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Slovo, Vol. 16, No. 1, Spring 2004

The Hungarian Status Law in Romania:Anatomy of an Inter-National Dispute*

SERGIU Z . TROIE

Hungary adopted a 'status law' that sought to provide cultural, social, and economic ben-efits to ethnic Hungarians and their spouses and children who resided in any of the immedi-ately adjacent countries except for Austria. The motivation for the law was based in parton the national trauma of Hungary's post-YJWl territorial dismemberment. Romanian gov-ernment and media greeted this legislative project with hostility expressed as continuingnational insecurity about Hungarian irredentism and the loyalty of ethnic Hungarians inRomania. By supporting their rhetoric with mutually exclusive national symbols, the twogovernments made compromise extremely difficult. Yet after European intervention, justsuch a compromise was eventually reached. The success of European institutions in bring-ing the two sides together was due in part to the symbolic power of 'Europe' as an ideal inthe domestic politics of both countries.

Introduction: 'More than tourists, not quite citizens'

The love of Transylvania is [...] an excessive and exclusive love. A love on continu-ous alert, both frightened and devouring. A love full of anxieties [. . .] accompaniedby a frenzied and pathological jealousy. The Romanian (and particularly, as themost sensitive and possessive, the Romanian politician) is infuriated if he hears thatthere are also others who would be interested in her.'

They are not listening to us [...] and we don't understand what they say.̂

On 19 June 2001, the Hungarian National Assembly passed Act LXII of 2001 onHungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries — more commonly known as theHungarian status law — with 306 yeas, seventeen nays, and eight abstentions.-* Theculmination of several years of legislative work in consultation with the politicalrepresentatives from Hungarian communities in neighbouring countries, the status

* A longer version of this paper was submitted for consideration as an MA thesis to the School ofSlavonic and East European Studies, University College London in 2002.' Alexandru Cistelecan, 'Manele pentru ardeleni', Provincia (Romanian edition), December 2001, p. 1.(author's translation: all other Romanian language sources cited are translated by the author unlessotherwise noted).^ Stefan Markus, Slovakia's ambassador to Hungary, speaking to reporters about his government'sconsultations with Hungary concerning the status law. The same could be said about Hungary'sconsultations with Romania. Reuters, 'Hungary's Neighbors See Bias In a Law to Aid Its Diaspora', NezvYork Times, 11 December 2001, p. A5.' Eva Kekes, 'Controversial law gives privileges to ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries'.Associated Press, 19 June 2001.

© School of Slavonic & East European Studies, University College London, 2004

36 SLOVO, 16.1, SPRING 2004

law sought to provide cultural, social, and economic benefits to ethnic Hungarians,their spouses, and children who resided in any of the immediately adjacent coun-tries except for Austria. According the law's preamble, such benefits were meant 'toensure that Hungarians living in neighbouring countries form part of the Hungar-ian nation as a whole and to promote and preserve their well-being and awarenessof national identity within their home country'."* Or to put it more simply, it wouldcreate an intermediate legal category for any ethnic Hungarian from surroundingstates: 'more than a tourist, not quite a citizen'.^

The government of Romania, and most Romanian politicians, reacted extremelynegatively to this legislative project. In mid-May, Romanian Prime Minister AdrianNastase declared that 'so long as we are not consulted and we do not agree uponcertain things together, the law will not apply to Romanian territory'.* Shortly afterits passage, Romanian President Ion Iliescu threatened the abrogation of the1996 Romanian-Hungarian Basic Treaty/ and the xenophobic nationalist CorneliuVadim Tudor, head of the Greater Romania Party (GRP), likened the status law to adeclaration of war against Romania.^ Much of the Romanian press followed suit,leveling accusations ranging from 'discrimination' to 'irredentism' with varyingdegrees of animosity depending on the publication and the author.' Under thisbarrage from political elites and the mass media, Romanian public opinion alsotended to oppose the law's application on Romanian territory.^"

In defending the legitimacy of the law, Hungarian government officials arguedthat their project was enacted in the European integrative and state-boundary-spanning spirit. In an interview granted to Romania's largest circulation dailyAdevarul, Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi stated that in the context ofa number of European legal instruments and decisions in favour of minority rights'the [status] law is [...] in complete accord with the philosophy of Europeanapproaches and with their practical realization'." Likewise in a Radio Kossuthinterview, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban argued that:

* Preamble, paragraph 5, Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (hereafterStatus Law).^ 'Near citizenship promised ethnic Hungarians abroad'. Associated Press, 14 December 2000. This issueof intermediate legal status is explored at length in Brigid Fowler, 'Fuzzing citizenship, nationalisingpolitical space: A framework for interpreting the Hungarian "status law" as a new form of kin-statepolicy in Central and Eastern Europe', Economic and Social Research Council 'One Europe or Several?'Programme, University of Sussex, Working Paper 40/02, January 2002.'' §erban Mihaila, 'Premierul Nastase refuza sa aplice pe teritoriul Romaniei legea statutuluimaghiarilor', Adevarul, 14 May 2001, p. 1.' Oana Iura§cu, 'Pre§edintele Ion Iliescu ameninja cu suspendarea Tratatului bilateral romano-ungar',Adevarul, 23-24 June 2001, p. 1.* Alin Bogdan, 'C.V. Tudor a vorbit despre un razboi cu Ungaria', Adevarul, 25 June 2001, p. 14.' For a review of the press coverage in Romania immediately after the status law's passage, see CristinaMaria Pantiru, 'Presa romana "faja cu reacjiunea": O analiza a reflectarii in presa scrisa a adoptarii "legiistatutului"', Sfera Politicii (online version), 9 (2001), 93-94.'" However, partial results of two polls conducted regarding this issue were more equivocal than theheadline of Adevarul would have its readers believe: 'Romanians oppose en masse the application of theHungarian status law within their country's territory'. See Corina Dragotescu, 'Romanii se opun inmasa aplicarii legii statutului maghiarilor pe teritoriul ârii lor', Adevarul, 27 July 2001, p. 1." 'Legea statutului maghiarilor de peste hotare este conforma cu legislajia europeana', Adevarul, 6 July2001, p. 17.

HUNGARIAN STATUS LAW IN ROMANIA 37

The Hungarian status law does not contravene the legal norms of the EuropeanUnion. On the contrary. The status law was elaborated taking into account the legalnorms of the European Union. [.. .J The whole of Europe is built upon this concep-tion, the importance of citizenship, the importance of borders is in continualdecline. Thus, what Hungary is doing is applying a European concept.'̂

The Romanian side likewise appealed to the idea of Europe, emphasizing fhenorms of mutual consultation and non-discrimination. Interviewed for a Hungariantelevision programme before the passage of fhe law, Iliescu said that 'the Hungariandocument fo be introduced is not truly democratic and is not at all European [.. .Jthe proposal has several points that run againsf fhe European identity'." Speakingbefore a feleconference with regional bureaucrats, Nasfase sfafed that 'the Hungar-ian premier Orban wants to teach us a lesson about European values, but instead hedemonsfrafes an anti-Europeanism that is evidenf'.^^ His foreign minister was noless direct, calling fhe law both 'anachronistic and non-European'.'^

Not content with their war of words in the press, both the Romanian and theHungarian government attempted to win the approval of European institutions.Romanian officials lobbied European Commission Presidenf Romano Prodi, Euro-pean Commissioner for Enlargement Gunter Verheugen and External RelationsCommissioner Christopher Patten.^'' Hungarian and Romanian representatives atthe Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly battled over a Romanian sponsoredresolution condemning the status law.'^ Rolf Ekeus, the Organization for Securifyand Cooperafion in Europe's (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities,paid visits to Bucharest and Budapest to hear both sides of fhe argument.'^ AndNastase and Martonyi appealed formally fo fhe Council of Europe's Commissionfor Democracy Through Law — also known as the Venice Commission — to makea ruling on the matter.^'

The summer dragged on without much progress and with little constructivepublic intervention by the Council of Europe, the European Union, or the

'2 'Premierul ungar, Viktor Orban, trateaza cu disprej reactiile Romaniei', Adevarul, 28 June 2001, p. 9." 'Iliescu Interview on Hungarian Television — Status Law', Hungarian News Agency (MTI),26 May 2001." Cristina Ciobanu, 'Premierul i§i acuza omologul de la Budapesta de "antieuropenism"', RomaniaLibera, 23 June 2001, p. 3." Kekes, 'Controversial law gives privileges to ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries'.'̂ Andreea Bratosin, 'Forurile europene se fac ca ploua in legatura cu legea statutului maghiarilor depeste hotare', Adevarul, 21 June 2001, p. 1." See for example Rodica Ciobanu and Ion M. Ionija, 'Proiect de rezolujie a APCE lmpotriva Legiistatutului maghiarilor', Adevarul, 27 June 2001, pp. 1 and 14; and 'Council of Europe — HungarianInitiative Over Status Law', Hungarian News Agency (MTI), 29 June 2001.'* C. Popa, 'Inaltul comisar OSCE pentru minoritati refuza sa comenteze "Statutul maghiarilor"',Romania Libera, 25 July 2001, p. 3." See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Council of Europe,'Introduction', Report on the Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by Their Kin-State (hereafterVenice Commission Report), adopted by the Venice Commission at its 48tfi Plenary Meeting (Venice,19-20 October 2001), Strasbourg, 22 October 2001.'̂' Verheugen's remark about the status law's being in compliance with Hungary's Association Agree-

ment with the EU turned out to only harden the Hungarian position. See Andreea Bratosin, 'LuiVerheugen, legea statutului maghiarilor i se pare in regula' (emphasis in original), Adevarul, 28 June2001, p. 1.


With the fall came bilateral, expert-level talks which remained stalled on whatthe Hungarian side called 'political' questions.̂ ^ In the second half of October,the Venice Commission released its much anticipated report, and both sidesclaimed victory. For Romania the findings seemed to support its claims of extra-territoriality, economic discrimination, and unilateral action by the Hungariangovernment with respect to the status law. For Hungary, the findings demonstratedthat, in addition to the primary responsibility held by 'home-States' for minorityrights, 'kin-States also play a role in the protection and preservation of theirkin-minorities', and that 'preferential treatment may be granted [.. .] in the fields ofeducation and culture'.̂ ^

The essential message of the Venice Commission report to both governmentswas that a negotiated bilateral resolution to the impasse was expected. The Com-mission's conclusions were reiterated, with perhaps even less sympathy for theHungarian position, by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities ina press release a week later,̂ ^ and by the European Commission's progress reporton Hungary issued after that.̂ "* With the status law's implementation deadline of1 January 2002 fast approaching and European pressure increasing, both sidessigned a Memorandum of Understanding vis-a-vis the status law on 22 December2001. As part of this compromise, Romanian citizens regardless of ethnicity wereentitled to Hungarian work permits valid for up to three months per year, andthe Htmgarian government agreed that the process of applying for the 'certificate'necessary to enjoy certain cultural and educational benefits would take place'primarily' within the borders of Hungary and its embassies.̂ ^

Although economic arguments were used by both the Hungarian and Romaniangovernments during the status law controversy, this article argues that the disputewas primarily understood by its antagonists in symbolic, non-material, and affec-tive terms. Unlike economic policy negotiations from which some theories ofinternational bargaining and cooperation are derived,̂ *" the dynamic of the negotia-tions involving the status law was not one of quantifiable, incremental movementsfrom two opposing poles toward some intermediate position between them.Instead, it was built upon a series of symbols not easily placed along one or moreaxes in relation to one another — and even upon the same symbol, 'Europe', whichheld different meanings for each of the participants involved.

'̂ 'Hungary and Romania Hold Consultations on Status Law', Hungarian Neivs Agency (MTI), 8September 2001.^ 'Conclusion', Venice Commission Report.^^ Rolf Ekeus, 'Sovereignty, Responsibility, and National Minorities: Statement by OSCE MinoritiesCommissioner', OSCE Press Release, 26 October 2001.•̂' European Commission, European Union, 2001 Regular Report on Hungary's Progress Toivards

Accession, Brussels, 13 November 2001, p. 91.^ Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Governmentof Romania concerning the Law on Hungarians Living In Neighbouring Countries and Issues of bilateralco-operation, 22 December 2001 (hereafter Memorandum of Understanding).^^ See for example. Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. by Robert O. Keohane and Helen V.Milner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).


Drawing their meanings from differing contexts within Hungarian and Roma-nian societies, such symbols were primarily employed by the governments of thetwo countries. But in addition to state-level governments, at least two other actorswere crucial in the unfolding of the status law dispute. First, above the state level,the group of inter-governmental organizations including the European Union, theCouncil of Europe, and the OSCE which played the part of a collective 'European'institution. Second, below the state level, the ethnic Hungarian umbrella party inRomania, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR).

This article begins with a brief examination of the historical underpinnings ofcontemporary Hungarian and Romanian national political discourse, using theexpression of national sentiment in the constitutions of both countries as a frame-work. The two following sections discuss the results of the 2000 Romanian nationalelections and the political alliances which resulted in an effort to understand thepolitical constraints which shaped how both the governing party and the ethnicHungarian party responded to the status law. The article then explores the way inwhich Romanian elites expressed opposition to the status law in terms of nationalsymbols such that compromise with Hungary became more difficult. The final sec-tion highlights the appeals made by both countries to European institutions andthe role those institutions played in breaking the deadlock of national politics tofacilitate a political compromise.

The national ideas codified: constitutions in conflict

ARTICLE 6.3 OF THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONThe crucial point of departure for most analyses of the conflict between thesetwo nations and the states they control is the Treaty of Trianon through which theWestern powers approved the redrawn boundaries of a shrunken, post-First WorldWar Hungary. The shock of the loss of two thirds of historic Hungarian territory,and a significant number of ethnic Hungarians along with it, placed Hungarianinter-war policy squarely in the revisionist camp. Trianon as a historical sharedmemory of tragedy and loss thus became an important strand of Hungariannational identity. The aim of Hungarian irredentism was not just regaining lostpieces of the homeland, another component important to the national idea, but alsoobliterating the political frontiers between members of the same Hungarian nation.

For a brief time, Hungary's eventual alliance with Nazi Germany resulted in thereturn of a portion of Transylvania which had been lost to Romania. Yet with itsallies' defeat in the Second World War, Hungary was again consigned to theTrianon borders. As George Schopflin recounts, 'in 1945 it was evident that integralrevisionism was bankrupt and Hungary could begin to come to terms with the lossof empire.'̂ ^ In communist Hungary, especially after the 1956 uprising, concernwith the millions of ethnic Hungarians in surrounding territories was constrainedby the dynamic of the Cold War and 'the question largely disappeared from theovert political agenda'.̂ ^

^̂ George Schopflin, Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe (hereafter Nations Identity Power)(London: C. Hurst and Co., 2000), p. 379.2" Ibid., p. 380.


Events in Romania, coupled with the internal changes Hungary underwent inblossoming into a mature post-totalitarian regime,^' conspired to bring the strand ofnational identity that concerned itself with ethnic Hungarians^" beyond Hungarianborders back into the public sphere. In addition to the general repression andmisery experienced by almost everyone in Ceau§escu's Romania, ethnic Hungar-ians were also subject to the additional burden of Romanianization. Many observersmaintain that by the mid-1980s efforts to assimilate ethnic Hungarians in Romaniaaccelerated.^^ In this context, the Hvmgarian Socialist Worker's Party made thedecision to break its public silence about ethnic Hungarians abroad:

It should be made clear that the Hungarians living in the countries surrounding us,including those of Transylvania, are part of the Hungarian nation. That is why thesepeople have every reason to expect the Hungarian state to be responsible for them,too, and voice their problems with determination.̂ ^

This renewed sentiment straining to define an affective connection of collectiveidentity at odds with boundaries of citizenship became duly institutionalized in thenew Hvmgarian Constitution, of which Article 6, Paragraph 3 reads:

The Republic of Hungary recognizes its responsibilities toward Hungariansliving outside the borders of the country and shall assist them in fostering theirrelations to Hungary.^'

The centre-right Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) which won a pluralityin the 1990 elections pursued and extended the notion of national ties betweenethnic Hungarians in Hungary proper and outside its borders. On the eve of theMDF victory, the party's candidate for prime minister famously declared that hewould be prime minister — 'in spirit' — to all fifteen million Hungarians.-'* Thus,in speaking of the status law, Karoly Gruber of Budapest's Office for Hungarians

'̂ See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: SouthernEurope, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,1996), pp. 296-316.'" Here I follow a convention in English language usage based upon the confusion between the con-cepts of 'citizenship' and 'nationality', and between 'nationality' and 'ethnicity'. When I write 'ethnicHungarians' or 'ethnic Romanians', I am seeking either to differentiate between two groups sharing acommon citizenship or to highlight a shared bond of identity that transcends boundaries of citizenship.By using the modifier 'ethnic', I do not mean to make some sort of pejorative value judgment or toimply that Hungarian or Romanian identity ought to be understood only in ethnic terms.•'" See for example, 'Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Hungarians of Romania', Helsinki Watch Report,February 1989.'̂ Statement by Szuros Matyas, Central Committee Secretary responsible for foreign affairs who wenton to become Hungary's first post-Communist president, in a Hungarian radio interview. HenryKamm, 'Rumania and Hungary Let War of Words Slip Out', New York Times, 21 February 1988, Section1,p. 11.'̂ Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, 31 December 1990. Reprinted in Council of Europe, The rebirthof democracy: 12 constitutions of central and eastern Europe, 2nd edn (hereafter The rebirth of democracy)(Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub., 1996), p. 158. The Constitution of Romania has a similar provisionfor Romanians beyond its borders.3** 'Outlook Foggy', Guardian, 10 April 1990, p. 20; and Schopflin, Nations, Identity, Power, p. 371. Sincethe population of the modem-day state of Hungary is only ten million people, the fifteen million figureis a reference to ethnic Hungarians in other countries.


Abroad could reasonably argue, 'It is a constitutional duty for any Hungariangovernment to care about Hungarians abroad'.^^

ARTICLE 1.1 OF THE ROMANIAN CONSTITUTIONFor the historical memory upon which Romanian nationhood is built, Trianon asevent and symbol takes on a different meaning. Rather than signifying nationalmourning, the Treaty of Trianon itself is overshadowed and transformed withinRomanian national discourse into the declaration of the reunification of the Roma-nian national homeland at Alba Iulia on 1 December 1918, which made Trianonpossible. As symbols of historical memories, Trianon and Alba Iulia have becomeperhaps inextricably intertwined in a zero-sum relationship. Lesser Hungary isthe flip side of Greater Romania. In hearing irredentism when a Hungarian speaksof Trianon or injustice when a Romanian speaks of Alba Iulia, members of bothnations reaffirm their own nationality.^^

Just as the symbols of Trianon and Alba Iulia find themselves in polar opposition,so too was the immediate post-First World War situation in Romanian state inmarked contrast with that of Hungary. Unlike Hungary, which had lost so much ofits territory and co-nationals, Romania doubled in both population and territoryand gained not only the now 'redeemed' ethnic Romanians, but also a number ofsubstantial minority groups, the largest of which was the Hungarian minority inTransylvania. Along with all of its new territory, the Romanian state also inheritedtremendous insecurity as the potential target of its neighbours' irredentisms: 'every[pre-WWI] country bordering Romania lost territory to Greater Romania.'^^

The insecurity of the Romanian state's inter-war frontiers was confirmed bythe loss of portions of its newly acquired territories, including northern Tran-sylvania to Hungary and Bessarabia to the Soviets. While it was one thing to feelinsecure about integrating the new territories into the highly centralized state, itwas quite another to have such insecurity borne out by the use of force or its threat.Although northern Transylvania was recovered after the war in exchange for theimposition of communism, the trauma of the experience was firmly embeddedwithin the national identity.

The idea that under communism national identity was somehow put in a'deep freeze' has by now been thoroughly debunked. Hitting his stride onthe national idea after protesting against the invasion of Czechoslovakia in1968, Ceau§escu only too gladly relied upon national identity as a source oflegitimacy for his regime.^^ The theme of insecurity, inherited as part of the nationalidea from the interwar period, meshed well with the paranoiac scapegoating ofnational-communism.

•'̂ Lucian Kim, 'Budapest Seeks to Strengthen Ethnic Ties that Bind', Christian Science Monitor, 28August 2001, p. 7.^ See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Subjective Transylvania: A Case Study of Post Communist Nationalism(hereafter Subjective Transylvania), International Policy Fellowships online manuscript, 1999.•" George W. White, Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 157.•" See Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceau§escu'sRomania (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991); and Katherine Verdery, 'Nationalism andNational Sentiment in Post-socialist Romania', Slavic Review, 52 (1993), 179-203.


'One of the major lessons of the national history, as taught until December 1989, wasthat the Romanian unitary nation-state has been continuously contested and threat-ened, and that it was the patriotic duty for all responsible Romanians to defend it atall costs.'''

The bloody 1989 Romariian Revolution was more of a revolution againstCeau§escu than one against the Romanian brand of national-communism, thoughthe two were obviously closely related. After the elections of 1990 manufacturedan overwhelming victory for Ion Iliescu and the other former Communist Partymembers who made up the National Salvation Front, it is hardly surprising thatthe national conception of the Romanian nation-state as threatened and requiringvigilant protection was given pride of place in the new Romanian Constitution.

The very first paragraph of Article 1 reads, 'Romania is a sovereign, independent,unitary and indivisible National State.""* With the word 'national', the framers wereconcerned more with ethnicity than citizenship, or conflated the two concepts.Article 4's claim that 'Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all itscitizens [.. .] without any discrimination on account of [...] nationality [or] ethnicorigin'*' is not borne out throughout the text. We learn from Article 12 that the'National Day' is the first of December, recalling the Janus-faced Trianon/Alba Iuliasymbol discussed above, and Article 13 decrees the official language to be Roma-nian.*^ But the Romanian Constitution goes even further to safeguard the Romanianstate and thereby the nation. As Schopflin argues, 'cultural reproduction is soimportant for communities that it must be protected from everyday cognition. Itsrules cannot become part of the political contest'.*^ Article 148 provides such protec-tion: 'The provisions of this Constitution with regard to the national, independent,unitary and indivisible character of the Romanian State, [. . .] territorial integrity,[...] and official language shall not be subject to revision.'**

The 2000 elections in Romania: electoral counter-revolution?

If the 1996 elections where the Democratic Convention of Romania (DCR) oustedthe Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PSDR) — successor to the NSF — werein Tismaneanu's words an 'electoral revolution',*^ then to some the 2000 electionsthat returned PSDR to power might have seemed a counter-revolution. But asmany have pointed out, the Romanian electoral turnover was similar to that whichbrought communist successor parties to power in Poland and Hungary. In thissense, the 2000 victory for PSDR — or rather the bitter defeat for the Christian

' ' Drago§ Petrescu, 'Can Democracy Work in Southeastern Europe? Ethnic Nationalism vs. DemocraticConsolidation in Post-Communist Romania', in Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanians andHungarian Case Studies, ed. by Balazs Trencsenyi and others (Budapest/Ia§i: Regio Books/EdituraPolirom, 2001), p. 283.'"' Constitution of the Republic of Romania, December 1991. Reprinted in The Rebirth of Democracy, p. 287."' Ibid.« Ibid.••̂ Schopflin, Nations, Identity, Power, p. 27.'•'' Constitution of the Republic of Romania, p. 317."•̂ Vladimir Tismaneanu, 'Romanian Exceptionalism? Democracy, Ethnocracy, and Uncertain Plural-ism in Post-Ceau§escu Romania', in Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe,ed. by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 404.


Democratic-National Peasant's Party (CD-NPP) which was the mainstay of DCR,but did not even pass the electoral threshold in 2000 — was quite 'normal'. TheDCR-led coalition government had failed miserably to improve the lives of theirconstituents. Voters did what they are supposed to do in a democracy. They 'threwthe bums out', hoping that PSDR would have cooled its heels while in oppositionand would do a better job this time around.

The troubling aspect of the 2000 elections was the success of Greater RomaniaParty (GRP), which by now had co-opted a number of other extreme nationalistformations under one banner. GRP — well-understood within the Romanian politi-cal establishment to be pariahs for the purposes of advancing European integra-tion — was the second largest party in parliament. Analysts attributed GRP'svictory to a range of factors including 'historical ignorance and amnesia', the media,and civil society groups out of touch with the electorate.'"' Whatever the cause, the2000 election result effectively removed approximately one quarter of both housesof parliament from possible coalition permutations.

Yet PSDR did not achieve an outright parliamentary majority, winning only app-roximately forty-five per cent of the seats in both chambers of the bicameral legisla-ture."*̂ It had to consider its alliance options. Besides GRP, the other parties thatpassed the electoral threshold were DAHR, the National Liberal Party (NLP), andthe Democratic Party (DP). DP, a social democratic party that formed part of theformer coalition government, was not a likely candidate for an alliance. Its leaderwas Petre Roman who was forced to resign as prime minister by Iliescu in 1991.'*^With similar claims on the ideological map, DP maintained that it represented 'true'social democracy''' and feared being swallowed and subsumed by PSDR. The ever-pragmatic NLP, having politically deserted the previous government in its waningmonths and having begun cooperating with PSDR, was willing to enter into a looseparliamentary agreement.

What was perhaps more surprising was DAHR's willingness to sign a similaragreement with PSL)R. For the DAHR leadership, the accord meant making the bestof an admittedly bad situation where their former allies had badly stumbled andGRP had made such a strong showing. Justifying the arrangement with PSDR,DAHR President Bela Marko raised the spectre of PSDR's having no choice but toseek the support of GRP to pass laws in parliament:

Through our collaboration with [PSDR], we are trying to support a Europeanprogramme, [...] to keep Romania on the path of integration, because [...] therealso exists the danger of another direction. Who could assume responsibility for

''* Vladimir Tismaneanu and Gail Kligman, 'Romania's First Postcommunist Decade: From Iliescu toIliescu' (heareafter 'Romania's First Postcommunist Decade'), East European Constitutional Review(online version), 10.1 (2001)." Alegeri 2000 <http://domino.kappa.ro/election/election2000.nsf/All/Home> [accessed 16 August2002].'"' With dwindling popularity among the rank and file, Roman was replaced as party president by thepopulist mayor of Bucharest, Traian Basescu, in May 2001. However, an alliance between Basescu's PDand Nastase's party is not any more likely.•" DP furiously fought to keep PSDR from being accredited by the Socialist International where DP wasa full member.


pushing [PSDR] towards an alliance with the Greater Romania Party? Pure andsimple, we, at this moment, are the alternative to such an eventuality.'"

Strange bedfellows: the fallout of the DAHR-PSDR partnership

As part of the or\e-year-long parliamentary cooperation agreement entered intoin late December 2000, DAHR agreed not to sign or support a motion of censuredissolving the minority government and to generally support the governmentprogramme. PSDR agreed to a number of DAHR demands including passinga long-delayed local administration law and 'creating the legal framework' forreturning church property nationalized by the communists. While eager to cooper-ate with DAHR, PSDR was more careful with its promises than DAHR's previousDCR allies, who had 'appeared willing [to honour] any request [...] withoutthinking if they [were] truly capable of bringing it to fruition'.^'

Even as the status law was being drawn up and debated in the Hungarian parlia-ment, PSDR moved to deliver on their agreement. In early March 2001, theyreversed their prior position entirely and voted en masse along witb DAHR in favourof a local administration law originally proposed under the government of DCR'sfirst Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea. PSDR had spent four years alongside GRP pre-venting its passage. Amongst its many provisions, the law would have made it pos-sible to use minority languages in the local administration — including the erectionof controversial bilingual signs — where the minority represented at least twentyper cent of the total population.^^

In late May, Adevarul breathlessly reported Iliescu's visit to the ethnic Hungarianmajority counties of Harghita and Covasna on the day that the public administra-tion law was to become effective. Indeed, what Iliescu had to say on this occasionwas rather breathtaking: 'As we, on a national level, take care of minorities, so thisresponsibility is incumbent upon the majority in Harghita and Covasna, those whocontrol the counties' destinies'.^^ The party even exerted its discipline over PSDRMP Adrian Ca§unean who in bis function as prefect̂ * for Covasna was described ashaving been a 'spear tip in the struggle against the Hungarians'. He uttered a stun-ning mea culpa where he renounced his former stance, which had only caused his'own party to accuse [him] of nationalism', and 'urged Romanians to cultivate thatwhich draws the two ethnic groups together, not that which divides them'.̂ ^ Suchobvious concessions to DAHR could be, as Adevarul had opined, costly. ^^

°̂ Rodica Palade, 'Interview cu Marko Bela, pre§edintele UDMR: In colaborarea UDMR—PSD e greude spus al cui interes este mai mare' (hereafter 'Interview cu Marko Bela'), 22, 24-30 July 2001, p. 8.5' Ana Dinescu, 'UDMR la schimbarea puterii', Sfera Politicii (online version), 9 (2001), 87-88.^̂ Ada Mese§an and Rodica Daniciuc, 'PDSR a votat fara abjineri Legea administrapei publice locale',Romania Libera, 9 March 2001, p. 3.'•̂ Razvan Mitroi, 'Majoritarii din Harghita §i Covasna trebuie sa aiba grija de romanii minoritari',Adevarul, 24 May 2001, p. 2.^^ The office of prefect is a sort of centrally-appointed regional governor responsible for implementingthe policies of the state-level executive.'̂ Mitroi, 'Majoritarii din Harghita §i Covasna trebuie sa aiba grija de romanii minoritari', p. 2.^ See Melania Mandas Vergu, 'Targul cu UDMR costascump PDSR', Adevarul, 23 May 2001, p. 3.


PSDR was not nearly as considerate with the agenda of PNL. In April, the party ofgovernment teamed up with both GRP and DAHR to pass the 2001 budget in theface of PNL and DP's failed amendments and fierce objections. This proved to bethe last straw for the uneasy liberals who immediately broke off their agreementwith PSDR.̂ '' One month later in mid-May, the liberals used the occasion of a partycongress to sharpen their attack and position themselves as better protectors of theRomanian nation. Ostensibly meant to approve the dissolution of the alliance withPSDR, but more of a rubber stamp, the PNL party congress was clearly a mediaevent. PNL president Valeriu Stoica theatrically ripped apart the protocol withPSDR in front of the cameras. Only a few days before GRP would accuse PSDR ofbeing DAHR's client,̂ ^ Stoica levelled the charge that DAHR was akin to GRP: 'bothare ethnic, anachronistic political groupings at odds with the understanding of thenation as the political project of citizens freely united in a democratic community'.^'He went on to appeal to the PSDR government to take all measures to stopthe application of the status law's granting of 'special rights' to ethnic Hungarians:'We do not need a new pan-Germanism or pan-Slavism in Europe in the form ofpan-Hungarianism. [PSDR] has stopped its ears in order to no longer hear thesounds of nationalism [coming] from Budapest'.''''

PSDR now had to walk a political tightrope. Overt cooperation with DAHR madethe government vulnerable to criticism that it was not protecting the national inter-est: 'if there is to be a choice between Romania's interests and the collaboration withDAHR, we will choose Romania's interests'.^^ Yet without DAHR's support, thegovernment could fall, and with the difficulties that would ensue in reconstitutingit, parliament could be dissolved. GRP's attacks on the alliance had to be expectedand surely were worrisome to the extent that they appealed to that party's sym-pathizers within PSDR, but such criticism would be chronic so long as the DAHR-PSDR alliance lasted. With NLP President Stoica's criticism of DAHR and of thegovernment's response to Budapest's 'nationalism', however, Nastase felt threat-ened enough to immediately assert that the status law would never be applied inRomania without his government's consent.*"̂

The closing of political space in response to the status law

If the contingent political situation in Romania made the status law a hot buttonissue, its politicization and the particular discourse used by the Romanian and Hun-garian governments to frame their arguments placed the dispute firmly within therealm of symbolic politics. Part of the power of symbols is their 'multivocality'

'̂ Ada Mese§an, Mihai Ionescu, and Romulus Georgescu, '"Alianta patriotica" PRM-UDMR a ajutatPDSR', Romania Libera, 13 April 2001, p. 3.^̂ See Ion M. Ionita, 'Deputajii PRM au parasit sala de êdinja, acuzand PDSR ca a devenit clientulUDMR', Adevand, 16 May 2001, p. 1.'̂ Ion Purcareanu, 'PNL a rupt protocolul cu PDSR §i a deschis atacul la adresa fo§tilor aliaji',

Evenimentul Zilei (online), 12 May 2001.* Ibid." Corina Dragotescu, 'Nastase e hotarat: Legea maghiarilor nu se aplica in Romania', Adevarui, 23 June2001, p. 2.^̂ See Mihaila, 'Premierul Nastase refuza sa aplice pe teritoriul Romaniei legea statutului maghiarilor'.


which allows for 'political solidarity in the absence of consensus'.*^ Yet the corollaryis that where symbols are packed with meanings opposed to one another, suchas the Trianon/Alba Iulia pairing discussed above, their use in politics can alsodegenerate into a zero-sum game of mutually exclusive positions.

For Orban's government, the status law was more than just about delivering eco-nomic, social, or educational benefits to ethnic Hungarian in neighbouring coun-tries. It was important that the government be seen as doing so. In the words of oneliberal Bucharest intellectual, the status law was purposefully 'noisy'.''* In the past,Hungary had fairly quietly aided ethnic Hungarians in Romania with a number ofeducational and cultural programmes. In fact, DAHR President Marko argues thatmuch of what is in the status law was already being provided to Hungarians understatus quo ante arrangements.*"^ The symbolic value of their assistance to the lessfortunate Hungarians abroad relies upon the existence of a shared historical myth ofTrianon and of the nation dismembered.

What is interesting is that what little coverage of the status law there existedin the mainstream and moderate-nationalist Romanian press, as exemplified byAdevarul,^^ was initially fairly balanced and even positive. The front-page editorialit ran on the weekend after the Hungarian government unveiled the draft law inparliament lamented that, unlike Budapest, 'Bucharest has hardly succeeded indoing anything for ethnic Romanians spread all over the world'.^'' It further argued:

The [status law] takes part of the not very spectacular, but real and necessary,process of normalization in Romanian-Hungarian relations. [...] Perhaps theRomanian-Hungarian normalization could draw attention to the fact that minorityrights exist only in culturally similar spaces. If the West was so interested in therights of the Hungarians, maybe Romania could also ask for help for the rights ofRomanians present in the Russian space.""'

In the following issue, the newspaper's director, Dumifru Tinu, had a ratherasfonishing response fo an efhnic Romanian reader's e-mail from Transylvania. Thereader feared that the status law would resulf in large numbers of efhnic Romanianswho spoke Hungarian declaring themselves fo be Hungarians in order fo fakeadvantage of fhe law's benefifs. Although unspoken, fhe reader was anxious thafa much larger number of self-declared ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania wouldjustify irredentist claims fo the region. Tinu dismissed such concerns:

Hungary wants to accord some socio-economic facilities to the Hungarians wholive outside its borders. What is wrong with that? There will appear, statisticallyspeaking, more [Romanian] citizens who will declare themselves to be Hungarian

" David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 11.^ Renate Weber, 'Opinii despre proiectul de lege privind maghiarii din {arile vecine', 22, 29 May-4 June, 2001, p. 10.'̂ Palade, 'Interview cu Marko Bela', p. 9.'^ Editorial policy on this, the most widely read Romanian newspaper, tends to be extremely sensitiveto any demands made by ethnic Hungarian political figures. It was particularly paranoid aboutHungarian separatism during the Kosovo conflict." Bogdan Chireac, 'Capra unguirlor', Adevarul, 21-22 April 2001, p. 1.<^ Ibid.


in order to enjoy such benefits. And what of that? [...] Can anyone still believe thatthere exists any danger to Romania's territorial integrity? [...] That fact that moreHungarians will appear in statistics is not, on its own, worrisome. Whether many orfew, we are together here and have a common destiny.'''

The furore thaf followed cannof be said fo be due fo a jingoisfic press runningaway wifh public opinion. Rafher, PNL first raised fhe status law as an issue inmainstream political discourse^" after sensing a political opening. Nastase, feelingpressure fo respond from both wifhin PSDR and from PISJL, raised the stakes byasserting that the status law could not be applied within Romania without hisgovernment's consent. Once this die was cast, the cost of backing down after the lawwas passed by the Hungarian national assembly without more face-saving conces-sions to Romania''' grew markedly. As the argument unfolded, two major inter-related symbolic strands emerged. The first was based upon an ambiguity in theunderstanding of sfate and nation and relied upon symbols such as Alba Iulia thatdefined Romania as a 'unifary' state. The second had to do with the perceptionof relafive group worth of Romanians vis-a-vis Hungarians wifhin fhe Romaniannafional discourse.

The unitary nation-state

The governmenf of Romania's official posifion echoed the Constitutional conflafionbefween fhe nofions of 'state' and 'nation'. It rejected the political component of thestatus law because 'it seems to give the concept of "nation" an international sensewhich is not accepted, the concept of nation being tied to the formation of nationalstates'.^^ Cultural and linguistic ties were acceptable — the government admitted topromoting these with respect to Moldova — but political and economic ties werenot. Yet as the very existence of the dispute illustrated, culture is political and bothcontribute to national identities. This is not to imply that borders must be redrawnaround culture — an impossible undertaking in any event. But it does mean thatthe Romanian government had a certain insight when it identified, wifhin fhenotionally cultural aims of fhe sfafus law, the codification of a political relationshipbetween the Hungarian state and ethnic Hungarian citizens of Romania. To theextent that the Romanian government believed stopping the status law wouldsever the underlying political ties between the minority group and the national'homeland', it was mistaken. These political ties were already institutionalized insuch informal norms as regular bilaferal consultations between DAHR and the

'̂ Dumitru Tinu, 'Legitima{ia de romani', Adevarul, 23 April 2001, p. 8.™ Here I am discounting GRP's predictable chauvinist paranoia." As the Hungarian government noted, Romanian Foreign Minister Geoana's efforts prior to the law'sratification did result in the removal of a clause that would have meant preferential financial treatmentfor private firms that would aid in the preservation of Hungarian identity in neighbouring countries.See Andreea Bratosin, Xegea statutului maghiarilor de peste hotare este conforma cu legislajiaEuropean!', Adevarul, 6 July 2001, p. 1.^̂ The Government of Romania, 'In contradicjie cu normele internajonale de drept', 22,5-11 June 2001,p. 6.


Hungarian government as well as more formally through the Hungarian StandingConference.''̂

A corollary to the argument above was the one of extra-territoriality. Thestatus law, rather than venturing a solution to the difficult issue of what makesone 'Hungarian', passed off this responsibility to institutions 'representing theHungarian national community''''' in neighbouring countries. This delegation ofquasi-consular authority threatened Romanian national unity by seeming to claima measure of sovereignty over ethnic Hungarian institutions in Romania. Thisseemed to be irredentism by other means. What heightened the impact of thisempowerment of Hungarian institutions was the preoccupation with loyalty ofHungarians to the Romanian state. Since the state was conflated with the nation,expressions of discontent with respect to national symbols were taken to confirmdisloyalty to the state.

Lastly, the status law evoked the Hungarian national symbol of Trianon inall but name. The law was to apply to persons of Hungarian nationality only inneighbouring countries, except Austria, who 'have lost their Hungarian citizenshipfor reasons other than voluntary renunciation'.''^ As the Romanian governmentpoints out, this would literally apply to only a very small number of people,''* butthe law is obviously meant to encompass their offspring in a past-is-present locu-tion common to national discourses. ITie law therefore makes a distinction betweenthose Hungarians close to, but on the other side of Hungary's state borders andHungarian emigrants much farther afield.^ The hint of a historically-defined terri-torial expanse of magyardom that this distinction creates is enough to make it seemthreatening to the Romanian national discourse of unity.

The arrogant Hungarian boyars

One of the benefits of a group identity such as a national identity is that it providesa basis for individual self-worth, for 'self-esteem is in large measure a function ofthe esteem accorded to groups of which one is a member'.''̂ The measure of groupworth is necessarily relative and based upon stereotyped character traits which sup-posedly distinguish the in-group from the out-group. When the group in questionis an ethnic group or a nation, the seemingly immutable characteristics of thoseidentities gives the comparison with other groups 'an urgency, a centrality', because

'-'• Members of the HSC include 'the Government of the Republic of Hungary, the political parties rep-resented in the National Assembly of the Republic of Hungary, the political organizations of Hungar-ians living abroad represented in the parliament of their home states and at the provincial level, and therepresentatives of Hungarians living in Western countries'. Hungarian Standing Conference, FinalStatement, Fourth Session, Budapest, 26 October 2001.'" Article 20.1, Status Law.'̂ Article 1.1.a. Status Laiv.'"' The Government of Romania, 'In contradicîe cu normele internajonale de drept'.'" This is similar to Weimar Germany's distinction between Grenzdeutsche and Auslandsdeutsche.See Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the Neiv Europe(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 124, fn. 50.^^ Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 2nd edn (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University ofCalifomia Press, 2000), p. 143.


'to lose out in competition or comparison to others who are differentiated on a birthbasis is to be afflicted with an apparently permanent disability.''''

Some of the public reaction to the Hungarian status law can be understood inthe context of an ongoing group compefifion and comparison. As Mungiu-Pippidirelates, the constructed historical memory of Romanian cohabifafion with Hungar-ians in Transylvania has a certain class element. Within the standard Romaniannational discourse, the Hungarians were the lords of the manor, the boyars, whodid as they pleased with their serfs, fhe Romanians.^" A residual feeling of inferior-ify vis-a-vis Hungarians — bofh fhose in Hungary proper and fhose wifhin Roma-nia — survives in nafional idenfify. This is sfoked by fhe undeniable economichardship many Romanians are forced to endure while Hungarians are envied as thefirsf in fhe EU accession queue.

The passage of fhe status law in the face of very sfrenuous, public Romanianobjections played upon this sense of national insecurity. It was a sign of 'contempt'^^which threatened group assertions of self-worfh. The law was 'imperial' not somuch for its 'concrete provisions', but for 'the way it was promoted'.^^ Nastase andhis ministers expressed this sentiment in their oft-repeated argument that they werenot consulted prior to the law's passage. In the sense of being informed abouf thelaw, there can be little doubt that the Romanian objections are groundless. This isthe sense of 'consulfafion' fhaf was assumed by the Hungarian government. 'Con-sultation' as it was invoked in the Romanian press clearly meant something closerto compromise or the imposition of Romanian restrictions upon the law. Althoughone of the Romanian objections did affect the final version of fhe law, a much morepublic face-saving was needed before Nasfase's governmenf could back down.

When Nasfase and ofhers expressed fheir concern that the status law wouldinduce ethnic Romanians to declare themselves Hungarian in order to receive cer-tain economic benefifs, resenfmenf of the perceived differences in relative groupworth intertwined with the issue of fhe unifary sfafe. Ironically, Hungarian legisla-tors were acting on a similar fear when they empowered ethnic Hungarian institu-tions to act as gatekeepers, deciding who was permitted to claim Hungarian status.From the Romanian perspective, Hungary was literally buying new Hungariansin Transylvania. Rather than see the instrumental nature of such declarations, theassumption was that the new loyalty tie bought by Hungary would displace any tiesto the Romanian nation-state.

Reaching compromise: Europe reshapes political space

As argued above, both Hungarian and Romanian governments appealed to the ideaof 'Europe' as well as to European institutions as arbiters of their dispute. For theRomanian side, being European was an assertion of equalify with other Europeans.An assertion of Europeanness was meant to counteract the perceived superiority offhe Hungarian posifion. If Hungary and Romania were equals, fhen Hungary must

" Ibid., p. 147.^ See Mungiu-Pippidi, Subjective Transylvania.*' Andreea Bratosin, 'Parlamentul de la Budapesta adopta Legea "legitima{iei de ungur", in disprejulBucure§tiului', Adevarul, 20 June 2001, p. 1.*̂ Adrian Ursu, 'Legitimajie imperiala', Adevarul, 21 June 2001, p. 1.


make certain concessions on the status law issue rather than impose its will upon itspoorer neighbour.

For the Hungarian government, being European meant entering into a bargainwhere one exchanges some sovereignty for other benefits, such as the reintegrationof the nation under the European umbrella. The looming imposition of Schengenborders between Hungary and some of its neighbours was very much on the mindsof many Hungarians who had come to rely upon fairly easy transit between theircountry of citizenship and Hungary. Even as certain provisions of the status lawlooked to be incompatible with the strengthened border regime, Hungarian politi-cians promised the most favourable visa treatment possible for ethnic Hungariansabroad.

Before examining how a compromise between the two conceptions of Europe wasreached, one must ask the question of whether the two sides actually intended tocome to an agreement from the outset. What was the cost of no agreement? It is notat all clear what the Romanian government could effectively have done to stop itscitizens from taking advantage of the Hungarian law. 'In fact, a large part ofthe frustration of the Romanian authorities [came] from not quite having a way torespond.'^^ Carrying out the threat to dismantle some or all of the treaty architecturewith Hungary would have been at least as harmful to Romania as it would havebeen to Hungary.

Without further evidence to the contrary, it appears the Hungarian governmentconcluded that those particular Romanian threats were not credible. Indeed, onemay infer from Hungarian officials' statements that their aim was to stay just withinthe letter of West European demands while counting on the combativeness ofRomanian objections to be counter-productive. Commissioner Verheugen's state-ment that the status law did not appear to contravene Hungary's AssociationAgreement is a case in point. Foreign Minister Martonyi's response was telling ofhis government's early stance on negotiations: 'The European Commission hasalready indicated that though it is still studying the law, it seems to be in compliancewith European Union legislation, and it has asked Hungary only to continue theconsultations' .^

Yet Romania had one rhetorical tool at its disposal that the Hungarian side dis-counted: 'Western [Europe's] denial about its ethnic identities'.**^ After the SecondWorld War, overt concern with co-ethnics in neighbouring countries was tainted byassociation with Nazism, and the discourse of group minority rights was super-seded by that of human rights held by an individual.^* The late exclusion of Austriafrom the list of countries where the status law would be applied illustrated the EU'suneasiness. Although Hungarian officials attempted to argue that the small number

*̂ Andrei Cornea, 'Romani §i unguri', 22, 26 June-2 July 2001, p. 13. This is not to deny the possibilitythat ethnic Hungarians feared the Romanian government would be all too effective in preventing theapplication of the status law.*̂ TM on Status Law, Stronger EU', Hungarian News Agency (MTI), 27 June 2001. (emphasis added)'*' George Schopflin, 'The Hungarian Status Law: Political, Cultural and Sociological Contexts'(hereafter 'The Hungarian Status Law'), manuscript, 2002.*' See Mark Mazower, 'The strange triumph of human rights'. New Statesman, 4 February 2002,pp. 25-27.


of ethnic Hungarians involved and their relative affluence justified their exclusion,Orban himself admitted that EU strictures against differentiating between EUcitizens was the reason why Austria was eliminated from the list.̂ ^

Romanian officials pushed the thesis that the status law represents un-Europeandiscrimination on ethnic grounds whenever the subject came up. Responding to aquestion from an Economist reporter at the World Economic Forum, Iliescu asked,'What would happen if, for example, the German Bundestag were to adopt a similar[law] for ethnic Germans in Erance? It would be an international scandal.'^^ Nastasealso attempted to limit his government's responsibility for any failure to changeHungarian policy by preparing the way for the scapegoating of European institu-tions: 'If at the European level such regulations [the status law] will be accepted,then we will also accept the new standards'.^*

Orban, his ministers, DAHR and certain observers all pointed out that the Hun-garian law was similar in a number of ways to those promoted by quite a few coun-tries in Eastern Europe, including Romania, as well as countries in Western Europe.But this sort of argument did not engage with the affective power that the threat tonational unity and denigration of nation moral worth held with ethnic Romanians.Eor the Romanian government, accusations of a double standard were met with thefollowing response:

There exists a fundamental difference between the Hungarian legal project andthe Romanian law. The Romanian law concerns itself exclusively with issues of lin-guistic and cultural identity of persons of Romanian origin and only on Romanianterritory.'"

The European Union, as an institution, initially took a low profile approach. At anAssociation Council meeting with Hungarian representatives in mid-July, Enlarge-ment Commissioner Verheugen stated that 'Hungary has been the driving force ofcooperation in the region for a number of years, "acting as a model to other coun-tries. Therefore [. . .] I see no cause for concern regarding implementation of thestatus law'".'' To make this message explicit, Eernand Van Brusselen, the Belgianambassador to Hungary whose country held the EU Presidency at the time, madethe following comment in an interview on the same day: 'Hungary has underminedthe stabilizing role it has so far played in the region with the Status Law'.'^ ThoughVan Brusselen tried to soften his statement later,'^ the general message seemed clearenough. The EU wanted the whole dispute to go away and the two countries to getalong and stop causing trouble. The Hungarian government was expected to viewconsultations as a means to an end rather than an end in itself as Martonyi hadsuggested.

"' 'Interview With Prime Minister — Hungarian Television', Hungarian News Agency (MTI), 6 June 2001.^ Daniel Oanja, '"Ce s-ar intampla daca, spre exemplu, Bundestagul ar emite o asemenea lege pentrucetafenii germani din Franja?"', Adevarul, 3 July 200i, p. 1.*' §erban Mihaila, 'Adrian Nastase §i Viktor Orban au cazut de acord ca nu sunt de acord', Adevarul, 30July 2001, p. 1.'" The Government of Romania, 'In contradictie cu normele internajonale de drept'." 'EU-Hungary Hold Association Meeting', Hungarian News Agency (MTI), 18 July 2001.'̂ 'EU diplomat attacks Hungarian ethnic law', Agence France Presse, 17 July 2001.'•* 'Belgian Ambassador Claims To Be Misquoted', Hungarian Neivs Agency (MTI), 20 July 2001.


As mentioned above, tbe Venice Commission report of late October took a middlecourse between tbe position of tbe two governments. On tbe one band, it recognizedtbat tbe provision of educational and cultural benefits to national minorities inotber countries by tbeir kin-state is an accepted European norm. On the otberband, it criticized Hungary for not consulting sufficiently witb its neigbboursand for empowering Hungarian minority organizations outside its borders witbquasi-consular functions. Wbile not completely denying tbe Hungarian-backednorm of Europe as 'integration', tbe Venice Commission seemed to favour tbeRomanian norm of 'equality' as being more fundamentally 'European'.

Scbopflin identifies one explanation for tbis interpretation. People in WesternEurope, and tbe 'West' in general, tend to conceive of tbe nations to wbich tbeybelong in civic terms only, wbile downplaying tbeir ethnic component as mucb aspossible. Wben Hungary so 'overtly' addressed tbe ethnic basis of Hungarianidentity, 'it is as if tbe disreputable relative were suddenly to be allowed into tbedrawing room, at any rate for a brief period, and to frigbten tbe respectable bour-geois wbo see tbeir own sbadow qualities in bim.''"* It is telling tbat, of tbe countrieswbose legislation was examined by tbe Venice Commission, most were Central andEast European, and tbe few wbo were not were Greece and Italy. It is even reportedtbat Ireland and tbe United Kingdom failed to provide any information of tbeir ownpractices during tbe preparatory stage of tbe Commission's report.'^

Tbat report issued by tbe Venice Commission was a political godsend to Nastaseand PSDR, and a tremendous boost to Romanian group worth. Tbe day after tbereport was released, Adevraul's beadline blared, 'Acknowledging Romania wasrigbt on all counts, tbe European Commission of Venice asks Hungary not to applytbe Hungarian identity card law'.'*^ Tbe next day's editorial called the result, 'tbefirst victory in eleven years for Romanian diplomacy and a Romanian governmentover Budapest'.''' By handing Nastase sucb a symbolic victory to work witb, tbereport effectively gave bim some political cover to seek a compromise.

Though agreeing to comply with the Venice Commission's findings, Orban andotber Hungarian politicians understandably sougbt to highlight tbe positive result,namely tbe confirmation that tbe Hungarian state bad a legitimate role in support-ing Hungarian minorities in neigbbouring states.'^ However, in a late October pressrelease, tbe OSCE Higb Commissioner on National Minorities made it clear tbat'protection of minority rigbts is tbe obligation of tbe State wbere tbe minorityresides'.'^ TTie European Commission's progress report on Hungary issued inmid-November devoted several paragrapbs to tbe status law controversy. Amongstits conclusions were tbe following:

'* Schopflin, 'The Hungarian Status Law'.'5 Ibid."^ §erban Mihaila, 'Comisia Europeana de la Venejia cere Ungariei sa nu aplice Legea legitimaîei demaghiar', Adevarul, 20-21 October 2001, pp. 1 and 8." Bogdan Chirieac, 'Orban — obligat sa puna foarfeca pe legitimajia de maghiar', Adevarul, 22 October2001, p. 1.'" 'Status Law — Venice Commission — Hungarian and Romanian FMs', Hungarian News Agency(MTI), 20 October 2001.' ' Ekeus, 'Sovereignty, Responsibility, and National Minorities: Statement by OSCE MinoritiesCommissioner'.


the Law on Hungarians living in neighbouring countries raised controversies withsome of these neighbouring countries as it was adopted by Parliament in June 2001without due consultations [...] Some of the provisions laid down in this Law appar-ently conflict with the prevailing European standard of minority protection [...] theLaw will need to be aligned with the acquis at the latest upon accession, since it iscurrently not in line with the principle of non-discrimination laid down in the[Rome] Treaty [establishing the European Community].''"'

The equivalent progress report for Romania had little to say about the status law:'relations with Hungary have encountered difficulties concerning Hungarian legis-lation granting preferential status to ethnic Hungarians living in selected thirdcounties (including Romania).''"'

Clearly, pressure for a compromise was being placed upon the Hungariangovernment. Such pressure effectively raised the cost of no agreement becausethe status law was incorporated into the list of issues that had to be resolved priorto EU accession. The absence of agreement with Romania on this issue grew moreand more politically unacceptable, outweighing whatever benefit the status lawwas calculated to bring the centre-right government. Orban's rhetoric grewmarkedly conciliatory. He admitted that some provisions of the status law were'confused' and that the Romanian government's ethnic discrimination argumentwas a 'powerful point of view'.'"^

With the 1 January 2002 start date for the law rapidly approaching, the Hungarianand Romanian governments ended the dispute by signing a Memorandum ofUnderstanding on a Saturday two days before Christmas, limiting the potentialmedia reaction. The Memorandum was a masterstroke of symbolic politics. Firstly,it claimed to reduce the role of Hungarian cultural organizations in making a rulingon who was and was not Hungarian by adopting more definite standards ofHungarianness for purposes of the law.'°^ Rather than make recommendations tothe Hungarian government on a case-by-case basis as originally envisioned, suchorganizations would only be empowered to provide 'legally non-binding' informa-tion where an individual applicant lacked certain documents. Thus, 'the entire pro-cedure of granting the certificate [of Hungarian identity] shall primarily take placeon the territory of the Republic of Hungary [. . .] and at the Hungarian diplomaticmissions'.'"* Secondly, the Memorandum permitted 'all Romanian citizens, not-withstanding their ethnic origin', to enjoy the benefit of an annual three monthwork permit valid in Hungary.'"^ This portion of the compromise was a de factoacknowledgement that ethnic Romanians as well as ethnic Hungarians werealready working in Hungary illegally in substantial numbers. The compromise as a

™ European Commission, 2003 Regular Report on Hungary's Progress Towards Accession, p. 91."" European Commission, European Union, 2001 Regular Report on Romania's Progress TowardsAccession, Brussels, 13 November 2001, p. 93.'"̂ Calin Stoica-Diaconovici, 'Premierul Orban a recunoscut ca drepturile economice §i sociale dinLegea statutului sunt oarecum incurcate', Adevarul, 19 November 2001, p. 13.103 jiigge were adopted at the fourth session of the Hungarian Standing Conference in late October2001, a week after the release of the Venice Commission's report.™ Memorandum of Understanding."•5 Ib id .


whole responds to Romanian concerns as expressed through a symbolic, nationaldiscourse. The equalization of employment opportunities communicates a parity inrelative group worth. Decreasing the economic incentive to declare a Himgarianidentity also answers the symbolic fear that Transylvania will become a n\ajorityHungarian province and naturally secede.

ConclusionsUltimately, the larger national interests of both countries favoured compromiseon the status law, yet domestic political circumstances made such compromiseunlikely. Hungary's status law represented a growing assertiveness in Hungarianforeign policy commensurate with its newfound regional economic power.'"'' Onan issue of such symbolic importance to the sense of Hungarian national identityas relations with ethnic Hungarians abroad, compromise was of limited appealdomestically, especially for a centre-right government. Romania's laggard status inEuropean integration fed into negative conceptions of relative group worth vis-a-visa Hungary on the verge of EU accession. With the status law seeming to rub salt intoa wounded pride, it became very important to assert the notion of equality amongstEuropean states and to score a victory in the realm of symbolic politics. The strengthof the Romanian opposition to the law, much of it manufactured by the domesticpolitical process, made compromise symbolically costly. As the linkage between thestatus law controversy and EU accession was made apparent, however, compro-mise became more likely for both sides. The nature of the later interventions byEuropean institutions increased the costs of no agreement for the Hungarian sideand supplied political cover for compromise. The timing of such interventions inrelation to the eventual compromise strongly suggests that they were crucial tobringing the two sides together.

Yet one should not conclude this was mere power politics at work. Europeaninstitutions could perform the role of arbiter in this dispute due to the strengthof their legitimacy in both Romania and Hungary. Although a significantly higherfigure in Romania than in Hungary, the majority of Eurobarometer survey respon-dents in both countries had a 'very' or a 'fairly' positive image of the JEuropeanUnion, a score significantly higher than the average score for respondents in thecurrent member countries.'"^ Over seventy per cent of respondents in both coun-tries — results which placed Romania and Hungary at or near the top of the appli-cant pool — tended to trust the EU.̂ "̂ Even if political elites did not share suchsentiments, the overwhelming public support for EU membership — eighty percent of Romanians and sixty per cent of Hungarians™ — could not be ignored.Furthermore, the norm of 'Europeanness', which institutions such as the EU mon-opolize, is an aspiration which does not seem to conflict with either Hungarian orRomanian national identities. Ninety-one per cent of Hungarians and eighty-seven

™ Caius Dobrescu, 'Aspiratii regionale §i politici identitare', Provincia (Romanian edition), June-July2001, pp. 4-5.™ European Commission, European Union, Applicant Countries Eurobarometer 2001: Public Opinion inthe Countries Applying for European Membership (Brussels, 2002), p. 46.™ Ibid., p. 52. The average result for the EU15 on the trust question was only forty-one per cent.™ Ibid., p. 55.


per cent of Romanians felt either 'very' or 'fairly' proud to be either Hungarian orRomanian, respectively. An almost identical proportion in each country was alsoproud to be European.""

This suggests an important limitation to the capacity of a third party to moderatea conflictual inter-national relationship. A consensus on the third party's legitimacyto intervene was crucial here. Although the EU has long had a certain amount oflegitimacy amongst those behind the iron curtain, one could imagine a more isola-tionist EU that had squandered this reserve with outright refusals of eastwardexpansion. Alternatively, instant membership in the EU would also have dissipatedmuch of the political leverage that a delayed expansion has generated. This is not toargue for stringing along applicant countries indefinitely while ironing out all thekinks in their inter-national relations. Rather, constructive, even activist, engage-ment over a longer political horizon can positively influence political culture andnational conflict if the reward is credibly within reach.

Sceptics would rightly be concerned that many of the political changes in Roma-nia especially are superficial, adopted instrumentally, and not likely to be long-lasting. And that may be true if certain incentive structures are suddenly yankedaway. But the hope is that if politicians like Iliescu and Nastase say conciliatorythings about DAHR and the Hungarian minority, for whatever reason, eventuallythe domestic political cost of PSDR's reverting to extremist anti-Hungarian rhetoricwill be too much to bear."^ From the perspective of a theory of cognitive dissonanceas elaborated by Albert Hirschman, this represents the 'inverted sequence' hypoth-esis. Rather than a change in belief leading to a change in behaviour, the dissonancecaused by 'discrepant behaviour' can convince people to alter their beliefs. As thetitle of Hirschman's work suggests, this is indeed 'a bias for hope'."^

"" Ibid., pp. 33-34.' " As a cautionary note, PNL's behavior during the status law controversy shows that the politicalbenefits of playing the nationality card may still outweigh its cost, especially for parties without theresponsibility of forming a government."^ Albert O. Hirschman, A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America (New Haven, CT: YaleUniversity Press, 1971), pp. 322-34.

Documents

Slovo, The Hungarian Status Law in Romania: Anatomy of an ...cafefle.org/texteskkkmg-icc_articles EU/14(1)_Romania_2 - copie.pdf · Maria Pantiru, 'Presa romana "faja cu reacjiunea":