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Institute of Pacific Relations
Siam Manoeuvering towards Self-SufficiencyAuthor(s): Virginia ThompsonSource: Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 7, No. 25 (Dec. 21, 1938), pp. 289-294Published by: Institute of Pacific RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021261 .
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FAR EASTERN SURVEY
Fortnightly Research Service
AMERICAN COUNCIL ? INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
129 East 52nd Street ? New York City
Russell G. Shiman, Editor
Telephone: Plaza 3-4700 Cable?Radio: Inparel
Vol.VII ? No.2S DECEMBER 21, 1938 s^ajt^ *?
Contents
SIAM MANOEUVERING TOWARDS SELF-SUFFICIENCY
REPERCUSSIONS OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBARGO ON IRON ORE EXPORTS
Japanese Heavy Industries Show Large War Profits Germany Replaces U.S. as Outlet for North China Wool Decline in U.S. Arms Shipments to Far East U.S. Gains, Japan Loses in Philippine Trade Shif ts
SIAM MANOEUVERING TOWARDS SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Virginia Thompson
Western interest in Siam, to judge by written
commentary, is restricted to occasional scare- heads about a possible Japanese canal dooming Singa? pore, to the education of a boy-king in distant Switzer-
land, to the visits of Siamese dignitaries for medical
operations or inspections of police departments, and to
twins, cats and elephants, all freaks of nature. Amidst editorial search for the sensational, few have noticed that independent Siam, hedged in by two great colonial
powers, is going through a transition stage which on a miniature scale mirrors the struggle of many better endowed larger nations for self-sufficiency, if not isolation.
Ever since the coup d'etat of June 1932, foreign firms in Siam have been nervously following the govern-
ment's economic policy. Though still
Foreign in the stage of crude attempts, certain Interests principles are clear despite, rather than Nervous because of, the many vague ministerial
programs. Occidental business is still
making profits, as a glance at the dividends paid by the tin companies even during the depression and the first
years of the constitutional regime attest, but the profits are less large than they used to be. The declining number of foreign advisers, the problematical renewal of the teak leases, taxes on business and banking, the introduction of the income tax, these measures though less severe than in many countries are regarded by the heretofore pampered Westerners as the handwriting on the wall. Though the government has consistently re- fused foreign capital?notably Japanese proffers?in executing its policy, there is a distinct impression on the part of the European community that foreigners
are being eased out of a share in the country's expan? sion. With but few technical experts now, more and
more Siamese trained in Western schools are returning to direct their country's future. It is also obvious that
Siam can finance no large-scale program of self-de-
velopment, yet the Treasury is so sound, Siam's public debt so small, her resources so great, and her popula? tion growing at such a pace, that the mounting tide of
nationalism may find aggressive expression, especially in the current Asiatic atmosphere.
The nationalistic urge towards self-sufficiency is the
driving power behind the present regime, but such a
policy involves no break with the aims of the absolute
monarchy which it displaced. Rather, it is an accentu-
ation of what was formerly a latent attitude on the
part of the limited official class which ran the country. The depression was already forcing a modification of the traditional laissez-faire, but the revolutionists?
though they shy off from so violent a self-description? whipped it into slogan form to popularize their regime.
Although the successive coups d'6tat which have shaken the country in recent years are far more politi?
cal than economic or social in charac-
Consolidating ter, yet to consolidate her coveted in-
Independence dependence Siam must keep in mind Status that the human material with which
her salvation is to be worked out is
traditionally quiescent and used to receiving political and economic manna from above. In this the mantle of paternalism has descended smoothly from the abso? lute monarch to the semi-constitutional government in
power. To achieve her ends, Siam has tried to take ac- curate and not patriotic stock of her limited resources.
? 289 ?
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290 Siam Manoeuvering Towards Self-Sufficiency December 21
Siam was, and still is, a poor country as regards pro? duced wealth in relation to natural resources, and her
independence is only partially the cause of this poverty. Foreign bankers have ever been ready to lend Siam
money and have done so on four occasions, but both the former and present regimes have pursued a pro- foundly conservative financial policy, partly due to a fear lest foreign countries use loans and disordered finances as the entering wedge for political control, and partly because neither misery nor native psy- chology favored sufficient exertion to develop the coun-
try's resources. Until the depression whittled down the normal revenues via taxation, the administration contented itself with thinking that the farmer knew best how to grow his rice; the Chinese middleman how to finance and sell the crop; and the European, along with the Chinese both as employer and coolie, how to
exploit the country's tin, teak and rubber. Communi? cations were more showily than seriously developed and the government was content to exercise a light control over its economy, such as reserving to itself certain public utilities and imposing royalties on tin and teak. By modifying foreign treaties, it had man-
aged to revise the tariff, which had remained an im-
pediment since the mid-19th Century, by changing the
3% ad valorem to far bigger revenue-bearing specific duties. But the emphasis had principally been on put- ting its political rather than its economic house in order so as to shake off the humiliating extraterritori-
ality exercised in Siam by its two powerful neighbors, among others.
Foreign commerce has been the cause of Siam's
emergence into the world horizon. The change from sail to steam navigation, coinciding
Economy with the accession of a progressive Based on Occidental-minded monarch, in 1851, Rice who was willing to make treaties with
countries offering markets and mer?
chandise, revolutionized Siamese life as no subsequent political changes have done. Siamese rice, though of the best natural quality in the world, heretofore raised
solely for home consumption, became the great article of trade. Up to then Siam had exported, as a royal monopoly, articles of high value and small bulk like
sugar and forest produce. Steamship freight and the
opening of the Suez then made profitable bulky cargoes of low value, and rice, and to a lesser extent teak, came to remain the chief factor in her economy. (Three fourths of the population even now is very largely de?
pendent on this monoculture?a danger which the Siamese government, like that of Indo-China, has been
trying to remedy by developing secondary crops.) Of Siam's total area, 518,000 square kilometers, 70
to 80% is covered by forests and only 6% of the whole is cultivated. This is a surprising proportion in view of the fact that 80% of the 14,000,000 Siamese in the
Kingdom are engaged in agriculture. The country itself is tidily divided into five geo-
graphical units, of which the center, comprising the vast alluvial Menam valley, is by far the most impor? tant from a population as well as an agricultural view-
point. The hilly north produces some rice, but is re- nowned as the best teak producing area. Fertile
peninsular Siam, geographically and economically allied to British Malaya, has permitted the production of rubber and tin to dwarf other products, like fruit and vegetable crops, which are capable of export de?
velopment. The northeastern plateau, bordered by a
liquid though largely unnavigable frontier, the Me-
kong, is the poorest and most isolated part of the king? dom. Here a scattered and self-sufficing community barely clothes and feeds itself, although animal hus-
bandry flourishes on a small scale for export to other
parts of the country and spasmodically to Singapore. The eastern and southern areas lopped off to appease France and Britain, though humiliating to national
pride, did have the advantage of making Siam more
homogeneous and compact. Malaya on the southern frontier and hill tribes in the north do not impair Siam's racial symmetry, especially since the Laos of the northeast were admirably assimilated to their Thai
brethren, the Siamese, in the late 19th Century. In a predominantly Buddhist country fish is the
most important "animal" food. They are not killed but merely commit suicide when ex-
Fish posed to the air. Fish ranks second to Second in agriculture in extent and value among Importance the basic industries. A recent estimate
appraises the catch at over 25,000,000 baht (1 baht equals about 46 U.S. cents). Marine fish abound in Siam's shallow gulf, as indeed all along her
2,500 kms. of coastline. About half of this catch is
exported, chiefly to China, but the methods of salting and preservation are so crudely primitive that the
original good quality is impaired and deteriorates
quickly. Almost all the many kinds of fresh water fish are consumed by peasants along the river banks, who fish in between bouts of rice farming.
Until 1923 the government's interest in this industry was purely fiscal. It farmed out the monopoly to Chinese of doubtful methods. A foreign expert dur?
ing his 11 years of service did succeed in codifying the innumerable regulations to protect the rapidly dimin-
ishing supply of fish, in organizing a Fisheries Depart? ment and in persuading the government to regard fish from the food not revenue viewpoint because of its health importance as the only protein in the diet of the vast majority of Siamese. Recently, to further this
end, the government has debated more active protec- tion, like abolishing the inland monopolies controlling the outlets of marshes and streams, fish culture for other than fighting fish, and measures against the inter-
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1938 Siam Manoeuvering Towards SelfSufficiency 291
loping Japanese fishermen who have been caught more and more frequently of late in Siamese waters.
For many years teak was Siam's second most im?
portant export. Progressive deforestation and the in- cessant litigation resulting from leases
Teak granted by Lao chiefs to British sub- Future jects, necessitated the government's as- in Doubt sumption of control over that industry
in the late 19th Century. Siam, with Burma and Indo-China, supplies the world's teak. About 88% of the timber industry is in foreign hands, 5% under governmental control and 7% worked by pri? vate Siamese individuals. Each concession area is di- vided into two parts with a 15-year working period each. These leases expire in 1940, and a general con- viction exists that the state will have to come to bet- ter terms with foreign firms for renewal. For long there has been a progressive shrinkage in teak reve?
nues, as well as in the size and quality of the timber. Timber stealing and heavy deforestation, mainly by peasants, is causing concern to the Irrigation Depart? ment. A falling off in boat and rolling stock construc? tion during the depression hit the industry hard. As insult to injury, the British Empire taxed teak 25% in favor of the Burmese product. While revenues
dwindled, the government royalty has been constant.
During the last 11 years, the state has got over 67% of the gross profits of the six principal companies, though the original basis of the royalty was a 40% share. To be sure, other woods exist and are exported but they are far less important. The Far Eastern
markets, notably Japan, to which Siamese teak has
increasingly sold, are handicapped by exchange fluctuations.
Of more immediate importance to the Siamese than
foreign teak interests are their animal resources. Bud- dhism is against the use of animals as meat, though the ubiquitous Chinese have introduced pigs and poul- try into almost all the local markets. As draft animals for farmers and in the teak industry, and as motive
power for caravans, the bullock and the elephant rank
high for capital investment. In times of prosperity the iarmer bought them second only to land, and he
liquidated them more readily when the depression be?
gan to be felt. A vague and not too recent animal census suggests there are about five million buffaloes and the same number of bullocks in the country, of which less than a million buffaloes and more than a million bullocks are exported annually. Singapore has been the great market for this trade which was for?
merly controlled by Indians. The prevalence of
rinderpest and cattle theft caused the government to intervene in 1897. Spasmodic and inadequate attempts to control both these drawbacks have been handicapped by the lack of experts and the people's refusal to report outbreaks or submit their animals for inoculation.
Periodic stoppage of their import into the Straits Set? tlement has very recently provoked Siam's Assembly to demand stricter control over epidemics, markets and
slaughter houses, and to call for further experiments in scientific breeding.
Siam's reputation for great mineral wealth has been the source of grave disappointment. Invariably unsuc-
cessful attempts have been made to TinAttracts mine gold down to the present day. Foreign Gem mining continues but declines. Investors Tin is the only important branch of
mining extant. The richest tin area lies along the western granite range of the Peninsula, as far down as Puket Island. For generations tin was mined exclusively by the Chinese, and only compara- tively recently has it attracted European investors, principally the British. The state does not exploit mines directly, but levies a tax which averaged in the
pre-restriction years of 1925-29 almost four million baht annually, as well as license and concession fees, and a S?/o tariff on imported machinery. The Depart? ment of Mines, established in 1892, issues permits, regu- lates litigation, and in general tries to replace a non- existent land register. This was especially important in the early days when the lack of communications increased the Peninsula's traditional independence of
Bangkok. In 1928 about 25 mining companies representing
50,000,000 baht of capital formed a Chamber of Mines, which has not, unfortunately, represented the industry as it might, as was shown during the recent restriction
negotiations. Chinese miners were outstanding in their
objections. Having lower running expenses they could continue to make profits even when European firms were not quite breaking even. The Malayan press, already soured by Siam's nuisance-value in the rub? ber restriction cfo-agreement, was further angered that her recalcitrance was rewarded by an increase in the allotted quota to about 60% of capacity production. Siam took advantage in both these restriction schemes
?though not unfairly?of her position not as producer but as a potential area for smuggling operations, and on these grounds almost wholly were her demands acceded to.
Within the last few years rumors have persisted, though without confirmation, that Siam will start a
smelting factory of her own, as her Favored present dependence on Penang and Position Singapore in this respect is of great in Quota significance. The state has persisted,
in the face of severe criticism, in re-
serving a very large proportion (70%) of the quota, with the right of transfer to producers at will?a power capable of serious abuse. In 1936 a draft law was
brought into the Assembly to open up more to the Thai people an industry that is now almost wholly in
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292 Siam Manoeuvering Towards Self-Sufficiency December 21
the hands of foreigners. In spite of these ominous
signs, there has been a new influx of British capital for the very good reason that, in the restricted tin
areas, it is only in Siam that any company has increased its earnings.
In the field of another internationally-controlled commodity results have been somewhat similar. When Siam was first approached by the Rubber Restriction
Committee, she refused to participate on the ground that her planted area was too small. In March 1934, she accepted a second invitation and was allowed a
quota of 15,000 tons, based on a complete lack of statistics. This amount seemed so inadequate to Siam's new-born Assembly that it threw out the government and, much to everyone's surprise, succeeded in even
getting a substantial increase. The latest quotas per? mit Siam to expand progressively up to 60,000 tons in
1943, and the area now under rubber is estimated at
312,000 acres. Recently the government manipulated its railroad rates, ostensibly to check the smuggling trade through Peninsular ports, by diverting the trade to Bangkok, but Penang which had hitherto been Siam's rubber market regarded it as a personal blow. Moreover there were ugly rumors about the disappear- ance of rubber coupons in 1937 which did not add to the happy impression abroad.
Siam started her rubber industry just at a time when
prices were going down?her late start being due to a
general belief that the soil was not Rubber suitable for rubber. In 1920 there Restriction were 50,000 acres of southernmost Profitable Siam under hevea, and subsequent col-
lapses of the market caused periodic and partial abandonment. Neither in quality nor in
quantity has Siam ever remotely rivaled Malaya. Siamese rubber generally lacks scientific methods, or?
ganization of production and trade, and so fetches lower prices. Malaya represents 53% of world produc? tion; Siam 0.5%. Native planters usually combine
paddy with rubber on a seasonal basis, but Europeans in Siam who work rubber exclusively have grievances, especially when they contrast high transport charges, lack of roads, an 8% profits tax, and miscellaneous duties with the privileged position of the Malayan planter. Yet there has been an extraordinary evolution in Siam's rubber trade since 1934, and there is no deny- ing that restriction has proven profitable to Siam.
There is little likelihood that Siam can succeed in
building up industries to transform these raw materials into manufactured exports at home. As in the case of
iron, fuel is conspicuous by its absence. Coal exists to a small extent and is of poor quality. Water power is
inadequate to supply more than limited electricity. Though no comprehensive survey has been made, it is
improbable that oil exists, certainly not in any quan? tity. The question of oil control is agitating Siam at
present. Foreign firms fear the government may enter the field either as competitor or monopolist. The very recent treaties are significant from the monopoly angle. Though rice husks in good years, as well as timber, exist as cheap fuel, yet these are either uncertain or too exhaustible, and on them alone the government can? not industrialize Siam as it wants to do.
Regarding the state's more general role in directing the national economy, there has been much criticism
of over-many programs and little ac-
Agricultural tion, notably in the pressing need of Research an agricultural policy. Two early min-
Inadequate isterial plans were gently shelved as
being too radical in 1933-34. Scientific
agricultural research, to which lip-service has long been
paid, has been woefully inadequate, not only through lack of experts and money but in putting its results across to a very isolated and conservative farming group. Radio broadcasts of rice prices have been use- less to a community which can barely pay the head tax
let alone buy a radio. Better seed selection and stand-
ardization, and better transportation, storage and mar?
keting facilities that would exclude the middleman and
relieve the heavily indebted farmers, have been at-
tempted by the cooperative movement. But owing to their financial conservation, contrasted with Burma's
bankrupt overexpansiveness, these societies have been
very small in scope and have not touched the poorest stratum of farmers who have no guarantees to offer.
Moreover, knowledge has remained too theoretical; the two economic surveys sponsored by the government have been only very partially translated into Siamese.
It takes teaching by demonstration to break down
the age-old conservatism of the Siamese farmer. Not
being money-minded and being by nature carefree, he
pleasantly permits himself to lose his land through sheer genius for getting into debt. Land tenure is fur?
ther complicated by a failure to survey more than the central provinces in the 40 years of the Survey Depart- ment's existence, and this means that most of the land
is held on temporary permit. Yet the farmer seems
almost as contented when he gets 20 baht a picul for
his rice as he did when he got 100 in the pre-depres- sion days, and it is frequently said in Siam that a man is passing rich on less than $200 a year. The standard of living varies so slightly between rich and poor? there are no very rich just as there are no very poor? that it makes the average Siamese indifferent towards
working to amass a surplus. The only place where such a margin might be said to exist at all is in the central
rice-exporting provinces and even there the depression has largely absorbed it.
In the field of public utilities, state activity contrasts with such individual apathy. Siam has long been famed for its railway system. Pioneer experimen- tation with Diesel engines, the large profits it has
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1938 Siam Manoeuvering Towards Self-Sufficiency 293
consistently paid, its coordination with and at the
expense of a scanty road network, seemed part of an ideal plan to open up the country effi-
Railway ciently. More recently an extensive
System road system has become necessary in
Conspicuous order to open up new areas and to offer
cheaper freight transportation than by rail. The development of post and telegraph from the outset kept pace with rail extension, and has recently been enhanced by making Bangkok?so long off the beaten sea track?an aerial crossroad for French, Eng- lish and Dutch planes. In other fields, housing and town planning are just in their infancy.
The public works, however, do not affect the average Siamese as does irrigation and the water system. Siam? ese rice depends on innundation plus rainfall. Records show that out of a 99-year period, only 32 were good rice years. Irrigation is not absolutely indispensable but it is needed to put the farmer in comparative secur?
ity and to insure regular tax revenues. When this was borne home to the government 34 years ago, it hired several experts. The plan drawn up by Sir Thomas Ward was only partially followed and not even in the order of importance as designated by its author. So the results have been only dubiously successful. Peas? ants will not pay for water which they consider should
be, and which sometimes is, the gift of heaven. But a renewed interest in irrigation, as evidenced by an increase in recent budgetary allotments, shows an en? hanced realization of the value of stabilizing produc? tion especially as against growing competition, notably from Burma which benefits by twice Siam's rainfall. The great drawback, of course, is that such works do not yield to the state the revenues they would bring in a country entirely dependent on irrigation.
The Siamese farmer has benefited enormously by a fine system of natural waterways. More than 80% of the country's trade is carried in boats with which rail- roads cannot compete. Moreover, the central plain is under water for about two months every year. The
government should and could have done far more to
preserve and improve these God-given waterways which continue to be used even though many have silted up. The latest statistics show that there are 55,563 licensed watercraft.
After many years of toying with the idea, the gov? ernment has finally accepted the Japanese tender to
dredge the bar at the Menam's mouth, New Port and construct a new port at Bangkok. at Bangkok The capital has long been inaccessible
to big steamers whose cargo has had to
support heavy lighterage charges, which in turn have burdened the Siamese with heavier costs both as pro- ducer and consumer. As a corollary to his irrigation scheme, Ward suggested the extension of the potable water supply. One of the finest accomplishments of
the absolute monarchy is the Bangkok water supply. But the provinces, only excepting Korat, have lagged far behind. Very recently municipal loans have been secured to extend the system to other communities. The health aspect of this problem is vital, especially in a cholera-ridden region like Siam.
Perhaps only in the realm of industry has the new
regime in Siam markedly diverged from the old. For?
merly spasmodic attempts were made to encourage new crops or silk culture, but there was no factory construction. The educated Siamese looked to gov? ernment jobs and were content to let the Chinese do the hard labor and retail commerce, and the Europeans to exploit their resources. But the new nationalism insists on manufacturing from local products to sup? ply the home market. The Army is, strangely enough, behind this move, not only to insure the country's self-
sufficiency for economic reasons but as a sugar-coated pill to woo the opposition into passing the large army appropriations in the budget. A sugar factory was
completed last December and though not yet working to capacity, it has already paid planters 100,000 baht for cane and has 16,000 rai under cultivation. Two months ago a paper factory began to function. The
Army, which has long manufactured its own supplies, is now paternalistically offering canned milk to the public at very low prices and experimenting with the
infinitely useful soya bean. Attempts to induce large- scale cotton growing have, however, been wholly un- successful, but it is hoped that the current soil survey will indicate how to remedy the basic defects.
In this whole venture, it is obvious that the govern- ernment has no intention of competing in the world
market; it simply aims to keep money Siamese formerly spent abroad at home, and to Initiative pare down as far as possible its de-
Encouraged pendence on other countries. Less re?
cently the state actively and success-
fully encouraged individual Siamese initiative in start-
ing beer and cement factories. It has welcomed, even
begged, for Siamese capital for its own or these enter?
prises, but little has been forthcoming. Siam is a very poor country in liquid capital. Though steady progress has been made by the Government Savings Bank, yet the amount therein is not quite a baht per head of the population. Some displacement of capital naturally resulted from the various coups d'etat in 1932-33, for the princes-in-exile were virtually the only native capi- talists. More important are the invisible exports: the
repatriation of their earnings by the Chinese in Siam and dividends paid by foreign firms. The former are
roughly estimated at 38,000,000 baht a year. The 1936-37 revenue from the income tax was baht 1,382,869 as compared with 7,253,975 from the head tax. More? over only 2,731 Siamese paid any income tax at all, despite the exemption limitation being placed at 2,400
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294 Repercussions of the Australian Embargo on Iron Ore Exports December 21
baht. It is not so much lack of confidence in govern- ment-run industry that makes the individual Siamese investment in them so minute, but rather because there is virtually no liquid capital in Siam outside the Treas-
ury reserve. For the little investment he can make the Siamese prefers land or jewelry.
Paradoxical as it may seem from this lack of pub? lic spirit, economic nationalism has recently reared its
ugly head. A strong and new tendency to reserve cer? tain fields to Siamese labor was shown by the Labor Bill introduced into the Assembly last August, and
by the obligatory employment of Siamese labor in the new state factories. Ninety percent of the labor in Siam is foreign, and this is a fact only recently resented
by the Siamese. One of the constitutional regime's avowed purposes, in the manifesto it published justify- ing the 1932 revolution, was to remedy the former
regime's failure to meet native unemployment. A few
employment agencies have been opened; Chinese immi?
gration has been progressively restricted; 77 new voca-
tional schools are in the process of being established; and the government has persuaded foreign firms,
though not on a large scale, to take on native appren- tices. Although the state has dealt successfully with
a few strikes, labor in the organized sense does not exist in Siam. Rather, it is contagion of the general politi? cal unrest in the country since 1932 more than either
the depression's inroads or the designing hand of Mos?
cow. And whatever political self-consciousness labor
may have as a group, it is wholly confined to Bangkok. Siam's affinity for Japan, and notably the Kra Canal
bogey, have been of recent years exploited by the un-
discriminating press. But Siam's na-
Friendship- tionalism is in no way tinged with Pan-
With-All Asiaticism. In fact her indifference to
Policy nationalist movements elsewhere in
Asia is very striking. It is obvious
that Siam has no intention of acquiring an Asiatic
tutelage any more than she formerly wanted a Euro?
pean protectorate. Her foreign policy over changing
regimes has been perfect impartiality so as to main-
tain her independence and to insure markets for her
exportable surplus. Siam does not benefit like her
three colonial neighbors from a protected home market
?perhaps tiresome from an internal tariff viewpoint but a welcome haven in time of depression. She must
remain on good terms with everyone, and particularly with Great Britain who is not only her greatest market
and investor, but who also controls her foreign debt.
The only flaw in Siam's impeccably correct foreign policy is vis-a-vis China. Intent on having indigenous labor, Siam has restricted Chinese immigration and is determined to obviate the potential menace of the Chin? ese as a state-within-a-state. She has tried to exercise a severe control over the Chinese schools in Bangkok, and has prevented an active boycott of Japanese goods which last year formed about one fourth of Siam's im?
ports. These measures have brought down periodic counter-boycotts of Siamese rice in Southern China, but the fact that these measures hurt the Chinese merchants in Siam who control the rice export, neutralizes such action. Also the realization that Siam has been and still offers the Chinese an undeniable refuge in these troubled times, plus the primordial Japanese men?
ace, makes China's indignation rather academic and ineffectual.
Self-sufficiency is an impossible goal for a country without natural frontiers and lacking certain basic
necessities, such as fuel. But Siam has Real Self- simply followed the world's suit in this
Sufficiency drawing in of her economic horns. She
Impossible is not going to antagonize any nation and she hopes to escape unnoticed in
her remote corner of Asia. No matter how sensitively she may reflect the shifting balance of power in Asia, her aim is to be lef t alone long enough to develop the resources of the country which she is at present arm-
ing so expensively to defend?against a strictly anony- mous and probablv theoretical enemv. PRINCIPAL SOURCES:
Statistical Yearbooks of the Kingdom of Siam; Ministry of Economic Affairs, The Record; Bangkok Times, Bangkok Directory; Ministry of Commerce and Communications, "Siam: Nature and Industry," Bangkok, 1930; "General Medical Features," (official), Bangkok, 1930; C. C. Zim- merman, "Siam: Rural Economic Survey," Bangkok, 1931; J. M. Andrews, "Siam, Second Rural Economic Survey, 1934-35," Cambridge, Mass., 1936; P. W. Thornely, "The History of a Transition," Bangkok, 1923; W A. R. Wood, "History of Siam," Bangkok, 1933; W. A. Graham, "Siam," London, 1924, 2 vols.; M. Sivaram, "The New Siam in the Making," Bangkok, 1936; Bangkok Times; Siam Chronicle.
RELATED ARTICLES IN PREVIOUS ISSUES: "Siamese Labor Legislation Tinged with Nationalism," Nov. 23t 1938; "Siam Aiming for Self-Sufficiency in Sugar," May 4, 1938; "Restriction Group Increases Siam's Rubber Share," Apr. 20, 1938; "Siam Fights Growing Opium Menace," Mar. 23, 1938; "Siamese Adviser Recommends Long-Term Reforms," Feb. 2, 1938; "Siam Suffers from Poor Rice Crop," Jan. 5, 1938; "Siam Emerging as Aviation Center," Nov. 5, 1937; "Siam Seeks More Favorable Treaty Basis," Sept. 1, 1937; "Siam's Ten-Year Plan Stresses Coopera- tives," July 7, 1937; "Siam Begins 1937 with Brighter Pros? pects," Mar. 3, 1937; "Siam Balks at Tin Quota But Favors Restriction," Oct. 21, 1936; "Strengthening of Japanese Ties with Siam," July 15, 1936.
REPERCUSSIONS OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBARGO ON IRON ORE EXPORTS
Jack Shepherd
It is almost as difficult to analyze the effects of the
Australian embargo on exports of iron ore announced
last May as it is to fathom the real reasons for the im-
position of the embargo. It seems likely that the Aus?
tralian action was linked up primarily with the govern- ment's new plans for the manufacture of armaments
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