Smaller States and Larger Neighbors || The Challenges and Restraints of White Power for a Small African State: Botswana and Its Neighbors

The Challenges and Restraints of White Power for a Small African State: Botswana and ItsNeighborsAuthor(s): Richard DaleSource: Africa Today, Vol. 25, No. 3, Smaller States and Larger Neighbors (Jul. - Sep., 1978),pp. 7-23Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185787 .

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The Challenges and Restraints of White

Power for a Small African State:

Botswana and Its Neighbors.

Richard Dale

The Endless Quest for Security

If one takes as a point of departure the assertion by Professor John J. Okumu that "The foreign relations of any African state are a function of its colonial history. . .,"'1 then one should be able to explain, and perhaps even predict, at least the larger patterns of statecraft for Botswana. With- out becoming ensnared in the practical and theoretical problems of providing an operational definition of a small state in international politics,2 it should be sufficient to draw attention to Botswana's location within the horseshoe-type configuration of its neighbors to the south, east, and west - all three currently under white rule. Equally important is Botswana's status as a landlocked state in Southern Africa. Finally, it is particularly meaningful to analyze Botswana's challenges and constraints on state behavior in terms of a Southern African regional system, a system which is presently in flux.3

1. John J. Okumu. "The Place of African States in International Relations." in August Schou and Arne 0. Brundtlalnd (eds.). Small States in International Relations (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell Forlag AB. 1971). p. 147.

2. See Erling Bjel, "The Small State in International Politics,' and Ronald P. Barstoa, "The External Relabtions of Small States." in Schou and Brundtland. Small States . . . , pp. 29-37 and 39-5b, respectively.

3. Such an analysis may be found in Susani A. Gitelson, "The Transformation of the Southern African Subordinate State System." Journal of African Studies, vol. 4. no. 4 (Winter. 1977-78). pp. 3b7-391.

Richard Dale is Associate Professor of Political Science at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.

Author's Note: The author is most grateful to Southern Illinois University at Carbondale for financial and other support for his research work oni. as well as in, Southern Africa. He is appreciative of the research clearance granted to him in the summer of 1976 by the Office of the President in Gaborone under the provisions of Section 3 of the Anthropological Research Act No. 45. which was applicable to this research. Mrs. Diana Boernstein of the United Nations Secretariat kindly supplied the author with United Nations documents, while Mr. William B. Edmondson of the U.S. Department of State. Professor E. Philip Morgan of Indiana University, Professor Louis A. Picard of Gustavus Adolphus College, Professor Maynard B. Swanson of Miami University, and Miss Jacqueline A. Kalley of the South African Institute of International Affairs were gracious enough to comment on the author's previous research and/or provide additional data and insights on Botswana. Only the author is to be held responisible for errors or omissions in the presentation and interpretation of the data in this article.

JULY-SEPT. 1978 7



Turning to Professor Okumu's admonition to examine the colonial history of any African state, one does not have to immerse oneself long in 19th and 20th century Botswana history to notice the significance of the quest for security as an element involved in the British declaration of a protectorate over Bechuanaland (as Botswana was called before independence in 1966) in 1885. The better known chiefs were anxious to have the Imperial Government interpose itself between Botswana and those Afrikaners in the Transvaal who coveted the land of the Tswana, and later in the 19th century three of these chiefs successfully sought the Queen's protection against Cecil John Rhodes' British South Africa Company which purported to have valid claims to at least parts of the Protectorete .4

In the Anglo-Boer War, during the seige of Mafeking (which served as the administrative headquarters of the Protectorate until 1965), the British defenders of this beleaguered town dispatched a number of Africans north to Kanye, the captial of the Bangwaketse people. This crossing of the enemy lines to relative safety was deemed to be a logistical necessity in order to conserve food in the siege.5 Shortly after the termination of this particular war, the Protectorate again offered asylum to Africans from German South West Africa who were engaged in a sanguinary revolt against their German overlords. These Herero people moved into territory inhabited by Batswana in the Ngamiland area of Bechuanaland which abutted on German South West Africa. 6

The Tswana chiefs, and their counterparts in the other British protectorates of Basutoland (now Lesotho) and Swaziland, were quite articulate in their wish to keep their territories and peoples out of the proposed amalgamation of the Cape and Natal colonies with the two defeated Afrikaner republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State into what was known as the Union of South Africa.' Chief Khama III of the Bamagwato, the grandfather of the current President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, was adequately informed about the conditions prevailing in the Union with regard to the treatment of Africans and had good reason to oppose the incorporation of the Protectorate by the Union.'

4. For a succinct account of the history of Botswana by an erstwhile Resident Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, consult Anthony Sillery. Botswana: A Short Political History (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1974).

5. As recorded in John L. Comaroff (ed.), The Boer War Diary of Sol T. Piaatje (Johanne-sburg: Macmillan South African [Publishers] (Pty.J Ltd.. 1973). pp. 98, 104, and 162. ftn. 65.

6. See Frank R. Vivelo, "The Entry of the Herero into Botswana," Botswana Notes and Records (Gaborone: The Botswana Society), vol. 8 (1976), pp. 39-46.

7. The standard work on the incorporation issue is Ronald Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion, 1908-1948 (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd.. 1972).

8. As documented in J. Mutero Chirenje. Chief Kgama and His Times c. 1835-1923: The Story of a Southern African Ruler (London: Rex Collings Ltd., 19781, pp. 84, 88. 91-92. and 1)1.

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Botswana's quest for security during the period of the Union of South Africa (1910-1961) was manifested primarily in avoiding absorption into the Union and in seeing to it that the British did indeed act as their protectors and benefactors. There was little evidence that during most of this half century Botswana was a place of asylum for those caught up in the throes of armed conflict or for those actively involved in acts thought to undermine the system of white paramountcy in the neighboring states and territories. In the case of the Bamangwato people, for example, types of political asylum were offered by the Bakwena in the 19th and 20th centuries to certain aristocrats and their retainers or followers who found themselves involved in dynastic disputes.9

As the system of apartheid was more rigidly applied in South Africa and Namibia in the late 1950s and very early 1960s, the British found themselves increasingly in the business of inas political innkeepers to those who sought asylum from the rigors of white i -west and in the south. Once called the missionaries' road or the road to the north in the 19th century,'0 illustrating its utility in reaching the more highly prized possessions of the two Rhodesias, Botswana was regarded in the 1960s as a corridor for African nationalists and their white South African

9. Ibid. p. 1 and Mary Benson, Tshekedi Khama (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), p. 191.

10. Consuh Anthony J. Dachs, The Road to the North: The Origin and Force of a Slogan. Local Series Pamphlet No. 23 (Salisbury: Central Africa Historical Association, 1969).

JULY-SEPT. 1978 9



sympathizers to reach African-ruled Tanzania or Zambia (which obtained its independence three years later than mainland Tanzania)." The British authorities laid the groundwork in the early 1960s for managing the flow of refugees northward, across the so-called freedom ferry at Kazungula, to Zambia. Under the exemplary leadership of Sir Peter Fawcus, the Queen's Commissioner (that is, governor) for the Protectorate, physical security was furnished, and it was made crystal clear that those requesting asylum were not to abuse it by attacking the neighboring white-ruled states.'2 Sir Peter's job, in essence, was to make optimal use of scarce resources, avoid provoking the wrath of the Pretoria authorities, and cultivate a humane image with respect to those articulate M.P.s in the House of Commons who, in br. Goldsworthy's felicitous phrase, acted as the "honourable Members for Africa" or "vicarious representatives of colonial peoples."'3

This influx of African (and some white) refugees from the south had tendency to facilitate the politicalization of the Batswana, and modern political parties in Botswana are less than two decades old.'4 Both whites and Africans had very limited roles in the governance of the Protectorate following the end of the First World War, but each group interacted with the Protectorate Administration on a separate and not necessarily equal basis, through the African and European Advisory Councils. The former was, in essence, a mechanism to facilitate inter-tribal consultation and consensus-formation. Representation was on a tribal basis and provided access to the Resident Commissioner and his administrative cadre for members of the traditional African hierarchy and their liege men. The latter represented those whites who were permanently settled in the Protectorate in the several white territorial enclaves on the eastern perimeter and one in the far west (Ghanzi) and who were not officials of the Administration. In neither Council was the notion of representation by political party manifested, and only in the European one did the notion of one man, one vote prevail. The world views of both Councils were quite pragmatic and could not be said to be characterized by "high politics,"'5 for their frame of

11. See Jan Pettman. Zambia: Security and Conflict (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inic., 1974). p. 23.

12. Ample documentation may be found in International Refugee Council of Zambia, [The) Refugee Situation in Bechuanaland, June, 1965 (Gaberones, Francistown. Lusaka: author, June-July. 1965), filed as item BNB 347 in the Botswana National Archives. See also the adjournment motion debate in Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, Debates, 5th series, vol. 697, cols. 786-796 (June 25, 1964) and the much fuller journalistic accounit in Jack Halpern, South Africa's Hostages: Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), pp. 3-49, 326- '327. and 452-453.

13. David Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-1961: From 'Colonial Development' to 'Wind of Change' (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. b69 and 68, respectively for the quoted phrases.

14. The constitutional history of Botswana is adequately analyzed by Robert H. Edwards, Political and Conistitutional Change in the Bechuanaland Protectorate," in Jeffrey Butler and A.A. Castagno leds.), Boston University Papers on Africa: Transition in African Politics. Published for the African Studies Center of Boston University (New York, Washington, London: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967), pp. 135-165.

15. The term has been described as meaning ". . . those issues of primary importance to top decision makers, whereas low .politics are those issues of lesser importance relegated to lesser levels of authority." Joan E. Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1977), p. 17, ftn. 4.

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reference was basically only Southern Africa and the imperial capital of London.

Such basic political torpor was congruent with the political status of the Protectorate after the formation of the Union of South Africa because of the South African anticipation of incorporation of Bechuanaland and the other two High Commission Territories. The Protectorate was, in essence, only a transitory stage on the passage to British disengagement by transfer to South Africa, a prospect which the Tswana and their Afrophilic friends in London found abhorrent, particularly when the Hertzog Government in Pretoria began to erode whatever civic rights the Cape Africans had in a grand apartheid scheme in the mid-1930s. The British disposition to transfer the territories was predicated upon the assumption that the milder views on race relations found in the Cape and, to a lesser extent, in Natal would become the dominant ones within the white body politic."6 As the hard-line attitudes manifested by the whites in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State grew to be the pervasive ones in South Africa and as the London government began to think in terms of retreat from empire, albeit in a slow, methodical manner,'7 the British not only proffered protection but also began to make small amends for the imperial economic neglect of the territory. 8

The political gulf between Botswana, on the one hand, and South Africa and Namibia, on the other hand, was quite apparent to the politicized stratum of Africans in the latter two countries, notwithstanding the demonstrable economic improvishment of Botswana. Much later, the geographical distribution of the refugees spread to white-ruled Rhodesia and even to a handful of political dissidents from Lesotho'9 and the Transkei20 Prior to the independence of Angola, a group of approximately 5,000 Angolans sought political asylum in Botswana where the government gave them an agricultural settlement of their own, and later allowed them to assume full citizenship.2'

16. See note 7 above.

17. This period of British colonial history is well covered in J.M. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government: A Study of the Ideas Expressed by the British Official Classes in Planning Decolonization, 1939-1964 (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1967) and W. Roger Louis. Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press. 1978).

18. T'he extent of the neglect is set forth in the notable Pim Report. viz., Great Britaini. Commission on Finiancial anid Economic Position of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, Financial and Economic Position of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Cmd. 4368 (London: H.M.S.O., 1933), collated in Parliamentary Papers, 1932-1933. vol. 10.

19. *Lesotho 'Exiles' Seek Asylum," The Star, January 23. 1974, 2ndcity late ed., p. 9. col. 1.

20. "Kei Refugees in Botswana," The Star (Johannesburg), April 30, 1977, international airmail weekly ed. (hereafter cited as The Star [IAWEI), p. 2, col. 5.

21. Details are given in David Potten, "Etsha: A Successful Resenlement Scheme," Botswana Notes and Records, vol. 8 (1976), pp. 105-119.

JULY-SEPT. 1978 11



For those British proconsuls, such as Sir Peter Fawcus, and their high-level assistants at the district administration levels who were sympathetic to African political aspirations and decidedly cool toward the politics of white paramountcy,22 the influx of political refugees raised nettlesome problems. There were economic costs involved in protecting the refugees from possible harm from groups or persons hostile to African nationalists,23 a problem that the Khama Government inherited from the British in 1966, and there was the long-term and incalculable cost of possible destabilization of transitional and traditional political structures. Host governments have reason to be chary about large, permanent, concentrated refugee enclaves in close proximity to hostile borders and/or settled groups regarded as marginally loyal to the central government.24 Having had to cope with the political fall-out of Sir Seretse's marriage to a white Briton on the Bamangwato people in the 1950s,25 the British were predictably skittish about the ingress of articulate African nationalists from South Africa. A close scrutiny of the official annual reports of the Protectorate in the final years of British rule reveals that the Administration did make use of the well-known device of declaring persons to be prohibited immigrants.26 Whether all such persons were declared to be so solely or primarily for political reasons cannot yet be answered until the National Archives materials for these years are made available to students of Botswana government and politics.

In addition to their possible disruptive influence on the internal balance of political forces (as defined by the authorities of the host government), political refugees, especially the better educated ones from South Africa, might be a source of economic embarrassment to Botswana depending upon the nature of their skills and the elasticity of public and/or private sector employment. The higher the skill level, the less the likelihood of competition with the local Botswana citizens for employment. The readily available evidence would suggest that the field of pre- university education was the one to which most skilled resident African

22. See Louis A. Picard, Role Changes among Field Administrators in Botswana: Administrative Attitudes and Social Change (Madison: University of Wisconsin, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1977), pp. 139, 252, and 4113.

23. See, for instance, "The Last Refugee Flight? Police Almost Sure Incendiary Bomb Blew up Plane." The Star, August 30, 1963, 1st stop press ed., p. 1, cols. 7-9 and p. 3, col. 4; "Lobatsi Inquiry into Explosion in Vehicle." The Star, September 19, 1963, city late ed.. p. 5, cols. 3-4; and "Bechuanaland Blast: No Arrests Yet," The Star, July 27, 1964, city late ed., p. 1, col. 3.

24. For a thoughtful analysis of this problem, see Kenneth W. Grundy, "Host Countries and the Southern African Liberation Struggle," Africa Quarterly (New Delhi), vol. 10, no. 1 (Aptil-June, 1970), pp. 15-24.

25. Consult Picard, Role Changes ... pp. 316-317, 346-347, 364, and 375-379.

26. In the half decade from 1960 to 1964, inclusive, 182 Africans, 45 Coloreds, 5 Asians, and 73 Whites were declared prohibited immigrants, as tabulated from Bechuanaland Protectorate, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police for the Year 1960 (n.p.: n.p., n.d.), p. 27; Annual Report ... for the Year 1961 (n.p.: n .p., n .d.), p. 35; Annual Report ... for the Year 1962 (n.p.: n.p., n.d. ,, pp. 24; Annual Report ... for the Year 1963 (n.p.: n .p., n.d.), p. 30; and Annual Report ... for the Year 1964 (n p.: n p., n .d.), p. 24.

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South Africa turned.27

Defense of the Realm

Close observers of Botswana history have drawn attention to the extensive use made of the police force as an administrative factotum in the early years of the Protectorate,28 thereby saving costs for the Imperial Exchequer and allegedly imparting a certain mediocrity29 to the quality of British governance. As the Protectorate moved out of the imperial backwaters, beginning roughly with the tenure of Sir Charles Rey as Resident Commissioner (1930-1937), the caliber of the administrative staff improved, although the quality of colonial civil servants sent to the Protectorate was usually not exceptionally high,30 the cream of the crop going elsewhere in Africa or to India itself with its prestigous Indian Civil Service. Such a change in administrative attitudes and policies would enable the police force to handle its assigned roles and to become more professional and specialized in its skills.

Following independence in 1.966, the official opposition in the National Assembly of Botswana clamored for the creation of an armed force in the fledgling republic. Perhaps they felt that it would be an excellent instrument for soaking up the chronic unemployed in Botswana at a time of an unparalleled drought (something along the lines of the CCC or the WPA in the United States during the 1930s) and/or what Professor Morris Janowitz has termed a "mark of sovereignty"3" for a new nation. Irrespective of the motivation(s), the Khama Government was quick to dismiss the request, on the grounds that it would be a drain on very scarce financial resources.32 A recent study of British aid to the former High Commission Territories has indicated the reluctance of granting governments and agencies to fund projects dealing with either prisons or

27. Consult Edmond A. Watters Ill, Botswana: The Roots of Educational Development and the Evokidon of Formal and Informal Education (Bethlehem, Pa.: Lehigh University, unpublshed Ed.D. dissertation, 1973), pp 155 and 220-222.

28. See Picard, Role Changes. . . ., pp. 127- 128.

29. For such an indictment of mediocrity, see Leonard Bames, The New Boer War (London: Hogarth Press, 1932), p. 193.

30. Patterns of recruitment into the Botswana administration in the period prior to 1933 are examined in Picard, Role Changes .... pp. 134-139, as are the changes wrought by Sir Charles Rey, pp. 195-160, 180-184, 186-188, and 219 ftn. 96.

31. Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis (C(hicago anid Lonidon: University of Chicago Press. 1964). pp. 5-6.

32. See the (imperfectly transcribed) debate on the motion favoring military training proposed by the Opposition M.P.. Mr. T.W. Motlhagodi. in Bechuanaland Protectorate. Legislative Assembly. Official Report (Hansard 17), pp. 19-25 (March 16, 1966).

JULY-SEPT. 1978 13



police because of possible future repercussions from members of dissident groups, and this may explain part of the Khama Government's unwillingness to underwrite a military establishment.33 Moreover, British troops were stationed in Francistown to protect a British built broadcasting relay station designed as a psychological warfare weapon against the neighboring Smith Government in Salisbury which declared its independence of the United Kingdom roughly ten months before Botswana was granted its independence. This psychological weapon proved to be ineffective against Rhodesian jamming, and the British Government turned over the facility to the Khama Government and withdrew its Army units.34 This period was one of retrenchment for the British armed forces outside the NATO area,35 and the Botswana Government probably could not count on the massive deployment of British forces to protect its territorial integrity. Its first line of defense, then, was the art of diplomacy in regard to its powerful southern neighbor and its renegade eastern neighbor. Its policy toward Salisbury and Pretoria was cautious and guarded and derived from weakness rather than approbation of the system of white hegemony in both states.36

For the first decade of its independence, there was only a minimal problem of maintaining the peace and protecting the borders against external threats, with the bulk of the fighting taking place in the Portuguese territories of Angola, Guinea (Bissau), and Mozambique. There was little insurgency or counterinsurgency activity in western Rhodesia at this time,37 and the Vorster Government proved rather adept at coping with African nationalist operations within South Africa itself and beyond its own borders in the Zambesi salient in cooperation with the Rhodesian units.38 Botswana's support for the liberation groups was confined primarily to unexceptional rhetoric and it apparently made no monetary contribution to the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity.39

David Jones, Aid and Development in Southern Africa: British Aid to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland Lon don: CLroom Helm Ltd.. 1977). pp. 127 and 146.

14 For further details, see Richard Dale, "Botswana," in Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale (eds.). Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 119 and 358, ftn. 91.

3i lor lie British overview, consult Phillip Darby, "East of Suez Reassessed," in John Baylis (ed.), British Defenice Policy in a Changing World (Loridon: Croom Helm Ltd., 1977), pp. 52-65.

.30 Further details are given in Richard Dale, "President Sir Seretse Khama, Botswana's Foreign Policy, and the Southern Africani Subordinate State System." Plural Societies (The Hague), vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring, 1976), pp. 69-87.

37 Some data are provided in Kees Maxey, The Fight for Zimbabwe: The Artaed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI (London. Rex Collings Ltd., 1975), pp. 6, 10, 33. 40, 43, 48-50, 58,:65, ow, /0-71, 90, 93, 96, 99, 122, 168, and 192.

"is Cons-ilt Michael Morris, Armed Conflict in Southern Africa . . . (Cape Town: Jeremy Spence, 1974), pp. 28-70 and 281 -297

39. According to Liberation Fund Short of Cash," The Star August 6, 1977 (IAWE), p. 7, col. 3.

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But at the same time, there were compelling reasons not to become embroiled in the hostilities between the liberation groups and the armed forces of the white-ruled neighboring state. Undoubtedly stung by the oft- repeated allegations that it was a mere client of South Africa,40 President Khama's Government attempted to realign customary patterns of transportation that limited economic options and merely reinforced the critics' point about clientage. The focus of attention was the line of rail connecting Mafeking, South Africa with Bulawayo, Rhodesia which traversed Botswana's eastern perimeter through the corridor granted to Cecil John Rhodes by the Tswana chiefs.4" This railway, both owned and operated by an agency of the Rhodesian Government, was Botswana's link with the ports of the Atlantic and Indian Ocean as well as with Zaire (via Zambia). The highway network was not well developed enough to act as a viable alternative for a vigorous and competitive trucking business, while air freight was hardly an economic alternative, owing to the vast distances involved and the density and location of shippers. The optimal solution to the problem appeared to be to build an all-weather (tarred) road from the ferry crossing at Kazungula (where Rhodesia, Zambia, Botswana, and the Caprivi Strip of Namibia intersect in the middle of the Chobe River when it merges with the Zambesi to flow eastward toward the Victoria Falls) to the nearest railhead inside Botswana's borders. The road- to-rail linkage was made at Francistown, and the U.S. Agency for International Development provided the funds for the construction of the road (often called the Botzam highway) to Kazungula as part of its effort to foster regional projects in Southern Africa.42

With subsequent closure of the Zambian-Rhodesian border for purposes of economic sanctions against Rhodesia, followed by the even more severe closure of the Mozambique border, Rhodesia's only access to the sea was southward along the Bulawayo-Mafeking line of rail. To protect its untrammeled access to South Africa through the Transvaal, Rhodesia needed to effect a short rail linkage at Beit Bridge, which it did, while continuing to utilize the Botswana rail corridor.43 In order to diminish its dependence upon its eastern neighbor and to expand its trade links north into Black Africa, Botswana needed maximum security in the

4(). Sir beretse Khama. Botswana and Southern Africa: Address to the roreign Policy Society, Copenhagen, November 13, 1970 (London: The Africa Bureau. n.d.). p. Il1.

41. See I.R. Phimister. "Rhodes, Rhodeisa anid the Rand. Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 1. no. I (October, 1974). pp. 84-86.

42. The United States furnished $13.5 million as a loan to Botswana to build the road from Nata to Kazungula; it was a 30 year loan with a 3% interest charge. Data from Jones, Aid and Development .. pp. 133 and 137 (table 9.1).

43. See "First T'raini T'ravels Rhodesia 'Lifelinie'. " The Star, September 11. 1974. 2nd city late ed.. p. 29. cols. 4-7.

JULY-SEPT. 1978 15



Francistown and Kazungula areas, a desire shared by those South African businessmen who wished to continue their trade with Zambia but could not do so via Rhodesia after the border closure." The fledgling tourist business in Botswana made world news when Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor were married in a civil ceremony at Kasane, a village bordering the Chobe National Park, in October, 1975. The Chobe area is valuable not only as a wilderness area but also because of its close proximity to Victoria Falls, which both Zambian and Rhodesian tourist bureaus publicize. This proximity to the Falls enables Botswana to receive the benefits of group tours aimed primarily at one or the other side of the Falls, and thus tap some of the foreign exchange brought in by overseas visitors. However, tourism and big game hunting are extremely sensitive to political instability and turmoil. Since 1977, Chobe Park has been closed due to its vulnerability.45

Beginning in 1976, however, the armed clashes and border penetrations from neighboring Rhodesia began to increase in intensity and frequency, with the Rhodesians engaging in hot pursuit tactics, following the Zimbabwe insurgents across the border into Botswana. Exchange of fire among the Rhodesian units, their Zambian counterparts across the Zambesi, and the Botswana police units stationed at Kazungula became extremely disturbing to the Khama Government which, after all, had no control over the tactics and targets of liberation groups operating in the northwestern perimeter of Rhodesia." The diplomatic response to this perception of threat from the Rhodesian counterinsurgency units was to secure a meeting of the United Nations Security Council in New York in early 1977, the first time in Botswana's history in which it was able to seek redress of grievances at such a high diplomatic level.47 Not unexpectedly, the Rhodesian Government claimed that it was not afforded an

44. Consult 'Botzam Highway Soon Busy Outlet for SA Traders?," TheStar, February 19, 1977 (IAWE). p. 16, cols. 2-3.

45. See, in general, Harold M. Prowse, Wildlife Adminitration and the Safari Industy in Botawana (Ann Arbor: University of Michegan, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1974) and, in particular, "Southern Sun Gloom over Hotel Bookings," The Star, June 25, 1977 (IAWE), p. 17, cols. 5-6 and Don Knowler, "Okavango Tours Hit by Border Conflicts," The Star, October 1, 1977 (IAWE), p. 15, cols. 4-6.

46. Additional details may be found in Don Knowler, "Flashpoint on the Zambesi," The Star, August 13, 1977 (IAWE), p. 14, cols. 1-4 and in Wilf Nussey, "The Kazungula Controversy: Facts Throw New Light on Shootout," The Star, November 26. 1977 (IAWE). p. 12. cols. 1-5. The latter article contains a useful diagramatic sketch of the area.

47. Conisult the following: Letter Dated 22 December 1976 from the Permanent Representative of Botswana to_the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security CouncD, U.N. Security Council Document No. S/12262, dated December 22, 1976. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Third Meetin'g ... 12 January 1977 . .. U.N. Security Council Document No. S/PV. 1983, dated January 12, 1977; Provisional Verbatim Record of the Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Fourth Meeting . .. 13 January 1977 . . ., U.N. Security Council Document No. S/PV. 1984. dated Janiuary 13, 1977; Provisional Verbatim Record of the Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Fifth Meeting ... 14 January 1977 . . . , U.N. Security Council Document No. S/PV. 1985, dated January 14, 1977: Resolution 403 (1977) Adopted by the Security Council at Its 1985th Meeting on 14 January 1977, U.N. Security Council Document No. S/Res/40)3 (1977). dated January 14, 1977.

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opportunity of defending itself in this august world body.48 The end result of the Security Council's deliberation was a resolution highly favorable to Botswana and the dispatching of a United Nations Mission to investigate the various ways and means of assisting Botswana, which was now facing greater security problems than ever.49 Exacerbating the border tension was the influx of young Africans who had become highly politicized as a result of the Soweto and other urban township disturbances in South Africa in 197650 and those young African students from the western parts of Rhodesia who left (or were said to have been abducted from) their schools to transit Botswana to enlist in the Zimbabwe liberation groups operating out of Zambia.5" Francistown itself became one of the key theaters of operations, with destruction of property and alleged kidnappings by pro- Smith forces,52 essentially a repeat performance of the 1960s, when it had been a crucial way station on the refugees' trek northward and a center of regional intrigue by various intelligence operatives.53

In its 1977 session, the Botswana National Assembly authorized the formation of a Botswana Defense Force, which was an outward and visible sign of the level of border tension existing, particularly with regard to Rhodesia.54 The South Africans, who had previously dispatched paramilitary units to Rhodesia on the rationale that it was extending its security perimeter from the Limpopo to the Zambesi River in containing the activities of South African liberation groups acting in concert with Zim- babwean ones,55 now began to step up its police patrols on the extensive

48. "Invite Us, Rhodesia Asks UN.' The Star, January 15, 1977 (IAWE), p. 3, col. 2 and "Let Us Explain - Rhodesia," The Star, January 22, 1977 (IAWE). p. 5. cols. 1-3.

49. See Assistance to Botswana: Note by the Secretary-General U.N. Security Council Document S/ 12307. dated March 28, 1977; Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand and Sixth Meeting. .. 24 May 1977 . . , U.N. Security Council Document No. S/PV 2UUb, dated May 24, 1977; Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand and Eighth Meeting ... 25 May 1977 . . ., U.N. Security Council Document No. S/PV 2008, dated May 25, 1977; and "U.N." Mission Recommends R53-m in Aid for Botswana," Mafeking Mail and Botswana Guardian (Mafeking), April 7, 1977. p. 1, cols. 1-3.

5(. See Tony Hodges, "Botswana: External Threats and Internal Pressures," Africa Report, vol. 22, no. 6 (November- December. 1977). p. 41.

51. For details, see 40( 'Abducted by Terrorists', ' The Star, January 29, 1977 (IAWE), p. 2, cols. 1-3; 'Red Cross To Contact Zapu over Children," The Star, February 5, 1977 (IAWE), p. 2. cols 5-6; and "Children for Zapu Training," The Star, April 23, 1977 (IAWE), p. 6, col. 6.

52. For documentation, consult "Selous Scouts Blamed for Blast," The Star, May 14, 1977 (IAWE), p. 2, cols. 1-3 and "Kidnap: Rhodesia Accused," The Star, October 17, 1974, 2nd city late ed.. p. 3, cols. 9-l1U.

53. See the following accounts: "Francistown: The 'Budapest of Botswana'.- Africa Report, vol. 13, no. 1 (January, 1968). p. 37; "Francistown: A Hotbed of Bitter Racialism," The Star, December 24, 1976 (IAWE), p. 13, cols. 5-6; and "Whites Feel Tension in Ithel War Zone', The Star, January 15, 1977 (IAWE), p. 4, cols. 1-6.

54. "Situation on Border Is Tense'," The Star, March 4, 1978 (IAWE), p. 2, cols. 2-3.

55. As set forth in John de St. Jorre, A House Divided: South Africa's Uncertain Future (New York, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Int- -tional Peace, 1977), pp. 63-64.

JULY-SEPT. 1978 17



South African-Botswana border.56 The levels of tension with South Africa were kept in check by relatively cool heads on both sides of the border, with the South African Army court martialing some of its very young soldiers who were involved in transgressing the frontier and engaging in unseemly behavior.57 The Botswana Defense Force, whose members were not as seasoned as their South African counterparts suffered over a dozen casualties in a firefight with Rhodesian army units in the northeast, thus bringing the combat zone ever closer to home." Perhaps as a result of its reverses in the northeast and insufficient training in the demanding tasks of border surveillance, it became less cautious than it should have been, causing the death of South African and British civilians.59 Outside Bot- swana, a plea was made for an investigation of these civilian deaths, but the Khama Government appears to have maintained its silence on the matter to date.60

Although it seems implausible at the present, it is worth noting that African armies have exhibited a tendency toward praetorianism,61 and even in Lesotho, the crack paramilitary police unit headed by the Briton, Fred Roach, at one time became the functional equivalent of a private army for Prime Minister Jonathan.62 Given its very high marks for civil liberties by outside observers,63 it would be a tragedy indeed were the newly created Botswana Defense Force to prove to turn out like too many of its counterparts elsewhere in Africa.

Escape from Economic Bondage?

One of the more glaring examples or the lack of affluence of Bot- swana is the long-standing system of migratory labor of adult males,

56. Based on "New Border Patrols 'A Success'," The Star, July 16, 1977 (IAWE), p. 4, cols. 5-6.

57. -4 Rape Soldiers Are Sentenced," The Star, October 29, 1977 (IAWE), p. 1, cols. 4-6.

58. " 15 Die after Hot Pursuit," The Star, March 4, 1978 (IAWE). p. 2, cols. 1-3.

59. See the following accounts and commentaries: "We Shot Them, Says Botswana," The Star, April 1, 1978 (IAWE). p. 1, cols. 1-3; "No Sign of Assault," The Star, April 8, 1978 (IAWE), p. 5, cols. 4-6; Allen Pizzey, "Unwanted Army," The Star, April 22, 1978 (IAWE), p. 9, cols. 5-6; and Wilf Nussey, "Botswana's Big Mistake," The Star, May 6, 1978 (IAWE), p. 9, cols. 1-5.

60. According to "Botswana Should Set an Example," The Star, April 8, 1978 (IAWE), p. 10, cols. 1-3; "Father of Slain Youth To Fight for Inquiry," The Star, April 22, 1978 (IAWE), p. 7, col. 3: and the commentary under the uncaptioned photograph of President Sir Sereste Khama in The Star, May 20, 1978 (IAWE), p. 3, cols. 4-6.

61. This topic is examined with great care in Eric A. Nordlinger, Sokliers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977).

62. Consult Bennett M. Khaketla, Lesotho, 1970: An African Coup under the Microscope (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 212, 258, 269, 282, and 298, along with Richard F. Weisfelder, "The Decline of Human Rights in Lesotho: An Evaluation of Domestic and External Determinants," Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter, 1976), especially pp. 27-28.

63. The evaluation of Freedom House, as reported in Martin C. Spring, Confrontation: The Approaching Crisis between the United States and South Africa (Sandton, South Africa: Valiant Publishers, 1977), pp. 88-89.

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whose deferred pay and remittances from the mines, factories, and farms of South Africa are vital for the maintenance of their families and the revenue of the Government. The system dates back to the 19th century in Botswana when, among others, Chief Khama III, the current President's grandfather, permitted the recruitment of some of his subjects to work abroad.64 The migratory labor system provided a point of diplomatic contact via the British with the South African economy, for the British authorities during the days of the Protectorate established a labor officer at Randfontein (in the Witwatersrand area) to act as a type of ombudsman for the Batswana migrant laborers in the industrial and mining complex around the greater Johannesburg region.65 This practice of using a labor emissary in the Witwatersrand area has been maintained and sanctified by a treaty between the two adjacent republics." Even though it might be argued that such a point of contact is an acceptable modus operandi for avoiding the more (economically and politically) expensive practice of diplomatic representation for the Khama Government,67 its existence points up the continuing need for Batswana to migrate to South Africa in search of semi-skilled and unskilled work.

An option at least theoretically open to Botswana on this question would be to form a powerful labor cartel with other black Southern African states. In the short run, diplomatic coordination with the other two erstwhile High Commission Territories and perhaps Malawi and Mozambique as well might help lead to a bargaining entente relative to the South African private sector representatives in commerce, industry, and mining. Bot- swana, Lesotho, and Swaziland did act in concert in order to renegotiate the terms of the quadripartite customs union agreement, the returns from which have substantially augmented Botswana's revenues.68 The three, however, do not always act uniformly toward South Africa as seen in their roll call voting records in the United Nations General Assembly69 and with regard to staying within the South African Rand currency zone, which Bot-

64. Chirenje, Chief Kgama and His Times ... p. 51. See also Q. Neil Parsons, "The Economic History of Khama's Country in Southern Africa," African Social Research (Lusaka), no. 18 (December, 1974), pp. 643-675 for a much fuller account.

65. Isaac Schapera, Migrant Labour and Tribal Life: A Study of Conditions in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (London, New York, Cape Towr: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1947). p. 207.

66. As noted in Jacqueline A. Kalley (compiler), Index to the Republic of South Africa Treaty Series, 1961-1975. Bibliographical Series No. 1 (Braamfontein: The South African Institute of International Affairs. 1976), p. 15

67. See Kenneth W. Grundy, Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 89-90.

68. For an excellent overview, consult Quill Hermans, "Towards Budgetary Independence: A Review of Botswania's Financial History, 1900 to 1973," Botswana Notes and Records, vol. 6 (1974), pp. 89-115.

69. This matter is explored in Rolf Bodenmuiller, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland: Their External Relations and Policy towards South Africa (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1973), pp. 144-164.

JULY-SEPT. 1978 19



swana has now left.70 The fragmentation of the tripartite University ot Hot- swana, Lesotho, and Swaziland is further evidence that bloc action by these three states cannot automatically be assumed. 7

However, the long-run problem is the inadequate economic base to provide adequate employment for most Botswana nationals, assuming (as in the United States, for example) that some degree of structural un- employment could be tolerated. The mining sector, although certainly a glamor asset and one which is a magnet for foreign private investment, is a solid contribution in the proper direction, but it is hardly sufficient and has a tendency to benefit expatriates with highly valued artisan-type skills.72 Presumably, over time, these skilled positions in mining can be localized, given proper vocational or on-the-job training. It is not unreasonable to ex- pect further employment opportunities when Botswana is ready and able to assume operation of the railway owned by Rhodesia, although how compensation will be paid to Rhodesia, and how it will be financed, is a re- fractory question in light of Rhodesia's current status.73

The Khama Government has been markedly successful at the art of attracting foreign aid, especially from the British metropole and Sweden, to fuel the engine of economic growth and to add to the relatively meager economic infrastructure bequeathed to the republic at independence. Some of this aid, however, has found its way to South Africa to purchase locally made capital goods and equipment, with the express permission of the Swedish and British Governments. Other nations, including the United States, have required tied purchases as the quid pro quo of granting aid, i.e. the grantee may purchase supplies only from the grantor and may not go shopping on the international market." Notwithstanding the attractiveness of nickel, copper and diamond mining, with the ensuing ownership and royalty agreements (some of which have been renegotiated with the multinational corporations to provide a proportionately greater share of ownership), Botswana still lacks much in the way of an industrial or manufacturing sector.."5 Its economy may, in the future, be plagued with the problems of servicing external debts,76 and to the extent that non- strategic metal prices fluctuate, Botswana may go through some of the

70. bee Francis d'A. Collings et al., "The Rand and the Monetary Systems of Botswana, Lesotho, dnd Swazilanid, The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (March, 1978), particularly pp. 109-1 12.

71. de St. Jorre, A House Divided . p. 43.

72. Jones, Aid and Development. . ., particularly pp. 82-83.

73. According to Botswana: Looking Ahead," Africa (London), no. 59 (July, 1976), p. 103. the pricetag for purchasing the railway was ?44 million.

74. Jones. Aid and Development.. , pp. 40-41 and 134.

75. Ibid., p. 83.

76. Details are furnished in Donald Rothchild and Robert L. Curry, Jr., Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 19781, pp. 283-291.

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traumas that have faced other copper-producing nations, notably, its neighbor to the north, Zambia.

Close observers of the Botswana scene have pointed to the rural areas of Botswana as those most in need of assistance and to the growing and glaring inequitable distribution of wealth not only between town and countryside but also within the countryside itself, giving rise to a rural plutocracy based on ownership of cattle and grazing and watering privileges. The Khama Government receives its lowest marks in the area of rural development and this, in turn, may be only too clear a manifesta- tion of the value preferences of the current Batswana elites in the socio- economic and political systems.77

A "Pocket Major Power"?78

The classification of states in the international political system or what Professor Steven L. Spiegel has chosen to call "the Jacob's ladder of international affairs,"79 can become nearly a fulltime occupation for students of international politics who are mesmerized by power differentials in the contemporary world. Another equally fascinating enterprise has been the analysis of small state behavior which, to a large extent, subsumes the sub-field of African foreign policy studies. Those who concentrate on small and/or African states are reacting, or even overreacting, to the emphasis that has been placed on great power hegemony, Machtpolitik, or Realpolitik so characteristic of the work of Professor Hans J. Morgenthau and his disciples.80

Although one might quarrel with his construction of "Jacob's ladder," Professor Spiegel does point to the different rank order (in 1970) of all ex- cept one of Botswana's neighbors: South Africa is termed a "middle power," Zambia and Rhodesia are regarded as "regional states," while Botswana itself is classified as one of the "microstates." Namibia fell into

77. Jones. Aid and Development . .. , pp. 104-107 and 115, along with E. Philip Morgan. Botswana: Democratic Politics and Development," in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds.), Southern Africa in Crisis (Bloomingtoni and London: Indiana University Press, 1977), particularly p. 217.

78. T'his phrase is from David Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 8.

79. Steven L. Spiegel, Dominance and Diversity: The International Hierarchy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1972). p. 39.

80. An example of such a reaction to Professor Morgenthau, mentioning him by name, is Marshall R. Singer. Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships (New York: The Free Press. 1972). p. v (for the mention of Professor Morgenthau). For a recent analysis of the state of the art or discipline, consult James N. Roseniau et al., "Of Syllabi, Texts, Students, and Scholarship in International Relations: Some Data and Interpretationls on the State of a Burgeoning Field," World Politics, vol. 29, no. 2 (January, 1977), pp. 263-341.

JULY-SEPT. 1978 21



the residual category of "dependent states."81 It does not seem likely that in the forseeable future Botswana will ascend the ladder to what Professor David Vital has dubbed a "pocket major power," which he restricts to North Vietnam (prior to its fusion with South Vietnam) and Israel.82 What seems to be of more immediate and pressing interest will be the pentagonal links among South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Rhodesia, and Zambia once Namibia and Rhodesia - two of Botswana's three white- ruled neighbors - accede to African majority rule. In the near future it is assumed that white power in South Africa will not have substantially eroded or that it will not be dissipated through fragmentation which permits the Bantustans to exercise More than nominal or showcase sovereignty. It is also assumed that the South African defense perimeter will have moved south from the Cunene and Zambesi Rivers to the Orange and the Limpopo Rivers, the natural frontiers of the South African heartland. Finally, it is also assumed that, based on past practices, Botswana will not involve itself in a federation or confederation with the Tswana homeland, Bophuthatswana, which was granted its independence by South Africa in December 1977.83

Given the location of its economic resources, the distribution of its population, and its traditional trade routes, it is most likely that the Republic of Botswana will tilt toward Zambia and Zimbabwe, while retaining the bulk of its present-day ties to at least the private sector of the South African economy. As its economic strength grows from closer cooperation with its northeastern neighbors, it is altogether plausible that it will again bargain with South Africa for additional economic concessions with respect to the customs union and the status of its migrant workers. Moreover, its relationships with Lesotho and Swaziland, which stemmed more from British colonial administrative convenience than from anything else, will attenuate, particularly as the rather conservative leadership in Swaziland accommodates itself to the new rulers of adjacent Mozambique. What seems enigmatic, however, will be the nature of Botswana's relationship with its western neighbor, Namibia, which has considerable prospects for an affluent future as an independent nation. The economies of the two neighbors are somewhat complementary as opposed to competitive, and the chief attraction of Namibia to the economic planners in Gaborone would be the historic dream of an outlet to the Atlantic via Walvis Bay, a route that has intrigued the white rulers of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia primarily because of the livestock industry. Such a

81. Spiegel, Dominance and Diversity . . ., pp. 93-96.

82. Vital. The Survival of Small States . . ., p. 8.

83. See Don Knowler, Botswana Worried about New Homeland. The Star, August 27. 1977 (IAWE), p. 10. cols. 5-6 and p. 11. cols. 1-3.

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route across the northern rim of Botswana would save a long coastal shipping journey for Rhodesian products destined for Western European markets 84

Thus, there seems little prospect of Botswana's rapid rise to the level of a "pocket major power," but it does not necessarily have to content itself with being at the lowest rung of "Jacob's ladder of international affairs." How far up that ladder it can climb depends on the regional configuration of power following the advent of African majority rule in Salisbury and Windhoek and how much Pretoria is willing to concede (presumably under pressure) to live in peace with its northern neighbor. The retreat from clientage is likely to be a slow, measured one with a minimum of risk- taking by the authorities in Gaborone, assuming that President Khama or, if that is not humanly possible, his successor in the majority Botswana Democratic Party,85 oversees the withdrawal.

84. These topics are treated in Richard Dale. "Colonial Rulers and Ruled in South West Africd and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. 1884-1966: A Framework for Comparative Andlysis, Journal of Southern African Affairs, vol. 1. special issue O(ctober. 1976). pp. 95-1 11).

85. See Don Knowler. If Sereste Goes. The Star, December 4. 1976 (IAWE), p. 12. cols. 1-3.

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Documents

Smaller States and Larger Neighbors || The Challenges and Restraints of White Power for a Small African State: Botswana and Its Neighbors