Social Construction (1)

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Identity, the Group, and the Social Construction of Reality

David P. Levine

Graduate School of International Studies

University of Denver

Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society4,1: pp. 81!1 "Sprin# 1!!!$

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%o&ever i'portant esta(lishin# a relationship &ith reality 'ay (e for the

individual)s survival, &e should never underesti'ate the dan#er individuals perceive reality

to pose for the'. *he dan#er to &hich I refer here is not the dan#er of this or that version

of reality, (ut of reality itself, &hich is to say of a sphere of e+istence outside the

individual)s su(ective control. -ecause of the threat reality poses, the individual)s life

proect as often as not (eco'es that of dis'issin# reality rather than livin# creatively in

relation to it.

ur a'(ivalence to&ard reality is no&here (etter e+e'plified than in the idea that

"social$ reality is /socially constructed./ *his idea atte'pts to deny social reality any clai'

to o(ectivity #rounded in a relationship &ith natural i'peratives, for e+a'ple as their

sy'(olic e+pression. 0t the sa'e ti'e, ho&ever, that social construction e'phasies the

sui generis2uality of social reality, it also calls into 2uestion those 2ualities that could

'a3e our social (ein# real: that it is nonar(itrary, and that it endures. If it does not endure,

in &hat sense is it real 5ould it not (e (etter, then, in thin3in# a(out the e+perience of the

social &orld, to focus attention on its contin#ency and indeter'inacy "-ha(ha 1617$

0 specific application of the idea that social reality is /constructed/ is of special

i'portance: its application to understandin# the individual. *o understand reality as a

social construct 'eans to understand the individual as a social construct, as a 'eetin# point

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of socially produced identities. -ut, social construction has 'ore si#nificance than this. 0t

the sa'e ti'e that it locates the individual in the intersection of social identities, it also

su##ests a proect, &hich is to under'ine the definition of the individual on the (asis of

identity. *his proect is supported (y the ud#'ent that identity is on the surface, and does

not reach do&n to the depths of our (ein# "-ha(ha 48$. Identity is on the surface (ecause it

is a product of the &ay &e are seen (y others.

*he de'and of identificationthat is, to (e for an therentails the

representation of the su(ect in the differentiatin# order of otherness.

"-ha(ha 4$

*his association (et&een identity and (ein# for other is the first indication that identity, and

thus our social construction as the 'eetin# point of identities, is i'posed on us, and is a

for' of deprivation, thou#h &hat &e are deprived of is not clearly e+pressed.

5e 'i#ht sur'ise that identity is connected to &hat Donald 5innicott refers to as

the /false self/ since, li3e the false self, identity is 'eant to hide &hat is vital. 0nd, li3e the

false self, identity is (ein# for other as true self is (ein# for self. Since identity places us in

the /differentiatin# order of otherness/ &e can only escape the deprivation i'plied in (ein#

identified as the /other/ (y (eco'in# invisi(le to those in &hose eyes &e are other. *hus,

those points &here &e cannot (e seen and &here &e pass (eyond identity are of special

i'portance.

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9ach ti'e the encounter &ith identity occurs at the point at &hich

so'ethin# e+ceeds the fra'e of the i'a#e, it eludes the eye, evacuates the

self as site of identity and autono'y and'ost i'portantleaves a resistant

trace, a stain of the su(ect, a si#n of resistance. "-ha(ha 4!$

*his connection of identity to (ein# for other is vital, as is the dou(t e+pressed that

havin# an identity can (e anythin# 'ore than the loss of "true$ self. 0s &e &ill see, the

connection ust referred to incorporates a si#nificant ud#'ent a(out the &ay identity

depends on reco#nition, ust as it incorporates a si#nificant ud#'ent a(out the i'plication

of the effort to 'a3e social (ein# real.

Insistin# that identity depend on ho& &e are seen (y others 'a3es identity

contin#ent on conte+t, &hich 'a3es it less real than it appears &hen &e i'a#ine that

identity is an endurin# internal 2uality of the individual. *hus, the social construction of

reality 'eans (oth the do'ination of the individual (y his or her identities and the

contin#ency of identity. Identity is an over&hel'in# reality for the individual, and yet in

another sense it is no reality at all, (ut only appearance "for others$. *he effort to co'(ine

t&o opposed 2ualities in this &ay tells us so'ethin# vital a(out the idea that social reality

and thus social identity are socially constructed. *his idea of social construction actually

incorporates t&o ideas: that &e e+ist only in the eyes of others, and that to e+ist in the eyes

of others is to lose so'ethin# vital a(out e+istence. *here is in this (oth a profound need

for and fear of (ein# identified, &hich is to say, (ein# 3no&n (y others.

2.

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ur concern here is &ith reality, and 'ore specifically &ith social reality. *his

'eans that our concern is &ith the e+istence and status of a sphere outside the individual)s

su(ective (ein#. 5hat 'a3es so'ethin# real, then, is this 2uality of (ein# e+ternal. Put

another &ay, &hat is real endures independently of our "individual$ su(ective attitude

to&ard it, for e+a'ple our desire for it or our hatred of it. *o (e e+ternal, and thus to

endure independently of, also places reality outside the control of the su(ect. *his 'eans

that reality e+ists only so far as su(ect and o(ect are separate. 0n attac3 on reality is an

attac3 on the separateness of the o(ect, &hich is an effort to su(su'e the o(ect into the

inner &orld, the &orld of hatred and desire, of hope and fear.

Social reality poses a special pro(le' insofar as its e+ternality to the su(ect is not

derivative of any physical opposition. Indeed, (ecause it is real thou#h not 'aterial, &e can

say that social reality is su(ective. *his does not 'ean that it e+ists at the &hi' of, or is

controlled (y, the su(ect, (ut only that it is in so'e sense the o(ective e+istence of hu'an

su(ectivity. *he 2uestion re'ains a(out the nature of this hu'an su(ectivity that

(eco'es o(ective as social reality.

*he su(ective 2uality of social reality is so'eti'es attri(uted to its (ein#

controlled (y a collective su(ective, especially a #roup. *he idea of social construction

endo&s the social &ith a special 'eanin#, one that 'a3es it contin#ent on historically or

culturally specific fra'e&or3s for interaction, especially fra'e&or3s instantiated in #roup

constitutin# 'odes of co''unication. *hus, as one student puts it, /discourse is the

process throu#h &hich social reality co'es into (ein#/ "9sco(ar ;!$.


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Discourse #ains its stren#th fro' its rootin# in the interests of #roups &hose po&er

is protected (y their a(ility to control &hat is said and thou#ht (y controllin# the 'ediu'

throu#h &hich spea3in# and thin3in# ta3e place. *here is, of course, a pro(le' in this

since, if discourse constructs the social, then it 'ust also construct the #roup, &hich 'eans

that it cannot si'ply (e the e+pression of the #roup)s interests. Indeed, the notion of

discourse 'a3es do'ination less a 'atter of individual or #roup action and intent, 'ore a

'atter of adoptin# a 'ode of co''unication= it constitutes, rather than si'ply servin# the

interests of, the su(ect of po&er. /Discourse trans'its and produces po&er= it reinforces

it, (ut also under'ines and e+poses it, renders it fra#ile and 'a3es it possi(le to th&art it/

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atte'pts to use &hat is outside to achieve psychic ends.

?onsider, for e+a'ple, proection, the process (y &hich &e attri(ute our feelin#s

and selfstates to others. Proection attri(utes 2ualities of the su(ect to the e+ternal &orld.

*hese 2ualities, since they are not in the &orld (ut in the su(ect)s e+perience of it, are not

real. Proections can (e 'ade 'ore real if &e not only e+perience our feelin#s and self

states outside ourselves, in others, (ut also provo3e others to have those feelin#s and states.

If &e are successful in this, then our su(ective e+perience (eco'es so'ethin# alien fro'

"outside of$ us. @ust as our su(ective life (eco'es so'ethin# outside ourselves, so the

e+ternal &orld no& (eco'es essentially su(ective, havin# only those 2ualities &e put into

it. *hus, &e are no lon#er an#ry or afraid, others are. -ut others 'ust (e 'ade an#ry or

afraid so that &e &ill not (e, or &ill not 3no& that &e are. *hen, others serve a su(ective

end of ours and not ends of their o&n= they are not an o(ective reality for us. 0t the sa'e

ti'e, since they contain our su(ective e+perience of our selves and our &orld, &e have lost

(oth our su(ectivity and the o(ectivity of the e+ternal &orld.

*o su''arie, proection can (e involved in our e+perience of the outside &orld=

(ut it can also (e involved in our atte'pt to create &hat is real for us. In the latter case,

proection, or &hat is so'eti'es ter'ed proective identification, is construction of reality,

&hich involves the need to control o(ects in the outside &orld so they act as appropriate

containers for &hat ori#inates &ithin us. *he distinction (et&een e+periencin# our feelin#s

outside and controllin# the outside &orld so that it validates our proections and

identifications is an i'portant one since it is the latter that involves shapin# institutions and

interactions.

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*o understand this possi(ility, &e need to thin3 of institutions servin# a psychic

purpose additional to, or even in place of, the ostensi(le purpose &ith &hich they are

nor'ally associated.1 *his psychic purpose can include the validation of the

psychodyna'ic processes participants e'ploy to deal &ith psychic conflict. 5hile

individuals 'ay see3 to, and so'eti'es succeed in, controllin# o(ects in &ays that serve

psychic need, esta(lishin# institutions and #roups &ith the purpose of 'aintainin# control

over o(ects ta3es the process a step further. *his is (ecause of the special po&er

institutions and #roups have to create a su(stitute reality. *his su(stitute reality has an

i'portant 2uality, one that &e often confuse &ith the 2uality of (ein# real: it carries the

a#ree'ent of the #roup. 5e &ill not (e surprised, then, if &e find 'any students ar#uin#

that the only reality is the one sanctioned (y the #roup, &hich is assu'ed to create reality.

*his i'plies that reality can (e &hatever the #roup &ills it to (e. *his creation of reality is

also, ho&ever, the destruction of reality. *hat is, creation of reality (y and for the #roup is

'eant to displace any reality that 'i#ht e+ist for the individual outside the #roup. *he

po&er of #roups and institutions, then, is that they can dis'iss, and even destroy, reality, so

far as reality e+ists apart fro' and stands a#ainst #roup consciousness.

In psychodyna'ic accounts, #roups consist of face to face encounters (et&een

individuals "-ion, Aern(er#, 0lford$. In these accounts, a /lar#e/ #roup is still s'all

enou#h to 'eet to#ether in ti'e and space. Groups of this 3ind can and do create their o&n

realities, even ele'ents of their o&n discourse, (ut the realitycreatin# po&er of #roups to

&hich those co''itted to the social construction idea refer is not restricted to, or pri'arily

a 'atter of, #roups of this sort. *he #roups that construct social reality are 'ore a(stract,

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even ideal: ethnic #roups, co''unities, classes, and so on.


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5e can (e so'e&hat 'ore specific a(out the ideal 2uality of the transcendent

#roup. *he core idea of the #roup is an idea a(out identity, one that 'a3es havin# an

identity a 'atter of ta3in# on contin#ent 2ualities &hose 'eanin# is that they esta(lish the

individual not as an individual (ut as a 'e'(er. *he si#nificance of the concrete attri(utes

that constitute #roup identity lies in their 2uality of (ein# shared. It is not so 'uch &hat

they are, &hich in the end does not really 'atter, (ut that they are i'posed on the 'e'(er

as the price of (elon#in#. *his 2uality transfor's those contin#ent 2ualities fro'

'eanin#less accidents to #roup constitutin# ideals= it ta3es the' fro' the concrete to the

a(stract.

5e can say that #roup identity is i'posed on the 'e'(ers, and in this sense is a

(urden for the'. *he idea of identity as a (urden recalls the criti2ue of identity &ith &hich

I (e#an this discussion. *o adopt a #roup identity is to (e for other. *hus t&o 2ualities of

identity &or3 to#ether: that it endures and in this sense is real, and that it esta(lishes #roup

'e'(ership, and thus 'eans (ein# for other.

*he idea of identity also endo&s identity, so far as it connects us to a #roup, &ith a

'oral si#nificance. 5hat 'a3es the #roup an ideal is the attach'ent of 'oral ud#'ent to

its concrete &ay of (ein#, &hich in the a(sence of such 'oral ud#'ent has no reality for

the individual or the #roup, and re'ains contin#ent, even ephe'eral. *he connection of

'oral ud#'ent to the constitution of the #roup follo&s fro' the psychic 'eanin# of the

#roup, &hich is that the #roup represents for the 'e'(er the prospect of attainin# a state of

connectedness. Psychically, connection is &hat is #ood= the #ood o(ect is the o(ect that is

and re'ains connected to the child and in that connection affir's the child)s #oodness.

-ad refers psychically to disconnected, &hich is to say reected. f course, (ein# (ad is

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initially the #round for disconnection. *hen, (ein# (ad causes disconnection, ust as (ein#

#ood causes connection. Bet, that it provo3es or disrupts connection 'a3es an action #ood

or (ad, so the ter's can (e thou#ht to refer to the t&o states, connected and disconnected.

*he #roup taps into this psychic 'eanin#, and indeed is shaped in relation to it. -ecause of

this, the #roup is inherently, and inevita(ly, a 'oral construct. *he reality that the #roup

see3s to instantiate is a 'oral reality, a per'anent connection that 'a3es the 'e'(ers

per'anently #ood "and (y the sa'e lo#ic, 'a3es those &ho are not 'e'(ers (ad$.

5hat 'a3es the 'oral reality of the #roup real is that it transcends the individual in

ti'e and in space. In this sense, the 'oral reality of the #roup e+ists outside the individual,

and is real. 5e can see this di'ension of #roup e+perience in the e+cessive effort #roups

underta3e to preserve o(ects, 'e'ories, 'yths, and &ays of life throu#h ti'e. nly (y

preservin# o(ects, 'e'ories, and 'yths can they (e endo&ed &ith the 2uality of (ein#

real, a 2uality they 'ust have if the #roup itself is to (e real. 5e can say of #roups of the

sort &ith &hich &e are concerned here that they ta3e the concrete interactions and &ays of

life e+perienced (y individuals and constitute the' as a(stract ideals of conduct and

e+perience. -ut, &e can also reverse the relation and spea3 of the individual)s day to day

e+periences as instantiations of the ideals that &e associate &ith the #roup. *his is the

sense in &hich the #roup precedes, and can (e said to constitute, the 'e'(er. 5hat &e

really 'ean in spea3in# this &ay is that the ideal "&hich is the transcendent #roup$ #overns

the individual)s day to day life, or vital di'ensions thereof.

Spea3in# of discourse as the reality of the #roup, and thus of discourse as

do'inatin# life, fits this &ay of thin3in# &ell enou#h. Bet, spea3in# this &ay also tends to

o(scure the sense in &hich &e are spea3in# of a #roup. 5hy not si'ply refer to ideals, or

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to discourse centered on ideals ?an &e distin#uish ideals that constitute #roup do'ination

of the individual fro' ideals that do not I return to this 2uestion further on.

-efore pursuin# the possi(ility that social reality 'i#ht 'ean so'ethin# other than

the reality of the #roup, &e should consider &hy the individual i'a#ines that the #roup has

a special po&er to create reality, especially if the individual does not. *he ans&er to this

2uestion involves the fantasy of o'nipotence that e+ists at the center of the notion of the

creation ofreality. 5hether &e i'a#ine reality can (e created (y acts of individual &ill, or

only (y a putative #roup &ill, in either case &e i'a#ine that &ill can create reality. *his

'eans that, for us, reality is not so'ethin# outside, (ut a part of that sphere &ithin &hich

our su(ectivity e+erts control. *his is the sphere of fantasy, &here &e do indeed create a

"su(stitute$ reality. 5hat constitutes this sphere is the pri'ary fantasy: that &e can create

reality (y &ishin# and &illin#.

5e can ans&er the 2uestion posed a(ove a(out &hy the individual i'a#ines that

the #roup can create reality if he or she cannot, then, in t&o &ays.


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e+hi(it a /chronic overdependence on e+ternal o(ects/ "1;$. *heir need to control o(ects

follo&s fro' this overdependence on the', since this overdependence 'a3es the o(ect)s

response to, and e+perience of, the individual a selfconstitutin# or selfdestroyin#

e+perience. *o assure that the o(ect)s response to and e+perience of the individual are

consistent &ith his or her "psychic$ survival, that e+perience and response 'ust (e

controlled.


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&ith the an+iety such conflict creates. *his conclusion &ould find support, as &e have

seen, in the effort underta3en (y such individuals to esta(lish #roup reality. Bet, in sayin#

this, &e should not lose si#ht of the dan#er reality poses for individuals, includin# the

dan#er posed (y the hoped for and needed #roup reality.

*o see this, consider one i'plication so'eti'es attached to the idea of social

construction of reality, and &hich I e'phasie a(ove: that it 'a3es reality contin#ent. *his

contin#ency of social for's 'a3es the' 'allea(le. In so doin# it overco'es that 2uality

of institutions that poses a threat to those individuals 'ost in need of #roup reality: their

independence of our &ill. verdependence on o(ects ste's fro' the need to cope &ith

inner conflict (y esta(lishin# the su(ective in the &orld outside. *his 'a3es the o(ective

su(ective in a special sense: it incorporates it into the inner &orld, &hich is the &orld of

o'nipotent control. Should, ho&ever, the effort to constitute e+ternal reality as the

e+ternaliation of inner conflict (e too successful, should, that is, the real (eco'e

so'ethin# separate fro' the su(ect)s need, standin# a#ainst the su(ect, then it too 'ust (e

overco'e.

*hus, the social construction of reality enco'passes t&o radically opposed ideas,

&hich nonetheless share a co''on root. *he first involves the need to esta(lish the

su(ective 'eanin# of o(ects as their o(ective reality, &hich is their 'eanin# for others.

*he second is the need to assure that all e+ternal reality re'ains contin#ent on su(ective

need, and therefore ephe'eral. *he need to instantiate interaction so that its 'eanin# for

the individual can endure, and ta3e on a life to so'e de#ree independent of the transient

interactions &ith particular others, is also a need to institutionalie interaction. 0nd the

dan#er of the institution to the individual)s need for o'nipotent control re2uires that the

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individual attac3 the sa'e institutions created to #ive the sta'p of reality to su(ective

processes.

%o& does the individual cope &ith the contradiction ust considered *he solution

that follo&s fro' the ter's of the pro(le' is or#aniational chan#e "Levine Creativity$.

Su(ectin# or#aniations to a continual process of transfor'ation si'ultaneously

su(ordinates the' to the individual)s &ill &hile affordin# the individual the opportunity to

'a3e real the needed selfsupportin# interactions (y institutionaliin# the'. In li#ht of this

result, there is nothin# surprisin# in the ideolo#y of chan#e that do'inates institutions in

conte'porary society.

It is interestin# to note that the socially constructed reality, &hich see's, in contrast

to the prevailin# notions of &hat is real, to (e essentially su(ective, is not so for the

individual. >ather, the socially constructed reality confronts the individual as the loss of

su(ectivity, even if this loss is in a sense the individual)s o&n &or3. Indeed, as &e have

seen, this loss of su(ectivity is the purpose of the displace'ent of feelin#s and self

e+periences fro' self to other, a purpose &ellserved not only (y other individuals (ut (y

the other &e refer to as the #roup. 5hat the individual #ains (y the i'plied

i'poverish'ent of su(ective e+perience is a 3ind of po&er, or the illusion of po&er, over

the &orld. *his is the po&er to create reality (y assertion of #roup &ill. In other &ords,

su(ectivity is transferred fro' individual to #roup, &ith the e+pectation and hope that the

#roup su(ect &ill have the po&er to create reality, includin# the reality of the individual.

*he purpose of this ne&ly created reality is co'ple+, as &e &ill see. n one level, it is to

realie illusions of o'nipotence and fantasies of 'er#er. -ut, on another level, the purpose

of the ne&ly created reality is to 'a3e inevita(le the loss of su(ectivity that is the 'eanin#

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of the #roup for the individual. I return to this second di'ension of #roup e+perience

further on.

*here is an i'portant connection (et&een the i'pulse drivin# or#aniational

chan#e and the attac3 on identity associated &ith the idea of social construction considered

at the (e#innin# of this essay. *he i'pulse for or#aniational chan#e develops out of a

contradiction: on one side the need to instantiate interaction of a particular 3ind in order to

'a3e it real, on the other side the need to overco'e the (urden of this reality, &hich

challen#es the su(ect)s control over the o(ect. *he attac3 on identity develops out of the

(urden of "i'posed$ identification for the individual, &hich is overco'e "in thou#ht$ (y

'a3in# identity so'ethin# on the surface, a false self used to hide the real self fro' the

threatenin# #ae of the other. 5e 'ust, then, protect ourselves fro' our identity (y

'a3in# identity e+ternal, transient, and indeter'inate. eco#nition does not affir' an inner reality= it

creates and destroys reality for the individual. *hus, the attac3 on identity lin3s up &ith the

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attri(ution of a special po&er to reco#nition, and &ith the overdependence on o(ects

already considered.

*his special po&er is real, at least so far as &e consider the process (y &hich

identity is for'ed for the individual. 9arly in its develop'ent, the self lac3s the de#ree of

inte#ration needed to 'aintain its identity a#ainst potentially hostile e+ternal i'positions.

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assu'ption that identification is a defensive adaptation. *his assu'ption 'a3es

reco#nition an act that deprives rather than affir'in# the true self.

4.

*he transcendent #roup has its ulti'ate e+istence not in face to face interactions,

thou#h these are vital, (ut in the institutions created to esta(lish the per'anence of the

'eanin# for the individual that those interactions are 'eant to carry. Groups, then, e+ist

throu#h institutions or or#aniations, and they do so precisely in order to esta(lish their

reality, the reality of the ideals they e'(ody, and the reality of the 'e'(ers as constituted

&ithin the #roup. *he clai' associated &ith the idea of social construction is, of course,

that this reality is the only "social$ reality, that the individual is constituted as such only (y

displayin# #roup characteristics and conductin# hi' or herself in accordance &ith #roup

nor's. *he 2uestion is &hether this reality is the only reality, and further &hether it is a

reality deservin# of the na'e.

%o& 'i#ht &e understand another reality, the reality created not in the alienation of

su(ective e+perience, (ut in its retrieval (y the su(ect, and thus re'oval fro' the &orld

outside *he other reality, the reality not constituted (y and for the #roup, consists of

o(ects e+istin# in a &orld #enuinely outside the su(ectCs internal &orld and e+perience.

*his reality is &hat the individual finds &hen displaced feelin#s and selfe+periences are

retrieved fro' the o(ects used to contain the'.7 5hat the individual then finds re'ainin#

outside is real only in the sense that it is separate fro' and independent of his or her

control. *his reality 'ust (e dis'issed, even destroyed, if inner conflict is to (e dealt &ith

(y displace'ent of unaccepta(le content onto o(ects. *he su(ective purpose of #roups

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and institutions (eco'es, for those &hose psychic need includes control in the sense

considered here, to dis'iss this reality of a #enuinely e+ternal &orld of o(ects over &hich

the su(ect does not e+ert control. *his su(ective purpose can easily over&hel' the

ostensi(le purpose of #roups and institutions to solve pro(le's, satisfy needs, facilitate

individual creativity, and so on. *here are, then, t&o realities: the reality of control over

o(ects, and the reality of a &orld apart.

*he distinction ust dra&n applies directly to our understandin# of institutions.

Institutions can e+ist to facilitate the controlcreation of reality as a su(ective 'atter.

0lternatively, they can facilitate the individual)s effort to live in reality. *o live as an

individual in the &orld 'eans to have a su(ective life in t&o senses.


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5hy, then, do &e need a relationship &ith reality, and &hy does esta(lishin# such a

relationship pose a pro(le' for us

I a' spea3in# here of a psychic need. ?learly, the individual has a 'aterial need

for a relationship &ith reality since &ithout that relationship the individual &ill not survive.

Eonetheless, the reco#nition of reality (y the individual 'ust (e understood as a psychic

acco'plish'ent that serves a psychic need, ust as denial of reality is a retreat fro' that

acco'plish'ent, a retreat that also serves a psychic need. Let 'e (e#in &ith the need

served (y the denial of reality, then consider the need served (y the reco#nition of reality.

*o understand the need served (y dis'issin# reality, &hich is also the "psychic$

need served &hen &e atte'pt to su(stitute for it the #roup reality considered a(ove, &e

have to understand &hat the su(stitute reality constitutes a fli#ht fro'. @ohn Steiner

su##ests that denial of reality is denial of three funda'ental aspects of reality. ; *he first is

the ina(ility of the infant to create the #ood o(ect, &hich, therefore does not reside &ithin

hi' and is not under his control. *he second is the /painful e+perience of feelin# e+cluded

fro' the pri'al couple./ 0nd the third is the /fact of the reality of death/ "!4!$. 0ll of

these aspects of reality e+press the finiteness of life for the individual. *heir denial

e+presses fli#ht fro' the pain associated &ith reco#nition of the li'itations of the

individual, of his effectivity, creativity, and of his (ein# in the &orld.

*he relationship to reality involves dependence on that &hich is e+ternal to the

individual, and &hich he or she does not control. 5ithout the dependence on &hat is

outside, reality &ould have no "psychic$ 'eanin# for the individual. -ut, this dependence

is also a li'it. *o ac3no&led#e this li'it, &hich is to ac3no&led#e reality, constitutes a

loss. 0cceptin# this loss is not si'ply a 'atter of the inevita(le reco#nition of &hat is and

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of &hat &e are= rather, it follo&s fro' a psychic need for reality, &hich also 'ust (e

considered. *his psychic need is precisely the need to (e li'ited in re#ard to the infinite

possi(ilities of life. *his li'itednes is our (ein# so'ethin# finite, and therefore real.

-ein# finite 'eans #ivin# up all possi(ilities in order to realie one, or only a fe&.

0cceptance of li'its is also &hat &e 'ean (y havin# an identity, &hich is the

individual)s attach'ent to particular 2ualities. *o (e a self is to (e selfidentical, that is to

have continuity of (ein# across ti'e and space, &hich is also across differin# conte+ts of

interaction &ith others. *o have an identity, then, is an i'portant part of &hat it 'eans to

(e a particular person. nly throu#h (ein# so'ethin# finite and particular, therefore

li'ited, can personhood (e 'ade real. Individual identity is the reality of the individual in

the &orld "9ri3sonEgo Identity, von -roe'(son$.

0s &e have seen, the idea that reality is socially constructed contains the notion that

identity is contin#ent on conte+t. *his is the idea that &ho &e are varies &ith the

reco#nition others (esto& "or i'pose$ upon us, so it depends on the specific others &ith

&ho' &e interact at a particular ti'e and in a particular place. 0(ove, I connect this idea

to the /chronic overdependence on o(ects/ Aern(er# attri(utes to certain individuals. Bet,

&e can also see ho& this ud#'ent a(out identity, &hile placin# the individual under the

control of others, also li(erates the individual fro' any re2uire'ent that he or she (e

so'eone in particular, fro' the li'its associated &ith (eco'in# this particular person.

9ven as the idea that identity depends on conte+t su(ects the individual to the do'ination

of others and of #roups, it also e+presses the fantasy of o'nipotence in that it denies the

si#nificance of li'its to identity, that &ho &e have (eco'e li'its &ho &e can (e. Bet, in

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denyin# the li'its of identity, &e also lose so'ethin# i'portant, the possi(ility of 'a3in#

identity real for self and other.

5hat is si#nificant "psychically$ a(out #ainin# the reality of the finite self is that it

is the only &ay &e can (e real, and it is the only &ay &e can esta(lish for ourselves a

particular, distinct reality that is, in the end, ours and ours alone. *he ans&er to the

2uestion, then, &hat do &e need reality for, is that &e need it to (e our "separate$ individual

selves, and thus to have rather than to lose our su(ective lives. @ust as it is the desire for

separate (ein# that fuels the develop'ent of a relation to reality, it is the dan#er of

separation and loss that #ets in the &ay of our acceptin# reality, and that fuels the

'ove'ent to dis'iss reality or su(stitute for it so'ethin# 'ore tolera(le.

*he social construction of reality, understood in li#ht of these considerations,

constitutes a 'iddle point, or co'pro'ise, (et&een acceptance and denial of reality. It

neither co'pletely denies reality nor co'pletely accepts it. 4 *hose en#a#ed in #roup

reality of the 3ind considered a(ove e+press a need for others and for a dependence on an

e+ternal sphere. 0t the sa'e ti'e, they insist on 'aintainin# o'nipotent control throu#h

the #roup, and in this sense e+perience the #roup as a &ay of dis'issin# the reality of a

finite life and of the acceptance of li'its. Social construction, then, see3s to retain the

possi(ility of an e+ternal reality, &hile denyin# that doin# so li'its the su(ect. *his

contradiction is &ell e+pressed in the effort to see reality as 'ere appearance, as contin#ent

and indeter'inate. In this &ay, the idea that reality is socially constructed represents (oth

reco#nition of reality and an attac3 on it.

5e can thin3 a(out this co'ple+ relation to reality in the lan#ua#e of loss. *o

accept reality 'eans to lose the control over o(ects needed to use the' as containers for

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unaccepta(le parts of the self, &hich is also the loss of o'nipotence and of li'itless

possi(ilities. *he use of o(ects as containers for parts of the self i'poverishes the self at

the sa'e ti'e that it secures the self a#ainst the dependence associated &ith ac3no&led#in#

e+ternal reality. Givin# up control over o(ects secures the su(ect as a &hole person, a

particular individual, (ut one livin# &ithin the li'its of a separate reality on &hich he

depends and &hich e+ists independently of his &antin# and &illin#. 0cceptin# reality

'eans vie&in# the o(ect /'ore realistically, no lon#er distorted (y proections of the self,/

&ith the result that /the e#o is enriched (y reac2uirin# the parts of the self &hich had

previously (een disavo&ed/. *he vital ele'ent in acco'plishin# this end is 'ournin#,

since /it is throu#h 'ournin# that the proective identification is reversed and parts of the

self previously ascri(ed to the o(ect are returned to the e#o/ "Steiner ;$. If 'ournin#

reverses the ori#inal proection, it 'a3es the e+ternality of the &orld a reality for the

individual. If &e consider that, at a pri'itive level, /all e+perience of separateness F is

felt as a loss/ "7$, then &e can see ho& 'ournin# loss is (ound up &ith the acceptance of

reality.

*he si#nificance of loss for the construction of reality applies &ith special force to

the su(stitute reality associated &ith #roup e+perience. In this connection, &e can i'a#ine

that #roups are essentially a(out the denial of separation, and the refusal to 'ourn the loss

of o'nipotence. 0s


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*his last o(servation leads, once a#ain, to an i'portant conclusion a(out the

individual and the #roup, &hich is the threat the latter poses to the for'er "Aern(er#

?hapter 11$. *his is the threat of loss of identity, and the attendant dan#er associated &ith

the e'er#ence of pri'itive a##ression. *he loss of identity in the #roup not only poses a

threat to the 'e'(er= it also confir's that aspect of the 'e'(er)s psychic reality that is

or#anied around the loss of identity. *he #roup has the po&er not only to i'pose this loss

of identity on others as a &ay of copin# &ith envy, it has the po&er, or is hoped to have the

po&er, to 'a3e loss of identity an o(ective rather than a psychic reality. *his is, once

a#ain, the #roup)s po&er to destroy and create reality.

*he #roup 'a3es loss of identity an o(ective 'atter (y 'a3in# the e+perience of

loss the central ele'ent of #roup identity, so that the #roup is held to#ether (y shared loss.

*hus, the cele(ration of oppression, &hich is so co''on in #roups constituted (y the

e+perience of shared loss, see3s to turn deprivation into the positive (asis of identity. *his

'eans that &ithout the loss of identity, the individual has none. So, for e+a'ple, those

outside the #roup, &ho have not e+perienced the #roup)s constitutin# loss, are understood to

have an i'poverished self precisely (ecause they lac3 the e+perience of deprivation.

In this &ay, the #roup constituted around deprivation destroys the reality of

individual identity, and creates the reality of the loss of identity. *he cost of doin# so is not

only the loss of identity itself, (ut also the 'o(iliation of pri'itive a##ression and the

further dan#er this poses to the individual. *he increased dan#er and enhanced an+iety

provo3e pri'itive defenses, &hich typically play a lar#e role in #roup pheno'ena.

*he effort to control o(ects in the &orld denies, or see3s to overco'e, their

separateness fro' us. *his separateness of o(ects fro' us not only puts the' outside our

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sphere of control, it also esta(lishes a line that separates us as su(ects fro' o(ects outside.

*his line is the (oundary (et&een self and not self. *he stru##le over reality, &hich I have

here characteried as a stru##le (et&een t&o realities, i'plicates the esta(lishin# and

'aintainin# of self(oundaries. *o understand the 'eanin# of reality for the individual, &e

need to consider the (oundary (et&een &hat is internal to the individual)s 'ental life and

&hat is outside "Aern(er# 1$.

Social construction does not create reality= it creates, or atte'pts to create, a

su(stitute for reality &ithin &hich o(ects can (e controlled to the end of dealin# &ith

psychic conflict. @ust as the social construction of reality atte'pts to put a #roup reality

into place, it see3s to dis'iss, even destroy, the reality that e+ists for the individual &ho

ac3no&led#es rather than disavo&in# his or her feelin#s and selfe+perience, and &ho

ac3no&led#es rather then denyin# the loss of o'nipotence. *his loss can alone ena(le the

individual to reco#nie a #enuinely separate sphere of reality.

7.

If the reality that e'er#es &hen the illusions associated &ith the #roup are #iven up

is not /socially constructed,/ does this 'a3e it an e+pression of, or response to, natural

i'peratives 5hat is the 2uality of the reality that &e find &hen &e cease usin# o(ects as

containers for su(ective e+perience, and relate to the' as e+istin# outside our sphere of

control

5e 'i#ht ans&er the 2uestions ust posed (y considerin# the distinction (et&een

social reality and #roup reality, (et&een the construction of the social and the life of the

#roup. *his distinction can (e e+pressed in the lan#ua#e of culture understood as the

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concrete e+pression and 'anifestation of social (ein#. ?ulture can (e considered a #roup

reality, or it can (e considered a conte+t of 'eanin# in &hich the individual finds and

develops a uni2ue "individual$ identity. *o (orro& a phrase *svetan *odorov uses to

distin#uish types of nationalis', culture can (e a 'anifestation of #roup reality, or a

vernacular for an individual life "167, ;86$. *his is the difference (et&een a culture that

defines identity for the individual, includin# appropriate conduct and &ays of life, and a

culture that provides a conte+t for individual selfdeter'ination. In the for'er

interpretation, culture is irreduci(ly particular in that it li'its and ulti'ately deter'ines the

'eanin# of interaction for the 'e'(er. In the latter, culture is a &ay of e+pressin# ideas

and shapin# a life that includes possi(ilities as yet un3no&n: ideas yet unthou#ht, and &ays

of life yet to (e e+perienced. In this sense, treatin# culture as a vernacular 'eans treatin#

it as a 'ediu' for creativity and the e+pression of individual selfdeter'ination.

Institutions can instantiate interaction, and thus create an endurin# social reality (y

su(ordinatin# the individual to predeter'ined 'odes of conduct. *his is the social reality

of the "transcendent$ #roup, and of its do'ination over the individual)s identity.

0lternatively, institutions, rather than instantiatin# conduct and &ays of life in an effort to

'a3e real the 'e'(er)s fantasies and illusions, can afford the individual &hat 9ri3 9ri3son

refers to as the /freedo' of opportunities yet undeter'ined/ "Insight117$. *his includes

the freedo' to pursue a course of life e+pressive of a personal 'eanin#.


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particularly the disappearance of individual identity into #roup identity. *his dan#er is

overco'e either (y su('er#in# the institution into an endless cycle of or#aniational

chan#e, or (y transfor'in# it fro' an institution or#anied to instantiate interaction to one

or#anied to facilitate selfdeter'ination.

Institutions either create reality for the individual, or facilitate individual creativity.

*he social construction of reality is an e+pression of the for'er idea, one that ta3es it to (e

inevita(le. In this sense, for all its tal3 a(out overco'in# do'ination, the discourse of

social construction insists on, rather than 'appin# a path of escape fro', do'ination.

Endnotes

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Documents

Social Construction (1)