Smith - Hegelianism and the Three Crises of Rationality

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Hegelianism and the Three Crises of RationalityAuthor(s): STEVEN B. SMITHReviewed work(s):Source: Social Research, Vol. 56, No. 4, Philosophy and Politics (WINTER 1989), pp. 943-973Published by: The New SchoolStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40970573 .

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Hegelianismand theThreeCrises f

Rationality*BY STEVEN B. SMITH

JL om ts inception n ancientGreece,political hilosophyhas beenvexedbytherelation etween oliticsndrationality.Thisrelationshipasrecentlyecomemoreproblematicy hereflection hat terms ike reason and rationalityre notunequivocalbut have, over the course of two and a halfmillennia, cquired a plethoraof meanings nd attributeswhichwe areonlynowbeginningo sort ut.Before, hen,weare in a position o statewhether olitics re or can be made

rational,t is necessary rieflyo consider numberof themostprominentival onceptionsfthisproblem.The idea ofrationalityeceived tsfirst r classic xpression

in thewritingsfPlato and Aristotle,orwhomrationalitysour distinctiver mostcharacteristicallyumancapacity rfunction.yreason he lassicsmeant nactive rinciplefthesoul that allows us to rise above the particularitiesrcontingenciesf our experienceand "participate"n the

structure f the cosmos.Reason is not just a faculty ordrawingnferences ut s somethingike a principle forderwhich llowsus notonlyto shapebut to transcendhe basicdesires nd appetiteswithwhichwe are endowed.Rationality,

SOCIAL RESEARCH,Vol.56,No. 4 (Winter 989)



944 SOCIAL RESEARCH

as Aristotleepictedt, sthereforen arrangementf the oulin accordancewithvirtue, or t is virtue hat s the humangood.1

The classical onception frationalityought odistinguishvariouskinds f human ctivitynd rankthem naccordancewith heirproperdegreesof self-sufficiency.he productivearts technai) ere learlyeast elf-sufficient,ateringargelyo

the needs of survivaland necessity.2 he practicalarts,especially politicsand ethics,were guided by a set ofhigher-ordernds, the aim of whichwas action praxis) rdoingitself erformedwell.3 t was onlytheorizingtheoria)whichwastruly ational ecausefreefrom nyadmixture fnecessityr compulsion.twasonly hephilosopherwho wascapable of realizing hatpart of the divine nous or activeintellecthat inkedhimto thecosmos s a whole.4

Theconception

frationalityevelopedby

Aristotlend theancientsunderwentts first risisat the beginning f themodern ge. It was Thomas Hobbes who attackednot ustAristotleut"Aristotelity"s thegreatestbstacle o a rationalor scientifictudyof man and society.ndeed, for Hobbesthere s "scarce ny thing . . moreabsurdlyaid in naturallPhilosophy,han thatwhichnow is called Aristotles étaphy-siques; ormorerepugnantoGovernment,hanmuchof thathe hath said in his Politiques; or more ignorantly,hana

greater artof hisEthiques."0Hobbes's ttack n theAristotelianonceptionfrationalitytook heform f a repudiationfthedoctrinef "essences" r

1Aristotle,Nicomacheanthics . 7. 1097b-1098a.2NicomacheanthicsVI. 4. 1140a; Metaphysics81a-b.3NicomacheanthicsVI. 4. 1140 a-b; Politics. 1252b-53a; III. 1280b-81a.4NicomacheanthicsX. 7. 1177a-78a; De Anima II. 5. 430a; for a good treatment,

see Trong Berg Eriksen,Bios Theoretikos:otes n Aristotle'sEthicaNicomachea' 0 6-8

(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget,976); see also Nicholas Lobkowicz, Theorynd Practice:Historyf Conceptrom ristotleoMarx NotreDame: Universityf Notre Dame Press,1967), pp. 3-57.

5Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,d. MichaelOakeshott London: Macmillan,1962), ch.46, p. 481.



HEGELIANISM 945

"incorporeal ubstances,"whichHobbes took to be oxymo-ronic.Classicalphilosophy ad claimed to disclosethe truenature ressence fthingswhile dmittinghat hese ssenceswere tbestonlypartiallymbodied n thephysicalorporealworld.The idea thatessences had an existence partfromtheirmaterial mbodimentstruckHobbesas a fantasy hichthe modern science of physicswould at last lay to rest.

Hobbes'srepudiationf the Aristotelianheory fessences stied to his denial of any divine or transcendent tatus toreason.Reason s only n abilityo calculate, o stateprecisedefinitionsnd drawexactconclusions. ccordingly,ational-ity onsistsargelyn our abilityo givenames to things nddeduce theproperconsequences,eadingHobbes to declarethat there s nothingnthe worlduniversal utnames."Theessential eature f thisnewconception frationalitys that t

beginswithknown r "settled" efinitions,orwithouthese

we find urselvesna kindof inguistictate fnature.6The consequences fHobbes's"linguisticurn" n philoso-

phywereprofound.7n thefirst lace, freason s butnaming,it follows hat such traditionalmoral distinctionss thosebetweengood and bad, just and unjust,have no divinesanction utare simplywords hat xpress ursubjectiveikesand dislikes. Reason becomes an instrument or helpingpeopleto achieve heobjects ftheir esires ut s silent bout

what those desiresoughtto be.8Second,the task of politicsbecomes the imposition f a common language upon aheterogeneous eople so thattheycan betterpursue theirdesires. he sovereigns, then, kindof inguisticrbiterwithfinalpoweroverdeciding uchmatters s life nd death,war

6Ibid., h. 5, p. 41. That "reason .. is nothingbutreckoning"s a central hesis fthework.

7For a useful account of the linguisticnature of Hobbes's work, see FrederickWhelan,"Language and ItsAbuses in Hobbes' PoliticalPhilosophy,"Americanolitical

ScienceReview75 (1981): 59-75; Terence Ball, "Hobbes' LinguisticTurn," Polity17(1985): 739-760.

0Leviathan,h. 6, pp. 48-49.



946 SOCIAL RESEARCH

and peace.At the rootofpoliticss an initial ct of consent ragreement o be ruledbyan "artificial"ersonwhohas thepower ospeakfor nd representhewills f thosewhohavecreatedhim.9Thus from n Aristotelianerspective, obbe-sianrationalitys profoundlyntipolitical.t seeks to preventpeoplefromxercising reciselyhosepowers, amely oliticalspeech, hatforAristotlemade thempoliticalnimals.

The secondcrisis f rationalityo appear in thehistoryfpoliticalhoughts identifiedmost learlywithHegel and the"historical chool."Hegel's conception f rationality as incrucial espects refiguredyRousseau,forwhom easonwasbothcause and consequenceof our "perfectibility,"ut fornowtwofeaturesfHegel'stheorymust e emphasized. irst,to a fargreater xtent hanhad hitherto eenthought, egelemphasized he embeddedor contextual eatures frational-

ity.10hat s rational or

Hegelscrucially

elated o the ocialcontexts nd institutionsithinwhich easoning ccurs.Thushewrotenthefamous reface o thePhilosophyfRighthat llphilosophyis ts wntime pprehendednthoughts"nd thatit s as absurd o believe hat philosophyantranscendts geas that"an individual an . . . jump overRhodes."11 venPlato'sRepublic,orHegelthegreatest ork fclassical oliticalphilosophy, as nothingmore than an interpretationf thespirit f itsage. Its valuelaypreciselyn the fact hat tgave

expression o the highest deals and aspirations f Greekethical ife Sittlichkeit.)Second,Hegel sought o avoid therelativisticmplicationsf

histheoryfrationalityy ouchingtwithin heframeworkfa progressivisthilosophy f history. ationalitys not onlyrelative o particularnations and cultures Volksgeister)utdevelops vertime s differenteoplescome nto onflict ith

9Ibid., h. 16,pp. 125-128.10See my Hegel's Critique f Liberalism:Rights n ContextChicago: University f

Chicago ress, 989),pp.4-5,9-10, 165-169, 23-225.11G. W. F. Hegel,PhilosophyfRight,r. T. M. Knox Oxford:Clarendon ress,

1967),p. 11.



HEGELIANISM 947

one another.12 istory xhibits ationality,hen,not becauseHegel believed ndividual gents ct out of carefullyeliber-atedplansof action utbecausewhen aken s a wholehistoryconstitutesslow ndsteadymovementoward reedom. Thehistory f the world,"he wrote,"is none otherthan theprogress f the consciousnessffreedom."13ccordingly,ebelieved t possibleto divide all of human historynto a

number f differentpochsor stagesbased on thedegreeoffreedom hathad been achieved. n the Orientalworld,hecould say, only one person,the despot,was free; in theGreco-Roman orld, nly few, he free-bornitizens ftherepublics,were free. It was onlyin the modernEuropeanworldcreatedby the unique confluence f the ProtestantReformation,heFrenchRevolution,ndthe wakeningfthemarket conomy hat ne couldfinally aythat ll were free.

Historys realizednthe ocial

practicesnd institutionsfthe

contemporaryuropeanworldhad achieved or would soonachieve) tsfinal ndorpurpose.

Hegel'sconception f an historical ationalityontains hefollowing aradoxes. n the first lace,if rationalitys fullyembedded n the practices nd institutionsf its time,thisseems o render egligiblenyrolefor ndependentmoral ndpolitical valuation.Hegel appears to denyus any wayofcriticizing ociety xcept in its own terms.Second, if all

philosophys itsowntime pprehendednthoughts, hy oesthisnotapplyto Hegel himself? ow can Hegel consistentlymaintainhat eason s relative ohistorynd not at the sametime ondemn isownphilosophyomerelyne moreopinionor setofopinionsn thedevelopmentf Geist} inally,ven fHegel believed it possibleto escape fromthe relativisticconsequencesfhisthoughtypositing supreme nd ortelostohistory,t s still ot learhowwe canknowwhether rifwe

12G. W. F. Hegel, ThePhilosophyfHistory,r.J.Sibree New York: Dover, 1956),pp.47, 64.

13Hegel, Philosophyf History,. 19.



948 SOCIAL RESEARCH

have attained o thatend. To maintain hat thepurposeofhistorys the realizationffreedom resupposes hatwe havethe bilityostepoutside fhistorynd see it from detachedor disinterestederspective,ut this s precisely hatHegel'stheoryf embedded ationalityoulddenyus the bilityodo.

The questionthatthe Hegelian conception f rationalityasks us to consider, hen, s this.Can political ationalitye

seen as subject o changeand stillretain tscritical osture?Does Hegel'srelativizationfphilosophynd timeultimatelyforceus to abdicatethepossibilityf independent houghtsand udgments ooverriding istoricalressuresnd dynam-ics? It is unlikely hat willbe able to answer ll of thesequestions ere, lthought s possible hatwe willbeginto seethe outlines f what such answerswouldhave to look like.Indeed,these uestionsre raised nan especiallyorceful ay

bythe thinkerwhomI take to be

Hegel'smost

mportanttwentieth-centuryxpositor:AlexandreKojève.14AlexandreKojève (né Kozhevnikov) as a Russian migré

whose ectures n Hegel's Phenomenologyt theÉcolePratiquedesHautesÉtudesbetween 933 and 1939 were ocaptivatenentiregeneration.15ot publisheduntil1947 byhis studentRaymondQueneau, theselectures, ntitled ntroductionlalecture eHegel, ttemptedo establish directphilosophicalconnection ot onlybetweenHegel and Marx but between

14AlexandreKojève, Introductionla lecture eHegel,ed. RaymondQueneau (Paris:Gallimard, 1947); an abridged English translation was published under the titleIntroductionotheReading ofHegel,tr.James H. Nichols,Jr.,ed. Allan Bloom (NewYork: Basic Books, 1968); Kojève's other works include a posthumouslypublishedtwo- olume Essai d'unehistoireaisonnée e la philosophieaienne Paris: Gallimard, 1972,1973) and Kant (Paris: Gallimard, 1973). Only the work on Hegel, Kojève's most

significantwork,willbe consideredhere.15

Kojève's influenceon laterFrench and European thoughthas been thesubjectofa numberof excellentrecent tudies;see VincentDescombes,Modern rench hilosophy(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity ress, 1983), pp. 9-47; Barry Cooper, The End of

History: nEssayonModernHegelianismToronto: University f Toronto Press, 1984);Michael Roth,Knowing nd History: ppropriationsfHegel in Twentieth-Centuryrance(Ithaca: Cornell University ress, 1988); StanleyRosen, Hermeneuticss PoliticsNewYork: Oxford University ress, 1987), pp. 87-107; see also my ReadingAlthusser:n

Essayon Structural arxismIthaca: Cornell University ress, 1984), pp. 46-59.



HEGELIANISM 949

Hegel and Heidegger that was to prove so volatile a mixtureafter World War II, especially n France. So influentialwerethese lectures in reassessing the importance of Hegel forcontemporary hought hatMerleau-Ponty ould write:

All the great philosophical deas of the past century-hephilosophiesfMarx, nd Nietzsche,henomenology,ermanexistentialism,nd psychoanalysis-ad theirbeginningsn

Hegel ... it was he who started he attempto exploretheirrational nd integratet into an expanded reason,whichremainshe task f ourcentury.16

In theremainderof thispaper I would like to examine and

appraise the implicationsof Kojève's "Hegelo-Marxism" forthe history f Western rationalism. n the next section I shalloutline Kojève's reading of Hegel; I shall then examine thisreading n the ightofhisdebatewithLeo Straussregarding ts

alleged complicitywithtyranny;nd in thefinal section shallpropose an alternative to Kojève's reading of Hegel andjuxtapose it to the so-called"postmodern" critiqueof reason.

Re-reading lexandre ojève

There are three organizing principles informingKojève's

Reading ofHegel.First: the

emphasis upon recognitionas a

basic, ifnot the basic, human need. Second: his treatment fthe famousdialecticof masterand slave as the keyto Hegel'sPhenomenology.hird: the idea of an "end of history,"whichKojève identifiedwiththe"universal nd homogeneous state,"that s, thefully ationalor planned society.

Kojève's reading begins by asking the question "What isman?" and concludes withthe answer thatman is the beingwho desires recognition.Since the desire to be recognized is

our distinctivelyumandesire, t s necessary o inquireexactly16Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ense and Non-Sense, r. H. and P. Dreyfus Evanston:

Northwestern niversity ress, 1964), p. 63.



950 SOCIAL RESEARCH

whatkind of desirethis s. Desire s whatunsettles he mindandmoves tto act.The simplestorm fdesire sthedesire osatisfyomecorporealneed or other,hunger,forexample.But ifman actedonlyto satisfy is basicbiological rges,hisexistencewould neverrise above thatof the brutes.Thesatisfactionf basicanimalneeds sonly necessaryut not asufficientondition or he fulfillmentr "satisfaction"four

specificallyumanneeds. t isbecauseman has thecapacityodesirenotonlynatural bjects utnonnaturalrspiritualnesthathe is able to riseabovethe evel of animal xistencendcreate distinctiveorld fhistoryndculture. here comestime, hen,whenman is no longersatisfied o appropriateexternal hings ut feels thatonlythrough ssociationswithothers an he be truly atisfied.When thistimecomes,mandesires ome ign f"recognition"orhimselfs a rational ndself-conscious

eingwithworth nd

dignitynhis own

right.17The problem,s Kojèvedescribest, sthatnthebeginningthis ecognitionfequalworth s not mmediatelyorthcomingfromothers.Each wantsto be recognizedwithoutn turnhaving o grantrecognitiono theother, nd thisone-sidedstate faffairseads mento enter life-and-deathtruggle,otunlike heHobbesianheliummniumontra mnes.18t is fromthis ife-and-deathtruggleKampf),n whichman'spassionforhonorand prestiges asserted verhisfearofviolent eath,

that the all-importantelationship f mastery nd slaveryarises.This arisesbecause nthestrugglene ofthepartiessunwillingo go all thewayand riskhis life forthe sake ofrecognition,hereby ubmittingo the other and grantingrecognitionwithoutrequiring t in return. n short,thevanquished artyubordinatesisowndesire or steem othestronger esireforself-preservation.his, forKojève is the

17Kojève, ReadingofHegel, pp. 3ff, lff.18That Hegel's philosophybears a striking esemblance o Hobbes's has been noted

by, mong others,Leo Strauss,The Political hilosophyfHobbes:ts Basis andGenesis,r.Eisa M. Sinclair Chicago: University f Chicago Press, 1966), p. 58.



HEGELIANISM 951

truehistoricalriginof society.Unlike iberal, ontractariantheories f the stateforwhich he socialorder s the outcomeof a voluntaryransaction etweenfreeagents,forKojèvesociety as itsoriginsn an inequality etween master lasswhichsprepared o risk verythingor he akeofrecognitionand a subordinatelasswhich ccepts laverys thepricefor tsown elf-preservation.he Kojèvian eading fHegelnotonly

points ackward oAristotle;tpoints orward oNietzsche.19The dialectic fstruggle etweenmaster nd slaveprovidesuswith he eitmotivf thePhenomenology,ccordingoKojève.The conceptualbasis for thisdialectic s the need of oneself-conscious ind to be recognized yanother, nd underthe conditions f masterynd slavery his turnsout to beimpossible. he slavegrants ecognitiono the master ythevery act hathe is forced o work nhis service. he master's

enjoyments

predicateduponhis freedom from work.

However, herecognitionhat he master njoys snotthat fan equal but of a degradedtool whois merely mployed osatisfy is lord'smaterial omforts. ather hanachievinglevelofcontemplativeutonomy,he master omesto realizehisdependence ponthe lave.The mastermayhavethoughthimself o be a "beingforhimself." e is in fact "beingforanother."20

Thischange n self-consciousnessn thepartofthe master

finds correspondinghangeon thepartof the slavewho,throughn ironical wistnthedialectic,ecomes hemover fhumanityoward higher evelof self-awareness.he slavehad initially cceptedhis position ut of fear,but throughlabor Arbeit)e learns oconquer nddiscipline isfear nd inthe process developa sense of his own worth.Work s nolonger hebiblical urseofAdam but sthebasisforhistoricalbecoming.Throughworkthe slave transformsature nto

19Koiève, Reading: f Hegel pp. 53ff.20The argumenthere is virtually satire on Aristotle'streatment f slavery n

Politics, ook 1; see the author's"Goodness,Nobility, nd Virtue n Aristode'sPoliticalScience,"Polity 9 (1986): 5-26, esp. 23-25.



952 SOCIAL RESEARCH

somethingther han toriginally as;he creates specificallyhumanworld f cultureBildung). utthis s notall.Throughwork the slave not only "humanizes" xternalnature buthumanizes imself s well.His laboreducateshimbeyond hefearofdeathand prepareshim for lifeoffreedom,otakehis place along side the master. Work,"'Kojèvewrites, isBildungn the double senseofthe word: on the one hand, t

forms,ransformsheWorld,humanizes tbymakingtmoreadaptedtoMan; on theother, ttransforms,orms,ducatesman, it humanizes him by bringinghim into greaterconformityith he dea thathe has ofhimself."21

By liberatinghe slave from he fearthat nce heldhim nthrall,work now becomesthe keyto humanemancipation."The future nd end ofhistory," ojève says, belongnot tothewarlikeMaster . . butto theworkinglave."22 orKojève,the future f

historyelongso the once terrorizedlavewho

has earned oconquerhis fear nd demands o be recognizedas a freeand equal humanbeing. ndeed, it is thisview ofhistorys beingmadebythe workernd for heworkers hatKojèveclaimed ohavediscovered irstn thePhenomenology.The belief hat heindustrialworking lass,themodern-day"wageslaves," s Marxcalledthem,would nevitablyriumphover heir apitalistmasters asclearlywhatmade this eadingofHegelso appealing o thoseyoungMarxistsnsearch f the

metaphysicalnderpinningsf their aith.23The conditionof universalrecognitions describedbyKojèveas the end ofhistory.f history eginswith n act ofnegation,t must ndwith henegation fthenegation. heend of historywould mean the end of all alienationor"otherness." or Hegel, othernessoriginally ignified he

21Kojève, ReadingofHegel, p. 52.

22Ibid.,p. 23.¿s See Allan Bloom's "Introduction,"p. viu: "Kojève is the most earned, the most

profoundof thoseMarxistswho,dissatisfiedwith hethinness f Marx's accountof thehuman and metaphysical grounds of his teaching, turned to Hegel as the trulyphilosophicsource of thatteaching."



HEGELIANISM 953

positing f an objectiveworld ndependent f consciousness.This othernesswould be overcomewhenthemindregardsrealitys its owncreation,when t sees itself eflectedn theother.The reconciliationf selfand other s forKojèvethesolution o the problem f alienationwithin istory. nlikeearlier theological" hilosophiese.g.,Plato),which osited nend to this roblem nly nan "ideal"world utside fhistory,

Hegelian realism" ositsnothing utside f humandoings.24Alienationwill be overcome once men have learned todominatenature, conquer fortuna, nd in general exertrationalmastery ver their own affairs.Historywill becompletewhen, iterally,othing uman s alien tous.

The end of history,hen, s the culminationf a lengthyhistoricalrocess hepreconditionsf whichwere aidbytheFrench Revolutionand the Napoleonic aftermath.Thisrevolution ouldbe thefinal evolutionrthe

negationf all

previous egations reciselyecause t wouldaccomplish hatall previousrevolutions ad only promisedto do, namely,ensure the rightsof all to equal worthand dignity.Allsubsequent evolutionary ovements- he Russian, he Chi-nese,etc.- havestayedwithinheorbit f theFrench,whichaimed at establishing "universal nd homogeneous tate."The state is universalbecause it allows no possibilityfplanetaryxpansion;t shomogeneous ecause t absorbs nd

unites ll previouslyistinct ations, ribes,nd classes ntoasingle humanity."

The absorption f the "particular" y the "universal" sprobably est llustratedyan anecdoterelated ySimonedeBeauvoir, ne ofKojève'spupils:

Towardthe end of theafternoon,ittingn thegrassnexttoQueneauI had a discussion ith im bout he end ofhistory."It was a frequentubject f conversationt thetime.We had

discovered he reality nd weightof history, ow we werewonderingbout tsmeaning. ueneau,who had been nitiated

24Kojève, Reading fHegel, pp. 89ff.



954 SOCIAL RESEARCH

intoHegelianismyKojève, houghthat neday ll ndividualswould e reconcilednthe riumphantnityfSpirit.Butwhatif have pain nmy oot?" asked. We hallhave pain nyour oot," ueneau eplied.25

Strictlypeaking, he universal nd homogeneous tate sonly hepreconditionor he end ofhistory.t is the materialbase or "infrastructure."he true end ofhistoryulminates

not withNapoleon at the battle of Jena but withHegel'sconceptualization f the meaning of that battle in thePhenomenologyr, moreprecisely,with"the diad Napoleon-Hegel."26Historyannot ulminatewithNapoleonbecausehelacksawareness f his role in history; e is an instrumentfhistory,ut himselfacks nsightntothetruemeaning f hisdeeds. It is due to Hegel to supplyNapoleon with theself-consciousnesshathe lacks nd which anonly omeafterthe fact. Philosophy, s Hegel tells us in the prefacetothePhilosophyfRight,lways omes oo atetogive dvice.Theowl ofMinerva preads tswings nlywith hefalling f thedusk.27

Historyculminates, hen, only with the attainment fwisdom r "AbsoluteKnowledge." he aim of philosophysnot tochangethe worldbut nterprett. Wisdom s achievedonly fter he state s able to provideforthecomprehensivesatisfactionf all humandesires,notonlyour materiallyr

biologicallyonstitutedesires, utourhigher-ordereed forrecognition.Whenthishappensthere s nothingmore to doexceptforthephilosopher, egel,toputthe whole n order.When this s accomplished,whenphilosophy aints tsgreyon grey,"not only will history e completebut so willphilosophy. hilosophy,n the original ense of the term,meant he ovefor r search fterwisdom. utphilosophy aspossible nly ecauseofa discrepancyetween herealand the

25Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance,r. Richard Howard (New York:Putnam,1965), pp. 34-35.

26Kojève, ReadingofHegel, pp. 69-70.27Ibid.,pp. 163ff.



HEGELIANISM 955

ideal,what s and whatoughtto be. In the universal ndhomogeneous tatenowcoming ntobeing,thissplitwillbeovercome. he realwillbecomerational nd the rationalwillbe madereal. Whenthishappens,philosophys a distinctiveactivity illbe dialecticallyvercome ythewise manor sagewhosurveyswhathe sees and knows t to be bothnecessaryand good.

Tyrannyncient nd Modern

Kojève's reading of Hegel was inevitably ontroversial.Consequently,number fdifferentactics avebeenadoptedby critics o attack t. One tactic s to show thatKojève'scommentaryests n a deepmisrepresentationfHegel.Thus

GeorgeA. Kelly,while dmittinghat everytudent fHegelis deeply enrichedby Kojève," argues that his one-sidedemphasisupon the struggle f master nd slave leads to "aunilaterallysocial' nterpretationf thePhenomenology"ith"anachronisticvertonesof the Marxian class struggle."28"Kojève'soriginal xegesisof Hegelianthemes,"Kelly vers,"is a profoundwork or urowntimes,"lthough e maintainsthat"a 'Marxian* henomenologyoes not make very goodsense."Suchan

interpretationignoreshe

depthnd

passionof Hegel's Greekattachments"s well as "the complicatedrangeofhisstruggle ith heKantian plitvision."29

Another riticismfKojève s thathe arrests he dialecticalelementnHegel'sthought, orcingtarbitrarilyo culminatein the present.Distinguishingetween he "fixed" nd the"moving"trandsftheHegelian ialectic,enjamin arberhasarguedthatKojève, ikemanyof Hegel'sother nterpreters,favors ne aspect o thewhole.Thus Kojève, ruing hefixity

28George A. Kelly, Notes on Hegel's 'Lordship and Bondage/

"Hegel'sRetreatrom

Eleusis Princeton:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1978), pp. 31-32.™Ibid.,p. 53.



956 SOCIAL RESEARCH

ofhistory'sinal ppearance s reason" nd fearing hat theold Hegel may merely oncealtheyoungPlatoin disguise,"endsup by turning istorynto a "frozen andscape"which,whencomplete, wouldyielda portrait f the worldno lessrational han the Ideal FormsfromwhichPlato believedourimperfect istoryctuallyssued."30 n a similar einI haveargued lsewherehatHegel'send ofhistoryulminates ot n

the universal nd homogeneous tateor cosmopolis.Rather,Hegel's end state s neither niversal orhomogeneous.HeaffirmsgainstKant'splansfor perpetual eace"theultimatesovereigntynd autonomyf thenation-statehich s at thesame time constitutedy considerable ocial differentiationand hierarchy.31

Another actichas been takenbyLeo Strauss,who treatsKojèveas theauthentic oiceofHegelianism. he pretext orStrauss's

critiquewas

Kojève'sreviewarticle of Strauss

commentary n Xenophon's Hiero, the only work by acontemporaryfPlato'sdevoted xclusivelyo theproblem ftyranny.32he Hierotakes the formof a dialoguebetweenSimonides,a wisemancomefromfar," ndHiero, hetyrantofSyracuse, hoof atehasbecomedisenchanted ith oliticallife. Straussuses the dialogueto show that the exerciseofpolitical power must of necessitybe at odds with thephilosophicalife whileat the same timeshowinghow the

philosopheran offer omepracticalnstructionotyrantsnhow to make their rule less arbitrarynd capricious.Thequestion hat heHiero sksus toconsiders whether rationaltyrannyr "utopia"is ither esirable r feasible.

The argument etweenKojèveand Strauss ltimatelyurns

30Benjamin Barber, "Spirit'sPhoenix and History'sOwl or the Incoherence of

Dialectics n Hegel's AccountofWomen,"PoliticalTheory6 (1988): 7.31Smith,Hegel'sCritiquefLiberalism,p. 140-145, 156-164, 236-237.2Kojève's responsewas originallypublishedin twopartsunder the title L'actionpolitique des philosophes," Critiques 1-42 (1950): 46-55, 138-155; this essay was

republished in a revised formunder the title"Tyrannyand Wisdom" along withStrauss'soriginal"On Tyranny"and his "Restatement n Xenophon's 'Hiero,'" in avolume entitledOn TyrannyNew York: The Free Press, 1963).



HEGELIANISM 957

on whether he rational ociety an be fully nd adequatelycomprehendeds a response o the need forrecognition.nhisreply oStrauss, ojèvereaffirmsisbelief hat thedesireto be recognizednone'srealitynd inone's eminent umandignity.. is actually . . the ultimatemotive f all emulationamongmenand henceof all political truggle."33utwhileKojèvetakes thisdrive forrecognitions a primary atum,

Strauss akes t tobe secondaryr derivative. n the basis ofhisreading fXenophon nd theclassics s wellas theBible,Strauss eniesthat hey vertaught hedesirabilityfseekinguniversalrecognition. his was an invention f modernthought riginated yMachiavelli nd perfected ythinkerslike Hobbes and laterHegel. "BothdoctrinesHobbes'sandHegel's]," trausswrites,construct uman ociety ystartingfrom heuntrue ssumptionhatman as man s thinkables a

beingthat acksawareness f sacredrestraintsr as a

beingthat sguidedby nothing ut a desireforrecognition."34Whatustifies traussnmaking his laim? t mustbe said

thathe providesno direct nswer, ut he appearsto believethat hedesireforrecognitions inherentlyelf-defeating.norder o be truly atisfying,trauss vers, ecognition ust egivenfreely. ut to be givenfreely,t cannotbe coerced orcompelled ut earned.The tyrantmust hereforee inducedto confer enefitsnhis ubjectsfrecognitionstobegranted.But this s preciselywhat Strauss laimsthat the tyrant uatyrants incapable fachieving.

One cannot become a tyrant nd remaina tyrantwithoutstoopingodo basethings; ence, self-respectingan willnotaspireto tyrannicalower.But,Kojève might bject, his tilldoes notprove hat hetyrantsmotivatedhieflyrexclusivelyby desire orhonor rprestige. e maybemotivated,.g., bya misguideddesire to benefithis fellowmen. This defensewouldholdgood ferrornsuchmatters eredifficulto avoid.

But it is easy to know thattyrannys base; we all learn as33

Kojève, "Tyranny nd Wisdom,"p. 151.34Strauss, Restatement," . 205.



958 SOCIAL RESEARCH

children hatone mustnotgiveothers ad examples nd thatone mustnot do base things orthe sakeofthegoodthatmaycomeoutofthem. he potentialractual yrantoes notknowwhateveryreasonablywell-bred hildknows,because he isblindedby passion. By what passion?The mostcharitableanswer s thathe is blindedbydesireforhonororprestige.35

Kojève holds it possible to avoid the taint of moral

opprobriumbecause

tyrannytakes

todaya

fundamentallydifferentform than in the time of Xenophon. As a goodHegelian, Kojève takesXenophon tobe a representative fthe"pagan" or "aristocratic" thicof the ancientmasterclass. Thisethic cannot be reduced to thefundamentally ourgeoisdesireforsafety, omfort, nd security. he desire forrecognition snot the prerogativeof all men but onlyof the "real men,"theaneranderes, s opposed to the anthropoi, ho are regarded asslaves.For such men "no human pleasure" is greaterthan"the

joy which comes fromhonors."36Today, however, the classical conception of honor must

compete with another of biblicalorigin. In opposition to thepagan ethic of self-assertion,he Bible taught a moralityofrenunciation nd asceticism.Kojève's language here seems toowe more to Nietzsche's On theGenealogy fMorals than to

Hegel's Phenomenology.ietzsche had linked the moralityofthe slaves to the psychology f ressentiment.y ressentimente

meant an utterlyreactive moral disposition born out ofconditions of disappointment,frustration, nd impotence.Like Hegel, Nietzsche saw that the moralityof the slave

ultimatelyproved strongerthan the older master morality.Disciplined throughwork and fear, the slaves devoted theirefforts o ameliorating nd improvingtheir condition. It wasthis desire for comfort nd security hat is the originof ourideas ofaltruism, ompassion,and pity.What smore,theslave

moralityould never have

triumphedwithoutthe

helpof a

55Ibid.,pp. 204-205.36

Kojève, "Tyranny nd Wisdom,"p. 148.



HEGELIANISM 959

class f "ascetic riests."hesepriests ere riginally olymenseeking o minister o the needsof theirfollowers,ut laterbecame eaders f secularpoliticalmovementsikedemocracy,nationalism,nd pacificism.37

The triumphf the lave smost vident odayntheriseof"ideological"olitics ith tsdemandfor elf-renunciationnddevotion o a "cause." RevolutionariesikeRobespierrend

Lenin are virtuallyextbook xamplesof Nietzsche's sceticpriestswhowould olve heproblem frecognitionhroughsystematicenialof the ndividual. t is easyto see how suchdevotionoabstractauses erves o iberate oliticalctors ndintellectualsrom heordinary esponsibilitiesnd constraintsofmorality yturninghem ntoharbingersf a new socialorder.Nothing ecomes implerhan urningllopponents fthisneworder nto reactionaries"r "enemies fthepeople"to be exterminatedn the name ofprogress.38

It s thedependence nthe dea ofprogresshatmost learlydistinguishes ncient from modern tyranny. Tyranny,"Strausswrites,is a danger oeval withpoliticalife."39 t thesametime, e admits hatmodern yrannys boundup withparticularonceptionfscience hat ssues n theconquest fnature.The idea of theconquest fnature, traussbelieves,wasnot unknown o theancients. t was considered ythembut rejected n advanceas "unnatural" nd "destructivef

humanity."40t was left o certainmodern hinkers- alileo,Descartes, acon- toattempto iberatecience romheolderethicopoliticalestraintshathad been mposeduponit.Whilethe ancientshad seen nature as an eternal order to becontemplated,he moderns ended o see itas a vastreservoir

37FriedrichNietzsche,On theGenealogyfMorals, . 10, 13-15; II. 20; III. 15; for afineanalysiswitha useful comparisonto Hegel, see Tracy Strong,Friedrich ietzscheand thePolitics fTransfigurationBerkeley:University f CaliforniaPress, 1975), pp.

237-259, 327-329.38See Nicola Chiaromonte, "On Modern Tyranny: A Critique of WesternIntellectuals," issent 6 (1969): 137-150.

39Strauss."On Tvrannv." D. 140Strauss, Restatement" . 190.



960 SOCIAL RESEARCH

ofenergiesto be used forhuman ends and purposes. The newscienceof nature was to be conceived, then, long the ines of auniversal techne hich could serve as an instrument f humanself-assertion.41

Kojève is fully ware of the potentialof thisnewly iberatedscience of nature. Indeed, modern tyrants o no more thanimitate science when they attemptto harness their political

ambitionsto dynamic, progressivistphilosophies of history.Here is a perfectexample of art imitatingnature (or at leastthemodern conceptionof nature). It is not at all unusual forsuch men to think of themselves as the "engineers" or"architects" fessentially ewpoliticalorders.Kojève describestherevolutionary r tyrant s a "workman"whose devotion tohis craft s so complete that he literallyforgetshimself andthose around him:

I think t wouldbe falseto say,with imonides,hatonlythe"desire o be honored" nd the"joywhich omesfromhonor"makesone "endure ny abor and brave nydanger."The joythatcomesfrom abor itself nd the desire to succeed n anundertakingan, bythemselves,rompt man to undertakepainfulnddangerousabors. . .Aman can workhard,riskinghis ife, ornoother eason han oexperienceheoywhich ealways as nthe xecutionf hisplanor,what sthe amething,the transformationf his "idea,"or his "ideal," ntoa realityconditioned y his own efforts. . . Thus- though t is an

extreme ase- a mancanaspire otyrannynthe ameway hata "conscientious"nd "enthusiastic" orkman an aspire toadequateconditionsorhis abor.42

It is not difficult o imagine the dangers to whichKojève's"conscientious"and "enthusiastic" deal of workmanshipcanlead. No matterhow admirable the end, without ome set of

prior restraints causes function at best as unredeemed

promissory otes for a betterfuture.Kojève triesto meet this

41For a powerful tatement f thisview, ee Hans Blumenberg,TheLegitimacyftheModernAge,tr. RobertM. Wallace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983).

42Kojève, "Tyranny nd Wisdom,"pp. 148-149.



HEGELIANISM 961

objectionby arguingthathistory ontains ts own internalspheresof usticewhich at any time imitwhat is deemedpolitically ossible.The problemhere is obvious.So longasthereare no permanent riteria f ustice,what s deemedpoliticallyossiblewill e determinedythecrudely ragmaticstandard fsuccess,whateverworks.Kojèveremains ondofquoting Hegel's dictum die Weltgeschichtest das Weltgericht,

which ranslatedmeanswhatever ucceeds s right.43

An End ofHistory?

Kojève nd Strauss iffer otonly boutthepossibilityf anideal or rationalutopiabut about its desirability. s inter-preted by Kojève, the rational societywould entail the

universalizationf theprinciplesf freedom nd therights fman first rticulatedduring the French Revolution ndperfected y Napoleon. n a footnoteo theReading fHegelKojèvereminds s that this"Hegeliantheme, mong manyothers,was takenup byMarx" at the end of Capital.HereMarx made a distinctionetween therealm fnecessity"nd"the realm of freedom."The former onsists f "Historyproperlyso-called, n which men ('classes') fightamongthemselvesorrecognitionnd fight gainstNaturebywork,"while he atter efers o that beyond jenseits]nwhichmen(mutually ecognizing ne anotherwithout eservation) olonger ight,nd work s little s possibleNaturehaving eendefinitivelyastered- hat s,harmonizedwithMan)."44

The end of history illnotonlymeanthe instaurationfsocialharmonynd thepacificationfnature ut alsothe ndof historical egating ctionof any kindsuch as wars andrevolutions.his transitionrom herealmofnecessityo the

realmof freedomwillculminate n "the disappearanceof43

Kojève,ReadingofHegel,p. 185."Ibid., p. 159.



962 SOCIAL RESEARCH

Man,"not, o be sure, hebiological henomenon omoapiensbut "Man properly o-called-that is, Actionnegatingthegiven .. or,in general, heSubjectopposedto theObject."The disappearance f man attheendofhistory ill lso meantheend ofphilosophy,ecause when Man himself o longerchanges ssentially,here s nolonger nyreason ochange he(true)principles hich re at thebasisofhisunderstandingf

theWorld nd of himself."45The precisemeaningof Kojève's end-of-historyhesis smade clear once again in his exchangewithStrauss. HereKojèvespeaks f theend ofhistorys a synthesisf thepaganor aristocraticmorality f antiquity nd the bourgeois-Christianmoralityf the modernworld. FromAlexandrianantiquity e have inheritedhe idea of a "universal tateorempire."But the ancientworldwas stillpredicated pon theideaof human nequality.Masters nd slaveswere wodistinctclasses r natures etweenwhich here ould be no mixture.twasChristianityhich or he first ime nhistoryntroducedsomeconception f the fundamentalquality f thespecies.But this qualitywasas yet nly n equality f faithna singleGod. It wasnotyet qualitynthepoliticalenseoftheterm.46

It onlyremainedfor those two strandsof morality,hepaganand theChristian,obe synthesizedyHegel intotheidea of a "politicallyniversal tate"which s also a "socially

homogeneous tateor classless ociety." he resultingocialorderpursuedbythe"greatesttatesmen"sonethatprovidescomprehensiveecognitionf everyhumanbeing,of eachperson's ullworth nd dignity.fwhatmentruly esire s tobe recognized,tfollowshat he universalnd homogeneousstate r classless ocietywillbe the endofhistory. ll thatwillbe necessary illbe fortheHegelianphilosophero describethishappybreed n theplenitude f tsexistence.47

45Ibid.,p. 159.46Kojève, TyrannyndWisdom,"p. 179-181.47Ibid.,p. 183.



HEGELIANISM 963

In opposition o Kojève, Straussponderedwhether hiscondition f a homogeneousmankind ouldproveultimatelysatisfyingo those livingunder its dominion.There are,Strauss rgued, "degreesof satisfaction."he satisfactionftheordinaryitizenwhoenjoys n equality fopportunityndisrecognized orhismodest ttainmentssscarcely omparableto the satisfactionf the "Chief f State"who alone is "really

satisfied." trauss aisesagainstKojèvethe samechargethatNietzsche ad earlier rought gainstMarxian ocialism.twasNietzsche hofirstrgued hat heend ofhistory ouldresultnot in universal atisfaction ut in a kind of generalizedaimlessnessnd lossofmeaning. n Marx'sUtopian mageofsociety heremen huntnthemorning,ishnthe fternoon,rear attlenthe vening,nd criticizefter inner,"Nietzschesawnothingo muchas thereignof the "lastman,"the one

greatherdwithout

shepherd.The

completeatisfactionf

every umandesire, ven fpossible,wouldproveto be not ablessing uta curse:

The statethroughwhichman is said to becomereasonablysatisfieds, then, he staten which hebasisofman'shumanitywithersway, r inwhichman oses hishumanity.t isthe tateofNietzsche'slastman."Kojèvein fact onfirmshe classicalview thatunlimitedechnological rogress nd itsaccompani-ment,which re theindispensableonditions f theuniversaland

homogeneous tate,are destructive f

humanity.t is

perhapspossibleto say thatthe universal nd homogeneousstate s fated o come.But it is certainlympossibleo saythatman can reasonably e satisfiedwith t. If theuniversal ndhomogeneoustate s thegoal ofHistory, istorys absolutely"tragic."48

It is clear fromhis exchangewithStrauss that Kojèvebelievedthat the rationaltyrannywhichhad been onlyaremoteUtopian possibilityor Xenophonhad become "an

almost banal reality"for the present. Kojève refers toSimonides' dvicethat hetyrantistributeonors nd prizes

48Strauss, Restatement," . 223.



964 SOCIAL RESEARCH

as rewards orgoodworks, system hich, eclaims, ad beenfully implementedby Stalin's systemof "stakhanovisticemulation." he idea here, take t, s to redirecthe humanpassion for gloryand preeminence oward public ends,especiallyhegoodofthe state.49

Strauss annot ccept hat heStalinistystemSalazar s alsomentioned)sthegoodoridealtyrannyroposed ntheHiero.

In the first lace,he notes that good tyranny ouldmostlikely ee the declineof the role of thesecretpoliceand thelaborcamps, point bout whichKojèveis ominouslyilent.Second,he also asks, f Stalin s a good tyrant, hether eregards ll his fellow itizens s comrades rwhether e couldtravelfreelywithinor outside the Soviet Union withoutanythingo fear. The inference e bids us draw s thatthegood tyrannys as much n impossibilityowas itwas in thetime f

Xenophon.50Kojèvehimself ad occasionto reconsider hemeaning fthe nd ofhistorynthe econd dition f hisReading fHegelIn a lengthyfootnotehe came to questionwhetherthecomplete atisfactionf humandesirepromised t the end ofhistorywould mean not the fulfillment ut the "re-animalization"fhumanity.f labor, truggle,r, in a word,alienation, ave broughtmen to theirpresentheight, heremight e reason othink hat he bolition f all thathasmade

menhumanwouldresultnthe bolition fhumanity.Henceitwouldhave to be admitted," ojèvewrote, that fter heend ofHistory,men would constructheir difices nd worksof art as birdsbuild theirnests nd spiders pintheirwebs,wouldperformmusical oncerts fter hefashion ffrogs ndcicadas,wouldplay ikeyoung nimals, nd would ndulge nlove ike dultbeasts.Butone cannot hen aythat hismakesManhappy.'"51

49Koiève, "Tyranny nd Wisdom," pp. 146-147.50Strauss, Restatement," p. 201-202.51

Kojève, Reading f Hegel, p. 159.



HEGELIANISM 965

In the amenoteKojève eft odoubt hat he ompletionfhistory,hich adonly een announced yHegel n1806,hadnowbeenaccomplishednthe ffectivelyclassless" ocieties fboth hecontemporarynited tates nd SovietRussia. f,hesaid, theAmericans ive heappearance frich ino-Soviets"this is only because "the Russians and Chinese are onlyAmericans hoare still oorbutarerapidly roceedingoget

richer."n either aseKojèvethought e saw nthe riumphf"theAmericanwayof life"the actual completion f "post-history"nd thereturn fmantothe "eternal resent."52

Kojève greetedthe end of historywiththe kind of sageacceptance ne wouldexpectfrom n Hegelian"wiseman."Still, isawareness hat posthistorical"ifewillnotmakemanhappyforces s to reconsider headequacyof theHegelianperspectiven the humancondition.For if history annot

guaranteehe abolition falienation,hen solutionmustbe

foundelsewhere.One suggestionmaybe thattheHegelian-Marxistemphasison labor, struggle, nd the desire forrecognitionoesnot xhaust he ssence fhumannature. ortraditionalheisticritics fHegel,thismerely epresentsheinadequacy f anyhumanisticeaching ivorcedfrom omeconceptionof transcendence nd a nonhumanabsolute.Strauss gain returned o Nietzsche'snsight hatan end ofhistorywould sanction a series of "nihilistic evolutions"

unenlightened y any positivepoint or purpose. In theuniversal ndhomogeneoustate uch ctsofabstract egationwouldbe theonlyway eft ormen toreassert heirhumanity.Strauss laimed o find his bstract egation referableotheindefiniteontinuationf"the nhuman nd."53 itherway, ysuggestinghat heproblem falienations inseparable romhuman existence,that we cannot expect fulfillment rcomplete atisfaction ithinhistory, ojève perhapsunwit-

tingly repared hewayfor he "abolition"fHegelianism.52Ibid.. d. 161.53Strauss, Restatement," . 224.



966 SOCIAL RESEARCH

Rationalitynd Postmodernism

The questionwe are now left with near the end of thetwentiethentury s exactlythat asked by Croce near itsbeginning, amely, What s living nd what s dead in thephilosophyfHegel?"Or,toputCroce's uestionnsomewhatdifferent orm,is the Hegelian conceptionof historical

rationalitytill iable oday?One way of approaching hese questions s to confrontHegelianism ith omeof themost ignificantolitical ealitiesof our age. Is his belief n a rationalityperating n andthrough istoryompatible,ndeedhospitable,oallempiricalrealities? r do somepossibilities,ayNazism, ystematicallyviolate he essenceofHegelianism? his question s a crucialone. If Hegelianisms simply its own time pprehended nthoughts,"ftheHegelianphilosophers,as Kojève'maintains,a "positivist"ho does no more than "describewhathe sees,everythinghathesees, ndnothingutwhathesees," henhelosesall critical urchase n politicsnd history.54fthis s alltrue, henHegelianisms exactlywhat tsseverestritics avealwayssaid it is, an uncritical ationalization f whateverhappens o exist.

If,on theotherhand, heHegelian onceptionfrationalityisnotmerely Panglossiandealizationfthepresent,t must

becapableofgeneratingorms or valuating riticallyhat s.Hegel believedthathistorytselfwas capable of generatingsuch standards f right nd ustice.But theproblemhere isobvious.Hegelmaywellhaveearnestlyelieved hat hefutureofEurope, ndeedofhumanity,asto becomemore menableto reasonand freedom.What, hen,would he havemade oftheoutbreak f "demonic vil" ntheheart f civilized uropein 1933?55What reweto makeofHegel'sclaim fStrausswas

54Kojève,Reading f Hegel,, . 176; see also p. 259 wherehe comparesHegel'sprocedureoHeidegger'sphenomenologicalnthropology."55See EmilL. Fackenheim,WouldHegelTodaybe a Hegelian?" ialogue (1970):222-226.



HEGELIANISM 967

correct henhe said that Hegel'srule overGermanyame toan end onlyon theday thatHitlercame to power."56 hisimplies hatHegelianism, hile ncetrue,has been refuted ysubsequentvents nd as such saufgehoben.tisthis ossibilitythat want oconsidern conclusion.

A standard,but by no means negligible, riticism fHegelianismsthat toperateswith metaphysicalnterpreta-

tion of historys the gradualunfolding f reason. Such ametaphysicalnterpretationfhistoryeeksout notonlythecausesof events ut thegrounds f thosecauses. ForHegel,thisground sreason, r as he put t nhisPhilosophyfWorldHistory:The sole thoughtwhichphilosophy ringsto thetreatmentf historys the simpleconceptof Reason: thatReason s the awof the world nd that, herefore,n worldhistory,hings ave come aboutrationally."57hatare we tomake, hen, f the view hat

onlyhe

studyf world

historycan show . . the rationally ecessary ourseof the WorldSpirit?"

The idea thathistorys a rationalprocessor that"reasonrules heworld"mplies hat heres a general hapeorpatternto humaneventswithoutwhich t would be impossible oorganize hemnto meaningful hole.Thisshapeorpatternis, we recall,the unfolding f the idea of freedomwhich,despitewhat ndividualsmaydo either o advanceor impede

this end, is the immanent ause of their actions. Whileindividual istoricalctorsmaywellbe ignorantf this ause,Hegelbelieved t wasnowpossible opresent he end oftheiractions s the achievementfthemodern tate.The modernconstitutionaltatewith ts iberal ocialorderwas forhimthetruevocation fhumanity,heendtowardwhich ll ofhumanhistoryhad been striving.AfterHegel historywould beunderstoodnot as a timeless, nd hence static, nterplay

56Leo Strauss, pinoza'sCritiquefReligion,r. Eisa M. Sinclair New York: Schocken,1965), p. 2.

57Hegel, PhilosophyfHistory,. 9.



968 SOCIAL RESEARCH

between set ofequallyproblematicalolitical orms,ut as aprogressive volutiontowarda determinate nd. Just asTocqueville, a generationafter Hegel, emphasized theirreversibilityf the democraticmovement s the neluctablefate and destinyof Europe, so did Hegel present theRechtsstaat,he stateruled by law, as the concrete ocus ofmodern reedom.

It is precisely hisconception f historys embodyingprogressiveationalityhathas beenthesubject fwidespreadattack n Hegel. It is one thing o saythatthere s reasonoperatingwithin istory;t is something ntirely ifferentosay hathistorysa rational rocess imedatachieving moralend.The firsttatement taketobe a relativelyncontrover-sialstatementffact; he econd san attemptoprovide omekindofstrongermetaphysicalrounding or hatfact.To saythathistorys a rational rocessmeans hatt spossible t eastinprincipleoprovide singlenarrativeccount fevents hatwill not be subjectto futurerevision.History s rationalbecause we shouldbe able to constructromt an account fsuchcompelling ecessityhat t carrieswithintself ts owncriteria f certainty. rational ccountof historywould betantamountoprovidingompleteknowledge r proofwhichcould onlybe possible f we knew thathistorywas at lastcomplete.58

The problemwiththisconception f rationalitys that tmisdescribesherelationshipetween eliefsnd truth. n theview frationalityhat wouldrecommend,eliefs re rationalnot becausethey re notsubject o changeand revision utprecisely ecausethey re. A beliefor expressions rationalbecause it is open to criticismnd evaluation.Rationalitysmore predicate ffallibilityhanofcertainty.ndeed,to theextent hatbeliefs emainopen to criticism,heynecessarily

admit f mprovementnd thereforehange.Thus beliefs re

rational f we have "good reasons"forholding hem,which

58See Hegel'sCritique fLiberalism,p. 217-231.



HEGELIANISM 969

implies a willingness o reconsiderthose beliefs and, ifnecessary,evise hemffurthervidence resentstself. o berational, hen,is to be aware of the fallibilityf humanreasoningnd thus oaccept hedangers swell s thebenefitsto which uch mperfectationalityanbe put.59

The conception f a fallibilisticationalitys notnecessarilyincompatiblewithHegelianism n a revisedform.On this

modified ersionwe need notacceptthe results fhistorynsome bsolute ense.Hegelön this iew snot ryingoprovidesome"ontological roof"for heend ofhistory. ather, e issuggestinghat a rationalpoliticalorder is one thatmustremainopen to the possibilityf future hange. If to berationalmeans, mongother hings,o be aware of thefinite,fallible haracter f humanreasoning hen it is impossiblerationally o tryto foreclosethe futureby denyingthe

possibilityffuture

hange.ndeed, t would be irrationalo

do otherwise.A rationalpolitical rder, then, s one whichworksbest

when t operateswith certaindegreeof indeterminacyrskepticismbout tself*t isa mark f sucha polity ot toseekcertaintynd controlover all thingsbut to recognize ndacceptthattheboundaries f rationalityre always pen topublicdiscussionnd debate. Reason s nota destinationutan adventure nd one inwhich heterms re neverfixed n

advancebut continuallyecede as we approach. It follows,therefore,hat if a commitment o rationalitympliesanopenness o criticismnd an acceptance fchange, hen hereis built into Hegel's conceptionof history self-criticalmechanism. process fquestionings implicitn our socialpractices.We can accept he results fhistorys rational nlyin a provisional ense, that s, true untilsomething ettercomes long.

Only by adopting the more provisional nd skeptical59See Leszek Kolakowski, In Praiseof Inconsistency," oward Marxist umanism:

Essays n theLeftToday, r.J. Z. Peel (New York: Grove Press, 1968), pp. 211-220.



970 SOCIAL RESEARCH

conception f rationalityuggested bove can Hegelianismtoday enerate heresources oresistarge-scale istoricalvil.Totalitarianegimes re "un-Hegelian" reciselyo theextentthat theyseek to impose some final solution on politicalproblemshat rebytheirnature pen-ended nd intractable.The turn toward such solutions,whether n the formofRousseau'sGeneralWill,Marx'sclassless ociety,r the Nazi

Fuhrerprinzip,s evidence f the exhaustion fpolitical eason.A rational olity eednotbe one thatdemands onsensus nall issues. ndeed,to identifyolitical ationalityith onsen-sus is,as I havesuggested,omisunderstand hatreason s.Sucha view s not rational ut rationalistic.his rationalisticmisuseof reasontypicallynsists hatthere s somesurefire,foolproofmethod by which all social conflicts an besatisfactorilyesolved.A rationalpoliticss, on thecontrary,one whichmustbe

fullylive to its own

imperfectionsnd

thereforepen to discussion nd deliberation boutalterna-tives. t must ncorporate he virtues f prudence,balance,compromise,nd toleration. hus to demand thatpolitics ethe ocusofsome"idealspeech" ommunitys to demandtheimpossible.t isakinto the searchfor hephilosopher'stone,a search s impossibles it sdangerous.60

RevisionistHegelianism, s I have called it, is, broadlyspeaking,fa piecewith heEnlightenment'selief hat eality

should be ruled by reason. To be sure, there has beenconsiderableontroversyverwhether he ttemptedeconcil-iation of reason and realityhad been accomplished.ForHegelians fthemoderate enter,heRechtsstaatpelledout nthe Philosophyf Rightcontained sufficient ationalityowarrantheir bligation, hileforHegelians fthe eft t wasfelt necessaryto liberate the potentialitiesnherent indialectical ernunftrom hestraitjacketfbourgeois ational-

ism.Fromhere,however,t was but a short tepto a third60For a similarview, ee Benjamin Barber,TheConquest fPolitics: iberalPhilosophy

in Democratic imesPrinceton:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1988).



HEGELIANISM 971

more horoughgoingritiquewhich ought odelegitimizeherule of reason ltogether.

The postmodernritique f reasongrew ut of an attack ntheEnlightenment,hichwasthought oreach tsapotheosisinHegel.Drawing n theworks f Nietzsche ndHeidegger,numberof post-HegelianhinkersAdorno, Foucault,Con-nolly-havecalled attentionothedominatorynd dehuman-

izing aspects of rationalitytself.From the outset of theWesternmetaphysicalradition hese thinkers ee reason,aidedby he win orces fscience ndtechnology,s driven ya sinister esireforpower nd control. he attempto securecontrol over external nature has invariably ed to thesubjugationnd exploitationfhumanitys well.Bylocatingthisdesireforsubjugation otin anyparticularocialorderbut n thestructuref reason tself,hesepost-Hegeliansavedeclared eason obe

simplyhe ervant f

power.ince

poweris exercised hrough ationality,ll rationality,hey pined, sreallypower.The onlydifferences between ocietieswherepower sexercised hrough rute orce ndovert oercion ndthosemodern, nlightened,emocraticocietieswherepowerhas a morediffuse ace.

The questions hepostmodernritics sk us toconsider renot "Whatdoes reasonbring olight?" ut "Whatdoes reasonconceal?" nd "Whatdoes it notpermit s to see?" These are

notnecessarilyad questions. heyalertus especially o thedangers f thosepurveyorsfenlightenmenthodesire oseethewhole fsocietys a perfectlyransparentnity. he resultof this spirationor ransparency,t sretorted,s not ikelyobe liberatingbut would resemble nothingso much asBentham'sdealprison, hePanopticon, here very spectoflife is under the perpetualsurveillance nd controlof itswarders.The post-Hegelians, hen, are in large part in

agreement ithHegel and Kojèvethat hedialectic fmasterand slave s thecentral eitmotivfhistory,lthough heyoinissuewithNietzsche nd Straussnseeing he"triumphftheslave"not s liberatingut s spellingne moreform fpower.



972 SOCIAL RESEARCH

This postmodernritical heorys notable, hen,for ts cooldetachmentegarding ll proposalsfor humanemancipationas embodyingnlydifferentorms fa mythologyr reason.

The postmoderns ave a good thesisbut ruin t throughexaggeration. hey are clearly n to somethingwhentheyidentifyhepotentiallyotalitarianeatures fEnlightenmentrationality.ver ince heworks f theearlyFrankfurtchool,

ithas becomevirtuallycommonplaceo dentifyhe cientificEnlightenmentithpositivismnd tyranny.For theEnlight-enment,"s HorkheimerndAdornoput t n their ialecticfEnlightenment,whatever oes not conform o the rule ofcomputation nd utilitys suspect . . . Enlightenmentstotalitarian."61irtuallyhe same position an be foundinFoucault'sWhat s Enlightenment?,"lecturemocking ant'swork f thesametitle.Whilehe praises omewhatquivocallyKant's

ssayfor ts

perspicuitynoutlining

theuestion

f thepresent" nd forremovingmodernityrom ts"longitudinalrelationwith heancients," orFoucault heEnlightenmentsultimatelykindof "blackmail"o whichwe shouldnot allowourselves o submit.62

These criticismsftheEnlightenmentrewrong, owever,to see power as all-pervasivend unitary.There are, asHabermashas argued,differentinds fpowerrelationships,somecoercive,thers ot, nditmakes ll thedifferencenthe

world o be able todistinguishetween hem.63he new kindof critical nalysis nauguratedby Foucault tends to blurtogether ifferentorms r layers fpower o that t becomesimpossible o distinguishetween he legitimatend illegiti-mate uses of power, between a gang of thugs and aparliamentaryssembly.Without more subtleand fine-

61Max Horkheimerand Theodor W. Adorno, DialecticofEnlightenment,r.John

dimming (New York: SeaburyPress, 1969), p.6.62MichelFoucault,"WhatIs Enlightenment?" heFoucaultReader, d. Paul Rabinow

(New York: Pantheon, 1984), pp. 32-50.

JürgenHabermas,"Hannah Arendt'sCommunicationsConceptofPower, SocialResearch4 (1977): 3-24.



HEGELIANISM 973

grained tyle f analysis,he new critical heory hreatens obecome nothingmore than a game of seekingout andexposing vernew and more ubtle orms foppression. heresults a somewhataranoid earch or ources f dominationthatno one has yetbeen able to identify ith nytolerablespecificity.

Is itpossible hatwe are nowentering third,nd perhaps

moreominous, risis frationality?

* To thememory

fGeorgeArmstrongelly 1932-1987).

Documents

Smith - Hegelianism and the Three Crises of Rationality