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Sino-Kazakhstan transboundary water allocationcooperation study: analysis of willingness andpolicy implementation

Chenjun Zheng

To cite this article: Chenjun Zheng (2021) Sino-Kazakhstan transboundary water allocationcooperation study: analysis of willingness and policy implementation, Water International, 46:1,19-36, DOI: 10.1080/02508060.2021.1871718

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2021.1871718

Published online: 02 Feb 2021.

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VIEWPOINT

Sino-Kazakhstan transboundary water allocation cooperation study: analysis of willingness and policy implementationChenjun Zheng

China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies (CIBOS), Wuhan University, Wuhan, China; Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

ABSTRACTDuring the process of bridging conflicting water interests, coopera-tion and conflict tend to co-exist. The main aim of this research is to identify the reason behind the intensified water relationship between China and Kazakhstan. In this regard, the main research question is: what are the barriers hindering the implementation of Sino-Kazakhstan water allocation cooperation? In order to answer this question, the research applies a qualitative analysis approach to assemble the crucial descriptors that allow the main barriers to be categorized, such as appreciation of water, initial willingness, institu-tional conflict resolution, and bureaucratic system constraints. This is intended to provide an assessment of the motivation, organization, and implementation of Sino-Kazakhstan transboundary water man-agement, based on interdisciplinary literature on water manage-ment and international law. This research ultimately finds that the opposite interests, reluctance, ambiguity in the legal framework, and poor intra-governmental coordination negatively impact the imple-mentation of Sino-Kazakhstan water allocation cooperation.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 9 January 2020 Accepted 1 January 2021

KEYWORDS Water management; willingness of cooperation; policy implementation; transboundary water allocation; international water law

Introduction

It is now evident that rivalry over water resources is intensifying in many parts of the world (Dinar, 2007). In water negotiations, the majority of difficulties stem from rigid assumptions about how water should be distributed. During the process of bridging conflicting water interests, cooperation and conflict co-exist, and cooperation in water sharing is particularly crucial if societies in arid areas are to achieve economic and social development (Bhaduri & Liebe, 2013). The deteriorating conditions of water resources used jointly by China and Kazakhstan have raised concerns about security of water resources in the region. Moreover, rapid economic growth – especially in China – has significantly increased the pressure on both water resources and related ecosystems in the shared river basins.

There are 24 transboundary rivers between China and Kazakhstan, and all main-streams flow from China to Kazakhstan, constituting a distinct upstream-downstream relationship. The transboundary river runoff in this water-scarce region is limited. The task of negotiating both the use and allocation of water is complex and frequently

CONTACT Chenjun Zheng zhengchenjun@whu.edu.cn

WATER INTERNATIONAL 2021, VOL. 46, NO. 1, 19–36 https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2021.1871718

© 2021 International Water Resources Association

encounters difficulties. However, the realities of water shortages, river basin ecological protection, and increasing development in Sino-Kazakh transboundary river basins have catalysed the stimulation of water allocation cooperation.

Although both parties have reached a general framework agreement concerning the ‘principle of equity and rationality’ in the use and protection of all 24 transboundary rivers, in order to achieve this equity goal, there remain operational obstacles in both countries’ transboundary water resources management.

Despite growing apprehension over water scarcity, China and Kazakhstan have made little progress in a decade of continuing talks over water rights. The Sino-Kazakhstan Agreement on Cooperation in the Use and Protection of Transboundary Rivers was reached in 2001 (hereafter the ‘2001 Sino-Kazakhstan Agreement’), and the resolution of the water allocation problem was expected before 2014 (Trend News Agency, 2014), although this was pushed back to 2015 or 2016. At the time of writing, no results have been achieved. Igor Malkovsky, the deputy director of the Institute of Geography in Almaty, has suggested that the longer China postpones the resolution of these issues, the more intensive infrastructure development it will be able to develop (Stone, 2012).

Cooperation in water management is a long-term social endeavour, and management research routinely promotes the process of water conflict resolution (Priscoli, 2009). Conflict management research mainly focuses on the negotiation process, although it rarely pays attention to a crucial component of conflict resolution – policy implementation – which is the central theoretical concept behind this research. The main question this research seeks to answer is: what are the barriers hindering the implementation of Sino- Kazakhstan water allocation cooperation? Based on interdisciplinary literature in the fields of water management and international law, this research aims to analyse the obstacles that hinder cooperation between China and Kazakhstan in transboundary river basins arising from institutional conflict resolution and bureaucratic system constraints.

Accordingly, this research employs a three-dimensional analysis of the willingness to cooperate, law enforcement, and public administration entrusted to the governance of water issues. This assessment approach is built on an ‘intergovernmental bargaining’ doctrine developed by Bardach, which focuses on the implementation of legislation and examines the motivation, incentives, and contextual variables that affect the assembly process of such intergovernmental bargaining (Bardach, 1977). Basing the research on this approach is beneficial, since it provides a clear indication and critical assessment of the motivation, organization, and implementation of water governance processes. In this regard, this research will develop an index of descriptors that allows different aspects of policy implementation to be categorized. These descriptors include the appreciation of water use, the willingness to cooperate, the applicability of existing agreements for institu-tional conflict resolutions, and the adequacy of management in a bureaucratic system. These grounds justify the application of this approach to the Sino-Kazakhstan transbound-ary water management context.

This paper undertakes a qualitative analysis of both primary and secondary text- based sources. Primary sources include bilateral agreements, case reports, and inter-view transcripts, and secondary sources include official governmental websites (such as the Ministry of Water Resources of the People’s Republic of China and the Ministry of Agriculture of Kazakhstan), news media (such as Xinhua.com and Mk.kz), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s global water information system (AQUASTAT),

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and reports from the UN Development Programme (such as ‘Water Resources of Kazakhstan in the new Millennium (UNDP, 2004)’) and the UN Economic Commission for Europe (such as ‘Second assessment of transboundary rivers, lakes and groundwaters (Economic Commission for Europe. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 2011)’). In addition, the author of this report has conducted an internship at the Ministry of Water Resources in the People’s Republic of China, during which time opinions were col-lected from officials and specialists through relevant documents by means of semi- structured interviews and discussions that arose during participation in relevant conferences.

The main body of this article is divided into five sections. The first section contextua-lizes the research background. In an attempt to delineate the research question, this part provides a snapshot of the two countries’ positions, values, and objectives, highlighting water allocation cooperation. This leads to the second section, which addresses the political willingness to cooperate in negotiation processes and the perspectives of China and Kazakhstan on third party involvement. The third section predominantly focuses on the factors that hinder cooperation from the perspective of conflict resolution, elaborating on the roles played by ambiguity and the lack of enforcement of existing agreements. The fourth section touches upon policy implementation in bureaucratic systems, revealing the lack of transparent information and the gap between policy and implementation in the context of cooperation. finally, the fifth section provides conclud-ing remarks and highlights key findings.

Appreciations on water uses: position, value, objective

It is recognized that upstream water use in transboundary river basins increases the water scarcity in downstream parts of the basin (Munia et al., 2016). However, downstream riparians can also harm upstream riparians by foreclosing their future uses through the prior use of waters (Salman, 2010); here, when the upstream and downstream riparian states are in an awkward situation of mutual restraint, common interests may play a positive role in finding shared values (Rijswick et al., 2014).

However, since water has no substitute, and it is the main resource serving many industrial areas, upstream and downstream riparian states both facing water scarcity and competitive water usage can hardly share common values. Based on their positions, Kazakhstan and China perceive transboundary water use differently, which is arguably illustrated through Kazakhstan’s ‘hard stance’ against China’s ‘threat’.

Kazakhstan’s State Programme for Industrial and Innovative Development for 2015–2019 (Office of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014) identifies water as a strategic resource and as important as non-renewable energy sources such as oil and natural gas. In addition, a report from the Water Resources Committee of the Ministry of Agriculture of Kazakhstan also addresses water shortage as one of the country’s most serious challenges (Water Resources Committee of the Ministry of Agriculture of Kazakhstan, 2013). Kazakhstan has previously exercised a strong voice against China, criticizing China’s expeditious development, regardless of its neighbour’s interests (Shishanova, 2015), and asserting that the reduction in the flow of the Irtysh River may cause serious ecological damage to Lake Zaisan (Ho, 2017).

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Compared to Kazakhstan, China holds a different stance on the exploitation of transboundary water. In governing its transboundary water resources, China operates in conformity with the principle of territorial sovereignty, according to which a state is entitled to use water as needed if the water’s source is located on the state’s territory (Wouters & Chen, 2013). During a plenary meeting at the UN General Assembly on the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (hereafter the UN Watercourses Convention), a Chinese representative claimed:

A watercourse State enjoys indisputable territorial sovereignty over those parts of interna-tional watercourses that flow through its territory (UN General Assembly, 1997, p. 6).

China claims its right to upstream water should be respected, and that in the context of transboundary waters, ‘China will not do any harm to Kazakhstan’s interests’.1 For instance, it is reported that as an upstream country, China’s diversion from the Irtysh River does not exceed 30% of the outbound flow, and from the Ili River does not exceed 45% of the outbound flow. Although there is no official universal acknowledgement of these proportions, in view of China’s contribution to total water runoff, current water demand, and no viable alternative of comparable value, China claims that its water use conforms with international practice and international law norms, and its restraint should be recognized (Zhang, 2008). On the contrary, China argues that the fluctuation in the levels of water in Kazakhstani lakes is primarily due to Kazakhstan’s inadequate management (Medetov et al., 2018; Long et al., 2010).

As for Kazakhstan, the downstream state seeks to rely on ecosystem services that are safeguarded by upstream states. The Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Kazakhstan attaches great importance to ecological issues, stating that regardless of the amount of runoff and water produced by the two countries in transboundary rivers, the corresponding share should take into account the final consumer – Lake Balkhash (Dubovaya, 2018). Considering the reduction of glaciers and river flows, Kazakhstan specialists propose to base water allocation on the ecosystem approach: water allocation agreements should consider seasonal variations (Ryabtsev, 2011), thus China should leave more water for the Lake Balkhash.

However, China argues that the main reason for the impact upon the water flowing in a watercourse system is climate change (Wang & Guo, 2016), by which the quantity of water reflects seasonal variations in flow. On the other hand, to explain the fluctuation of the water levels in both Lake Balkhash Lake Zaisan, China claims that this region has been an important base for industrial and agricultural activities, and its ecological problems are mainly derived from environmental problems inherited from past political and economic systems of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Wu et al., 2010). This is manifested in how Kazakhstan’s activities – for instance the Grand Almaty Irrigation Canal (1985) and other key hydro projects – transformed Kazakhstan into an important industrial and agricultural production base and permanently altered the area’s hydro-logical reality. This in turn has vastly worsened the ecological situation, which has not been addressed in a sufficiently timely manner. Furthermore, the construction of the Kapuchagai Reservoir and the over-exploitation of water resources in the Ili River Delta have had a major impact on the water level of the Balkhash lake (Wu et al., 2010).

This antagonism of positions demonstrates how water is used as a means to realize national interests. Unlike economic and trade cooperation, the interests of the two parties

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in this relationship contradict, rather than coincide. Accordingly, China and Kazakhstan foresee contradictory objectives in using transboundary water resources. For China, transboundary water is indispensable for industrialization and irrigation benefits, whereas Kazakhstan regards water as crucial for establishing a national competitive brand focusing on environmental restoration and sustainability. These positions are detailed in Table 1.

To sum up, water is increasingly a central consideration for food, energy, and environmental security, thereby significantly impacting human development at the regional and national levels (Tortajada, 2010). Although it is crucial that the policies and strategies of the water sector are viewed in a coherent and systematic manner on the river basin scale to take into account their impact on other sectors (and vice-versa), China and Kazakhstan still maintain divergent or even isolated positions. The reasons underlying these positions can be identified by analysing the willingness of each party to cooperate, prompting participants to formulate their positions. The following section will discuss this in detail.

Willingness to cooperate

The coordination of interests derived from water use is the fundamental motivation for transboundary water allocation cooperation. This section mainly analyzes how the pur-suit of interests is reflected in the willingness to cooperate.

The willingness to cooperate depends on how people define a situation. Of particular importance is the difference between gains and losses. Individuals are keener on avoiding losses than on achieving gains, ceteris paribus (Wright, 2015, pp. 862–863).

In transboundary water allocation cooperation, China has shown a certain degree of intentional conservatism, which has been interpreted as ‘responsive diplomacy’ resulting from a passive response to a request or dispute (He, 2015). How this results in the divergent positions illustrated in the previous section is divided into two aspects: achieving gains and avoiding losses.

With regard to achieving gains, China maintains numerous interests in its trans-boundary waters, each of which must be protected through diplomatic means (Li, 2014).

Table 1. Divergent positions, values and objectives for water management.China Kazakhstan

Overall positions Watercourse State enjoys indisputable territorial sovereignty over those parts of international watercourses that flow through its territory.

Water is a strategic resource and as important as non-renewable energy sources such as oil and natural gas.

Values for Ecological health & Climate Change

The main reason for the impact upon the water flowing in a watercourse system is climate change; Kazakhstani ecological problems are derived from environmental problems inherited from past political and economic systems.

As a downstream state, Kazakhstan seeks to rely on ecosystem services safeguarded by upstream China. Reduction in the flow in China may cause serious damage to Kazakhstan ecologically. China should leave more water for Kazakhstan.

Water Use objectives

Xinjiang takes an important position in food security, which makes the water for agricultural irrigation crucial.

Rapid population growth exerts greater pressure on water resources. At present, Kazakhstan has prepared a comprehensive plan for the utilization and restoration of agricultural water use.

WATER INTERNATIONAL 23

China, which is about to become the world’s largest economy, relies heavily on declining water resources while promoting its domestic development. Due to the rapid use of domestic waters, focusing on the use of transboundary waters may be one way for China to cope with the imminent domestic water crisis. In this regard, China’s water allocation cooperation focuses primarily on economic cooperation for the purpose of national economic gains (He & Feng, 2006). To put it differently, water use that is consistent with basin-wide sustainable development and the maintenance of ecological security is a weak link in cooperation.

Regarding China’s avoidance of losses, the existence of external forces that operate to balance China’s development is regarded by some as indicative of China losing some of its original interests. Having this in mind, even if accepting a so-called ‘strategic loss in cooperation’ might increase overall gains in the ‘interconnected game (Madani, 2011)’ between ecological and economic benefits, China’s stance on ‘water use’ conservation remains strong. In facing the ‘upstream development dilemma’ (Wouters, 2014) despite strategic loss, China is biased towards safeguarding its own economic interests, as it always has been. Another clear example of China avoiding losses is its adoption of the one-river-one-country policy, preferring to sign bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries rather than regional agreements with numerous countries (He, 2015), as a third party is likely to restrain China and impinge on its interests.

For example, in terms of dispute settlement, there is a divergence between China’s practice and the UN Watercourses Convention regulations, particularly on the concept of compulsory dispute settlement. During a Plenary meeting at the General Assembly, China’s representative claimed that:

The Chinese Government favours the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means, through consultations. We are not against fact-finding as an optional means of settlement, but we cannot agree to any mandatory means or procedures for the settlement of a dispute without the consent of the countries parties to the dispute (UN General Assembly, 1997, p. 7).

As a result, such behavioural characteristics are also reflected in Sino-Kazakhstan water relations. Being an upstream riparian, China takes pole position in hydro-geography. Nonetheless, for the sake of protecting interests from damage, the ‘2001 Sino-Kazakhstan Agreement’ also limits conflict resolution to a bilateral scope and excludes the applicability of other international conventions signed by either party on the utilization of transbound-ary rivers between China and Kazakhstan. In this regard, it is unclear what measures should be taken in the absence of meaningful results from such limited means. Provided the problem cannot be properly solved through diplomatic channels, Kazakhstan, as a downstream country, could be left with few options.

Also, China has been heavily censured for its reluctance to settle the dispute in a timely manner, thus gaining time for development. In addition, although China’s treaty practice seems to indicate China’s endorsement of the obligation to cooperate in all agreements, laying particular emphasis on technology, in practice this is not realized (Chen et al., 2013).

Except for technical preparations that seek to avoid loss, a substantive agreement concerning the water allocation issues of two major rivers (Ili and Irtysh) has been under negotiation for more than a decade. Cooperation is still in its infancy, and China has been blamed for stalling the negotiations (Stone, 2012). Another less visible example of

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China’s unwillingness to cooperate is evident in the issue of water pollution in some regions of China. Kazakhstan takes the view that a water quality monitoring and pollu-tion prevention agreement should be reached as soon as possible, whereas China has repeatedly failed to sign such an agreement within reasonable time on the pretext of premature technical conditions, claiming that basic work on water quality analysis and evaluation methods of transboundary rivers should be further strengthened.

Last but not least, China has rejected the involvement of third parties in this dispute. However, the involvement of a third country in the transboundary river basin might positively contribute to the holistic development of the entire basin. Simultaneously, regional development will also demand higher requirements for the sharing of trans-boundary water resources. However, reginal cooperation can only be promoted by an unanimously agreed, basin-wide comprehensive framework for the peaceful manage-ment of disputes. Nevertheless, China’s transboundary water cooperation has hardly reached this stage.

To illustrate this, take the example of the Irtysh River, which originates in China, meanders through Kazakhstan, and eventually joins the Obi River in Russia; there are thus three countries in the river basin. However, current legislation on the Irtysh River Basin consists of two different sets of agreements between Kazakhstan and China and Kazakhstan and Russia, which is inadequate for the purpose of managing the basin (Vinogradov & Wouters, 2013). It has been suggested to bring this issue to the attention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) so that Russia can also participate, but China has never taken the idea seriously (Ruskline, 2013). Provided a three-party agreement between Russia, China, and Kazakhstan will be signed, it may enable Kazakhstan to balance China through Russia, thereby impacting China’s development interests (Ryabtsev, 2011). For this reason, China has rejected such an agreement. A leading Kazakhstani expert also believes that it is highly unlikely that Beijing would ever agree to discuss the issue of the Irtysh River within trilateral (China, Kazakhstan, Russia) or multilateral forums. Numerous experts are also of the view that current levels of cooperation between Kazakhstan and China are insufficient given the magnitude and complexity of the water issues they face (Baizakova, 2015).

Existing agreements for institutional conflict resolution

Conflict resolution is a process that aims to solve central incompatibilities between conflicting parties and facilitate agreement among them for a solution to their issues (Tayia, 2019). In order to solve conflicts at an implementation level, a set of processes that seek to translate the law into actions that achieve the aims of the legislation must be followed. If such actions fail to be taken, the law is unenforceable.

The enforceability of law (in this context: existing joint agreements) is a crucial indicator that distinguishes cooperative from non-cooperative situations. In other words, actions are considered functional when the parties can establish an enforceable joint agreement (Dixit & Skeath, 1999). Such an agreement could be realized through an institutional conflict resolution approach that clarifies water usage rights, provides the management framework that dictates the way in which actions are taken, and restricts parties’ choices (North, 2008). The importance of the role of institutions in the creation of such a water resources governance system has been highlighted in research (Agyenim,

WATER INTERNATIONAL 25

2011). Implementation plans of relevant institutions embedded in joint agreements should be developed by parties, outlining expectations of behaviour under circumstances brought about by practical conditions (Ostrom, 2008). In the Sino-Kazakh transbound-ary water negotiations there are many implementation issues, including hydrological monitoring methods, water quality protection, and emergency notification; but the core obstacle evident in conflict resolution is how to implement water allocation by institu-tional joint agreements.

The start of negotiations in 1999 for the purposes of reaching ‘water uses’ arrangement resulted in the signing, in 2001, of the landmark Agreement on the Use and Protection of Transboundary Rivers (as the ‘2001 Sino-Kazakhstan Agreement’), which laid a solid foundation for further cooperation on all transboundary rivers between China and Kazakhstan. Under the framework of the ‘2001 Sino-Kazakhstan Agreement’, the Joint Commission for the Use and Protection of Transboundary Rivers between China and Kazakhstan (hereafter ‘Joint Commission’) was established. From 2003 to 2019 the Join Commission held 17 meetings, which resulted in many of the agreements, ranging from water quality, joint research, information sharing.

However, water allocation negotiations are the most substantive issue, and they have been postponed for a decade, seriously impeding the enforceability and the institutional function of joint agreements. At the eighth meeting of the Joint Commission held in 2010, China and Kazakhstan considered and approved a key implementation plan, which marked the formal beginning of cooperation in water allocation. In 2014, an ad-hoc working group was established to coordinate and prepare a draft agreement on water resources allocation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, 2014). Until now, the ‘2001 Sino-Kazakhstan Agreement’ has been supplemented,2 and it has achieved periodic results,3 receiving continued attention from leaders of both sides (Kazinform, 2015). However, the section of the 2011 Agreement that deals with water allocation is mostly comprised of provisions at the principle level.

Article 2 of the ‘2001 Sino-Kazakhstan Agreement’ reads as follows:

In the use and protection of transboundary rivers, the Parties shall adhere to the principles of equity and rationality, as well as closely cooperate in a sincere, neighbourly, and friendly manner.

Article 4 reads:

Taking into account mutual interests, no Party shall limit the other party in the rational use and protection of the water resources of transboundary rivers.

As such, the main problem concerning the above-mentioned provisions is that neither party can be prevented from applying the principles of equity and rationality stipulated in Articles 2 and 4. Despite this, there is no legal document that provides for the institu-tional mechanism requiring the implementation of such provisions. Likewise, there is also a lack of monitoring and compliance mechanisms, and institutional conflict resolu-tion mechanisms are generally considered ineffective (Janusz-Pawletta & Gubaidullina, 2015).

It is worth noting that the application of the principle of ‘ equity and rationality’ faces some difficulties and uncertainties in the context of International Water law. On one hand, in national practices, equity and rationality are crucial indicators by which the

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activities of riparian states are assessed, and through which the thresholds of river damage are set. However, the precise meaning of ‘equity and rationality’ depends on the balance of relevant factors and circumstances, the evaluation of which should first be carried out by each watercourse country, whereby the results of that country are applied first (International Law Commission, 1994, p. 101). This discrepancy may lead to differences in evaluation criteria. For example, China and Kazakhstan have not coordi-nated on the monitoring method chosen to measure basic hydrological facts, but rather undertook this separately, which has hindered further cooperation.

On the other hand, except for basic human need, there is no pre-established hierarchy among different factors of water use. The process of balancing factors in national practices must consider whether the evidence of one factor is more valuable or significant than that of others (Fuentes, 1997). However, the current agreement reached between China and Kazakhstan does not address this.

To sum up, the weaknesses of conflict resolution and law enforceability reside in the indeterminacy and vagueness of agreements provisions. The framework spirit of the ‘2001 Sino-Kazakhstan Agreement’ is a double-edged sword; its general concern may facilitate bilateral settlement of differences, but the ambiguous expression of its content may lead to different interpretations and unenforceable management (Zheng, 2018). Accordingly, implementation faces obstacles in the form of international legal relation-ships on transboundary rivers, causing significant confusion over the water usage rights and obligations of upstream and downstream riparian states (Salman, 2010). This in turn results in a lack of sufficient common knowledge to support each party’s fair share for environmental and social water consumption.

Water management in the bureaucratic system

Lowi (1995) reminds us that politics over water is generally subordinate to the ‘higher’ political picture. Transboundary water interaction is an inherently political process determined by a broader management context, which is reflected in a series of manage-ment issues that affect policy implementation on a domestic level. Policy implementation is the stage of the policy process immediately after the passing of a law or the action that will be taken to either put the law into effect or resolve the problem. These issues are reflected in Sino-Kazakhstan water relations.

The gap between policy and its implementation

Among the reasons underlying political fragmentation, the isolation of multilevel coor-dination stems from self-sufficient and self-contained organs through ‘bureaucratic entrepreneurship’. In this sense, the tendency of bureaucracy to vigorously promote and safeguard its own interests in the decision-making process has also been intensified (Kenneth et al., 1992).

In China, local water policy implementation is shaped through various contested discourses (Wang et al., 2018). However, political fragmentation presents a significant obstacle to implementation; the absence of intra-governmental connections has resulted in a lack of clarity regarding the allocation of power and responsibility. In addition, the

WATER INTERNATIONAL 27

policy implementation process is generally unsatisfactory, with poor coordination and weak implementation widespread across the country (Ran, 2013).

There are two water management departments in China Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, namely the Water Resources Department of the Autonomous Region and the Water Resources Bureau of Production and Construction Corps; both have generally managed to establish a water management organization system. These water manage-ment departments exercise corresponding water management functions within their jurisdictions and occasionally overlap with each other. At present, there are fragmenta-tions and contradictions in water resources management between the two sides, which mainly manifest in the inconsistent understanding of the status of the Corps’ Water Resources Bureau in water resource management and the unclear authority of river management (Wang, 2017).

The transboundary rivers basin (together with Kazakhstan) in Xinjiang are mainly located within the jurisdiction of Altay and the Tenth Agricultural Division (one produc-tion and construction corps). The general agenda of water management in Xinjiang is based on the unified management of the autonomous region, which is responsible for monitoring the implementation but does not tackle operational details. Especially since the promulga-tion of interim measures for water distribution, issued by the Ministry of Water Resources in 2007, the initial water use rights owned originally by the state were transferred to administrative regions and actual users at provincial, prefectural, county, and municipal levels (Jia, 2011). In practice, these decentralized administrative bodies are responsible for the redistribution of property rights. Likewise, the Tenth Agricultural Division individually carries out its own planning, licencing, law enforcement, fee collection, and other manage-ment functions in local areas.

However, there is no superior-subordinate relationship between the Water Resources Department of the Autonomous Region and the Water Resources Bureau of Production and Construction Corps (Figure 1, Xinjiang Water Resources Management System); as such, the overlapping management system prevents the effectiveness of the water admin-istration framework. Therefore, the low-level water management stations have learned how to prevail (or at least compete) in the rough-and-tumble world of Chinese politics without losing their normative and often strongly held personal policy goals (Mertha, 2009).

The ‘2001 Sino-Kazakhstan Agreement’ contains a provision stipulating that ‘the parties will agree on the content, quantity, and time of the exchange of information’

Water Resources Department

of Autonomous Region

County Water Management

Bureau

Township Water Management

Station

Corps Water Resources

Bureau

City Water Management

Bureau

Round Field Water

Management Station

Figure 1. Xinjiang water resources management system.

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(Art. 6). In other words, at the governmental level a general resolution has been put forward, but no clear-cut action mechanism has been operationalized, likely due to the weak ability of local governments to implement policy and their inclination to protect their own interests. Malkovsky claims:

In 2006, the two countries agreed to conduct research together and exchange data on transboundary water quality. There has not been any joint research. Since 2009, Kazakhstan has been providing China with data on flow rate, pollutants, and other indica-tors of river health. We still have not received anything in return (Stone, 2012, p. 407).

On the other hand, Kazakhstan adopted a strong heritage of centralized and hierarchical government structure from the USSR (SIC ICWC, 2009). State management of water resources in Kazakhstan is conducted by the government, an authorized state body managing water use and conservation, local representative and executive bodies, and other state bodies within their competencies. At the national level, state water resource management and conservation are implemented by the Water Resources Committee of the Ministry of Agriculture and its basin water management units (BVOs). The Committee is responsible for distributing water resources between territories and sectors and helping to distinguish priorities in intergovernmental water cooperation with neigh-bouring countries, including China. BVOs are charged with coordinating plans for rational water use, working out plans for diversion flow, and apportioning water; and local representative (maslikhats) and executive (akimats) bodies manage water relations at the regional (oblast) level, within their competences (UNDP, 2004).

Gaps in policy implementation stem from the decentralization of water management in Kazakhstan. Bardach argues that many management dilemmas are due to organiza-tional structural characteristics, a shortage of competent people, and barriers to coordi-nation (Bardach, 1977). Initially, the Water Resources Committee worked directly under the Ministry of Water Resources & Environment, and was responsible for all river basins, including those of Irtysh and Ili. However, the Water Resources Committee has under-gone reorganization several times in recent years. In 2014, the Ministry of Water Resources & Environment was disbanded, and the Water Resources Committee was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture. However, in 2019, this Committee was re- incorporated into the recently reorganized Ministry of Ecology, Geology & Natural resources. These structural changes have negatively impacted human resources, materi-als, and equipment, and the Committee’s full-time staff has been reduced several times (Baizakova, 2015). Furthermore, in August 2014 the Kazakh government announced a major ministerial reform. The impact of the change to the executive body of Kazakhstan’s water resources management is evident in the decentralization of work from the unified departments to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Energy (Tu, 2014). The withdrawal of the Ministry of Water Resources & Environment implies that the focus of work is more biased towards economic development rather than the institutionalized management of transboundary rivers.

Meanwhile, the full-time personnel of BVOs have been halved, which makes it more difficult for BVOs to meet their objectives in transboundary cooperation. There has also been a loss of key personnel with scientific, technical, and project expertise. Scientific research has not been set priorities when it comes to solving critical problems, and there is a lack of research into the rational use of water resources (Shibutov, 2017). The Chinese

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delegation is equipped with well-trained and qualified teams of water experts, lawyers, and diplomats (Mustafina, 2014), whereas Kazakhstan lacks a sufficient number of technical experts to conduct appropriate negotiations (Uvarov et al., 2014). The same can be said about the work of the Joint Commission. As a result, on most occasions Kazakhstan procrastinates over the implementation of arrangements made by the Joint Commission, to the extent that some projects as old as 20 years remain unfulfilled and lie forgotten in the desk drawers of Kazakh officials.

Another drawback in dealing efficiently with policy implementation issues in Kazakhstan is that, several water bodies hold conflicting interests and agendas. Since the country’s independence, the Committee for Water Resources has been responsible for the management of all water bodies (Uvarov et al., 2014), which made it necessary for intradepartmental and inter-agency coordination regarding the implementation of deci-sions. Nevertheless, there are great numbers of other stakeholders at various levels of water governance, although very little cross-level coordination (Mukhtarov & Cherp, 2014). Like in other areas, internal contradictions have always existed in the sphere of water use (Shibutov, 2017), which also causes problems in transboundary cooperation. For instance, if Kazakhstani farmers could reach an agreement with water reservoir managers, the tension created by water deficiencies in irrigation would be relieved, and the complex situation simplified when it comes to cooperation with China. The reason behind this is the poorly organized coordination between hydraulic power development and irrigated cropping. This contradiction is evident in the efforts that water reservoir management takes to ensure a highly stable water consumption in order to generate electric power. This means that in spring, they reduce the water flow, thus worsening conditions for farmers to plant in locations where water is required for the emergence of seedlings.

The problem of Information openness

Political fragmentation tends to lead to information asymmetry (Mertha, 2009). In theory, citizens have the right to access the documents and proceedings of the government to allow for efficacious public supervision. In practice, however, sharing and publishing research is also extended to those who use such information to cause harm. In this context, China, exercising its ‘responsive diplomacy’, overacts to limit the access of possibly malicious parties to information. In any case, it is of political significance for local organizations to provide information to journalists and for journalists to collect this information. In this respect, the intrinsic cognition of responsive diplomacy (or conservatism) still impedes the pace of information disclosure.

The technical information involved in international river disputes is highly sensitive, and it is arguably unavoidable that information disclosure is insufficient (Surie, 2015). As for China’s transboundary rivers, this situation has aroused widespread dissatisfaction among downstream countries, resulting in more suspicion and misunderstanding of over-exploitation in China (Han, 2017). For example, in 2010 the downstream Mekong countries suffered a severe drought, and a few local media outlets pointed their finger at China, mistakenly believing that China’s dam construction on the upper Mekong River caused the drought to worsen (Sun, 2010).

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Furthermore, environmental NGOs, water users, and other relevant agencies are unable to obtain sufficient reliable data on the scale and extent of environmental damage to rivers caused by China and Kazakhstan. Without reliable data, they would not be able to launch any serious public campaign or start lobbying to support river conservation. In China, journalists and experts are also restricted from communicating with governmen-tal officials.

Because of the sensitivity of the negotiations with Kazakhstan, it is tough to get discharge data now from Xinjiang Water Resources Bureau (Stone, 2012, p. 407).

Civil servants responsible for water-related issues are prohibited from accepting interviews or answering questions without formal organizational requirements. These requests must be made in the form of official letters, with seals and signatures, and must be registered with major bodies, such as the Water Resources Committee. The Committee is obliged to respond within 15 working days, although this may be invariably delayed, because different questions require different expertise. However, officials are unlikely to share any objective information if it gives a negative impression; in other words, if it implies that someone is not performing their duties properly. Civil servants will therefore think twice before sharing any objective information on ‘sensitive’ issues if it might have an impact on their career. Likewise, the head of the Chinese delegation to the bilateral negotiation, Liu Weiping, director of the Water Resources and Hydropower Planning and Design General Institute in Beijing, declined to comment on the sensitivity of the issue of transboundary rivers in China. Liu referred inquiries to China’s Ministry of Water Resources, which also did not respond to requests for comment (Stone, 2012). In this respect, the difficulties in information disclosure, born out of conservatism, still impede the pace of conflict resolution.

Discussion and conclusions

This research aimed to analyse the implementation of Sino-Kazakhstan water allocation cooperation. The analytical framework provided an extensive analysis of water governance process and its elements, such as parties’ appreciation on water, their initial willingness, institutional conflict resolution, and bureaucratic system constraints. Accordingly, this research engaged in a three-dimensional discussion, with empirical evidence manifested in value-willingness, law enforcement, and policy implementation in the bureaucratic system (political fragmentation, information openness).

First, it is demonstrated that when confronting water shortage and competitive water use, China faces the ‘upstream development dilemma’: how to satisfy the domestic water demand while simultaneously giving consideration to the water needs of other co- riparian countries (Wouters, 2014). China and Kazakhstan hold divergent objectives on water use, in according with their respective standpoints and values. This opposition shows that water is being used as a means of realizing national interests. Cooperation, when China is solely focused on its own interests, will result in a lack of mutual trust and negligent substantive progress in negotiations, leading to possible disputes and divergent interaction at local and interstate levels.

Second, China’s willingness to facilitate negotiations on water use will be tested in future negotiations. It was shown how reluctance can stem from divergent positions and

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how responsive diplomacy or a conservatory stance can hinder effective solutions. It was found that third party involvement provides China with an opportunity to help promote a basin-wide cooperation, which is currently restricted by China in order to avoid loss. In other words, what has been observed is the aim to maximize China’s benefit in the basin, with full knowledge that the current low level cooperation is a product of all prior conservative decisions (Madani, 2010).

Third, because of the ambiguity and the different types of uncertainties in the imple-mentation plan of the legal framework on water allocation cooperation, more clearly elaborated agreements are needed to oversee implementation and address future challenges.

Last but not least, the tendency of bureaucracy to vigorously promote and safeguard each party’s own but conflicting interests in the decision-making process has also been intensified. Political fragmentation, overlapping management, poor coordination, lack of expertise, and information asymmetry in the policy implementation process are wide-spread at the local level and negatively impact on the institutionalization of management on Sino-Kazakhstan transboundary rivers.

Interactive cooperation has developed to reveal positive effects of containing conflict. Previously unchallenged typical indicators of cooperation (such as signing treaties or establishing a joint committee) do not fundamentally address policy implementation issues. Cooperation based on goals, interests, and the characteristics of solving substan-tive problems can be termed ‘effective cooperation’. On the other hand, it is evident that superficial cooperation may conceal or perpetuate conflicts, and forcible cooperation (compulsory dispute settlement) may exacerbate such conflict relationships.

Notes

1. As stated by Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister during his official visit to Kazakhstan on 19–20 August 2013: ‘If we talk about the transboundary waters, China is not doing anything to the detriment of the interests of Kazakhstan. I am convinced that by further efforts of both sides, we will find a deserved solution to this problem, and transboundary rivers between the two countries will be the ties that will closely connect our peoples.’ (IBP, 2009).

2. The Sino-Kazakh Boundary Management Agreement in December 2006 and the Joint Declaration on Further Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and Kazakhstan in September 2013 complement and improve the basic framework of the aforementioned agreements, such as the maintenance of border corridors and joint border inspection.

3. Transactional agreements, including the Agreement on the Emergency Notification of Natural Disasters in Transboundary Rivers, the Agreement on the Exchange of Hydrological and Water Quality Information at Border Hydrological Stations in Major Transboundary Rivers, and the Agreement on Scientific Research Cooperation in Transboundary Rivers, have been reached by the two sides. Both China and Kazakhstan have also achieved on phase of an agreement focused on diverting the water from the Horgos River: Completion and Operation of the Friendship Joint Diversion Project of the Horgos River between China and Kazakhstan.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Marleen van Rijswick, Otto Spijkers, Herman Kasper Gilissen, Liping Dai and Raymond Yu Wang for their valuable suggestion on earlier versions of this article. At the same time, I would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their detailed and valuable comments.

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Funding

This research was funded by China Scholarship Council, grant number 201806270086.

ORCID

Chenjun Zheng http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7231-0759

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