Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Atienza; Police Power of LGU's

Facts:    Pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units. the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. The said ordinance, in essence, reclassified portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas from industrial to commercial areas [reservoir of oils of big oil companies are located in this area- this is called as the Pandacan terminals] and owners or operators of industries and other businesses, of the Pandacan terminals are given a period of 6 months from the date of effectivity of the Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are disallowed.        Subsequent to the approval of the ordinance, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option and not total removal of the Pandacan terminals as demanded by Ordinance 8027. Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to scale down the oils reservoir and agreed that the  joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. The said MOU was adopted by a resolution of the Sanggunian Panglunsod of Manila.

    Petitioners filed a mandamus compelling respondent in his capacity as Mayor of Manila to enforce the said ordinance and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.  

    Atienza contended that Ordinance 8027 was superseded by the MOU, hence he cannot enforce it.

Issue:    Whether or not respondent can be compelled to enforce Ordinance 8027.    Whether or not the MOU superseded Ordinance 8027.

Ruling:    Yes, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to 'enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.' One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by theSanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.  The Court ratiocinated, "these officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it."

    As to the second issue, assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,530 SCRA 341 (2007)

Facts: PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a Mass Transport System for Greater Manila. Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila Council of the MMDA cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Respondents, provincial bus operators who had bus terminals that were threatened to be removed, alleges that EO should be declared unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals

Issue: Whether or not EO 179 is a valid exercise of police power

Held: Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void. MMDA has no police power, let alone legislative power. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the EO; hence it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of the respondents’ terminals.

Police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may bedelegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government under an expressdelegation by the LGC of 1991.

Measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.

On Constitutional Law, “The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enactedwith due deference to rights.”

Velasco vs. Villegas [G.R. No. L-24153 (120 SCRA), February 14, 1983]

Facts: Petitioners herein are members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association. This is an appeal from the lower court's(LC) order dismissing their suit for declatory relief. They are challenging theconstitutionality of Ord. No. 4964. They contend that it amounts todeprivation of properties and their means of livelihood without due process of law. 

The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person." 

Respondent in its reply, said that the Ordinance No. 4964 is constitutional and such is just an exercise of the state's inherent power (police power). 

Issue: Whether or not the assailed Ordinance violated the petitioner's right to property and their means of livelihood. 

Held: Ordinance is Constitutional. Petition is dismissed, LC decision affirmed. 

Enactment of such (Ordinance) is a valid exercise of Police Power. 

The objectives of the Ordinance are: 

(1) To impose payment of license fees for engaging in the business of massage clinics, and; 

(2) To forestall possible immorality which might grow from the construction of a separate room for massaging customers. 

This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. And for that reason, the petitioners’ rights were not violated and they are not deprived of the due process of law.

Case Digest: Lozano v. MartinezG.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986 

FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.

YAP, J:Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality.

BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the draweebank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates aprima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by thedrawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.

Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute primafacie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."

The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.

ISSUE: Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt.

HELD: No.The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust

of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

ISSUE: W/N it violates the equal protection clause.HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.

TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]

Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena,Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the municipalityconcerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioner’s warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Onthe other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code

(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.

Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or anystatute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.

People vs. Judge Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992Facts:

Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged with violation of B.P. 22. He moved to quash the Information of the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check which was in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. Judge Nitafan, ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was based was unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order quashing the Information. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:

Wether a memorandum check is within the coverage of B.P. 22

Held:

A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word "memorandum", "memo" or "mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the bona fide holder absolutely, without any condition concerning its presentment. Such a check is an evidence of debt against the drawer, and although may not be intended to be presented, has the same effect as an ordinary check, and if passed to the third person, will be valid in his hands like any other check.

A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence it does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum.

A memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not be presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan fall due. However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such understanding or private arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of check be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provision of B.P. 22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted — to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks. After having effectively reduced the incidence of worthless checks changing hands, the country will once again experience the limitless circulation of bouncing checks in the guise of memorandum checks if such checks will be considered exempt from the operation of B.P. 22. It is common practice in commercial transactions to require debtors to issue checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment. To determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the

faith the public responses in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities.

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATIONFACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only enforced in Manila and directed solely towards the taxi industry.Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a valid exercise of police power.HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety and general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause because it is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places.

DECS vs. San DiegoG.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

Facts:Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission Test) three times. When he applied to take again, petitioner rejected his application based on the  “three-flunk-rule”.  He then filed a petition before the RTC on the ground of due process and equal protection and challenging the constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted by the RTC therefore this petition.

Issue:Whether or not the NMAT “three-flunk-rule” order is valid and constitutional.

Ruling:Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that  “ every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements”. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. Petition was granted and the RTC ruling was reversed.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987]

Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine. However the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT).Republic Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of Medical Education (BME) whose functions include "to determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine" (Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of the same Act requires fromapplicants to present a certificate of eligibility for entrance (cea) to medical school from the BME. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, established a uniform admission test called National Medical Admission Test as additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility.

Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Sec. of educ, BME from enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as condition for securing (cea). 

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 violate the constitution as they prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement

Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state.

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus,legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process ofadmission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limitingadmission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need tomaintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known. 

The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe anadmission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its statedobjective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."

G.R. No. 158793. June 8, 2006

James Mirasol, Richard Santiago, and Luzon Motorcyclists Federation, Inc., petitioners, vs.Department of Public Works and Highways and Toll Regulatory Board, respondents.

Facts:

On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction to nullity of the following administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access Highway Act" enacted in 1957: (a) DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968; (b) DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993; and (c) Art. II, Sec. 3 (a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB). 

Issue:

Whether or not Administrative Order No. 1 introduces an unreasonable classification by singling-out motorcycles from other motorized modes of transport and violates the right to travel.

Ruling:

No. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners’ right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways. There exists real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. A classification based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity.