Shumpei Kumon, Center for Global Communications

> From Wealth to Wisdom: A Change in the Social Paradigm-- A Speech Given at CSCW '92 on Nov. 2, 1992 at Hilton Hotel, Toronto.

One cannot avoid the impression that, in recent times, world news has beendominated by unhappy events. The total world population has already reached5.5 billion and is still growing by 2.5% each year. In fact, the growthrate is apparently accelerating. Even without acceleration, a populationgrowth rate of 2.5% per annum is a frightening statistic. If globalpopulation were to continue to grow at this rate, in 850 years, the humanrace would be heavier than the planet. (1 )

Humanity is causing massive pollution of the Earth's environment throughthe waste products generated by industry and day-to-day living. Earth'sgreenery is being consumed and destroyed: as feed for livestock, a sourceof fuel, and other raw materials used in modern human activity.

The socialist system, once seen as a powerful tool for modernization andindustrialization, has totally collapsed 70 some years after the RussianRevolution. Even the Western countries that emerged as victors of the ColdWar are displaying a variety of pathological symptoms, including economicstagnation and social disruption. The end of the Cold War, rather thanbringing global peace and new conditions for economic development, hasinstead allowed ethnic conflicts to erupt in various parts of the world andexacerbated the difficulties of third world nations.

The world may be now "living on a lifeboat," as biologist Garett Hardinpredicted. (2) In the face of current harsh conditions, many countries ofthe South despair of their ability to attain Modern Civilization; many areturning instead to fundamentalist movements based on the principles ofearlier civilizations. There is now a significant danger that the world ofthe late 20th century will be a world of endless confusion and conflict.

At the same time, a totally different kind of social change is occurring intoday's world. In June, I attended INET '92, the first internationalconference of the Internet Society. This conference was held in Kobe,Japan, and over 600 people from 70 countries participated in livelydiscussions about the exponential growth of computer networks and thesocial implications of this phenomenon. The number of host computers in theInternet has doubled each year since 1987; It is estimated that the numberof hosts exceeded 700,000 early this year. (3) The rate of increaserecently has accelerated even further, and we are now witnessing anexplosive growth process.

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During his address to the Kobe conference, the President of the InternetSociety, Vinton Cerf, predicted that the number of host computers connectedto the Internet may be on the order of 100 million by the turn of thecentury. The number of users, he projects, will be at the one billionlevel. He also forecasts that, if the "ubiquitous computing" modelprevails, the number of hosts may eventually reach several billions. Arecent survey of computer networking by the British Magazine The Economistconcluded that "one day, the computers of the world will unite." (4)

This contrast-between hopeless social stagnation on the one hand andbreathtaking social development on the other-merits our close scrutiny.What meaning can we extract from this situation?

In a speech to the World Economic Forum, held in Switzerland in February ofthis year, the then-President of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel, said that"The end of the Communism ... has brought an end ... to the modern age as awhole." (5) The basis of Modern Civilization is the belief that we canattain a future of infinite progress and prosperity through the applicationof objective scientific knowledge in specialized fields. This value systemis diametrically opposed to the fundamentalistic tenets of Classical(Religious) Civilization, the predecessor of Modern Civilization. ClassicalCivilization was based on the belief that the passage of time can lead onlyto the decline and fall of a civilization built on the teachings of a great savi

or or theprinciples described in holy writings from some golden age in the past.

The communist system represented the perverse extreme of ModernCivilization in this sense. It collapsed not as a result of externalmilitary force, but because of peaceful rebellion by the people who livedwithin the system. Havel sees this as the end of the modern era. Hemaintains that we can no longer rely on the progress of science andtechnology to provide answers to our problems. His speech continued asfollows.

"What is needed is something different, something larger. Man'sattitude toward the world must be radically changed. We have toabandon the arrogant belief that the world is merely a puzzle to besolved, a machine with its instructions for use waiting to bediscovered, a body of information to be fed into a computer in thehope that, sooner or later, it will spit out a universal solution....Things must once more be given a chance to present themselves asthey are, to be perceived in their individuality. We must see thepluralism of the world, and not bind it by seeking commondenominators or reducing everything to a single common equation.We must try harder to understand than to explain. The way forward

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is not in the mere construction of universal systemic solutions, to beapplied to reality from the outside; it is also in seeking to get to the

heart of reality through personal experience....(6)

I must confess considerable sympathy for Mr. Havel's criticism of ModerCivilization, particularly modern science and technology, as well as hiscall for change in the paradigms of human knowledge and life. However, Ialso feel considerable dissatisfaction. Above all, I want to ask ifcommunism was really a part of Modern Civilization. I would argue insteadthat the communist systems adopted in the Soviet Union and China actuallybelonged to the mold of Classical Civilization. In my interpretation,leaders of those countries merely sought to revive the authoritarianempires and ideologies of Classical Civilization under the banner of"modernization" borrowed from Moder Civilization. In that sense, I amconvinced that their experiment was doomed to failure. As has been pointedout by Francis Fukuyama and others, to this extent the collapse ofcommunism can perhaps be interpreted not as the end of Moder Civilization,but rather as its triumph. (7)

This is not to suggest that Modem Civilization is without problems. Infact, it is clear that Modern Civilization is already reaching the limit ofits development, both in terms of the potential for global expansion and interms of our ability to achieve sustainable economic growth in thedeveloped areas. It is for this reason that I support Mr. Havel's criticismof Moder Civilization. In the long run, our development-orientedcivilization must inevitably give way to a different, sustainment-orientedcivilization. At that time, we may be forced to impose deliberateconstraints on the advancement of human knowledge, including science andtechnology.

I believe, however, that this crucial point is still some distance in thefuture. As I stated earlier, we are riding on (or being carried along by)exponentially expanding waves of growth generated by the remainingdevelopment potential of Moder Civilization. Thus, I should like to offera hypothesis for your criticism. My hypothesis consists of two basicpropositions:

(1) We are moving from militarization/state-formation andindustrialization /enterprise-formation toinformatization/"intelprise'-formatio, which represents the thirdand final phase of the development of Modern Civilization. Thisthird phase will be accompanied by a shift from the paradigms ofan industrial society to the paradigms of an information society.(2) The various new elements of Modern Civilization--knowledge,

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institutions and machinery--that will be developed during thisthird phase will be integrated into, and utilized as essentialcomponents of, the post-modern civilization that will succeeds ourModern Civilization.

In short, I maintain that the modern era has not yet ended. I believe that,in order to achieve a smooth and successful transition to post-moderncivilization, we must work not only to understand and overcome the weakpoints of Moder Civilization, but also to develop it further. Inparticular, while we must recognize the problems that exist in thescientific and technological paradigms of Modern Civilization, it seemsobvious that science and technology itself will remain essential buildingblocks of post-moder civilization. My greatest source of dissatisfactionwith Mr. Havel's speech was his failure to recognize this point.

Since time is limited, I will confine the remainder of my discussion to thefirst of the above two propositions. I shall outline my personal viewsregarding the nature of the third phase of Modern Civilization and aboutthe shift in social paradigms that will occur during that phase.

One of the values that sustains Modern Civilization is "activeinstrumentalism." The individual actors that make up modern society usevarious means of influencing the world in order to attain their particulargoals. One of the most effective of such means is influencing the acts ofother actors. In other words, a secondary goal of each actor is toeffectively control the acts and states of other actors in ways thatcontribute to the achievement of its own primary goals. Acts that aredesigned to influence the acts and states of other actors are "political"acts in the broadest definition of the term.

In this sense, political acts can be divided into two basic types. Thefirst, negotiation, is based on indirect control. This consists ofpresenting requests regarding the acts and states of other actors, andnegotiating compliance with those requests. The second, manipulation,involves the control of the acts and states of other actors by more directmeans, without the presentation of requests.

Negotiation can be divided into three sub-types (8):(a) Threat: If you do not comply with my requests, I will attack you.(b) Exchange: If you accept my requests, I will cooperate with you.(c) Persuasion: It would be in your best interests to accept my requests.Manipulation can also be divided into three sub-types:(a) Coercion: Forcing other actors to adopt the state that we desire,without consideration for their freedom of action.(b) Exploitation: Taking advantage of gaps in the defenses of other actorsin order to achieve the state that we desire.

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(c) Inducement: Creating environments in which others will be motivatedspontaneously toward specific acts or states.

In either of these two types of political acts, consideration for theindependence of others is greater in the second and third sub-types than inthe first sub-type. In modem society, there is a strong tendency to usethreats in conjunction with coercion, exchange with exploitation, andpersuasion with inducement. Historically, we have moved from the firstphase of modernization (in which threats and coercion were widely used associally legitimate acts) to the second phase of modernization (in which anincreasing emphasis has been placed on exchange and exploitation). Ipredict that the advent of the third phase of modernization will beaccompanied by a gradual increase in the use of persuasion and inducement.

During the first two phases of modernization, attempts were made tolegitimize the prevailing forms of political acts by establishing theconcepts of rights and defining specific limits for those rights. The firsttwo phases were also characterized by the development of competitive socialgames in which the objective was to acquire, accumulate, and demonstratepower, that is, the means of political acts. This was accompanied by theemergence of actors who became the main players in these games, and theformation of the social systems that functioned as their arenas.

The first phase of modernization, which began around the 16th century, sawthe formation of moder sovereign states for which national sovereignty was a sa

cred concept.This resulted in the spread of the "prestige game," whereby each statesought to enhance and express its national prestige as a general andabstract means of threat and coercion. The prestige game was based on warsof invasion and diplomacy in the arena of "international society."International law developed as a system of rules to govern theestablishment, limitation, and cession of the sovereign rights of states.

This tendency was paralleled during the second phase of modernization,which began in the late 18th century, by the formation of modern industrialenterprises for whom private property ownership was a sacred concept. Theresult was the spread of the "wealth game," in which enterprises used the"world marketplace" as the arena for a competitive game based on productionand sales. The goal was the accumulation and demonstration of wealth as thegeneral and abstract means of exchange and exploitation. Commercial andcivil laws were developed as a framework to govern the establishment,limitation and transfer of the property rights of individual industrialenterprises.

While conflict and war have not been eliminated in the closing years of the

20th century, at least the international community has come to accept thatwars of invasion are unjust wars. The implication of this is that the"prestige game" has decisively lost its social legitimacy. The competitivepursuit of profit in the "wealth game" also has become the focus ofcriticism for various reasons, but we have not yet reached the point oftotally denying the social legitimacy of this type of behavior. Althoughthe nature of the wealth game may change, it is likely that it willcontinue into the 21st century. And even if we cease to play the wealthgame, the economic acts as such (the production and distribution of goodsand services) will not cease.

It seems to me that we are now poised to enter the third phase ofmodernization, which will result in the formation of a new type of socialentity, modem information "intelprises" for which "information rights,"rather than national sovereignty or private property rights, will be asacred concept. We will see the spread of the "research and educationgame"-- that is, the "wisdom game." These intelprises will compete in the"global intelplace" to acquire and demonstrate wisdom as the general andsymbolic means of persuasion and inducement.

In other words, we are on the brink of a momentous change in our socialparadigms, for the second time in recent social history. Of course, we havenot yet established a system of rules to govern the establishment,limitation, and sharing of information rights by intelprises and otherparticipants in this information society. Nevertheless, I am sure that wewill eventually start to form suitable systems.

Like other social games, however, the wisdom game must fulfill threepreconditions before it can become established and start to spread inearnest. These three requirements are mental awakening, technologicalbreakthroughs, and the establishment of a system of rules.

Mental awakening first requires recognition of ourselves not as"individuals" but as "contextuals" enveloped in various social contexts andrelationships in which we are only relatively autonomous. This will replacethe existing concept of the modern self as a self-sufficient andindependent individual separate from other people (which is a prerequisitefor the wealth game). Existence as a contextualist rather than as anindividualist is equivalent to what Arthur Koestler referred to asself-awareness as a "holon." (9) In the words of George Lodge, it is'communitarianism." (10) It is equivalent to recognition of oneself as amember of a network that consists of multiple relationships, or as a beingthat coexists with and is actually a part of its environment It alsoimplies the awakening of wider forms of awareness, such as planetaryconsciousness or cosmic consciousness. In the United States, this new typeof consciousness is clearly present in the counter-culture movement and the netw

orkingmovement, which have emerged since the mid-1960's.

Obviously, people who have achieved this awareness are extremely wellqualified to become members of networks that function as social systems.They are also well qualified to become members of the intelprises thatparticipate in wisdom games (or, indeed, to become intelprises in their ownright). By "networks that function as a social system," I mean a socialsystem that is formed primarily with a view to reciprocity in terms of thesharing of information and knowledge among members and promoting the mutualgranting of goods and services. In such a system, persuasion and inducementare the prevailing political acts.

Persuasion is based on the sharing of information and knowledge; inducementis based on the granting of goods and services-including information andknowledge as goods. Networks that function as social systems can becategorized into "network organizations" that function as individualorganizations -- that is, complex actors -- in their own right, and thosethat do not (which I refer to as "societal networks"). In this context,intelprises can be regarded as network organizations that function as asocial system.

The second prerequisite for the wisdom game is technological breakthroughs.By this, I mean the development of computer-based information processingand sharing technology and the use of that technology to create aninformation infrastructure (11) in the form of the Internet. The Internetis a network of computer networks for global information processing andsharing.

Today, the revolutionary progress of information technology (12) isgenerally regarded as the breakthrough that will lead to theinformatization of industry and the industrialization of information. Thesewill form the core of the "third" industrial revolution, which has beentaking place since the mid-1970's.

For example, there can be no doubt that the United States has adopted anindustrial policy stance targeted toward the improvement of theinternational competitiveness of American industry through government-ledefforts to develop information processing and sharing technology in theUnited States. This is apparent from the passage late last year of theHigh-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (102P, L. 194). Although there isnothing inherently wrong with this approach, I would like to emphasize thatthe present technological breakthrough process is also significant as thetechnology breakthrough required for the wisdom game that will characterizethe third phase of modernization.

It is interesting to note, in relation to my comments about the newAmerican law, that the National Research and Education Network (NREN) hasbeen selected as the computer network that will form the core of theInternet from now on. There have been calls for private sector enterprisesin the computer and telecommunications industry to participate in theformation of the NREN, and for membership in this network to be extended toinclude not only educational and research institutions but also generalprivate enterprises and individual citizens.

Whatever the intentions of those who framed the law, an objectiveinterpretation suggests that if the computer network is opened up in thisway, it has the potential to function as an intelplace (by which I mean anarena for the global wisdom game). The computer network can also functionas a work space, or office, for intelprises. In other words, the computernetwork will function as an information infrastructure for intelplaces andoffices for intelprises.

Mitchell Kapor, founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a privatesector organization in the United States, has already suggested that theNREN should be structured as an international public network (IPN). Kaporbelieves that the network should be open to small- and medium-sizedenterprises and individuals, and that its scope should be internationalrather than national. (13)

In terms of social systems, the wisdom game requires the establishment of inform

ation rights as the third majorcategory of social rights in modern society, and the establishment of aglobal framework of laws and systems to provide partial limitation of thoserights. As becomes apparent when we consider the wealth game, commerce andindustry cannot grow freely until private property rights have been fullyestablished.

The excessive insistence on such rights in absolute terms, however, canhinder the development of commerce and industry. For example, if we decidethat land bequeathed to us by our ancestors is too sacred to sell or evenlease, it becomes in effect impossible to use that land for commercialpurposes. In contrast to this, when enterprises supply the goods andservices that they produce to the market as commodities, they show awillingness to transfer their property rights to others at any time(subject to certain conditions, such as payment). In the same way,intelprises are starting to supply the information and knowledge that theyproduce to the intelplace, which is a kind of network-based social system,as "sharables." They probably will show a willingness to transfer theirinformation and knowledge to others at any time, subject to such conditionsas respect for their priorities.

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Information rights differ from property rights in that they are based onthree key components. The first component is the right ofinformation-autonomy--that is, the right of each actor to exercise autonomyover the processing of information. This includes information-securityrights concerning processing, such as the right to prohibit other partiesfrom invading or intervening in this process.

The second component is the right of information-title, which I define asthe right to claim title over new information and knowledge discovered orcreated through the information processing activities of individual actors.This also implies information-priority rights over information generated inthis way--that is, the right to prohibit another person who has beenallowed access to such information from sharing it with a third partywithout title-holder's permission.

The third component is the right of information-control, which is the rightof actors to supervise the information and knowledge that pertains tothemselves. It also includes information-privacy rights over theinformation concerning oneself or one's group. That is to say, I shouldhave the right to prohibit others from processing information about mewithout my permission.

Society is gradually forming systems to define rights and obligationsrelating to information. These efforts are currently focusing primarily onsuch concepts as privacy rights and the right to know. (Unfortunately,Japan has lagged significantly behind in this area.) There also isconsiderable pressure, particularly in the United States, for theincorporation of certain aspects of information rights--notably, theconcepts that I have referred to as information-title rights andinformation-priority rights--into the context of property rights (whichfalls within the scope of the wealth game) by treating them as"intellectual property rights."

However, it would be grossly inappropriate to treat information-title andinformation-priority rights as simply another type of property rights. Manypeople have pointed out that the transfer of information and knowledge toothers does not necessarily result in the loss of that information andknowledge for the provider. Only certain types of information might be lostin this way, such as material that is only recorded in document form andhas not been totally memorized or copied by anyone. However, thetechnological breakthroughs of the information revolution have made itextremely easy to copy such information and supply the copies to otherpeople. Furthermore, since information does not need to take a specificphysical form or occupy a particular space, we cannot readily check whetherit has been moved or copied. Even if property rights are established overinformation, it will be almost impossible to prevent infringements or even to as

certain whether infringements haveoccurred.

Also, it often is not an easy task to determine a single title-holder of anitem of new information for at least two reasons. First, it is highlylikely that people with similar mindsets and working in similarenvironments may discover or invent the same information independently andmore or less simultaneously. In fact, chances are that we areunconsciously connected with one another in an extra-sensory globalcommunication network of minds. Second, when we are deliberatelycommunicating and collaborating as a group, it makes little sense to singleout a particular item of information and ascribe it to a certain individualin the group. At best, we can identify that particular group itself as theholder of the information-title for a set of newly acquired items ofinformation.

An even more decisive problem is that the economic value of informationtends to depend on the range of actors who will share it. The price that Iask when I provide information to you may differ according to whether ornot third parties will share that information. If I sell information to youat a price determined on the understanding that we will not allow thirdparties to share it, the value of the information will change if you or Isubsequently break this agreement. Once information has been sold as acommodity, however, it is practically impossible to revise its price oncethe transaction takes place.

When all factors are taken into account, it is far more advantageous toshare information and knowledge through the reciprocal relationships ofnetworks than to distribute them through trading in the marketplace. Inreciprocal relationships, the induction effect is determined by eachpartner's estimation of the extent to which it has given or received value.Unlike market transactions, no problems arise even though the giver andreceiver might place a different value on the information, or if the valuefluctuates as the information changes over time.

If, after supplying information to you on the understanding that you willnot share it with a third party, I subsequently discover that you havebroken that promise, I simply increase (in my mind) your debt to me fromthat point in time. Similarly, you too might feel psychological and socialpressure to increase (in your mind) the extent of your obligation to me.The flexibility that results from the reciprocity of networks makes thosenetworks more suitable than markets as a social system for the distributionof information and knowledge.

Once the three stated prerequisites have been satisfied, the wisdom gamecan begin in earnest. The wisdom game differs from the wealth game in a

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number of respects. In the wealth game, entrepreneurs produce individualand specific goods and sell them as commodities. By selling their goodssuccessfully, the entrepreneurs demonstrate the social usefulness of theirproducts and gain rewards in the form of wealth, thereby acquiring thesymbolic and general power to trade. In this sense, the market is an arenain which the social usefulness of entrepreneurs' activities is evaluated.

In contrast, the "intelpreneurs" who participate in the wisdom game produceindividual and specific information and seek to provide it to others assharables. By successfully sharing their information, they demonstrate thevalue of the individual information that they have supplied in terms of thesocial values of truth, goodness, or beauty. Their reward is wisdom, whichis the symbolic and general ability to persuade and induce others, namely,to exert intellectual influence over other actors. In other words, manypeople will be prepared to heed the words of an intelpreneur who has gaineda social reputation for wisdom.

In the case of the wealth game, if we disregard purchases by otherentrepreneurs, the actors who buy commodities supplied by entrepreneursthrough the market are "households." Entrepreneurs seek to accumulatewealth by selling "commodities," while households seek to maximize utility by bu

ying and consuming those commodities.

I anticipate that the wisdom game will be based on the sharing of sharablessupplied by intelpreneurs to network-type organizations, particularlynetwork-type communities. I would propose the term "connectives" todescribe these communities, or virtual communities, that are thecounterpart of the household in the wisdom game. The goal of connectivesand their members in acquiring information and knowledge through theintelplace would not be to expand their wisdom, and hence theirintellectual influence, as is the case with intelpreneurs; rather, it wouldbe to use the information and knowledge to make their lives moremeaningful. I am tempted to predict that, in the third phase ofmodernization, these connectives will replace the traditional community andfamily as the most basic social group.

It is important to recognize that, in the wisdom game, there is no need forthe information and knowledge supplied in the intelplace for socialevaluation to be treated as commodities subject to property rights, or evenas the objects of reciprocal social exchange. Since it is desirable forsharables supplied in the intelplace to gain social value by being sharedamong as many people as possible, sharables should in principle be suppliedat cost or without charge (or even with some form of incentive attached).For this reason, it is inappropriate to think of the rules that govern theprovision of sharables as being similar to the rules that govern the sale

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of commodities.

In this sense, an excessive preoccupation with the concept of "intellectualproperty rights" is dangerous for two reasons. First, information andknowledge are basically unsuitable for distribution as commodities that canbe treated as objects of property rights. Thus, even if our approach isbased on the paradigm of the industrial society, we need to develop specialmechanisms that differ from those used with other commodities. Second,intellectual property rights conflict with and contradict informationrights in a variety of ways. For this reason, the spread of the wisdom gamewill require efforts to establish and limit information rightssystematically as distinct from intellectual property rights (as a conceptbased on the paradigms of the information society).

The attitude of those who regard the sharing of sharables as a means ofaccumulating wealth, and who seek to amass intellectual property rights andsell them for the highest possible price, is reminiscent of the philosophyof mercantilism. This philosophy viewed the trading of commodities as ameans of enhancing national prestige, and therefore as something thatshould be under the control of the state. Perhaps the philosophies andpolicies that place an excessive emphasis on intellectual property rightsand the balance of pecuniary payments might be described as "intellectualmercantilism."

The wisdom game's equivalent of the world marketplace of the wealth gamewill be the global intelplace, which will function as an arena for thedissemination and evaluation of sharables as well as the acquisition ofintellectual influence (that is, wisdom). Obviously, this global intelplacehas yet to come into being as an established system, or even as a de factostructure. As I stated earlier, however, the Internet is alreadyexperiencing explosive growth as the infrastructure for the globalintelplace of the future.

History suggests that social systems that could be described as localintelplaces, which are equivalent to the local marketplaces of the wealthgame, have existed for a very long time. One such example is the academicconference, where various schools of thought offer theories for evaluation.The same is true of theaters, sports arenas, exhibition halls, newspapers,and magazines. These are all local intelplaces in which actors, sportsteams, artists and artistic schools, or writers and critics can presenttheir performances and works for evaluation by the public. As theInternet's coverage expands and its circuits become capable of carrying large vo

lumes of data at enormous speeds, people will begin to use it to supplyadvanced applications based on information technology, such as multimedia,groupware, virtual reality, and artificial life. At this stage, the

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Internet will begin to take on the specific characteristics of a globalintelplace. Indeed, newsgroups on the USENET may very well be seen as aburgeoning form of such an intelplace.

What then will be the significance of CSCW in the present context? Ofcourse, I freely admit that one can discuss the significance of CSCW interms of the transition of industrial society from its 20th century system,with consumer durables as the leading industries, to its 21st centurysystem, led by information industries. There is no doubt that the conceptand technology of collaboration, particularly computer-supportedcollaboration, will occupy a central place in the new paradigm of 21stcentury industrial system. I want to argue at the same time, however, thatCSCW will have far more significance in the context of "informatization":namely, the transition of Modern Civilization to its third phase. Mutualpersuasion and inducement, the dominant forms of mutual political acts bothamong and within intelprises and connectives, can take place mosteffectively where relevant technological and institutional premises forcommunication and collaboration are already provided. In other words,computer-supported collaboration, together with computer-mediatedcommunication, will be the key technology for successful persuasion andinducement, and hence for successful informatization. In this sense, Iwould like to urge my colleagues at this conference to give serious thoughtto the possibility of using CSCW technology for the purpose of enhancingthe effectiveness of mutual persuasion and inducement.

If the wealth game survives into the 21st century, then the limitedcommercialization of information is inevitable. Intelpreneurs cannot liveon air; they must make a living by engaging in some form of economicactivity. It is vital both to the spread of the wisdom game, and to thesurvival of its players, that participation in the game results in thefulfillment of economic necessity as a byproduct. In fact, there probablywill be enterprise-intelprise collaboration, at least during the initialstages of development of the wisdom game. In this sense, thecommercialization of information and knowledge is probably inevitable.

During the industrialization period, the nation states that participated inthe prestige game provided various forms of support that enabledenterprises to devote themselves to the wealth game. In the same way, wecan expect the enterprises that now participate in the wealth game toprovide the economic support that will enable intelprises to devotethemselves to the wisdom game during the informatization phase of thefuture. Naturally, enterprises should be able to expect something in returnfrom intelprises, just as the state has expected enterprises to compensatefor the provision of security through the payment of taxes and the reliablesupply of large quantities of high-quality weapons as well as other goodsand services demanded by the states. As part of this repayment, it is

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possible that intelprises will provide enterprises with information andknowledge that can be commercialized and sold either directly orindirectly.

The growth of enterprise-intelprise collaboration should (and probablywill) be accompanied by a gradual decline in the tendency to regard thestate as the most obvious patron of scientific, artistic, and sportingactivities and, thus, in the expectation that it will operate, protect, orsubsidize such activities. The direction in which that the Olympic Gamesare heading today is, for better or worse, a representative example.

Of course, this does not mean that the state will have no role as an entitythat is permitted to exercise threats and coercion, either in thepreparation of an environment for the spread of wisdom game or in theprovision of assistance to ensure a smooth transition to the wisdom game. The st

ate or other supra-national centers ofcoercive power will play active roles in the spread of the wisdom game, inthe same manner that the state has contributed to the spread andmaintenance of the wealth game. In particular, the most important initialroles for organizations with the power to threaten and coerce will probablyconsist of the abolition or relaxation of outmoded regulations that hinderthe spread of the wisdom game. Such power centers will promulgate andimplement rules relating to the establishment and limitation of informationrights and to the sharing and dissemination of information and knowledge.They will also make timely provision of accurate and useful informationabout those rules. Enterprises may be able to take over these roles fromthe state to a significant extent; however, I do not believe that authoritymechanisms will relinquish their roles completely.

Clearly, it would be overly optimistic to assume that there will be noundesirable elements in the wisdom game or that participants will be ableto establish an order simply by agreeing among themselves to ostracize orscorn those who break the rules. Our past experiences with computernetworks show that there are people who will maliciously release viruses ordeliberately try to spread unfounded criticism, insults, or rumors. Sexualand other forms of harassment on the network are not uncommon, either.There is no justification for the assumption that the wisdom game can beplayed fairly and equitably without rules or a rule enforcement mechanism.

Even if all participants in the game are virtuous, there is no guaranteethat outsiders will not seek to disrupt the game or use it for their ownpurposes. In this sense, while the format of the rules may be based onmutual persuasion and agreement among participants, there will probablyalways be a need for an organization with coercive power, one that can takeresponsibility for the establishment of authoritative rules and for the

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maintenance of the order that evolves under those rules.

However, it is unlikely, in the third phase of modernization, thatindividual sovereign nation states will continue to function as the powercenters maintaining the order of social games, including the wealth gameand the wisdom game. Instead, an increasing portion of such roles willprobably be taken over by a higher form of complex actors transcending theexisting sovereign states. I am convinced that the wisdom game will be moreglobal in nature than the wealth game. In this context, the major advancednations will need to promote the formation of supra-national actors thatcan actively transcend the limitations of sovereign states and take overnot only global security and environmental management, but also theestablishment and implementation of rules for the new social game.

Even if these prerequisites are fulfilled to some extent, we may find thatthe path to widespread social acceptance for people with new attitudes, orfor the new social games in which they are players, is not easy. This wasthe case during the formative stages of the wealth game. The people whocontributed to the technological breakthroughs of the industrial revolutionand helped to establish the rules for the wealth game were described as"neither learned, nor ingenious, nor respectable." Instead, they weredescribed as people whose hearts were "strangely warmed" and who "set greatmovements in motion and change the whole temper of an age." (14)

These descriptions could be applied to the early players of the wisdomgame, including computer hackers, the leaders of new sciences, and theanalysts who develop and propose new social paradigms. People who areactive on the leading edge of informatization may not always be treatedwith respect under existing paradigms and social orders. However, Isincerely hope that their "strangely warmed" hearts may provide the triggerfor a major movement leading to the third phase of Modern Civilization.

(notes)1. Based on a statement by Shigemi Kono, Director-General of the Institute of Po

pulation Problems, Ministry of Health andWelfare, at the GISPRI Symposium 1992: World-Wide Population Explosion andJapan.2. Garett Hardin, "Living on a Lifeboat," Bioscience 24:10 (October 1974).3. John S. Quarterman, "The Global Matrix of Minds," in GlobalizingNetworks: Computers and International Communication, Linda Harasim, ed.,Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press (forthcoming).4. "Science and Technology: The Fruitful, tangled trees of knowledge," TheEconomist, June 20, 1992, pp. 91-94.5. The New York Times Weekly Review, March 1st, 1992.6. ibid.

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7. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York:International Creative Management, 1992.8. For similar classifications, see: Kenneth E. Boulding, Beyond Economics:Essays on Society, Religion, and Ethics, Ann Arbor: The University ofMichigan Press, 1968; and John Kenneth Galbraith, The Anatomy of Power,Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983.9. Arthur Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine, London: Hutchinson, 1967.10. George C. Lodge, The New American Ideology: How the Ideological Basisof Legitimate Authority in America Is Being Radically Transformed-theProfound Implications for Our Society in General and the Great Corporationsin Particular, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975.11. Brian Kahin, ed., Building Information Infrastructure: Issues in theDevelopment for the National Research and Education Network, McGraw-Hill,1992.12. Tom Forester, High-Tech Society, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987.13. Mitchell D. Kapor and Daniel D. Weitzner, "Social and Industrial Policyfor a Public Network: Lessons of INTERNET," in Globalizing Networks:Computers and International Communication, Linda Harasim, ed., Cambridge,MA: The MIT Press (forthcoming).14. Kenneth E. Boulding, op. cit.

Institute for HyperNetwork Society

Institute for HyperNetwork Society was established on March 29, 1993 underthe auspices of Ministry of International Trade and Industry and Ministryof Post and Telecommunications.

The mission of this research institute is to articulate the fundamentalstructure and dynamics of hypernetwork society which will emerge in the21st century. The institute will actively engage in the promotion ofrealizing hypernetwork society in practical ways to help improve thequality of life both in Japan and around the world.

Major funding from:

Government of Oita PrefectureNTT Data CommunicationsNippon Telephone and TelegraphNECFujitsu

Board of Directors

ChairmanFumio Watanabe Former Chairman, Tokyo Marine InsuranceExecutive Director

-2-76.

Shinobu lidaPresidentShumpei KumonVice PresidentYoshio Tsukio

Deputy Governor, Oita Prefecture

Professor, International University of Japan

Professor, University of Tokyo

Board of Trustees

Takehiko Aoyagi President, Nippon TelematiqueKen-ichi Imai President, Stanford Japan CenterKoichi Utsumiya Professor, University of OitaJun-ichi Ono Director, NHKKoji Kanaoka President, Intec CorporationTakahiko Kamae President, Information Research Lab, Hewlett

Packard JapanYukio Kitaya President, Institute for Strategic StudyKazuta Kiyohara Director, Kyushu Power Co.Kazuo Takahara President, CRC Research InstituteShigechika Takeuchi President Apple Computer, JapanYuzuru Tanaka Professor, Hokkaido UniversityHiroshi Nagasue Director, Yasukawa Electric Co.Nobuaki Hachinohe Professor Tokyo Metropolitan Institute of

TechnologySaburo Matsuo President, SCC CorporationJun Murai Assistant Professor, Keio University

In March 1993, the Institute for HyperNetwork Society was established inOita Prefecture, Kyushu, Japan. Supported by Oita prefectural government,Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Ministry of Post andTelecommunications and a number of leading Japanese corporations, theinstitute will examine the global impact of computer-based communicationmedia on a wide range of social, economic, cultural and technical issues.Research that will attempt to grasp the landscape of the newinformation-oriented civilization.

As we enter a new phase of modernization, the information age, many of theways in which we live, work and interact will undergo profound change.Increasingly the problems facing global society demand that we begin to actin ways which are more harmonious and sustainable with regard to theenvironment in which we live. The best way for Japan and other nations ofthe world to deal with this new phase in our collective history is tomutually emulate, that is to "co-emulate", others' civilizationalcomponents that each lacks and that seem to cope with the demands we willjointly face.

A new form of organization, that we propose to call "intelprise" will

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engage, collaboratively and competitively, in the "wisdom game", a new typeof social game the goal of which is to enhance the intellectual influenceof its players. Intelprises will also act as agents for co-emulationbetween the individualism-based Western branches and thecontextualism-based Eastern branches of modern civilization. In otherwords, co-emulation will be the main content of the wisdom game. It isthrough such co-emulation that the transition to post-modern civilizationwill take place in the 21st century.

We propose to call the next generation of networks in both technologicaland sociological contexts "hypernetworks". In technological context theywill provide more bandwidth and capability to handle a wide range of media,forming the information infrastructure to support the global activities ofnot only industrial enterprises in the wealth game but also intelprises inthe wisdom game. In sociological context they will present a new socialsystem which people join in order to share useful information, knowledge, and ev

en wisdom and in which the dominantand form of social interaction is persuasion/inducement. Global hypernetworks ev

in this sociological sense will be the arena for the wisdom game.

The term hypernetwork was first coined in the fall of 1989 by the membersof a Japanese computer conferencing system, COARA, located in OitaPrefecture, to reflect the configuration resulting from the convergence ofcomputer-mediated communication and hypermedia -- text, voice, motion andstill picture-- taking place around the world. COARA evolved in Oitacorresponding with the vision of Oita prefectural Governor MorihikoHiramatsu to develop their region into an economically autonomous area thatdoes not have to rely on centralized Tokyo and the national government forguidance, leadership, or economic opportunities.

In 1989, the local government installed the world's first free X.25 publicpacket network to provide uniform low cost access to COARA and gateways tonational and international information systems from throughout Oitaprefecture. To celebrate this, in March 1990, the 1st HypernetworkConference was held in a small resort town in Oita prefecture with theobjective of discussing the human and technical potential surrounding theconstruction of hypernetworks into the next century. The importance of theconference was immediately recognized by the Japanese computer andcommunications community. COARA members and the citizenry of Oita werejoined at the event by representatives of major companies such as NEC,Pioneer, NHK, Sony, Apple Japan, Fujitsu and NTT, academics from socialscience and technological fields, representatives of Japanese local andnational government departments and their agencies, and users of othercomputer conferencing systems from across the length and breadth of Japan.In his address to the conference, Oita Governor, Morihiko Hiramatsu,

proposed that a new research institute --The Institute for HyperNetworkSociety-- be established to continue the work inspired by the event.

Over the next two years, the hypernetwork concept broadened to include awider range of social and economic issues. Discussion during early onlinedebates about "hypernetworks" centered on technology. Using text basedsystems as a starting point, COARA members looked at trends in thedevelopment of computer and communication technology and proposed thathypernetworks would be computer mediated communication networks with theability to carry hypermedia (an extension of the term "hypertext"), thatis, nonsequentially structured text with multimedia handling capabilities.

Professor Shumpei Kumon, Center for Global Communication, InternationalUniversity of Japan, a member of the conference organizing committee andthe man Governor Hiramatsu proposed as the head of the new institute, sawhypernetworks as the information infrastructure that would support newtypes of social and economic organizations emerging with the coming of theinformation age and would eventually lead to a new era in humancivilization. Kumon proposed to broaden the original technology baseddefinition to include wider sociological concepts.

In earlier joint U.S.-Japan research efforts, Kumon had worked to definemodern Japanese and East-Asian society as "network society". He used theterm "network" to emphasize the complex web of human-to-human relationshipsthat typify Japanese and other East Asian societies, and referred tointeraction between people, especially that emphasizing persuasion andinducement, as "human networking". He also attempted to define the nextstage in the development of moder industrial society in a generic sense as"network society". In this usage, the term "network" refers totelecommunications and computer systems as well as to persuasion orientedways of human interaction.

There had been a clear need to make a distinction between the two differentconnotations of network society, sociological and technical/economic, aswell as to analyze the interrelationship between the two. The concept of "hyper

network" fits this need since it represents an emerging newtype of society, based on the conventional Japanese or East-Asian type ofinteraction, but with great transformation resulting from highly advancedtechnological innovations. Just as the term "network" is widely used torepresent both technological and sociological concepts, we would like touse "hypernetwork" in a way that has both technological and sociologicalconnotations.

This broader view of the world of hypernetworks and the role they will playin the coming civilization were the basis for the 2nd Hypernetwork

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Conference held in Oita prefecture, in February 1992. Again the conferencewas attended by people representing a broad spectrum of interests fromacross Japan, and the "ordinary" users of COARA continued to play a keyrole. The 2nd conference also saw a rise in international participationwith speakers attending from the United States, Europe, Korea and otherAsian countries.

The establishment of the Institute for HyperNetwork Society will becelebrated at the 3rd Hypernetwork Conference, to be held in the spring of1994.

The Institute will organize a series of workshops in 1993 and 1994, andthen start to install a regional experimental network system in Oita andconduct field research on the application of advanced networking servicesand their implications to society.

For more information about theInstitute for HyperNetwork Society andthe 3rd Hypernetwork Conference, please contact:

Institute for HyperNetwork SocietyOita Office:51-8 Higashi Kasuga-cho, Oita City, Oita 870, JAPANTEL: +81-975-37-8180 FAX: +81-975-37-8820

Tokyo Office:Shoyu Kaikan, 3-3-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, TokyoTEL: +81-3-3506-8180 FAX: +81-3-3506-8181e-mail: izumi@glocom.acjp

100, JAPAN

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SECOND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM: NATIONAL SECURITY & NATIONAL

COMPETITIVENESS: OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS Proceedings, 1993 Volume II -

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