)

I

SH~u~~s~r __ ~D~/_J_~ __ T.-~-~-(------.'

nt9-n c ~AS~rGEI) B'L-__ - -----

"'...:: -~.'., -' . ----.. a:--,---~~~ :

, " , ", I !",", .--.U.Q..t.l~=J._L..L._._:-_,_-" ( .

I .L"TZil .\Crr()~ ~ Wl; :&\:-::1·:; ?Or; A :m:.u

/ .,' ~J

~e A Shau. CDG C8::p !:ad ':tie Jl%'1=..-:r oi.ssion ot bor<!cr surve.1llanCQ llD:l inter-­d1ct1.on of 1.trt11tl't'.tion I"tr..!tes 1..'9'J.t~ i ·~~ 'P..ss-t.g-i",.z;d a-c.s. o:t operatio:.1.. / The Ca.."':lf. wo.s

!\;Located south wdst of YIE ..m "?i'~tely :?1ve kUometers CQ3~ of the lD.oUou, '>Order at cC'ord1nates YC 494834. .B...~se ot i.t!:> locCl-~on ncar three ~J:RljQ'!,,: in:CU1.x."l:t;~.on

lC'OU7"" ~eeii1ns fi= :r.~os ea!'t u,to th~ A ""-,,,,-Uoui "/al~"y the e=p \"'-" COnUtlI.lCluUy b.arP38ed b,y SJ;l~ ~Tiet C~ c1et:('nts :ti th ~ ar.:J.3 t"1l.~~ prior t o the ~'U"~3 "nc:altl

. attack .u.1clfb~g"-n "" 9 Ha...~ ~965. The or.ly ~_oce1 popuJ.ation'thl:t a,' catc<l priQ.' to the attack we:;" en u.tl.'ulown l'IilC.btz of sec:...~eti,,-e ~ ~ostUe :t;,A:.t""{i ~jbesoe=. who were

'either Viet CC4lG or Viet eoru 3jOpathize.rs. ~"he cccupa:lts at Ca!>ly ..\. Sho.u nEl'Y'Cl" Pe,de friendly c.:>:>tact In th the KL"U. The wcather on 9, 10, ll, <>:ld 12 !!:>reh included " heavy o~oud Clever and croUJ:l:! fO!! during the, early I>orllinG hours, with ceU:lA$lI. ~eos., I than 2,000 feet. ' The attack too:;' full odvanteee ot bad \",athqr conditiOIl3 to ,filndex: ' tactical air support, re1ll:oroement, and rCSUi'Ply attenpts./ Elepl:ll:nt gr.>Ds rMc:lling' a to ~2 fcet high covers most ~f the vnll<:>y floor uround the OO/ilp, thorefore. obsar-­ntion free the ground c.nd sir is very dif'.ticult, a'ld detectinG "", ...... ent of "ven 'lare;<> units is practically imJloosible u;lless they are detected while moving on tre.1ls in the vtilley~ On the eaot side of the airstrip and the south side of camp \1Ie:re old l:I1ne fields ttnt were overt;rOwu with dense, h:i,7l gI"'...ss, which could no·t be cut ' " because of the d~1er to :friendly forces.

The friendly situation p...-ior to the attscl, ..... as follows: Patl'O~s 01l 1J.6-J.9 Peb an!! 24-25 Feb captured e"""'Y docwne!lts that indic"ted Camp A Sl-.au was under ellem;r

·reco::M.iosance pending an cnem.v attack. On 5 March ° reconnaissance patrol ,eons1ot- , ing of 30 C:UX; end 2 .oSASl' was dispatched 2 kilOl.letcrs sout.,} of CaLip A SMu, end no .J,

contact was made. On 6 lia',w Do company size patrol was dispatched. The mission of ' this pat.-ol 'lIaS to move southvrest 0:1: canp A S'r.,,-u cn~, be prepared to o"tack and deotrOY a su.sP<lOted en~ position 10 this area. These positions were detected .by an a.,-er-' fl:1&ht o.1rcraft on 5 :.:arch 1966. This p:ltrol y= pla,;med for ° 2 <1,,;), operotion. In the tlean:t1me., however, 2 NVA detectors had turned thcr....oelves in at C!'..mp A She.u .:md indicated that four bIlt~ons or I'-VA planned to attack Ca.,,!) A Slw.u on II or 12 hk>rCh

'and that heavy 1ll:1l tration into the "".lley w&s continuiD!!. Eased ,on this i:1fomaUOI\ ') 1 , the po.trol was rec~led to Camp A 3hau to wprov~ the 'dctcusi.vc po~ture of " ~e caap. '(

The patrol returned ro.th negative cuc!!!y contect. On 6 iJa:..-ch e. racollll.!liGsance pc.tro1 wna dispatched appro:1mately 2 Id.lometors norti'.wcst 0:>: Ccup A Sh9.u 'Hi th the l!t1so1on to . , reconnoiter a BU:lpccted en~ mortar position. Th1~ patrol \laS unable to locate the .' ... , poSition an<! returncd to Cam]> A Shcu Idth negnUve ccntact. Since He<ldq,uartera I ,

~ Corps had disapproved repeateo. requests to rein:furce the c""'p, ... tochnent (:-~ requesteq. and r :..'Ce:lvod 0. rein:forcement fioOl:l the 5th SFG llike Porco in N'aa . Trma.:;. On 1 B""oh < ' at 1640 hours one !.I1ke Force COJ>p<>ny cowis tint; of 141 !dike Force, 7 1IDASl' 3nd 7

y • Interpreters aI'l'i ved to improve the roco:ma1ssance and defense capab1l1 ty of the camp. Patrolo were initiated approximately 1 to 2 idlol>eters north. Gouth, and nortn\'l<tSt of the CIlIIlP .,Hh the mission of cocf:L."'lll1ng +.he locations of reported INA troo",,)'OS1t­ions. These ootrolo returned with nc:tntive ecmtncts WId ne(llltivc in:fCJn>Q.t;l.on of e:tJ;f e~ activity. In conjunction with these patrols ni;;ht embush pc.trols wore dispatched

I:ICLOSu:'.E 15 to SX~IO;I II to 30 AprU 1966

Opor;\tional Report on Le~sons Learned

... .:.. ,:"j':: f D t-': .\.~ III~ L (ReS CSGro-2e, (Rl»

, ,

: '

\

" .,

" {,

. . '. "':~ t .~ ~ t ;.l', ':J , , ~,v., () I~) ~! h £: ;~J:rll" ,c.. A ,

I r" ~ ,'1J~ ~ .)' " ,. in c.ll. directions around the C=p area: end reSulted in no <mCI!I7 contact. , 'Du.."ing the ,~od 4 , thru 6 HEircn d.a.il,y ovcrfiisht aircraft ft'I'!re requested' and rece,ived. Thoae overtliehts detected numerous \Venpcn"pcsitioful, h-es~ , dug personnel positions" and antl-a1rcrnrt ""'plncetlenta. This confiroed information recel. ved from the 2 NVA de1'- ' actors that a definite buildup of a large unit ·wag in p~CSG. Tactical airstr1kes J were :rcc;.ul!Bted c..zx1 received on theE'u po::-itiona; ' hen'/ever, ~sessments .01' t..~eBe strikes ' !I'8re, vi:.'tu..".J.ly :l:!:!posslble because of denao folingc c!ld heavy ground foS. On 7 March '""

a l~'let drop nns conducted in conjunction With,n loudspcnkcr 'broadcast ' cnco~~ 1I!D:t'e eneoy peroOlmel to defect vii th the theme that all , defcbtors would bo well treated and moved to ". Deem-" locntion. On ';;be evenins of B J.!arch tho Crollp' s strength \'lOS as follc"",: 220 0=, 141 1.lTI.." :?orce, 9 IntEL'1lretel'S, 41 Civ1lians, 6 LLilll, 17 USASi'.

!the sequence of evonts dur.l.ne the attc.ck~ e~unt1on, end escape and evasion wore 08 :follovrs: ", h

. • ~ ;{ '( , i, On B Y.arch, the night bofore thc at"took" t,he camp co"",,,,,,der placed the camp on general "l",,·t, Since he considcred 'an attack :imm1nent. All personnel rema:l.ned in " their defensive positions. At 8pproxl.rlmte1y 1930 hours a' squad of en""'Y 'm3 observed !l'

on the north end of the camp, a.'ld vms fired on With mortars. At about 2300 hours the camp was ale.'t'ted b:r ditmill3 noises ,hC'Brd ~',u·'!J. 0;: tho camp. At about 0130 hours ,8 ' c~ore mine we8 fired in the direction toward whieh vlire cuttins sounds were heard. Then, at approximately 0350 hours on 9 llarch the cump beg"" receiving heavy 8lmm , mortar fire, vtlich continued until 0630 hours. A probe of about 2 NVA companies ros , 1n1 t1ated on the south wall at approx1mate1y 0430 hours. They ,','ere met with heavy , fire and fell back at no loss in additional friendly caeualties. y The ·1n1tial .~~ , of mortar fire was extrem1y "Cpur~,te and caused heavy damage to the USASF teom hO)iBe, , , supply room, water storage, end cor.tributed to. thc temporary loss of communications With 'all outside installationS; COIIIilUIl1cations wex.:e reestablished through' LLDll ., ',.

cbmmels at, approx1mate1y 0800 hours and through U''; 'channels at appro:ldmnte1y 0920 hours. Casll1.'~ties rcsultillG fran ,the 3 hour .mortar barrnBe were as follorls; 2 USASF KIA, 5 USASF WIA, 25 CIDG WIA, 7 Mike , Force KIA, 14 MIKE Force 'IlIA, 1 Civilian KIA, :s Civ111anB 'i:IA. After the mortar barr».se stopped, sporadic sniper fire .. continued , resulting in 1 Civilian KIA, 1 Civilian ,ITA, and"3' CIDG WIA.~ Sniper end mortar fire continued throughout th~ day. " .

~.', 'H! At 1100 hours on 9 !.l:lrch an airs trike 'roB received north em south of t,:,,, camp. Because of heavy ground fog the FAC could not observe tho targot, so; .bombs were in-1t1al1y dropped from "bove the clouds a11d were "a..ljusted ' from \Vi thin the c=p by sound. All airotrikes were discontinued "'0 apprOximately l~oo hours uue to 10\'/ coi1ings. At , appro:::lJn."\tely 1015 houre the camp' requested emergency resupply of ommun1 tion ,and ' medical evacuation of nIl wounded. At 1100 hours two L-19 aircraft landed to evacuate .. soriOl.'.sly wounded personnel. HOI'Icver, these aircraft began receiv1n& intense :;round . fire ro:d \"lore able to ovneuato only 1 USA':>1' '(ldSGT ROm:RT I. GIllSOll). At ,approximntelj 1300 hours an AC-47 n1rcrnft arrived over the c=p nraa. This a1rcrnrt was flying northwost to southeast and reeeivod intenae nnt1"",-ireraft fire \'/hile flying down the

-. ,),.~

INCLOGriRE 15 TO SEC~ION II to 30 April 1966

, . . ~ \

, 0 Opere.tiona1 Report on Lc~"ons Loarnod (RCS C3GPO_28 , (Bl» C!. OJJ F I £)I~'" TI rt L , .,

•

~ V '

F! bE I'.III/~ L . ,',

.' r • , ~q. ~e n1rcrnf't ntt"",pted to circle O~.Bt of tho c=p and' S!,'1lin rocehed heo.v;r , 8Dt1~ n... ...... :frail tho 'hi,gh ~ to ,the east. At tlUs t1IIle tho {;rOUIld' fire >IllS TCif accurnte 3X>d th" <rlrcrnft crnshed spr.roximn';,,}y ttYe ldl."....ters north ot the .% camp. !l:reel'of the ere<aD,en .,.,;. ... rescued by holicopter end three \1er8 KIl. .U J.415 hou:ri a lorul of (mllluni tioll and l:Icdiccl.. supplies were dr dropped by CV-2 just outs1de . ' the Camp ""..,.,. It """ retrieved by c. p .. '.rty , ~ '<;he c""'p. At 1(;30 hours another lend rd. m1tion 1lIIlS air drOpped by C-123, " psrt '~ outs1de the camp nren. Approx­, '" ~te~ 5~ of this re8Upp~ wns not recovercd becuutle of 'heavy {;rOund fire on the , " ~0Yer;y t....... ~t 1700 <lIlOthcr reaupplY drOp x'rom n CV-2 !li:rorntt lcndcd both in and OIlt of comP. 'Also about t!o1s til:le :>n H-54 hclicopter lnDded insido the caDpOUXid to , ~i' ewpu.'\to caaualticc. It"";' llenv1ly cl.eIJJnsod,' by cniper t:\.r,, ·,m tho a?prosch into the OilaP and """ unable to lift off. One Bore lted1c~.J. hc11copter, an Air ~'Oroc Cll-3 VIh1ch " had been called in, """"uated 26 cnsu.-u tics prior to darkness. J.:J darkness fell " ,porsoDllel ' werc deployed in' defensive positions in a!1.tici~tion of Q:Ound assault during the night, nod work cont1nu~d to repair d~ed , defen31ve positions caused by ~ortar nttnclro. · Those portions ox the clrdropo that h:!d fall.on outside o:t o:"':-~~ \ f'W,-l; l~tri\;-• .::~~ ') At app:'o;;Untely 2000 hours n l.'laro "hip F=1vod wer thc c"ap and provided continuoUIJ but umtod 1llum1!lation thrO\l8hout the n1/iht.

At 0400 hours 10 IJarch the oamp aenin bclJ'Ul receiving intense and cxtrcme~ accuratc l:Iortor and 57mm rec?1lless rifle fire wl'.ich oottered ,alJnost all remnining buildings to rubble. 'l'his heavy fire c9ntinucd thr~out the entire dey in vur;yillg inJ;ens1ty until the comp was everrtusJ.l.y evacuated at 1730 hours. 'l'b.e 571!11i1 firc :rep-1!iJ.y destroyed approx1I!Jntely fifty percent of all crew served weapons. At 0500 hours a III<ISs1ve cround asS3Ult \'I3S initinted 01', the east wan. from aoross the ~, and on the south wall, the LlOst 'vulneroblo side dU,e ' to the tall grass. At ap:>rox:lmatel;y the """'e t1IIl<> defense of ';;be southeast corner of the CQl!lp collasped &s CIDG company 141 oeased all effective resiotance. 'l'b.o remainder of the cast wall occupied by Uike Porco and two Americans 1ni tinted fire again:Jt .. ti..:.u ~a~" ",:i t!rl.:.: t~ .... c"';~!) "ho..!l. d t:".kcn part of the ,east and eouth walls and t.."po=il;y bolted thoir advance. ll1ttar 1l..~" ,,"" hand fighting continued for almost 3 hours until ' t :-,ose fr1cndl;y forces on the cast wall "'ere isolated troll! the rest of the camp, draw1n,:; hoa"y =1l:itlg gun and SJlIlIll arms fire from front and rear. ITuen the south ,7Illl, """ to.l::en nt abeut 0800 hours the retreating persoDllol withdrew to ' the vicinity of tho c=unications bunker and the north wall. They were joined about 0830 hours~ by surv:l.vors from the east ' wall. 'l'b.e exl'lI1ples of outstand1ne courage, eel:i:-s:;c .. -Uice, rC:lou:-cei'ullnoss and l""dership of the defanders ware so widespread as be oOlillIlonp~e • • ..-

At 0600 hours j;llt)' oamp had reque.oted nU:s'trilroB and tal.'sots werc hit in the , r. ~ 1lIIneoUate vi"ini~y north ane: south~ of the camp., 'l'b.ose strikes ,\Verii' effeotive but = BSsesamant could not be made due ' to the heavy ground fire ,within: the camp. At 08,0 ,I ~.~ ,hours onJ.y the north wan. ar.d the oamnunicntions bunker were still held. Abgut this .. , tae the enemy ,.,11 tintad an "'Bsaul t ·,~o seot«:,<; ' the ocmmnm1cnUoDS bunker b~t "VlSS; un­SUCcessful beoause of tho heav;Y, vo~e of !ite ,dclivur,ed b;y; 'the defanders. 'l'b. ' ons remaining 8J.mm mortar and 6<imn mqrtor pontinucd to firo but w~e ~estroyed prior . ' to 1200 hours. ' ,:,'_, .~~

3 itl :I i- , ". . ~. P' u • " n:cr.osURI: 15 TO Sl1mIOH II to Opero.t1onal .Report ' cn Lessons Loarned ' (RC~ CSGPO-.28 (Rl» .' 30 April 1956 ;, 'il ,"'('0';-1 F I' 6;.N I, A L $.' 1,., " '

~. • ~I~ iL~ "

,

,

· '. ,rr H~ ... !If'':\:~ " , .t~t

,". O· • I -:- '" '7i " :'> - ,;'V h I ~. EN , ,IJ.L ' '~. i l!" " , At 0900 hours IurstriJccG continued imd 1nflictad hoavy c:>.S\lCl~1co on ,tIic' NV.tl !.:

entrenched in the south ~, ',OllOTOr, no e:::act figures at <>Ilemy' ctwual.Ue~\c:OU1d ,be·, , , lII!Ide. 'Tho rewnieg USASl' ~ !.:ike l.'arce persorinel~ i~ 05- .::cpte1J,l. llo.v.l.d"m.WI', lIirule

aever:>J. assau1te to ,reoocu!>y' the south t.ru.l. l>l!t th~sc "~tempts "!'f' ~o~c~~,,¥'~ ':

At 1000 hours the "AI; dot"""h"oot co~cr 1"e'l.Ucstcd the enUre comp, filXCept for t)1e ccmmunicntions bunker ,m<\ north m>ll, be bombed nnd strnfec. '30'twcen 1000 end, 12oo hours the ctrstrikes continued, iI>I"11ctin,; hc..-,.v;)" cnsup~~icB, :!l'X! discouraged ~ turther aso"ul ts on the collltmnicntions lnmltcr ""d the north wall. by the North Viet-namese forcon. '..,.'

At ' 1215 hours a cV-2 nircrof't ,lroppcd anoth<:; ~'C"'ll>Ply of ,mter cnl cmctlnition. ,\, However, all of tili:; fell into tho caemy controlled portion of t:1e camp. At the 8CII1e time = AlE r.1rcr:rl't crash l:mded on th:' :rlrs trir:> , shot <loTm by heavy anti-aircre.tt :fire from th.o ='lJ' I.A positions in the vclley. !:'hc ,pilot =s irn!lledintely picked \I;p by nnothcr AlB ~Mch l~ded on the strip.

:Betwee" 1215 tuId 1400 a hea"" exch:mgo of Sl>l3ll = fire continuoc, nnd the coumnmic:ltions bunker sustained several ncar hits from c he: r;f caliber vreopon. It should be noted thnt enemy 8lmm mortllr fire hnd continucd uninterrupted throughout tho ottack.

At 1415 hours the enemy was obso.ved to be massing on the cast side of the air­Strip, prenumnbly t 'or WlOthe~ assault on the east wall. , (This is the w:lll. 'whero the tront gate is located). Airstrikes were illlmediately called on t ilis tarcet, end heavy oasualties were sustained by the Gllemy, causing them to disperse. The 3SBDUlt failed to mterializ8. 1l01"!eVeX', the ve con'~inued to pour intense fire into the compo

'j'

l";r"", 14}0 to 16}0 hours the situation of the 'defenders iieteriorated groVely • • {lrnost all firendly crew sorved weaponS were destroyed. Very little amMUnition remained. No food {I.'"ld water had· been availllbl!' for 36 hours. f:O further offensiVO ,capnbility existed duc to the strength of onemy forces entrenched in the Camp. ' .. " .• :'

I • ~,.',

At 1500 hours a dccision VItlS made by III ~IAP Headquarters to commit Morins helicopters to ..... pport the OV<ICU:ltion of the 'garrison. Tho camp was thorofore immed­iately instructed to destroy their waapoilS 'end SOI's cind prepare to evacuate by holicopter at 1700 hours.

At 1700 hours all collll!UDicntions eQ.uipruent o.nd 30I's Imd been dostroyed o.nd per­sonnel occupying the bunker ,Ii thdrew under firo ' to the north wall and took defensive positions with tho reroining force.' ?riendly forces on the north wall co~ed this

wi thdrnweJ. by :fire. ' '.

At 1720 hollI's personnel we!"e ordered to evacuate the oamp by mOvill6 nol·t!i ' to <\

heli"opter lIln<i!n,,<; zono nppro:dmc.t6ly 300 moters outside the wire. All able-bodied AmericlliiS 8nd thE; remainder o·~ ·.he Nil", ,Forco ata;yed,"behind '~o fight a rear /tu.er<l. , notion bu't the enemy ,laid lioevy fire do'l1ll in the helicopter piokup oron nnd }.nflioted many onoualt1oo., The rescue ' clement conoiatcd Of ,+6, H-34 helicopters in ~s of ~ '4 supported by 4 IIU-lll gun ships and tactical air; v~licli had rl!lllained over tho oamp arGo.. ::Jame o~ those helicopters werc UIlBblo to OOIOIC in, hcmever, 'duo to lOtI ceiling. ,I , ~\.-K'[n ~.;" .,:t: ' ' ( , ~~. '. . '

IlICWl'OIlB 15' TO SllX:'i!ION II to Qp~tionnl Roport on Lessons L<>Ql'lled (ReS eSGP0...2a U13:» 'O' :APril 1966, "," ~, ~ 0 ,.J F.'I b 12iJU' 7":1 i9 b ' , ~

, .

... "p~~-,.,...",,---:-~"r-'""_"~ "':, __ '!:

~:.,'

> ; . _, 1:,,(:·)'l!J7 ,J-D,:",JT·Al '/ ' At the helicopter picJ."Up point thC Vietnamese pCl.'sonnal ponicL:-ed

it'

) cre1't. 'Jlbnndon1nc -llicir "",unt!cd :uld thro11in& down thei:.- "''''pons the Victll.!mese pcl'son::.cl !'led 1'rcG the "clltlp, ' tronpll:l!; SFC CAl\ilAlii.a,_ U~'" 'mo """ prart~ tire SU!)port. l .. t tho a.:1.rcr--ft thc,r ~o'l4lt to .. got aboa.r.lt'.:!lcl !It one point threw n UOtmdod. ~ soldi;u-, SP5 ~l!:mAY, o:~ -the a1J..~"'t. ~c helicopter pUottld by Lt' Co1 HOU3B, the 163r<1 $ .7; Sqlll'dron C(t.l!X'.ndcr, ""':S cc overloaded tbnt it could ilOt 1ni'tinlly tnJr:t:;;. of'!. ·1.J.1. et"for~G to throw t:!C p.'l!lic-st!:'iok-en ~:m hystcl~ic:::.l. Vietnm:lcae persol"..!.""\ol off tho undo .. 0=1<;,.""s "c."C :fruitless. ~ this tine tile t:-.il rotor was dCl'lll,Sed nn<i the helicopter hr~d to be abandoned. Due to the t'llcO!li.:rclled ncticns of the indigc.uous · ., people and :the lllOuntin,:; 1!ltCl",i ty of h~e.vy ground ;'ire, t i1e rescue h,,11c.opters ucre only able to l:U"t out 69 porsOlmel ta, t fi:.-st dny, includ1"!; four \1CunCed .1meric<'JlS. Two R-34 h~licoptcro we.;. ... destl"Oyci! durin,: t )a3 o!'"raU,m. -- By 1745 hour3 all tx-1eruily personnel hnd 1<>ft the C~Jl!p ""'0 co-.ud do so ,,,,d CO, ll<>t."lf.llun"ut C-1, declared the csmp closed.

At spprorl!:l..1.toly '1800 hours .::U.l pe.rso::.mel net c~.cuatcd be;3:3.11 eV3.Sion nnd escape actior.. This incll'.ded seven USiJ3F personnel, on"O of whom WU3 s.::riously woumedj forty lUke Force perconncl, 1L.~y CIlXi- ru:d the cr~v; of two dmIDca ~ine helicopters. The wounded lJSASF (SSG ~AYLOR) died in the vieinity or th~ helicopter land in(: zone. !"rom this time on the evas10n element mOYdd northwest nod took up pos1 tiona on the high , ground approximately two Jdlaneters o.\~ frQ:l! the compo .n'~ 0200 hours they .moved ng<l.in in u northerly direction. . During this mo'"""cnt several men ware lost bccnuse 'ot estreme exhaustion end tho ' <li:::ficul1;y of ,mo~ in the dark. On 11 !.larch one VSASF, the marine hclicopter cr~w, o.."Id an unlmown number of J:dkc Force 3Ild CIDG were rescued , by helicoptlU' at different times duriIl(l ' the~. The remninine clements continued north in the hope of be~seen by ,:friendly nircrnf't •• Theiz; o!>jcctivc in tho event reSoue -a1rcraf't :fn1led to llIIltdrinlize was the city nf ,ruE. The remni.niJlg J\mericons and same scattered groups were seen by rc~cue ail~raft and returned to BUS on 12 -March. l'urther <:.1r recoimaissnnoe on 13, '14, and 15 liarch fn1led to locate =y more tl:'1andly persOIlIlcl and VIaS discontinued on 16 , l£rcil. Th~ totl:ll personnel still MIA ' "

. are depJ.cted 1n the pex:sonne1 recapi tulnt10n. - ' ' ,

" " , '

5

nl!1,;WGud;; 15 TO Sm~IoN 'II to Opero·~ionDJ. Report on Lessons Le:u-ned (ReS CSGPO..28 (ra)) 30 April 1966

•

, '

• l

,.

"

. , , .. "

0r1g1nally in C=p

Retur:led

Returned '1oundod

MIl,

1.iI.:' :Believed KLi

, ,

""?t! '., tt'~"'~~'--'

6J;J r' DeN T, li L , . PID;JC."illELrl~J:roI.\;uO~~ -,'

mKE

~.

,

~~~ elY t'S.h3I' LLDB IHT;;np TOTAL

21Q ]4, 51 17

109 52 6 12

56 53 2 12 ,

101 90 45 5

40 75 45 5

100 Carbin"s

10 U,lGs

so lWIs . ,,,'

4 !.iortors - 60mm

2 lIortnrG - 8l1mn

6 , J

6

5

1

1

1 "

•

"

t' , '

7 4)4

l ' 186

1 101

6 248

G 172

J

"

IIICLOSUi!E 15 ro SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Loomed (ReS eSGl'O..2a {RIH 30 April 1966 ' ,

. . i

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