Sino-Indian Border Dispute: The Impossible settlement, and need of a newframework

Abstract:

Why have India and China failed to resolve their border disputes? This paper argues thatthe current public discourse on the Sino-Indian border dispute, based on legal andhistorical analysis, has paved way for an inconclusive and unending saga of conflictedclaims and accusations. The said discourse is strictly limited to analysing the Sino-Indianborder conflict of 1962, and examining either country☂s responsibility for the war and theirborder transgressions before and during the war. The primary purpose of the paper is toshowcase the futility of any such analysis that blames either India or China for thecontinuing border crisis. For India and China to foster friendly ties, the dominantdiscourses need to veer away from the regular ☁blame game☂ approach. This papersuggests a rather holistic approach to view the border dispute, where the emphasis wouldessentially be on the external international factors at play. Understanding these factors, asthe paper aims to, could lead to a de-escalated security situation between India and China,and can possibly make way for a healthy competition.

1. Introduction

History is a contested space for political narrations, and no single country can layundisputed claim over the narratives of past happenings. Sino-Indian border disputefalls under a similar realm of contested history. Despite sixteen rounds of talks betweenIndia and China on the ☁contentious boundary issue☂, both countries have till date failed

to come to agreeing terms on the issue of resolving border dispute. At the heart of thisdispute is the month-long 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict that continues to retainsignificance to the tumultuous relationship between India and China. The ☁uncertain☂ or☁ambiguous☂ reasons that led to the 1962 conflict have hitherto troubled policymakersfrom both the countries to negotiate any conclusive settlement. In popular discoursesabout the conflict, both countries accused the other of aggression guided byimperialistic ambitions. Whilst India accused China of unwarranted incursions and ofillegally occupying Aksai-Chin (Nehru 1963), China claimed to have acted in self-defenceand counter-charged India of being a regional hegemon (Enlai 1973).

This paper examines the epistemological framework of popular discourses on Sino-Indian

border conflict. To this end, the paper analyses several prominent scholarly writings that have

examined the conflict through historical verification of claims and legal analysis of boundary

disputes (Fisher et al. 1963; Dalvi 1969; Desai 1963; Noorani 1964; Rao 1962; Gupta1974; Maxwell 1972; Lamb 1964; Anand 2012). Their works hold either of the twocountries accountable for having intruded into the other country, and thereforeresponsible for the 1962 conflict. Scholarly writings like that of K.K. Rao (1962), M.W.

Fisher (1963) and A.G. Noorani (1963) support India’s claim, whilst writings of K. Gupta

(1974), N. Maxwell (1972) and A. Lamb (1964) support the claims of China on the issue of

border dispute. These writings suggest a theoretical underpinning of ☁reductionisttheories☂, which implies that if the causes of conflict are removed then the effect (i.e.existing boundary dispute) could also be removed (Hollis and Smith 1991: 106). Morepertinent, a neutral judgement on boundary issue based on legality and historicitywould resolve the border dispute between India and China. On further analysis, many ofthese writings have their orientation in the ☁individualist☂ approach. Explained by Hollisand Smith, this approach takes ☁State☂ as the central factor for explaining events (1991:

4). Accordingly, the causes of the conflict are with the State (i.e. India or China), where astate☂s motive, legality of claims and allegations of intrusion acquire central position.

This ☁individualist☂ approach, as the paper argues, has further deepened the existingboundary dispute between India and China. The paper make no claims to provide anyfactual reasons behind the 1962 conflict rather I attempt to challenge the state-centricapproach of the public discourses; in other words this paper argues that the existingdiscourse on the conflict is bound to result in an inconclusive settlement between Indiaand China. For this purpose, this paper analyses the claims, allegations and motives ofboth countries, to explore the flaws of this approach. As an alternative and moreappropriate paradigm to analyse the issue of boundary dispute, this paper extends theanalysis to the ☁holistic☂ approach. Explained by Hollis and Smith, ‘holistic’ approach takes

various systematic and external forces into consideration; for instance, inter-state alliances,

balance of power and threats from nations other than those involved in a direct dispute

(Hollis and Smith 1991: 4). Unlike the individualistic approach where individual States

acquire central position, holistic approach focuses on the international structure of which the

States are part of. On Similar lines, Renaud Egreteau (2012) analyses the China-India

relationship through the conceptual framework of ‘enduring international rivalries’. Thispaper argues for an extension of this theoretical model to better understand theongoing boundary dispute between the two countries.

To this end, the paper has been divided into four sections ♠ first, looks into the disputedboundary claims of India and China; second looks into the allegations of aggression byboth countries; third problematizes the individualist approach; the fourth section bringsin the holistic approach, also the ☁enduring international rivalries☂ to better understandthe dispute. This paper concludes by claiming that the holistic approach is a better way

to analyse the Sino-Indian border dispute towards envisioning any settlement betweenIndia and China on border dispute.

2. Disputed Claims by India and China: An Individualist Approach

The individualist approach views conflict in abstraction, as an exclusive inter-stateevent. Within this framework, scholars on Sino-India border conflict attribute thecauses of war to either of the two countries. Their scholarly writings can broadly becategorized into two schools of thought ♠ one that blames China for the conflict, and theother that blames India. Scholars supporting India☂s claim characterized the 1962conflict, primarily, as a result of Chinese aggression and betrayal against India (Fisher etal. 1963; Dalvi 1969; Desai 1963; Noorani 1964). Other factors, namely- the naivety ofIndian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in trusting the Chinese (Anand 2012: 231), andfailure on the part of political leadership to strengthen the military forces, remainderivatives of the primal factor i.e. Chinese aggression. On the other hand, scholarssupporting China☂s claim rejected all of India☂s allegations and accused India of behavingin an imperialist fashion (Lamb 1964; Maxwell 1972). Underlying both countries☂ claimwas the assertion of legitimacy on the border issue.

This section brings forth a scholarly conversation of claims and counterclaims on the

legitimacy of boundary issue between India and China. The readings in this section areimportant to explore the usability of individualistic approach.

2.1. India☂s Claim on Contested Boundary

The contested boundary areas between India and China can be categorized into ☁theeastern sector, where the famous McMahon Line lies; the middle sector, which is

between the states of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh of India, and theTibet region of China; and the western sector, which is in the Ladakh area of Kashmir[Aksai Chin], and through which China built a 100-mile highway linking China☂s Tibetregion with the Chinese province of Sinkiang☂ (Lu 1986: 3). While the middle sectorwitnessed the first round of ☁diplomatic squabble☂, the eastern and western sectoremerged as the hotbeds of conflict (Anand 2012: 3). According to the Indian claims, theconflict of 1962 resulted in loss of the Indian territory of Aksai Chin (in western sector)to China, while in the eastern sector the Chinese forces overran more than hundredmiles into the country before withdrawing (Lu 1986). India claims authority over thesedisputed boundary areas, and considers China as an illegal occupant of India☂s AksaiChin.

India☂s claim in the western sector can be traced back to the ☁Ladakh ♠ Tibet treaty of 17September, 1842☂ (Noorani 2011: 12), which was concluded between the Dogra rulerGulab Singh of Kashmir and the Lama Guru of Tibet, and that the treaty had beenacknowledged by the Chinese government in the year 1847 (Lu 1986: 90). Theagreement declared Dogras as the ☁legitimate rulers of Ladakh☂, and that the oldestablished frontiers between the two parties were to be accepted (Noorani 2011: 12).Since then, ☁Ladakh has been an integral part of Kashmir☂ (Rao 1962: 382). Post-independence, after Kashmir acceded to the Indian union, India claims to havesovereign rights over the areas of Kashmir which included Ladakh and Aksai Chin.Treaties aside, India claims to have a traditional integrity with areas in the westernsector (Pardesi 2012: 190). Such claims are based on the pertinent references made tothese areas in the ancient Indian religious texts of Ramayana, Mahabharata andUpanishads (Rao 1962). On the question of effective jurisdiction, India claims that

because of the geographical location and topographical features of western sector☁Indian government did not expect any kind of aggression across its frontier in thissector, [therefore] it did not think it was necessary to set up checkposts right up to theSino-Indian border☂ (Lu 1986: 101).

Middle sector, though relatively less-conflict-prone than the other two sectors, was theemerging point of diplomatic imbroglio and military confrontation between India andChina. India☂s claim on these areas, especially in the disputed lands of ☁Chuva, Shipki LaPass, Sang, Tsungsha, Barahoti, Sangchamalla and Lapthal☂ (Lu 1986:105), was based oneffective jurisdiction. In support of its claim, the Indian government produced ☁evidencesuch as assessments of land, revenue, and other taxes, census operations, maintenanceof schools, construction of roads, and establishments of checkposts in this sector☂ (Lu1986: 105). Further, the Panchsheel Agreement between India and China in 1954, asper India☂s claim, symbolized China☂s acknowledgement of India☂s authority in themiddle sector. Distinguished scholar C RajaMohan claims that the Panchsheel Agreement

was essentially a trade accord between India and China on the issue of Indian trade with

Tibet. The agreement specified six passes in the middle sector through which the tradeand pilgrimage were to be carried out. India claims that these specifications in theagreement were an unofficial demarcation of border passes between China and India(Fisher et al. 1963: 85).

In the eastern sector, the Indian claim goes back to the famous ☁Simla Conference☂ of1913-1914. The conference was hosted by the British authorities to conclude anagreement between China and Tibet on the boundary question ☁between Outer Tibet(nominally under Chinese suzerainty but administered completely by Lhasagovernment) and Inner Tibet (Tibetan-populated areas where Chinese writ would run)☂

(Anand 2012: 234). Indian government claims that the plenipotentiaries of Tibet andChina came to a mutually accepted solution (Desai 1963: 108), and the British Indiaplenipotentiary ♠ Sir Henry McMahon ♠ acknowledged China☂s suzerainty over Tibet onthe condition of Tibetan autonomy (Eekelen 1964: 19). In addition, Sir Arthur McMahonbrokered a separate deal with Tibet that specified the boundary between Tibet andIndia (Eekelen 1964: 16). The final draft of the conference, which enlisted all theboundary resolutions between India, China and Tibet, was agreed to by all the threeconcerned parties. India claims that the Simla conference concluded in the officialdemarcation of boundary between India and Tibet, what came to be known as☁McMahon Line☂.

However, as pointed by scholars supporting China☂s claim, there were evidences thatcontradicted India☂s legalistic assertions.

2.2. China☂s Claim: Refuting India☂s Assertions

Refuting all of India☂s legalistic claims, China claimed that there had been no officialdemarcation of the boundary between China and India. However, China didacknowledge that ☁a traditional customary boundary line had long taken shape on thebasis of the extent of each side☂s administrative jurisdiction☂ (Enlai 1973: 3) and it wason the basis of this traditional boundary line that China claimed authority over AksaiChin in the western sector. Further, India was found unaware of the Chinese presence inthe Aksai Chin region and of the ☁construction of gigantic highway☂ in this region until1958 (Enlai 1973: 10), which evidently dismisses India☂s jurisdiction on this area(Anand 2012). On the question of treaty, China claimed to have never ratified the

Ladakh ♠ Tibet treaty of 1842. Moreover, as China claimed, the Ladakh ♠ Tibet treatywas essentially a peace treaty, which had no specification on the boundary question (Lu1986: 91; Noorani 2011).

In the middle sector, China claimed that the areas in question fell within the traditionalboundary line of China, and in its support produced ☁land-conferring documents,taxation papers, and census records☂ (Lu 1986: 105). Refuting India☂s claim about thePanchsheel Agreement of 1954 declaring border passes between the two countries,China claimed that the boundary question ☁was not touched on at all☂ in the agreement(Lu 1986: 93).

China☂s claim in the eastern sector was based on the effective administrative jurisdictionof Tibet over the areas of NEFA, Tawang in particular. The Tawang tract was ☁inhabitedmostly by Monpas who followed Tibetan Buddhism, [and] the Tawang monasterycollected taxes and dues for its parent Drepung monastery of Lhasa [in Tibet]☂ (Anand2012: 235). Prior to 1914, ☁the boundary between British Assam and Tawang Tract waswell known☂ (Lamb 1964: 121), and it was only on February 2, 1951 that India took overTawang (Gupta 1974: 11). In claiming the Twang tract, China refuted to having agreedto the McMahon Line in the past. China claimed that the McMahon Line was the result ofa secret exchange of notes between the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries, and thatthe treaty was never officially ratified by China (Gupta 1974: 29, 62). Also, the BritishIndian government was legally ☁debarred from singing a bilateral agreement with Tibet☂because of the ☁prohibitory clauses of the Anglo-Russian Convention (1907)☂ (Gupta1974: 29). Scholars have also argued against the very authenticity of India☂s claim onMcMahon Line (Gupta 1974; Maxwell 1972; Anand 2012). These scholars claim that theSimla Agreement of 1913-14 was never a success, and McMahon himself had admitted

that: ☁It is with great regret that I leave India without having secured the formaladherence of the Chinese government to a Tripartite Agreement☂ (Maxwell 1972: 37-38). It was only in 1938, under the instructions of the Foreign Secretary of British India♠ Sir Olaf Caroe, that the Simla Conference was declared a partial success which hadfixed the North Eastern frontier of India (Gupta 1974: ix). Volume XIV of the Aitchison☂streaties, which contained the Simla Agreement and based on which the Indiangovernment made its claim in the eastern sector, was re-produced in 1938 with animprint of 1929 containing fabricated information, while all the original copies of thevolume were recalled and destroyed (Gupta 1974: 29; Maxwell 1972: 44; Anand 2012:236).

On the whole, both countries claimed to have legitimate rights on the disputed borderareas, and accused the other of violating into their territorial spaces.

3. Allegations of Aggression: The Blame-Game

In the context of Sino-Indian conflict, attributing blame to either of the two countrieswould require a three-layered process: first of claiming legitimacy over the disputedareas, followed by alleging the other country of aggression for intruding in thosedisputed areas, and finally claiming the other country to be expansionist. Based on theself-perceived legitimacy over boundary claims, both countries accused each other ofaggressive intrusions. In this section, the paper briefly summarizes the scholarlywritings on allegations and counter-allegations of aggression between India and China,and the charges of expansionism against each other.

3.1. Allegations by India ♠ Expansionist China

As per the Indian claims, incidents of Chinese intrusion were reported since 1954 withthe first being reported in Barahoti in the middle sector. However, these reports nevercrossed the threshold of diplomatic squabbling. The first major incident that drewpublic attention occurred on September 1958, when an Indian patrol party wasallegedly detained by the Chinese forces in Aksai Chin ☁for nearly five weeks, duringwhich they were subjected to ill treatment☂ (Noorani 1963: 22). It was in the same yearthat the Indian government lodged a protest against China for having ☁trespassed onIndia☂s Ladakh region and built the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway through it without theknowledge of the government of India☂ (Lu 1986: 65). The first major militaryconfrontation, as charged by India, occurred on August 7, 1959, when an approximate of200 Chinese soldiers crossed into India☂s Khinzemane and refused to withdraw. Thesituation was further aggravated when the Chinese soldiers allegedly crossed intoIndia☂s Kongka Pass on October 21, 1959, and opened fire on Indian soldiers causingseventeen deaths (Lu 1986: 67).

In light of growing Chinese threat and non-conclusive diplomacy, the Indiangovernment embarked on the ☁Forward Policy☂ according to which Indian soldiers wereto establish posts in the frontier areas of the boundary to keep the enemy [Chinesesoldiers] in check. A large scale military confrontation had resumed by July 21, 1962when the Chinese troops allegedly attacked an Indian patrol party in the region of ChipChap River (Lu 1986: 69). In addition, the Indian government accused the Chineseforces for having established several military posts inside the Indian territory. Thesituation reached a critical phase when the Chinese forces allegedly attacked the Indianposts in India☂s Che Dong area on October 9, 1962, causing seventeen deaths. Days later,on the 20th of October, 1962, the Chinese forces launched a massive attack on the Indian

frontiers ☁along the Kechilang River and in the Khinzemane area☂ in the eastern sector,and the Galwan Valley and the Chip Chap Valley in the western sector (Lu 1986: 72).China☂s offensive ended on the 21st of November, 1962, after it withdrew from theeastern sector to ☁positions twenty kilometres behind the line of actual control whichexisted between China and India on November 7, 1959☂ (Lu 1986: 74), while occupyingAksai Chin in the western sector.

For scholars supporting India☂s claim, this attack confirmed their views on China as anexpansionist state. Their writings further claimed that China☂s expansionist plans wereup for open display in the 1950s when ☁Chinese Liberation Army entered Tibet☂ (Dalvi1969: 6), grossly violating the terms of Simla Agreement (1913-14) and seeking to☁restore the territorial extent and eminence the Manchu Empire enjoyed in its heyday☂(Bhutani 2012: 110). Noorani summed up China☂s expansionist behaviour alleging thatthe Chinese were aware of the legal boundaries with India however they ☁were anxiousto change them by grabbing our [Indian] territory and imposing on us [India] asettlement which could legalize their gains☂ (Noorani 1963: 48).

3.2. Counter-allegations by China ♠ Imperial India

China refuted all of India☂s charges of aggression, and counter-charged the Indian forcesof intruding into the ☁claimed☂ Chinese territory. On the first incident of militaryconfrontation, China accused the Indian forces for having ☁intruded into Wu-Je (calledHoti [Barahoti] by India) on June 29, 1954 (Lu 1986: 64). On the Aksai Chin incident of1958, China claimed that the area was well within the Chinese territory and it were theIndian soldiers who had intruded in their (China☂s) region. Refuting all similaraccusations of aggression, China claimed that they were the victims of Indian intrusion

instead. On the accusation of war against India, China refuted India☂s allegation andclaimed to have acted in self-defence against the provocative India☂s ☁forward policy☂.

Further, scholars supporting China☂s claim accused India of embarking on anexpansionist policy since independence, which was evident in its (India☂s) relationtowards Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Maxwell 1972:60). Pardesi quotes from China☂s official Foreign Language Press: ☁[Nehru☂s ambitionsince mid-1940s was the] establishment of a great empire unprecedented in India☂shistory▁ [that would] far surpass that of the colonial system set up in Asia in the past bythe British empire☂ (Pardesi 2012: 195). Summed up by Peking Review, India sought to☁impose on China a unilaterally defined boundary which it inherited from Britishimperialism☂ (Peking Review September 15, 1949: 3).

Scholars stand firm on their grounds of accusation against either China or India, and thishas further perpetuated longevity of the Sino-Indian border dispute. The two differentschools of thought are yet to find a common ground, and this irreconcilabilityproblematizes the ☁individualistic approach☂.

4. Problematizing the Individualistic Approach

The individualistic framework requires a state-centric analysis, and takes intoconsideration the State☂s motive as a causal factor for any inter-state event. Incontextualizing the 1962 conflict, both countries accused the other of harbouringexpansionist ambitions. However, the evidence points otherwise. In the case of China,the country had in the past made peaceful boundary settlements and even surrenderedclaim on ☁extensive tracts of land☂, as was evident from the Sino-Burmese treaty of 1960

(Lamb 1964: 4-5). Whilst in India☂s case, the country displayed exceptional restraint inacquiring the territory of Goa, which evidently belied the claims of Indian expansionism.Also, Nehru☂s rejection of Ayub Khan☂s offer to form a joint defence with Pakistanagainst China was evident of India☂s effort to prevent war and not be expansionist(Trivedi 1977: 166).

Evidently, the threats were misplaced by both the countries, and misperceptions aboutexpansionism had little factual grounding. As pointed by Garver, the two factorsdecisive in China☂s decision of war against India were ♠ a) ☁A perceived need to punishand end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet☂, and b) ☁Aperceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression☂, which was derived fromthe first factor (Garver 2006: 86-87). Whilst China was mistaken in perceiving theTibetan threat to have emerged from India (Garver 2006), India☂s aggressive policies(Forward Policy) were based on misconceptions about Chinese expansionist policies onIndian ☁claimed☂ borders.

If the aggressive policies of either state were in response to misperceived threats, whois to be blamed for the 1962 conflict? Misperceived threats? As mentioned earlier, thispaper does not intend to explore the causes of the conflict, rather attempts to provide adifferent approach that would better understand the dispute towards a possiblesettlement. To this end, a more pertinent question to ask would be ♠ why did India andChina perceived threat against each other in the first place, and why does thismisperception continue in the present context?

In this section, the paper proceeds to problematize the claims made by both countriesas an inconclusive chapter, and in the latter part the paper argues against the☁individualistic☂ approach.

The individualistic approach does not take into account the anarchic world order,where no single country can play adjudicators and impose unilateral decisions on othercountries. Attributing blame on either of the two countries, as seen in earlier sections,would be inconsequential given their equally substantive claims and allegations, andabsence of any third party jurist to decide on arguments between India and China. Also,there exist no factual grounds against which the claims and accusations of eithercountry could be verified. This problematizes the model of blame-attribution within theindividualistic approach, as the blame-game is bound to result in perpetuating theconflicted relationship between India and China.

On the other hand, the extensive legal arguments by scholars from the two schools ofthought have further substantiated both countries☂ claim that ♠ ☁what we demand isrightfully ours☂. Such claims have limited the bargaining potential of both countries☂leadership on the negotiating table. Especially in India, where democratic governancecompels the political leadership to consider public opinion, substantive claims oflegitimacy on boundary areas have stalled any possibility of compromise. Moreover,negotiations over the boundary issue are deemed as a sign of weakness, and in the caseof India the leadership☂s decision to not negotiate is to ☁demonstrate toughness☂ (Mastro2012: 78). This non-compromising posture by both India and China, backed by legaldocuments to prove their claims on the border areas, has pronounced an inconclusiveverdict towards an unbiased judgement of the boundary dispute.

The individualistic framework is limited to charting out probable causes of the Sino-Indian border dispute that have further deepened the conflicted relationship, howeverit fails to explain as to why these causes emerged in the first place. Towards alleviating

the tensions between India and China, the analysis requires going beyond the state-centred individualistic approach.

5. Holistic Approach and ☁Enduring International Rivalry☂

The holistic approach, as an alternative to the state-centred framework, centralizes onthe international structure of the anarchic world. On theoretical grounds, this approachis underlined by Kenneth Waltz☂s theory of ☁neo-realism☂ that focuses on theinternational system to analyse inter-state conflicts (Waltz 2001). The predominantassumption within this framework is that of prevailing anarchy, and the states aresovereign units acting to the best of their prudence (Hollis and Smith 1991: 98). Theprevailing anarchical structure, as explained by Hollis and Smith, ☁imposes on all states asecurity dilemma, whereby they have to ensure their own security without increasingthe fears of other states☂ (Hollis and Smith 1991: 98).

In the context of Sino-Indian border dispute, the framework aptly explains the mutualthreat perceptions of China and India, from an international standpoint. The policies ofIndia and China during and after the 1962 incident (till today) are stemmed in thesystemic factors of power rivalry, presence/absence of alliances and balance of militarypower. For China, India (in the 1962 conflict) acted in cahoots with the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA) of the US to promote ☁treasonable activities☂ by reactionaryelements in the Tibetan society against China (Peking Review May 5, 1959: 7). Chinaperceived this collusion between India and US as an imperial attempt to prevent its riseby meddling in the affairs of Tibet. Aptly summed up by Liu: ☁From the Chineseperspective, continued CIA-Nationalist activities in Tibet could be logically linked with

India☂s uncompromising stance and risky forward pushes beyond the line of actualcontrol☂ (Liu 1994: 39). Whilst in India☂s perception, threat surfaced in theneighbourhood after the disruption of status-quo i.e. Tibetan autonomy, and rise ofChina as a powerful state. Tibet ☁had been a buffer zone☂ for India since the colonialtimes, and ☁an abrupt removal of this buffer☂ was bound to have security implications onIndia (Dalvi 1969: 6). Such concerns were raised by Indian politicians ♠ SardarVallabhbhai Patel, Frank Anthony, Durga Bai, and Shyama Prasad Mookerjee ♠ whourged the Indian government to protect the Tibetan autonomy (Jetly 1979: 16-18; Dalvi1969: 6-7).

Evidently, the policies pursued by both countries were in response to threats arisingfrom the systemic factors rooted in the anarchic world. The two countries rivalledagainst each other to bring the balance of power in their favour. Even today, India☂sgrowing relationship with the U.S. is seen by China as a western attempt to stall China☂sglobal rise, and to counter any such attempts China has vigorously helped Pakistan inmatters that are opposed to India (especially on the nuclear issue). On the other hand,India sees China☂s collusion with the Pakistan and other neighbouring countries as anattempt to limit India in regional affairs. Any military or infrastructural developmentson either side of the border only gives rise to the already existing security dilemmabetween India and China.

But how can a holistic understanding help improve relations between India and China?For one, it shifts the focus from boundary dispute as a reason of ongoing conflict to theseveral systemic factors. The boundary dispute, based on legal and evidential analysis,is inconclusive to pronounce a verdict on who should acquire the ☁disputed☂ areas.However, understanding the systemic factors would help explain why the dispute

escalated to the levels of conflict, and why it continues to trouble the Sino-Indianrelations. On a more specific note for policy recommendation, India and China couldmaintain status-quo in regard to border areas while strengthening relations in otherfields of cooperation.

Egreteau explains this ongoing Sino-Indian rivalry through the conceptual framework of☁Enduring International Rivalry☂ (Egreteau 2012). The concept has been borrowed fromDiehl☂s work on enduring rivalries that takes three factors into consideration ♠conflicting goals, longevity of the rivalry and spatial consistency (Diehl 1998). India andChina, since the early 1950s, had their relations go south (Egreteau 2012), and the threecomponents of ☁enduring rivalry☂ perfectly fit their conflicted relationship. However, theapproach distinguishes between rivalry and an escalated rivalry i.e. conflict. Though theSino-Indian relations have been analysed through the concept of rivalry, this doesn☂tmean that the relationship is bound to end up in conflict. A better understanding of thesituation could de-escalate the rivalry between India and China into a healthycompetitive relation.

The holistic approach and the concept of ☁Enduring International Rivalry☂ provides ananalytical framework to better understand the Sino-Indian dispute and hence couldassuage the existing security dilemma between India and China, and could possibly de-escalate the conflicted relationship to normalcy.

6. Conclusion

Solutions to any problem depend on how well the problem is understood. In the contextof Sino-Indian dispute, the 1962 war continues to mar the relationship between India

and China. A better understanding of the conflict would presumably help to de-escalatetensions between the two countries. In this direction, the paper has explored theacademic writings on the topic, and their contribution towards the solution.

Majority of scholarly writings have taken an ☁individualist☂ approach to analyse thecauses of the Sino-Indian conflict. Working within this approach, the scholars havelimited their analyses to inter-state activities, and have concluded their research byattributing blame to either of the countries for the conflict. This paper makes a thoroughsummary of the various writings and their analysis on the topic. Further, the paperproblematizes this approach for being inconclusive and deepening the conflictedrelationship between India and China.

This paper proceeds to suggest ☁holistic☂ approach as an appropriate framework tobetter understand the conflict and the ongoing dispute, and examine the Sino-Indiandispute through the conceptual lenses of ☁enduring international rivalry☂. Furtherresearches on the topic of Sino-Indian border dispute, through the analytical frameworkof holistic approach, would help to understand the conflicted relationship betweenIndia and China in a better perspective.

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