Slightly redacted draft version of a Motion for Reargument at New York City Federal Court

8/16/2019 Slightly redacted draft version of a Motion for Reargument at New York City Federal Court

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...............................................................................................................................................................iii

Preliminary Statement .................................................................................................................................................................................1

Statement of Facts ..........................................................................................................................................................................................6

ARGUMENTS .................................................................................................................................................................................................9

I. THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION FOR PLAINTIFF’S SOX CLAIM AGAINST NTTAND FLSA CLAIM AGAINST CREDIT SUISSE MUST BE EQUITABLY TOLLED INACCORDANCE WITH EQUITABLE AND DURESS TOLLING ...............................................................

A. Plaintiff’s filing of a complaint against Defendants with the Wage and Hour Division ofthe United States Department of Labor in New York City on October 10, 2012 that wascomprised of both FLSA and SOX claims (though not specifically identified by him asSOX claims) confirms that he acted diligently and in a timely manner to seek legal relieffor unlawful acts Defendants committed in violation of the FLSA and SOX. ................................

1. The text of Section 1980.103 that appears within 80 Fed. Reg. 11868 that is includedin “Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under Section 806 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as amended” (Mar. 5, 2015) confirms that the time forfiling a complaint with OSHA pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may be equitablytolled when such a complaint was filed with another agency by mistake: ................................

“OSHA may consider the time for filing a complaint equitably tolled if acomplainant mistakenly files a complaint with the another agency instead ofOSHA within 180 days after becoming aware of the alleged violation.” ...........................

2. The failure by the Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department ofLabor to fully and accurately record the nature of the complaints he filed with it onOctober 10, 2012 against Defendants, investigate those complaints, and advisePlaintiff on October 10, 2012 to file a SOX complaint with OSHA against NTTconstituted extraordinary and egregious events that delayed Plaintiff’s filing of aSOX complaint with OSHA against Defendants.

a.

Pursuant to memorandum of understanding agreements that have existed between OSHA and the Wage and Hour Division of the United StatesDepartment of Labor for the purpose of sharing information between thoseagencies and referring complaints to one another for jurisdictional reasons, theWage and Hour Division had an implicit and ethical duty to refer Plaintiff toOSHA instead of advising him he needed to file a private lawsuit to seekrelief.



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B. Defendants’ unlawful acts against Plaintiff continue to subject him to constant andextreme duress and constitute continuous wrongs. ..............................................................................................

1. Defendants’ unlawful acts against Plaintiff caused what would have been a one-year period of stability in his life while working at Credit Suisse to be replaced by utter

turmoil stemming from the snowball effects of Defendants’ unlawful acts againstPlaintiff. .........................................................................................................................................................................................

2.

Defendants’ unlawful acts against Plaintiff deprived him of being able to retain anattorney to represent him in more than ten sets of extremely debilitating litigation hehas been besieged by since May of 2012 that have unlawfully caused him additionaland irreparable harm. ...........................................................................................................................................................

C. The consequences of Defendants’ unlawful acts against Plaintiff were insurmountable barriers that prevented him from being able to both sufficiently assert and substantiateSOX claims against NTT and FLSA claims against Credit Suisse in a legal proceedinguntil the end of 2015. ...................................................................................................................................................................

1. Despite Plaintiff’s diligence, Defendants’ unlawful acts against Plaintiff preventedhim from having sufficient time, finances, and other types of resources prior to theend of 2015 with which to retain an attorney and have sufficient legal researchconducted to develop a sufficient understanding of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, civilRICO, applicable case law and legal doctrines/theories, and how applicable case lawhas evolved in order to adequately plead and substantiate claims against Defendants pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and civil RICO. .................................................................................

II. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR PLAINTIFF’S SOX CLAIM AGAINST NTT. ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................

A. A final decision has not been made by the Secretary of the United States Department ofLabor nor anyone authorized to make a decision on his behalf about the SOX complaintthat I filed with OSHA against Defendants.

B. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.114(a) grants Plaintiff the right both to “bring an action at law orequity for de novo review” before this Court and to have a trial by jury. ............................

C. The case of Kshetrapal v. Dish Network, LLC (90 F. Supp. 3d 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2015))confirms that this Court is the appropriate district court of the United States to hearPlaintiff’s SOX claim against NTT. .................................................................................................................................

D.

A ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................

III. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST CREDIT SUISSE IN HIS SECOND AMENDEDCOMPLAINT ARE NOT INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED WITH HIS CLAIMSAGAINST NTT AND ARE NOT SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION. ..............................................................

A. This assertion is supported by statements expressed in the memorandum opinion andorder dated October 14, 2015 that was issued in the case of Korenblum v. Citigroup, Inc.,



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No. 15-CV-3383 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2015) that involved a group of I.T. workersthat had an arrangement with a staffing company to provide services to the staffingcompany’s client that mirrors the arrangement Plaintiff had with NTT to provide I.T.services to Credit Suisse ...........................................................................................................................................................

1.

It would be entirely unjust, anomalous, and in defiance of the precedent that wasestablished by the findings that were issued on October 14, 2015 in the case of Korenblum v. Citigroup, Inc. that is being heard in the very same courthouse as thisaction if this Court were to refuse to modify the May 17 th Decision that was issued inthis action in a manner that allows Plaintiff’s claims against Credit Suisse to belitigated. ..........................................................................................................................................................................................

IV. THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED MATERIAL FACTS ABOUT THE CONTRACT NTT ISSUED TO [REDACTED] ..............................................................................................................................................

A. Contrary to a statement in this Court’s May 17th Decision that indicated that Plaintiff wasthe only employee of [redacted] to be assigned to provide services to Credit Suisse, the

first paragraph of section three of the contract that NTT issued to [redacted] explicitlystipulated that [redacted] would have sole control over the hiring, firing, and assignmentof [redacted]’s employees. .....................................................................................................................................................

1. NTT’s contract with [redacted] authorized [redacted] to hire someone other thanPlaintiff, then assign that person to work at Credit Suisse as Plaintiff’s replacement. .....

B. Contrary to a statement that appears in page 2 and in paragraph 2 of this Court’s May17

th Decision, NTT exceeded the authority it was granted by the contract it issued to

[redacted] with respect to the manner in which NTT terminated its contract with[redacted].

1. Although the contract NTT issued to [redacted] bestowed sole control to [redacted]over the hiring and firing of [redacted]’s employees, NTT willfully conspired onApril 10, 2012 to directly fire Plaintiff and violate the NTT’s contract with [redacted]in the process, then carried out its plan to fire Plaintiff directly and violate thecontract on April 27, 2012. ............................................................................................................................................

a. The following remarks about Plaintiff contained in an e-mail message EdwardEpstein of NTT sent at 3:46 pm on April 10, 2012 to Sharin Newman, KeithBacker, Meghan Duffy, and Rebecca Freund of NTT confirm NTT conspired onthat date to directly fire Plaintiff and violate the NTT’s contract with [redacted] in

the process:

“And, I think you should have some face-2-face conversation with him and coolhim down or we will need to terminate him

Everyone in the back office knows this guy ... in a very bad way. I would suggestyou get him out on our terms.”

b. The following remarks about Plaintiff contained in an e-mail message Edward



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Epstein of NTT sent at 4:04 pm on April 10, 2012 to Sharin Newman, KeithBacker, Meghan Duffy, and Rebecca Freund of NTT further confirm NTTconspired on that date to directly fire Plaintiff and violate the NTT’s contract with[redacted] in the process:

“It is my strong recommendation that you plan for his exit. Inform the client, startlooking for a backfill and get him out of our account.”

c.

The following remark about Plaintiff contained in an e-mail message Sharin Newman of NTT sent at 10:08 am on April 27, 2012 to Diana Cousins of CreditSuisse confirm NTT carried out its plan to fire Plaintiff directly and violate thecontract NTT issued to [redacted] in the process:

“Hiya Diana-I need to release [redacted].”

V. PLAINTIFF’S SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO ASSERT CIVIL RICO CLAIMS

AGAINST NTT. .......................................................................................................................................................................................

1. Plaintiff’s proposed civil RICO claims against NTT are substantiated by multiple actsof wire fraud NTT committed against Plaintiff in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 onJanuary 17, 2012, April 10, 2012, April 25, 2012, and April 27, 2012. .......................................

2. Fraudulent intent is shown if a representation is made with reckless indifference to itstruth or falsity. ...........................................................................................................................................................................

a. NTT repeatedly exhibited reckless indifference about the truth or falsity ofrepresentations it expressed in the contract it issued to [redacted] on January 17,

2012 and in e-mail messages NTT’s representatives sent to Plaintiff and oneanother on January 17, 2012, April 10, 2012, April 25, 2012 that constitute NTT’sintent to commit against Plaintiff. .....................................................................................................................

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................................................................................



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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Brady v. Williams Capital ,

928 N.E.2d 383, 14 N.Y.3d 459, 902 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2010) .................................................................................

Dietz v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., ARB No. 15-017, 3/30/16 (released 4/6/16) ...............................................................................................................

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,544 U.S. 280, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005) . ................................................................................................

Goldberg v. Kelly,

397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970) .....................................................................................

Korenblum v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 15-CV-3383 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2015) ................................................................................................

Kshetrapal v. Dish Network, LLC ,90 F. Supp. 3d 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ................................................................................................................................

Statutes & Other Authorities

5 U.S.C. § 552a ...................................................................................................................................................................................................

18 U.S.C. § 1343 ................................................................................................................................................................................................

18 U.S.C. § 1514A .......................................................................................................................................................................... passim

18 U.S.C. § 1961 ................................................................................................................................................................................................

18 U.S.C. § 1962 ................................................................................................................................................................................................

18 U.S.C. § 1964 ................................................................................................................................................................................................

29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(d) .............................................................................................................................................................................

29 C.F.R. § 1980.105(a) .............................................................................................................................................................................

29 C.F.R. § 1980.106(a) .............................................................................................................................................................................

29 C.F.R. § 1980.112(a) ...............................................................................................................................................................................

29 C.F.R. § 1980.114(a) ...............................................................................................................................................................................



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Plaintiff [redacted] submits this memorandum of law in support of his motion for

reargument of this Court’s May 17, 2016 Opinion & Order in this action pursuant to Local Civil

Rule 6.3 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The statements expressed within the Opinion & Order dated May 17, 2016 that this Court

issued in this action confirm that they were based upon matters of law and fact that this Court

misapprehended and overlooked in materials ways. The following terms that appear within this

Court’s Opinion & Order dated May 17, 2016 appear within this Memorandum of Law

hereinafter as follows:

1. The consultancy agreement between [redacted] and M.I.S.I. Co., Ltd. will

hereinafter be referred to as “the Contract.”

2. [redacted] will hereinafter be referred to as “[redacted].”

3. M.I.S.I. Co., Ltd. and Defendant NTT Data, Inc. will both hereinafter be

referred to as “NTT.”

4.

Defendant Credit Suisse AG will hereinafter be referred to as “CS.”

5. The First Amended Complaint will hereinafter be referred to as “FAC.”

6. The Second Amended Complaint will hereinafter be referred to as “SAC.”

7. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act will hereinafter be referred to as “SOX.”

8.

The Fair Labor Standards Act will hereinafter be referred to as “FLSA.”

When I commenced this action and as it proceeded, I sought for the following to occur:

1. To have this Court exercise its supplemental jurisdiction to consider

independent claims pertaining to my legal disputes with NTT and CS that had

not previously been considered in any other legal forum, such as whether my



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particular financial circumstances made it possible for me to engage in

arbitration with NTT.

2. To have this Court determine whether CS was explicitly listed in the

Contract’s arbitration provision and whether both [redacted] and NTT had

intended for that arbitration provision to cover actions that CS engaged in.

3. To have this Court determine whether my claims in this action against NTT

and CS deserved to be subject to equitable tolling.

4. To have this Court allow me to engage in discovery with NTT and CS to

determine the degree to which they may have colluded and been complicit in

committing and condoning the unlawful acts against me that were the basis of

the claims against them that I raised in FAC and SAC in this action.

5. To have this Court recognize and formally acknowledge the fact that both the

Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor and the

Occupational, Safety, and Health Administration of the United States

Department of Labor committed substantial errors in the manner in which

those agencies processed complaints against NTT and CS that I and others

submitted to them and, in so doing, demonstrated that both of those agencies

represented inadequate legal forums in which I could vindicate my statutory

rights against NTT and CS pursuant to the FLSA and SOX.

When I commenced this action and as it proceeded, I did not seek the following:

1. To evade engaging in arbitration with NTT for the simple fact that it has never

been possible for me to engage in arbitration with NTT and continues not to

be possible because of my financial circumstances.



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2. To seek appeal of decisions that were issued by Judge Jennifer Schecter on

April 11, 2014 and in October of 2015 in a New York state court action

between NTT and I that compelled me to engage in arbitration with NTT and

never considered whether I had the ability to engage in arbitration with NTT

because of my financial circumstances.

3. To engage in conduct that could be considered frivolous.

4. To commence an action to which I would subsequently be unable to commit

my full attention and resources. The action of Komatsu v. Bernard Nickels

Inc., Case No. 1:14-cv-00167 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2014) was dismissed

primarily because I had insufficient time and resources that I could give to it

because of frivolous litigation I was facing from my slumlord at that time and

had to contend with on a pro se basis.

Since February of 2012, I have been deprived of income I earned through the Contract by

working at CS in New York City as a result of unlawful acts committed by CS and NTT. I have

also been deprived of income that I had been entitled to earn through the Contract by working at

CS in New York City between April of 2012 and January of 2013 as a result of unlawful acts

committed by NTT that were condoned by CS. The unlawful acts CS and NTT committed and

continue to commit against me and condone have subjected me to irreparable harm in numerous

ways. An example of this has been my inability to hire an attorney since 2012 that stems from

the unlawful acts committed by NTT and CS against me. Since 2012, I have been involved in

numerous sets of litigation in which I have been forced to represent myself on a pro se basis. As

a result of having been unable to be represented by an attorney in any of those sets of litigation

because of the unlawful acts by NTT and CS, terrible and irreversible things have happened to



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my detriment in many instances in those sets of litigation in violation of my rights. Some of the

terrible and irreversible things that have happened to me in and as a result of those sets of

litigation for which the unlawful acts committed by NTT and CS have been the underlying root

cause have been the following:

1. I was deprived of my due process rights to present material evidence in court

and have the date for trial in a lawsuit scheduled for a date and time when I

could be heard in a meaningful way instead of less than three days after I had

just moved into an apartment and while most of my belongings, including

legal documents, were disorganized and in assorted moving boxes.

2. I was unlawfully evicted from my former apartment on October 22, 2015 and

made homeless.

3. I had more than $4,000 in property of mine stolen by my former landlord, a

New York City Marshall, and/or a moving company hired by my former

landlord that I left behind in my former apartment on October 22, 2015 for my

landlord to have packed by a moving company, temporarily stored, and

returned in full to me in undamaged condition.

4. Money judgments were unlawfully issued against me by two judges that

violated my due process rights and an attorney for a slumlord was able to

fraudulently gain access to my bank account.

Furthermore, the unlawful acts NTT and CS committed against me have been responsible

for why there were delays in having claims filed against both of them pursuant to the SOX and

against CS pursuant to the FLSA. By having engaged in unlawful acts that deprived me of

sufficient finances with which to hire an attorney and legal researcher, NTT and CS forced me to



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have to conduct diligent and extensive legal research entirely on my own throughout periods

when I have had to contend with other litigation and being unemployed. In this respect, the

unlawful acts NTT and CS continue to commit against me have been and continue to be

analogous to someone who has his or her legs severed by an attacker and then is ordered by that

attacker to run. Accordingly, this Court should grant my motion for reargument in its entirety.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following is the entire text of the arbitration provision that appears on page 4 and in section

7 in the Contract:

“VII. ARBITRATION.

The Consultant and M.I.S.I. each desires to resolve any and all “Claims” (defined below) which may ever arise between them in relation to this Agreement or theConsultancy solely through binding arbitration.

Any controversy, dispute and/or claim (a “Claim”) which M.I.S.I. may haveagainst the Consultant or which the Consultant may have against M.I.S.I. and in the caseof each of them any of its affiliates, parent, subsidiary or sibling corporations and/or any

of their respective officers, directors, shareholders, or employees shall be settled solely by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules (the “Rules”) of theAmerican Arbitration Association. Each party hereto shall cause each of its suchaforesaid affiliates and such aforesaid related persons to likewise so agree.

Each party to any arbitration will pay one-half (1/2) of the fees of the arbitrator(s),the costs of any record or transcript of the arbitration proceedings, any and alladministrative fees, and all other fees and costs of the arbitration. Judgment upon theaward rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court. Any such arbitration proceeding shall be held in the City of New York, State of New York unless M.I.S.I. andthe Consultant specifically agree to another location for such proceeding.”

Neither “Credit Suisse” nor any variation thereof appears or is otherwise referred to in the

arbitration provision of the Contract. The arbitration provision in the Contract was not written in

a manner that states the following:

“The Consultant, M.I.S.I., and M.I.S.I.’s client all desire to resolve any and all “Claims”



)

(defined below) which may ever arise between them as a result of acts each of them may possibly take in relation to this Agreement or the Consultancy solely through bindingarbitration.”

Neither [redacted] nor I agreed explicitly or implicitly in 2012 to be restricted to

engaging in arbitration for claims against CS triggered by acts committed by CS.

Although the following statement appears between the bottom of page 1 and top of page

2 in this Court’s Opinion & Order dated May 17, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “this Court’s

May 17th Decision”), the only client of NTT identified in the Contract is CS:

“The Agreement provides that [redacted] as a consultant of M.I.S.I. would provideservices to certain of M.I.S.I.’s clients as provided in Exhibit A.”

Although the following statement appears at the end of the first paragraph shown on page

2 in this Court’s May 17th Decision, nothing in the Contract substantiates this claim:

“Pursuant to the Agreement, Plaintiff was the only employee of [redacted] to be assignedto provide services to Credit Suisse.”

The following text appears on page 3 and in section 3 in the Contract partly to confirm

that [redacted] would be solely responsible for hiring any and all persons who would be assigned

by [redacted] to provide services to CS:

“III. EMPLOYEES OF THE CONSULTANT.

The Consultant shall hire and employ, at its own cost and expense, any and all persons whom it uses in performing its obligations hereunder (“Consultant Personnel”).Any and all such persons shall be under the sole direction and control of the Consultant,and the Consultant shall be and at all times remain solely responsible for the selection,hiring, firing, disciplining, supervising, compensating, assigning, directing, setting ofwages, hours, and working conditions, and adjusting the grievances of each and all ofthem.”

In regards to the statements that appear in the first complete paragraph that is shown on

page 2 of this Court’s May 17th Decision and in spite of what is explicitly stated in section 3 that

appears on page 3 in the Contract, NTT fired me on April 27. 2012 instead of NTT terminating



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the Contract with [redacted].

Although it is true that the Contract requires that any “controversy, dispute and/or claim”

between [redacted] and M.I.S.I. -- or any of their respective officers, directors, shareholders or

employees -- “which may ever arise between them in relation to this Agreement” be settled

solely by binding arbitration to be held in New York City, all of the following statements are

equally true:

1. The provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1514A make it clear that claims pursuant to the

whistleblower protections of the SOX are not subject to arbitration.

2.

Civil Rico claims are not subject to arbitration.

3. As I stated earlier within this Memorandum of Law, “Credit Suisse” nor any

variation thereof appears or is specifically referred to in the arbitration provision

that exists in the Contract and [redacted] and I never agreed in 2012 to engage in

arbitration with CS or for acts committed by CS.

As this Court correctly stated on page 4 of this Court’s May 17th

Decision, I filed a

complaint with OSHA on October 29, 2015 against the Defendants in this action pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 1514A. When OSHA issued its decision to dismiss that complaint as untimely on

February 11, 2016, OSHA’s decision was a preliminary decision that could be appealed. After

learning about OSHA’s February 11 2016 decision to dismiss my complaint, I filed an appeal

that was deemed by United States Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge Adele

Odegard to have been filed in a timely manner. Since I filed my appeal of OSHA’s decision to

dismiss the complaint that I filed with it against Defendants, no final decision has been issued by

the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor nor anyone acting on his behalf about the

complaint that I filed with OSHA against Defendants. More than 180 days have passed since I



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filed the complaint with OSHA against Defendants pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1514A and I reiterate

that no final decision has been issued by the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor

nor anyone acting on his behalf about the complaint that I filed with OSHA against Defendants.

29 C.F.R. § 1980.106(a) (2015) confirms that when a preliminary order issued by OSHA

has been appealed within 30 days from the date that OSHA issued its preliminary order, OSHA’s

order remains preliminary in nature. The following is the text of 29 C.F.R. § 1980.106(a) (2015):

“Any party who desires review, including judicial review, of the findings and preliminaryorder, or a respondent alleging that the complaint was frivolous or brought in bad faithwho seeks an award of attorney fees under the Act, must file any objections and/or arequest for a hearing on the record within 30 days of receipt of the findings and

preliminary order pursuant to § 1980.105(b).”

29 C.F.R. § 1980.114(a) (2015) explicitly states the following about my right to bring an

action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate district court of the United States:

“If the Secretary has not issued a final decision within 180 days of the filing of thecomplaint, and there is no showing that there has been delay due to the bad faith of thecomplainant, the complainant may bring an action at law or equity for de novo review inthe appropriate district court of the United States, which will have jurisdiction over suchan action without regard to the amount in controversy. A party to an action brought under

this paragraph shall be entitled to trial by jury.”



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ARGUMENTS

The following claims that appear in this Court’s May 17 th Decision are without merit and

confirm that this Court overlooked, misapprehended, and seems to have ignored key facts and

matters of law that warrant my motion for reargument being granted immediately:

• “Pursuant to the Agreement, Plaintiff was the only employee of [redacted] to be assigned

to provide services to Credit Suisse.” This claim appears at the end of the first paragraph

shown on page 2 of this Court’s May 17th Decision.

• “NTT Data exercised its right to terminate the agreement in April 2012.” This claim

appears at the end of the second paragraph shown on page 2 of this Court’s May 17th

Decision.

• This Court’s claim that it lacks jurisdiction to hear my claim against NTT that I filed with

OSHA pursuant to the SOX and 18 U.S.C. § 1514A that appears in the last paragraph


• This Court’s claim that it lacks jurisdiction to hear my claim against NTT that I filed with

OSHA pursuant to the SOX and 18 U.S.C. § 1514A that appears in the last paragraph


• This Court’s claim that even if this Court had subject matter jurisdiction to review

OSHA’s determination of my SOX claim against NTT, it is evident that my SOX claim

against NTT is untimely. This Court’s claim in regards to this appears in the second

paragraph shown on page 8 of this Court’s May 17th

Decision.

• This Court’s claim that I neither alleged nor otherwise suggested specific facts that,

construed in the most generous light, would give rise to an inference of a criminal

predicate act necessary to bring a civil RICO claim against NTT. This Court’s claim in



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regards to this appears between the bottom of page 8 and top of page 9 of this Court’s

May 17th Decision.

• This Court’s claim in regards to RICO that I made “only conclusory statements that” I

“can substantiate allegations that Ed Epstein and Sharin Newman of NTT Data, Inc.

committed multiple acts of wire fraud at” my expense. This Court’s claim in regards to

this appears in the first paragraph shown on page 9 of this Court’s May 17th Decision.

• This Court’s claim that I have attempted to take successive bites at an apple in a manner

that I am not entitled by law. This Court’s claim in regards to this appears in the first

paragraph shown on page 9 of this Court’s May 17th

Decision.

• This Court’s claim that I “cannot avoid the arbitration provision by pressing” my “claims

against Credit Suisse rather than NTT” that appears in the second paragraph shown on

page 9 of this Court’s May 17th Decision.

• This Court’s claim that my “claims against Credit Suisse are intertwined with the

Agreement” that appears in the last paragraph shown on page 9 of this Court’s May 17th

Decision.

• This Court’s claim that “it would be anomalous and could lead to inconsistent results to

require claims against NTT Data to be arbitrated and the related, if not identical, claims

against Credit Suisse to be litigated.” This Court’s claim in regards to this appears in the

first paragraph shown on page 10 of this Court’s May 17th Decision.

•

This Court’s claims I am “therefore estopped from litigating here claims that should be

arbitrated” and that allowing me leave to amend my “complaint to add the proposed

claims against Credit Suisse would be futile. This Court’s claims in regards to this appear

in the first paragraph shown on page 10 of this Court’s May 17th Decision.



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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully request that this Court grant my motion for reargument

in its entirety.

Dated: New York, New YorkMay 27, 2016

__________________________[redacted] Plaintiff, Pro Se

[redacted]

Documents

Slightly redacted draft version of a Motion for Reargument at New York City Federal Court