended Rules on

Employees' Compensation. (At pp. 17-18, Rollo)


19/75


20/75

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's

compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a find under

its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation

process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open

ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered

claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the

rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have

importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which

called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the

claimant, is now absent. (At pp. 99-100)

The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. These is no serious

attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.

The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should be

addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former

workmen's compensation program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial

procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the

political departments. The present law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the

mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of working men and

women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to

apply it.

Under the present law, a compensable illness means any illness accepted as an occupational

disease and listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or any illness caused byemployment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased

by working conditions (Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276).

Applying the law to the present case, parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not

an occupational disease considering the deceased's employment as accounting clerk and later

as manager of the budget division. The petitioner must, therefore, prove that his wife's ailment

was caused by her employment or that her working conditions increased the risk of her

contracting the fatal illness.

The petitioner alleges that as budget manager, the deceased visited regional and field

operations and was, naturally, exposed to the elements. According to the petitioner, the

deceased's field trips necessitated her to take frequent plane travels which caused deafening

and numb sensations in her ears. This, he says, caused her "differentiated carcinoma" which,

according to the certificate of Dr. Ariston Bautista, "apparently started on external auditory

canal."

We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause and

nature of parotid carcinoma is still not known. A medical authority, however, declares that:

SALIVARY GLANDS

Painless swelling of the parotid glands is often noted in hepatic cirrhosis in

sarcoidis, in mumps, following abdominal surgery, or associated with neoplasm

or infections. The common factors may be dehydration and inattention to oral

hygiene. The latter promotes the growth of large numbers of bacteria which, in

the absence of sufficient salivary flow, ascend from the mouth into the duct of a

gland. Another cause of a painful salivary gland is sialolithiasis (salivary duct


21/75

stone). The submandibular glands are most commonly affected. Pain and

swelling associated with eating are characteristic. Saliva promotes retention of

artificial dentures because of its mucin content. Thus, conditions characterized

by diminished saliva flow often adversely affect the ease with which dentures

may be worn. Calcium phosphate stone tend to form because of a high pH and

viscosity of the submandibular gland saliva which has a high mucin content.Stones are removed by manipulation or excision.

Autoimmune sialosis is the MikulicsSjogren Syndrome, a unilateral or bilateral

enlargement of the parotid and/or submandibular gland, and often the lacrimal

glands. Occasionally painful, it is associated with xerostomia (dry mouth) due to

impaired saliva formation that is most common in older women. Beriow et al.,

The Merek Manuel, 14th Edition, pp. 2095-2096).

Another author states the following regarding squamous cell carcinoma:

Moreover, when the salivary gland is almost totally destroyed and replaced by

epidermoid cancer it may be difficult or even impossible to ascribe the origin of

the growth to salivary gland tissue. Indeed many squamous cell carcinomas,

especially of the parotid, may be metastatic lesions that develop in lymph nodes

included within the parotid. And it is important to stress that the juxtaparotid

and intraparotid lymph nodes are not merely accumulations of lymphoid tissue

but nodes with efferent and afferent lymphatics.

Squamous cell carcinomas of the major salivary glands are generally fixed to the

skin and the underlying tissues and, in the case of the parotid, are often the

cause of facial palsy.

Epidermoid cancers grow swiftly and the clinical course is usually rapid. A few

tumours, however, have been present for as long as two years before the patient

seeks advice. Some patients remain alive and asymptomatic after radical surgery,

but ordinarily the lesions are highly malignant, infiltrating locally and

metastasizing to the regional nodes Distant metastasis is seldom a prominent

clinical feature. In the case of the submandibular gland the tumor may simulate

osteomyelitis of the mandible or an abscess in the gland itself, and if such lesions

are incised a chronic sinus is liable to persist until radical treatment is

undertaken. (Evans and Cruickshank, Epithelial Tumours of the Salivary Glands,

Vol. 1, p. 254)

Given the preceding medical evaluations, we affirm the findings of the public respondents

which found no proof that the deceased's working conditions have indeed caused or increased

the risk of her contracting her illness.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decisions of the Government Service Insurance

System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


22/75

Sarmiento vs ECC

Facts:

late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power Corporation in QuezonCity as accounting clerk in May 1974.

At the time of her death on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division.History of the deceased's illness showed that symptoms manifested as early as April

1980 as a small wound over the external auditory canal and mass over the martoid

region. Biopsy of the mass revealed cancer known as "differentiated squamous cell

carcinoma." The employee sought treatment in various hospitals, namely, Veterans

Memorial Hospital, United Doctors Medical Hospital and Makati Medical Center.

In March 1981, a soft tissue mass emerged on her left upper cheek as a result of whichher lips became deformed and she was unable to close her left eye. She continued

treatment and her last treatment at the Capitol Medical Center on July 12, 1 981 wasdue to her difficulty of swallowing food and her general debility.

On August 12, 1981, she succumbed to cardio respiratory arrest due to parotidcarcinoma.

GSIS denied the claim for death benefits under PD no. 626, on the ground that parotidcarcinoma which is a Malignant tumorof the parotid gland ( salivary gland) is not

caused by employment conditions of the deceased. ECC affirmed the decision of the

GSIS.

Ruiling:

The SC affirmed the ECC decision. Parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not an occupational disease

considering the deceased's employment as accounting clerk and later as

manager of the budget division. The petitioner must, therefore, prove that his

wife's ailment was caused by her employment or that her working conditions

increased the risk of her contracting the fatal illness.

The petitioner alleges that as budget manager, the deceased visited regional andfield operations and was, naturally, exposed to the elements. According to thepetitioner, the deceased's field trips necessitated her to take frequent plane

travels which caused deafening and numb sensations in her ears. This, he says,

caused her "differentiated carcinoma" which, according to the certificate of Dr.

Ariston Bautista, "apparently started on external auditory canal."

We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer, thecause and nature of parotid carcinoma is still not known.


23/75


SUPREME COURTManila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46684 April 27, 1988

ROSALINA G. NAVALTA, petitioner,vs.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and EMPLOYEES'COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Employees' Compensation

Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System and

denied the claim for income benefits filed by Rosalina Navalta, widow of the late Alberto

Navalta.

The facts as found by the respondent Commission are as follows:

Before his death on September 8, 1976, Alberto Navalta was employed as Port

Administration Checker in the Office of the Special Commissioner on Port

Administration, Bureau of Customs. It appears that his actual duties consisted ofcontrolling receipts, storing and distributing supplies and equipment; conducting

periodic inventory supplies, materials and equipment; disposing obsolete and

unserviceable properties; and doing related work. Sometime in August, 1976,

while deceased was assigned at warehouse 12 to assist in the inventory of

properties of the defunct CAS per Office Order NO. 15-76, he suddenly

complained of extreme abdominal pain, for which reason, he was confined at the

Philippine General Hospital for nineteen (19) days. He died in the hospital on

September 8, 1976 due to Cancer of the Pancreas.

Deceased's widow filed a claim for income benefits with the Government Service

Insurance System. On the basis of a finding that deceased's fatal ailment, Cancer

of the Pancreas, is not an occupational disease, the System denied compensation

to the claimant. ... (p. 18, Rollo)

After the respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance

System, the petitioner went to this Court on petition for review.

The petitioner alleges that the deceased as a member of the customs inventory team and later

as port administration checker was exposed to various cargoes stored inside warehouses, which

included carbons, ink, concentrated toners and chemicals such as alphanaphtylamine,

betanaphtylamine, or bensidrine auramine or magenta in their raw forms. The petitionerargues that since the deceased's cancer has spread to the gallbladder, it may be concluded that

papilloma of the bladder, which is listed in the employee's compensation law as an

occupational disease, was one of the causes of his death.

The petitioner's views have no merit.


24/75

Since the deceased's ailment is not an occupational disease listed by the Employees'

Compensation Commission, it became incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that the

employee's working conditions increased the risk of his contracting the fatal illness (Bonifacio v.

Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276).

This task was not satisfactorily discharged by the petitioner.

As a general rule, cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of

life, employed or unemployed (Milano v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 52).

Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions or

environment, we cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of

contracting the disease. The nature of cancer of the pancreas is discussed by a medical

authority as follows:

Cancer of the Pancreas

Gen. Considerations. Carcinoma of the pancreas is now the 4th commonest

cancer causing death in the US; only cancer of the lung, colon and breast occur

more frequently... The disease is more common in males than females (1.5:1),

and the peak incidence is between the ages 60 to 70. Although the etiologic

factors in most cases are not known, incidence of carcinoma of the pancreas is

2.0 to 2.5 times greater in smokers than in non-smokers, and about 2 times

greater in patients with diabetes mellitus. Patients with calcific pancreatitis also

have an increased incidence of pancreatic carcinoma. Some reports have

suggested an association between heavy coffee intake and increased risk of

pancreatic cancer, but whether a true causal relationship exists is uncertain. The

tumors are usually adenocarcinomas arising from ductal epithelium. The head ofthe pancreas is involved in about 65%, the body and tail in 30 percent, and the

tail alone is 5%. At the time of diagnosis the tumor is confined to the pancreas in

only 15% of patients; 25% demonstrate local invasion or regional lymph node

spread, and the remaining 60% exhibit distinct metastases. (Harrison's Principles

of Internal Medicine, 10th Ed., p. 1845)

These medical findings support the evaluation of the Government Service Insurance System

that "(P)ancreatic carcinoma is a malignant new growth of the said organ, characterized by loss

of weight, pain and yellowish discoloration of the skin. It affects predominantly patients over

forty-five (45) years of age. Predisposing factors are age, sex, genetic influence and presence of

diabetes mellitus. Diabetic patients are believed to have increased susceptibility to the disease.

(p. 19, Rollo)

We do not find merit in the petitioner's contention that Mr. Navalta's cancer was caused by his

exposure to certain chemicals. As the respondent Commission opined "exposure to the (above

named) chemicals is the risk involved in the contracting of cancer of the epithelial lining of the

bladder." (p. 19, Rollo) The petitioner's contention that cancer of the bladder was also one of

the causes of her husband's death was correctly denied due to the fact that the employee's

bladder was affected as a result of metastatic spread only. The real and direct cause of his

death remains cancer of the pancreas.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The decisions of the Government

Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission are hereby

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


25/75

Navalta vs. GSIS

Facts:

Before his death on September 8, 1976, Alberto Navalta was employed as PortAdministration Checker in the Office of the Special Commissioner on Port

Administration, Bureau of Customs. It appears that his actual duties consisted of

controlling receipts, storing and distributing supplies and equipment; conducting

periodic inventory supplies, materials and equipment; disposing obsolete and

unserviceable properties; and doing related work.

Sometime in August, 1976, while deceased was assigned at warehouse 12 toassist in the inventory of properties of the defunct CAS per Office Order NO. 15-

76, he suddenly complained of extreme abdominal pain, for which reason, he

was confined at the Philippine General Hospital for nineteen (19) days. He died

in the hospital on September 8, 1976 due to Cancer of the Pancreas.

Deceased's widow filed a claim for income benefits with the Government ServiceInsurance System. On the basis of a finding that deceased's fatal ailment, Cancer

of the Pancreas, is not an occupational disease, the System denied compensation

to the claimant.

Ruiling:

The petitioner's views have no merit. Since the deceased's ailment is not an occupational disease listed by the Employees'

Compensation Commission, it became incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that the

employee's working conditions increased the risk of his contracting the fatal illness

(Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276).

As a general rule, cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in allwalks of life, employed or unemployed (Milano v. Employees' Compensation

Commission, 142 SCRA 52). Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused

by specific working conditions or environment, we cannot conclude that it was the

employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease. We do not find merit in the petitioner's contention that Mr. Navalta's cancer was caused

by his exposure to certain chemicals. As the respondent Commission opined "exposure

to the (above named) chemicals is the risk involved in the contracting of cancer of the

epithelial lining of the bladder."

The petitioner's contention that cancer of the bladder was also one of the causes of herhusband's death was correctly denied due to the fact that the employee's bladder was

affected as a result of metastatic spread only. The real and direct cause of his death

remains cancer of the pancreas.


SUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION


26/75

G.R. No. L-45484 April 8, 1988

ZOSIMO CAPACIO, petitioner,vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Bureau of Public Schools) respondent.

GANCAYCO,J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC)

denying the claim of petitioner Zosimo Capacio for compensation benefits under the

Workmen's Compensation Act against respondent Republic of the Philippines through the

Bureau of Public Schools.

The petitioner was an elementary grade public school teacher assigned in Barrio Matambong,

Palapag, Northern Samar. He started working as a substitute teacher and progressed to that of

a regular teacher. His service covered a span of 33 years. Finding himself suffering from peptic

ulcer, hypertension and schistosomiasis he retired from the government, service on August 13,

1974 at the age of 60 years.

Immediately upon retirement he was called to the Workmen's Compensation Commission

Regional Office in Samar for medical check-up by the office physicians. These ailments

complained of started from March 19, 1973 and continuously bothered the petitioner up to

August 13, 1974, his last day of work. After this medical examination on the petitioner, and

after the lapse of almost a month he was treated up to September 15, 1974. A further

examination was conducted on August 13, 1974, when an EKG test was taken. He stoppedteaching after August 13, 1974. Another EKG examination of petitioner was made on July 22,

1975. He sought workmen's compensation after this disabling sickness.

The claim of the petitioner was initially heard by the hearing officer, Romeo M. Resuello of

Regional Office No. 9, Department of Labor, Tacloban City, Leyte. After the hearing, petitioner

was awarded the amount of P5,693.57 as sickness compensation and reimbursement of

medical and hospital expenses on November 24, 1975. The award states-

It appearing upon perusal of the records, that claimant Zosimo C. Capacio

contracted illness (Peptic ulcer, hypertension and schistosomiasis on March

19,1973, which either supervened in the course of his employment as a public

school teacher (with an average weekly wage of P90.53) of the respondent, or

was aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, and it

appearing further that the respondent failed to controvert the claimant's right to

compensation within 14 days from the date of disability or within 10 days from

knowledge thereof, pursuant to Section 45 of the Act, as amended, resulting as it

did, in the loss of its non-jurisdictional defense and ultimate admission of the

compensability or work connection of claimant's illness, an outright award of

compensation in favor of the claimant is, under the circumstance, in order.1

The dispositive portion of this award states:

Award, therefore, is hereby entered in favor of the claimant of the

aforementioned compensation benefits, and the respondent is directed to pay

the following:


27/75

1. To the claimant, thru this Office, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED

NINETY-THREE PESOS and FIFTY-SEVEN centavos (P5,693.57) as compensation

and reimbursement for medical and hospital expenses;

2. To this Office, the amount of FIFTY SEVEN PESOS (P57.00) as fee, pursuant to

Sec. 55 of the Act.

A motion for reconsideration of this Award was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General. The

Workmen's Compensation Commission, upon review, reversed the aforesaid award.

The Workmen's Compensation Commission took exception to the findings of the Regional Labor

Office and reached a contrary opinion. In its Decision, the Commission said:

Gleaned from the record of this case, claimant had alleged to have been sick of

the aforementioned illness sometime on March 19, 1973 and stopped working

on August 13, 1974. This was also the exact date when he retired, It is sad to

note however, that nowhere in the records could We find any documentary

evidence which would substantiate claimant's allegations. While it is true that

Dr. Ramon Rabino was once his attending physician, the first and last treatment

was conducted only on September 15, 1974, which was one month after the

employer-employee relationship had ceased to exist. True, that there is attached

to the record on EKG results, likewise, the same should not be given any

evidentiary value, it appearing that it was conducted only last July 22, 1975, Of

course, there is a showing that claimant was on leave from July 22 to August 13,

1974, there is no showing that it was on account of the; illness subject of this

claim. his Commission believes that the aforementioned leave of absence was

merely preparatory to his retirement, which eventually took effect on August 13,1974. This Commission is further convinced that claimant retired not as a result

of any disabling illness, but rather with the sole aim and purpose of enjoying the

benefits afforded him by the Retirement Law after rendering 33 years of service

with the government and reaching the age of 60.2

We reverse.

The records of the case reveal that the petitioner suffered from peptic ulcer, hypertension and

schistosomiasis Feeling that he could not withstand the rigors and continuous strain of his

teaching job with his assignment in a remote barrio which entailed the stamina of walking for

one and one-half hours, he retired on his 60th birthday. All along he could have served the

whole length of a normal civil service tenure of work with the retirement age of 65. He served a

continuous 33 years. His daily hike from the town proper passing through rivers, creeks,

streams and rough roads, trails and woodland affected his health. The streams in that region

were infested with parasitic worms known as schistosoma haematobium. Indeed, this physical

strain took a toll upon his health. It does not take a stretch of the imagination to conclude that

this strain had its consequence and adversely affected his health.

There is on record the fact that after retirement, he immediately filed his claim for sickness

compensation with the Department of Labor Regional Office No. 9, Workmen's Compensation

Unit in Tacloban City. He submitted himself to medical examination by the physician of theWorkmen's Compensation Unit. After this examination, the medical officer studied his case and

then ordered that the petitioner be hospitalized in Tacloban City. These facts show that the

illness of the petitioner occurred during the course of his employment.

The petitioner took the Commission to task for not taking into consideration the mandatory

provision of Section 45, Act No. 3428, as amended, wherein the employer (in this case the


28/75

Bureau of Public Schools) is given up to 14 days from disability, or 10 days after it had

knowledge of the alleged illness, to controvert the right of the claimant; otherwise, by

operation of law, the employer waives or renounces the right to dispute its liability for said

compensation. This provision has been consistently applied by this Court when a condition of

this nature confronts Us.

In Manila Railroad Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission and Crispin Pineda,3We

ruled: "The company's failure to controvert the claim on time amounts to a renunciation of the

right to dispute compensability." Again, in Dinaro vs. Workmen's Compensation

Commission,4We set aside the Commission's dismissal of the claim made by a clerical aide in

the District Engineer's Office in Marawi City who contracted pulmonary tuberculosis and

rheumatism in the course of his employment. This Court held:

The Commission inexplicably failed to apply the express mandate of Section 45

of the Workmen's Compensation Act and issue outright an award, since a failure

to controvert is a renunciation of the right, to challenge the claim and a waiver

of all non-jurisdictional defenses and there is nothing that the employer can

legally prove in relation thereto.

Regarding the point of presumption of compensability, We had occasion to rule as follows:

Once the illness supervened in the course of employment, rebuttable

presumption arises that such illness arose out of or was at least aggravated by

such employment and the burden to overthrow such presumption shifts to the

employer ...5

Lately, in Buyco vs. Secretary of Labor6

We ruled that the presumption of compensability shiftsthe burden of proof on the employer to show the contrary. Where the illness supervened

during the time of employment, there was rebuttable presumption that the illness arose out of

or at least was aggravated by the employment.7

Thus, the government's stand that failure to file an employer's report did not divest the

Workmen's Compensation Commission of its power to review the Decision of the Regional

Office and seek reconsideration is plainly without merit.

We held before that:

... Failure to seasonably controvert the compensation claim renders the claim

beyond challenge and a waiver of the employer's right to do so.8

... Main consideration for compensability of illness is that the essential

hypertension of the deceased was constracted during and by reason of her

employment.9

We also stated that an:

Employer has the burden to establish the contrary to the presumtion of

compensability of illness by substantial evidence.

10

Another point raised by the respondent Commission in its Decision reversing the award is that

the petitioner submitted to medical treatment after the employer-employee relationship had

ceased. This implies that petitioner's illness was not work connected as he got sick after his

retirement; that the documents submitted proved the existence of petitioner's illness after he

retired from his employment, not before.


29/75

We disagree.

First, there is no proof that the respondent was able to overcome the presumption under

Section 44 of Act No. 3428 that the illness or injury either arose out of, or was at least

aggravated by his employment. With this legal presumption, the burden of proof shifts to the

employer and not the employee.

Second, the petitioner's ailment occurred while he was an employee a teacher working

under the hazardous conditions of that far-flung town. There is a showing that his illness was

caused or was aggravated by his teaching duties. He got his schistosomiasis from his daily hike

to his place of work, the barrio school.

As regards a teacher's ailment, We had occasion to say that:

Presumption of compensability is rendered conclusive by reason of employee's

employment as barrio school teacher and working conditions which increased

the risk of contracting her illness and failure of employer to rebut

presumption.11

We likewise made the following observations:

Reasonable work connection, not direct causal relation between the disease and

employment is the only requirement to establish compensability,12

and actual

proof of causation is not necessary to justify compensability.13

In one of Our latest rulings on employment compensation of teachers, We opined:

The teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury

in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain in

the teacher's health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in

accordance with existing laws.14

Accordingly, the Decision of the respondent Commission dated March 9, 1976 is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered reinstating the original

award made by the Hearing Officer of November 24,1975. No costs. This decision is

immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.


30/75

Capacio vs Republic

Facts:

The petitioner was an elementary grade public school teacher assigned in BarrioMatambong, Palapag, Northern Samar. He started working as a substitute teacher andprogressed to that of a regular teacher. His service covered a span of 33 years. Finding

himself suffering from peptic ulcer, hypertension and schistosomiasis he retired from

the government, service on August 13, 1974 at the age of 60 years.

Immediately upon retirement he was called to the Workmen's CompensationCommission Regional Office in Samar for medical check-up by the office physicians.

These ailments complained of started from March 19, 1973 and continuously bothered

the petitioner up to August 13, 1974, his last day of work. After this medical

examination on the petitioner, and after the lapse of almost a month he was treated up

to September 15, 1974. A further examination was conducted on August 13, 1974, when

an EKG test was taken. He stopped teaching after August 13, 1974. Another EKG

examination of petitioner was made on July 22, 1975. He sought workmen's

compensation after this disabling sickness.

The claim of the petitioner was initially heard by the hearing officer, Romeo M. Resuelloof Regional Office No. 9, Department of Labor, Tacloban City, Leyte. After the hearing,

petitioner was awarded the amount of P5,693.57 as sickness compensation and

reimbursement of medical and hospital expenses on November 24, 1975.


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SUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-42087 April 8, 1988

URSULA VDA. DE CLEMENTE, FOR HERSELF AND FOR HER CHILDREN NAMELY: MARITA, EDNA,AMELIA, ROBERTO, ANTONIO AND REYNALDO, ALL SURNAMED CLEMENTE, petitioners,vs.

THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND RATTAN ART AND DECORATIONSINC., respondents.

PADILLA,J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, treated by the Court as a special civil action.,1of the

decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission2reversing the decision of the Acting

Referee which granted death compensation benefits to the claimants.3The antecedents of the

case are as follows:

The deceased Ricardo Clemente was employed as a machine set-up man by respondent Rattan

Art & Decorations, Inc., assigned to the Preparation Section, working six (6) days a week from 6:

A.M. to 11:00 A.M. and from 12:00 noon to 3:00 P.M., earning a daily wage of P10.30.

On 21 February 1974, at about 1:40 A.M., Ricardo Clemente, while asleep, died of acute

cardiorespiratory failure, with manifest pulmonary infarct, cardiac dilatation and marked

visceral congestion.4He was at the time of death forty-nine (49) years old. The deceased was

survived by his widow, Ursula vda. de Clemente and six (6) minor children, who filed on 17

March 1975 a claim for death compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act,

on account of the death of said deceased.

In a decision,5dated 10 September 1975, the Acting Referee of the Workmen's Compensation

Commission rendered a decision in favor of the claimants. The dispositive part of the decision

reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the

respondent Rattan Art and Decorations, Inc., to pay through this office and in

lump sum:

1. Claimants the death compensation in the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (

P6,000.00 ) plus the burial expenses in the sum of TWO HUNDRED PESOS

(P200.00 ) PESOS, through Ursula Clemente, the legitimate mother of the above-

named children;

2. Their counsel, Abraham M. Perez, the sum of P300.00; and

3. This Office the sum of SIXTY ONE ( P61.00 ) PESOS as fees pursuant to Section

55 of the Act, as amended.'

On 22 September 1975, private respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of the

Acting Referee but the same was denied in an order dated 23 October 1975.6Pursuant to


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Section 49 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the motion for reconsideration and the

records of the case were referred to the Commission for review. The decision of the acting

referee was reversed, the Commission upholding the allegations of the private respondent that

the cause of death of the deceased is what is commonly known as "bangungot," that it is non-

compensable, and that the claimants failed to establish the fundamental preliminary link to

connect the death of the deceased to his work, thereby justifying a denial of the claim of hereinpetitioners,

7hence, this petition.

Petitioners claim that the work of the deceased was not only strenuous but debilitating and

weakening on the constitution of the deceased, so much so that in the years 1973-1974, he was

always complaining of dizziness, severe cough, chest and back pains, over-fatigue and was later

found to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis (PTB) and heart failure.8However, no proof

was submitted by petitioners to substantiate their allegations as to the ailments of the

decedent prior to his death.9

It is further contended by petitioners that it is for convenience, rather than for accuracy, that

some medical practitioners call or brand the causes of death similar to that of the deceased in

this case as "bangungot" but the fact is, that no inference was ever made in the "post mortem

certificate of death" that the late Ricardo Clemente died of "bangungot."10

The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the cause of the death of the

deceased had a causal relation to the nature of his work while in private respondent's employ.

To be entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the illness which

resulted in the death of the employee must be directly caused by his employment or either

aggravated by, or the result of the nature of his employment.11

In the interpretation of this

rule, the Court has adopted a liberal stand to give effect to the compassionate spirit of the lawas a social legislation, and has ruled that what the law merely requires is a reasonable work

connection and not a direct causal relation of the illness or ailment to the job or working

conditions present in the course of the performance of one's duties.12

The degree of proof

required to establish work-connection between the disabling ailment and the working

conditions is merely substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."13In testing the evidence on the relation

between the injury or disease and the employment, probability and not certainty is the

touchstone.14

Moreover, when illness supervenes during employment, there is a disputable presumption that

the claim is compensable. The claimant is relieved of the duty to show causation as it is then

legally presumed that the illness arose out of the employment.15

The law presumes, in the

absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim for death or disability benefits is

compensable. The burden to disconnect, by substantial evidence, the injury or sickness from

the nature of the employment is laid at the employer's door. So rigid is this rule that, even

where the cause of the employee's death is unknown, the right to compensation subsists. The

reason for this is, that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a social legislation. It is designed to

give relief to the working man. To give effect to this purpose, the Act must be liberally

construed in favor of the worker.16

The exact medical cause of the illness of an employee is not significant for, granted for the sakeof argument that the evidence of the claimant is insufficient to establish a causal link between

the nature of his employment and his ailment under the provisions of Section 44 of the

Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, still, it is to be presumed that the illness which

supervened at the time of his employment, either arose out of or was at least aggravated by,

such employment.17This presumption, rebuttable at its inception, becomes conclusive upon

the failure of the respondent employer to overcome the same.18


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In the instant case, the deceased was found to have died of acute cardiorespiratory failure

during his sleep, commonly known as 'heart failure" and not of what respondent claims as

"bangungot." While it is true that the claimants failed to prove the causal link between the

cause of the death of the deceased to the nature of his work, yet, the Court cannot discount the

probability that his work, as a set-up man, caused or aggravated his illness that led to his death.

Considering the nature of the job of the decedent, it may be fairly concluded that the strenuousphysical activity required in the performance of his duties caused a heavy strain on his heart,

which ultimately resulted in death.

It is claimed by petitioners that the deceased was also suffering from PTB, and medical science

has already established that any chronic lung disease, such as tuberculosis, may lead to a

pulmonary heart disease.19The allegation of respondents that the medical records of the

deceased, prior to his death, reveal that he was in good health20and the fact that the death of

the decedent occurred at a time when he was already off from work is not material; the main

consideration for granting death compensation to petitioners is the fact that the illness which

resulted in the death of the deceased supervened in the course of his employment. The

contention that the deceased had no history of cardiac ailment strengthens the presumption

that his fatal heart attack, during the period of his employment, was work-connected or

aggravated thereby and therefore compensable.21

Respondents' claim that the cause of the decedent's death is 'bangungot," is without legal or

medical basis, for it is apparent from the "Post Mortem Certificate of Death" that the deceased

died of heart failure. The real cause of "bangungot" has remained a mystery up to the present,

and no medical explanation has so far been established to unravel this phenomenon. There are

several theories submitted in an attempt to explain the reason or cause for the death of

reported victims of 'bangungot;' however, the exact cause of death is still unknown.

However, assuming ex gratia argumentithat the deceased indeed died due to 'bangungot," still

in Mercado, Jr. v. ECC22it was held that where the causes of an ailment are unknown and

undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of causal link between the

ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized. The Court said:

... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award

of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailmentthe cause or

origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science

was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working

conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially

considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the

intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material

resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between

the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment

compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not

having been intended and/or imposed.

Verily, by permitting compensation notwithstanding the absence of any showing

of causal link between the ailment whose Causes are unknown and the working

conditions which may be the probable origins of said ailment, We merely accede

to the dictates of the social justice provisions of the Constitution. Where thecauses are known, determined or determinable, the claimant must prove

reasonable work- connection in order to receive compensation otherwise, the

parity or balance between the competing interests of employer and employee

with respect to Workmen's Compensation is destroyed. (Sulit v. ECC, L-48602

[June 30, 1980]). Where, however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to

and/or undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any


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causal link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized

so that those who have less in life will have more in law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Workmen's Compensation

Commission, dated 27 November 1975, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, a new

one is entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Acting Referee, dated 10 September 1975. Nocosts. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.


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Clemente vs ECC

Facts:

The deceased Ricardo Clemente was employed as a machine set-up man by respondentRattan Art & Decorations, Inc., assigned to the Preparation Section, working six (6) daysa week from 6: A.M. to 11:00 A.M. and from 12:00 noon to 3:00 P.M., earning a daily

wage of P10.30.

On 21 February 1974, at about 1:40 A.M., Ricardo Clemente, while asleep, died of acutecardiorespiratory failure, with manifest pulmonary infarct, cardiac dilatation and

marked visceral congestion.4He was at the time of death forty-nine (49) years old. The

deceased was survived by his widow, Ursula vda. de Clem

Documents

Social legislation digested cases