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Chapter 5 83

5 . SSSPPPEEECCCTTTRRRUUUMMM SSSHHHAAARRRIIINNNGGG

Authors: Adrian Foster, Founding Partner, McLean Foster & Co., Canada

John Alden, Vice President, Freedom Technologies, United States

5.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews various spectrum-sharing meth-

ods that increasingly are being used to respond to the esca-

lating demand for spectrum, which has been sparked by the

seemingly unstoppable surge in new wireless services and

technologies. Spectrum sharing encompasses several tech-

niques – some administrative, some technical, and some

market-based. Spectrum can be shared in several dimen-

sions: time, space and geography. Limiting transmission

power is also a way to permit sharing among low-power

devices operating in the spectrum “commons” – as ex-

plained later with dynamic spectrum access, which takes

advantage of power and interference reduction techniques.

Sharing can also be accomplished through licensing and/or

commercial arrangements involving spectrum leasing and

trading.

In considering the need to share spectrum, it is best to

begin with a discussion of how various sources of spec-

trum demand and scarcity are generating new spectrum

management goals and objectives. It will be helpful to

briefly review administrative, market-based, and technol-

ogy-enabled solutions for spectrum sharing. That will set

the stage for reviewing the important policy decisions

many regulators are considering in order to change spec-

trum assignment practices.

A common issue for both innovative technologies and

market-based methods is arriving at the right balance. It is

important to address interference issues that are implicit in

the increasingly popular principle of technological neutral-

ity. Since the chance of interference can never be totally

eliminated, regulators have an ongoing task to identify and

implement interference management and mitigation mod-

els. section 5.6 offers some best practices for encouraging

spectrum sharing, while section 5.7 will provide a report

on the results of the 2007 World Radiocommunication

Conference (WRC-07), as they pertain to spectrum sharing.

5.1.1 The traditional spectrum management approach

In the traditional model, a spectrum manager specifies

the rules and technical parameters that determine how,

where and when spectrum can be used and who can use it.

At the heart of the traditional model is the need to mini-

mize harmful interference. This places a technical empha-

sis on spectrum management. The simplest way to prevent

interference, from this perspective, is to allocate different

frequency bands to different services. In practice, however,

more than one radio service is allocated in a given band,

and sharing between services is governed by technical cri-

teria.

In circumstances where the demand for spectrum is

less than the supply, the traditional model works ade-

quately, promoting innovation at a steady and predictable

rate. In recent years, however, demand for spectrum use

has grown significantly, particularly in frequency bands

suitable for mobile communications. Furthermore, applica-

tions such as mobile telephony, fixed broadband wireless

access, high-definition terrestrial TV services, and mobile

terrestrial TV services are all able to work in the same fre-

quency bands. 1

The economic value associated with access to spec-

trum is often considerable – and it has grown significantly

in recent years. The intensified competition among the

many different potential users, particularly for bands lying

below 3 GHz, is rapidly undermining the effectiveness of

the traditional spectrum management model. Because it

emphasizes technical factors and focuses primarily on

harmful interference, standard spectrum management it is

relatively inflexible and less useful for dealing with criteria

such as economic efficiency.

The traditional model, for example, usually requires

new equipment testing to minimize interference, and this

can delay the introduction of new services. 2 The long-

range and even static planning inherent in the traditional

model can also lead to costly regulatory gambles that turn

Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2008

84 Chapter 5

out to be errors in retrospect. Several examples of this have

occurred in Europe, where regulators reserved certain

valuable frequency bands for new services such as the Ter-

restrial Flight Telephone System (TFTS) and the European

Radio Messaging System (ERMES), both of which failed

to deliver their promised benefits.

5.1.2 Mobile telephony and broadband ubiquity

No contemporary observer can escape noticing the

commonplace use of mobile phones and wireless laptops,

from Vienna to Vancouver to Vientiane. In 14 out of

31 OECD countries, mobile subscriber penetration rates

exceed 100 per cent (Luxembourg is the highest at 157 per

cent).3 In developing countries, mobile penetration rates

are about 32 per cent. Not surprisingly, the average mobile

usage in least-developed countries is more than 92 per cent

of total telephone usage – a consequence of the lower cost

of wireless infrastructure.4

Meanwhile, the number of broadband subscribers in

the OECD countries increased 18 per cent, from 200 mil-

lion in December 2006 to 235 million in December 2007.

DSL represented 62 per cent of all broadband connections

during that time. Overall broadband penetration rates in the

OECD countries increased from 15.1 per cent to 18.8 per

cent during the 2006-2007 period.5

Increased market penetration and access have occurred

along with significant levels of investment in telecommu-

nication services and capital equipment. Investment

reached the level of USD 579 billion in 2005, after having

grown at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of

12 per cent over the previous 10 years. This investment has

unleashed widespread innovation and creativity in the de-

velopment of new technologies and services, including 3G

mobile and other broadband wireless access services such

as WiMAX.

5.1.3 The need for spectrum sharing

As the demand for spectrum increases and frequency

bands become more congested, especially in densely popu-

lated urban centres, spectrum managers are exploring di-

verse paths to sharing frequencies:

• Using administrative methods, including in-band shar-

ing;

• Creating new, secondary market mechanisms, such as

leasing and spectrum trading;

• Adopting unlicensed or spectrum “commons” ap-

proaches; and

• Encouraging use of low-power radios or advanced ra-

dio technologies, such as ultra-wideband or multi-

modal radios.

The next sections of this chapter examine in more de-

tail all aspects of spectrum scarcity, as well as innovations

in services and technological advances, various spectrum-

sharing techniques, and examples from several countries.

Figure 5.1: Representation of frequency assignments for a single GSM/UMTS operator

Note: No notion of liberalization is assumed in the depiction of licence features.

Source: Linda Doyle & Tim Forde: Towards a Fluid Spectrum Market for Exclusive Usage Rights. Trinity College, University of Dublin,

2007.

3G market emerges

space

frequency GSM UMTS

tim

e

Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2008

Chapter 5 85

Figure 5.2: Mobile technologies worldwide, by June 2007

Disclaimer: The designations employed and the presentation of material in this map do not imply any opinion whatsoever on the part of the

ITU concerning the legal or other status of any country, territory or area or any endorsement or acceptance of any boundary.

Source: ITU, based on data from 3Gtoday.

5.2 Dealing with spectrum scarcity

There are three “causes” of spectrum scarcity:

1) Increased demand,

2) Administrative processes, and

3) Technical issues, such as interference management and

technical obsolescence.

It is important to note that spectrum scarcity is a rela-

tive term – scarcity can vary within a country and from one

country to another. When examining various spectrum

management approaches for spectrum sharing it is impor-

tant to keep in mind that differences do exist between

countries and between urban, rural and remote regions.

5.2.1 Spectrum management goals and objectives

Broadband wireless access (BWA) services are an in-

novative solution for connecting the world. They embody

one of the main objectives of ITU: extending connectivity

to a greater number of people through increased availabil-

ity of ICT services to all geographical areas. Using spec-

trum more efficiently and managing it more effectively are

the best ways to accomplish this goal.

Core spectrum management objectives include:

• Planning for future needs and monitoring the utiliza-

tion of spectrum, in accordance with legislative and

public policy objectives and international agreements;

• Improving the efficient and optimal use of spectrum

through adoption of advanced spectrum allocation,

management, and licensing processes, based on opera-

tional requirements and technical and economic viabil-

ity;

• Ensuring flexibility, adaptability and ease of spectrum

access in response to technological advances and eco-

nomic, social and market factors;

• Ensuring that national interests are protected while

striving for global harmonization and coordination on

spectrum allocations and issues, in compliance with

ITU and other treaty obligations;

• Supporting and promoting innovation, research and

development in new radiocommunication techniques

and spectrum-based services and applications; and

• Coordinating and establishing well-balanced, national

spectrum and radiocommunication policies and plans,

based on consulting with all interested parties and the

general public.

5.2.2 Spectrum scarcity

It is important to note that spectrum scarcity can be

met partly by existing operators. Sufficient incentives are

needed to ensure that frequencies will be used efficiently.

As pointed out earlier in the chapter, there can be differ-

ences in levels of spectrum congestion between urban and

rural areas. Congestion and scarcity can occur as a result of

some types of services being allocated for use in certain

geographic areas, such as maritime services in coastal

areas.

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86 Chapter 5

Figure 5.3: UK licence-exempt band utilization

Current LE bands are lightly used

Note: Ofcom Spectrum Framework Review in 2004.

In the UK, the Office of Communications’ (Ofcom’s)

2004 Spectrum Framework Review examined the potential

for greater sharing and use of licence-exempt bands, de-

termining that existing use of certain of those bands was

less than optimal in the UK (see Figure 5.3).

5.2.2.1 Scarcity due to demand for new services

As pointed out earlier, the growth in demand for wire-

less mobile telephony worldwide over the past decade is

such that the worldwide number of mobile phone subscrib-

ers now surpasses the total of fixed-line customers. In-

creased competition, leading to lower prices in the mobile

and ISP sectors, is the net effect of liberalization, deregula-

tion and privatization in telecommunication services.

As the demand for new services grows, it may be de-

sirable to switch some services to higher frequencies and

“re-farm” the lower-frequency spectrum for new services.

This is one of the biggest challenges facing spectrum regu-

lators: the need to reallocate spectrum in the face of ongo-

ing, legacy use of the band that may go back decades.

5.2.2.2 “Administrative” scarcity

It is a highly complicated administrative task to incor-

porate allocation changes resulting from new international

allocations or domestic re-farming. In addition, it is costly

and time-consuming to resolve disputes among licensees

and users, often requiring hearings or appearances before

dispute-resolution panels. The cumulative time and re-

source backlogs can constitute a kind of “administrative”

spectrum scarcity. As the European Commission has stated,

“The deployment of innovative wireless services and tech-

nologies is increasingly hampered by the reservation of

certain spectrum bands for narrowly defined services, cou-

pled with rigid usage conditions that are unduly constrain-

ing spectrum use.”6

The reallocation (re-farming) of spectrum from gov-

ernment exclusive use to civil and commercial uses can be

a problem in both developed and developing countries.

Significant blocks of spectrum may be allocated for gov-

ernment use, often for military and other ministry commu-

nications systems. As reported in the Independent Audit of

Spectrum Holdings to the UK Government in 2005 (the

“Cave Audit”), government holdings of spectrum ap-

proximated 50 per cent of the UK’s spectrum below

15 GHz. Figure 5.4 illustrates the relative share of spec-

trum between various British government services.

Scarcity can also stem from delays or reluctance of

stakeholders to resolve spectrum access issues. This has

been a problem for new entrants into mobile markets.

There are numerous examples of decisions made by regu-

lators concerning spectrum “set-asides” that ultimately fa-

vour one party over another, creating spectrum scarcity.7

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Chapter 5 87

Figure 5.4: Composition of public sector spectrum holdings below 15 GHz, United Kingdom

Source: Independent Audit of Spectrum Holdings, HM Treasury, 2005, Figure 1, page 13.

Two of the mechanisms gaining favour in efforts to al-

leviate administrative scarcity are (1) the use of market

methods, such as spectrum trading or in-band migration;

and (2) “spectrum commons” approaches. Trading of spec-

trum licences is taking place in several countries, including

Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the United States.

Guatemala has allowed trades of commercial spectrum as-

signments since 1996. This topic is explored further in sec-

tion 5.4.2.

5.2.2.3 Technical scarcity

Technical issues can also contribute to spectrum scar-

city. For example, licensees typically must comply with an

applicable radio system plan and set of specifications that,

by implication, may limit the types of technologies the li-

censee can use. While the intention is to create technical

restrictions that protect against interference, the prescrip-

tive nature and lack of flexibility in spectrum management

may result in scarcity. Another aspect of the same problem

is technical obsolescence of equipment. Governments often

reserve exclusive spectrum allocations for services that no

longer meet contemporary standards for spectral efficiency.

The use of innovative technologies in response to these

problems is discussed in the paragraphs below.

5.2.3 Service innovation

Convergence of wireless and Internet technologies is

not a new topic. For spectrum managers, the challenge is to

address the evolution of technology and the growth in de-

mand – ensuring that sufficient spectrum is available for

current and future generations of commercial services –

while protecting public safety and security. One of the

main issues at WRC-07 was to identify additional spec-

trum bands for International Mobile Telecommunications

(including IMT-2000 and IMT-Advanced systems, all

known now collectively as IMT). The goal was to agree on

globally harmonized bands in order to facilitate future

technology development, equipment manufacturing and

network roll-out. The WRC was seeking to make spectrum

available to meet project demand for these new services

(see Table 5.1 and section 5.7).

Table 5.1: Predicted spectrum requirements by the year 2020 for IMT

Predicted total

1280 MHz low

1720 MHz high

Identified

Low demand

net additional

MHz needed

High demand

net additional

MHz needed

Region 1 (Europe, Africa and Middle East) 693 MHz 587 MHz 1027 MHz

Region 2 (Americas) 723 MHz 557 MHz 997 MHz

Region 3 (Asia) 749 MHz 531 MHz 971 MHz

Note: Prediction based on one network deployment.

Source: ITU, 2007

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88 Chapter 5

5.3 Improved access through spectrum sharing

5.3.1 When is spectrum sharing needed?

Spectrum sharing typically involves more than one

user sharing the same band of spectrum for different appli-

cations or using different technologies. When a band al-

ready licensed to an operator is shared with others it is

known as overlay spectrum sharing. For example, a spec-

trum band used for TV distribution in one geographical

area could be used for an application such as broadband

wireless access in another area without any risk of interfer-

ence, despite being allocated on a national basis. 8 To

understand when sharing is needed or desirable, it is im-

portant to address some basic questions:

• Does spectrum sharing make better sense in developed

or developing countries?

• Does it make more sense in urban or rural areas?

• Are there different degrees or dimensions to spectrum

sharing, such as geographic sharing?

• Is it cost effective, taking in the costs of regulation and

transaction costs?

• Will spectrum sharing help develop innovative broad-

band applications, improving accessibility and af-

fordability of ICT services?

It should be conceptually straightforward to answer the

question of when sharing is required. Essentially, spectrum

sharing may be needed when:

1) Demand for spectrum exceeds the supply;

2) There is congestion and the potential for harmful inter-

ference;

3) The technical means exist to permit different users to

share; and

4) Other means for adjusting spectrum use and assign-

ment (such as re-farming) have become burdensome

and costly, undermining the goals of economic and

technical efficiency.

The larger implication is that spectrum management

policies are evolving towards more flexibility and market-

oriented models to increase opportunities for efficient

spectrum use. The following subsections explore many of

the aspects of spectrum sharing in greater detail.

5.3.2 Forms of spectrum sharing

There are several ways to share spectrum and to

achieve the goal of improving access to spectrum. Regula-

tors can provide greater flexibility by implementing:

• Liberalized methods for assigning spectrum rights

such as leasing, trading and the unlicensed use of spec-

trum;

• A new paradigm for interference protection that takes

into account new technologies such as dynamic spec-

trum access.

Dynamic spectrum access can make use of underlay

spectrum sharing technologies that feature power limits or

other technical features that minimize the risk of harmful

interference. Such underlay technologies may include

UWB, mesh networks, software defined radio (SDR),

smart antennae and cognitive radios.

5.3.3 Which frequency bands can be shared?

Some bands can be shared because the different users

maintain geographic separation and strictly adhere to op-

erational constraints that prevent interference between ser-

vices. One good example of this is spectrum shared by

satellite and fixed microwave links. In this case, the mi-

crowave links transmit a roughly horizontal beam, while

the satellite links point skyward. So the likelihood of cross-

ing beams and causing interference is minimal. In some

cases, fixed and mobile services can share bands by main-

taining geographic separation and power limits.

The bottom line is that all bands potentially can be

shared. In fact, many bands remain underutilized and could

be shared using a combination of:

• Administrative rules – time, geographic and interfer-

ence-management constraints; and

• Technical solutions – filters, smart antenna, smart

transmitters (such as SDR and cognitive radio) and

transmit power limitations.

An important exception to sharing may result from a

policy decision to maintain exclusive bands and assign-

ments for public safety and security services.

Perhaps the most relevant question is not which bands

can be shared, but which draw the most interest for sharing?

In order to work for BWA services, spectrum bands need

not necessarily be contiguous, but they must have suffi-

cient bandwidth (that is, at least 2.5 MHz) to support

broadband applications such as video. In addition, they

should have good propagation characteristics (preferably

below 1 GHz) and allow wide geographic coverage. Bands

with low usage can also be of interest (most such bands are

above 15 GHz).

5.3.4 Administratively managed spectrum sharing

Administrative management of spectrum sharing gen-

erally involves regulatory decisions on where sharing

should take place, what sharing rules should be applied,

and what technical standards, equipment specifications and

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Chapter 5 89

equipment type approvals should apply. Regulators can

approach this in a step-by-step process:

• Establish a policy to base spectrum allocation and as-

signments on market demand, and to develop fair, effi-

cient and transparent processes for awarding licences.

• Evaluate existing allocations and determine how much

spectrum can be allocated on a shared or non-exclusive

basis;

• Conduct an independent audit of spectrum holdings to

identify bands where immediate changes can take

place;

• Conduct consultations with stakeholders to obtain nec-

essary information to support decisions on sharing and

technical standards;

• Encourage solutions based on negotiations between

affected parties, including the payment of compensa-

tion;

• Specify the use of spectrum-efficient technologies and

consider mechanisms, such as fees, to provide an in-

centive to use less spectrum;

• Consider using band managers to resolve issues among

licensees sharing the band. There are several models

that allow delegation of spectrum management func-

tions to a band manager, on an exclusive and non-

exclusive basis.9

5.3.5 Using markets to improve access

As a starting point, economically efficient use of spec-

trum means the maximization of the value of outputs pro-

duced from available spectrum, including the valuation of

public outputs provided by the government or other public

authorities. From an economic efficiency viewpoint, spec-

trum should be divided in such a way that the benefits to

the overall economy are the same from different uses of

spectrum for an equivalent incremental amount of spec-

trum assigned to either use. Economists view market-based

approaches such as auctions and spectrum trading as supe-

rior to administered methods with regard to achieving eco-

nomic efficiency.10

Spectrum managers are now seeking to employ mar-

ket-based methods, both to assign spectrum initially

(through auctions) and, perhaps more significantly, by al-

lowing spectrum rights to be bought and sold over the life-

time of a licence. In cases where spectrum is a scarce

resource, efficient assignment decisions can be driven by

market prices. Well-designed and properly managed auc-

tions are appealing, since they ensure that frequencies go

to the company that bids the most. That company may, in

certain conditions, be the most efficient operator. Effi-

ciency is further enhanced if the successful licensee

chooses which services to provide and technologies to use

– again, based on conditions in the market.11

Spectrum trading contributes to economically efficient

use of frequencies, since trades should only take place if

the spectrum is worth more to the new user than it was to

the old user, reflecting the greater economic benefit the

new user expects to derive from its use. Many experts be-

lieve that spectrum trading contributes to greater economic

efficiency, in the absence of misjudgements, irrational be-

haviour, or external effects.

5.3.6 Technically enabled spectrum sharing

Technically efficient use of spectrum, at a basic level,

implies the fullest possible use of all available spectrum.

Two measures of technical efficiency are occupancy and

data rate. Time, for example, can be used to gauge techni-

cal efficiency in the sense of how constant or heavy the

usage is over a given period. Data rate refers to how much

data can be transmitted using a given amount of spectrum

capacity. Several spectrum-optimizing technologies – in-

cluding spread spectrum, dynamic access and UWB – are

described in the next sections.

5.3.6.1 Underlay technologies

Spectrum underlay technologies allow signals with

very low spectral power density to coexist, as a secondary

user, with the primary users of the frequency band. The

primary users deploy systems with a much higher power

density level and are therefore not threatened by the under-

lay use, although the underlay leads to a modest increase in

the noise floor. The following paragraphs discuss common

underlay technologies.

Ultra-wideband (UWB)

Ultra-wideband transmits information spread over a

large bandwidth (more than 500 MHz) while sharing spec-

trum with other users. The FCC defines UWB in its Part 15

Rules.12 ITU defines UWB, meanwhile, as a transmission

in which the emitted signal bandwidth exceeds the lesser of

(1) 500 MHz or (2) 20 per cent of the centre frequency.

Due to the extremely low emission levels currently

allowed by regulatory agencies, UWB systems tend to be

short-range, indoor applications. However, because UWB

pulses are so short in duration, it is easier to engineer

extremely high data rates. Data throughput can be readily

exchanged for range by simply aggregating pulse energy

per data bit, using either simple integration or by coding

techniques.

Spread spectrum

Spread spectrum is a technique of spreading a signal

out over a very wide bandwidth, often over 200 times the

bandwidth of the original signal. A spread spectrum trans-

mitter will use one of the following techniques:

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90 Chapter 5

Figure 5.5: The power profile of ultra-bandwidth (UWB) devices

Source: Microsoft.

• Direct sequence spread spectrum – Spread spectrum

transmits in bands where noise is prominent, but does

not rise above the noise. Its radio signals are too weak

to interfere with conventional radios and have fewer

restrictions. Data is altered by a bit stream that repre-

sents every bit in the original data with multiple bits in

the generated stream, thus spreading the signal across

a wider frequency band.

• Frequency-hopping spread spectrum – Using this

technique, the original data signal is not spread out,

but instead “hops” over a wide range of frequencies

that change at split-second intervals. Both the transmit-

ter and the receiver jump frequencies in synchroniza-

tion during the transmission.

CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) is a digital

cellular standard that uses wideband spread spectrum tech-

niques for signal transmission.

5.3.6.2 Overlay technology and dynamic

spectrum access

There are two types of overlay: passive or active (dy-

namic). The Amateur Service has shared spectrum with

various government users using passive overlay technolo-

gies that require the user to look for a CB radio channel

that is free. Meanwhile, active overlay technologies are

beginning to emerge and be trialled. A major trial is cur-

rently taking place in Ireland involving several manufac-

turers of equipment and devices.

In 2007, as part of Pakistan’s consultation on infra-

structure sharing for mobile companies, the concept of

spectrum pooling, which is a form of spectrum sharing

achieved by overlay, was considered. It was pointed out in

the consultation report that no country has yet to permit

this type of sharing.13

Dynamic spectrum access14

Dynamic spectrum access (DSA), which is in its early

stages of development, is an advanced approach to spec-

trum management that is closely related to other manage-

ment techniques such as flexible spectrum management

and spectrum trading. Dynamic spectrum access involves

unitizing spectrum in terms of time slots or geographical

location. This allows users to access a particular piece of

spectrum for a defined time period or in a defined area. In

effect, it multiplies the number of potential users of a given

frequency by the factors of time and geographic space.

DSA incorporates concepts such as:

• Monitoring to detect unused frequencies;

• Agreeing with similar devices on which frequencies

will be used;

• Monitoring frequency use by others; and

• Changing frequency bands and adjusting power as

needed.

In order to truly provide increased access to spectrum

and improved spectral efficiency, DSA techniques will

have to overcome several hurdles, including:

• A possibility of increased interference;

• Challenges to quality of service;

• The need to comply with regulatory frameworks; and

• Multiple technical issues posed by (1) the need to de-

velop complex new equipment, and (2) the fielding of

numerous, networked radio devices competing for the

same frequencies (the “hidden node” problem).

Emitted

Signal

Power

–41 dBm/Mhz

Bluetooth,

802.11b 802.11a

Cordless Phones

Microwave Ovens

“Part 15 Limit”

UWB

Spectrum

1.6 1.9 2.4 3.1 5 10.6

Frequency (GHz)

GP

S

PC

S

Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2008

Chapter 5 91

Dynamic spectrum access is often associated with – al-

though not exclusively dependent on – technologies and

concepts such as software-defined radio (SDR) and cogni-

tive radio (CR), which are described in the next section.

5.3.7 Emerging technology enablers

Along with the spectrum-sharing techniques described

in the previous paragraphs, there are important emerging

technologies that will enable them. The most prominent

enabling technologies are described in this section.

5.3.7.1 SDR and CR15

Software-defined radios are nothing more than radios

with universal-purpose hardware that are programmed for

different operational characteristics using software uploads.

Different radio systems and standards are essentially

loaded as software programs, allowing a radio to be tuned

to different frequencies or even different wave forms (e.g.

a GSM program or a Wi-Fi program). An SDR is optimally

flexible because its core functionality is software-based.

SDR technologies are slowly making their way into

commercial radio systems as technology developments

make them economical for manufacturers. SDRs enable

more flexible and intensive spectrum use and are more tol-

erant of potential interference.

A cognitive radio, meanwhile, is “aware” of the spec-

trum environment around it, because it can monitor trans-

missions across a wide bandwidth, noting areas of unused

spectrum. Based on that knowledge, the CR then modifies

its transmissions to employ frequencies that are not being

used at that time and location. Faced with heavy traffic, the

cognitive radio will simply “change lanes” whenever it

needs to, in order to keep transmitting.

5.3.7.2 Smart antennas and other technologies

Programmable and nimble radios are not the only de-

veloping technologies that can multiply spectral efficiency.

So-called smart antenna applications and technologies also

have emerged in the past ten years. These have already

proved to be valuable for their ability to significantly in-

crease the performance of 2.5 G (GSM-EDGE), 3G

(IMT-2000) and BWA systems. Smart antenna systems use

arrays of multiple antennas, with associated coding, modu-

lation and signal processing, to enhance the performance of

wireless systems in terms of capacity, coverage and

throughput. Smart antennas are not a new idea, but they

have become more cost effective with the advent of digital-

signal processors, general-purpose processors, and applica-

tion-specific integrated circuits (ASICs).

Multi-modal radios are capable of operating across

multiple bands and technologies. The tri-band and world

mobile phone are examples of these multi-modal radios.

Frequencies continue to be divided in discrete elements,

reducing the need to harmonize frequency allotments.

Meanwhile, multimodal radios minimize the need to har-

monize technical standards or interfaces on a regional or

global basis.

5.4 Regulatory and policy trends

In recent years, spectrum management policy and

regulation have evolved considerably to reflect changes in

the demand and supply of spectrum-dependent services.

Many significant developments have occurred, both in re-

forming spectrum management institutions and in updating

how spectrum is allocated and assigned. Managers are in-

creasingly using market-based mechanisms and giving us-

ers more flexibility by eliminating constraints on

applications of new technologies.

5.4.1 Spectrum policy reform

There has been a shift away from relying predomi-

nantly on the traditional planning and allocation model,

most notably in countries where demand for radio spec-

trum access is rising fast. The hallmarks of contemporary

spectrum management have become liberalization and

flexibility.

Liberalization refers to managing spectrum usage

rights through market-based mechanisms. 16 This covers

issues ranging from competitive assignments (such as auc-

tions) to secondary trading. This approach delegates as

much spectrum “management” as possible to participants

in the marketplace. Spectrum management agencies in lib-

eralized settings perform the role of “light-handed” regula-

tors.

Flexibility involves relaxing constraints and prescrip-

tions that specify particular uses and technologies for spe-

cific spectrum bands. This might mean just setting

technical rules to preclude interference, and then letting

licensees choose whatever technologies meet those criteria.

But it can also mean setting up spectrum “commons” or

managed-sharing bands, along with licence-exempt usage.

Very few countries have opened up large parts of the spec-

trum as pure “commons” bands.17 But many allow licence-

exempt use of certain bands for low-power devices. The

United States has embarked on a path of considerable in-

novative activity. The use of Wi-Fi, WiMAX and UWB in

the US has emerged many years before its deployment in

most other countries, due both to the size of the market and

as a result of regulatory actions designed to promote flexi-

bility and unlicensed use.

The benefits of liberalization are enhanced by greater

flexibility, and the benefits of flexibility reach their full

potential within a liberalized environment. So liberaliza-

tion and flexibility are closely intertwined.

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92 Chapter 5

5.4.2 Spectrum authorization reform

The European Commission regards technology and

service restrictions as increasingly incompatible with con-

vergence. It envisions instead a spectrum trading regime

that will embrace flexibility, giving spectrum holders the

right to use frequencies for any service they choose, sub-

ject to technical constraints (primarily to prevent interfer-

ence). Policy in the EU embraces the principles of

technological neutrality and service neutrality.

• Technological neutrality means applying no con-

straints or prescriptions on choices of technology or

equipment, within the bounds of compatibility and in-

terference avoidance. In some cases, of course, the

need to avoid interference may tilt the choice toward

certain technologies rather than others.

• Service neutrality means that the spectrum holder can

choose what service to offer using its spectrum rights.

It is becoming widely recognized that limiting the

choice of what services can be offered is usually not

necessary from a technical, spectrum management

standpoint. According to the European Commission,

“In the field of terrestrial electronic communications,

these [service] categorizations are rapidly becoming

obsolete.”18

Lack of flexibility in spectrum management has, ac-

cording to the Commission, led to a spectrum bottleneck

for new radio technologies.19 Detailed ex ante rules and the

requirement for prior regulatory approval often delay or

even prevent the introduction of new products and services.

The Commission has therefore embraced secondary trad-

ing and licence-exempt (commons) approaches to make

spectrum distribution more flexible.20

5.4.2.1 Spectrum trading

Spectrum trading allows parties to transfer their spec-

trum rights and obligations to another party, in return for a

financial or market benefit. In contrast to spectrum re-

assignment, spectrum trading allows the present user to

decide when and to whom the spectrum authorization will

be transferred – and what sum it will receive in return. The

market, not the regulator, determines the value.

Efficiency gains

Spectrum trading can contribute to a more efficient use

of frequencies. A trade will only take place if the spectrum

is worth more to the new user than it was to the former

user, reflecting the greater economic benefit the new user

expects to derive from the acquired spectrum.21 These effi-

ciency gains will not be realized, however, if transaction

costs are too high. So, one aim of any spectrum-trading re-

gime is to minimize transaction costs. After all, the goal is

to facilitate transfers by establishing a swift and inexpen-

sive trading mechanism. If neither the buyer nor the seller

behave irrationally or misjudge the transaction – and if the

trade does not cause external effects (e.g., anti-competitive

behaviour or intolerable interference) – then spectrum trad-

ing can contribute to greater economic efficiency and

transparency by revealing the true opportunity cost of the

spectrum.

Indirect benefits

Furthermore, trading has other relevant, indirect ef-

fects:

• It enables licensees to expand their businesses more

quickly.

• It makes it easier for prospective new market entrants

to acquire spectrum.

• If spectrum trading is combined with extensive liber-

alization of usage rights, there will be increasing com-

petitive pressure from new market entrants (who can

easily obtain spectrum), prompting lower prices and

more service innovation.

Forms of spectrum trading

In a consultancy report commissioned by the European

Commission, the consulting firm Analysys identified the

following methods for transferring rights of use: 22

• Sale – Ownership of the usage right is transferred to

another party.

• Buy-back – A usage right is sold to another party with

an agreement that the seller will buy back the usage

right at a fixed point in the future.

• Leasing – The usage right is transferred to another

party for a defined period of time but ownership re-

mains with the original rights holder.

• Mortgage – The usage right is used as collateral for a

loan, analogous to taking out a mortgage on an apart-

ment or house.

In terms of the trade itself, there are a variety of

mechanisms that can be used. These include:

• Bilateral negotiation – The seller and buyer directly

negotiate the terms and are not subject to any particu-

lar constraints set by the regulator.

• Auctions – Once a type of auction has been chosen and

the rules have been decided, prospective buyers have

the opportunity to bid for the spectrum usage rights.

• Brokerage – Buyers and sellers employ a broker to ne-

gotiate, with their consent, the contractual terms for

transfer of usage rights.

• Exchange – This refers to the establishment of a trad-

ing platform, similar to a stock market, where transfers

take place according to specific rules.

These mechanisms are most likely to be used in com-

bination. An auction will be used as the initial means of

Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2008

Chapter 5 93

assignment. After that, tradable spectrum can be listed on

an exchange and transferred either through direct negotia-

tion or brokerage activity.

Spectrum transfers

Spectrum transfers generally refer to a lease or sub-

lease arrangement that includes features such as frequency

assignment transferability or divisibility.

• Transferability – licences may be transferred to other

parties;

• Division and partition – Since spectrum can be as-

signed nationally or on a regional or local basis, a

given assignment can be partitioned and shared by dif-

ferent users in different areas.23

One variation is the Irish model, which encourages

smaller market players to provide broadband fixed wireless

access in very small service areas – recently updated to

cover a 21 km radius around a base station.24

Property rights

Enforceable and identifiable property rights are central

to trading radio spectrum. Spectrum rights would be worth-

less if other parties were able to infringe on them, includ-

ing by causing harmful interference. Property rights should

be consistent, even when ownership or usage of those

rights is repeatedly reshuffled. This contributes to greater

efficiency by minimizing the underlying transaction

costs.25 Regulators will have a role in establishing property

rights and maintaining databases and registries to facilitate

ongoing, efficient spectrum market operations.

Tradable licences and spectrum prices

The core characteristic of enabling market mechanisms

for exclusive licences is to allow such licences to be traded,

divided and aggregated (although with aggregation, con-

trols may be needed to protect against the creation of un-

due market power).26 Licensing frameworks must allow the

transfer of licences as part of the trading of usage rights.

The goal of tradable licences has several beneficial

implications for licensing:

1) If licence ownership can be transferred, market forces

will provide incentives to shift spectrum to the use that

represents its highest value, reflecting its true opportu-

nity cost. This provides powerful incentives to use

spectrum efficiently.

2) The more spectrum that is traded, the more liquid the

secondary markets will be, lowering average spectrum

prices. Encouraging low spectrum prices, consistent

with aggregate demand and supply factors, will enable

low-cost access for new applications and services,

which is an important overall goal of spectrum man-

agement reform.

In short, trading lowers the costs for selling and ac-

quiring new spectrum. Despite these benefits, the transition

to tradable licences may need to take place in a two-phased

approach, as discussed in the next section.

5.4.2.2 Interference management

An exclusive licence defines the user’s right to occupy

the spectrum. The primary user has a presumptive right to

exclude other users from harming it within that spectrum.

Secondary users may have the right to occupy the spectrum,

but only if they can do so without causing interference to

primary users. And they may have no interference protec-

tion rights of their own.

Spectrum managers are fundamentally concerned with

managing interference. Much of their time and resources is

spent in establishing the methods, techniques, information

and processes needed to protect users and uses from harm-

ful interference, which occurs when a transmitter’s ability

to communicate with its intended receiver(s) is limited be-

cause of the transmissions of others. Ironically, the prob-

lem is often not with the transmitter but with the receiver.

Better receivers are more able to extract the desired signal

from a “noisy” spectrum environment.27

There are three categories of interference that are of

principal concern:

1) In-band interference from adjacent areas;

2) In-band interference from adjacent frequencies;

3) Out-of-band interference.

The term electrospace can be used to capture the spec-

trum environment as having several dimensions: frequency,

location, direction of arrival and time (all of these are rele-

vant, along with transmission volumes). It is theoretically

possible to specify transmitter (Tx) and receiver (Rx) oc-

cupancy rights so that a Tx/Rx must operate in different

and distinct electrospace volumes to ensure non-interfering

operation.

Interference cannot be entirely eliminated. So it is im-

portant for spectrum managers and regulators to identify

interference management models that support spectrum

sharing under either administrative, market-based or “spec-

trum commons” approaches. The goal is to develop an ap-

propriate regime that protects user rights and sets the right

balance for flexibility, innovation and service neutrality.

Finding the balance and structuring the appropriate re-

sponse continues to be debated.

5.4.2.3 Government use of spectrum –

Is it different?

In a market economy, inputs such as land, labour and

capital equipment are distributed throughout the economy

via a market process. The provider of capital or labour is

Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2008

94 Chapter 5

attracted to whichever activity offers the best reward.

Spectrum can be viewed as one input among others, such

as water and electricity, in a variety of production pro-

cesses. Market systems, when workably competitive, pro-

mote economic efficiency, because inputs are put to use

where they yield the highest returns.28

Does this argument apply in the case of public sector

spectrum use? At first sight it may seem incongruous to

require a public sector body such as a fire service or a de-

fence force to compete in a marketplace for spectrum with

commercial providers of services such as mobile broad-

casting. But this is exactly how public sector organizations

acquire other inputs such as employees, vehicles, land and

office space.

The arguments for non-market treatment of public sec-

tor spectrum are that:

• Spectrum is indispensable for certain uses that con-

tribute to the public good, such as public safety vehi-

cles and defence radars;

• These public services have high priorities in most so-

cieties; and

• Under traditional spectrum management practices,

administrative methods have provided sufficient spec-

trum for these uses.

The use of markets to allocate other equally indispen-

sable inputs into vital public services appears to negate the

first two arguments. The third argument could be resolved

by the development of a spectrum marketplace. At a mini-

mum, government spectrum uses that are similar to com-

mercial services should be subject to prices reflecting the

market price or opportunity cost of the commercial spec-

trum. Also, such government spectrum should be traded in

secondary markets.

5.4.2.4 “Spectrum commons” approaches

A “spectrum commons” is a spectrum band without

any central authority to determine who can or who cannot

operate there. Anyone can transmit without a licence –

which is why such a band is sometimes referred to as li-

cence-exempt or unlicensed spectrum.

In practice, what is referred to as a “spectrum com-

mons” can have varying degrees of management. The ISM

bands, for example, are “spectrum commons” that retain

power restrictions on individual users (in the US, these re-

strictions are set through the FCC’s Part 15 rules). 29 In

Europe there is a further degree of control: devices used

for communication in these bands must conform to certain

technology standards (e.g. ETSI approval). So far, this ap-

proach has only been used in limited bands for short-range

applications. However, “commons” have nurtured signifi-

cant innovation (for example, Wi-Fi), encouraging propo-

nents to call for more unlicensed bands. The UK regulator,

Ofcom, has published general guiding principles for suc-

cessful management (see Box 5.1).

5.4.2.5 Spectrum white spaces

Most radio and TV broadcast channels are separated

by small amounts of unused channels called white spaces,

which are used to limit interference between active chan-

nels. Technology companies and consumer advocates be-

lieve this underutilized and unassigned spectrum could be

used for new services such as BWA. Not surprisingly, TV

broadcasters oppose allowing any unlicensed device to use

white-space spectrum because, they argue, these devices

would interfere with television broadcasts and potentially

harm the mandated transition from analogue to digital TV

service.

5.4.3 Regulatory institutional reform

Regulatory institutional reform, leading to the combi-

nation of telecommunication, broadcasting and spectrum

regulators, can help facilitate spectrum sharing. There are

several examples of where this has occurred or is being

considered.

• Australia – The Spectrum Management Agency, the

Australian Communications Authority and the Austra-

lian Broadcasting Authority were merged in several

steps beginning in 1997 to create the Australian Com-

munications and Media Authority.

• Canada – The Canadian Telecommunications Policy

Review Panel Report recommended that Industry

Canada transfer its spectrum regulatory functions to

the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunica-

tions Commission (CRTC).

• Germany – Regulation of spectrum is combined with

regulation of telecommunications (and of other infra-

structures), but separate from regulation of broadcast-

ing.

• United Kingdom – The government set up such a com-

bined regulator, the Office of Communications

(Ofcom), which regulates wireline and wireless broad-

cas-ting, telecommunications, and spectrum usage.

It can be debated whether the duties of such an inde-

pendent spectrum regulator should be combined with those

of regulating competition and protecting consumers in

downstream service markets.

Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2008

Chapter 5 95

Box 5.1: General principles for successful “commons” management

1. Clearly defined boundaries – the rights to withdraw resources as well as boundaries need to be carefully and clearly

defined.

2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions.

3. Collective-choice agreements – those affected can influence rule changes.

4. Monitoring – active ongoing monitoring of conditions and behaviour.

5. Graduated sanctions – sanctions by users and officials for violating operational rules.

6. Conflict resolution mechanisms – rapid access to low-cost arenas for resolving disputes.

7. Minimal recognition of the rights to organize – governments accept users’ rights to devise their own governance insti-

tutions.

8. For larger systems including a “commons” use multiple layers for 1-7 above.

Source: Ofcom, 1990.

5.5 Best practices – International trends

This section identifies some best practices that have

been pioneered in new spectrum management techniques.

5.5.1 Defining best practices

This subsection describes best practices of reformed

spectrum management that incorporate a greater reliance

on spectrum-sharing techniques. It evaluates the different

routes that can be taken to develop more flexible systems

that permit a more efficient use of radio spectrum. The fol-

lowing section then provides country examples of how

these best practices have been applied.

5.5.1.1 Spectrum user rights

When existing licences become tradable and are

shifted to new uses, rights should be established among all

parties. This will avoid conflicts over rights and will per-

mit parties to renegotiate those rights when circumstances

change. The discussion of spectrum user rights is a very

detailed topic dealing with questions such as:

• Easements for new technologies and whether to allow

them;30

• Whether vacant spectrum should be placed in the mar-

ket place (subject to international agreements);

• Fall-back or insurance policies such as compulsory

purchase of spectrum when there are hold-out owners

of spectrum; and

• Spectrum licensees – should users pay a perpetual an-

nual charge, or will these charges discourage efficient

trading.

Discussion of these topics and answers to these ques-

tions are beyond the scope of this discussion paper.

5.5.1.2 Licence databases

The ability of potential sellers and buyers (and regula-

tors) to keep track of the status of licences is an important

component of tradable markets. Status-checking can be fa-

cilitated by a publicly available database. Knowledge of

the location of any existing Tx or Rx (where feasible) will

allow potential purchasers of rights to accurately model the

existing interference environment they are seeking to enter

and to properly assess the rights they seek to acquire. The

information also should enable regulators to adjudicate

spectrum disputes and to track and assess the usage of

spectrum in differing bands. Finally, the database should

include additional tools to analyse data on historical occu-

pancy of spectrum and to interpret alternative propagation

models.

In the United States, Cantor Fitzgerald, the Wall Street

brokerage firm, operates a spectrum auction and trading

system, providing an example of the capabilities that are

needed.31 Cantor Spectrum & Tower Exchange provides a

transparent forum for both primary (auction) and secon-

dary (post-auction) spectrum transactions in both public

and private marketplaces.

• Sellers/lessors can review FCC licensee information

obtained by the exchange and see a snapshot in real-

time.

• Qualified licence sellers, leaseholders or public sector

entities can offer radio-frequency spectrum and digital

subchannel capacity in a multidimensional format

showing coverage area, population, frequency range,

radio service rules, terms and conditions, channel

spacing, time slots, and other factors.

• Buyers and leaseholders can search for specific assets

(or receive electronic notification), and can easily

evaluate and bid on them.

This type of system helps facilitate the critical match-

ing function on which liquid markets depend.

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96 Chapter 5

5.5.1.3 Dispute resolution

With the arrival of the “spectrum commons” and in-

creased sharing of spectrum through transfers and trades,

effective dispute-resolution mechanisms will have to

evolve. There are two trends at work: (1) rapid changes in

the telecommunication sector, and (2) changes in the realm

of dispute resolution procedures themselves.

The expansion of the global telecommunication market,

with its emphasis on innovative and fast-changing technol-

ogy, may need to be accompanied by dispute resolution

procedures which are fast and flexible – and suited to the

types of disputes the industry will produce. In turn, the

dispute resolution field is increasingly offering new models

that may be useful to the telecommunication sector’s new

needs.

Traditionally, regulators decide between the positions

of disputing parties, typically after a formal process that

involves written arguments and hearings. There is now,

however, a trend towards more flexible and consensual

methods, known collectively as alternative dispute resolu-

tion (ADR). The new methods emphasize negotiation and

arbitration. Most telecommunication licences include guar-

antees of access to arbitration. Even so, it is helpful to de-

velop guidelines for managing ADR processes. A good

example are the guidelines issued by Ofcom governing

ADR between telecommunication operators and the public.

Those guidelines call for dispute resolution to be:

• Independent and impartial;

• Transparent, providing regular communication to the

public throughout the process;

• Effective (Ofcom expects disputes to be resolved in

less than six weeks);

• Able to properly investigate disputes and make awards

of appropriate compensation.

In New Zealand, the devolution of interference man-

agement has been taken one step further. Under its frame-

work of tradable “management rights”, a management-

right owner essentially assumes the role of a regulator in

setting boundary conditions for the “licensees” that use its

band. Essentially, the rights owner becomes its own band

manager or spectrum landlord.

This approach effectively reduces the interference

management burden on the actual regulator. Nevertheless,

in at least one case, the regulator had to intervene signifi-

cantly. This occurred when management rights for cellular

bands around 900 MHz allowed the operation of AMPS

and GSM systems in adjacent bands. Interference problems

resulted, and the regulator was forced to intervene by re-

leasing spare spectrum to act as a guard band.

5.5.2 Country examples

The following country examples reflect many of the

best practices described in the preceding section. Some of

them feature practices for spectrum trading and “spectrum

commons” management. Given the recent focus at the in-

ternational level on identifying BWA bands, this section

also looks at the experiences of several countries where

BWA is being implemented.

5.5.2.1 Mauritius – Broadband wireless access

In early 2005, with spectrum pollution occurring in the

2.4 GHz band, the Information and Communication Tech-

nologies Authority (ICTA) in Mauritius conducted a public

consultation to receive input on proposed BWA frequency

band allocations, technical characteristics and regulatory

requirements. ICTA issued its decisions within three

months, opening the 2.5 GHz band for mobile and nomadic

BWA (IMT-2000) applications by 2010. It also allocated

the 3.5 GHz band immediately for fixed BWA, and the

5.1-5.3 GHz band for low-power, in-building applications.

In 2006, ICTA subsequently opened the 5.4 GHz and

5.8 GHz bands to BWA. Band plans and technical rules

were established, limiting allowable power levels and pre-

scribing separation and channelization. As of 2007, there

were two licensees providing IMT-2000 and WiMAX ser-

vices on a national basis.

5.5.2.2 Brazil – Broadband wireless access

In January 2008, ANATEL in Brazil issued four li-

cences per licensed area for 3G wireless deployment

throughout the whole country. Coverage obligations for all

licensed operators will lead to the whole Brazilian territory

being covered – perhaps eight years after the licences have

been issued (see Chapter 4). Spectrum-sharing arrange-

ments must be authorized by ANATEL. The rules govern-

ing the 3G auction in Brazil refer expressly to spectrum

sharing as a means of providing coverage in rural and re-

mote areas (i.e. municipalities with less than 30 000 inhabi-

tants).

ANATEL has issued several licences for WiMAX in

the 2.6 GHz band and five licences in the 3.5 GHz band. A

new auction for additional 3.5 GHz spectrum is planned

for 2008. Some of the licensees have already started au-

thorized trials.

5.5.2.3 New Zealand – Spectrum trading and

“spectrum commons”

The pioneering Radiocommunications Act 1989 radi-

cally changed the landscape of spectrum management.

New Zealand was the first country to redefine spectrum in

terms of property rights and to assign those rights in a trad-

able form. New Zealand also pioneered the application of

Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2008

Chapter 5 97

competitive assignments based on auctions for radio spec-

trum, with the first auction held in 1989.

There are three licensing systems that apply to spec-

trum in New Zealand:

• The Management Rights Regime (MRR) (applicable to

spectrum used primarily for commercial purposes);

• The Radio Licence Regime (RLR), earlier known as

“apparatus licensing”, (an administrative assignment

process that applies to spectrum used for applications

in the public interest); and

• General User Licences for low-powered devices such

as garage door openers and Wi-Fi.

5.5.2.4 Guatemala and El Salvador – Spectrum

trading

Guatemala and El Salvador decided in 1996/97 to

adopt simple but effective spectrum market reforms that, in

the case of non-public-sector spectrum, gave private par-

ties exclusive control over use of bandwidth and confined

the regulator to defining, issuing and protecting spectrum

rights. This account focuses on Guatemala; the regime in

El Salvador is similar but less well documented.32

The so-called títulos de usufructo de frecuencias

(TUFs) created licences that could be leased, sold, subdi-

vided or aggregated at will. Lasting for 15 years, and re-

newable on request, they are virtually private property.

Regulation is restricted to setting aside bands for use by

the State and adjudicating interference disputes that cannot

be resolved by mediation. The actual TUF is a paper cer-

tificate listing the frequency band, hours of operation,

maximum transmitted power, maximum power emitted at

the border, geographic coverage and duration of right.

5.5.2.5 United States – Flexible spectrum use and

broadband wireless access

The United States has been a leader in spectrum liber-

alization, particularly with regard to non-government spec-

trum. Government spectrum continues to be managed in a

more traditional manner. A 2003 Presidential Spectrum

Policy Initiative proposed to give the FCC permanent au-

thority to assign licences via auction. It also urged policy-

makers to explore possible incentives, including expanded

user fees, to induce more efficient spectrum usage.

The United States has also moved progressively in the

direction of flexible use of spectrum, in conjunction with

generally liberalized practices. The Communications Act

of 1934, as amended, specifically authorizes the FCC to

permit flexible use where:

• It is consistent with international agreements to which

the United States is a party;

• The Commission finds, after notice and an opportunity

for public comment, that such an allocation would be

in the public interest;

• Such use would not deter investment in communica-

tions services and systems, or technology development;

and

• Such use would not result in harmful interference

among users.33

The FCC’s Spectrum Policy Task Force in 2002 advo-

cated:

• Increased reliance on both the exclusive use and the

“commons” models, and reduced use of traditional al-

location mechanisms;

• Maximum feasible flexibility for licensees, limited

only by interference concerns;

• Increased use of spectrum trading, including the ability

to lease spectrum on an overlay or underlay basis.

An example of spectrum sharing in the United States is

the deployment of UMTS/HSPDA services. UMTS opera-

tors wanting to implement a European-style 2100/

1900 MHz system needed to share spectrum with existing

2G services in the 1900 MHz band. The 2100 MHz band

was unavailable because it has been allocated for satellite

communications. Some of the 2100 MHz range was subse-

quently freed up for 3G services, together with some of the

1700 MHz band (for the uplink).

UMTS/HSPDA service in the United States was

launched by the end of 2004 strictly using the existing

1900 MHz spectrum allocated for 2G PCS services. In

some cities, a UMTS network using 850 MHz to enhance

existing 1900 MHz UMTS network was rolled out, using

dual-band phones. Spectrum sharing was achieved through

the use of dual-band network elements, and filters, along

with a channel plan providing for minimal carrier spacing

on a site-by-site basis.

5.5.2.6 United Kingdom – Flexible user rights and

spectrum trading

Ofcom is currently shifting UK spectrum policy to-

wards a flexible system of spectrum management. It is lib-

eralizing spectrum usage rights and spectrum trading. A

gradual approach is being adopted, embracing progres-

sively more bands and greater flexibility but relying on

competitive assignment methods. This progression is ex-

emplified by Ofcom’s intention to apply service and tech-

nological neutrality in a forthcoming spectrum assignment

involving frequencies currently used to support terrestrial

analogue TV broadcasting. Ofcom also is proposing spec-

trum user rights in a forthcoming auction of the L band,

and in other auctions.

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98 Chapter 5

The UK has also adopted a policy of extending market

methods of spectrum management to public sector spec-

trum, giving public sector users the right to trade or lease

their spectrum and the obligation to go into the market-

place to acquire additional spectrum. Ofcom is also extend-

ing the application of administrative incentive pricing (AIP)

to government agencies, requiring them to pay commercial

prices for their existing spectrum, as set by regulators.34

5.5.2.7 Europe – Flexible user rights and

spectrum trading

The European Union (EU) does not manage radio

spectrum. Instead, the Member States supervise its man-

agement at the national level and in international coordina-

tion. Spectrum management is, however, influenced

significantly and increasingly by European legislation

aimed at facilitating harmonization of regulation and pro-

moting competition through the liberalization of markets.

The key legislation is contained in a number of directives

and decisions passed in 2002.

The Radio Spectrum Decision35 laid the foundation for

a general EU radio spectrum policy and is binding on all

Member States. The objective of the Radio Spectrum Deci-

sion is to ensure coordination of radio spectrum policy ap-

proaches by facilitating harmonized conditions for the

availability and efficient use of radio spectrum. The Deci-

sion encourages the European Commission to organize

consultations, taking into account the views of Member

States and all other stakeholders. To facilitate more effec-

tive consultations, the Radio Spectrum Policy Group

(RSPG) was established by separate decision.36

The RSPG launched a consultation on secondary trad-

ing of spectrum in February 2004, following a 2003 re-

quest from the EC. In November 2004, the RSPG

published its opinion on secondary trading.37 RSPG has

adopted a cautious stance with regard to spectrum trading,

considering it to “be beneficial in certain parts of the spec-

trum” and that “European administrations should introduce

secondary trading with due care”. The EU now proposes

that one-third of the spectrum below 3 GHz could have

flexible usage rights and be tradable by 2010.38

RSPG is elaborating on the concept of Wireless Access

Policy for Electronic Communications Services (WAPECS)

to move away from too narrowly specified allocations and

applications, for which specific spectrum is designated.

5.5.2.8 Canada – Technology neutrality and

broadband wireless access

Access to spectrum is gained through one of four

forms of authorization:

1) Apparatus licences,

2) Spectrum licences,

3) Broadcasting certificates, and

4) Radio operator certificates.

The two main types of licences are apparatus and spec-

trum licences. Spectrum licences represent a more market-

oriented form of licensing in what is really a mixed mar-

ket/administrative system. They authorize the operation of

(non-specified) devices within a defined geography. The

geography is to be defined by bandwidth, geographic area

and time. Licensees are free to use any type of equipment

for any purpose, although they are subject to licence condi-

tions and technical frameworks designed to minimize the

risk of interference with other spectrum users. Spectrum

licences are transferable and can be divided and aggregated.

They are issued for periods of up to 10 years and are gen-

erally renewable.

5.6 Implementing spectrum sharing

Success in implementing spectrum sharing requires

both vision and a commitment to move from current tradi-

tional allocation and assignment practices to ones that

promote greater efficiency. Spectrum policies should ad-

dress incentives for innovation, promote flexibility, estab-

lish spectrum users’ rights and determine practical methods

for compliance monitoring, interference management, and

dispute resolution. These factors apply whether spectrum is

used in the “spectrum commons” or shared by some other

means.

An additional step could be to follow the path being

used by the FCC and the United States. Commerce De-

partment to create a spectrum sharing “test-bed” for study-

ing emerging radio systems such as SDR and techniques

such as DSA.39

5.6.1 Practical steps for implementing spectrum sharing

The next few paragraphs outline practical steps spec-

trum managers can take to implement spectrum sharing.

5.6.1.1 Planning

Spectrum managers can analyse current and future

spectrum uses to determine which bands would be suitable

for spectrum-sharing approaches. They should also study

when and how sharing should be implemented in those

bands. Planning will involve consultation with various

stakeholders and industry forums. At a minimum, careful

review and understanding of recent WRC decisions and

actions by leading countries will be both helpful and nec-

essary. A chief concern will be ensuring that sufficient

spectrum is available to satisfy demand and for proper

market functioning. As discussed earlier, the extent to

which spectrum is allocated for commercial or exclusive

government use has an important bearing on improved ac-

Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2008

Chapter 5 99

cess. Processes to review and understand government re-

quirements and to shift spectrum away from exclusive use

require both time and negotiation.

5.6.1.2 Assessing demand and scarcity

Market-based methods work best when demand is suf-

ficient and rules and rights are clear. For developing coun-

tries, the absence of any scarcity or emerging demand for

services might hold up the introduction of spectrum-

sharing policies and assignment practices. The difficult

question to answer is what impact this might have on in-

vestment and productivity in markets for spectrum-

dependent services. Policy-makers cannot ignore the need

to create attractive markets for investors, who can deploy

or utilize advanced services and technologies.

5.6.1.3 Valuing spectrum and compensation of

public sector users

Spectrum should reflect its opportunity cost, which is

best determined by market methods. Administrative meth-

ods for establishing near-market prices, such as the use of

administrative incentive prices, should be considered. All

users, including government users, should reflect spectrum

values in investment decisions. Decisions will be required

to determine whether special markets exist for public sec-

tor users, and whether those users should be compensated

to facilitate better access and sharing.

The use of service-neutral and technology-neutral li-

cences will facilitate spectrum sharing and improve flexi-

bility, while ensuring that users’ rights are protected.

Meanwhile, interference management remains an impor-

tant area of further study, especially as enabling radio

technologies such as SDR evolve.

5.6.1.4 Monopolization of the market

In theory, market approaches could lead to the mo-

nopolization of the spectrum supply for downstream ser-

vices. A single operator could corner all the spectrum

needed to produce those services. If no other competing or

substitute technologies or services were available, a spec-

trum market could then easily generate worse results than

an administrative system that was regulated to produce

competition. But is spectrum monopolization likely?

That depends upon the degree of flexibility the regula-

tor allows the market to exhibit. If there are no prior allo-

cation restrictions (limiting certain services to certain

bands), and if the arena in which the market operates is ex-

tensive, building a spectrum monopoly leading to domi-

nance in downstream markets is not likely to succeed. For

major services such as mobile voice or data, or mobile

broadcasting, the required spectrum holdings would be

very large. The danger does increase either if there are al-

location restrictions or if the scope of the market is small

(and other barriers to entry are high).

If competition law is considered to be inadequate to

prevent spectrum hoarding, special procedures can be put

into place to limit the acquisition of spectrum licences.

Regulators can require prior approval of licence transfers,

and they can establish merger-control procedures that give

them a chance to screen proposed concentrations of spec-

trum for their potential market impact.

Finally, spectrum regulators can construct auction

rules for the release of new spectrum in ways that promote

competition. For example, 700 MHz auctions in Canada

were designed to promote competition by setting aside

spectrum for new market entrants.

5.6.1.5 Market liquidity

Another key requirement for an effective market is

sufficient liquidity (i.e. volume of trades) to provide par-

ticipants with a reliable method of transacting. Financial

markets without liquidity notoriously exhibit high spreads

or differences between the buy and sell price, to compen-

sate the intermediary for the cost of holding stock. Interna-

tional experience in spectrum trading underlines the

following characteristics of spectrum markets:

• There are few, if any, signs of intermediaries being ac-

tive in the market;

• There are no signs of speculators entering the market;

• Several countries have exhibited significant levels of

trade (Guatemala and El Salvador), or high-magnitude

trades (i.e. a value of USD 100 000 000 or more), in-

cluding the United States;

• In Australia and New Zealand, levels of trade have

been fairly low (roughly equal to the turnover of

commercial property), reflecting an orderly turnover in

spectrum trading;

• In the United Kingdom, trades in the limited bands

available have been infrequent, and the number of

traded bands has been small. But the regulator is in the

middle of a large programme of spectrum assignments,

which may provide an alternative source of spectrum.

Liquidity of spectrum markets remains a real issue,

and the design of liberalization measures should be in the

foreground.

5.6.2 Practical steps

5.6.2.1 The role of the regulator

In exercising their primary responsibilities related to

spectrum management goals and objectives, regulators

should decide on an appropriate balance and mix of admin-

istrative and market-based spectrum management tech-

Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2008

100 Chapter 5

niques. It is primarily a matter of determining which meth-

ods will ensure spectrum access and interference protection

in any given band. The current balance in most countries

tilts toward administrative approaches, and regulators

should be encouraged to examine potential market-based

methods that could promote greater efficiency and ease

regulatory burdens. The practical steps involved in this

shift toward market approaches include:

• Enacting spectrum legislation and regulation to expand

the regulatory agency’s ability to employ flexibility of

use, technology neutrality, and sharing.

• Creating the necessary mechanisms, tools, and proc-

esses to capture and include the needs and expertise of

current and future spectrum users.

These may seem like obvious steps to take. But mak-

ing the decision to increase access and improve sharing

requires a very strong commitment by the regulator to cre-

ate change. There must also be a plan to include stake-

holders and users as integral partners in the process. When

the commitment to change and inclusion is lacking, the

process often sputters to a stalemate.

Advocating the use of innovative technologies is also a

key role of regulators. Providing the means to test and trial

new technologies by making spectrum available and

through test licences are two very practical steps that can

be taken. ComReg in Ireland has indicated that it is keen to

encourage innovative developments and more efficient

ways to use spectrum through its test and trial licence

scheme.40

5.6.2.2 Band allocation strategies

Regulators’ ability to allocate spectrum for various

uses is a powerful tool. Eliminating restrictions on uses

and users can improve access, but knowing how to go

about this requires information and some measure of con-

sensus. Regulators can:

• Acquire the information needed to assess users and

utilization through spectrum audits;

• Consult with current and prospective users;

• Clear zones of spectrum through incentives and ad-

justments like re-farming;

• Examine ways to license underutilized spectrum to in-

crease use and sharing;

• Reinforce technical standards application and compli-

ance, to ensure interference is managed and manage-

able; and

• Utilize band managers where demand has been pooled

and where trading can now take place.

Channelling plans compact spectrum assignments and

increase the number of occupants through techniques such

as re-use. This can be critical to easing problems of con-

gestion and potential interference.

5.7 Spectrum decisions at WRC-07

The need to identify sufficient spectrum availability

for current and future generations of BWA systems proved

to be the dominant issue at the ITU World Radiocommuni-

cation Conference (WRC) held from October 22 to No-

vember 16, 2007 (WRC-07). Several WRC agenda items

touched upon issues relating to BWA, but most of the work

focused on Agenda Item 1.4 – a catch-all agenda item that

proved to be the most contentious of the Conference. In the

end, the WRC agreed upon a mix of new allocations and

identifications in bands below 4 gigahertz:

• 450-470 MHz (global);

• 698-806/862 MHz (with some countries identifying

only 790-862 MHz);

• 2300-2400 MHz (global); and

• 3400-3600 MHz (through opt-in provisions in new

footnotes to the Radio Regulations).

What is apparent following WRC-07 is that these

bands may well become laboratories for spectrum-sharing

technologies and techniques. As this section will reveal,

these bands are already heavily used for other services. In-

deed, this phase of licensing and development of BWA

may well be remembered for the efforts required to limit or

mitigate interference to and from incumbent services.

5.7.1 The IMT candidate bands

As a result of the final Conference Preparatory Meet-

ing, held in Geneva during February 2007, the Conference

had teed up the following new spectrum bands for consid-

eration:

• 410-430 MHz

• 450-470 MHz

• 470-960 MHz

• 2300-2400 MHz

• 2700-2900 MHz

• 3400-4200 MHz

• 4400-4990 MHz

With the seemingly large range of bands from which

to choose, there was no consensus going into the confer-

ence on which band(s) would be most appropriate for IMT.

The problem was that each of the bands was already heav-

ily constrained with other uses. Because of previous diver-

gence in uses globally, each of the regional groups – e.g.,

CEPT (Europe), CITEL (Americas), APT (Asia-Pacific),

ATU (Africa), RCC (the former USSR republics) and the

Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2008

Chapter 5 101

ASMG (Arab countries) – had a slate of different candidate

bands they favoured and opposed. This was also some-

times true within the regional groups. As the Conference

was about to find out, the slates did not match up.

As the Conference got under way, it became apparent

that certain of the bands would not be practical because of

a combination of lack of positive support and/or over-

whelming opposition. As a result, Working Group 4A (a

subcommittee of WRC-07 Committee 4, which considered

Agenda Item 1.4), agreed that three of the bands lacked

sufficient support to go forward in the identification pro-

cess. These were the following:

410-430 MHz – Most regional groups opposed the

identification of this band because of its existing uses,

which included everything from space mission communi-

cations to public mobile radio (PMR) and public access

mobile radio (PAMR).

2700-2900 MHz – This band already was allocated, in

all three Regions, for aeronautical radionavigation and

ground-based meteorological radars. Aeronautical ra-

dionavigation is classified as a safety-of-life service, and

ITU-R studies showed that sharing the band with IMT sys-

tems was not feasible.

4400-4990 MHz – In North America and Europe, this

band was already extensively used for fixed and mobile

services, and segments of the band were also used for fixed

satellite service and public protection and disaster relief

(PPDR) applications. Japan maintained its support for

identification of this band in the face of both opposition

and lack of interest in much of the rest of the world. In the

end, although Japan reserved its right to reintroduce the

band in Committee 4 or the plenary, it was never able to

garner sufficient support from other administrations.

5.7.2 Bands negotiated at WRC-07

As a result, Committee 4 eliminated these three bands

from consideration as IMT bands. That left four remaining

bands to be considered for identification for terrestrial IMT:

450-470 MHz, 470-960 MHz, 2300-2400 MHz, and 3400-

4200 MHz. In practice, however, proposals regarding the

470-960 MHz band centred on the heart of the UHF band:

698-806/862 MHz.41

Ultimately, the negotiation at WRC-07 came down to

a decision on reconciling two highly contested bands: the

698-806/862 MHz or “UHF band”, and the 3400-

4200 MHz or “C-band”. In a situation with no clear fa-

vourite prior to the Conference, these two bands drew dia-

metrically opposite support; that is, administrations tended

to favour one and oppose the other, for reasons that will be

explored in the following subsections.

5.7.2.1 The UHF band

The issue of whether to identify all or part of the 698-

806/862 MHz band cannot be understood without under-

standing the costs and opportunities inherent in the so-

called “digital dividend”. For decades this band has been

allocated globally (and accepted almost universally) as

broadcasting spectrum and used for analogue television.

The advent of digital television (“DTV”), however, created

a new possibility to broadcast more channels over the same

amount of spectrum. Thus, the conversion, over time, to

digital broadcasting transmission could allow the consoli-

dation of spectrum usage, freeing up “excess” spectrum for

other uses. This was to be the dividend: efficiency from

digital transmission would allow governments to benefit

the public by redirecting the use of this newly recovered

spectrum.

Figure 5.6: ITU Regions

Source: ITU.

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102 Chapter 5

At a certain juncture, however, it appears that national

and regional approaches to leveraging the digital dividend

diverged onto different paths. There are at least two rea-

sons for this divergence:

• Different countries varied in the speed at which they

planned to complete the transition to DTV broadcast-

ing, and

• Governments were divided over how to re-allocate the

dividend, with some seeking to retain it for expanded

broadcasting and others seeking to make it available

for BWA systems.

Essentially, administrations with conservative transi-

tion timelines were sceptical of identifying the UHF band

for BWA systems. The opponents of identification argued

that it was premature to identify the band, since many

countries were still using it for broadcasting and would

continue to do so for at least the next eight years. They

cited the output of ITU Regional Radiocommunication

Conference 2006 (RRC-06) held in Geneva the previous

year – known as the “GE-06” Agreement. This agreement

did not call for completing the DTV transition until

17 June 2015 in parts of Region 1 (see RR No.5.2) situated

to the west of meridian 170° E and to the north of parallel

40° S, except the territory of Mongolia, and in the Islamic

Republic of Iran (all together 120 countries). Moreover,

the GE-06 Agreement allowed for the band (also known as

“Bands IV-V”) to continue as a digital broadcasting band –

including for mobile broadcasting – using standards such

as DVB-T (Digital Video Broadcasting – Terrestrial) and

DVB-H (Digital Video Broadcasting – Handheld). So it

appears that the platforms driving continued use of the

UHF band in Europe grew out of the broadcasting model,

as embraced in the GE-06 Agreement.

By contrast, countries outside the RRC-06 planning

area appeared more likely to promote or at least acquiesce

in the use of part of the UHF band for IMT systems. The

proponents of IMT identification for the digital dividend

took a position that countries could complete the DTV

transition at their own pace; the IMT designation would be

waiting for them whenever they could make use of it.42

Moreover, they argued that the frequencies in the 700 MHz

band were intrinsically ideal for mobile services, because

of their range, ability to penetrate into buildings and gen-

eral propagation capabilities. The high quality of the spec-

trum could translate into lower costs for network

infrastructure, they argued.

The output agreement reached at WRC-07 was essen-

tially a compromise that, however, did provide a global

identification in the UHF range – albeit with regional dif-

ferences in the size of the band and the timing of imple-

mentation. More specifically:

• In Region 1 (Europe, Africa and part of Asia), the 790-

862 MHz band was identified for IMT, but only after

17 June 2015 – and subject to conformity with the GE-

06 Agreement;

• In Region 2 (the Americas), the 698-862 MHz band

was identified for IMT systems with a co-primary al-

location, except that in Brazil the 698-806 MHz band

will be allocated to mobile service on a secondary ba-

sis;

• In Region 3 (Asia-Pacific), several nations, including

China, India, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore,

opted to identify the 698-790 MHz band, in addition to

the 790-862 MHz band, which was accepted by all

countries in the region43.

The net result was that, after 17 June 2015, there

would be a global identification of the 790-862 MHz band

for IMT. In addition, major portions of the world – includ-

ing the Americas and the most populous nations of Asia –

identified a larger band (698-862 GHz). With the notable

exception of China, those countries will implement the

identification without the eight-year delay.

Table 5.2: Review of Actions in WRC-07 Agenda Item 1.4

Band Region 1 Region 2 Region 3

450-470 MHz IMT identified IMT identified44

IMT identified

UHF Band 790-862 MHz

Effective 2015

698-862 MHz

Effective now

698-862 MHz or

790-862 MHz, depending on country

2300-2400 MHz IMT identified IMT identified45

IMT identified

C-band 3400-3600 MHz

Opt-in by footnote

3400-3500 MHz

Opt-in to primary allocation

by footnote

3400-3600 MHz

Opt-in by footnote

Source: ITU.

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Chapter 5 103

5.7.2.2 The C-band

The 3400-4200 MHz band had been traditionally a

band shared among fixed and fixed satellite services, on a

co-primary basis, with mobile, amateur and radiolocation

allocations in some sub-bands and regions. In addition,

many countries already had turned to the lower portions of

the band (3400-3700 MHz) to begin licensing fixed

WiMAX networks.

The C-band became the primary focus of administra-

tions that opposed identifying the UHF band – particularly

in Western Europe (CEPT) and East Asia (e.g., Japan and

Republic of Korea). The large block of contiguous spec-

trum was attractive, despite the presence of satellite

downlinks in the band. The satellite industry, however, op-

posed what it viewed as an incursion into vital FSS spec-

trum, citing concern about the ability to prevent or mitigate

interference with a wave of ubiquitous mobile devices. The

satellite industry’s mantra entering the Conference was

“No Change” to the C-band, a position that was echoed by

the United States and several other administrations con-

cerned about the potential effects on incumbents.

As the Conference went on, the debate in Agenda Item

1.4 pitted the proponents of the UHF band against propo-

nents of the C-band – with very little yielding in the posi-

tions on either side.

Ultimately, in the final hours of the Conference, the

same agreement that yielded a compromise on the 698-

806/862 MHz (UHF) band also provided a result on 3400-

4200 MHz (the C-band). There would be no change to the

majority of the C-band, from 3600-4200 MHz. With regard

to the remaining, lower portion (3400-3600 MHz), the re-

sult was fractured along regional lines once again:

• Region 1 – Nearly 90 countries opted in, through a

footnote to the Table of Allocations in the Radio

Regulations, to a mobile allocation and IMT identifica-

tion for the 3400-3600 MHz band46.

• Region 2 – There was no identification for IMT, but a

footnote was added to allow certain countries to “opt-

in” to a primary mobile allocation (with no IMT iden-

tification) in the 3400-3500 MHz band.

• Region 3 – Several of the most populous countries, in-

cluding China, Japan and Pakistan, opted in to a mo-

bile allocation and/or IMT identification in either the

3400-3500 MHz band or the 3500-3600 MHz band –

and in several cases, both.

Where countries opted in to IMT identifications, the

footnotes stipulated that those countries follow required

agreement or coordination procedures.47 In addition, the

Conference added interference safeguards in the form of

power flux density (PFD) limits on the IMT systems.

While there was no global identification, the “opt-ins” al-

lowed many countries to signal their intent to move for-

ward with IMT systems in the lower portion of the

C-band.

5.7.2.3 The remaining bands

The 450-470 MHz and 2300-2400 MHz bands were

not as contentious as the UHF and C-bands, although sup-

port for identifying them was not universal. In the final

agreement, both bands were identified globally, with pro-

visions added to protect incumbents from interference.48

5.7.3 Implications for administrations

The results of four long weeks – culminating in a

marathon all-night session – in Geneva during the autumn

of 2007 will be felt into the next decade. The bottom line is

that national regulators were given multiple options for

adding spectrum to the total amount that could be deployed

for terrestrial IMT systems – current and future. In addition,

ITU laid the groundwork for further development of IMT-

advanced systems, along the lines of mobile WiMAX,

Long-Term Evolution (LTE) and ultra-mobile broadband

(UMB) technologies.

The results of WRC-07 reflect the realities of regional

divergence in allocations, as well as the constraints on

spectrum usage posed by the need to share spectrum.

5.7.3.1 Spectrum-sharing challenges

One of the most important factors in determining

which bands are used for future IMT services is the situa-

tion regarding spectrum sharing in each band. Both the

UHF and C-bands pose real challenges for the advent of

ubiquitous IMT devices – but serious opportunities for

spectrum sharing.

Broadcasting

The transition to DTV is well under way in some

countries, but in many others, it has barely begun. The

RRC-06 agreement reflected the reality that, in many coun-

tries, it will take years to convert the UHF band from an

analogue broadcasting band into a home for digital media.

Even then, it is not clear that all countries would prefer to

follow the lead of the United States in reclaiming spectrum

from broadcasters and auctioning it to new licensees that

would build IMT systems.49

One of the primary arguments against identifying the

UHF band during WRC-07 was the issue of potential shar-

ing between IMT and broadcasting systems in the band.

This issue was not resolved to the satisfaction of those ad-

ministrations that had opposed identification. So the UHF

sharing issues will carry over into the next WRC, as the

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104 Chapter 5

WRC-07 delegates approved an agenda item (1.17) for

WRC-11 with the following language:

“To consider the results of sharing studies between the mo-

bile service and other services in the band 790-862 MHz in

Regions 1 and 3, in accordance with Resolution 749 (WRC-

07), to ensure the adequate protection of services to which

this frequency band is allocated, and take appropriate

action.”

This could be a wedge issue for some administrations

to reopen the entire question of identification of the UHF

band. That effort may come too late, however, because the

United States is currently scheduled to complete the DTV

transition in February 2009, shutting off over-the-air ana-

logue broadcasts and paving the way for deployment of

new BWA systems by licensees from the January 2008

700 MHz band auction. For the United States, the sharing

issue has been avoided by essentially moving the broad-

casters and giving the freed spectrum to their IMT succes-

sors.

Satellite systems

In addition to broadcasting, there remain sharing issues

with regard to the compatibility of terrestrial BWA sys-

tems with satellite systems. WRC-07 dealt with one such

issue, relating to BWA systems (WiMAX, in particular)

and future satellite systems in the 2 gigahertz range. The

2500-2690 MHz band had been identified for broadband

wireless access systems (IMT-2000 and WiMAX) by pre-

vious WRCs. Some countries (e.g. the United States) had

already licensed the band to companies planning to offer

terrestrial services. However, the band also was allocated

internationally for sharing with fixed satellite service (FSS),

mobile satellite service (MSS) and broadcasting satellite

service (BSS). By WRC-03, there was a growing recogni-

tion of the potential incompatibility between use of the

band for BWA systems and use for satellite systems – par-

ticularly MSS. Several countries – many of them in Asia –

were preparing to launch satellites in this band, raising

fears of interference that could compromise the ground-

based systems.

In Agenda Item 1.9, WRC-07 considered proposals to

establish regulatory limits on the future satellite systems in

order to protect terrestrial systems from over-the-horizon

interference – but without unduly hampering the satellite

systems. The conference adopted limits on future satellite

systems designed to avoid interference.50

Another potential sharing problem arose with propos-

als to identify the C-band for IMT. Initially, many propos-

als included the entire band, from 3400 to 4200 MHz. This

would have posed sharing issues for the communications

satellite systems that employ the C-band. The final agree-

ment at WRC-07 left most of the larger band untouched,

but allowed “opt-in” use of the 3.4-3.6 GHz band, which is

commonly known in the industry as the “extended

C-band.”

The industry now faces a somewhat confused situation,

in which some of its operators, in some countries, may be

subject to interference in the lower C-band frequencies.

The footnotes that enable “opt in” access to the band do

require mutual agreement between administrations in some

circumstances. Meanwhile, the footnotes also spell out

power flux density limits that the terrestrial IMT systems

must comply with in order to protect the satellite incum-

bents.

As countries implement the IMT provisions of WRC-

07 over the next four years, the broadcasting and satellite

industries will seek to work with governments to ensure

that they are not overwhelmed by future BWA system de-

ployments. Meanwhile, administrations and Sector Mem-

bers alike will begin preparing for WRC-11. The next

section previews the relevant issues that could impact on

BWA systems four years from now.

5.7.3.2 Looking ahead

As the previous section indicated, WRC-07 did not

completely resolve the questions of spectrum sharing and

protection of incumbents in the IMT bands. Moreover, the

battle over the UHF band raised new questions regarding

convergence between mobile, fixed and broadcasting ser-

vices. Several of these compatibility and convergence

questions have been teed up for WRC-11, in the following

agenda items:

Agenda Item 1.2 – This item calls for studies pursuant

to Resolution 951, in which ITU noted the increasingly

blurred lines between terrestrial broadcasting, fixed and

mobile services – precisely the kind of blurring associated

with the digital dividend services in the UHF band. At pre-

sent, there appears to be little understanding of what the

agenda item would lead to – it is essentially open-ended –

but the language calls on WRC-11 to “take appropriate ac-

tion with a view to enhancing the international regulatory

framework.”

Agenda Item 1.17 – This item is an explicit follow-up

to WRC-07 Agenda Item 1.4; it calls for studies on sharing

between mobile services and other services (i.e. broadcast-

ing) in the upper UHF band (790-862 MHz) in Regions 1

and 3. Accepted at the insistence of countries opposed to

IMT identification in the band, the agenda item calls on

WRC-11 to “ensure the adequate protection of services to

which this frequency band is allocated, and [to] take ap-

propriate action.” Needless to say, this also ensures a revis-

iting of the UHF identification decision, particularly in

Region 1.

Agenda Item 1.19 – The 2011 conference will also take

up “regulatory measures and their relevance, in order to

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Chapter 5 105

enable the introduction of software-defined radio and cog-

nitive radio systems.” Meanwhile, ITU-R will be conduct-

ing studies, and discussions will proceed over the next four

years regarding how to begin “regulating” (or perhaps even

whether to begin regulating) the dynamic spectrum alloca-

tion (DSA) systems.

Until then, the focus shifts to the business world and to

the national governments that will implement the WRC-07

decisions. It looks certain to be a world of even greater

complexity in four years – not less.

5.8 Conclusion

Where the demand for radio spectrum is less than the

available supply – and where service innovation is steady

and predictable – the traditional spectrum management

model works reasonably well. But with penetration rates

exceeding 100 per cent in many countries, the demand for

spectrum is increasing and frequency bands (especially be-

low 3 GHz) are becoming more congested in densely

populated urban centres.

Increasingly, spectrum managers will have to resort to

new techniques and technologies to allow spectrum sharing.

In theory, all bands can be shared, using combinations of

administrative means (setting geographic separation buff-

ers and channelization plans) and technical solutions (SDR

and cognitive radio, as well as smart antennas). Power lim-

its and more robust receivers are also key factors.

Interference, however, cannot be eliminated and so

must be managed. Identifying interference management

models that support spectrum sharing under either adminis-

trative, market-based or spectrum commons approaches

will remain an ongoing requirement and challenge for

spectrum managers. Their goal is to develop an appropriate

regime that protects user rights and finds the right balance

for flexibility and innovation, along with service neutrality.

Finding that balance and structuring the appropriate re-

sponse continue to be debated. Spectrum managers and

regulators can successfully implement spectrum sharing by

combining vision, commitment and careful planning, alter-

ing their spectrum allocation and assignment policies to

permit greater flexibility and access to spectrum resources.