Sidney Jones Indonesia Update 2014

It also could have been significantly worse. Some of the same weaknesses that prevented the achievements of major reforms also prevented the adoption of security policies that could have been much more hardline and led to a greater role for the military.

SBY’s emotional speech after the

2009 Jakarta hotel bombings when

a plot to kill him was discovered.

Under SBY, jihadis were never charged with makar, even when they declared the government apostate and idolatrous and announced their intention of replacing it with an Islamic state.

The only Islamists to be convicted of makar under SBY were members of a non-violent NII faction in West and Central Java, because there was nothing else to charge them with.

In 2003 (under Megawati) prosecutors

couldn’t make makar charges stick

against Abu Bakar Ba’asyir because

appeal court ruled that bombing

churches, which they acknowledged

he had endorsed, could not be seen

as an effort to undermine the state.

Why? Because the Islamic State recruitment video, “Joining the Ranks” featured an Indonesian urging others to join, and officials saw it as a challenge to loyalty to the Unitary Indonesian Republic (NKRI)

even when they had evidence that OPM fighters were deliberately using violence against civilians.

Shootings along the Freeport road,

July-Oct 2009

Copyright ICG 2010 from “Radicalisation and Dialogue in

Papua”, Asia Report No.188

1. Key documents from both Detachment 88 and BNPT state that terrorism in Indonesia is of two types, radical Islamic and “ethno-nationalist separatist”

“Kelompok etno-nationalis/

separatis yang masih aktif

beroperasi melakukan aksi teror

adalah kelompok OPM di Papua.

Sedangkan kelompok GAM yang

sebelumnya aktif melakukan

serangan terorisme cenderung

menghentikan aksi kekerasan

pasca perjanjian damai dengan

Pemerintah RI pada tahun 2005.

Namun demikian potensi serangan

terorisme dari eks-GAM ini masih

perlu diwaspadai karena aktifitas

kelompok ini amat tergantung

dengan dinamika situasi politik di

Aceh.” Detachment 88 presentation,2010

In 2012, four Acehnese GAM members linked to Partai Aceh were convicted of terrorism for politically-motivated murders of Javanese workers and trying to kill Irwandi before the 2012 election for governor.

In 2006, 14 Christians in Poso were

convicted of terrorism for killing two

Muslim traders in anger over the

judicial executions of three Christians

accused of masterminding a massacre

of 200 Muslims in Poso at the height

of the conflict there – because of the

need for balance.

But Tito actually proved to be more interested in trying to apply community

policing techiques than counter-terrorism lessons.

Less antiquated rules of evidence than the Criminal Procedure Code

Allow use of electronic evidence Longer pre-trial detention

After 2009, terrorism became increasingly low tech, low competence and low casualty, aimed overwhelmingly at police. Of post-2010 terrorist attacks, 25 out of 27 victims were police .

Revenge has been major motive OPM also killed dozens of police. Jihadists get charged with terrorism; OPM rarely get

caught, but when they do, they get charged under Criminal Code.

31 July 2014: Label Teroris Untuk Islam, KKB Untuk Kafir. Dikotomi Media, BNPT & Densus 88 - Menebar Teror, Kenapa Kriminal Bersenjata Papua Tak Disebut Teroris?

30/11/2012: PUSHAMI: Kirim

Densus 88, Tangkap Separatis Teroris OPM di

30/9/2012: Bom Siap Ledak di

Papua Targetkan Polisi & TNI, Apakah ini Terorisme? -

This alleged quotation was widely

circulated on hardline websites,

including voa-islam.com but

there is no evidence Mbai actually said

it.

FATALITIES Police TNI Civilians

Killed by

suspected

OPM

21 22 40

Killed by

suspected

terrorists

34 0 76*

* All but 2 of these deaths occurred between Nov 2004 and July 2009

GAM negotiators from the failed COHA accord (2003) in LP Sukamiskin, Bandung,

Charging the Acehnese with terrorism generated criticism For the SBY government, rebellion (makar) was always the

more serious crime because it involves disloyalty to the state. Perceived as more dangerous than terrorism.

That’s why makar continues to be used against unarmed political activists in Papua – it brands them as disloyal in a way that terrorism charges do not.

(Amnesties for those convicted of makar are easier, however)

The suggestion that ISIS supporters should be charged with makar is an indication of how seriously the government takes the threat.

His concern about image pulled in different directions. He got praise from the international community for being tough on terrorists but criticism for human rights abuses in Papua. In 2013 when police identified the OPM gunmen shooting at vehicles traveling the Freeport road and asked for a green light to raid their camps, they were told not to, because such raids would inevitably lead to casualties and more criticism in the international press.

His refusal to interfere in the institutional autonomy of the security

forces meant that he wouldn’t exert pressure for more accountability but he also wouldn’t interfere with Detachment 88 when it was doing its job reasonably well, even when he may have wanted more of a role for the military.

His hubris in seeing himself as the great peace-maker led him to a number of policy initiatives on Papua, which were well-intentioned, even if many were based on the assumption that Papua could be solved by more money for economic development.

His failure to ever create a national security strategy probably helped the perpetuation of inconsistencies which in this case, may have helped prevent more crackdowns in response to political violence in Papua.

Finally, for all his failures to initiate security sector or legal reform, he really does believe that Indonesia is a negara hukum and that in itself was a barrier to more draconian measures.