sites.hks. Web viewContemporary developments suggest many reasons for concern both about ... Donald Sears and C.L. Funk ... using the ‘d’ word but without

CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 5 5/5/2023 11:29 AM

Chapter 5

Critical citizens around the world

The previous chapter compared trends in public opinion in Western Europe and the United

States – all affluent post-industrial societies, long-standing liberal democracies, and stable states.

Instead of a tidal wave of growing political alienation, the evidence during the third wave era

demonstrates fluctuating orientations towards the nation-state, its agencies and its actors. Some

enduring contrasts in cultural attitudes persist for many decades, such as those distinguishing Norway

and Italy, Britain and France, or the Netherlands and Belgium, maintaining diversity among European

nations. Even in the United States – where the loudest alarm bells can be heard about a supposed rising

tide of political cynicism and voter anger – in fact American support for government has both risen and

fallen over time, and contrasting trends in public confidence are evident among the major branches of

the federal government. Subsequent chapters analyze whether the dynamic of systems support can be

best explained by the evolving social-psychology of citizens, shifting normative standards of public life,

problems of government performance, or the structure of winners and losers from political institutions.

Whatever the precise diagnosis and the appropriate cure, post-industrial societies in Western Europe

and the United States are all secure societies and wealthy economies, where the culture of liberal

democracy has deep-seated roots which has evolved over centuries. Lack of trust in government may

tie policy-makers hands.1 Deeply-unpopular governments or leaders may fall. Widespread

dissatisfaction can catalyze support for constitutional reform movements and public outcry for greater

transparency, monitoring, and accountability.2 At worst, contentious politics can fuel sporadic outbreaks

of violent street protest. The existence of multiple indicators of political disenchantment should raise

genuine concern about the workings of democratic governance. But the fundamental resilience and

institutional inertia of long-standing democratic states makes them highly unlikely to collapse due to

political disaffection or a major legitimacy crisis.

The same is not necessarily true elsewhere. This chapter expands the comparative framework to

examine contemporary indicators of systems support in a wide range of countries and conditions around

the world. The chapter first considers the theoretical reasons why support is thought to be particularly

important for democratic consolidation and government legitimacy in fragile states. We then compare

systems support using the indicators, conceptual framework, and regime typology already developed in

chapter 3. We lack cross-national evidence for approval of incumbent office-holders, such as the

popularity of particular party leaders or presidents, but we can compare several dimension, ranging

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from the specific to diffuse levels, including: (i) confidence in a range of public sector institutions; (ii)

evaluations of democratic performance; (iii) support for democratic values; (iv) the rejection of

autocratic forms of government; and also (v) citizens’ orientations towards the nation. Cross-national

comparisons are drawn mainly from the most recent wave of the World Values Survey (WVS),

conducted in 2005-7, covering a wide range of societies. The World Values Survey also contains time-

series survey data spanning twenty-five years, since the early-1980s, for a more restricted sub-set of

eleven nations. By examining trends over time, we can see whether there has been any persistent

erosion of system support in these cases. After looking at all these indicators, the next chapter explores

critical citizens in more depth, a syndrome understood as combining cognitive awareness of the

principles of liberal democracy with support for democratic values and yet simultaneously negative

evaluations of the actual performance of democracy.

The role of systems support in democratic consolidation

Theories of congruence suggest that systems support is likely to have consequences for

democratic consolidation, regime stability, and government legitimacy. Any impact is expected to be

particularly important in countries which have only recently experienced the transition from autocracy,

by holding multiparty elections, but which have not yet established the full panoply of institutions

associated with liberal democracy. 3 Many electoral democracies are in regions lacking historical

experience of this form of rule, as well as being found in low income economies, in post-conflict divided

societies, and in fragile states, all providing unfavorable soil for the seeds of democratization to flourish. 4

In particular, congruence theory predicts that regimes will prove most politically stable where they

reflect the mass culture. Hence democratic regimes built upon popular cultures which strongly endorse

democratic ideals are expected to weather shocks arising from any sudden economic crisis, internal

conflict, or elite challenge more successfully than societies where the public remains indifferent, cynical,

hostile, or simply apathetic towards the idea of democracy. Along similar lines, autocratic regimes are

expected to endure where they rest upon popular support, such as deference to traditional monarchs or

religious leaders. Where congruence is lacking, however, regimes are thought more susceptible to

challenge arising from mass uprisings. Democratic states, which rely upon a reservoir of popular

legitimacy and voluntary compliance to govern, remain most vulnerable to this risk. Autocracies, if

undermined from below, can always call the military out of the barracks to reassert their grip on power.

Contemporary developments suggest many reasons for concern both about the state of popular

support for democracy and the underlying stability of many states which experienced transitions from

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autocracy during the third wave era. The heady hopes for the spread of democracy worldwide,

captured by Fukuyama’s idea of the ‘end of history’, coined immediately after the fall of the Berlin wall,

have flagged over time.5 Freedom House report that the number of electoral democracies grew globally

during the third wave era but that further advances stalled around the turn of the 21 st century. 6

Diamond even suggests that the last decade saw the onset of a democratic recession.7 Previous

historical waves of democratization were followed by reversals.8 Elected governments have often

struggled to maintain stability following inconclusive or disputed contests (for instance, in Kenya and

Mexico), partisan strife and recurrent political scandals (Bangladesh and Guatemala), and persistent

outbreaks of violent ethnic conflict (Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq). Setbacks for democracy

have also occurred in recent years following coups against elected leaders (Honduras and Thailand) as

well as creeping restrictions on human rights and fundamental freedoms (Russia and Venezuela).

One global region where democratic consolidation has made sustained progress has been Latin

America, but even here studies suggest that dissatisfaction with the performance of democratic regimes

to solve problems and to meet social needs has encouraged political disillusionment and cynicism.9

Others have detected evidence of a public backlash in the region against the way that liberal democracy

and economic neo-liberalism works, although not a rejection of democratic ideals per se.10 In sub-

Saharan Africa, younger democracies in some of the world poorest nations, such as Mali, Benin, and

Ghana, have now experienced a series of multiparty competitive elections and major gains in human

rights, but they still lack the capacity to lift millions out of poverty and to deliver the targets for

healthcare, education and welfare in the Millennium Development Goals.11 Among Arab states, some

concrete but limited gains for human rights and freedoms have registered in recent years. 12

Nevertheless Carothers suggests that under the administration of President George W. Bush, the

association of the rhetoric of democracy promotion with unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may

have depressed public support for this type of regime in the region, and encouraged a more general

push-back by oil-rich plutocrats.13 Moreover the rhetoric of reform among Arab states runs far ahead of

realities. Many traditional autocracies continue to endure in Eurasia, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. 14

Occasional outbreaks of popular dissent seeking to topple autocratic regimes have been brutally

suppressed by the authorities, for example, most recently in Burma/Myanmar and Iran. In the light of all

these factors, initial high hopes and expectations for the further expansion and steady consolidation of

democratic regimes around the world have not come to fruition in recent years.

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Does this mean that popular support for democratic governance has also fallen worldwide?

Empirical survey data is now available to compare this issue in many world regions. The third wave era

was accompanied by the rapid growth of new cross-national survey research seeking to understand

public opinion around the globe. The most systematic and comprehensive world-wide evidence of

political attitudes is available using data gathered since the early-to mid-1990s both from successive

waves of the World Values Survey, as well as from the Global-Barometers monitoring public opinion in

post-Communist Europe, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The replication

facilitated by using two independent cross-national surveys allows us to test whether the major

generalizations are robust findings, or whether they may be more technical artifacts, for example if

attributed to the design of particular survey items, questionnaire translation, fieldwork and sampling

practices, or the country coverage.

Propositions, regime classification, and methods

To compare public opinion this chapter utilizes the classification and indices presented in

chapter 3. We can set out a series of propositions about how systems support is expected to vary under

alternative types of regimes, and then use descriptive tables and graphs to examine the relationships

without any prior controls. Subsequent chapters use multivariate analysis to build upon this foundation.

Firstly, cultural attitudes are expected to display the enduring imprint of each society’s historical

political experiences. Persistent differences are predicted to be evident among contemporary liberal

democracies, even those within relatively similar global regions, if they differ in their past political

experiences, such as Spain and France, Hungary and Austria, or Japan and South Korea. Socialization

theory has long suggested that people gradually acquire enduring cultural attitudes during their

formative years and early adulthood, through learning primarily from parents and siblings, as well as

absorbing the prevailing social norms and values transmitted by the mass media, teachers and religious

authorities, and within local communities.15 Longitudinal studies of social learning report that core

political predispositions tend to be highly stable through the life span, with attitudes crystallizing as

people age, infusing core predispositions with increasing psychological strength over time.16 For these

reasons, public opinion should display more positive evaluations of the quality of democratic

governance in long-standing liberal democratic states, which have consolidating and deepened

democratic institutions and inculcated civic awareness among citizens over decades and even centuries,

compared with younger liberal democracies which only developed during the third wave era.

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This leads to the second proposition: systems support is also expected to reflect the type of

contemporary regime in power. If citizens are responding to their current situation, and if there is

congruence, then support for democratic values and satisfaction with the performance of democracy

should be greater among citizens living in contemporary societies which enjoy widespread political

rights and liberties. By contrast, if there is congruence, citizens living today under autocratic regimes

should display greater support for autocratic principles and values. Autocracies commonly exercise

techniques of propaganda and censorship which seek to manipulate public opinion and to suppress

criticism of the regime. Despite these propositions, any relationship between political attitudes and the

type of regime currently in power in any country is expected to prove relatively weak. The reason is that

a state’s level of democracy can fluctuate substantially from year to year (generating noise) due to

specific historical events, such as a sudden military coup staged against elected presidents, or the

breakdown of autocracy following the death of the leader. By contrast, political culture is a relatively

deep-seated and enduring phenomenon. Thus political attitudes and values may not be strongly

associated with short-term fluctuations in Freedom House ratings, although these orientations are

expected to be more important in determining whether democracy persists and consolidates over the

longer term.17

Thirdly, a related proposition suggests that democratic orientations and feelings of government

legitimacy will gradually strengthen over the years among citizens living within younger democracies .

The idea of democratic consolidation suggests that increased experience of living in a democratic state

should inculcate stronger democratic norms and values, such as trust, tolerance and participation, so

that eventually democracy becomes, in Linz and Stephan’s phrase, ‘the only game in town’. 18 Direct

comparison of changes over time within the same countries allows us to test this idea. For direct time-

series analysis, we can compare the eleven countries included in successive waves of the WVS, spanning

a quarter-century.

The regime classification used in this book also facilitates comparison of the most recent 5 th

wave of the World Values Survey, conducted in 2005-7, with earlier studies. In particular, Hans-Dieter

Klingemann compared political support among older democracies, younger democracies, and ‘low’

democracies, based on the 3rd and 4th waves of the WVS conducted during the early-to-mid-1990s.19 His

conclusions highlighted the phenomenon of ‘dissatisfied democrats’, defined as: “people who put a high

rating on the attractiveness of democracy as a form of government but at the same time place a low

rating on the performance of their particular democratic regime.” In Central and Eastern Europe,

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however, when studied by Klingemann, in the early-to-mid-1990s many states had only experienced

their initial founding or transitional multi-party election. This chapter can update Klingemann’s findings

to examine whether this phenomenon continues to be observed in the 5 th wave of the WVS, roughly a

decade later.

As discussed in chapter 3, contemporary regimes (in 2006, to match the 5th wave of the WVS)

are classified into four categories: older liberal democracies, younger liberal democracies, electoral

democracies, and autocracies. Data from Freedom House is used as one of the most common

approaches to classifying contemporary regimes based on the country’s record of civil liberties and

political rights (see Table 3.3). Each country’s historical experience of democratization is measured by

the cumulative record of civil liberties and political rights for each nation during the third wave era, as

estimated annually by Freedom House from 1972-2006, taking account of both downturns and upticks

over the years. The resulting index is standardized to 100-points and it is used to sub-divide older and

younger liberal democracies, to reflect their differing historical experiences. To summarize the core

propositions, does system support vary in predictable ways, generating significant contrasts (i) by length

of historical experience of democratization; (ii) among contemporary regimes by level of democracy;

and (iii) among liberal democracies over time? Are the main hypotheses supported by the survey

evidence?

Table 5.1 summarizes the correlations between six indicators of system support and the

historical and contemporary levels of democracy in comparisons of around 50 nations, without any prior

controls. The technical appendix for the book describes the specific items and measures used to

construct all attitudinal indicators. The correlations show fairly mixed results, rather than a

straightforward story, as discussed in detail below. To understand these general patterns further, we

need to consider the specific measures and scrutinize the cross-national results and time-series trends in

depth.

[Table 5.1 about here]

(i) Confidence in regime institutions

As already observed, at the more specific level, the issue of declining confidence in the core

institutions of liberal democracy, including parliaments, parties, and governments, has attracted

considerable concern in Western Europe and the United States.20 Some of the worry is clearly

exaggerated in popular commentary; the evidence presented earlier shows that most West European

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states have seen trendless volatility in institutional confidence. Admittedly, a few countries have

experienced steadily growing public mistrust of state institutions during the last decade, but others have

experienced the reverse. Confidence in the core institutions of state, however, is arguably far more

critical for democratic stability in countries which have only recently transitioned from autocracy.

Prospects for democratic consolidation in these countries seem poor if the public expresses widespread

cynicism about the working of representative institutions such as parliaments and parties, as some of

the principle agencies connecting citizens and the state, and if the legitimacy and authority of the

government is widely questioned in deeply-divided or post-conflict societies.

To compare the cross-national evidence, an institutional confidence scale was constructed from

the WVS 2005-7 data, measuring attitudes towards seven types of public sector organizations, including

political parties, the national government, the national parliament, the civil service, the courts, the

police, and the armed forces. The factor analysis presented in Table 3.2 shows that in the WVS 2005,

responses to these items were strongly inter-correlated, meaning that people who trusted parties or

parliaments, for example, often usually also trusted governments and the civil service. When the pooled

sample was broken down further by the type of regime, and the factor analysis run separately for each,

the public living in the older liberal democracies distinguished between the institutions closely

associated with liberal democratic governance (parties, parliaments, the government and the civil

service) and those associated with maintaining security (the armed forces, police and the courts). In the

remaining publics, however, no such dimensions emerged from the factor analysis, suggesting that the

scale based on aggregating confidence in all seven types of public sector institutions is the most

appropriate one to compare across all societies.

[Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 about here]

Table 5.2 describes the 100-point standardized institutional confidence scale for each nation in

the fifth wave of the WVS by the major type of regime, without any prior controls. The overall results

show that, with one exception, the majority of citizens living in these societies expressed confidence in

public sector institutions; on average, roughly two-thirds of the public trusted political institutions in the

countries under comparison.21 Did these attitudes vary by the contemporary type of regime, as

predicted? Most strikingly, significantly greater institutional confidence, not less, was expressed in

contemporary autocracies than in liberal democracies (R=-0.356, Sig .012).

To explore this pattern in more detail, Figure 5.1 shows that among all the nations under

comparison, Viet Nam and China were outliers, with the public living in these societies expressing 7


exceptionally strong confidence in public sector institutions. The precise reasons for this remain unclear

and these findings are open to several possible interpretations, as discussed in the chapter’s

conclusion.22 Clearly the pattern in these autocracies requires further exploration. If we exclude China

and Viet Nam from the analysis, however, then average confidence in public sector institutions in the

remaining autocracies (Russia and Iran) is similar to levels of support expressed in the other types of

regimes. It is also striking that greater variations in levels of institutional confidence were usually evident

among countries within each category, rather than across different types of contemporary regime.

Amongst the younger liberal democracies, for example marked contrasts can be observed between the

relatively positive attitudes expressed towards state institutions in Mali and India, compared with the

more critical orientations evident in Serbia and in Antigua and Barbuda. Similar variance is displayed

among electoral democracies as well, exemplified by the contrasts between the positive sentiments

recorded in Jordan and Malaysia compared with greater skepticism expressed in Ethiopia and Moldova.

In general, there is little evidence here for the contention that older liberal democracies have a much

stronger and deeper reservoir of institutional confidence than their younger counterparts, casting

reasons to doubt the impact of historical experiences on these indicators of specific support.

[Figures 5.2 and 5.3 about here]

To examine trends over time, Figure 5.2 shows how the institutional confidence index varies

over the last twenty-five years in the eleven countries contained in all five waves of the WVS survey. For

comparison, since much of the concern focuses upon legislatures, Figure 5.3 illustrates the trends in

confidence in parliaments in these nations. Patterns over time show a few cases of decline across both

indicators, notably during the 1980s in Argentina and South Korea. Constitutional rule was restored in

Argentina in 1983; the presidency of Raúl Alfonsín saw the re-establishment of civilian command over

the military and strengthened democratic institutions, although there were persistent economic

problems in controlling hyperinflation. During this era, however, Argentinean institutional confidence

fell sharply before stabilizing at a lower level. The Sixth Republic of South Korea began in 1987 with

democratic elections which marked the transfer of power from the authoritarian President Chun Doo-

hwan; despite this, and growing economic prosperity prior to the Asian economic crisis of 1997,

confidence in public sector institutions gradually slipped among Koreans, and confidence in the National

Assembly fell sharply. In South Africa, however, rising confidence peaked during the first post-apartheid

election and then fell back. There is no support here for the argument that institutional confidence

progressively strengthens over time among younger democracies. In the remaining countries, the

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composite institutional confidence scale generally shows a stable pattern from the start to the end of

the series. The trends in confidence in parliament, however, confirm the fall in the United States

Congress already observed from the GSS data, and a similar loss of confidence in the legislature

occurred in Germany, Argentina and South Korea, while the remaining countries show trendless

fluctuations around the mean. Overall, therefore, any loss of institutional confidence does appear to be

more clearly related to parliaments rather than all public sector institutions, as observed earlier in

America. These patterns also do vary across nations worldwide, as noted in Western Europe in the

previous chapter.

(ii) Evaluations of democratic performance

How do people evaluate the workings of democratic regimes as a whole? This represents a more

diffuse level of support which is arguably more important as an indicator; people can express skeptical

attitudes towards leaders and elected officials in parliament and governments, but in multi-party

democratic states, regular elections provide periodic opportunities to ‘throw the rascals out’, providing a

release valve for pressures. If the public loses faith in the broader workings of democratic regimes,

however, this can have potentially far more significant consequences for political stability. As discussed

earlier, measures gauging democratic satisfaction are common in cross-national surveys including the

EuroBarometer (see Table 4.4), as well as the International Social Survey Program, and the

GlobalBarometers. The standard question asks: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not

very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?” The results have

been widely analyzed in the research literature, especially in cross-national and longitudinal

comparisons using both ordinary least squares and multi-level methods to analyze the impact of

institutional design, good governance, policy performance, and regime histories on satisfaction with

democracy.23 Others have also reversed the relationship, for example to examine whether satisfaction

with democracy is linked to authority structures.24 Nevertheless the precise meaning of the standard

measure of democratic satisfaction remains ambiguous and open to interpretation. Satisfaction with

democracy may reflect assessments of democratic practices and the way that governments work, but

responses to the standard question may also be seen as endorsing normative ideals about the legitimacy

of democratic principles. 25

Using an alternative phrasing, the 5th wave WVS asks the following question: “And how

democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means

that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would

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you choose?” The way that this question emphasizes evaluations of how democratically each country is

being governed makes it suitable to test public evaluations of the perceived democratic performance of

regimes in each country.26 The use of the 10-point scale provides respondents with more choice than the

standard question. Moreover evaluations of democratic performance using this question are strongly

correlated at national-level with another WVS survey item asking respondents to evaluate respect for

human rights in their own country (R=0.78 p>.000 ). This strong association suggests that the question

concerning democratic evaluations taps into how positively people regard the workings of their own

political system more generally.

[Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4 and 5.5 about here]

The comparison of 49 nations shows that satisfaction with the performance of democracy was

significantly correlated with the historical index of democratization (see Figure 5.4), reflecting the length

of experience of each country with this form of governance, (R=0.371 p>.009). This pattern suggests

that, unlike institutional confidence, a reservoir of support for the performance of democracy does

gradually accumulate and deepen with greater familiarity with this form of governance. The cumulative

experience of living in a democratic state, and the cultural values gradually acquired through this

process, therefore does seem to generate positive satisfaction among citizens. Attitudes were also

linked with the contemporary level of democracy, although the relationship was weaker and not

statistically significant at the conventional .05 level (R=0.257, P=.075).

To explore these patterns in more detail, Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3 show that the majority of the

public approve of how democratically their country was being governed in nearly all the countries under

comparison, with the exception of four cases (Bulgaria, Ukraine, Ethiopia, and Russia). In older liberal

democracies, on average roughly two thirds of the public approved of the performance of democracy in

their own county, reflecting higher satisfaction than in the other types of regimes. Scandinavian citizens,

in particular, usually proved exceptionally positive about the democratic performance of their states.

But the link between experience of democracy and satisfaction with its performance was not wholly

clear cut, as favorable evaluations are also evident in Ghana, South Africa, Mali, and Jordan, as well as in

Viet Nam and, to a lesser extent, China. Satisfaction with the performance of democracy in the

Communist autocracies deepens the puzzle already observed in terms of institutional confidence. What

do the Chinese and Vietnamese understand when they give high marks to democracy in their own

country? Is this an issue of how the term ‘democracy’ is conceptualized in Confucian cultures, if

understood as representing ‘government for the people’ rather than ‘government by the people’, as Shi

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suggests?27 Is this due to the limits of using opinion polls to gauge political attitudes in autocratic states

which suppress freedom of speech and overt criticism of the governing party? Or is this the product of

effective state propaganda, a process which may encourage citizens to believe (falsely) that they already

live in a democratic state? The next chapter seeks to unravel the meaning of the concept of democracy,

to understand this further.

(iii) Support for democratic governance

Surveys have sought to tap public support for democratic principles in several ways.28 Perhaps

the most common approach has relied upon questions which ask the public to express their direct or

overt preferences for democratic rule as a normative ideal, using the ‘d’ word but without providing a

more specific context, concrete principles, or elaborating its meaning further. For example, surveys have

typically asked people whether they approve of democracy as the ‘best form of government’, whether

democracy is ‘preferable to any other form of government’, whether it is important ‘to live in a country

that is government democratically’, or whether they approve of having a democratic system ‘as a good

or suitable way of governing their own country’. The direct approach allows survey respondents to reply

using their own understanding of these terms, rather than imposing a common meaning. Similar direct

survey question have often been used to gauge opinions towards other complex normative concepts,

such as notions of equality, freedom, or human rights. At the same time, direct questions suffer from

certain important limits which put their face validity into question. It is important to explore the

underlying meaning, as well as the depth, of any overt support for democracy.29

Research based on the Global-barometer and the World Values Surveys suggest that during the

1990s, when asked directly, many citizens around the globe expressed widespread aspirations for

democratic principles as the best system of government. 30 The ‘Asian values’ thesis propounded by Lee

Kuan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore, claimed that democracy was a Western cultural

artifact.31 Confucian values, the thesis stressed, emphasize community rather than individualism, duties

rather than rights, and the importance of harmony, consensus, respect for authority, and an orderly

society.32 Nevertheless despite these claims, surveys have reported that in fact orientations towards

authority, as well as support for democracy, are remarkably similar in East Asia and Anglo-American

societies. 33 Indeed almost universal public approval for the abstract idea of democratic governance has

been expressed even in some of the most rigid East Asian autocracies, including Communist China and

Vietnam, where the public lacks any direct experience of living under this type of rule.34 In the Middle

East, as well, the region which lags furthest behind the rest of the world in democratic reforms, it might

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be expected that support for democracy would be low. Yet the 2006 Arab Barometer survey reports that

eight or nine out of ten respondents in Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and Kuwait believe that ‘democracy is

the best form of government’ and that ‘having a democratic system of government would be good for

our country’.35 As Diamond summarized the survey evidence worldwide: “Strikingly, the belief that

democracy is (in principle at least) the best system is overwhelming and universal. While there is a

slightly higher preference for the Western industrialized countries, in every region – even the former

Soviet Union and the Muslim Middle East – an average of at least 80 percent of people polled say that

democracy is best.”36


To further confirm and update these patterns, direct or overt support for democracy can be

compared using the following question in the World Values Survey: “ I'm going to describe various types

of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one,

would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having

a democratic political system.” Most strikingly, overt support for democratic values was insignificantly

related to either the historical experience of democratization or to contemporary levels of democracy.

To understand why, Table 5.4 compares democratic values across the 51 societies included in the 2005

wave of the WVS. It confirms what many previous studies have reported: support for democracy as an

ideal form of governance proves over-whelming and almost universal today; almost nine out of ten

respondents approved of democratic governance as ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ good. Moreover positive attitudes

were expressed among the public living under every type of regime, including in autocracies, and also in

every cultural region, including in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. The fact that both the

Chinese and Viet Nam respondents say that they approve of democracy again requires more detailed

analysis and reinforces the need to understand what citizens in these countries understand by the

concept of democracy, an issue explored in the next chapter. Far from being a Western phenomenon, as

earlier research suggested, the WVS survey evidence indicates that approval of democratic governance

is widespread and universal, confirming previous studies based on the Global-barometers. 37 Democratic

states have not produced ‘the end of history’ but it seems as though democratic values have broad

appeal, even in unlikely places.


But has public enthusiasm for democracy possibly faded in recent years, reflecting the

slowdown which has occurred in the process of regime change? Contrary to gloomier predictions, during 12


the last decade, in fact direct support for democratic values and principles rose in two-thirds of the

countries under comparison (see Table 5.5). This was particularly notable in some of the post-

Communist societies, including Russia, Ukraine and Moldova, where approval had been well below

average during the mid-1990s. But at the same time trends during this decade are not whole uniform;

approval of democracy fell in South Korea and Romania, despite the fact that the spread of political

rights and civil liberties deepened in these countries during these years.

As an alternative measure, we can also compare the importance of democracy. Democratic

values in this regard are gauged from the World Values Survey 2005 in terms of the statement “How

important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means

it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?” This

item is arguably superior to asking simply about approval for democratic values, as it seeks to gauge the

depth or strength of support. Moreover the 10-point scale allows respondents greater flexibility than

the standard 4-point attitudinal measure. Table 5.6 and Figure 5.5 confirm that in most countries, the

general public regards living in a democracy as important, a view especially popular among citizens in

long-established liberal democracies, but also expressed among those living in many autocratic states.

Overall the saliency of democracy also does deepen significantly with historical experience.


(iv) Rejection of autocratic governance

The ubiquity of public approval of democracy around the world raises certain important

questions, however, about the measurement and interpretation of these results. Direct approval or

disapproval of democracy by itself is essentially ‘costless’, and hence it remains difficult to estimate the

weight which should be given to these responses. Thus although general approval of democratic

governance proved remarkably widespread in countries such as Ghana, Mali and Burkina Faso, it is

unclear from this evidence whether democracy is regarded as vital and urgent to people’s lives, or

whether it is seen as generally desirable but as less important than more immediate priorities facing

poorer societies, such as strengthening economic development, living standards, or security. Schedler

and Sarsfield argue that the validity of direct measures of abstract support for democracy can be

questioned due to the potential problems of interviewer effects generating ‘politically correct’

responses, as well as the vague, shifting and controversial meaning associated with ideas of

democracy.38 Instead, they argue, abstract measures need to be compared with attitudes towards more

specific, concrete, and detailed procedures, rights, and institutions associated with this form of 13


governance. Hence using a Mexican survey they analyzed approval of freedom of speech, freedom of

assembly, political equality and tolerance of minority rights, without mentioning the term ‘democracy’

directly in these questions, to avoid cueing respondents. They report that Mexicans expressing the

strongest support for democracy also manifest illiberal convictions on at least some specific political

rights and civil liberties.

Another way to explore whether attitudes are robust is to compare alternative survey measures

using trade-off items where citizens are asked to express their preference for different types of regimes.

For example, in countries which have experienced a recent water-shed transition, notably in post-

communist Europe, surveys have commonly compared people’s evaluation of the current against the

previous regime.39 This is a useful item in the context of revolutionary upheaval, but it is less

appropriate in countries where democratization has been an evolutionary process of incremental

reforms, or with states such as Russia which have veered back and forth in their human rights record,

rather than experiencing a sharp and distinct break from the past regime. Democratization occurs

gradually in many states, with an extended series of steps transforming each polity. As an alternative, to

see whether people reject autocratic forms of government, the World Values Survey asks about the

desirability of military rule, rule by bureaucratic elites, and strong-man leadership unchecked by

parliament and elections. The standardized autocracy index combines these responses. Table 5.7 shows

the distribution of public opinion, where it is apparent that majorities reject these forms of autocratic

rule in all the countries under comparison. Disapproval is particularly strong among older liberal

democracies, where eight out of ten reject this type of regime, but it can also be observed by two-thirds

of the public living within autocratic states.


For comparability, to see whether the results remain robust and consistent with other

indicators, the Global-Barometer used a trade-off question to monitor regime preferences, as follows:

“Which of the following statements do you agree with most? Democracy is preferable to any other kind

of government. In certain situations, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic

one. It doesn't matter to people like me whether we have a democratic government or a non-democratic

government.” The results confirm widespread popular support for democratic rule in the abstract, with

majority populations in 43 out of 49 societies preferring democracy over any other kind of government.

Most people also exercised a clear choice, with few responding that it didn’t matter to them either way.

Therefore the trade-off question employed in the Global-barometer surveys, where respondents are

14


offered a choice between democracy and autocracy, did produce a less overwhelming consensus that

simply asking about direct approval of democracy. Nevertheless both the Global-barometer and the

World Values surveys confirm the apparent universality of democracy’s appeal and its growing

popularity among a diverse range of contemporary societies, as well as the public’s rejection of

autocratic forms of government.

(v) Strength of nationalism

Lastly we can compare trends in the strength of nationalism, operating at the most abstract or

diffuse level of systems support. Lasting bonds to the nation reflect a sense of community within

common territorial boundaries. Such feelings are important for binding-together every nation-state, but

they are particularly significant for strengthening social cohesion and state legitimacy in multicultural

communities, in deeply-divided societies, and in fragile states emerging from long-lasting conflict.

Nationalism can be expected to weaken under the forces of globalization, especially in Western Europe,

due to the process of European Union integration. The experience of growing economic and political

integration within the EU, with people working, living, studying and traveling across the borders in

different member states, have dissolved traditional physical barriers. European identities can also be

expected to have gradually strengthened most among citizens of the founding states that have lived

under European institutions for a long time, such as Italy, France, and Germany. Despite these

predictions, in fact the empirical evidence that cosmopolitan identities have indeed come to supersede

the older attachments of nationalism, even in the EU, remains limited.40


Nationalism is a complex concept but one way to measure its strength is through feelings of

national pride, as well as by the willingness of citizens to defend their own country in case of war. Table

5.7 shows the distribution of public opinion on the composite nationalism indicator used in this study.

The comparison shows that roughly eight out of ten people expressed strong levels of nationalism.

These feelings proved weakest in the older liberal democracies, especially in West European states and

in the historically-special cases of Germany and Japan. These indicators strengthened in the electoral

democracies and in autocracies, where feelings of national pride and willingness to fight for their

country were exceptionally strong in Turkey, Thailand, Viet Nam and Iran. The overall correlations in

Table 5.1 demonstrate that, at the most diffuse level, feelings of nationalism were negatively related to

both measures of democracy. Although democratic governance is often believed to have many intrinsic

and instrumental benefits, the pattern suggests that it does not lead to stronger feelings of national 15


community. One reason is that democratic states are often among the most cosmopolitan societies,

with open borders to information flows. Elsewhere, it has been demonstrated that cosmopolitan

communications weaken traditional attachments to the nation, especially among news users in these

types of societies.41 As some hope, and others fear, denser and faster interconnections across territorial

borders do thereby seem to gradually erode older allegiances and promote a more multicultural ethos.

[Figure 5.8 about here]

What of trends over time? Figure 5.8 shows that these expressive orientations were also

relatively stable during the last quarter century across most of the eleven countries with time-series

data available since the early-1980s. Hence nationalist feelings were persistently low in Germany and

Japan, reflecting the enduring legacy of World War II, in comparison to all the other countries. The major

changes in the series involved South Korea, where nationalism fell over the years, whereas by contrast

the indicator became more positive in South Africa, peaking around the time of the end of apartheid and

the first fully-democratic elections in the early-1990s.

Conclusions

This chapter sought to examine how far system support strengthened with historical

experienced of democratization, as well as how far it varied among contemporary types of regime, and

whether it strengthened over time among liberal democracies. The results suggest that at the most

specific level, confidence in public sector institutions and also approval of the democratic performance

of states usually varied more among countries within, rather than across, each type of contemporary

regime. Approval of democratic principles was remarkably widespread in most countries under

comparison, as many others have reported, and the time-series evidence suggests that support for

democracy usually rose during the last decade. Rejection of autocratic principles was strongest among

the older liberal democracies, but it was evident among the majority of the public in all countries, even

among those living under autocracies. Lastly the strength of nationalism was also high and these feelings

were particularly strong in the less democratic nations.

It remains to be determined why systems support, including overt lip service to democratic

values and approval of the democratic performance of their state, should be exceptionally high in Viet

Nam and China, one-party Communist states. This puzzle requires further investigation in subsequent

chapters and several alternative interpretations remain possible. Propaganda theories suggest that

public opinion polls cannot be relied upon when conducted in states which sharply curtail freedom of

16


speech over political issues and which stifle public expressions of dissent. 42 The cumulative result of

years, or even decades, of tight media control in restrictive and isolated societies such as Burma and

North Korea is usually assumed to have a powerful impact on citizens, especially the effect of state

control on political views.43 Autocracies with restrictive media environments aim to suppress critics and

to provide positive messages about the regime, rallying support for the authorities, as well as

manipulating more diffuse feelings of patriotism and spreading ideological values favorable to the

regime. State-run propaganda and official censorship may also mobilize public support for the

government. If state control succeeds in its objectives, then regular exposure to the news media in this

environment would be expected to generate confidence in the government and state institutions and to

reinforce a strong sense of nationalism. In a repressive climate, when responding to social surveys,

people in Viet Nam and China may be unwilling to express negative attitudes towards the current

regime. Yet this view is not given prime fascia support by the high level of approval of democracy

recorded in these nations. Alternatively, instrumental or performance-based interpretations suggest

that public opinion polls capture a genuine snap-shot of public opinion, with positive attitudes towards

government in Viet Nam and China reflecting the rapid growth rates, successful economic expansion,

and marked improvements in living standards experienced by millions of people living in these states in

recent years, as well as the pro-state ideological legacy of communism. 44 To explore these issues

further, the next chapter goes on to operationalize the concept of critical citizens, and then examine the

distinguishing characteristics of this syndrome.

17


Figure 5.1: Institutional confidence and historical experience of democracy

Note: V146-147 “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (4), quite a lot of confidence (3), not very much confidence (2) or none at all (1)? (Read out and code one answer for each): The armed forces; The police; The courts; The government (in your nation’s capital); Political parties; Parliament; The Civil service” The standardized 100-point institutional confidence scale, where high represents most confidence, combines these items. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For more detail about the survey items contained in each indicator, see the factor analysis in Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.

Source: World Values Survey 2005-7

18


Figure 5.2: Institutional confidence over time

Note: Institutional confidence scale (8) 1981-2005. V146-147 “I am going to name a number of

organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal

of confidence (4), quite a lot of confidence (3), not very much confidence (2) or none at all (1)? (Read out

and code one answer for each): The armed forces; The police; The courts; The government (in your

nation’s capital); Political parties; Parliament; The Civil service” The standardized 100-point institutional

confidence scale, where high represents most confidence, combines these items. The table describes

the mean distribution by nation. For more detail about the survey items contained in each indicator, see

the factor analysis in Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.

Source: Pooled WVS 1981-2005

19


Figure 5.3: Confidence in parliament over time

Note: Confidence in parliament, 1981-2005


20


Figure 5.4: Evaluation of democratic performance and historical experience of democracy

Note: V163. “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?” For comparison, these items have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.

Source: World Values Survey, 2005

21


Figure 5.5: Democratic values and historical experience of democracy

Note: “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?” For comparison, all indicators have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.


22


Figure 5.6: Anti-autocracy and historical experience of democracy

Note: Rejection of three items: V148-V150 “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.”; “Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country” Having the army rule.” For comparison, all indicators have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.


23


Figure 5.7: Nationalism and historical experience of democracy

Notes: The nationalism index was constructed from the following items.

National pride: V209. “How proud are you to be [French]*? “ Very proud (4); Quite proud (3); Not very proud (2); Not at all proud (1).

Fight: V75. “Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?”

For comparison, all indicators have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.


24


Figure 5.8: Trends in nationalism over time

Note: The nationalism scale is constructed from two items: (V75) Willingness to fight for one’s country in a war and (V209) Feelings of national pride. These items are summed and standardized to a 100-point scale.


25


Table 5.1: Dimensions of systems support and democratization

Dimension of system support Historical experience of democratization

Contemporary levels of democracy

N.

Nationalism -.280 * -.354 ** 52

Values: Approval of democratic principles

.103 N/s .063 N/s 51

Values: Rejection of autocratic principles

.653 ** .510 ** 51

Values: Importance of democracy .330 * .225 N/s 50

Evaluation of regime performance .371 ** .257 N/s 49

Confidence in public sector institutions -.126 N/s -.355 * 49

Notes: The figures represent the correlation coefficients and their significance. The historical experience of democratization is measured by the cumulative Freedom House index for political rights and civil liberties 1972-2006, standardized to a 100-point scale. Contemporary levels of democracy are measured by the nation’s score on the 2006 Freedom House index for political rights and civil liberties. For details about each of the scales measuring the dimensions of system support, see Tables 5.1 to 5.7. ** = significant at .01 level, * =significant at .05 level.

Source: World Values Survey

26


Table 5.2: Confidence in public sector institutions worldwide

Older liberal democracies

Younger liberal democracies

Electoral democracies Autocracies

Finland 69 India 72 Jordan 78 Viet Nam 91Norway 67 Mali 71 Malaysia 72 China 80Switzerland 66 Indonesia 63 Turkey 69 Iran 62Cyprus 67 South Africa 66 Morocco 64 Russia 57Sweden 65 Korea, Rep 59 Burkina Faso 61Germany 64 Uruguay 58 Zambia 61United States 64 Brazil 57 Thailand 61Canada 64 Bulgaria 56 Colombia 56Australia 63 Chile 56 Ethiopia 54UK 62 Mexico 54 Moldova 50New Zealand 61 Romania 54Spain 61 Trinidad & Tobago 53Japan 60 Ukraine 53Italy 59 Taiwan 53France 57 Poland 53Netherlands 56 Slovenia 52

Serbia 51Antigua & Barbuda 46

Total 63 58 63 73 Note: V146-147 “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (4), quite a lot of confidence (3), not very much confidence (2) or none at all (1)? (Read out and code one answer for each): The armed forces; The police; The courts; The government (in your nation’s capital); Political parties; Parliament; The Civil service” The standardized 100-point institutional confidence scale, where high represents most confidence, combines these items. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For more detail about the survey items contained in each indicator, see the factor analysis in Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.

Source: World Values Surveys, 2005

27


Table 5.3: Evaluations of the performance of democratic governance worldwide



Electoral democracies

Autocracies

Norway 81

Ghana 85 Jordan 78 Viet Nam 80

Switzerland 76

Uruguay 77 Malaysia 70 China 67

Sweden 75

South Africa 74 Thailand 70 Iran 52

Spain 74

Mali 70 Zambia 67 Russia 44

Finland 74

Chile 70 Colombia 63

Germany 72

Antigua& Barbuda

70 Turkey 59

Australia 71

Taiwan 69 Burkina Faso 57

Canada 71

Mexico 66 Moldova 51

Japan 69

India 65 Morocco 50

France 66

Indonesia 65 Ethiopia 42

Cyprus 65

Korea, Rep 64

Netherlands 65

Brazil 62

United Kingdom 64

Slovenia 58

United States 63

Romania 58

Trinidad & Tobago 61

Poland 57

Italy 58

Andorra 54

Serbia 52 Bulgaria 43

Ukraine 42Total 6

963 60 63

Note: V163. “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?” For comparison, these items have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.

28



29


Table 5.4: Approval of democratic principles worldwide




Sweden 98 Andorra 97 Ethiopia 98 China 94Norway 97 Indonesia 97 Morocco 96 Viet Nam 93Switzerland 96 Germany 96 Jordan 96 Iran 92Spain 96 Romania 95 Burkina Faso 95 Iraq 88Cyprus 96 Antigua & Barbuda 95 Turkey 93 Russia 80Germany 95 Taiwan 93 Thailand 93Italy 95 Chile 93 Zambia 92New Zealand 94 India 92 Malaysia 92Canada 91 Uruguay 91 Moldova 88Netherlands 91 South Africa 91 Colombia 88Australia 90 Brazil 90 Guatemala 87Trinidad & Tobago 90 Mali 88Finland 90 Slovenia 87United Kingdom 90 Bulgaria 87France 90 Poland 84Japan 88 Ukraine 80United States 88 Yugoslavia 80

Korea, Rep 79

Total 93 90 85 90

Note: V151: “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system.” For comparison, this item has been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.


30


Table 5.5: Change in approval of democratic principles, 1995-2005

Nation 1995 2005 Change 1995-2005Russian Federation 6 24 18Ukraine 20 36 16Moldova, 26 41 15Sweden 63 76 13Chile 30 42 12Uruguay 45 55 10Finland 31 39 8Taiwan 25 33 8Australia 52 59 7Germany 58 65 7Slovenia 41 47 5Brazil 27 30 3India 49 52 3Argentina 51 52 2Mexico 28 28 -1United States 55 52 -3Bulgaria 37 33 -5Colombia 35 27 -8Japan 43 35 -8Romania 66 54 -13Serbia 50 35 -15Republic of Korea (South) 45 24 -21Total 40 43 2Note: V151: “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system.” Percentage ‘very good’. The table describes the mean distribution by nation in the 22 societies included in both waves.


31


Table 5.6: Importance of democracy

Older liberal democracies Younger liberal democracies


Sweden 95 Ghana 92 Jordan 94 Vietnam 92 Norway 93 Argentina 91 Ethiopia 92 Rwanda 89 Switzerland 93 Taiwan 89 Turkey 91 China 85 Germany 92 Uruguay 89 Morocco 89 Thailand 82 Cyprus 91 Andorra 89 Zambia 88 Iran 79 Australia 91 Poland 87 Burkina Faso 80 Russia 75 Canada 90 Mexico 87 Malaysia 79 Italy 88 South Africa 87 Moldova 79 United States 88 Romania 86 Colombia 79 Netherlands 87 Korea, Rep. 86 Finland 87 Indonesia 85 Spain 87 Brazil 82 Trinidad & Tobago 87 Chile 82 United Kingdom 86 Ukraine 80 Japan 85 Bulgaria 80 France 85 Slovenia 79

Mali 77 Serbia 75 India 71

Total 89 84 86 84

Note: “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?” For comparison, all indicators have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.


32


Table 5.7: Rejection of autocratic principles worldwide

Older liberal democracies Younger liberal democracies Electoral democracies Autocracies

New Zealand 83 Andorra 78 Zambia 71 Viet Nam 78Norway 82 Antigua & Barbuda 75 Colombia 69 Iraq 71Germany 82 Slovenia 74 Ethiopia 68 China 67Sweden 81 Uruguay 73 Morocco 66 Russia 66Switzerland 81 Chile 72 Burkina Faso 64 Iran 61Canada 80 Korea, Rep 70 Guatemala 62Italy 80 Serbia 68 Moldova 62Australia 79 South Africa 68 Turkey 61Japan 79 Poland 66 Jordan 59United Kingdom 77 Taiwan 65 Thailand 58Spain 77 Ukraine 64 Malaysia 57Finland 77 Bulgaria 61United States 76 India 60Germany 75 Brazil 59Trinidad & Tobago 75 Indonesia 59Netherlands 74 Romania 59France 74 Mali 57Cyprus 69 Total 78 67 64 67Note: Rejection of three items: V148-V150 “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with

parliament and elections.”; “Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they

think is best for the country” Having the army rule.” For comparison, all indicators have been

standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items

contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.


33


Table 5.8: Strength of nationalism worldwide




Trinidad & Tobago

91 Mali 96 Turkey 95 Viet Nam 96

Finland 87 Mexico 91 Thailand 95 Rwanda 95New Zealand 86 India 90 Burkina Faso 93 Iran 87Norway 86 South Africa 87 Jordan 93 Iraq 83United States 86 Poland 87 Guatemala 90 Russia 83Cyprus 86 Indonesia 86 Malaysia 89 China 77Canada 85 Slovenia 85 Ethiopia 88Australia 85 Uruguay 85 Morocco 85Sweden 83 Antigua Barbuda 83 Zambia 83United Kingdom 81 Chile 82 Moldova 70Spain 79 Serbia 79Switzerland 78 Romania 78Italy 75 Bulgaria 77France 75 Brazil 76Netherlands 71 Korea, Rep 75Germany 64 Andorra 74Japan 60 Ukraine 73

Taiwan 70Total 80 83 87 88

Notes: The nationalism index was constructed from the following items.

National pride: V209. “How proud are you to be [French]*? “ Very proud (4); Quite proud (3); Not very proud (2); Not at all proud (1).

Fight: V75. “Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?”

For comparison, all indicators have been standardized to 100-points. The table describes the mean distribution by nation. For the survey items contained in each indicator, see Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A.


34


35

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British Journal of Political Science 31(3): 447-474.

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sites.hks. Web viewContemporary developments suggest many reasons for concern both about ... Donald Sears and C.L. Funk ... using the ‘d’ word but without