To my mother and father

THE TOURNAMENT PLAYER'S REPERTOI RE OF OPENINGS Series Edited by R .G.Wade, O .B .E .

Sicilian: Keres Attack

Jon Kinlay

B.T.Batsford Ltd, London

First published 1 98 1 Jon Kinlay 1 98 1

ISBN 0 7 1 34 2 1 39 9 (limp)

Photoset by Andek Printing, London and printed in Great Britain by Bill ing & Son Ltd, London, Guildford & Worcester for the publishers B.T.Batsford Ltd , 4 Fitzhardinge Street, London W I H OAH

A BATSFORD CHESS BOOK Adviser: R.G.Wade Technical Editor: P. A .L amford

Contents Symbols Acknowledgments

I Int roduction 2 Central Counterattacks: 6 . . . d5 ; 6 . . . e5 3 6 . . . h6 4 Queenside C ounterattack: 6 . . . a6 5 6 . . . lbc6; 6 . . . i.. e7

Index of Complete Games Index of Variations

vi vii

I 1 5 19 56 75

1 00 1 0 1

Symbols + Check ;!; + Slight advantage + Clear advantage ++ Winning advantage = Level position 00 Unclear p osition ! Good move ! ! Outstanding move !? Interesting move ?! Dubious move ? Weak move ?? Blunder Corres Correspondence OL Olym piad IZ Interz onal L League Ch Championship \.-S f Semi-final

Acknowledgments

My thanks are due to Graham Hillyard for checking the manuscript, to Paul Lamford for his editorial work and especiallyto Bob Wade, whose extensive library, friendly advice and warm hospitality were equally invaluable. My thanks also to E,obert, whose creativity both on and off the chess board will always be a source of inspiration, and, above all, to my wife Margaret for her enduring support and patience.

Jonathan Kinlay, London, July 1 98 1 .

1 Introduction

B

The Keres Attack, introduced by the IlliO ves

l e4 cS 2 ltlf3 e6 3 d4 cd 4 ltlxd4 ltlf6 S ltlc3 d6 6 g4

is one of the most dangerous weapons available to White in the Paulsen Variation of the Sicilian . An uncompromising strategy, its purpose is to assure W hite of an undisputed advantage in space and a firm grip on the centre , which form the basis for a direct kingside attack with pawns . The unbalanced positions w h ich arise require a deep understanding of the strategic concepts a nd a high degree of tactical alertness to supplement the necessary detailed knowledge of current theory. This

introduction will provide the reader with an understanding of the fundamental strategic ideas; th e main text will deepen that understanding and acquaint him with the theory ; tactical ability the reader will himself have to provide.

Origin The a ttack derives its name from

the Estonian grandmaster P aul Keres , whose lucid, attacking styl e of play placed him among the topmost rank of chess masters of this century. His approach to chess strategy was clear and direct and in his handling of openings he displayed an extraordinary inventiveness .

These distinctive qualities which typified his style were nowhere more apparent than in the following game in which he first experimented with the attack which was later to bear his name.

Keres-Bogoljubow, Salzburg 1943

l e4 cS 2 ltle2

Another of Keres' ideas, the pur pose of which is to retain the option of a closed system.

2 e6 3 d4 cd

2 Introduction

4 lbxd4 lbf6 S lbc3 d6 6 g4

Keres wrote : 'Th is interesting idea came into my mind during the course of the game . In this position the continuation 6 g3 followed by i.g2 was often employed and an attack on the king's wing was begun only later by f4 and g4. The thought came into my head, however, why not save a tempo and begin immediately with g4?'

6 c6 It is interesting that Bogoljubow

avoided the natural attempts at refutation, 6 . . . d5 and 6 . . . e5 . Perhaps he chose this solid continuation instinctively, or perhaps, like Keres, he was able to convince himself through over-the-board analysis that the idea was sound. In any event he must h ave found the situation confusing and it is not too surprising that he rather quickly goes wrong.

7 g5 xd4? Black quite justifiably desires to

simplify the position as much as possibl e, but exchanging the knights at this stage turns out to be an error of judgment. The white queen takes up a dominating position in t he centre of the board where it hinders both the development of Black's pieces and his intended expansion on the queenside - a theme we wil l be returning to at various stages of the analysis to follow.

8 11Vxd4 lbd7 9 i.e3 a6

10 i.el 1!fc7 1 1 f4 b6

It now transpires that the normal 1 1 . . . b5 will merely result in a serious weakening of Black's pawn formation after 12 a4! since the undesirable exchange 12 . . . ba i s forced due to the positioning of White's queen - directly the result of the premature simplification on move 7 . White's advantage is al ready substantial .

2 B

12 fS! (2)

The concession of e5 in this way is permissibl e onl y in special circumstances. Here White is able to force open the f-file by tactical means thereby preventing Black from castling.

1 2 lbe5 13 fe f e

The point is that 1 3 . . . i.x e6 fail s to 14 "t!f a4+ i.d7 ( 1 4 . . . 'ir d7 1 5 i.b5 ! ) 1 5 lbd5 !

14 a4 N ot immediately 14 "t!fx b6 't!Vx b6

1 5 i.x b6 lib8. The tex t move

ensures that White will be able to protect his bishop with a5 if necessary.

14 e7 15 h4

Renewing the th reat on the b -pawn. Black has no time to get castled.

15 16 1!Vd2 17 llfl 18 ,.td4!

1!Vc5 1!Vc7 b7

Now 1 8 . . . -0 is impossible on account of 19 1!re3 .

18 llf8 19 0-0-0 llxfl 20 llxfl i.d8

Or 20 . . . c4 21 't!rf4 0-0-0 22 "it' g4 etc.

21 . 't!rf4 lDg6 22) "it'g4! 1!re7

As Keres points out, a prettier finish would have been 22 . . . d7 23 d5 1!rc6 24 't!rxe6+ xe6 25 g4 mate ! After the move played Keres won as follows: 23 't!rh5 e5 24 e3 i.c7 25 't!rxh7 f4 26 i.xf4 ef 27 i.h5+ d7 28 i.g4+ c6 29 "ft' f5 b5 30 "it' d5+ ct>b 6 31 1!rd4+ c6 32 d5 1 -0 .

Basic Strategies Keres' comments on the game

in which he first experimented with the attack provide an important insight into its rationale and the underlying strategic concepts. In the 6 g3, 7 i.g2 varition to which Keres refers White's aim is to combine the pattern of strategy of

Introduction 3

the closed system with the advantages of space and piece mobility which he enjoys in the open system. Th e disadvantage of the variation is th at it is rath er slow, so it is difficult for White to generate and sustain an attacking initiative to offset the looseness of his open formation. In the Keres Attack the intention is to overcome thi& problem by extending the fianchetto immediately to create a fast moving flank attack. The justification for this is that if Black is thrown onto the defensive at an early stage he will be too preoccupied with his own position to prevent White from consolidating his initial gain in space and subsequently pursuing his ready-made kingside attack.

To summarise , Wh ite's aims in the Keres Attack are to: I) make early gains in space on the kingside. 2) disorganise Black's forces, so that it is difficult for him to counterattack. 3) consolidate his position in the centre (note that the displacement of the knight from f6 weakens Black's control of d5 and e4) and on the kingside . 4) finally, pursue his kingside attack directly with f4, f5 and h4, h5 etc.

Turning to Black's viewpoint, there are a numb er of different strategies he can follow. We will examine: A) rapid counteraction with 6 . . . d5 or 6 . . . e5 .

4 Introduction

B) restraint on the kingside with 6 ... h6. C) counterattack on the queenside by means of 6 .. . a6 and . . . b5. D) simple dev elopment with 6 . . . ltlc6 or 6 . . . e7.

A) 6 ... d5; 6 ... e5 After 6 . . . dS Black is saddled

with an isolat ed pawn and White gains a subst antial development adv antage . One example: 6 . . . dS 7 ed ltlxd5 8 J.b5+ J.d7 9 ltlxd5 ed 1 0 't!Ve2+ 1!re7 1 1 J.e3 g6 1 2 xd7+ ltlxd7 1 3 lObS ltle5 1 4 0-0- 0 Fischer-Reshevsky , USA Ch 1 966/ 67 (3).

Diagram 4 shows a typical outcome from the move 6 . . . e5 ,

which seriously weakens Black's white square control: 6 . . . e5 7 J.b5+! J.d7 8 J.xd7+ 1!rxg7 9 ltlf5 h5 10 J.g5 ltlxg4 I I h3 (4). After 1 1 . . . ltlf6 1 2 J.xf6 gf 1 3 ltld5 Whit e has complete control.

B) 6 . . h6 Black shores up his defences to

av oid t he disorganisation of his forces which results from g4-g5 . At t he same time, howev er, t he move provides a target for Whit e's kingside att ack .

There are t hree ways in which White can proceed: B 1) open up lines immediately with 7 g5. B2) reinforce his grip on the centre by fianchettoing the bishop. B3) make further preparations for the attack with 7 I!g l . Bl) 7 g5

This is a popul ar line of play in which White breaks early on the kingside to gain greater scope for his pieces. To offset the weakening of his pawn structure he has the open g-file and a strong bishop on g5 which hampe rs the action of Black's pieces while enhancing his o wn control of the centre . His strategy is to restrict his opponent by pushing the f- and h-pawns, looking for opportunities for a break with e5 and action along the g-file.

Black usually handles the position slowly, castling long and gradually untangling his position with . . . J.e7 and . . . llJg8 (5) .

5 B

From diagram 5 : 1 5 . . . .tc8 1 6 .tf3 (preventing 16 . . . d5) 1 6 . . . 1Wc7 ( 1 6 . . . lih7 1 7 1!V e2 lDg8 1 8 lihg 1 .txg5 1 9 lixg5 !i:J ge7 20 lDd5 ! ed 2 1 ed ;!; Skrobek-Adamski, P olish Ch 1 977) 17 b 1 !i:J g8 18 lidg 1 (White saves a tempo in this way) 1 8 . . . lih7 19 \t f2 .txg5 20 lixg5 (;!;) 20 . . . f!Jge7 2 1 lid 1 g6 22 hg !i:J xg6 23 li h5 lig7 24 lig 1 ligg8 25 lihg5 !i:J ge7 26 .th5 lixg5 27 lixg5 f5 with equality, KarpovAndersson, Skara 1 980.

But Black can also break quickly with . . . a6 and . . . b5 (6):

6 w

From diagram 6: 1 3 .ig2 (the simple 1 3 a3 needs testing) 1 3 . . . b4! ( 1 3 . . . .ib7 14 't!Ve3 ! b 4 1 5 lDa4 lDd7 1 6 e5 ! d5 1 7 f5 ! 't!Vxe5 1 8 \t f2

Introduction 5

1!V xf5 1 9 1!V xf5 ef - RazuvayevCommons, L ublin 1978 - 20 .txd5 ) 1 4 lDa4 e5 1 5 fe de 1 6 h3 .te6 17 1!V f2 !i:J d7 with a fine position for Black, Nunn-Ghinda, Dortmund 1 979. B2) 7 .tg2

A more sedate system which nevertheless deserves attention . White strengthens his position centrally before carrying forward his kingside attack . He can opt for either king- or queenside castling, the latter offering the better attacking opportunities though naturally incurr ing greater risk. The emphasis of the attack has shifted from the wing to the centre so that instead of steering for a g5 advance White wil l be looking for opportunities to push forward with e5 or f4-f5. Black's typical plan for counteraction is to wait for White's f4 a dvance and then liquidate in the centre with . . . !i:J xd4 and . . . e5 , when the outcome of the struggle will depend on how well each side makes use of the resulting open fi les .

One example scenario:

7 B

6 Introduction

1 1 . . . lt!xd4 1 2 .t xd4 e5 1 3 .te3 ef 14 .txf4 .te6 1 5 0-0-0 0-0 1 6 'it>b l (White has only a slight pull in this position and the way he develops his attack using the f- and e-files is most instructive) 16 . . . llac8 1 7 1!V d2 llfd8 1 8 llhfl lt!e8? ! 19 .te3 .tf6 20 lt!d5 .txd5 2 1 ed .te5 22 h4 1Wc4 23 g5 h5 24 .tf4 g6 25 llde l .txf4 26 llxf4 \!Vc5 27 lle7 with a winning attack in Horvath-Stean, Virovitica 1 977. B3) 7 llgl

This move introduces an interesting alternative to the more commonplace plans outlined in B 1 . White's intention i s to run through on the kingside with h2-h4, g4-g5 followed by an eventual g5-g6. The pawn attack will be all the more dangerous now that Black's kingside defences have been weakened and it is therefore incumbent on the second player to seek active counterplay as quickly as possible . R outine operations will permit White to complete his development wi th .te3, .te2, 1!V d2 and 0-0-0 and then pursue his strategy with h4 etc, so attention focuses on the more dynamic . . . d5. This break has the effect of shifting the emphasis away from the wing to the centre, so precipitating an immediate struggle for superiority in that sector of the board. Although Black is rather better prepared for the contest than after 6 . . . d5 discussed in section A, he once again runs the positional risk of an isolated d-pawn and faces tactical

t hreat s from Whit e's rapidly mobilised pieces.

By way of illust ration we consider t he position shown in diagram 8 , arising from the game KarpovSpassky, Tilburg 1980.

8 w

The continuation was 9 .tb5 .td7 10 ed lt!xd5 1 1 lt!xd5 ed 1 2 .te3 ! (White aims t o control the square in front of the isolated pawn and shapes up for an attack on h6 in case Black should castle short) 12 . . . .te7 13 't!Vd2 .txh4 (not so much pawn grabbing as an attempt to secure a sanctuary for the bishop on f6 where it can defend the kingside) 14 0-0-0 .tf6 1 5 lt!f5 .txf5 1 6 gf a6 (after 1 6 . . . d 4 1 7 .txd4 .txd4 1 8 \!Vxd4 1!V xd4 19 .txc6+ be 20 llxd4 Black's endgame prospects are bleak) 1 7 .txc6+ b e 1 8 .tc5 ll b 8 1 9 b 4 llb5 20 llge l + d7 21 c4 .

C) 6 . . . a6 The system where Black engages

in an early minority attack with . .. a6 and . . . b5 is the most energetic at his disposal . It is also the most dangerous plan for the second

player since it allows White a free hand to pursue his ambitions on the other fl ank. Evidence suggests that Black's most productive formation in this line is the placement of his knights on b6 and d7, in preparation for occupation of c4 o r in some cases .a n exchange sacrifice on c3. White's optimal development is less easy to define and it is an open question whether it is better to- bring the major pieces into play at an early stage or to concentrate on forcing concessions with an immediate pawn storman early h4 followed by h5 and eventually g5-g6 seems to be one of the most promising plans , - but we examine one or two of the options. 1

After 7 g5 .!t::l fd7 8 .te3 (8 llg 1 is interesting, as is 8 .tc4 reaching a type of Sozin position) 8 . . . b5 9 a3 we divide into: C 1 ) 9 . . . .!t::l b6 C2) Other formations Cl) 9 . . . .!t::l b6

As indicated earlier this plan is likely to be Black's best bet and can be precarious for White, particularly if he routin ely castles queenside, as the game KorsunskiTimoshchenko, USSR 1 979, illustrates (diagram 9).

The game follows three phases: 1) occupation of c4; 2) exchange sacrifice on c3 to demolish White's centre; and finally 3) switch to direct attack on the king.

1 2 . . . llc 8 13 .td3 .!t::l c4 14 .txc4 llxc4 1 5 llhe 1 .!t::l c5 1 6 .ig 1 .te7 !

Introduction 7

(enticing White's next) 1 7 b3 llxc3 18 ti' xc3 .!t::l xe4 19 ti'f3 't!Va8 20 \!Vg4 0-0 21 lld3 d5 22 llh3 .txa3+ 23 'it>b 1 't!Vd8 ! 24 lld 1 1!ra5 =f=f.

White's other major piece d evelopment strategies compris e llg 1 and 't!Vg4, and the two have been combined although without any particularly noticeable effect. Here we take a look at the latter scheme, this being rather less well mapped out than the llg 1 plan . White's intention in seeking a more active role for the queen is to pressurise Black's kingside, particularly the e6 square , in the hope of forcing positional concessions for his pawns to exploit - the reverse side ofthose h4 plans in which the pawns do the

8 Introduction

initial softening up. If we consider the position in diagram 10, it is clear that comparisons with the position shown in diagram 9 are in order, in which White's formation has a more passive look to it . Here Black's most natural move is 12 ... llc8, when in view of the routine exchange sacrifice intended White should test the potency of his own threats with 13 g6!? hg 14 li:lxe6!? fe I5 't!r xg6+

several of the pri ncipal themes.

The posl tl on in diagram 1 2 arises from the game FedorowiczP etrosian, Hastings 1977/78. White has already committed his queen to the attack (cf. diagr am 10) and stands ready to open the bidding with f4-f . Black reacts unsteadily, gaining a tempo on the queen only to fall back on the defensive at once: 1 1 . . . lik eS ?! 1 21i' h3 (pi nning the h-pa wn in preparati on for g5-g6) 1 2 . . . g6 (per haps Black had intended 12 . . . li'l b6, only now realising the consequences of 13 f4 li'l ec4 14 .txc4 llJxc4 1 5 g6! ) 1 3 f4 llJ c6 14 Iil g 1 "t!Vc8 1 5 f5 llJc5 (in . . . llJb6 lines Black would have been happy to play . . . e5, covering d5 wi th his pieces) 16 fe fe 17 .txb5 ! (Black has taken steps to protect the pawn on e6 but in so doing has weakened his d-pawn: the text is therefore justifi able as a tacti cal means of exploiting this posi tional weakness) 17 . . . ab 1 8 llJdx b5 llJd8 19 Iil gf l .te7 20 1!f h6 llJf7 2 1 't!Vg7 (completing the penetrati on on the dark squares; there follows a mopping up operati on) 2 1 . . . Iil f8

Introduction 9

22 1!b h7 llJ xe4 23 Iil xf7 Iil xf7 24 1!rg8+ Iil f8 25 1!rxg6+ ct>d7 26 llJ xe4 .txe4 27 Wxe4 .

D) Simple Development Strategies: 6 . . . li'l c6; 6 ... .te7

The strategic concepts underlying the 6 . . . li'l c6 and 6 . . . .te7 lines are difficult to pi n down in exact terms. Whereas in other variations Black follows clear policies of restraint or counterattack, here he adopts no particular str ategic plan but instead concentrates on avoiding weaknesses and on completing his development as rapidly as possible. His i ntention is to regroup his forces during the early midd le game and then draw up his plan according to the requirements of the position as he sees them, taking into account the particular method of dev elopment which White has opted for. The i dea i s that by retai ning maxi mum flexibility in his positi on he will be able to cope with any conti ngency and later on exploit the positional weaknesses i ncurred by White in the openi ng. On the debit side, the main criticism which can be made of these lines i s that they are essentially passive , and White shoul d aim to exploit thi s by adopting simple, forceful methods. There i s no shortage of options from whi ch Whi te may choose, and we exami ne a number of these i n turn.

6 ... llJc6 7 g5 llJd7 Dl) 8 .te3

A non-com mittal move whi ch

10 Introduction

Whit e can follow up wit h queenside cast ling and a rapid kingside att ack, or Karpov's idea of cent ral act ion, among ot her plans. Diagram 1 3 shows a t ypical position arising from the former plan. Scent ing White's intent ion of going for an attack with h4-h5 and g5-g6 Black has himself made preparations for an all-out assault on the opposite wing. As the sequel shows, the outcome of the struggle is decided by White's capability to adequately defend his own king while making use of his superiority in the centre to even tually open up lin es to his opponent's.

13 w

Mednis-Timman, Sombor 1974, continued 1 5 h4 a5 16 h5 a4 1 7 g6 b3? (more resilient was 1 7 . . . fg 1 8 hg h6) 1 8 gf+

lixc3 1!V b8 28 ll g3 1 -0. Finally in this section we take a

look at a plan devised by Karpov, the essence of which is to break open lin s in the centre by sacrificial means in an attempt to exploit the exposed position of Black's king. Naturally there are many fine points to this strategy and the reader is advised to take note in particular. of the idea behind White's 1 2th move.

15 w

The game Karpov-Dorfman,USSR Ch 1976, continued 12 llJxc6! (drawing the queen to the c6 square so that after the knight sacrifice on d5 White will be able to recapture with gain of tempo: note also the crucial role played by White's queen acting along the e-file - the point behind it s peculiar looking development on e2) 12 ... 't!Vxc6 1 3 .id4 b4 1 4 llJd5 ! ed 1 5 .txg7 llg8 16 ed 't!Vc7 17 .tf6 llJe5 18 .txe5 de 19 f4! .if5 20 .th3 .txh3 2 1 lixh3 lieS 22 fe with three pawns and a tremendous amount of play for the piece . D2) 8 llJdb5 An enterprising move, the point

Introduction 11

of which is to apply pressure to Black's d-pawn, which has been temporaril y weakened by the retreat of the knight to d7. In order to defend the pawn Black's pieces will be forced to take up exposed positions in the centre where they are subject to further harassment by White's forces. The line can thus be said to be tactically biased with primary emphasis on rapid development and piece play, factors likely to be favoured by K eres Attack players .

One example should be sufficient to highlight the main features of the variation.

16 B

Szabo-Ivkov, Hilversum 1973, went 10 ... .td7 (on 10 ... a6 White has the tactic I I 0-0-0! bc4 1 2 .txc4 llJxc4 1 3 .txd6: Black's best is probably 10 .. . g6) I I .txe5 ! (rarely a good move in this line but here justifiable on tactical grounds, e. g. I I . . . g6 12 .txd6!) I I . .. de 12 g6! a6 ! 1 3 gf+ e7 1 4 a3 'f/c7 1 5 0-0-0 g6 1 6 1!Vh4+ xf7 1 7 c4 xc4 1 8 .txc4 .te7 1 9 1!Vg3 ! (an important improvement on 19 'f/g4 after which Black can gain a

12 Introduction

t empo with . . . h5 , which could become necessary later on) 19 . . . litad8 20 .tb3 .tc8 2 1 h4 llxd 1 + 2 2 li:lxd 1 ! (instead of the routine 22 llxd 1 White maintains the rook on the h-file where it is doing some useful work while at the same time improving the prospects of his knight) 22 . . . lld8 23 h5 g5 24 lDe3 h6 25 1!r g4

some counterplay in the centre or on the queenside . The move does give Black the option of castling short early on, but this is rarely advisable given the strength of White's attack . On these grounds it would appear that White should do no worse than in analogous 6 . . . li:lc6 lines and i n addition t o the standard plan of pushing the fand h-pawns he has other inviting possi h ili ties. D4) 8 i.e3

This gives ri se to positions similar to those discussed in section D 1 .

Without a positive response by Black White will simply roll through with i.h3, f5 etc, as the game Alexandria-Kozlovskaya, Rio de Janeiro 1 979, illustrates: 10 ... 't!Vc7 ( 10 . . . 0-0 1 1 i.h3 li:lxd4 1 2 't!r xd4 b5 1 3 0-0-0 Iil e8 1 4 f5 i s virtually untenable for Black, KostroBaumgartner, Corres 1 975) 1 1 i.h3 lDc5 1 2 f5 b5 1 3 a3 lDxd4 14 't!r xd4 e5 1 5 lDd5! \t d8 16 't!r c3 i.b7 1 7 i.xc5 i.xd5 1 8 0-0-0! i.b7 1 9 f6! g f 20 gf \t c7 2 1 fe \t xc5 2 2 \t f3 't!r c4 23 't!r f6 i.xe4 24 i.d7+ ! '.!? xd7 25 \t xd6 .

Introduction 13

Belyavsky-Vogt , L eningr ad 1977, shows the right way for Black, viz to break up the pawn roller at once before it breaks on his kingside defences: 10 ... h6! 1 1 't!r f3 (there does not appear to be any method for White to avoid the ensuing simplification : 1 1 i.g2 hg 12 hg Iil xh 1 + 1 3 i.xh 1 lDxd4 14 \t xd4 e5 1 5 't!r d2 ef 16 i.xf4 lDe5 is about equal, but 1 1 i.h3 deserves a closer look) 1 1 . . . li:lxd4 12 i.xd4 hg 1 3 hg Iil xh 1 1 4 't!r xh 1 e 5 1 5 i.f2 ef 1 6 0-0-0 i.xg5 1 7 \t h8+ lt) f8 1 8 lDd5 with chances for both sides . DS) 8 Iil g1

This move is rather more effect ive than in compa rable 6 . . . lDc6 lines, since given Black's less act ive approach White has more time t o make preparations. He can follow up in much the same way as in 0 4 with f4, h4 etc, but here we examine an alternative strategy based on an attack with pieces.

19 B

Faced with the dual threats of lDxe6 and g6 Black is virtually forced to castle. White will than play Iil g 1 -g3, when the threat of

14 Introduction

lith3 will force the weakness . . . g6, presenti ng a useful target for th e h-pawn. Van Riemsdijk-Najdorf, Sao Paolo I978, continued from diagram I 9 with lO . . . 0-0 I I 0-0-0

liteS I 2 lilg3 g6 1 3 't!r e2 .tf8 I4 b I 'ttc7 I 5 h4 lbxd4 I 6 J.. xd4 b5 I 7 h5 b4 I S lba4 .ib7 I9 hg fg 20 b3 leaving White with most of the positional trumps.

2 Central Counterattacks: 6 . . . d5; 6 . . . e5

In response to White' s unorthodox kingside initiative it is natural for Black to c onsider the possibility of an early counterattack in t he centre, in accordance with Nimzowitsch' s axiom that this is the appropriate reaction to an attack on the flank. If successful such action wo uld completely disrupt the develpment o f White' s strategy and expose the weaknesses incurred by the knight' s pawn' s advance .

While in general the validity of Nimzowitsch' s maxim may not be challenged, the Keres Attack is something of an exception to the normal rules. As we shall see, neither of the two candidates for direct central action is an effective antidote to White' s wing attack. The reason for this is that despite its an tipositional lo ok the move 6 g4 is not merely a tactical device initiating an assault on the kingside. It is intended, through the displacement of B lack' s knight and the consequent disorganisation of his forces, to weaken the second player' s control of the centre, bringing about an abrupt shift in the balance of power in that

important sector of the board. A 6 . . . d5 B 6 . . . e5 A

20 w

6 d5 (20)

This appealing move rather rebounds on Black by giving White a lead in development and a stron g attacking position after . . .

7 ed Not 7 .ib5+ .id7 8 ed (8 .ixd7+

was tried in the game Stein-Castro, Havana OL 1966, which continued 8 . . . "t!rxd7 9 e5 i0 e4 10 i0 ce2 i0 c6 1 1 i0 xc6 Wxc6 1 2 i0 d4 Wa6 +) 8 ... .ixb5 9 i0 dxb5 a6 1 0 i0 d4 i0 xd5 when Black' s position is preferable, being free of weaknesses.

7 i0xd5 White has a winning position

16 6 ... d5; 6 ... e5

a fter 7 . . . ed 8 .tb 5+ .td7 9 't!re2+ 't!re7 10 g5 .

21 B

8 .tbS+ (21)

This is the move which causes a ll the problems f or Black. White's piece s now bec ome extremely active and Blac k's increasingly clumsy.

8 i.d7 9 xdS ed

10 't!re2+ .te7 Reshevsky tried 10 . . . 't!re7 a ga inst

Fischer in the USA Ch of 1 966/6 7 but af ter 11 .te3 g6 ( 11 . . . a6 1 2 .txd7+ x d7 1 3 f5 't!re6 1 4 0-0-0 0-0-0 1 5 't!rd3 f6 1 6 li[ he 1 ) 1 2 .txd7+ xd7 1 3 b5 e5 1 4 0-0-0 .tg7 1 5 li[ xd5 0-0 1 6 li[ hd 1 his position was hardly enviable.

11 fS! (22)

So fa r P anov-K otov, USSR 1939 , which was followed in the game N ikitin-Cherepkov, Moscow v L eningrad 1 958 . The latter went on 1 1 . . .

after 8 ... hg! (8 ... .i.e6? is too slow: 9 gh .i.xfS 10 ef .i.e7 I I h6 Bagirov-Morsovich, USSR 1 960) 9 lt:le3 .i.e6 10 Wd2 lt:lc6 1 1 0-0-0 lt:ld4 12 .i.xf6 gf 1 3 lt:lb5 't!Vb 6! 14 lt:lxd4 ed 1 5 Wxd4 't!rxd4 1 6 Ilxd4 .i. h6 =F. Black ha d more than sufficient compensation for the broken pawns in terms of his very active piece play.

24 B

8 9

1 0 11

lt:lxg7+ lt:lxe4

. lt:lg3 (24)

lt:lxe4 .txg7 d5

A rather deceptive pos1t10 n . Black, though in ful l command of the centre, i s under considerable pressure on the kingside where the really important action is taking place.

1 1 i.g4 This represents some improve

ment over the move 1 1 . . . h4? after which there followed in the game N eielov-Romanov, C orres 1 966, 12 lt:lh5 Ilh7 13 lt:lxg7+ lit xg7 1 4 t!Y h5 with a pow erful initiative .

1 2 .tel 't!rd7 Again the attempt to save the

pawn by 12 . . . .txe2 1 3 't!rxe2 h4

6 . . . d5: 6 ... e5 17

could rapidly prove fa tal after 14 lt:lh5 Ilh7 1 5 lt:lxg7+ Ilxg7 1 6 1!fh5 .

25 B

1 3 lt:lxh5 .txh5 14 i.xh5 lt:lc6 15 .tg4 (25)

Although B lack has some compensati on for the pawn his position is marred by his inability to remove his king from the centre in order to continue active operations there . White will slowly orga nise his development, castle queenside and run the h-pawn. B2

7 .tb5+! (26)

7 .td7 Black cannot avoid the exchange

of bishops ai though it emphasises his weakness on the white squares.

18 6 . . . d5; 6 . . . e5

7 . . . li:lbd7 is too cumbersome: 8 li:lf5 a6 9 .txd7+ '@xd7 1 0 g5 lilg8 I I lild5 and White's position is overwhelming.

8 .txd7+ '@xd7 Unsatisfactory is 8 . . . ll:l bxd7 9

lilf5 lilb6 (9 . . . li:lc5 1 0 f3 ) 1 0 g5 g6 ! ? II lile3 lilh5 12 ll:l ed5 .

27 w

9 lilfS hS (27)

On 9 . . . g6? 1 0 .tg5 ! is rather unsettling: 10 . . . ll:l xg4 I I "& xg4 gf 12 "& h4 with 13 li:ld5 to come.

10 .tgS! Keres' move and typically a very

active one. Far less clear is 10 gS

ll:l xe4 I I ll:l xg7+ .txg7 1 2 ll:l xe4 d5, O'Kelly-Christoffel, Groningen 1 946. Gipslis gives 10 f3 hg I I fg g6 ( I I . . . lila6 1 2 "& e2 Keller-Rat, Switzerland 1 96 1 ) 12 lile3 lilc6 1 3 "& f3 .tg7 1 4 li:lcd5 ll:l xd5 1 5 lilxd5 ll:l d4 16 "& g2 . The text is rather more dynamic and in keeping with Keres' style .

28 8

10 ll:l xg4 1 1 h3

(Keres). 1 1 lilf6 12 .txf6 gf 1 3 li:ldS (28)

White has a winning position.

3 6 ... h6

29 w

Lines in which Black plays the restraining 6 . . . h6 are an important and popular branch of the opening. The idea behind the move is, of course, to impede White's progress on the kingside until Black's defencei are sufficiently organised to launch an effective counteraction. While it is true that Black can avoid the loss of time and disorganisation of his pieces which trouble him in other variations, the move 6 . . . h6 suffers from the drawback of allowing White gr eater opportunities to open lines on the kingside . On balance the extra time which Black buys is insu fficient compensation in itself for the weakening of his pawn structure which loses a considerable amount of its defensive resilience as a result. It is , however, understandable that Black should be unwilling to

concede White a large spatia l advantage (with all the dangers which that entails) so early on in the opening, and the psychologica l feeling of security which the second player gains by containing White's initiative in this wa y is not to be despised.

If we tum our attention to White's viewpoint we fi nd that there are two pa tterns of strateSY from which he ca n choose. He may break a t once with 7 g5 or prepare the advance by fi rst extending his piece development in one' fashion or another (7 .t. g2, 7 lilg l) . Opening principles are too crude a yardstick with which to attempt to measure the relative merits of the two plans and the reader is advised to familiarise himself with both types of position before deciding which line to follow. Ideally White should have one or two (new) tricks up his s leeve with which to meet this variation.

We will divide our analysis as follows: A 7 g5 B 7 .t. g2 C 7 lit g l and other moves. A

7 gS hg 8 .t.xgS (30)

20 6 .. . h6

30 B

This position is quite possibly the most importa nt tha t can a rise from 6 g4, representing White's most reputa ble attempt for an adva ntage against Black's most solid defence . It has arisen in games at the highest standards of play with world class players championing both the white and bla ck pieces, and it is for this reason tha t I shall spend some considerable time a na lysing the strategic elements of the position in order to familiarise the rea der with it as thoroughly as possible .

I begin by drawing the reader's attention to the similarity of the position shown in the diagram to that which arises from the RichterRauzer line 1 e4 c5 2 ltlf3 lbc6 3 d4 cd 4 lbxd4 ltlf6 5 lbc3 d6 6 .i.g5 e6. Since Black in the Keres Attack position almost invariably plays . . . ltlc6 sooner or later the diff erences between the two positions amount to the following: White has gained the open g-file which he can use to put pressure on his opponent's kingside , while Black has the h-file and some possibilities of exploiting

White's now wea kened f3 squa re by bringing a knight to e5 where it a tta cks both c4 a nd f3 a t the sa me time . An importa nt considera tion a lso a re Bla ck's improved endga me prospects brought a bout by the wea kening of the white pa wn structure, a lthough this long term benefit is a mply compensa ted by the enlivening of the white position induced by the excha nge of pa wns.

Exploring the position further some other importa nt points come to light. In the Richter-Ra uzer it is often the case tha t White's stra tegy will involve exchanging the bishop fo r knight on f6 a t a time when his opponent can only recapture with the g-pawn, leaving B la ck with a weak h-pawn and a centra l majority which, although strong, tends to hamper the action of his bishops. Such possibilitie s a re not r eally open to White in the Keres Attack as with Black's h-pa wn a lready gone the first player would have relatively little compensation for the two bishops - Black would have no problems mobilising either his rook on h8 or his black-squared bishop, which could quickly come into play via h6.

But we have yet to mention the single most important feature of the position which is sufficient to outweigh all the disadvantages of the pawn exchange and tip the balance in White 's favour. It is that the bishop on g5 is virtually immune to attack, and as Black no longer has the option to drive it

away with . . . h6 he must suffer the constriction which it imposes on his game for as long as W hite chooses to leave the piece in this position. Furthermore White can later play h4 to support his bishop and eventually h5, reducing the scope of Black's rook considerably and threatening to undermine his kingside with h6. While it is possible for Black to defend against these threats he is often forced into a rather passive position in order to do so and it is this aspect which prospective Keres Attack players are likely to find agreeable .

Playing from the position shown in diagram 30 Black must choose between rapid queenside counterplay with lg . . . a6 or solid development with 8 . . . c6, possibly coupled with the modern . . . 't!Vb6. Only the latter seems to promise near-equality and hence is the current favourite . A I 8 . . . a6 A2 8 . . . c6 At

3 1 w

8 a6 (31)

Of course , Black may choose

6 ... h6 21

this move order to transpose to A2 lines but this plan is not to be recommended as White has more choice in the placement of his queen .

9 1!t' d2 It is also quite feasible to de velop

the queen on e2 where it guards the e-pawn and the c4 and f3 squares. This plan was illustrated by the game Geller-Korchnoi, match (6) Moscow 1 97 1 , which went 9 .tg2 (this move order has the benefit of ruling out an early . . . b5 by Black) 9 . . . .td7 (on 9 . . . bd7 1 0 1!Ve2 1!Vc7 1 1 0-0-0 White has a considerable advantage according to Velimirovic; Black dare not try 1 1 . . . b5? because of 1 2 e5 and hence must waste time with 1 1 . . . llb8, and after 1 2 f4 b5 1 3 llhe l ! White's build-up o n the e-file means he is ready for a direct attack based on e5, e.g. 13 . . . llxh2?! - 13 0 0 0 b4? 14 d5! - 1 4 e5 ! de 1 5 fe g8 - 1 5 ... i.b7 1 6 ef llxg2 1 7 xe6! ; 1 5 .. . h 7 1 6 .t/4 ; 15 .. o 1!Vxe5 161!Vxe5 xe5 1 7 llxe5 llxg2 18 c6 - 16 xe6! fe 1 7 .te4! xeS - 1 7 . o . llxe2 1 8 i.g6 mate; 17 0 0 0 llh6 18 1!Vh5+! llxh5 19 i.g6 mate; 17 ... e7 181!Vxh2 - 1 81!t' xh2! for if 1 8 . . . d3+ 19 llxd3 1!Vxh2 once more there i s 20 i.g6 mate) 10 1!Ve2 i.e7 1 1 0-0-0 1!Vc7 1 2 h4 c6 (finally Black has no othing better than to transpose to an inferior line) 13 f4 0-0-0 14 f5 'it>b8 1 5 fe fe and now as 1 6 i.h3?! allows the equalising 16 . . . h5 ! White should play 1 6 llhfl with

22 6 . . . h6

some advantage (Guf eld). The manoeuvre . . . h5 can be

of considerable use to Black if White has locked in his bishop with f4 and cannot avoid an exchange . For example , the game Kavalek-Szabo, Salgotarian 1 967, went 9 f4 bd7 10 1We2 i.e7 1 1 0-0-0 h5! 1 2 i.xe7 1Wxe7 1 3 1!re3 df 6 1 4 .ie2 e5! and Black took the initiative .

9 b5 The only move with independent

siginificance , but saf er is the transposition 9 . . . c6 leading to A2 lines.

Other possibilities are: (a) 9 ... 1Wc7 10 i.g2 bd7 1 1 f 4 Ji bS 1 2 0-0-0 h7 1 3 i.h4liJ b6 1 4 libe l! i.d7 1 5 d5 ! xd5 1 6 ed g5 1 7 de ! with a crushing attack, Savon-Bikov, Ukrai ne (Spartakiade) 1 973. (b) 9 . . . i.e7 10 i.g2 c6? ! I I xc6! be 1 2 e5 d5 1 3 i.xe7 'tf xe7 14 ed! 1Wxd6 1 5 0-0-0 Ji bS 16 e4 1Wf 4 1 7 c4 and White's active pieces and queenside pawn majority leave him very much on top , Ciocaltea-Bukic, Bucharest 197 1 .

1 0 .ig2 .ib7 1 1 0-0-0 bd7 12 f4 1Wc7 (32)

Black seems to have successfully completed his development but the sequel demonstrates a weakness in his f ormation on the long white diagonal.

1 3 e5! de 14 fe b4!

32 w

1 5 xe6! fe 1 5 1!rxe5 1 6 libe l be 1 7

1Wxd7+! xd7 I S c7 mate. 16 ef gf 1 7 e4 .ixe4

1 7 . . . f g I S 1!rxd7+ "t!Vxd7 1 9 xf6+ e7 20 lixd7+ 'it>xf6 2 1 .ixb7 Ji bS 22 .ixa6 .

33 B

1 8 i.xe4 0-0-0 19 1We2 (33)

Calvo-Panno, Las Palmas 1 973 . Black's weak pawns and exposed king will be difficult to def end against the two powerf ul white bishops. A2

8 c6 Theory suppose s that the immed

iate development of the knight

gives Black a more solid posit ion and bett er equalising chances but White should be able t o ret ain a slight plus with best play. In broad out line White's strategy must follow three phases: completion of his queenside development wit h '4W d2 and 0-0-0; restraint of Black's cent ral majority with .t. g2 or .t. e2-f3; and a st eady advance on the kingside wit h f4 and h4. As long as White main' tains his control of t he centre (and this should present no problems with the bishop now firmly entrenched on g5) the order in which these phases are enacted is relatively unimportant, but there are some nuances of which Keres Attack pl ayers should be aware and a thof ough study of the ensuing material is strongly advised.

We examine: A2 1 9 '4W d2 A22 9 h4 A23 9 .i. g2

An alternative rarely seen in practice is 9 ll:lb3 with which White voluntarily loses a tempo: 9 . . . a6 10 f4 '4W c7 1 1 '4W e2 b5 (the game L ane-Pritchett from Decin 1978 varied with 1 1 . . . .t. e7 1 2 0-0-0 b5 1 3 .t. g2 .t. b7 14 e5 de 15 fe lild5 1 6 .i.d2 1Wxe5 1 7 1Wxe5 ll:lxe5 1 8 ll:lxd5 .t. xd5 1 9 .t. xd5 ed =) 1 2 0-0-0 b4 when Black's rapid queenside expansion gave him the better chances in Karasev-Krogius, USSR Ch 1 97 1 . 12 a3 is Korchnoi's suggested improvement. A21

9 '4W d2 (34)

34 B

6 . . . h6 23

The most common move at this point. White follows the classical Richter-Rauzer plan, quickly castling long before he undertakes further kingside action.

Black has the choice of 9 . . . a6, the older continuat ion which we examine first, and the more modern 9 . . . '4Wb6. A2 1 1 9 . . . a6 A2 1 2 9 . . . '4Wb 6 A21 1

9 a6 1 0 0-0-0 .t. d7

10 . . . ll:lxd4 is premature: 1 1 '4W xd4 .t. e7 1 2 h4'4t c7 1 3 f4'4W c5 14 '4W d2 b5 1 5 e5! de 1 6 fe 1Wxe5 17 .t. g2 lla7 1 8 llhe l with excellent attacking chances for the pawn, Medina-Guge, L as Palmas 1 973 .

Naturally 10 . . . '4W b6 is possible, transposing to A2 1 2 .

1 1 h4 This is marginally more flexible

than 1 1 f4 but the latter is perfectly playable: (a) 11 . . . .t. e7 12 f5 ll:lxd4 13 '4W xd4 efl! ( 1 3 . . . '4W c7) 14 ef .t. c6?! 1 5 llg l llxh2 1 6 .t. f4 llh7 1 7 .t. c4 d5 18 .i. b3 '4W d7 19 '4W e5 and Black was

24 6 . . . h6

completely tied down in BelyavskySteinberg, USSR 1 972. (b) 11 . c7 12 i.g2 0-0-0? 13 h4 ( 1 3 e5! de 14 ll:lxc6 i.xc6 1 5 xd8+ xd8 1 6 lit xd8+ 'it>xd8 1 7 .txc6 be 1 8 fe ) 1 3 . . . lit e8? ( 1 3 . . . .te7) 14 e 5 ! de 1 5 ll:lxc6 i.xc6 1 6 i.xc6 xc6 1 7 fe lild7 1 8 4 f6 1 9 ef gf 20 i.xf6 lilxf6 2 1 xf6 i.e7 22 4 Bangiev-Zeliandinov, USSR 1 974. (c) 11 ... 't!rb6!? 12 .te2? ! (not 1 2 ll:lb3 ll:lg4 1 3 lit e 1 f6 =F + but 1 2 lilf3 seems a promising improvement as White threatens an immediate e5 and 12 . . . ll:lg4 leads nowhere after 1 3 lit e 1 - 1 3 . . . 1 4 lit e2! xf3 15 .tg2 ) 12 . . . ll:lxd4 1 3 xd4 xd4 1 4 lit xd4 lilh5! 1 5 f5 lilg3 1 6 lit e 1 ll:lxe2+ 1 7 lit xe2 + Bonev-Padevsky, Bulgaria 1 972.

35 w

1 1 c7 (35)

A curiosity was 1 1 . . . i.e7 12 lit h3 (normal are 12 f4, 12 .tg2, 1 2 i.e2 or 1 2 i.h3 transposing eventually to the main line) 12 . . . lilxd4 1 3 xd4 e5 1 4 ..,d3 i.xh3 1 5 .txh3 ll:lg8 1 6 ll:ld5 ! f6 1 7 .., c3 fg 1 8 lilc7+ 'it>f7 1 91!rb 3+ 'it>g6 20 i.f 5+ ct>h 6 2 1 M7 1-0 Pokojowczyk-

Adamski, Slupsk 1 978 . White has a small but persistent

advantage in this position and there are a number of ways to exploit his superiority: A2 1 1 1 12 f4 A2 1 1 2 1 2 i.h3 A2 1 1 3 12 i.g2 A2 1 1 4 1 2 i.e2 A21 1 1

1 2 f4 (a) 12 ... lilh7!? 1 3 .th3 ll:lxd4 ( 1 3 . .. f6? 14 lilxe6 .txe6 1 5 .txe6 fg 1 6 ll:ld5 .., a5 1 7 xa5 ll:lxa5 1 8 hg is winning for White and if 13 . . . ll:lxg5 14 hg the threat of 1 5 i.xe6! makes life difficult for Black) 141i' xd4 f6 1 5 f5 fg 1 6 fe .tc6 1 7 e7 ! (drawing the black queen to the e-file) 1 7 . . . xe7 1 8 lild5 i.xd5 1 9 ed 1!Vf6 20

1!rb 6 i.e7 2 1 lit hf l 1!Vh6 22 i.d7+! 'it>xd7 23 xb7+ d8 24 xa8+ 'it>d7 25 xh8 1 -0 was Ma rrisFormanek, USA 1 979. (b) 12 .. . .te7 1 3 'it>b 1 (more enterp rising is 1 3 i.g2 transposing to A23, or 1 3 .th3, or 1 3 .te2 - see A2 1 1 2 and A2 1 1 4 below) 13 . . . lilh5 14 .ih3 lilxd4 1 5 xd4 f6 1 6 f5 fg 1 7 fe i.c6 1 8 h g 0-0-0 was played in Alexandria-Belavenets, Tbilisi 1 979. With two pawns and a strong bind on the light squares White has considerable compensation for the piece . In the game Black did not find a satisfactory way to resolve the problem: 1 9 .tf5 ll:lg3 ( 1 9 . . . 'it>b8 t o free the dark-squared bishop is more resilient) 20 lit xh8 lit xh8 2 1 xg7 lit h 5 22 g6 lilxf5 23 ef lit xf5 24

'8h7 't!f d8 25 a3 lilf8? 26 g7 lilg8 27 lilf l .. e8 28 lilf7 8 29 .. f 5 7 30 lile2 't!f d8 3 1 lilf4 b8 , 32 lilg6 .te8 33 lilxe7 .txf7 34 ef 1 -0. A21 12

1 2 1 3 14

.th3 f4

"t!Vxd4 And now:

.te7 lilxd4

(a) 14 ... llc8 1 5 lld2! (to guard c2 and preparing to break open the centr e now t hat Black has for feited castling) 1 5 . . . "t!Vc5 1 6 "t!Vd3 .tc6 1 7 lile l "t!Va5 1 8 a3 lidS 1 9 li:ld5!? ed 20 ed "t!Vxd5 2 1 "t!Ve3 with a strong attack f or the piece in HolmovShamkovich, Timisoara 1 972. (b) 14 .. . .tc6 15 llhe l ( 1 5 . . . 0-0-0 1 6 li:ld5! ) 1 6 "t!Vf2 lilg8 1 7 .tg4 lilh6 1 8 .txe7+ "t!Vxe7 1 9 .tf3 ll:lg8 20 h5 lilf6 2 1 lild5! and White had a dangerous initiative, Gipslis-Jansa, Budapest 1 970. (c) 14 . . . 0-0-0 1 5 b l b8 16 f5! putting a great deal of strain on Black's position with the threat of switching the attack to the weak dark squares around his king) 1 6 . . . e5 ( 1 6 . . . .tc8 1 7 .te3 b 5 1 8 a4 ) 1 7 't!Vf2 .tc6 18 i.g2 llc8 19 .tf3 b5 20 a3 .tb7 2 1 lld2 llhd8 22 llhd l and White's simple strategy of loading up on the d5 square was sufficient to provide a marked advantage in Tarjan-Evans, USA Ch 1 973 . (d) 14 . . . '@c5 15 '@d3 0-0-0 1 6 llhg l b8 1 7 f5 '@c7 1 8 @f3 llh7 1 9 lld3 lldh8 with equal chances, B rowne-Andersson, Las Palmas 1 974.

6 . . . h6 25

A2113 12 .tg2

12 . . . .te7 1 3 b l ( 1 3 f4) 1 3 . . . lilxd4 1 4 .. xd4 .tc6 1 5 lilh3 0-0-0 1 6 llhd3 b8 1 7 lLld5!? ed 1 8 ed ll:lxd5! 1 9 .txd5 .txg5 = GipslisLiberzon, Tallinn 1969. A21 14

1 2 .te2 This move has invariably been

Karpov's choice in the position. White endeavours to constrict his opponent further by supporting the advance of the h-pawn.

1 2 0-0-0 13 f4 .te7 14 h5 b8

14 . . . ll:la5 1 5 llh3 lilc6 16 lilb3 .te8 1 7 b I b8 18 "t!Ve3 was Sutterer-Podzielny, West German Ch 1 978, in which White retained a substantial spatial advantage.

15 b1 .te8 1 5 . . . d5 16 e5 lile4 1 7 lilxe4 de

1 8 .txe7 lilxe7 19 "t!Ve3 lLlf5 20 ll:lxf5 ef 2 1 llhg I KarpovSteinberg, USSR 1 97 1 .

36 B

1 6 .tf3 (36)

Karpov-Smith, San Antonio 1 972. Black's position remains

26 6 ... h6

cramped and he faces grave difficu lties in attempting to free it . The sequel was 16 . . . a5 17 't!Ve2 c4 1 8 lithe! liteS 1 9 litd3 g8 20 Wg2 .tf8 2 1 lith I e7 22 b3 a3+ 23 b2 b5 24 cxb5 ab 25 't!Vd2 Wb 6 26 .th4! b4 27 .tf2 't!Va5 28 .te l e5 29 e2 c6 30 f5! f6 3 1 litd5 't!Va3+ 3 2 b I .tf7 3 3 litd3 b6?! 34 .tf2 b7 35 c3 be 36 litxc3 .te7 37 litg l lithg8 38 Wb2 't!Vxb2+ 39 xb2 a7 40 litxc8 xc8 4 1 c3 ( 1 -0, 70). A21 2

9 't!Vb6(!) It sometimes happens that chess

commentators get carried away when awarding 'oscars' to their favoured opening innovations. The unfortunate move is lumbered with this extravagant commendation until such time as the author recants or another more dispassionate analyst reviews it rather less enthusiastically.

The reader will notice that I have attempted to sidestep this pitfall by awarding Black's ninth only ' half an exclamation mark. My intention is to point out that the move , though far from being a devastating blow, represents a tangible improvement in Black's strategy as hitherto examined. The proof that this is so lies not only in the fact that in current master practice 9 . . . Wb6 is now regarded as the only acceptable way to play the line: the reasons why the move is good may be clearly stated.

for my oscar award: the move . . . Wb 6 opens new avenues for Black in not one but two opening variations!

37 B

1 0 b3 (37)

White should not permit a general exchange of pieces as in the resulting endgame the weaknesses in his pawn structure would begin to tell.

The interpolation of the moves 9 . . . Wb6 10 b3, while reducing the attacking p6> tential of the white position , has done little to alter the general pattern of his strategy. Unless Black attempts a vigorous follow-up such as . . . e5 or an early . . . b5 White will continue as usual with queenside castling, f4, h4 and .te2 or .tg2. Now that the g l -a7 diagonal is not blocked by the knight he may wish to give some consideration to the plan of exploiting Black's dark squares on the queenside with .te3 . In the main, though, his intention remains simply to increase his spatial advantage.

Black now has:

By pu tting immediate pressu re on his opponent's centre in this way Black forces the knight away f rom its central post, where it has enjoyed considerable activity, to a rather dull square on b3, and in so doing he has neutralised some of the dynamic potential in White's position. As a result White's buildup proceeds rather more slowly than in the 9 . . . a6 1ines . A possible drawback . to the move is that Black no longer has the option to exchange knights on d4 (which could precede an . . . e5 thrust) but this consideration is rarely of importance.

What of our comparison with the Richter-Rauzer? Why af ter I e4 c5 2 lt:lf3 1lDc6 3 d4 cd 4 lt:lxd4 lt:lf 6 5 lDc3 d6 6 .tg5 e6 7 Wd2 is the analogous 7 . . . "t!fb6 virtually unknown? It could be reasoned that in the Keres Attack position Black has a natural follow-up to . . . 1!fb6 in . . . lDe5 to exploit the absence of the defender of White's f 3 square, coupled with the threat of occupying c4, but it transpires that this strategy is not a viable proposition as White will reorganise his forces to cover the threatened squares and eventually drive out the invader.

My belief is that the dif ference between the two positions is . . . essentially nothing! 7 . . . 'itb6 in the Richter-Rauzer is certainly playable and probably good and my prediction is that we will be seeing more of the move in f uture. This brings me to the second reason

6 . . . h6 27

A2 1 2 1 1 0 . . . lDe5 A2 1 22 10 . . . a6 (the main line). A2121

10 lDeS 11 1!fel

This move has the benefit of reinf orcing c4 but 1 1 .te2 is playable, e .g . 1 1 . . . .td7 12 0-0-0 lih3 (playing to exploit the absence of the bishop f rom f l - Black now threatens 1 3 . . . lixc3 or 13 . . . lDf3; a mistake would be 1 2 . . . 1!fxf2 on account of 1 3 lDd4) 1 3 .ie3?! ( 1 3 f 4! lDf 3 1 4 .txf3 lixf3 1 5 e 5 lDg8 1 6 lt:ld4 lih3 1 7 f 5 or 1 3 . . . lixc3 14 .txf 6! lixb3 1 5 ab ) 1 3 . . . lixe3! 1 4 f e g 6 1 5 1!fd4 .th6 1 6 1!fxb6 ab 1 7 lixd6 .tc6 with f ull compensation f or the exchange, Browne-Kavalek, USA Ch 1 975.

1 1 .td7 Or 1 1 . . . 1!fc7 and now:

(a) 12 0-0-0 .td7 13 f 4 lDc6 14 .tg2 a6 1 5 .tf 3 0-0-0 1 6 h4 b8 1 7 h5 Ilc8 1 8 c.t>b l .te8 1 9 .th4! (the black square plan! ) 19 . . . lt:ld7? (better was 1 9 . . . lt:la5 20 lt:lxa5 1!fxa5 2 1 .tf2 lt:ld7 22 We3 lt:lc5) 20 .tf2 lDc5 21 lihg l g6 22 hg f g 2 3 f5! lDxb3 24 a b gf 2 5 ef ef 26 lt:ld5 1!fa5? 27 .ib6 @b5 28 1!ff2 Tatai-Sax, Budapest 1 976. (b) 1 2 h4 .id7 13 0-0-0 Ilc8 1 4 h5 lDc4 15 Ilh3 b5 Gipslis-Sax, Amsterdam 1 976, and now 1 6 lt:ld4! with the idea 1 6 . . . b4 1 7 lDd5!

1 2 0-0-0 Ilc8 1 3 f4

Less forceful is 1 3 h4 as played in the game Lanka-Knaak, Jurmala 1 978, which continued 1 3 . . . a6 14

28 6 . . . h6

lilh3 Wc7 1 5 f4 l0c4 16 lilhd3 l0h7 17 e5! ( 1 7 l0d5 !? 1!rb8 !) 17 . . . xg5 1 8 hg d5 19 g6! fg 20 Wg4 lilh6 2 1 lilh3 llxh3 2 2 .. xh3 (22 .txh3 l0xb2) 22 . . .

Black already held the advantage, Muhin-Estevez, Luhacovice 1973 . (b) 12 ..te3 'f!/c7 13 f4 ( 1 3 ..tf4?! lL!e5 14 .tg3 g5 ! 1 5 b l .te7 1 6 i.e2 b 5 1 7 a 3 llcS + Lein-Benko, Novi Sad 1 972) 13 . . . b5 14 i.g2 llcS 1 5 b 1 .te7 and now: b l ) 16 llhe1 b4 17 lL!a4 lL!a5 1 S ll:lb6 ll:lc4 19 lL!xc4 '4!xc4 SteinKrogius, USSR Ch 1964/65, and here 20 e5 is promising. b2) 16 h3 b4 17 lL!a4 llbS lS '4!f2 (notice how with the bishop on e3 White can set up threats on the dark squares) lS . . . .idS 19 e5! de 20 ll:lac5 with an attack, AmbrazatisRoizman, Riga 1972. (c) 12 .i.g2 and now: c l ) 12 . . . i.e7 13 .i.e3 !? 'it'c7 14 f4 ll:la5 l j lL!xa5 'f!/xa5 16 'i!?b l t Hort-Andersson, Nice OL 1 974. c2) 12 ... lL!e5 13 'ire2 llcS 14 f4 lL!c4 1 5 lld3 'irc7 1 6 h4 .ie7 1 7 lite l? ! b 5 18 e 5 de 19 fe lO b S 20 'f!/f2 (20 .i.xe7 lL!f4! 2 1 'irg4 ll:lxe5 ! ) 20 . . . lL!xe5 2 1 llh3? f6 22 .i.e3 b4 Tal-Adamski , Lublin 1974. (d) 12 f4 0-0-0 13 .i.g2 .i.e7 14 'i!?b l l0g4 ! 1 5 .i.xe7 lL!xe7 1 6 'f!/xd6 xd6 1 7 llxd6 lL!g6 1 S f5 lLl6e5 1 9 fe fe 20 lL!c5 llh6 2 1 h3 lL!e3 22 litg2 g5 with an unclear position , Mednis-Jansa , Kragujevac 1977 .

12 .te7 13 ..te2 (40)

1 3 .ig2 is an important alternative since White may arrive at the postion via a number of different routes, e .g. 9 i.g2 .i.e7 10 h4 a6 1 1 'ird2 1!fb6 1 2 ltlb3 .i.d7 1 3 0-0-0 (A23).

40 B

6 . . . h6 29

After 1 3 .ig2 't!fc7 ( 1 3 . . . 0-0-0 14 i.e3 ! 'irc7 1 5 lL!a4 is very difficult for Black; note that this manoeuvre is only possible because the bishop on g2 guards the e-pawn) 14 f4 0-0-0 1 5 .tf3 bS 1 6 h5 the game transposes to the main line. Black may , however, attempt to cross White's plans and prevent the transposition by playing 1 5 . . . g6 1 6 'it>b l 'i!?bS and now: (a) 1 7 'irf2 lOgS lS i.xe7 (forced because of the threat of f6) l S . . . ll:lgxe7 1 9 't!fg3 (with . . . g6 Black has effectively ruled out h5 by White , but in so doing he has slightly weakened his dark squares on the kingside) 19 . . . .icS 20 'irg5 llh7 2 1 lld2! (with the blacksquared bishops exchanged now is the time for White to pressurise Black's d-pawn) 21 . . . 1!fb6 22 llhd 1 'it'e3 23 'f!/g3 e5 24 fe lL!xe5 25 llxd6 llxd6 26 llxd6 l07c6 27 llxc6! llh5 2S llf6 1 -0 MednisFernandez, Budapest 197S . (b) 1 7 llhfl .tcS lS f5 (it's rather too early for White to commit himself in this way and Mednis's more restrained approach is to be

30 6 . . . h6

preferred) 1 8 . . . lbh7 19 .ie3 lbf6 20 'trf2 lbd7 2 1 llh l .tf6 22 lba4 lldf8 23 h5 gh 24 llxh5 .te5 25 .ib6 lbxb6 26 lbxb6 lbe7 27 lbxc8 lbxc8 28 lldh 1 llxh5 29 .txh5 ef 30 ef llh8 - TseshkovskyAnikayev, USSR Ch (Top L) Minsk 1 979 .

13 14 f4 15 h5

0-0-0 rJib8 .

White should not forego this important move which further restricts his opponent's position and cuts out some of his defensive resources such as . . . g6. Postponement of the advance will react in Black's favour, as the following games illustrate.

15 .tf3 1!fc7 and now: (a) 16 rJibl .tc8 (for 16 . . . g6 see note to White's 13th move) 1 7 'tre2 (after this White's advantage slips away: the most accurate was 1 7 h5 to answer 1 7 . . . lbg8 with 1 8 lthg l ) 1 7 . . . lbg8! (played a t a time when White must make the exchange of bishops because of the threat off6) 1 8 .txe7 lbgxe7 1 9 h5 g 6 2 0 a3 g h 2 1 llxh5 llxh5 22 .txh5 f5 23 'trd2 fe 24 lbxe4 e5 and Black has equalised, Chi-Andersson, Buenos Aires (Clarin) 1978. (b) 16 libel .tc8 1 7 1!ff2 lbg8 ! 18 h5 (the alternative 18 .txe7 lbgxe7 also leaves Black with few problems) 1 8 . . . .txg5 19 fg f6 20 llgl lbe5 2 1 .ie2 fg 22 llxg5 lbf6 and Black's firm grip on the important e5 square gives him sufficient counterplay, Karpov-Andersson, Bugojno

1980. 15 .tc8 16 .tf3 (41)

Following his strategy both logically and accurately White has increased his spatial advantage to the limit while fully restraining his opponent's central counterplay. However, he now finds himself without a clear way forward and so must use the extra flexibility allowed by his spacious position to manoeuvre his forces, preparing to react quickly to any small concession Black may have to make in order to free his pieces . For his part Black has succeeded in reaching a robust if somewhat defensive position and finding his counterthrust . . . d5 well and truly contained must seek to alleviate the crampedness of his formation by exchanging pieces . With careful play he should be able to secure equality, but White's advantage, though small and static, is likely to persist for some time to come, and even a relatively minor slip by the second player may eventually prove fatal.

Black now has: (a) 16 . . . lt:la5 (this is probably not the best way to seek exchanges) I 7 "4We2 '@c7 I 8 lt:lxa5 '@xa5 I9 l:thg i Ilde8 20 a3 '@c5? (better was 20 . . . "4Wc7 preparing . . . l:th7 and . . . lt:lg8) 2I e5 ! de 22 fe lLld7 23 .te3 '@c7 24 llxg7 Chiburdanidze-Muresan , Budapest I978. (b) 16 . . . l:th7 I7 'W'e2 lt:lg8 (the plan of exchanging bishops is Black's main chance for equality; notice how White correctly declines to make the exchange, thereby saving two tempi) I8 llhg i .txg5 19 l:txg5 ll:lge7 20 ll:ld5 ! (this is a noteworthy tactic) 20 . . . ed 2 I ed f6 22 de fg 23 '@xe7 g4! 24 .te4 l17h8 25 '@xg7 with a dangerous initiative, robek-Adamski, Polish Ch I 977. (c) 16 . . . '@c7. This move strengthens the d-pawn in preparation for the exchange of dark-squared bishops and guards against ltld5 tactics (see Skrobek-Adamski above). The move is particularly important because the resulting position can arise from a number of lines, e.g. after (A2 I 222) I I . . . '@c7 I 2 .tg2.

Now: c i ) 1 7 "4We3 (White takes up the g i a 7 diagonal which Black has abandoned) I 7 . . . lt:le8 I8 llhg I .txg5 I9 llxg5 lt:le7 20 lld3 f6? (20 . . . g6 2 I ll:la4 gh 22 .txh5 lt:lc6 ::!) 2 I l:tg i ( ) 2 I . . . d5?! 22 ed ed 23 ltlxd5 lt:lxd5 24 l:txd5 l:txd5 25 .txd5 Ilxh5 26 .txb7 SpasskyRibli, Manila IZ I 976.

6 . . . h6 31

c2) 17 b1 lt:lg8 I8 l:tdg i ( I 8 l:thg i !?) I 8 . . . l:th7 I 9 '@f2 ( I9 '@e3 .txg5 20 llxg5 lt:lge7 2 I l:thg i g6 22 hg ll:lxg6 23 .th5 lt:lce7 24 a4 (::!) l:tdh8 25 .txg6 ll:lxg6 26 f5 e5 27 llg8 llh3 28 '@d4 ll:lf3 29 l:txh8! l:txh8 ! 30 '@xh8 lt:lxg i 3I fe fe 32 lt:ld4 '@f7 33 '@d8 '@fl + 34 a2 '@c4+ 35 lLlb3 !h-!h Kinlay-Pritchett, London I 980) I 9 . . . .txg5 20 l:txg5 ' lt:lge7 2 I l:td i (2 I l:thg i !? - see Kinlay-Pritchett above) 2 I . . . g6 22 hg ll:lxg6 23 llh5 llg7 24 l:tg i Il7g8 25 l:thg5 ll:lge7 26 .th5 Ilxg5 27 Ilxg5 f5 28 ef lt:lxf5 29 .i.g4 ll:lce7 30 a3 l:tf8 3 I .te2 lt:lc6 32 .td3 ll:lfe7 and Black has successfully trodden the path to full equality, Karpov-Andersson, Skara I 980. c3) 17 ll:ld4 .i.d7 I8 ll:lb3 .te8?! I 9 .th4 d 5 2 0 e d lt:lxd5 2 I lt:lxd5 e d 2 2 .txe7 '@xe7 2 3 '@f2 (23 .txd.S lt:lb4) 23 . . . llh6 24 l:thg i '@c7 25 Ilxg7 '@xf4+ 26 '@d2 ! '@xd2+ 27 llxd2 lt:le5! 28 l:txd5 l:txd5 29 .txd5 .i.c6 30 .txf7 (30 .txc6 lt:lxc6 3 1 Ilg5 f6 32 l:tf5 lt:le7) 30 . . . lt:lxf7 3 I l:txf7 l:txh5 32 ltld4 (Sosonko), Timman-Spassky, Tilburg 1980. c4) 1 7 .th4!? with the plan of switching to the g i -a7 diagonal seems promising. A21222

1 1 "t!Vc7 (42) In this section we examine

Black's alternative strategy of forfeiting the immediate queenside castling and instead pushing for a direct attack with . . . b5 . White

32 6 . . . h6

42 w

has to remain alert to Black's intentions and consider forcing a transposition to line A2 122 1 to maintain a safe edge.

1 2 f4 (a) Too routine is 12 h4 .i.d7 13 .i.e2 hoping to transpose to A2 1 22 1 . Black need not continue 1 3 . . . .i.e7 but can instead play 13 . . . b5! e.g. 14 a3 b4 15 ab ll:lxb4 16 f4 litbS 17 f5 e5 I S lih3 .i.c6 19 .i.xf6 gf 20 'it>b 1 a5 2 1 l0d5 .i.xd5 22 ed a4 23 lL!c 1 ..th6 24 't!Vc3 @b6 + A.lvanovAnikayev, Frunze 1 979. (b) Good, however, is 12 .i.g2 clamping down hard on Black's attempts to play actively on the queenside . 12 . . . b5 is then not possible because of the reply 13 e5 ! so that Black is forced to give up the idea of fianchettoing his bishop and the game takes on the characteristics of the A2 12'2 1 1 1 . . . .i.d7 lines after 1 2 . . . .i.d7 (unworkable is 12 . . . lL!e5 13 f4 lL!c4 14 @d4 -even better is 14 @e2 .i.d7 15 lid4 - 14 . . . .i.d7? 1 5 e5 lLlh7 and now instead of 16 ed? ll:lxd6 17 lithe 1 liteS I S lid2 lL!xg5 1 9 fg ll:lf5 + Chiburdanidze-Kushnir, match ( 1 2)

Bad Kissingen 197S, White should try 16 .i.h4 de 1 7 fe with a promising game) 1 3 f4 .i.e7 (not 1 3 . . . b5 14 e5 ! de 1 5 fe 't!Vxe5? 1 6 .i.xf6 ) 14 h4 0-0-0 1 5 f3 transposing to A2 1 22 1 - see note to White's 1 3th.

12 b5 1 3 .i.g2

With accurate play Black emerges from this line quite well , so alternatives should be investigated: (a) 13 't!Ve3 .i.b7 14 .i.h3 ( 1 4 .i.g2 ! transposes into the favourable Razuvayev-Commons game that follows, so Black should improve with 1 3 . . . b4 instead of 13 . . . .tb7) 14 . . . b4 15 .i.xf6 gf 16 ll:le2 lL!e5 ! 1 7 'it'b l lL!c4 I S @d3 0-0-0 19 ll:led4 lieS 20 lithe 1 'it'bS 2 1 lie2 .i.h6 22 lif2 lieS 23 .i.g2 @b6 + . Black's pieces are aggressively placed and White is rapidly running out of ideas, Furman-Belyavsky, USSR Team Ch 1977. (b) The natural 13 a3 .i.b7 has yet to be tried . What has been tested (by transposition) is the position after 1 3 a3 .i.d7 14 .i.e2. The game Zaitsev-Padevsky from Baku 19SO continued 14 . . . b4 15 ab ll:lxd4 16 .i.f3 libS?! ( 1 6 . . . lieS 17 'it>b l e5 IS fe de 19 .i.xf6 gf 20 't!Vxd7+ @xd7 21 litxd7 'it'xd7 22 .i.g4+ = ) 1 7 e5 ! de I S fe l0h7 ( I S . . . lL!fd5 19 .i.xd5 ed 20 l0xd5 ll:lxd5 2 1 @xd5 .i.e6 22 @a5 ) 19 .i.e3 .i.c6 20 lihfl .i.e7 2 1 't!Vg2 ( ) 21 . . . g6 and here White could have underlined his advantage with 22 h4! .i.xh4 23 litd4 .i.xf3 24 't!Vxf3 .i.g5 25 .i.xg5 ll:lxg5 26 't!Vg4 @e7 27 litfd l

threatening 28 l:td7. 13 b4

1 3 . . . .tb7 is the natural move and until recently was considered perfectly adequate, e .g. (a) 14 'i!?b1 .te7 15 h4 ( 1 5 a3 b4 1 6 ab lt:lxb4 1 7 h4 e5 = ) 1 5 . . . b4 16 lt:le2 a5 17 Ilhe 1 0-0-0 1 8 lt:led4 lt:lxd4 19 @xd4 'i!?b8 20 @g l (20 c4 ! be 2 1 llc l oo) 20 . . . e5 + SteanSpassky, Moscow 1 975. (b) 14 h4 0-Q-O 1 5 f5 'i!?b8 1 6 fe fe 17 lt:ld4 lt:lxd4 18 @xd4 i.e7 19 i.h3 e5 20 @e3 b4 21 lt:ld5 lL!xd5 22 ed .ixg5 23 hg @a5 24 't!re4 Ilhf8 + Timman-Ligterink, Netherlands Ch 1 978.

However, a recent game has cast doubt on the move, with the result that prefrence is currently given to the text. (c) 14 @e3! b4 1 5 lt:la4 lt:ld7 (trying to cover the dark squares while preparing for . . . e5) 1 6 e5 ! d5 ( 1 6 . . . de 1 7 llxd7 ! 't!rxd7 1 8 lL!b6 't!rc7 19 lhxa8 i.xa8 20 fe ) 1 7 f5 ! 't!rxe5 ( 1 7 . . . lL!cxe5 1 8 fe fe 19 lt:ld4 't!rd6 20 i.f4 ) 1 8 't!rf2 't!rxf5 (after 1 8 . . . e7 1 9 i.xe7 lt:lxe7 20 fe fe 2 1 lt:ld4 Black's position is near to collapse) 19 't!rxf5 ef 20 llhe l +? (20 xd5! ) 20 . . . lt:lce5 2 1 lt:la5 :b8? (2 1 . . . llh2 oo) 22 lt:lxb7 :xb7 23 llxd5 llc7? 24 ll l xe5+ 1 -0 Razuvayev-Commons, Lublin, 1 978.

14 lL!a4 14 e5 be 1 5 't!rc3 lt:ld5 16 . lld5 ed

1 7 .id5 ..tb7 + . 14 e5 15 fe de

43 w

16 h3 17 'trf2 18 i.e3

6 . . . h6 33

i.e6 lt:ld7 lt:la5 (43)

Nunn-Ghinda, Dortmund 1 979. Black's position is excellent and the additional time which his opponent must lose in extricating his poorly placed knight will allow the second player to build a strong attack. A22

44 B

9 h4 (44)

This relatively little explored possibility has the merit of keeping White's position very flexible. In particular, if Black should adopt an early . . . 't!t'b6 plan White can follow l0b3 with t!te2, thereby saving a tempo in some variations.

34 6 . . . h6

Black can and probably should avoid this continuation by employing some of the less committal . moves at his disposal ( . . . a6, . . . .id7, . . . .te7) until his opponent's piece development becomes clear.

Nonetheless , 9 h4 seems a good alternative to the more usual 9 Wd2 and may serve as an introduction to the main line or the .tg2 formation's discussed under A23.

9 trb6 As mentioned above, Black can

force a transposition to A2 1 2 lines with 9 . . . a6 I(} 1!M2 '@1>6. There are grounds for the belief that the text is premature, as we shall see .

Possible also is 9 . . . .td7, e.g. 1 0 llJb3? ! (better are 1 0 Wd2 and I 0 .tg2) 1 0 . . . 1!rc7 I I h5?! a6 1 2 f4 b5 1 3 i.g2 lieS 1 4 We2 b4 1 5 llJd l a5 with good counterplay for Black in Tseshkovsky-Kurajica, Ljubljana/ Portoroz 1 977.

45 B

1 0 llJb3 a6 1 1 1!re2! ( 45)

The queen is clearly better placed on e2 where it covers the important c4 and f3 squares and prepares for future action in the

centre (f4, e5 or even llJd5). 1 1 Wc7 12 0-0-0 .td7

12 . . . b5 also did not work out well for Black in ZhuravlyevPjaren, Corres 1 977, which continued 1 3 .th3 .te7 14 f4 .ib7 1 5 libe l e 5 1 6 fe llJxe5 1 7 't!fg2 b4 1 8 llJd5 llJxd5 1 9 ed g6 20 llJd4 .

1 3 'it>b1 .te7 14 .ib3 0-0-0 15 .te3 (46)

A noteworthy plan. Instead of locking out the bishop with the customary f4 White attempts to exploit Black's weakened queenside dark squares , beginning with the immediate threat of llJa4. Black may counter with the llJc6-e5-c4 manoeuvre but with White's queen already on e2 the horse is likely to be displaced rather quickly.

1 5 llJe5 1 6 f4 lt:lc4 17 .tf2 'it>b8 18 lid4!

This is the procedure: the rook on d4 has the double function of attacking the knight on c4 and preparing further pressure on the

d-file. 18 li:c8? (47)

47 w

Tempting, because of the threat of 1 9 . . . xb2, but Black does not fully realise the extent of the danger he is in. Already the weakening 1 8 . . . b 5 was necessary.

19 llxc4! 20 , 't!fe3 21 a3!

Wxc4 llcS

The threat of .i.fl is devastating. 21 llchS 22 't!fa7+ 'itc8 23 J.b6 .i.c6 24 .i.fl

Trapl-Adamski, USSR 1 974. ,An outstandingly clear exposition of the possibilities at White's disposal in these lines. A23

9 .i.g2 (48) White's intention is to underpin

his hold on the centre and restrain Black's queenside initiative . In favourable circumstances he may break quickly in the centre with eS, opening up the long diagonal with devastating effect. As we shall see, Black would do well to avoid the accepted line of play, transposing

48 B

6 . . . h6 35

instead to A2 1 variations discussed earlier.

9 .i.d7 (a) 9 . 'tWaS 10 h4 a6 I I 't!fd2 g4 1 2 b3 't!fb6 1 3 We2 f6 1 4 0-0-0 .i.d7 1 5 .i.e3 was GoldevovKJzmin, USSR 1 964. After Black's loss of tempo White is prepared for a rapid f5 , e5 or l0a4-b6 and stands very wel l . (b) 9 .i.e7 may very well represent Black's most accurate method of handling the variation. After 1 0 h4 ( 1 0 xc6? ! 1>c I I e5 d5 1 2 .i.xe7 1!P'xe7 1 3 Wg4 - 13 ed Wxd6 14 e4 't!b4+ is awkward for White - 1 3 . . . 0-0 1 4 e d Wxd6 1 5 0-0-0 ll b 8 1 6 llhg l llb4! 1 7 Wg3 't!ff4+ 1 8 lld2 Wh6 =f Stepak-Dzhindzhihashvili, Israel (Ch) 1 977178) 10 . . . a6 1 1 't!fd2 Wb6! White has nothing better than 12 b3 transposing to the main A2 1 2 line , since if 12 .i.e3 Black can happily accept the offer of the white b-pawn as his own is guarded by the bishop on c8.

10 h4 Marginally more accurate than

10 "t!t'd2 since if he is given the option White would prefer to

36 6 . . . h6

develop the queen on the more active e2 square where it supports an eventual e5 break. The game Ljubojevic-Larsen, Orense 1 975, went 10 Wd2 "@b6 1 1 db5 ( 1 1 .i.e3 ! ) 1 1 . . . g4! 1 2 h3 a6 1 3 xd6+ .i.xd6 1 4 h g llxh l + 1 5 .i.xh 1 e5 regaining the pawn with an excellent position.

10 .i.e7 1 1 Wd2 a6 1 2 0-0-0 't!fc7

On 1 2 . . . "@b6 White has the important resource 1 3 .i.e3 ! which maintains his knight in its strong central post .

49 B

1 3 f4 (49)

1 3 xd4 This is the manoeuvre which is

supposed to equalise. Safer is 1 3 . . . 0-0-0, although White retains his superiority with 14 .i.f3 - see A2 1 1 .

14 Wxd4 .i.c6 I S eS!

The move overlooked by theory. Gipslis-Liberzon, USSR Ch 1969, went instead 15 .i.h3 b5 16 llhe l 't!fa7 ! 1 7 't!fd3 b4 with equal chances .

I S .i.xg2

15 . . . de 16 .t.xc6+ Wxc6 ( 1 6 . . . be? ! 1 7 fe lld8 - 1 7 . . . d7 1 8 i.xe7 xe 7 19 e4 xe5 20 Wc5+ e8 21 d6 + ; 1 7 . . . d5 18 i.xe7 Wxe7 19 e4 - 18 't!fa4 ) 17 fe lld8 18 't!fe3 d5 ( 1 8 . . . g4 1 9 Wf4 ) 1 9 xd5 llxd5 20 .i.xe7 xe7 21 llxd5 leaves Black with plenty of problems to solve : 21 . . . Wxd5 22 lld 1 fol lowed by 2 3 Wg5+ o r 2 3 't!fc5+; 2 1 . . . e d 22 't!fg5+ .

16 ef .i.xh1 (a) 16 . . . gf!? 17 .i.xf6 .i.xf6 1 8 Wxf6 llf8 1 9 llh2 .i.c6 20 h 5 ;1;- . (b) 1 6 . . . eS. 1 7 Wg l ! gf ( l 7 . . . .i.xh l 1 8 fe7 f6 - 18 . . . .i.c6 19 fe d5 20 xd5 .i.xd5 21 llxd5 - 19 .i.xf6! gf 20 Wg7 llxh4 2 1 Wf8+ d7 22 fe ! fe 23 Wxa8 xe7 24 llfl ) 1 8 't!fg2 fg 1 9 d5 .

1 7 fe f6 (a)17 . . . eS? 1 8 fe de 1 9 't!fd8+ . (b) 1 7 . . . .i.c6 1 8 't!fxg7 d7 1 9 Wxf7 llhe8 2 0 f5 ! .

50 B

18 .i.xf6! gf 1 9 't!fxf6 d7 20 rs! (50J

White has a winning attack .

B

5 1 8

7 J.g2 (51)

It is logical to make use of the luft created by the advance of the knight's pawn in this way , and the move has other merits besides. The bishop reinforces the e-pawn, i ncreasing White's bind on d5 while discouraging Black's intended expansior\ on the queenside. In addition the rook on hi is now guarded, enabling White to push forward the h-pawn in support of the g5 advance. On the debit side White has allowed his opponent access to the c4 square, and his intended h4, g5 advance will inevitably lead to the exchange of some of his attacking fire power while the rook remains on h I .

Black has two ways to continue: 8 1 7 . . . a6 82 7 . . . lDc6 81

7 a6 This move seems insufficiently

motivated towards central action and as a result White can gain the advantage by actively continuing his advance on the kingside.

8 h4

6 . . . h6 37

8 h3 transposes to l ine 82 after 8 . . . lDc6. At this and other stages 9 g5 will lead to positions discussed under A.

Black is already in difficulties, as can be seen from the fol lowing lines. B l l 8 . . . h5?! B I 2 8 . . . g6? ! 8 1 3 8 . . . lDc6 B l l

8 9 gS

10 f3

hS?! lDg4

10 't!t'e2 't!Vc7 I I f3 lDe5 I2 f4 lDg4 1 3 J.f3 , O'Kelly-Stoltz, Zaandam I 946, is similar to the column.

10 1 1 1 2 1 3 14 1 5 16 1 7 1 8

f4 J.f3 lDxc6 J.xg4 't!Vxg4 b3

't!t'f3 J.d2 (52)

lileS lt:lg4 lDc6 be hg

't!t'b6 dS

J.b4

Spassky-Shishkin, USSR I 960. White is a safe pawn up.

38 6 . . . h6

812 8 g6?!

This move was tried by Stahlberg as Black against O' Kelly at Mar del Plata 1948. The game continued

9 gS hg 10 hg nxh1+ 11 .ixh1 lDh7 12 'Wg4! eS 13 1!rh4 ed 14 lDdS

with White attacking down the h-file. 813

8 lDc6 The sturdiest alternative . None

theless White's initiative is gaining momentum:

53 B

9 gS 1 0 hg 1 1 .ixh1 (53)

hg nxh1+

Two games to demonstrate White's advantage in this position: (a) Strauss-Pelz, Krakow 1 964: 1 1 . . . lDxd4 1 2 'Wxd4 lDd7 1 3 .ie3 g6 14 0-0-0 I!b8 (this loss of time is necessary because of the white bishop on h 1 ! ) 15 f4 b5 16 e5 de 1 7 'fta7 ! (54)

54 B

Exploiting the ful l power of his bishops , White is winning with an attack on the queenside . (b) 8enko-Clarke , Tel Aviv OL 1 964, continued l l . . . lDd7 1 2 lDb3 lDa5 13 't!fe2 1!rc7 (hitting the c4 square again) 14 lDxa5 1!Vxa5 1 5 .id2 't!Vc7 1 6 f4 lDb6 1 7 b 3 (White can afford this weakness, having a strong position centrally and on the kingside) 17 . . . .id7? (better 1 7 . . . lDd7 ) 1 8 a4! .ic6 1 9 lDd5 ! lDxd5 20 ed with a clear plus for White (55) .

55 B

82 7 lDc6

As we saw in variation B l Black runs into difficulties if he does not play energetically enough in the

centre. For this reason it is more accurate to develop the queen 's knight immediately in order to be prepared to exchange White's actively placed pieces as soon as danger threatens. White is forced to play more slowly than after 7 . . . a6 and the immediate threat of . . . ll:\xd4 and . . . ll:\xg4 will cause him to lose some time safeguarding the pawn.

8 h3 As before , 8 g5 will effect a

transposition to lines handled under A.

8 tt:lb3 allows Black to equalise with 8 . . . e5 9 g5 hg 10 .ixg5 .ie7 I I .ixf6 .ixf6 12 ll:\d5 .ig5 or even take the initiative with a pawn sacrifice: . . . a5 ( ! ) 9 a4 d5 10 ed ll:lb4 l l de Wxd l + 1 2 ct>xd l tt:lxg4 1 3 ef+ ct>xf7 14 ll:\e4 .if5 .

The position after 8 h3 can also be reached by inverting the order of White's 7th and 8th moves.

White's intention, having taken care of his g-pawn, is to continue his development before attempting any further action on the kingside. He will use his pieces to maintain a grip on the centre , for which purpose the bishop is well placed on g2, and then push forward his kingside pawns, slowly increasing his spatial advantage until an opportunity appears for a direct assault.

In many ways this strategy is similar to the one which White follows in Maroczy bind formations with the difference that his pieces

6 . . . h6 39

are more active while his pawn structure is looser and less able to contain his opponent's counterplay. The contrast between the two types of game is not negligible.

, White players , I for one, may welcome the prospect of more active play and a straightforward plan of attack, even if Black too is given greater leeway.

For his part the second player should bide his time with developing moves until he can undertake an effective counterattack in the centre to simplify the position, thereby neutralising the attacking potential which White has built up.

56 w

8 a6 (56)

The game follows a similar course no matter whether Black plays the text or . . . .id7 first.

The exchange 8 . . . tt:lxd4 seems premature . 9 Wxd4 and now: (a) Gipslis-Abrasimov, Riga 1 966, saw 9 . . . eS 10 't!fd3 .ie6 I I .ie3 .ie7 12 0-0-0 0-0 l 3 f4! ef 14 .ixf4 't!fa5 1 5 Wb5! Wc7 l 6 e5 ! and White was winning material. (b) Gipslis-Zarchov, Latvia versus Ukraine 1 963, varied with 9 . . . .id7

40 6 . . . h6

1 0 't!fd3 .ic6 I I .if4 't!t"a5 1 2 0-0-0 0-0-0 13 't!t"g3! (forcing the weakness) 1 3 . . . e5 14 .ie3 b8 1 5 lild3 't!t"c7 1 6 lilhd l lilc8 1 7 lil l d2 .ie7 1 8 h4 . Having deprived his opponent of counterplay White proceeded smoothly with his attack on the wing.

The game Hort-Andersson, Malta OL 1980, featured a novel approach by Black: 8 . . . .ie7 9 .ie3 ll:\e5!? 1 0 f4 lDc4 I I .i f2 .id7 ( I I . . . lDxb2? 12 't!t"b l ) 12 b3 't!t"a5 1 3 't!t"d3 lDa3 14 0-0 lilc8 1 5 ll:\ce2 0-0 ( 1 5 . . . e5 1 6 ll:\f5 ! ) 1 6 c3 ( 1 6 c4 b5 ! +) 16 . . . lilfd8 1 7 lilac I lDb5 1 8 a4 ll:\xd4 1 9 ll:\xd4! a 6 2 0 lilfe l 't!t"c7 2 1 c4 ;!;.

From the position in diagram 56 White must choose between 9 0-0 and the more flexible 9 .ie3 . The only important feature to distinguish between the two lines arises if White castles queenside in order to push his attack forward with all the more vigour. The choice is, however, essentially a question of style as White's prospects are reasonable in either case . B21 9 0-0 B22 9 .ie3 B21

9 0-0 .id7 10 .ie3

10 ll:lde2 has also been played with the idea of avoiding exchanges and further increasing the pressure on d5. However, the move allows Black scope to expand on the queenside without fear of tricks on the long diagonal . This in itself need not be a bad thing: in variations

of the Sicilian which White handles positionally it can be dangerous for Black to push his queenside pawns too fast, leaving them exposed and allowing White to open lines to his advantage .

This theme is illustrated by the game Liebert-Madler, East German Ch 1963, which continued (after 10 ll:\de2) 10 . . . b5 I I a3 .ie7 12 f4 a5 1 3 .ie3 b4 14 ll:\b5 "t!t'b8 1 5 a4 0-0 16 c4 be 1 7 be d5 1 8 e5 ! ll:\h7 1 9 lilb l with good play for White.

57 B

1 0 't!t"c7 11 't!Vel .ie7 12 lilad1 (57)

The untested 1 2 a4 would seem more consistent with White's policy of restricting Black's counterplay as far as possible. Then attempts by Black to play on White's weak point, the c4 square , would appear to be unfruitful : (a) 1 2 . . . lbe5 1 3 lilad l lDc4 14 .ic l lilc8 1 5 b3 (promising is 1 5 h i

followed by 1 6 f4 ) 1 5 . . . lDe5 ( 1 5 . . . lbe3 1 6 .ixe3 't!t"xc3 1 7 lild3 't!t"c7 1 8 c4 ) I f! .ib2 0-0 1 7 h i ;l; . (b) Black probably does better to follow the plan of exchanging on

d4 coupled with . . . e5: 12 0-0 1 3 f4 l0xd4 1 4 .i.xd4 e 5 1 5 .i.e3 ef I 6 lixf4 .i.e6 with level chances.

12 0-0 The game Enklaar-Petrosian,

Amsterdam I973, continued instead with I 2 . . . b5 1 3 a3 l0xd4 I 4 .i.xd4 e5 I 5 .i.e3 .i.e6 I 6 l0d5 .i.xd5 I 7 e d l0d7 and here White could maintain a slight pull with 18 f4 according to Petrosian .

58 B

l3 f4 l0xd4(!) 14 .i.xd4 eS 15 .i.e3 ef 16 lixf4 .i.e6 1 7 lOdS .i.xdS 18 ed (58)

R. Byrne-Reshevsky, USA Ch I966/67 . The position is level . 822

9 .i.e3 This is the more flexible of

White's alternatives and allows him to consider the possibility of castling long in addition to transposing to the previous l ine.

9 .i.d7 An important departure was

seen in the game Horvath-Stean, Virovitica 1 977 : 9 . . . "t!t'c7 10 1!Ve2

6 . . . h6 41

.i.e7 I I f4 l0xd4 I 2 .i.xd4 e5 1 3 .i.e3 ef I 4 .i.xf4 .i.e6 I 5 0-0-0 0-0 I 6 b i - White is better placed than in equivalent positions in line B2 I because he can make better use of kingside attacking potential. In the game Black ran out of ideas rather quickly: I 6 . . . lilacS 17 1!Vd2 lifd8 I 8 lihfl l0e8?! I 9 .i.e3 .i.f6 20 l0d5 .i.xd5 2 I ed .i.e5 22 h4 1!Vc4 23 g5 h5 24 .i.f4 g6 25 lide l .i.xf4 26 lixf4 "t!t'c5 27 lile7 .

1 0 1!Ve2 .i.e7 10 . . . lic8 normally transposes

back to the main line after I I f4. The game Matulovic-Sax, Vrbas I 977, saw an attempt to avoid this by I I . . . "it'a5 1 2 l0b3 1!Vc7 1 3 0-0 .i.e7 I4 "t!t'f2 0-0 and now Sax's suggestion of I 5 a4 leaves Black neatly parcelled up, facing threats of a5 followed by l0a4 and f5 .

59 B

1 1 f4 (59)

Again the most flexible. White waits for Black to declare the posting of his major pieces before decidi ng which side to castle.

1 1 liteS 1 2 0-0-0

Safe and good is I 2 0-0 l0xd4 1 3

42 6 . . . h6

.t.xd4 .t.c6 1; R.Byrne-Lombardy, USA Ch 1 972.

12 W'aS The same idea as in the game

Matulovic-Sax mentioned earlier. Black's position seems in no way improved for having delayed the manoeuvre until White has castled. 1 2 . . . 0-0 was indicated (but not 1 2 . . . b5? allowing 1 3 e5 ! ) .

60 w

13 lilb3 W'c7 14 bS IS libel 0-0 (60)

Not 1 5 . . . b4 1 6 lLld5 ! with a winning attack. The text is better but the position strongly favours White anyway - according to Marie.

We are following Horvath-Sax, Hungarian Ch 1975 : 16 e5! de 17 g5! hg 1 8 fg (White's idea is a positional pawn sacrifice to enhance the scope of his own pieces while restricting the mobility of his opponent's) 18 . . . lilh7 19 lt:le4 ( 1 9 't!fh5 appears to be stronger) 1 9 . . . ll:'lb4! 20 lt:lec5? (better i s 20 .t.c5 .i.xc5 21 lt:lexc5 followed by 22 g6! ) 20 . . . ll:'ld5 2 1 lt:lxd7? lilxe3 22 ll:'lxf8 lt:lxd 1 23 lilxh7 lilxb2 24 g6

fg 25 .t.e4 ll:'la4 26 W'f3 lilc3 27 b2 W'd6! =F=F and Black went on to win. c

6 1 B

7 l::tgl (61)

In this section we shall examine the consequences if White should adopt a different approach from those outlined in A or B, dispensing with any preliminary restraining manoeuvres in order to pursue his flank attack directly .

To simplify matters we can say that White's ideal ' formation in this line is with his queen on d2, bishops on e2 and e3, the rook on gl and the h-pawn on h4, when he is ready to bring his king .to safety and continue the attack with g5.

The success or failure of this plan must hinge on the possibility of an effective counteraction by Black in the centre or on the queenside. Specifically, it will be a major concern for White to ensure that any attempt by his opponent to secure counterplay with . . . d5 can be actively combatted and exploited to his own advantage. In accordance with this observation White must

strive to achieve his ideal formation by alternating attacking moves ( l::tg l , h4) with developing moves ( .i.e3, .i.e2) so that the threat of . . . d 5 is contained a s much a s possible. If he can surmount these initial difficulties White should cope successfully with other attempts by Black to gain counterplay and reach a very promising attacking position indeed.

Before oeginning the detailed analysis of the line we pause for a word about White's seventh move alternatives . (a) 7 .i.el commits the bishop rather too early - it's useful to retain the option of a check on b5 in case of a quick . . . d5 by Black. (b) 7 h4 dclares White's intentions too soon and allows Black to make preparations for a rapid counterstrike in the centre . 7 . . . .te7 ( ! ) and now: b I ) 8 llgl d5! - transposing to C2. b2) More interesting is the novel I 1Wf3!? e.g. S . . . h5 ! (S . . . .!Llc6 9 tlxc6 be 1 0 g5 olild7 I I g6 oo) 9 gh /()xh5 I 0 .i.g5 lt:lc6 ( 1 0 . . . .i.xg5? I I hg 't!t"xg5 I 2 lt':ldb5 ) I 1 0-0-0 .txg5 ( I I . . . a6) I 2 hg 't!fxg5+ I 3 *b I lt:lxd4 I 4 l::txd4 .i.d7 I 5 llxd6 .tc6 I6 llxc6? ! ( 1 6 .i.e2 g6 oo) I 6 . . , be I 7 e 5 l::tdS ! I S 't!t"xc6+ ct>f8 1 9 't!t'c5+ gS 20 .i.c4 lt:lf4 + Ljubojevic-Timman, Montreal i979. b3) The curiosity 8 llh3, guarding the rook in preparation for g5, was played in the game Torre-Hubner, Rio de Janeiro IZ I 979. After S . . . dS 9 .i.b5+ ct>f8 1 0 e 5 lt:lfd7 I I .i.f4

6 . . . h6 43

't!t"b6 1 2 .!Llb3 .!Llc6 1 3 11fe2 a6 I4 .txc6 be I5 0-0-0 a5 Black already stood better. (c) The trouble with 7 .i.e3 is that after 7 . . . a6! White has problems guarding against the threat of S . . . e 5 , since after 9 lt':lf5 g6 h e n o longer has the square e3 for his knight. However, there has recently been much interest in the move S 11ff3 !? -an unusual sortie which despite its seeming artificiality keeps White's attacking chances very much alive . As yet no clear refutation of the idea has emerged, and the theory is rapidly developing: c l ) 8 ... .!Llc6 9 h3?! .i.d7 10 0-0-0 b5 I I .i.g2 liteS I2 a3 .!Lle5 1 3 tlre2 lt:lc4 I4 f4 .i.e7 I 5 .i.f2 11fa5 1 6 l::td3 d5? I 7 .!Llb3 11fc7 1 S ed 't!fxf4+ I 9 'it>b i 't!t"bS 20 de fe 2 I l::thd I ( ) 2 1 . . . e5 22 lt:le4! .i.e6 23 .!Llec5 't!t"b6 24 lt:lb7 't!fc7 25 lt:l3c5! .i.xc5 26 .i.xc5 I -0 CiocalteaUngureanu, Romania 1 9S l . c2) 8 ... olilbd7 9 't!fh3 (threat I O g5): c2 1 ) 9 .. .!LlcS 10 f3 e5 l l lt:lb3 .i.e6 ( I I . . . lt:lxb3+ I 2 ab .i.e6 1 3 .i.c4 ) 12 0-0-0 ( I 2 lt:lxc5 de I 3 't!t'g3 .i.e7 I4 h4 - 14 't!fxe5? .i.d6 =F=F - I4 . . . 't!fa5 I 5 't!t"xe5 0-0-0 I 6 .i.c4 .i.d6 1 7 .i.xe6+ ct>bS I S 't!ff5 fe 1 9 't!fxe6 l::theS 20 't!ff7 oo Sax-Tukmakov, Las Palmas I 97S) I2 . . . lt:lxb3+ 1 3 ab lieS I 4 lt:ld5! .i.xd5 I 5 ed 't!fc7 I 6 c3 't!fa5 I 7 .i.c4 b5 I S g5 lt:ld7 I 9 b 4 't!Va4 20 .i.d3 't!fa 1 + (20 . . . 't!t"xb4 2 1 .i.f5 ) 2 I ct>c2 't!fa2 (2 I . . . 't!fa4+ 2 2 'it>b l llxc3 ! 2 3 g6 ! lla3 ! 24 gf+ 'it>dS 25 ba 't!fb3+ 26 ct>c i 't!fc3+ 27 .i.c2 't!t'xe3+ 2S ct>b2 lt':lb6

44 6 . . . h6

29 lld3 ) 22 g6! '@a4+ 23 b l l:txc3 24 llc l ! lla3 25 '@xd7+ ! ! 1 -0 Perenyi-Barczay, Hungary 1 979. c22) 9 . . . e5 10 l0f5 ( 10 l0b3 b5 1 1 f3 .i.b7 oo) 1 0 . . . g6 1 1 g5 ! ( 1 1 l0xh6 J.xh6 12 .i.xh6 l0c5 ! 13 '@h4 .i.xg4 =F=F; l l lDg3 lOb6 1 2 .i.e2 h5 1 3 '@h4 J.e7 1 4 g5 l0h7 =F ErmenkovPolugayevsky, Buenos Aires OL 1978) 1 1 . . . gf 1 2 ef! d5! 13 gf ( l 3 o-O-O d4 1 4 gfdc 1 5 .i.c4 '@xf6 1 6 f4 l0c5 ! 1 7 libe l .i.xf5 1 8 '@g2 .i.e4 1 9 '@g3 l0e6 ( =F) 20 fe '@g6 2 1 .i.xe6 cb+ 22 'ibxb2 fe 23 '@f4 lieS 24 lld2 .i.b4 0- 1 Sax-Gheorghiu , Wijk aan Zee 198 1 ) 13 . . . d4 14 .i.c4! ( 14 lDe4 lDxf6! 1 5 '@h4 l0xe4 1 6 '@xe4 de 1 7 '@xe5+ .i.e6! 1 8 lld l ef+ 1 9 ct>e2 '@g5 and Black went over to the attack in Perenyi-Tompa, Hungary 1979) 14 . . . l0xf6 ( 14 . . . de 15 .i.xf7+ 'ibxf7 1 6 '@h5+ ; 14 . . . '@a5 1 5 .i.xf7+ xf7 1 6 '@h5+ xf6 1 7 '@g6+ 'ibe7 1 8 o-o-o with a dangerous attack for the piece) 1 5 0-0-0 't!t'd7?! ( 1 5 . . . '@c7 !?) Perenyi-Cabrilo, Kecskemet 1 979. Now Perenyi's suggestion is 16 llhe l .i.e7 ( 1 6 . . . '@xf5? 1 7 '@xf5 .i.xf5 1 8 .i.xd4 ) 1 7 f4 '@xf5 1 8 '@xf5 .i.xf5 1 9 fe de 20 ef .i.xf6 2 1 llxe3+ ct>f8 22 l:U3 J.g5+ 23 ct>b l .i.g6 24 Itd7 .

From diagram 6 1 Black has: Cl 7 . . . lDc6 C2 7 . . . .i.e7

7 . . . d5?! would fail for reasons similar to those which caused Black's demise in the 6 . . . d5 1ine as the interpolation of the moves 6 . . . h 6 7 It g I does little t o alter the character of the position as far as

an early central counterattack is concerned: 8 ed l0xd5 9 J.b5+ J.d7 10 l0xd5 ed 1 1 '@e2+ etc.

Unsatisfactory too is 7 . . . g5. The game Radovici-Kiuger, Lublin 197 1 , continued 8 .i.e3 a 6 9 '@d2 J.d7 1 0 0-0-0 l0c6 1 1 J.e2 '@c7 1 2 h4! g h 1 3 g 5 h g 14 .i.xg5 .i.e7 1 5 l0xc6 J.xc6 1 6 '@f4 with a clear advantage . Cl

6 2 w

7 l0c6 (62)

Once more 8 .i.e2 commits the bishop too early: 8 . . . d5! 9 ed ed 10 .i.e3 .i.b4! 1 1 a3 .i.xc3+ 1 2 be lDe4 1 3 l0xc6 be 14 '@d4 CiocalteaGolombek, Tunis 1 97 1 , and now 14 . . . 0-0 ! 1 5 0-0-0 '@a5 16 't!b4 '@xb4 1 7 cb lDc3 1 8 Itde l lbxe2+ 19 Itxe2 is equal according to Ciocaltea.

So White chooses from: C l l 8 h4 C l 2 8 .i.e3 C l l

8 h4 White has now expended three

successive tempi building up his kingside attack and is threatening to overrun his opponent's with g5-g6, so Black must fight back

without further delay. He can secure counterplay either by meeting his opponent head-on with 8 . . . h5 or opening up the centre with 8 . . . d5.

8 . . . ll:lxd4 on the other hand leaves White fully in control : 9 't!t'xd4 ll:ld7 10 g5 hg I I hg ll:le5 1 2 lig3 ! a6 1 3 .i.e3 .i.d7 14 0-0-0 't!Vc7 1 5 f4 ll:lc6 16 't!rd2 and White's position has considerable attacking potential . The game GuseinovMorgulev, USSR 1975 , continued 16 . . . g6 1 7 ll:la4 b5 1 8 ll:lb6 lib8 1 9 tl:lxd7 't!Vxd7 2 0 .i.c5 . C l l l 8 . . . h5 C l l 2 8 . . . d5 CU I

8 h5 9 hg

9 g5 was a recent try in Belya vskyAndersson, Moscow 1 98 1 , which continued 9 . . . ll:lg4 10 .i.e2 't!rb6? ( 1 0 . . . g6! I I ll:lxc6 be 1 2 .i.xg4 - J2 'ld4 'lb6! + - 12 . . . hg 1 3 't!rxg4 i.g7 oo) I I .i.xg4 't!rxd4 12 .i.e3 't!t'b4? ( 1 2 . . . 't!rxd l + 13 .i.xd l g6 14 tl:lb5 'i!?d7 15 i.e2 a6 16 ll:ld4 ;t) 1 3 .i.e2 g 6 14 a3 ! 'i!Vxb2 1 5 ll:lb5 't!re5 1 6 lib I 'itd7 1 7 't!Vd3 a6 1 8 f4 'i!Vg7 19 ll:lxd6 .i.xd6 20 lid I lid8 2 1 i.b6 't!t'f8 22 e5 'i!?e8 23 i.xd8 ll:lxd8 24 't!Vxd6 't!rxd6 25 lixd6 .

9 ll:lxh5 10 i.g5 ll:lf6

10 . . . 't!rc7 , though not clearly bad, is certainly more dangerous for Black : I I 't!Vd2 a6 12 0-0-0 ll:lxd4 ( 1 2 . . . .i.d7 allows the lively 13 ll:lf5 ! ef 14 ll:ld5 't!t'b8 15 ef) 1 3 't!Vxd4 .i.d7 1 4 'itb l lic8 1 5 .i.e2 b5 1 6 lige I 't!rc5 17 't!Vd2 ll:lf6 ( 1 7 . . . b4

6 . . . h6 45

1 8 ll:ld5 ! ed 1 9 .i.xh5 or 1 7 . . . 't!Vxf2 1 8 e 5 d5 1 9 ll:lxd5 ed 20 e6 .i.c6 2 1 .i.xh5 ) 18 a3 't!Vc7?! ( 1 8 . . . i.e7 1 9 e5 't!Vxe5 20 .i.xb5 't!Vc5) 1 9 f4 't!rb7 20 e5 de 21 .i.f3 't!Vxf3 22 .i.xf6 't!Vc6 23 ll:le4 VasyukovLarsen , Manila 1 974.

I I 't!Vd2 In the game Jansa-Andersson,

Cienfuegos 1975, White experimented successfully with the aggressive I I h5 !? The continuation was I I . . . a 6 ( I I . . . ll:lxd4 1 2 't!Vxd4 lixh5 1 3 .i.b5+ i.d7 14 .i.xd7+ 't!rxd7 1 5 i.xf6 g f 16 't!Vxf6 ; I I . . . 't!rb6 ! ) 1 2 ll:lxc6 be 1 3 't!rf3 .i.e7 1 4 e5 ! de 1 5 h6 gh 16 i.xf6 .i.xf6 1 7 lid I .i.d 7 1 8 ll:le4 i.e7 1 9 lig7 lif8 20 .i.c4 with a powerful attack.

I I 12 ll:lb3 1 3 0-0-0

't!rb6 a6 .i.d7 (63)

By all accounts this positiOn should favour White as he is two tempi up on a similar position occurring in line A2 1 22 1 . However, the position is not nearly so bad for Black as it might appear precisely because one of White's extra tempi has been expended on developing

46 6 . . . h6

the. rook to gi where it hinders rather than helps the evolution of his strategy: I4 f4 is impossible and if I 4 J.e2 then I4 . . . 't!Vxf2 can be played as I 5 .ie3 leaves the h-pawn hanging.

Despite this consideration it should be possible for White to realise his advantage by redeploying the rook and aiming for play in the centre rather than on the wing.

14 .ig2 I4 'i!?b i 0-0-0 I5 J.e3 't!Vc7 I 6 f4?

llxh4! I 7 't!rf2 lL!g4 I 8 't!Vxh4 lL!xe3 I9 lld2 J.e7 20 't!rh5 g6 2I 't!Vf3 lL!xfl 22 't!rxfl cilb8 with full compensation for the exchange in Cardoso-Andersson, Manila I 974.

14 't!Vc7