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Social Comparison as a Self-regulatoryMeasuring StickKevin P. McIntyre a & Donna Eisenstadt ba Trinity University , San Antonio , Texas , USAb Illinois State University , Normal , Illinois , USAPublished online: 07 Apr 2010.

To cite this article: Kevin P. McIntyre & Donna Eisenstadt (2011) Social Comparison as a Self-regulatory Measuring Stick, Self and Identity, 10:2, 137-151, DOI: 10.1080/15298861003676529

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Social Comparison as a Self-regulatory

Measuring Stick

KEVIN P. MCINTYRE

Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas, USA

DONNA EISENSTADT

Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois, USA

How do individuals assess the magnitude of their self-discrepancies? In this research,we suggest that social comparison operates as a self-regulatory measuring stick thathelps individuals assess where they stand relative to self-standards (ideal, ought, andfeared selves), and contributes to the experience of discrepancy-related emotions.Study 1 revealed that individuals high in social comparison orientation (SCO) reportideal and ought self-discrepancies larger in magnitude than those low in SCO. Study 2,which examined upward and downward comparison tendencies separately, demon-strated that chronic upward comparison predicts ideal and ought self-discrepancymagnitudes, whereas downward comparison predicts feared self-discrepancy magni-tude. Both studies indicate that social comparison tendencies are associated with theexperience of agitation, dejection, contentment and cheerfulness.

Keywords: Social comparison; Self-regulation; Self-discrepancies; Emotion.

On 7 August 1954 an Australian runner named John Landy ran a mile in under fourminutes which, at the time, was nearly unprecedented and made Landy one of thefastest mile-runners in the world. Despite this historic achievement, Landy was stilldisappointed in his performance because, although he was faster than almost everyliving person at the time, he came in second to Roger Bannister who finished the race0.8 seconds faster. Dejected, Landy returned to Australia and retired, at leasttemporarily, from competitive running. Landy’s reaction, we believe, makes salient apreviously under-emphasized aspect of self-regulation: How individuals perceivethemselves with respect to goals and self-standards often varies depending on thesocial context in which self-judgments are made. That is, insofar as self-regulationinvolves monitoring the self relative to desired and undesired self-states (i.e., self-discrepancies), and self-perceptions may be affected by the social context, individualperceptions of self-discrepancies—and the affect that results from these discrepan-cies—may also vary depending on the social context.

The notion that self-perceptions, in general, change as a result of social contextualfactors is not new. In the same year as Landy’s race, Festinger (1954) proposed the

Received 13 August 2009; accepted 6 November 2009; first published online 7 April 2010.

Correspondence should be addressed to: Kevin P. McIntyre, Department of Psychology, Trinity

University, One Trinity Place, San Antonio, TX 78212, USA. E-mail: kevin.mcintyre@trinity.edu

Self and Identity, 10: 137–151, 2011

http://www.psypress.com/sai

ISSN: 1529-8868 print/1529-8876 online

DOI: 10.1080/15298861003676529

� 2010 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

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theory of social comparison, which states that individuals learn about themselvesand subsequently alter their self-perceptions by comparing and evaluating theirtraits, abilities, and opinions against those of other people. Indeed, subsequentresearch has revealed that social comparison is one of the most important means bywhich individuals obtain self-relevant information, most likely because of the highavailability of social comparison information (Wood, 1989; Wood & Wilson, 2003).Opportunities for social comparison are ubiquitous and, as a result, socialcomparison often operates automatically and can even occur outside of awareness(e.g., Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995; Mussweiler, Ruter, & Epstude, 2004; Stapel &Blanton, 2004; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992). In addition to being readily available,social comparison is often more useful than other forms of feedback. Feedback fromothers is minimally diagnostic because people rarely give each other direct andhonest feedback, especially when that feedback would be negative in nature(Brickman & Bulman, 1977; DePaulo & Bell, 1996). Moreover, objective sources ofself-relevant information are less useful than social comparison, even when objectiveself-relevant information is available (which often it is not), because the meaning ofobjective feedback is frequently ambiguous devoid of a social context (Festinger,1954). In support of this notion, research has demonstrated that individuals seek outsocial comparisons even when objective information is available (e.g., Klein, 1997).

Given that social comparison is such an important source of self-relevantinformation, it seems likely that social comparison should affect the magnitude ofself-discrepancies that occur during self-regulation, which is the process by whichindividuals rely on feedback to move toward or away from various desired andundesired self-states, often referred to as goals or self-standards (Carver, 2004;Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1998; Karoly, 1993). Research on self-regulation hasrevealed that much of human behavior is motivated by the desire to attain goals andto avoid unfavorable ‘‘anti-goals’’ (e.g., Carver, 2004; Carver, Lawrence, & Scheier,1999; Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990, 1998; Eisenstadt & Leippe, 1994; Eisenstadt,Leippe, & Rivers, 2002; Higgins, 1987; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Ogilvie, 1987). Thesegoals can be concrete and immediate outcomes, such as eating more fruits andvegetables at dinner, or more abstract and distal, such as living a healthy lifestyle.

According to prominent models of self-regulation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981,1998; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Higgins, 1987), effective goal pursuit requires thatindividualsmonitor themagnitude of discrepancy between their present condition (i.e.,the actual self) and desired or undesired goal states. Higgins’ (1987, 1989) self-discrepancy theory differentiates between two types of desired end-states: (1) ideal self-guides, which comprise the set of qualities and outcomes that individuals would ideallypossess or attain; and (2) ought self-guides, which comprise the set of qualities andoutcomes that individuals feel they ought to possess or attain. Importantly, whenindividuals perceive that they are discrepant from each type of self-guide, theyexperience specific affective reactions depending on the type of discrepancy (Higgins,Bond,Klein,&Strauman, 1986;Higgins,Klein,&Strauman, 1985; Petrocelli & Smith,2005; Strauman & Higgins, 1988), although recent evidence examining this relation-ship has been mixed (e.g., Gramzow, Sedikides, Panter, & Insko, 2000; Tangney,Niedenthal, Covert, & Barlow, 1998). When they detect a discrepancy between theactual and ideal selves, individuals experience dejection-related emotions (e.g.,sadness, disappointment), whereas discrepancies between the actual and ought selveslead to the experience of agitation-related emotions (e.g., anxiety, tension). Moreover,the frequency and intensity of each of these emotional experiences is affected by themagnitude of self-discrepancies (Higgins et al., 1985, 1986), such that when individuals

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perceive a discrepancy between the actual and ideal or ought selves to be relativelylarge, they experience more intense dejection-related or agitation-related emotions,and do somore frequently, than when themagnitude of discrepancy is relatively small.

Building upon Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory, several researchers havearticulated the presence of a third self-guide that serves as a strictly undesired self-regulatory standard (Carver et al., 1999; Eisenstadt & Leippe, 1994; Eisenstadt, Hicks,McIntyre, Rivers, & Cahill, 2006; Ogilvie, 1987). For example, Markus and Nurius(1986), in their discussion of possible selves, described the role of the feared self, whichthey define as the collection of self-attributes that a person does not want, but fearsattaining. Similarly, Ogilvie (1987) described the undesired self, which representsnegative self-attributes that individualswouldneverwant to acquire.Research on thesenegative self-standards has shown that individuals are indeed motivated to avoidunfavorable outcomes and experience fewer negative emotions (Carver et al., 1999;Phillips, Silvia, & Paradise, 2007) and more positive emotions, such as contentmentand cheerfulness (e.g., Carver et al., 1999) as the discrepancy between the actual andfeared selves becomes larger. Moreover, some research has shown that discrepanciesfrom the feared self have a larger effect on the experience of emotion than ideal or oughtdiscrepancies (Heppen & Ogilvie, 2003; Ogilvie, 1987; Phillips et al., 2007).

How might social comparison affect perceptions of self-discrepancies and self-discrepancy-related emotions? We suggest that social comparison operates as a self-regulatory measuring stick, which allows individuals to size themselves up withrespect to their goals and self-standards. More specifically, social comparison mayaffect the magnitude of perceived self-discrepancies, as a result of the changes in theself-concept that are hypothesized to occur following social comparison.

The Social Comparison–Discrepancy Magnitude Relationship

According to Higgins (1989), ideal discrepancies are related to the presence andabsence of positive outcomes, whereas ought discrepancies and arguably feareddiscrepancies (see Carver et al., 1999) are related to the presence and absence ofnegative outcomes. How individuals interpret whether an outcome is positive or nega-tive, however, often depends on social comparison. For example, imagine a studentwho scores 70% on a psychology exam. This student may interpret the score as theabsence of a favorable outcome, and thus experience a self-discrepancy. However,what would the implications of this score be if the student later discovered that the classaverage was 60% and, therefore, that the score was substantially higher than otherstudents’ scores? Instead of experiencing a discrepancy, this student may now feel thatthe performance matches a desired performance, so no discrepancy would be expectedto occur. In this way, social comparison may directly affect perceptions of self-discrepancies by influencing how individuals interpret self-related characteristics andoutcomes.

Social comparison with individuals who are better or worse off than the self maybe most relevant to interpreting self-outcomes. Such comparisons may establish ormake salient standards of appropriateness and performance (Carver & Scheier,1998). Upward comparison seems most likely to affect positive standards, in thatthese comparisons are with superior others, who presumably embody desired (e.g.,ideal or ought) characteristics and performances (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Wood,1989). However, whether these comparisons result in a perceived increase or decreasein the discrepancy between the actual and ideal or ought selves may depend on anumber of factors. Research on the effects of social comparison on the self-concept

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(Blanton, 2001; Collins, 1996; Markman & McMullin, 2003; Mussweiler, 2003;Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995) suggests that comparison sometimes results inassimilation (i.e., self-concept displaced in the direction of the comparison target)and sometimes in contrast (i.e., self-concept displaced away from the comparisontarget). In the context of upward comparison, individuals may assimilate andbecome inspired by comparison targets (e.g., Lockwood & Kunda, 1997) andpresumably perceive a reduction in ideal discrepancy magnitude or may contrastagainst upward targets and feel demoralized by the comparison and perceive anincrease in ideal discrepancy magnitude.

Conversely, downward comparisons seem most likely to affect perceptions ofnegative self-standards, in that these are comparisons with individuals who representundesired (e.g., feared self) characteristics and performances (Wills, 1981). The resultsof these comparisons, however, also depend on whether they result in assimilation orcontrast (e.g., Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995). If downward comparisons lead toassimilation, individuals may perceive a decrease in the discrepancy between theactual and feared selves (Carver & Scheier, 1998), whereas downward comparisonsthat result in contrast may result in an increase in feared discrepancy magnitude.

As a result, when individuals compare themselves to others, they may gain aclearer perception of where they stand relative to their self-standards, especiallywhen those comparisons are with individuals who themselves represent ideal, ought,or feared standards (i.e., upward and downward comparisons, respectively). If socialcomparison indeed operates in this capacity, we hypothesized that individuals whoreadily engage in and rely upon social comparison should report self-discrepancies ofgreater magnitude than individuals who seldom engage in social comparison (Study1). Further, engaging in upward comparison should predict the magnitude of idealand ought discrepancies, whereas engaging in downward comparison should predictthe magnitude of feared self-discrepancies (Study 2). Additionally, Study 2 examinedwhether chronic upward and downward social comparison leads to assimilation orcontrast. Previous research suggests that individuals should engage in socialcomparison in a manner that maintains positive self-evaluations (Tesser, 1988;Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988)—thus leading to contrast following upwardcomparison and assimilation following downward comparison. However, otherresearch suggests that when comparisons are with similar others or in self-relevantdomains, individuals are more likely to engage in non-defensive comparisons andmay contrast against upward comparison targets and assimilate with downwardcomparison targets (Stapel & Johnson, 2007; Stapel & Schwinghammer, 2004). Thus,Study 2 sought to further examine the relationship between chronic upward anddownward comparison and self-discrepancies to find evidence of assimilation orcontrast. Finally, if engaging in social comparison is associated with the experienceof self-discrepancies, then social comparison tendencies should also predict thefrequency by which individuals experience agitation- and dejection-related emotions(Studies 1 and 2) and contentment- and cheerfulness-related emotions (Study 2).

Study 1

Method

Participants. Ninety-eight undergraduate students (48 males and 50 females)enrolled at a Midwestern university participated in the study in exchange for partial

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fulfillment of a subject pool requirement. All participants were tested individuallyand completed the study on a PC computer running MediaLab software (Jarvis,2004).

Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were greeted by a maleexperimenter and seated in front of a computer. The experimenter proceeded toexplain that the purpose of the study was to learn how individuals think about otherpeople and also how they think about themselves. For this reason, participants weretold that they would complete several questionnaires, some assessing their perceptionof others and others assessing their perceptions of themselves.

Participants first completed the Iowa–Netherlands Social Comparison Measure(INCOM; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999), an 11-item scale designed to measure individualdifferences in the tendency to engage in social comparison (e.g., ‘‘I often comparemyself with others with respect to what I have accomplished in life’’) and rely upon it(e.g., ‘‘If I want to find out how well I have done something, I compare what I havedone with how others have done’’). Participants indicated their level of agreement toeach statement on a 5-point scale that ranged from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agreestrongly). Items were summed (after reverse scoring two items) to create a singleindex of social comparison orientation (SCO; a¼ .81).

Participants next completed a computerized measure of ideal and ought self-discrepancies, following the procedure described by Higgins, Shah, and Friedman(1997). Participants were first asked to list five traits that described their ideal selves,which was defined as: ‘‘the type of person you would ideally like to be, the type ofperson you hope, wish, or aspire to be.’’ After each ideal trait, participants rated thedegree to which they would ideally possess each attribute and the degree to whichthey actually possess the attribute. Participants then listed five traits that describedtheir ought selves, which was defined as: ‘‘the type of person you ought to be, the typeof person it is your duty or responsibility to be.’’ After each ought trait, participantsrated the degree to which they ought to possess each attribute and the degree towhich they actually possess the attribute. All ratings were made on 5-point scalesranging from slightly to extremely.

After this, participants indicated how frequently they experience variousdejection- and agitation-related emotions (see Higgins et al., 1997). Specifically,participants rated how often they experience four dejection (disappointed,discouraged, low, sad) and four agitation (agitated, on edge, uneasy, and tense)emotions. Each rating was made on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (almost never) to 4(almost always) and scores on each of the four emotion words were summed togenerate separate indices for dejection and agitation emotions.

After participants had completed the emotion frequency measure, they wereprobed for suspicion, thoroughly debriefed, and thanked for their participation. Noparticipants indicated any suspicion, or guessed the study hypotheses, during thedebriefing session.

Results and Discussion

Self-discrepancies in this study, as in previous research (e.g., Higgins et al., 1997),were calculated by subtracting each ideal- or ought- self-guide rating from itscorresponding actual-self rating. Note, however, that when we refer to thesediscrepancies in the subsequent results and discussion, we omit the term actual fromour description of each type of discrepancy.

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We first sought to examine the relationship between SCO, as measured by theINCOM, and self-discrepancy magnitude for both ideal and ought self-discrepan-cies. Correlations between these variables, as well as frequency of dejection- andagitation-related emotions, are reported in Table 1. As predicted, SCO wassignificantly and positively correlated with both ideal (r¼ .420, p5 .001) and ought(r¼ .222, p5 .05) self-discrepancies, such that increases in the tendency to engage insocial comparison were associated with increases in the magnitude of both types ofself-discrepancies.

Moreover, SCO also significantly predicted how frequently participants reportedexperiencing agitation-related (r¼ .519, p5 .001) and dejection-related (r¼ .401,p5 .001) emotions, such that increases in the chronic tendency to engage in socialcomparison were associated with increases in the frequency of experiencingagitation- and dejection-related emotions. It should also be noted that idealdiscrepancy magnitude significantly correlated with the frequency of both dejection-(r¼ .277, p5 .01) and agitation-related emotions (r¼ .345, p5 .001) and oughtdiscrepancy magnitude significantly correlated only with frequency of agitation-related emotions (r¼ .233, p5 .05). These findings are somewhat at odds with thetheoretical basis of self-discrepancy theory, which predicts that ideal discrepancieshave a unique relationship with dejection-related emotions, whereas oughtdiscrepancies have a unique relationship with agitation-related emotions (Higgins,1987, 1989; cf. Gramzow et al., 2000; Tangney et al., 1998).

The results of Study 1 support the notion that social comparison functions as aself-regulatory measuring stick. SCO predicted both ideal and ought self-discrepancymagnitude, as well as frequency of experiencing dejection- and agitation-relatedemotions. Specifically, as individuals engage in more frequent social comparison,they experience larger ideal and ought self-discrepancies and an increase in theexperience of depression and anxiety. These latter results also raise interestingimplications for well-being, as engaging in social comparison seems to have negativeimplications for how individuals think and feel about themselves.

Building on these results, Study 2 sought to address the following questions: First,does the direction of comparison matter in determining how social comparisonaffects self-discrepancies? Specifically, does upward comparison predict ideal andought discrepancies, whereas downward comparison predicts feared discrepancies,as hypothesized? Second, does chronic upward and downward comparison lead toassimilation or contrast? Third, does upward and downward comparison predict theexperience of contentment and cheerfulness, in addition to dejection and anxiety?

TABLE 1 Study 1 Correlation Matrix for Social Comparison Orientation, Self-Discrepancies, and Emotion Frequency

1 2 3 4 5

1. Social comparison orientation 1 .420*** .222* .519*** .401***2. Ideal discrepancy 1 .529*** .345*** .277**3. Ought discrepancy 1 .233* .1494. Frequency of agitation 1 .647***5. Frequency of dejection 1

Note: *p5 .05; **p5 .01; ***p5 .001.

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Study 2

Method

Participants. Ninety undergraduate students from a Midwestern university(18 males and 72 females) participated in the study in exchange for partial fulfill-ment of a subject pool requirement. All participants were tested individuallyand completed the study on a PC computer running MediaLab software (Jarvis,2004).

Procedure. The procedure used in Study 2 was the same as that used in Study 1,with the following exceptions. First, participants completed a modified version of theINCOM that is comprised of two subscales: one measuring use of upwardcomparison and a second measuring use of downward comparison (see Gibbons& Buunk, 1999). The upward comparison subscale (Cronbach’s a¼ .75) consists ofsix items measuring individuals’ chronic tendency to use upward comparisons (e.g.,‘‘When I wonder how good I am at something, I sometimes compare myself withothers who are better at it than I am’’ and ‘‘When evaluating my currentperformance, e.g., how I am doing at home, work, school, or whatever, I oftencompare with others who are doing better than I am’’). Conversely, the downwardcomparison subscale (Cronbach’s a¼ .75) consists of six items measuringindividuals’ tendencies to engage in downward comparison (e.g., ‘‘I sometimescompare myself with others who have accomplished less in life than I have’’ and‘‘When things are going poorly, I think of others who have accomplished less in lifethan I have’’). Responses to items from both subscales are made on a 5-point scalethat ranges from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).

Following this, participants completed the same computerized measure of idealand ought self-discrepancies used in Study 1, with the following difference. Afterparticipants generated and rated ideal and ought self-discrepancies, they were askedto generate five traits that described their feared self, which was defined as: ‘‘the typeof person you would never want to be, the type of person you fear being, worryabout becoming, or try to avoid becoming’’ (Eisenstadt & Leippe, 1994). For eachtrait that was entered, participants were asked to indicate how much they would notwant (or would fear) to possess the trait as well as how much of the trait theyactually possess, using 4-point scales ranging from slightly to extremely.

Participants then completed a measure that assessed the frequency of experiencingemotions, which included the same items used in Study 1 to assess agitation anddejection, and additional items to measure cheerfulness (happy and satisfied) andcontentment emotions (calm and relaxed). As previously, ratings were made on5-point scales ranging from 0 (almost never) to 4 (almost always) and scores weresummed to create two indices of cheerfulness and contentment.

Results and Discussion

Discrepancy Magnitude. Table 2 shows the correlations between all the variablesof interest. As predicted, chronic upward social comparison significantly correlatedwith the magnitude of ideal discrepancy (r¼ .304, p5 .01), such that participantswho engaged in more frequent upward comparison reported significantly larger idealdiscrepancies, indicative of contrast. Upward comparison, however, only correlatedmarginally with ought discrepancy magnitude (r¼ .183, p¼ .085). Importantly,

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downward social comparison significantly and negatively correlated with feareddiscrepancy (r¼7.257, p5 .05), such that more frequent downward comparisonwas associated with smaller feared discrepancies, indicative of assimilation.

We sought to follow up these bivariate correlations with regression analyseswhere upward and downward social comparison tendencies were entered simulta-neously as predictors of ideal, ought, and feared self-discrepancies. As predicted,upward comparison (t¼ 3.08, p5 .01), but not downward comparison (t¼ 1.11, ns),significantly predicted ideal discrepancy magnitude, overall model F(2, 87)¼ 5.12,p5 .01. A similar, although marginally significant, result was obtained for oughtdiscrepancies, with upward comparison (t¼ 1.88, p¼ .067) but not downwardcomparison (t¼ 1.42, ns), predicting ought discrepancy magnitude, overall modelF(2, 87)¼ 2.539, p¼ .08. Conversely, for feared discrepancies, downward compar-ison (t¼72.66, p5 .01), but not upward comparison (t¼71.860, ns), significantlypredicted feared discrepancy magnitude, overall model F(2, 87)¼ 4.92, p5 .01.

We next examined the relationships between upward and downward socialcomparison and discrepancy-related emotions. As predicted, upward comparisonwas correlated with ideal and ought discrepancy-related emotions. Specifically,upward comparison positively correlated with dejection (r¼ .510, p5 .001) andagitation (r¼ .256, p5 .05) and negatively correlated with contentment (r¼7.295,p5 .01) and cheerfulness (r¼7.385, p5 .001) such that more frequent upwardsocial comparison was associated with increases in dejection and decreases incheerfulness. Surprisingly, frequency of downward comparison did not significantlypredict any of the discrepancy-related emotions examined in this study.

Somewhat discordant with the previous findings by Higgins and colleagues thatideal and ought self-discrepancies have a unique association with dejection- andagitation-based emotions respectively (e.g., Higgins et al., 1985, 1986; Strauman &Higgins, 1988), the current results show that ideal discrepancy magnitude wassignificantly and positively correlated with both dejection (r¼ .209, p5 .05) andagitation (r¼ .405, p5 .001) and negatively correlated with contentment (r¼7.321,p5 .01) and (cheerfulness r¼7.340, p5 .001). Moreover, ought discrepancymagnitude significantly correlated with dejection (r¼ .319, p5 .01), but notagitation (r¼ .163, ns). Finally, feared self-discrepancy was significantly andnegatively correlated with both agitation (r¼7.241, p5 .05) and dejection(r¼7.298, p5 .01), such that participants reported experiencing these emotionsless frequently as the discrepancy from the feared self increased.

General Discussion

The current research proposes that social comparison serves as a self-regulatorymeasuring stick that prompts individuals to evaluate where they stand relative tovarious self-standards through comparison with others. In line with this notion, theresults of the two studies revealed that chronic social comparison tendencies weresignificantly related to both the magnitude of self-discrepancies and the frequency ofexperiencing discrepancy-related emotions. In Study 1, participants high in SCOreported having ideal and ought self-discrepancies that were larger in magnitudethan participants low in SCO. Further, high-SCO participants in Study 1 alsoreported higher frequency of experiencing agitation- and dejection-related emotions,compared to low-SCO participants. In Study 2, chronic tendency to engage inupward comparison predicted ideal and ought discrepancy magnitude, but notfeared discrepancy magnitude, whereas chronic downward comparison predicted

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TABLE2

Study2CorrelationMatrix

forUpward

andDownward

ComparisonOrientation,Self-Discrepancies,andEmotionFrequency

12

34

56

78

9

1.Upward

SCO

17

.077

.304**

.183{

7.169

.256*

.510***

7.295**

7.385***

2.Downward

SCO

1.089

.133

7.257*

7.001

.132

7.067

.041

3.Idealdiscrepancy

1.439***

7.192

.209*

.405***

7.321**

7.340***

4.Oughtdiscrepancy

17

.125

.163

.317**

7.250*

7.312**

5.Feareddiscrepancy

17

.241*

7.298**

.247*

.214*

6.Frequency

ofagitation

1.562***

7.682***

7.606***

7.Frequency

ofdejection

17

.577***

7.722***

8.Frequency

ofcontentm

ent

1.592***

9.Frequency

ofcheerfulness

1

Note:SCO¼SocialComparisonOrientation.{ p¼.085;*p5

.05;**p5

.01;***p5

.001.

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feared discrepancy magnitude, but not ideal or ought discrepancy magnitude.Upward comparison tendency also predicted the frequency of experiencingdiscrepancy-related emotions, although no association was found for downwardcomparison.

We believe that the results of these studies have important implications for boththe social comparison and the self-regulation literatures. First, research on socialcomparison has identified a number of self-related processes that are affected bysocial comparison information. For example, although Festinger (1954) posited thatsocial comparison is primarily used for accurate self-assessment, subsequent researchon social comparison has found that individuals may compare themselves to othersfor many reasons, including self-improvement and self-enhancement (Biernat &Billings, 2001; Gruder, 1977; Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Seta, 1982; Taylor,Wayment, & Carrillo, 1996; Wills, 1981; Wood, 1989; Wood & Taylor, 1991).Similarly, Tesser (1988) implicated social comparison in self-evaluation main-tenance, such that individuals selectively engage in social comparison when theoutcomes of those comparisons are favorable in nature. The current research extendsthis literature by demonstrating that social comparison is also relevant indetermining the magnitude of self-discrepancies, and by extension is relevant toself-regulation more generally. One of the critical components of self-regulation isthe ability to assess the effectiveness of self-regulatory behavior (Baumeister &Heatherton, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1998) and one of the ways that people do this, itseems, is by comparing their traits, abilities, and performances to those of others.

The results of the current research also inform the literature on social comparisonby examining chronic upward and downward assimilation in the context ofassimilation and contrast. Study 2 revealed that upward comparison was positivelycorrelated with ideal and ought self-discrepancies as well as agitation and dejection,and negatively correlated with contentment and cheerfulness. These results implythat chronic upward comparison leads to contrast in that frequent upwardcomparers were more likely to see themselves in a negative light and experiencenegative emotions, compared to infrequent upward comparers. However, Study 2also revealed that downward comparison was negatively correlated with feared self-discrepancies, implying assimilation, in that more frequent downward comparisonwas associated with a perception that the self is closer to feared self-standards andmore negative self-feelings (although no correlations with negative affect weresignificant). Although these results differ from prior work showing that individualsselectively engage in social comparison when those comparisons maintain positiveself-evaluations (Tesser, 1988), they coincide with research demonstrating thatindividuals engage in non-defensive social comparison, especially with similar othersand when in self-relevant domains (Stapel & Johnson, 2007; Stapel & Schwingham-mer, 2004). In that everyday comparisons are most frequently with close others(Wheeler & Miyake, 1992) and the current study assessed self-relevant domains, it istherefore not altogether surprising that we found that evidence of a non-defensivepattern of relationships between social comparison and self-discrepancies. Never-theless, more research is needed to examine the conditions under which socialcomparison leads to assimilation and contrast in the context of self-discrepancies.

In addition, the present findings make important contributions to the literature onself-regulation by identifying social factors that influence perceptions of self-discrepancies. Prominent models of self-regulation (e.g., Baumeister & Heatherton,1996; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Higgins, 1987) have focused primarily on the intrapersonal dynamics of self-standards and the effects of non-social, situational cues on

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perception of self-discrepancies, affect, and deficits in self-regulation (i.e., egodepletion). Much of the work by Higgins and colleagues, for example, has examinednon-social variables, such as promotion and prevention focus and the impact ofthese foci on perceptions of self-discrepancies (e.g., Higgins et al., 1997; Idson,Liberman, & Higgins, 2000). Also, even though the role of the other is explicit in theformulation of the ought self (i.e., Am I living up to my duties in the eyes of others?),the process for how individuals assess the ought self is non-social. Similarly, work onego depletion has focused on intra-individual factors in self-regulation, such aswhether individuals have recently engaged in self-control (e.g., Muraven, Tice, &Baumeister, 1998). The current research suggests that social factors may play aprominent role in self-regulation, especially during the monitoring and assessmentstages of self-regulation (see Fitzsimons & Finkel, in press). Further, consideringthat social comparison is one of the primary ways in which individuals learn aboutand alter their self-concepts (Wood, 1989; Wood &Wilson, 2003), it seems likely thatsocial comparison plays a role in the establishment of self-standards and goals, aswell as the selection of regulatory behaviors, although more work is needed toaddress this possibility.

One area of research that has examined the social nature of self-regulation isautomatic goal pursuit, which suggests that a variety of social and environmentalvariables can activate self-regulatory standards and associated goal pursuit (Aarts,Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004; Aarts & Hassin, 2005; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Shah,2003). For example, Aarts and colleagues have examined the social triggers ofautomatic goal pursuit (e.g., Aarts et al., 2004; Aarts & Hassin, 2005), suggestingthat goals are contagious among individuals. Similarly, work by Fitzsimons andBargh (2003) demonstrated that increasing the accessibility of names of friends alsoincreases individuals’ helping goals (see also Shah, 2003), illustrating the ways inwhich exposure to other people may orient individuals toward specific goals. Futureresearch should examine whether social comparison increases the accessibility ofgoals in addition to altering the magnitude of self-discrepancies. For example, wouldcomparing with a highly productive colleague activate a person’s goal to beproductive and prime productive behaviors? Such a possibility seems likely given thepresent findings and those from work on automatic goal pursuit.

The results of the current study also inform the current debate over whetherspecific types of self-discrepancies are associated with particular emotional reactions(see Higgins, 1999; Tangney et al., 1998). Specifically, recent research has yieldedmixed results concerning whether ideal and ought self-discrepancies have uniqueassociations with dejection and agitation, respectively (Gramzow et al., 2000;Phillips & Silvia, 2005; Phillips et al., 2007). Although the current research did notset out to specifically address this debate, and therefore is limited in its ability to doso, we nevertheless failed to find support for the emotional specificity hypothesis.Ideal and feared self-discrepancies were significantly correlated with all four types ofemotions examined (dejection, agitation, contentment, and cheerfulness), whereasought discrepancies were unassociated with agitation, but were correlated withdejection. Thus, the current findings further question the general association betweendiscrepancy type and emotional outcome, although Higgins (1999) has argued thatsuch a relationship would be found only under specific conditions (e.g., highaccessibility), none of which were examined here.

It is important to note a limitation in the current study. Specifically, in that thedata are correlational, it is impossible to determine the direction of causality. Wehave approached this research using the rationale that engaging in social comparison

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has some effect on the magnitude of self-discrepancies, but it is also possible thatexperiencing changes in the magnitude of self-discrepancies increases the need toengage in social comparison. For example, individuals who perceive a decrease in themagnitude of feared discrepancies (i.e., feel closer to their feared self) may beespecially motivated to compare themselves to worse-off others as a way of buoyingtheir sense of self-esteem. Similarly, individuals who perceive an increase in themagnitude of ideal and ought discrepancies may be motivated to comparethemselves with upward targets as a means of self-improvement. We suggest thatthis explanation for the current findings is compelling but not necessarilycontradictive to the rationale presented above and we believe that, in fact, bothexplanations are likely to be correct. That is, it may be the case that socialcomparison affects the magnitude of self-discrepancies and large self-discrepanciesincrease the need for directional social comparison. Nevertheless, there is a clearneed for additional research to resolve this ambiguity. Future research shouldmanipulate ideal, ought, and feared self-discrepancy magnitude to examine if there isa corresponding increase in the motivation to engage in upward and downwardcomparison.

More broadly, we believe that additional experimental work is needed to buttressthe general claim that social comparison affects the magnitude of self-discrepancies.Such work should manipulate exposure to upward and downward comparisontargets directly and examine changes in the magnitude of self-discrepancies andexperience of discrepancy-related emotions. In addition, this work would be servedwell by manipulating variables that lead to assimilation or contrast (e.g., closeness totarget, attainability of target outcomes, independent vs. interdependent self-construal) to show that whether self-discrepancies increase or decrease in magnitudedepends on whether individuals assimilate with or contrast against comparisontargets. Finally, future research should examine the effects of social comparisonusing behavioral measures, rather than solely verbal measures (as in the presentstudies) to determine whether changes in the magnitude of self-discrepancies thatoccur following social comparison motivate behavior, as models of self-regulationsuggest that they should (Carver & Scheier, 1998).

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