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Microfinance Outreach, Multiple Lending and Regulation in India

Samirendra Nath Dhar*

Abstract:

Outreach of microfinance programmes are a sine-quo-non for financial inclusion for people at the

bottom of the pyramid. However, when the growth rate of building up microfinance client bases

attains extraordinary rates, maledictions like fierce competition among microfinance institutions,

client poaching, multiple lending, over-indebtedness crop up. This article traces the high growth of

customers and outstanding portfolios of SBLP and private MFIs and highlights the need and status

of MF regulation in India to curb the vices emerging out of high growth rates and

commercialization of microfinance in India.

Keywords: Microfinance, Multiple Lending, Over-indebtedness, Financial literacy, MF Regulation.

*Samirendra Nath Dhar, Professor, Department of Commerce, University of North Bengal, India,

email : dharsnd@gmail.com, Cell : +91(0)9434352886.

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MF Outreach – The Exponential Growth Phenomenon:

Over the past five years focus and interest of Governments, bankers, developmental economists in

financial inclusion has heightened in many countries across the globe. Financial inclusion denotes

delivery of financial services at an affordable cost to the vast sections of the disadvantaged and

low-income groups. Financial inclusion systems generally work on the principle of providing

graduated credit in an attempt to capacitate the poor to take up self-employment activities and lift

them from one level to another until they cross the poverty lines. It has to acknowledged that it is

due to the microfinance movement pioneered by Prof. Yunus that there is now a appreciable

recognition of the fact that it has given the poor access to banks and microfinance institutions and

resulted in overall socio-economic empowerment. Due to the positive impact of microfinance

programmes “building inclusive financial systems that work for the poor” became the principle

focus of the United Nations International Year of Microcredit 2005.

Concentration on building up inclusive financial systems has transmuted microfinance provision

systems drastically by engineering an extensive assortment of financial services for millions of

poor people in the world. The various financial services include credit, savings, insurance and

payments and remittance facilities.( Rangarajan 2008). This has resulted in increased outreach to

the microfinance clients in terms of diversified microfinance packages. Taking note of the fact that

there is still a huge unbanked and poor milieu to cater to as microfinance clients, there has been an

unprecedented growth in the number of microfinance institutions which have commenced

operations for delivery of these packages much more with commercial objectives as a mission

rather than embarking on social business ventures. More than a thousand microfinance institutions

(MFIs) that report to the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) have 88m borrowers and 76m

savers, and numbers are growing by 20 per cent a year, more in some countries. The microfinance

industry has grown at a galloping pace throughout the world especially over the last five years.

Moreover, there were also significant incentives for MFIs to grow and expand operations and

products because large funding, national and international recognition all flowed to the largest

players.

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The scenario in India is quite similar as witnessed by the governmental and non-governmental

programmes emphasising on building up a large base of microfinance beneficiary groups. From a

very modest beginning of about twenty thousand Self Help Groups in 1999, the drivers of the

Swarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana ( SGSY) (now renamed as National Rural Livelihood

Mission) has been able to link nearly 5.3 million groups to banks at the end of March 2012. The

same story unfolds for NABARD, which experimentally started a SHG- bank linkage programme

in 1992 with 255 groups and has linked 7.5 million groups (out of which 2 million are SGSY

groups) at the end of March 2011. The pace at which the movement took off in India in the early

nineties and the short span in which the microfinance system gained maturity in India is

phenomenal. In India while the Self Help Group model predominates, there are variations in

promotional and feeder systems to these groups depending on whether the programme is a

Government one or is being monitored by NABARD or other MFIs. Many other MFIs have been

able to successfully replicate the Grameen model and also provide micro financial services to joint

liability groups , individuals and CDFIs. Private microfinance institutions have also taken stock of

the situation and taken strategic measures in the form of either change in organisational forms,

diversification of products, accessing the capital markets and increasing management and field

staff to penetrate in all accessible geographic corners in India. A host of players have entered

microfinance space, each having a reason of its own. “Many NGOs that were early entrants

gradually metamorphosed into full fledged lenders and developmental professionals left their

cushy careers to set up microfinance firms.” (Agarwal and Sinha 2010). Today 60 largest MFIs in

India have more than 10 million clients and outstanding portfolio of $ 769 million. The past few

years have witnesed MFIs being successful in using their management expertise to attain scale

and to expand their operations to far flung geographical areas. “Thus, rating data from a large

sample of the leading MFIs, shows that these have recorded high growth rates of the order of 80%

per annum in terms of numbers of borrowers and around 40% per annum in terms of portfolio

reaching from 300,000 to one million clients each.” (Sinha 2007). The Report of the Sub-

Committee of the Central Board of Directors of Reserve Bank of India to Study Issues and

Concerns in the MFI Sector (2011) chaired by Y.H. Malegam finds that the growth in the outreach

of MFIs have outpaced the growths of SHG- Bank Linkage Programmes (SBLP) of the

Government. This is presented in the following table:

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Table 1

Relative share of SHG- Bank Linkage Programmes (SBLP) and private Microfinance

Institutions in India

Source: Extracted from The Report of the Sub-Committee of the Central Board of Directors of

Reserve Bank of India to Study Issues and Concerns in the MFI Sector (2011), pg 33

The figures in the table are self explanatory. Though the number of customers and outstanding

portfolio is more for the SBLP, yet the growth rates of the MFIs in both these indicators are more

than five times than that of SBLP. It may well be conceived that at this rate the private MFIs may

have a dominant position in the next five years or so.

II. MFI Mission Drift And Problems Of Multiple Lending

Increasing outreach as portrayed by the figures in table I is a cause for applause because

extensive outreach signals success of financial inclusion policies in the first instance. However,

during the last three years, microfinance has been under severe criticism for a number of apparent

reasons: its increasing commercialism, as substantiated by an increasing thrust on size and

profitability, a drift away from the social missions in the area of lending, and observations that

point out that the microfinance providers may be shifting focus from its virtuous “double bottom

line” objectives. “High growth brings with it possible dangers of mission drift as many MFIs

emphasize commercial behavior and may not strategically balance this with their original social

mission, or with social values expected in microfinance.” (Ghate 2007).

Particulars FY 2008 FY2009 FY2010 % Growth over 2 years

No. of Customers (million)

SBLP 50.8 59.1 64.5 26.96

MFI 14.1 22.6 26.7 189.36

Total 64.9 81.7 91.2 140.52

Portfolio Outstanding (Rs.

Billion)

SBLP 166.99 226.79 272.66 63.27

MFI 59.54 117.34 183.44 308.09

Total 226.53 344.13 456.10 201.34

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Commenting on the aspects of outreach and focus Sharma and Wright (2010) observed: “The

commercialization of Indian microfinance has allowed a massive increase in outreach and

expansion of credit to the poor in India, at rates of interest that are (by world standards at least)

relatively modest … but there are many that wish that the path to growth had been more moderate,

controlled, patient and focused on the double bottom-line.” “There have been incidents of over-

lending in some pockets of the country- examples include Kolar, Mysore and Tumkur districts of

Karnataka and in Lucknow and Agra districts of Uttar Pradesh (UP), where uncontrolled lending

and clients borrowing from multiple sources, coupled with high risk local socio-political

dynamics, have led to mass defaults.” (Intellcap 2009) . The rapid rate of growth and outreach

signifies that microfinance providers may be confronting the forces of competition and then taking

strategies to market their financial products which improve their financial bottom lines at the cost

of squeezing the long term socio-economic benefits of the clients. As Sriram (2010) observed,

“The language of microfinance has undergone a fundamental change in the two decades of its

evolution. Most of the early microfinance in India happened through donor and philanthropic

funds, which were channelled to not-for-profit organisations. As the activities scaled up,

microfinance moved to a commercial format.

Many researchers opine that though that competition may be always better for the

economy, it may not be the case in the microfinance sector. According to their views aggressive

competition may make microfinance institutions fight for control of the same geographic areas and

beneficiaries and thereby encourage borrowers to borrow from several sources, thereby over

leveraging their resources. The Reserve Bank of India observed that “NBFCs operating in the

Microfinance sector not only compete amongst themselves but also directly compete with the

SHG-Bank Linkage Programme. The practices they adopt could have an adverse impact on the

programme. In a representation made to the Sub-Committee by the Government of Andhra

Pradesh, it has been argued, that the MFIs are riding “piggy-back” on the SHG infrastructure

created by the programme and that JLGs are being formed by poaching members from existing

SHGs.” (RBI Malegam Committee Report 2011).

Aiyar (2009) stated that “new problems are cropping up with MFI expansion. Without technical

assistance, some businesses fail. Competition in some states is so intense that MFIs accuse rivals

of stealing their clients through unethical offers. Some women have borrowed from four or more

different MFIs, and could get into debt traps, which also hit MFIs through higher defaults”. The

observations made in 2009 have more relevance now as the practice of borrowing from several

MFIs at a small span of time is proliferating at a rapid pace.

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Multiple borrowing refers to the practice of borrowing from different sources, Government

programmes as well as private microfinance institutions at the same time. Recent studies from

India, Nepal, Kenya , Uganda and the Philippines have found that microfinance clients generally

take on multiple borrowing to have a continuous supply of funds to meet their diverse

requirements, such as capital for their microenterprises, repayment of other debts and catering to

health and nutritional needs of the household. Multiple borrowing is not a new phenomenon. As

highlighted in „Portfolios of the Poor‟, poor households regularly borrow from multiple sources to

smooth their cashflows (Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, and Ruthven 2009).

The observations of the Malegam Committee (2011) regarding multiple lending in India opens

up as” with the development of active competition between MFIs there has been a deluge of loan

funds available to borrowers which has fuelled excessive borrowing and the emergence of

undesirable practices. It is also claimed that the emergence of ring leaders as key intermediaries

between MFIs and potential customers has distorted market discipline and good lending practices.

There are reports that ghost loans have become epidemic in some states. Finally, it is believed that

in consequence of over-borrowing, default rates have been climbing in some locations but these

have not been disclosed because of ever-greening and multiple lending.”

Investigations have been on to find out as to why beneficiaries resort to multiple borrowing and

the findings of the surveys indicate that multiple borrowing practices generally emanate due to the

following reasons.

The client‟s credit needs are not fulfilled by one MFI‟s product ranges

The beneficiaries needs exceed the loan offers by a single microfinance provider

The beneficiaries want to use additional loans for consumption purposes or for an

emergency

Different members from the same family or household take loans from the same MFI.

Documents to be maintained by the group under PMFI are fewer in number than under

Government programmes.

Receipt of loan from private MFI is faster than loans from government programmes.

Process of loan repayment under Government programmes is more time consuming than

PMFI.

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Doorstep banking facilities provided by PMFIs is preferable to going to banks for

transactions under Government programmes.

Multiple borrowing is the other side of the coin of multiple lending and portrays the phenomenon

from the supply side . Reasons for multiple lending are in abundance. However, certain salient

reasons can be listed out here .

MFIs‟ have ambitious growth plans for outreach and often resort to indiscriminate enrolment of

clients without paying heed to debt absorption and use capacity of clients

• When field workers of MFIs can identify clients with good credit repayment history and they fair

knowledge of joint liability group they resort to poaching the existing clients of other MFIs and

SGSY groups.

•Field staff are eager to reach their monthly targets and thus ignore multiple borrowing

• Field staff do not reveal that the member has already taken multiple loans from different

institutions.

In places where there are multiple such field officer from different financial institutions, the

practice is often seen to be that of disbursing loans at whatever cost, including making

promises to the customer, or providing easy money.

The pertinent question that arises is whether multiple borrowing leads to over –indebtedness.

Over-indebtedness of individuals or households can be defined as the inability “to repay all debts

fully and on time” (Haas 2006,). First of all, a household is over-indebted if they cannot cover all

payment obligations arising from all debt contracts in a given period by the excess cash, i.e.

periodic cash income not used to cover all periodic expenses of the debtor, during that period

(Maurer and Pytkowska 2010, Wisniwski 2010).

“The phenomenon of over-indebtedness is not new to microfinance as the risk is, to a certain

extent, linked to market development itself. Over-indebtedness of microcredit borrowers however

can, in the first place, be detrimental due to the material psychological and social consequences of

being unable to respond to repayment obligations.” (CFM 2011). There are several issues to be

addressed in this context. First is the repayment capacity of the borrower. The beneficiary does not

face the problem of indebtness if the sources of funds can match the outflow of funds due to

principal and interest components. Basically, the sources of funds are related to the economic

activities they perform. Economic activities in the form of either microenterprises can generate

cash inflows if and only if they have the markets to sell their produce. While a substantial amount

of effort is being put by the government agencies for marketing of SHG products, yet establishing

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them at par with branded products in the markets is quite a challenge. Organising fairs such as

SARAS for SHG products are commendable step that the government has taken. However, such

initiatives also evoke lukewarm responses. As an example the agenda of of a PRC meeting for

SGSY in June 2011 reveals that “(a) During 2011-12, 16 States have so far informed the schedule

to organise the SARAS Fairin their State. State Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Goa,

Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tamil Nadu and

Uttar Pradesh have not yet informed the dates for organising the fair.(b) The Ministry has taken 44

stalls at Dilli Haat, Pitampura for showcasing the products of SHG artisans. However, it is found

that State Governments of Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, J&K, Karnataka, Orissa and all North

Eastern States are not sponsoring SHG artisans for participation at the Haat.” ( (SGSY) / (NRLM)

PRC Meeting2011) .If such conditions persist there will be little avenues for the microfinance

beneficiaries to meet their debt obligations in time and conditions will worsen if they resort to

borrowing from multiple sources. Further, there are scores of SHGs which have no economic

activities. How do these borrowers generate cash inflows for debt servicing?

Over-indebtness is also caused by the dearth of financial literacy of the borrowers. It is not always

that the borrowers understand the true overall cost of their loan. In many cases the microfinance

providers show financial information in a semi- transparent manner which may be far

comprehensible for the borrowers. Research has revealed that there is much perplexity about

interest rates, and the borrower fails to comprehend in the beginning that the interest rate alone

considerably understates the total cost of credit. The main problem in this case is that a borrower

believes she/he can afford the loan but in reality when the real interest and principal repayment

burden arises the borrower feels that she /he is unable to service the loan . Again in many cases the

borrower does not understand the principal terms and conditions associated with their loan? They

do not understand what will be the consequences if they fail to pay one or two instalments, Will

there be a penalty or will there be coercive pressures to realize the instalments? When such

situations arise the beneficiaries taken up the practice of debt swapping i.e., they are use loans

from one MFI to repay loans of the other MFI. While debt-swapping can continue for some time,

it cannot be a sustainable practical tool for debt management in the long run, especially when the

borrowers are poor and less literate. “Borrowing money and repaying sustainably is an issue that

everyone grapples with, not only the poor. In modern society almost every individual consumer is

constantly bombarded with offers of „free‟ credit cards and „low cost‟ refinancing schemes for

mortgages; in such a media saturated market, even the moderately financially savvy feel lost. Now

imagine the poor, who are not educated and are moderately financially savvy when it comes to

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money management. When offered access to credit, often by competing MFIs, they are much less

experienced and tempted to borrow from multiple MFIs (Simbaqueba and Bumacov 2009).

Then the inability to repay then subjects the client to often extreme social pressure from peer

groups to repay. An interesting article of the Wall Street Journal (Gokhale 2009) reports that

women in rural India are afraid of losing their standing in their community if they default on their

loan obligations. This fear of social exclusion is so extreme that some are forced to opt for suicide

so as to avoid harassment from the MFIs, relatives and the society. Microfinance Focus (2010)

has reported that there have been 54 suicides by microfinance borrowers in the State of Andhra

Pradesh alone. When there are one or two suicides it could be chance or coincidence, but adding

up to 54? Who can be liable? Microfinance Focus (2010) . These glitches therefore must be

obliterated through governance . Some suggestions for good governance are given in the following

section.

III. Regulations for MF- Need and Status

Criticisms on rapid commercialization of the MFIs, competition , multiple lending etc can at best

be attention drawers, but the situation can be controlled and governed from within and without

only if there are appropriate regulations spelt out in proper time.. Data from the Financial Access

2010 survey show that in 90 percent of economies, at least some aspect of the financial inclusion

agenda is under the purview of the main financial regulator. Consumer protection and financial

literacy issues, often as a part of standard conduct of business regulations and supervision

mandates, are the most common areas of focus across all income groups and regions. The control

and governance from within the microfinance institutions call for careful monitoring of targets and

assessment of debt absorption capacities of the beneficiaries through regular assessment of their

sources and application of funds and getting information from formal sources like the local

government bodies and banks . CSFI (2011) opines “, MFIs are seen to be institutionally weak in

the areas of corporate governance management quality and staffing meaning that they may lack the

resource and know-how to handle competitive pressures. A further contributor is inappropriate

regulation which is failing to provide the right framework to keep MFIs on track”

MFIs should develop a culture in transparency and field officers must read loan agreements and

explain repayment schedule to the borrowers before advancing any amount to them how little it

may be. For this it is essential that the MFIs impart proper training to the field officers and staff so

that they fully understand the product‟s terms and conditions and can communicate the

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information clearly to consumers. In addition to this the MFIs and government agencies can

shoulder the task of imparting financial literacy to the borrowers. Borrowers should also be

sensitized and be taught to avoid unnecessary and extra loan burdens. Responsible borrowing and

money management of the beneficiaries can be assured by providing a mixture of information,

education and advice. The provision of debt counseling for over- indebted consumers is common

in Europe. Through these services it may be possible to resolve financial difficulties and falling

into multiple debts. The Government can take up initiatives to set up centers of financial learning

for the beneficiaries in collaboration with universities and colleges in the country. To cater to the

problem of multiple lending, credit bureaus can play an important role in providing information

whether borrowers have taken loans from more than one MFI . However, problems of unique

identification of the borrowers pose a challenge especially in the rural areas because the borrowers

may not even a birth certificate or a ration card as a proof of one‟s identity. Several credit bureaus

have been formed in India now and microfinance institutions can share data with at least one of

these credit bureaus. This has started to build data bases on microloans. The client credit bureaus

like Equifax and HiMark are very useful in this regard. These help the MFI find cases of multiple

lending very effectively.

Regulations from the Government are a sine-quo-non for healthy development of an industry

when growth is exponential and competition galore. Steps towards regulating the industry or

providing general guidelines for better financial access through microfinance started really from the

year 2000 RBI issued comprehensive guidelines to banks in February for mainstreaming micro

credit and enhancing the outreach of micro credit providers. Later in 2005-06 RBI set up an

internal group under the chairmanship of H.R. Khan. Based on the recommendations of the group

and with the objective of ensuring greater financial inclusion and increasing the outreach of the

banking sector, banks were permitted in January 2006 to use the services of NGOs/SHGs, MFIs

(other than NBFCs). However, these were meant for the banks only and there were no concrete

guidelines for MFIs. This effort came in after two tears when, the Union Government introduced

the Micro Financial Sector Development and Regulation Bill on 20th March 2007 in the Lok Sabha

. Needless to say that this bill did not find fruition in form of an act . The government really woke

up when the crisis in Andhra Pradesh led to passing of an ordinance to restrict multiple lending and

related practices.

The major eye-opener about the state of microfinance in India and the role of MFIs came in

when the Report of the Sub-Committee of the Central Board of Directors of Reserve Bank of India

to Study Issues and Concerns in the MFI Sector under the chairmanship of Y.H. Malegam was

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presented in January 2011. Among a host of issues , Malegam gave comprehensive

recommendations regarding multiple lending and coercive recovery by MFIs from borrowers. Some

of the salient points in the report regarding these aspects were as follows:

a borrower cannot be a member of more than one SHG/JLG.

not more than two MFIs should lend to the same borrower.

there must be a minimum period of moratorium between the grant of the loan and the

commencement of its repayment.

all sanctioning and disbursement of loans should be done only at a central location and

more than one individual should be involved in this function. In addition, there should be

close supervision of the disbursement function.

The responsibility to ensure that coercive methods of recovery are not used should rest

with the MFIs and they and their managements should be subject to severe penalties if

such methods are used.

The regulator should monitor whether MFIs have a proper Code of Conduct and proper

systems for recruitment, training and supervision of field staff to ensure the prevention of

coercive methods of recovery.

Field staff should not be allowed to make recovery at the place of residence or work of

the borrower and all recoveries should only be made at the Group level at a central place

to be designated.

Each MFI must establish a proper Grievance Redressal Procedure.

In 2011 RBI issued regulations to govern MFIs operating as non-banking financial companies,

based on the recommendations of Malegam Committee. The apex bank capped the interest rate

MFIs can charge at 26% and made a minimum two-year tenure mandatory for all loans

above Rs. 15,000.

The Malegam report also paved the way for a second Microfinance Bill, the draft of which

came in form of Microfinance Institutions Development and Regulation Bill on June 2011 . The

major point to be noted in this bill is it has placed NABARD as the central regulator of the

microfinance industry in India. Other salient points for governance and regulation of the industry

are as follows:

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It modifies the suggestions by the Malegam Committee of only focusing on loans, and

instead introduces the whole range of financial services ( credit, thrift, insurance ,

pensions, remittances ) needed by the poor and to be offered by MFIs.

Certificate of registration from the Reserve Bank under this Act compulsory for MFIs to

start business.

Disclosure of APR (Annual Percentage Rate ) and Margin ( cannot exceed the

percentage of margin specified by the Reserve Bank computed on the basis of the annual

percentage rate fixed by the MFI

The Reserve Bank is satisfied that activities of any micro finance institution are being

conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of its clients or depositors or the micro

finance institution itself the Reserve Bank may pass an order directing such micro finance

institution to cease and desist from continuing the micro finance activities.

Regarding the functions of the RBI, the bill specifically mentioned that:

The RBI can set performance standards pertaining to methods of operation, methods of

recovery, management and governance .

The RBI can for information and data from micro finance institutions for micro finance

services and disseminating the same through a national dissemination network.

The RBI will facilitate institutional development of all entities, including groups, engaged

in micro finance services through training and capacity building measures.

The points given above are merely illustrative and do not cover the bill in entirety, but is sufficient

to show that there are now serious efforts to govern and regulate the state of affairs of

microfinance in India.

The bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on May 22, 2012 and was passed. The Bill

allows the central government to create a Micro Finance Development Council with officers from

different Ministries and Departments. This council will advise the central government on policies

and measures for the development of MFIs. The Bill allows the central government to form State

Micro Finance Councils. These councils will be responsible for coordinating the activities of

District Micro Finance Committees and reviewing the MFIs in their state. District Micro Finance

Committees review the development of micro finance activities within the district, monitor over-

indebtedness and monitor the methods of recovery used by MFIs. These committees can be

appointed by the RBI. The Bill allows the RBI to impose a monetary penalty of up to Rs 5 lakhs

for any contravention of the Bill‟s provisions. No civil court will have jurisdiction against any

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MFI over any penalty imposed by the RBI. It is thus evident that a three tired regulatory

mechanism has been put to place so that governance of MFIs can be made from the grass roots.

However, effective control and monitoring by the regulatory structure will depend upon timely

communication and coordination between the district and state councils.

However, the bill has raised the loan credit limit ten times, to 5 lakh from the 50,000

proposed in the draft bill last June. The RBI, the proposed regulator, can increase this further to 10

lakhs. This upward revision changes the basic characteristic of micro loans since most

microfinance systems are devised on the basis of small multiple injection system financing. This

system takes care of the debt absorption and utilization capacity of the microfinance beneficiary. It

is not clear whether the bill has also considered financing of small enterprises under this scheme.

Rajshekhar(2012) reported that Yeshwant Thorat, former chairman of National Board for

Agriculture and Rural Development has opined that "This is an upward revision of microfinance

that doesn't seem to be in alignment with reality. I'm not sure whether this is consistent with equity

and social justice," Such criticisms should be taken into consideration before the bill becomes an

Act. It has to be conceived that primarily microfinance movements have been generated for people

at the bottom of the pyramid and acts and regulations should be in consonance with the core spirit

of the movement. Finally, it is much more important that the MFIs stress on control from within

and self regulation with the vision that their activities primarily fall within the avowed ambit of

social business and strategies have to be evolved to balance their sustainability with social

obligations and external regulations. A committed and concerted effort by the government

agencies and MFIs can erase the vices of multiple lending and over-indebtedness and maintain the

sanctity of the microfinance movement.

References:

Agarwal, P. and Sinha, S.K. (2010). Financial Performance Of Microfinance Institutions Of India: A Cross-

Sectional Study. Delhi Business Review X Vol. 11, No. 2, July - December 37-46

Aiyar,S. (2009) .How Micro-Finance Institutions Beat Nationalized Banks. The Times of India, July 26,6

Center for Microfinance (CFM) at the Swiss Banking Institute of the University of Zurich, (2011) .Over-

indebtedness and Microfinance Constructing an Early Warning Index.

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Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI), (2011). Microfinance Banana Skins- The CSFI Survey

of Microfinance Risk.

Collins, D. ,Morduch,J., Rutherford,S., and Ruthven,O.,( 2009). Portfolios of the Poor: How the World’s

Poor Live on $2 a Day. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Consultative Group to Assist the Poor/The World Bank Group (2010) . Financial Access 2010-The State of

Financial Inclusion Through the Crisis. NW, Washington DC 20433 USA

Ghate, P. (2007). Microfinance in India- A state of the Sector Report 2007. New York, Ford foundation

Gokhale ,K.(2009). As Microfinance Grows in India, So Do Its Rivals “ The Wall Street Journal Dec 16

Haas, O. (2006). Over indebtedness in Germany. Working Paper No. 44, Geneva, ILO.

Intellcap (2009). Inverting the Pyramid – Indian Microfinance Coming of Age. Third Edition. Hyderabad,

Intellectual Capital Services Pvt.Ltd.

Maurer, K., and Pytkowska, J. (2010). Indebtedness of Microcredit Clients in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Results from a comprehensive field study. European Fund for Southeast Europe (EFSE).

Microfinance Focus (2010). Exclusive: “54 microfinance-related suicides in AP says SERP Report”

October 29

Rajshekhar, M. (2012). Changes in draft Microfinance Institutions Bill shocks the microfinance sector . The

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