Social dilemmas and leadership

European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 14, 105-121 (1 984)

Social dilemmas and leadership

C. G. RUVE and H. A. M. WILKE lnstituut voor Sociale en Bedrijfs Psychologie, Vakgroep Sociale Psychologie, University of Groningen, Kraneweg 2, Groningen, The Netherlands

Abstract

Subjects acted in a social dilemma situation. Two variables were experimentally manipulated: use and variance. One third of the subjects thought that the others in their group were overusing the common resource, one third thought that the others were underusing it, and the remaining third were led to believe that the others were using the resource optimally. Moreover, half of the subjects thought that the others took relatively similar harvests (low variance) while the other half thought the others differed greatly (high variance). Support was found for Homans’ assumption that the internal function of leaders is to allocate outcomes equitably over group members, whereas their external function is to deal efficiently with the external environment.

The results indicated that more subjects in the overuse condition voted to give up free access to the resource and to hand over the management of the resource to a leader than in the other me conditions. Moreover, more subjects in the high variance condition voted for a leader than in the low variance condition. Over all conditions, furthermore, subjects preferred themselves most as prospective leader. In addition, group members who were similar to the subject, competent at the task and concerned for the group were preferred as Leader. When subjects acted as leader they were more moderate in withdrawing harvests fi-om the resource than as regular group member. Moreover, leaders allocated outcomes equitably to the group members.

INTRODUCTION

The literature on social dilemmas goes back to philosophical investigations of Hob- bes (1651) and Smith (1976). These philosophers discuss whether it is possible that great societal problems can be solved by letting all individuals freely take decisions. Smith argues that individuals take decisions that are beneficial to society at large. Hobbes, on the other hand, points out that individuals take decisions that are at the expense of the entire society. Hobbes argues that the solution to large societal problems is the introduction of a leader, who takes decisions on behalf of all members of society.

Recently, Hardin (1968) explored the situation in which a number of herdsmen, sharing a common pasturage, must decide how many animals to graze on the

0046-2772/84/010105- 17$01.70 0 1984 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 22 March I983

106 C. G. Rutte and H . A . M. Wifke

commons. It is in the interest of each herdsman to increase the size of his herd because the profit accrues to the herdsman; the cost, measured as damage to the commons, is shared equally by all. Thus, each herdsman has an incentive to increase the size of his herd and, yet, if all do so, the ultimate result is the destruc- tion of the commons.

This social dilemma as it is described by Hardin is a metaphor that can be applied to several important societal problems. Hardin addresses overpopulation. He pleads for social arrangements that produce responsibility and he argues that social arrangements that produce responsibility create coercion of some sort. The kind of coercion Hardin recommends is mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected.

Dawes in his paper on social dilemmas (1980) surveys the contribution of psychologists who have studied social dilemma behaviour, referring to societal problems as overpopulation, resource depletion and pollution. By rejecting the principle of nonsatiety of economic greed, which lies at the basis of Hardin’s con- ception of social dilemmas, Dawes saw the possibility of cooperative behaviour in a social dilemma situation. He assumes that people can be made cooperative if they come to understand the nature of the dilemma and if they can be convinced that others will cooperate.

The present study concentrates on the solution to social dilemmas Hardin, and before him Hobbes, advocates. The basic question is then, when or under what circumstances will individuals voluntarily relinquish their freedom of access to a commons by handing over the management of the commons to a central authority? O r to put it differently, under which conditions do people opt for a leader?

According to Katz and Kahn (1966) a leader has to meet two role requirements: (a) he has to deal efficiently with the external environment in a way that guarantees optimal outcomes (task requirements) and (b) he has to take care of the efficiency of the internal system (maintenance requirements). This theoretical position agrees with Homans’ statement (1974) that ‘If the leader’s chief external task is to be successful, his chief internal one is to be fair’ (p. 281). These role requirements of a leader specify by implication under which conditions leaderless groups will opt for the introduction of a leader.

The first of these conditions is perceived ineffectiveness. As long as a leaderless group is able to acquire sufficient outcomes, there is no need for a leader. Thus, if group members in a social dilemma situation are adequately dealing with a common resource and are able to sustain the resource there is little incentive to change the leaderless group to a group with a leader. Support for this hypothesis has been found in a study by Messick, Wilke, Brewer, Kramer, Zemke and Lui (1983). They found that if group members saw that, as a group, they overused the commons, they were more inclined to elect a leader than if the exploitation of the commons remained within or under its limits.

The second of the conditions under which leaderless groups will opt for a leader is inequities in the distribution of resources. If group members consider differences in harvest behaviour between group members as fair and justified then there will be no need to elect a leader. Equity theory (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1974) specifies when group members perceive differences in harvest behaviour to be fair. Equity theory assumes that group members with the same investments should expect approximately the same quantity of harvest outcomes. The perception of unjus-

Social dilemmas 107

tified inequity produces a negative emotional state, which, in turn, motivates to restore equity. Consequently, dissatisfaction will arise if there are large unjustified differences in harvest outcomes among group members. Then there will be a need for a leader who may take care of a fair distribution of outcomes. If there are only slight differences in harvest behaviour between members of a group, a high level of satisfaction arises and there will be no need to elect a leader in order to realize fairness. In the aforementioned article by Messick et al. (1983) small and large differences in harvest behaviour were induced. They found only marginal support for the hypothesis that large differences in harvest behaviour of group members induce a stronger need to elect a leader than small differences. This result may be due to a rather weak discrepancy between large and small differences in harvest behaviour in the Messick et a f . study.

After the question under which conditions group members opt for a leader, a second one is: Who will be preferred as leader? Homans (1974) argues that he who fulfills one’s needs and expectations will be preferred as leader. Persons who per- form similar actions are assumed to share the same values. It may be predicted therefore that the more a person’s harvest behaviour is similar to one’s own harvest behaviour, the more one is inclined to prefer that person as prospective leader.

According to Hollander and Julian (1969) and Ridgeway (1981) group members expect their leader to be competent and to be concerned for the group. Therefore it seems plausible to assume that he, who has demonstrated that he understands the nature of the social dilemma task and who has taken into account the harvest behaviour of his fellow group members, will be elected as leader. Where the other group members underuse the commons he is the one who harvests more than his fellow group members; where the other group members overuse the commons he is the one who harvests less than the others. While doing so, he demonstrates that he understands the nature of the social dilemma task and at the same time expresses his concern for the well-being of the entire group.

A third question is: How will a regular group member behave when elected to the leader’s position, where it is his task to harvest for all group members including himself? Since the external role requirement of a leader is to manage the commons within the limits of the common’s resources, we may assume that a leader will do so. Equity theory (Adams, 1965; Austin, 1977) predicts that inequities which have occurred on a previous occasion will be restored by the leader. Group members who harvested too much on previous occasions will be allocated fewer harvest outcomes by the leader than group members who harvested too little. If no inequities have occurred on a previous occasion, equity theory predicts that a leader will allocate outcomes evenly to all group members.

METHOD Subjects

Subjects were 112 male and female students of the social sciences at Groningen University. Subjects participated voluntarily in the experiment and were paid f 1.10 per hour. Six subjects were recruited for each experimental session.

Fifteen subjects had to be discarded, because they distrusted the experimental set-up. This left 97 subjects in the design. The minimum number of subjects per condition was 15.

108 C. G. Rutte and H. A . M . Wilke

Procedure

Upon arrival at the laboratory the six subjects were assigned by the experimenter to separate, adjacent small rooms. In each room there were a videoscreen, headphones and a panel with ten buttons ranging from one to ten. The experimenter gave written instructions and a scoreform to the subjects and invited them to put on the headphones in order to listen to oral instructions which could be simultaneously read in the written instructions. After this the experimenter started a tape on which were the oral instructions and a program on a microprocessor with the help of which information was displayed on the videoscreen and reactions of the subjects were registered.

In the first part of the instructions subjects were led to believe they were going to interact with five other persons. Each person was assigned a letter, ranging from ‘A’ to ‘F‘, which could be found on top of the written instructions and the scoreform. In actuality all six subjects were assigned the letter ‘C‘.

The nature of the social dilemma was explained, stressing the interdependence of the group members. It was told that in this experiment subjects were going to be in a social dilemma situation, managing together a replenishable resource pool of points. Subjects were told that they had two goals: (a) to accumulate as many points as possible during the experiment and (b) to make the resource last as long as possible, in order to maximize the length of time over which pointscould be harvested. Subjects were made aware of the parallels between the experimental task and real world settings.

It was said that upon completion of the entire study a lottery would be held; one group would be selected to receive additional payment for its participation. Each member of this selected group would be paid fl. 0,25 for each point accumulated during the course of the experiment. This was done to increase involvement at minimal costs.

Following this general introduction more specific instructions were given about the experimental task. It was said that subjects would share as a group a resource pool initially containing 300 points. During a series of trials each subject could harvest zero to ten points, indicating the number of desired points by pushing a button on the panel. By not pushing a button in a given trial one could indicate that one wished to take zero points. Subjects had 12 seconds for this.

Subjects were told that after all group members had selected the number of points to withdraw for that trial the computer would display all withdrawals on the videoscreens. Subjects were asked to note each of the group member’s harvests on their scoreform. In actuality each subject was receiving bogus feedback about the harvests of the other group members and real feedback only about his own harvests. By means of the bogus feedback on the harvests of the other group members two variance conditions were manipulated. In the high variance condition group members widely differed in their harvest behaviour. In the low variance condition the harvest differences among group members were small.

It was said that after the computer had displayed all group members’ harvests, the computer would subtract the total group harvest from the existing pool size and replenish the remaining amount according to a given variable replenishment rate. At this point in the instructions three use conditions were manipulated. In the overuse condition subjects were told that the replenishment rate was about three

Social dilemmas 109

Table 1. Bogus feedback concerning harvest behaviour of others and new pool size specified per condition

Conditions

Low variance High variance Use

Group member Group member New pool size

T r i a l A B D E F A B D E F

1 5 4 5 5 5 5 1 6 3 9 2 7 5 3 5 5 5 2 5 4 9 3 4 4 6 4 6 4 1 7 3 9 4 5 7 5 5 3 5 1 7 4 8 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 1 9 2 9 6 3 4 7 5 5 5 1 7 2 9 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 7 3 9 8 5 3 5 5 7 5 1 8 2 9 9 6 4 6 4 6 6 1 8 2 9 10 5 5 5 5 6 5 1 8 3 9

Total 50 46 52 48 54 50 11 72 28 89

Over Optimum

278 300 255 299 232 300 208 300 183 299 158 300 132 299 105 300 77 300 48 300

Under

300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300

per cent, in the optimum use condition about ten per cent and in the underuse condition about seventeen percent.

After the new pool size was calculated by the computer, it was said it would be presented on the videoscreens. The new pool size was subjected to the constraint that the maximum size was never more than 300 points. Subjects were asked to write the new pool size down on the scoreform. Subjects could continue to take points from the pool for as long as the resource was sustained or until the experimenter stopped the experiment. In actuality, each new pool size was predeter- mined. In Table 1 is specified what feedback was given in each condition.

At the end of the instructions subjects were given three practice trials to assure their familiarity with the task requirements. The experimenter next went to each subject to answer any questions left.

Hereafter, ten trials each lasting one minute and a half succeeded each other. On each trial subjects were informed of the pool size, selected the number of points they wished to harvest, were informed of the harvests of all group members and were presented the new pool size. At the end of the tenth trial subjects were told that the first part of the experiment was over. The total harvest accumulated by each group member was displayed. Subjects noted these totals on their scoreforms.

A questionnaire was distributed concerned with subjects’ perceptions of the group’s behaviour. Moreover, subjects were given the opportunity to choose between continuing to harvest pointson an individual base or electing aleader harvesting in the name of all group members. After voting on whether to elect a leader, subjects were asked to rankorder the group members, including themselves, in terms of their preference for who should be the leader.

110 C. G. Rutte and H. A. M . Wilke

The experimenter collected the questionnaires and told subjects that after the computer had processed their voting data the experiment would continue.

After a couple of minutes it was displayed that the majority of the group members had voted in favour of having a leader and that group member ‘C’ had been elected leader (this was of course bogus feedback). Group member ‘C‘, now leader, was instructed that the other group members would continue doing another set of tasks while the leader completed the second session of the experiment. The leader started again with a pool of 300 points, the replenishment rate remaining the same as in the first part of the experiment. I t was told that at the start of each trial the leader could read the pool size on the videoscreen and after that ‘How many points gets group member “A” ? ’ The leader could indicate whatever he wanted to allocate to group member ‘A’ by pushing a button on the panel. After 12 seconds the same procedure was followed for group member ‘B’ and after that for group members ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’ and ‘F‘. It was told that after allocating points to all group members the computer would calculate the new pool size, present it and thereafter the next trial could begin. The leader could give zero to ten points per trial to each group member. The leader could harvest from the pool for as long as the resource was sustained. Actually, the experiment stopped after ten trials. After these trials the experimenter handed out a post experimental questionnaire.

MAIN RESULTS

Checks on the manipulation of use and variance

These measurements were designed to ascertain whether subjects correctly perceived (1) that the others in their group over, optimally or underused the common resource and (2) that there was greater heterogeneity in the harvests in the high variance condition than in the low variance condition.

Following the first session in which they harvested on an individual base during ten trials, subjects were asked to indicate on a one to seven point scale whether they thought the group was taking too much (7), too little (1) or the right amount (4) from the pool. A 3 (use) by 2 (variance) analysis of variance indicated only a significant effect for use, F(2,90) = 98.00, p < 0.001. The overuse subjects rated the group as taking too much ( M = 6.39), the optimum use subjects rated the group as taking about the right amount ( M = 3.85) and the underuse subjects rated the group as taking somewhat too little ( M = 3.30). All differences between use conditions were significant (p < 0.05).

Subjects were also asked to indicate on a one to seven point scale how satisfied they were with outcome differences among group members. A use by variance analysis of variance indicated only a significant effect for variance, F(1,90) = 12.59, p < 0.001. High variance subjects appeared to be less satisfied ( M = 2.94) with the outcome differences than low variance subjects ( M = 4.11).

We may conclude from these results that we succeeded in manipulating our use and variance conditions.

Vote to elect a leader

The number of votes cast in favour of electing a leader at the end of the first session

Social dilemmas 11 1

Table 2. The number of votes for a leader in each of the six experimental conditions over the number of subjects in that condition. The proportion of subjects favouring a leader is given in parentheses

Variance

Use High L O W Total ~ ~~ ~ ~~~

Over 13/16 (0.81) 9/15 (0.60) 22/31 (0.71) Optimum 5/16 (0.31) 2/16 (0.13) 7/32 (0.22) Under 5/18 (0.28) 1/15 (0.07) 6/33 (0.18)

Total 23/50 (0.46) 12/46 (0.26) 35/96 (0.36)

was recorded in each of the six experimental conditions. The relevant frequencies can be found in Table 2.

A x 2 analysis of the frequencies (Goodman, 1971) revealed three effects. First, there was an overall effect, reflecting the fact that over all conditions more subjects voted in favour of not electing a leader than of electing a leader, x L = 5.00, df 1, p < 0.025. Second, there was a significant effect for the use variable, x 2 = 25.20 df = 2, p < 0.001. Subjects in the overuse condition showed a clear preference for electing a leader in comparison to the other two conditions. Third, there was a significant effect for the variance variable, reflecting the fact that subjects in the high variance condition voted more often to elect a leader than subjects in the low variance condition, x2 = 5.59, df = 1, p < 0.025. The interaction of use and variance was not significant, x 2 = 0.20.

Which leader?

After subjects had indicated whether they opted for a leader, they were also asked whom they would most like to have as a leader. They were then asked for their second choice, their third, and so on until they indicated the least preferred leader. They could rank themselves anywhere they wished.

The only information subjects had about the supposed other group members was the harvest behaviour of each of them. In the low variance condition they saw that all others harvested approximately the same amount. Total harvests were for group member ‘B’ 46, for ‘E’ 48, for ‘A’ 50, for ‘D’ 52 and for ‘F 54. In the high variance condition harvests differed markedly between the other group members. Group member ‘B’ harvested extremely modest with 11 points, ‘E’ moderately modest with 28 points, ‘A’ was an average harvester with 50 points, ‘D’ harvested moderately heavy with 72 points and group member ‘F‘ extremely heavy with 89 points.

The results of the first row in Table 3 indicate that over all conditions subjects were likely to prefer themselves most as prospective leader. As one can see from the results of the other rows this result holds more or less for all conditions: group member ‘C‘ is either preferred most or is as much preferred as the most preferred group member.

The results of the leader preference data reflect the idea that he, who understands the nature of the social dilemma task and who seems at the same time concerned about the well-being of his fellow group members, is preferred more as

112 C. G. Rutte and H . A. M. Wilke

Table 3. Average rankings for the leader's position; capitals are group members

Overall

Overuse condition B(") 2.2

Optimum use condition A(") 2.7

Underuse condition CW 2.1

High variance condition C(") 2.5

Low variance condition Ccd) 2.4

3.2 CC") 2.2

(P)(b)(c)(d)Means within the same row which have a different index differ significantly from one another, p < 0.05.

leader. The results of the overuse condition (see second row of Table 3) suggest that the two modest harvesters are preferred as leader and the two heavy harvesters are rejected. The overuse subjects may have rejected the heavy harvesters because they thought that these group members either did not understand the nature of the task or that they did understand the nature of the task but were disloyal to the group. Both notions seem to disqualify a person as prospective leader. The same reasoning may be applied to the preferencesof the subjects in the other useconditions. In the optimum use condition (see third row of Table 3) the two extreme harvesters are rejected as leader. The extremely modest harvester 'B' is not preferred because he possibly did not understand the nature of the task. The same may hold for the extremely heavy harvester ' F and in addition he may be accused of being disloyal to the group by taking too much. In the underuse condition (see fourth row of Table 3) the modest harvesters 'B' and 'E' are least preferred, because they contributed so heavily to the underuse of the common resource, which may be attributed to their lack of understanding of the task.

That subjects indeed used the harvest behaviour of the other group members as the relevant information in the ranking for the leader's position, seems plausible from the two bottom rows of Table 3. It can be seen that the means in the low variance condition differ less from one another than the means in the high variance condition. In the low variance condition all other group members harvested approximately the same. Subjects have no basis here to prefer one group member more than another.

Evidence was found for Homans' (1974) hypothesis that subjects are more inclined to prefer group members as leader who are most similar in harvest behaviour to the subject. This appears from the correlations between the leader preference ranks and a similarity index, which consisted of the difference between the total harvest of the fellow group member and the total harvest of the subject.

Social dilemmas 113

Table 4. Correlations between rankings for the leader's position and similarity to group member 'C'

Use conditions Variance conditions Over Optimum Under

High 0.54' 0.43' 0.52* (n = 80) (a = 80) (a = 90)

(n = 75) (n = 85) (n = 75) L O W 0.16 0.01 - 0.07

'Significant at 0.001 level.

Table 4 shows that for the high variance subjects in all use conditions these correlations are positive and significant, indicating that the more a group member is similar in harvest behaviour to the subject the more he is preferred as leader by the subject. This is not the case for the low variance subjects, which may be explained by the fact that in the low variance condition the total harvest behaviours of the fellow group members are perceived to be identical.

Leader-role anticipations

After subjects had had the opportunity to elect a leader and made their leader- choice in case a leader was opted for by the majority of the group, a number of questions about anticipations concerning the effects of leader's behaviour were asked, to be answered on seven point scales. These questions concerned the efficiency with which the pool would be managed by the leader, the amount of points the leader would allocate to the subject personally and the fairness of allocat-ion of outcomes to the various group members by the leader.

A use by variance analysis of variance revealed that (a) over all conditions subjects anticipate the pool to be managed more efficiently with a leader than was the case in the first session of the experiment. This anticipation was stronger in the overuse condition (M = 5.68) than in the optimum and underuse condition (M = resp. 4.97 and 4.73), F(2,94) = 6 . 2 9 , ~ C 0.03. (b) Subjects in the overuse condition anticipate their personal outcomes to increase slightly (M = 4.61), whereas subjects in the optimum and underuse condition anticipate their outcomes to decrease a little (M = resp. 3.16 and 3.12) compared to the first session of the experiment, F(2,95) = 1 2 . 2 2 , ~ < 0.001.

The above results show that all subjects, but most of all the overuse subjects, anticipate the leader to manage the common resource pool more efficiently than the leaderless group was capable of in the first part of the experiment. Moreover, the overuse subjects also anticipate their personal outcomes to become higher than in the first session; this was not the case for subjects in the other two use conditions.

The analysis of variance further revealed that all subjects anticipate that with a leader the distribution of harvest outcomes over the group members will be more equitable than in the first part of the experiment. This anticipation was stronger in the high variance than in the low variance condition (M = resp. 5.74 and 5.12), F(1,96) = 6.08, p < 0.02.

114 C. G. Rutte and H. A. M. Wilke

Table 5. Leader harvests per group member summed up over ten trials

Theore tically Use conditions advisable Actual Difference

Over 14.56 21.66 7.1* Optimum 45.45 46.15 0.7 Under 72.64 66.89 -6.0'

'Significant at 0.05 level.

Behaviour as leader

All subjects were told they had been elected leader. They were given a series of ten trials on each of which they had to allocate between zero and ten points to each of the members of the group. All leaders started with a resource pool of 300 points, the rate at which the pool replenished remaining the same as before.

Two research questions are relevant here: Do leaders efficiently acquire external outcomes for their group and do leaders restore risen inequities?

First, we will turn to the efficiency question. Under the assumption of an infinite sequence of harvest trials a leader would be efficient if he withdrew exactly so much from the resource that this resource could replenish itself each trial to a size of 300 points. In other words, an efficient leader is one who maximizes his harvests at the same time keeping the resource at its original level. In the overuse condition, where the resource replenishes at a rate of three per cent, an efficient leader should withdraw 14.56 points per group member over ten trials. In the optimum use condition, with a replenishment rate of ten per cent, a withdrawal of 45.45 points per group member over ten trials would be efficient. In the underuse condition, where the resource replenishes at a rate of 17 per cent, an efficient leader should withdraw 72.64 points per group member over ten trials. In Table 5 the theoretically efficient harvests and the mean actual harvests can be found.

It can be seen from Table 5 that leaders originating from an optimum use condition behave efficiently. Leaders originating from an overuse condition overuse the resource and leaders originating from an underuse condition underuse the resource.

Do leaders restore risen inequities? In order to answer this question we ranked the group members ordinally with respect to their preprogrammed harvest behaviour in the first session of the experiment. After ordering the group members ordinally we performed a use by variance by rank analysis of variance.

The results revealed two significant effects. First, there was a main effect for rank, F(5,87) = 6.93, p < 0.001, indicating that the more a group member harvested in the first session of the experiment, the less he was allocated by the leader in the second session. Second, there was an interaction concerning variance and rank, F(5,87) = 4 . 5 4 , ~ < 0.001, indicating that the leader restored risen inequities to a greater extent in the high variance condition (t = 5.02, p < 0.001) than in the low variance condition (t = 3 . 3 0 , ~ < 0.002). In this last condition all group members had harvested about the same amount. The relevant means can be found in Table 6.

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Table 6. Means of leader allocations relevant to the interaction between rank and variance

Variance

Group members High LOW Mean

(Extremely modest) ‘B’ 57.88 45.17 51.72 (Moderately modest) ‘ E 54.96 47.04 51.12 (Average) ‘A’ 45.62 44.04 44.86

(Extremely heavy) ‘F‘ 3 1.90 42.66 37.1 1 (Moderately heavy) ‘D’ 35.98 43.38 39.57

ADDITIONAL RESULTS

Although it is not the primary aim of this paper, our data allow us to investigate harvest behaviour in more detail. These data give some further insights in what actually happens in the various conditions before and after the subject became leader.

Individual harvest behaviour

In the first session of the experiment subjects harvested on an individual base during ten trials. A use by variance by trials analysis of variance was performed on these harvests. This analysis revealed three significant effects.

First, there was a linear effect for trials, F(1,91) = 3 2 . 7 6 , ~ < 0.001. This effect reflects the fact that harvest size tended to increase over trials.

Second, there was a main effect for use, F(2,91) = 3 6 . 3 8 , ~ < 0.001. This result suggests that the individual harvests were smaller in the overuse condition than in the optimum use condition and again smaller than in the underuse condition.

Third, there was an interaction between use and trials, F(2,91) = 7.03, p < 0.002. This result indicates that, while in the optimum use condition (f = 5.90, p < 0.001) and in the underuse condition (t = 3.55,~ < 0.001) harvest size tended to increase over trials, harvest size in the overuse condition remained more constant (? = 0.49). The means involved in this effect are graphed in Figure 1.

That the amount subjects harvested tended to increase in the optimum and underuse condition can be explained as follows: In both these conditions subjects always received feedback that the new pool level was 300 points. These subjects could therefore harvest as much as they wanted, without ever being confronted with a decreasing level of the resource pool. So, feeling that the resource could handle it, they indeed harvested more and more. This was not the case for the overuse subjects. They were confronted with an ever decreasing level of the resource and were clever enough not to accelerate the decrement of the pool by maintaining their harvest levels. Thus subjects responded and adapted to the level of the resource at a given trial.

The above reported results suggest that harvest behaviour in the various conditions is difficult to compare. The pool’s level was constant in the underuse and optimum use condition, whereas the pool’s level decreased in the overuse condi-

116 C. G. Rutte and H . A. M. Wilke

(Underuse)

112 314 516 7/0 9/10

Trials

Figure 1. Interaction concerning use conditions, trials and individual harvests. Trials are depicted on the horizontal axis; two adjacent trials taken together

tion. These differential pool levels are due to the different rate at which the pool replenished in the various conditions. in order to get some insight into how subjects responded to the behaviour of their fellow group members irrespective the rate at which the pool replenished, we did a new analysis in which we corrected the actual individual harvests for the theoretically advisable harvests given a replenishment rate. This analysis is justified if we assume that subjects are inclined to keep the level of the pool on 300 points, while maximizing at the same time their personal outcomes. The theoretically correct harvest in the overuse condition is 1.456 per trial per subject, in the optimum use condition 4.545 and in the underuse condition 7.264. After we subtracted these ‘correct’ harvests from subjects’ actual harvests, we performed a use by variance by trials analysis of variance, to see to which extent subjects in the various conditions deviated from theoretically advisable (i.e. ‘intelligent’) behaviour.

There was a main effect for triab, F(2,80) = 30.73,~ C 0.001; there was a main effect for use, F(2,80) = 16.54, p < 0.001; and, finally, there was an interaction concerning use and trials, F(2,80) = 6.59, p < 0.002. The means involved are graphed in Figure 2.

It is of importance to note the difference in ‘intelligence’ of behaviour between the various use conditions. The results in Figure 2 suggest that overuse subjects overuse the resource and underuse subjects underuse it. The optimum use subjects initially optimally use the resource. We have already seen that optimum and underuse subjects increase their harvests over time, due to an ever constant pool level.

From these results one can tentatively conclude that subjects were led by two motives in their individual harvests. First, subjects are ‘intelligent’ in adapting their harvest size to the rate at which the pool replenished; the lower the replenishment

Social dilemmas 117

3r (Optimum use condition)

(Underuse condition)

112 314 516 71 8 9/10

Figure 2. Interaction concerning use conditions, trials and corrected individual harvests. Trials are depicted on the horizontal axis; two trials taken together

rate, the lower their harvests (Figure 1). Second, subjects conform to the harvest behaviour of their fellow group members; where the others take too much they take too much themselves and where the others take too little they take too little (Figure 2).

Comparison of individual and leader harvest behaviour

Strictly speaking, we cannot compare harvest behaviour in the first session with harvest behaviour in the second session, since in the first session the subject was partly responding to the harvests of his fellow group members and the pool’s level, which were experimentally induced, whereas in the second session the situation is different. In the second session the subject has to allocate points to group members and has, in so far, only to do with himself; moreover, the subject’s behaviour is of direct influence on the level of the resource pool.

If we set aside this reservation, we may compare a subject’s behaviour in session one, where he was regular group member, with that of session two, where he was leader, by calculating subject’s harvest total in the first session and subject’s harvest total in the second session divided by six (group members). We used these totals in a use by variance by sessions analysis of variance. This analysis revealed two significant effects. There was a main effect for sessions, F(1,91) = 13.9 ,~ < 0.001. This effect suggests that subjects harvested in the second session as leader less than in the first session as regular group member. Second, there was an interaction concerning use and sessions, F(2,91) = 3 . 5 4 , ~ < 0.03. This interaction suggests that in the overuse and optimum use condition subjects harvested as leaders fewer points than as regular group members; this was not the case in the underuse condition where harvest behaviour remained about the same. The relevant means can be found in Table 7.

These results suggest that in the overuse and optimum use condition the leader restricts his harvest behaviour compared to his individual harvest behaviour. In both these conditions he was a regular group member harvesting more than was

118 C. G. Rutte and El. A. M. Wilke

Table 7. Means of harvest totals in session one and two relevant to the interaction between use conditions and sessions

Sessions

Use conditions First Second

Over 32.74 2 1.66 Optimum 58.45 46.15 Under 67.64 66.89

Total 158.83 134.60

theoretically advisable (see Figure 2). Thus, compared to his behaviour as regular group member a leader harvested more ‘intelligent’. That the leader did not restrict his harvest behaviour in the underuse condition seems to be logical: In the underuse condition there was no need to restrict harvest behaviour since as regular group member he was already harvesting less than the theoretically advisable amount.

DISCUSSION

The data on the vote to elect a leader replicate data of Messick et af. (1983). Messick et al.’s and our results show that if a leaderiess group does not efficiently deal with its external environment, resulting in the depletion of a common resource, a strong need for a leader will arise. Moreover, our data show that with large inequities in harvest behaviour group members are unsatisfied with outcome differences and consequently are more ready to opt for a leader.

In the Messick et al. study no significant effect for inequity was found. This greater effect of inequity in our study is due to a stronger inducement of inequity in the present study; we increased the variance differences between the high and the low variance condition compared to the Messick et al . study. Thus, in our study the central hypothesis-greater need for a leader with greater inefficiency of the group and greater inequity within the group-is supported.

It should be noted that inefficiency of a group only plays a role if it results in the depletion of a common resource, which is elucidated by the fact that overuse subjects are more inclined to opt for a leader than optimum and underuse subjects.

The data on the leader-role anticipations suggest that overuse subjects are more inclined to opt for a leader in order to realize a better management of the pool and in order to increase the level of personal harvest outcomes. Subjects in the underuse and optimum use conditions, on the other hand, are afraid that electing a leader will provide them smaller personal harvests.

High variance subjects vote more often for a leader than low variance subjects. The data on the leader-role anticipation show that high variance subjects do so in order to establish fairness.

The above-mentioned results seem to support Homans’ (1974) notion that the leader’s external function is to realize sufficient outcomes, while his internal func-


tion is to be fair. If a leaderless group is not able to deal adequately with these requirements, then a need for a leader arises. When a leader is appointed, then one anticipates that he efficiently provides external outcomes and that he takes care of a fair distribution of outcomes over all group members.

Looking at the data concerning which group member is preferred as leader, we may tentatively conclude that one prefers group members who are most likely to live up to one’s own values. This explains possibly why one prefers mostly oneself as leader. Next, one prefers those group members who presumably share the same values, i.e. group members similar in behaviour. Moreover, one prefers group members who have shown to be competent in performing the task and who have shown to be concerned about the group. The present study does not provide evidence about the relative importance of variables as similarity, competence and concern for the group, which may be investigated in future research. Another interesting question is if the motives we derived from the election of a leader data are shared by the subjects, which may easily be investigated in a study in which the motives for a certain leader choice are explicitly asked for. Also, it would be interesting to investigate whether a subject will still mostly prefer himself as leader if he feels totally incompetent with respect to the task.

Above we explained the fact that subjects mostly prefer themselves as leaders by assuming that of ail group members subjects will judge themselves most likely to live up to their own values. An alternative explanation for this finding is that in general having more control is more preferable than having less control over environmental outcomes and group members’ behaviour (see e.g. Mulder’s (1972) power theory).

The data on the actual leader behaviour indicate that leaders, at least partly, live up to their functional role requirements. Leaders are fair, in the sense that they, depending on the circumstances, evenly distribute outcomes over group members or restore risen inequities. The data concerning the leader’s efficiency are more complicated. Over all conditions leaders restrict their harvest behaviour compared to their previous individual harvest behaviour. But only in the optimum use condition leaders deal efficiently with the common resource in a way guaranteeing optimal outcomes for the group. In the other two use conditions leaders do not deal entirely efficiently with the common resource and leaders originating from an overuse condition overuse the resource and leaders originating from an underuse condition underuse the common resource. A possible explanation for this finding is that leaders conform to what they possibly perceive as the group’s norm.

A weakness of the present design is the fact that harvest behaviour in the first and second session is difficult to compare. This is so, because (a) these sessions are not balanced over time; an increase in efficiency while dealing with the commons may therefore be attributed to a learning effect (b) subjects in the first session received bogus feedback about the behaviour of others as well as about the consequences of others’ and own behaviour for the maintenance of the resource; in the second session subjects received factual feedback about the consequences of their own allocation behaviour for the maintenance of the resouce (c) subjects in the first session were regular group members and had to take into account the behaviour of the other group members, while in the second session they were elected to leadership and had to take into account only their own behaviour. These design problems can be partly overcome by using a between-subjects instead of a within-subjects

120 C. G. Rutte and H. A. M. Wilke

design for the comparison of regular group member’s and leader’s harvest behaviour.

We believe that the present social dilemma paradigm has great potential for the study of group interaction, as well as for the study of leadership emergence. We indicated elsewhere (Rutte and Wilke, in press) that in small group research authors assume that group members are ‘mutually dependent’ and are ‘committed to mutual goals’. The nature of this interdependency, however, which may, according to Thibaut and Kelley (1959)’ have many forms and consequences, is not very well defined in most studies. We think that the social dilemma paradigm meets the requirement of a well defined interdependent relationship in groups. Moreover, the social dilemma character of many social situations (see Dawes, 1980) make research conclusions also relevant for our knowledge of the solutions of many practical problems.

In our recent paper (Rutte and Wilke, in press), where we reviewed the literature on the transition to the leader’s role, we argued that this literature exclusively dealt with individual factors preceding role transition. In the present study we have been able to demonstrate that also group factors precede the transiton of one of the group’s members to the leader’s role.

There are more questions that can be subjected to experimental test in this social dilemma pardigm. We already mentioned some before and will add here a final one. It would be interesting to study how regular group members react on the leader’s behaviour. We would suggest, inspired by the present results, that as long as the leader is behaving efficiently and fair, his power position will not be chal- lenged by his followers. However, when the leader is inefficient and unfair, his chances of being rejected as leader will increase. Such a study may not only contri- bute to our knowledge of equity on a group level, but may also increase our knowledge of why some leaders are supported and other leaders are rejected.

REFERENCES

Adams, J. S. (1965). ‘Inequity in social exchange’. In: Berkowitz, L. (Ed.) Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Academic Press, New York.

Austin, W. (1977). ‘Equity theory and social comparison processes’. In: Suls, J. M. and Miller, R. L. (Eds) Social Comparison Processes, Hemisphere Publishing Corporation, Washington.

Dawes, R. M. (1980). ’Social dilemmas’, Annual Review of Psychology, 31: 169-193. Goodman, A. (1971). ‘The analysis of multidimensional contingency tables: stepwise proce-

dures and direct estimation methods for building models for multiple classification’, Tech- nometrics, 13: 33-62.

Hardin, G. J. (1968). ‘The tragedy of’ the commons’, Science, 162: 1243-1248. Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviarhan, Dent, London. Hollander, E. P. and Julian J. W. (1969). ‘Contemporary trends in the analysis of leadership

processes’, Psychological Bulletin, 71: 387-397. Homans, G. C. (1974). Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,

Inc., New York. Katz, D. and Kahn, R. L. (1966). The Social Psychology ofOrganizations, John Wiley and

Sons, Inc. New York. Messick, D. M., Wilke, H., Brewer, M. B., Kramer, R. M., Zemke, P. E. and Lui, L. (1983).

individual adaptations and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44: 294-309.


Mulder, M. (1972). Het spel on macht, Boom, Meppel. Ridgeway, C. L. (1981). ‘Nonconformity, competence, and intluence in groups: A test of

Rutte, C. G. and Wilke, H. A. M. (in press). ‘Transition to the leader’s role’. In: Allen, V.

Smith, A. (1976). An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes ofthe Wealth of Nations, Strahan

Thibaut, J. W. and Kelley, H. H. (1959). The Social Psychology of Groups, Wiley, New

two theories’, American Sociological Review, 46: 333-347.

and van de Vliert, E. (Eds) Role Transitions: Explorations and Explanations.

and Caddell, London.

York.

Cette recherche prksente une situation de dilemme suivant un plan exptrimental 3 x 2. Le premier facteur correspond B l’usage des ressources communes (abus, usage optimum, Sous- emploi); le second, a I’homogknkitk des comportements: variabilitt faible ou forte. Le point de vue de Homans suivant lequel les leaders ont une double fonction: distribuer

de manDre equitable les ressources entre les membres du groupe (fonction interne) et agir de maniere efficace sur l’environnement (fonction externe) se trouve confirmt.

Dans la condition ob les sujets Ctaient amenes ii croire que les autres membres du groupe abusaient des ressources communes, plus de sujets accepttrent de laisser ii un leader la gestion des ressources communes que dans les autres conditions. De m b e , un leader fut plus souvent choisi dans la condition ‘forte variabilite’ que dans la condition ‘variabilitt faible’. Dans tous les cas, les sujets avaient choisi des leaders semblables B eux, compttents et soucieux du groupe. En agissant comme leaders, les sujets Btaient plus modCrBs que s’ils ttaient de simples membres. Enfin, les leaders distributrent les profits de maniere tquitable entre les membres du groupe.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

In dieser Untersuchung wurden die Vpn in eine Lage versetzt, die man als soziales Dilemma bezeichnen konnte. Zwei Variabeln wurden experimental behandelt: Verbrauch und Var- iabilitat.

Ein drittel der Vpn wurde dahin informiert, dass die iibrigen Gruppenmitglieder die gemeinsamen Vorrite iiberbeanspruchen, einer zweite Gruppe wurde vorgegeben, dass die Gruppenteilnehmer die Vorrate zu wenig beanspruchten und die ubrigen Vpn glaubten, dass die Gruppe die Vorrate optimal nutze. Die Halfte der Vpn nahm an, dass die ubrigen Gruppenmitglider ungefahr dieselben Ernetresultate erzielten (wenig Variabilitat), wahrend die andere Halfte der Vpn meinte, die Ernteresultate seien sehr verschieden (starke Var- iabilitat).

Die Annahme Homas, wonach dem Leader eine interne Funktion-gerechte Verwaltung und Verteilung des gemeinsamen Gutes-und eine externe Funktion-wirkungsvolles Beeinflussen der Umgebung-zukommt, kann als bestatigt betrachtet werden. In der Situa- tion der Ueberbeanspruchung der Vorrate durch die Gruppenmitglieder waren mehr Vpn geneigt, die Verwaltung der gemeinsamen Vorrate einem Leader zu iibertragen als in den andern Gruppen. Zudem kam in der Situation der starken Variabilitat die Notwendigkeit eines Leaders starker zum Ausdruck als in der Situation mit wenig Variabilitat. In der Leaderposition waren die Vpn gerechter und vorsichtiger bei der Verteilung der gemeinsamen Vorrate als gewohnliche Gruppenmitglieder. In allen Experimentalsituationen neigten die Vpn dazu, entweder sich selbst, ihnen ahnliche, kompetente oder gruppenbewusste Mitglieder in die Leaderposition zu bringen.

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Social dilemmas and leadership