Schooling in Murder: Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 and Hauptmann Roman Shukhevych in Belarus 1942

Per Anders Rudling Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universitt, Greifswald (Germany).

Introduction

The OUN(b) and UPAs campaign to cleanse Western Ukraine of its non-Ukrainian minorities in 1943 and 1944 was carried out in a brutal, systematic fashion.

The UPAs cleansing of the Volhynian and Galician Poles was the culmination of a campaign of violence, the understanding of which requires a study of the background of

its leadership, and the establishment of the context within which it operated. While

several researchers emphasize the training of a substantial part of the UPA leadership by

Nazi Germany, this is a relative recent field of study. Many questions remain to be

answered.i What seems clear is that the brutalization of the war in the east came to

influence the violent nature of the campaign, and the way it was carried out. Therefore, in

order to understand the nature of the UPAs anti-Polish campaign, particularly during its most violent phase in 1943-44, it is important to study the background of its leadership,

particularly its activities and affiliations in 1941-42. Roman Shukhevych, its commander,

had distinguished himself in German service. Serving in German uniform since 1938,

Shukhevych combined his political activism as a Ukrainian nationalist with a

distinguished military record. In 1941, he was a commander of the Nachtigall battalion, a

Wehrmacht formation consisting of Ukrainian nationalists. Soldiers under his command

carried out mass shootings of Jews in the vicinity of Vinnytsia. The role of Shukhevych

and the Nachtigall in the pogroms of the June 30, 1941 Lviv pogrom has been the topic of heated discussions.ii A less known, and often overlooked aspect of Shukhevychs

service for Nazi Germany was his whereabouts in 1942, something often omitted in the

nationalist historiography.iii During this year, Shukhevych served as Hauptmann (captain)

of the Schutzmannschaften, and stood under the command of Hhere Polizei- und SS-

Fhrer Heinrich Himmler. This paper is an attempt to document this white spot in the

Shukhevychs biography. Background: Jews, partisans, and bandits

Given the huge size of the Soviet territories under German occupation, the

German military personnel were spreading thinly. Aware of this shortage, Wilhelm

Keitel, the head of the Oberkommano der Wehrmacht, argued Since we cannot watch everybody, we need to rule by fear. Hitler himself, when learning about Stalins call for a partisan movement in the summer of 1941, exclaimed Thats only good, it gives us a possibility to the exterminate everybody who challenges our rule.iv Hitler himself compared the fighting of partisans with that of the struggle against red Indians.v On September 16, 1941 Keitel issued an order that every German soldier, killed in a partisan

attack in the occupied Soviet Union would be avenged by the killing of 50 100 Communists.vi At a September, 1941 meeting for army officers, von dem Bach-Zelewski and SS-Brigadefhrer Artur Nebe, the leader of Einsatzgruppe B linked the

partisans to the Jews: Where the partisan is, there also is the Jew, and where the Jew is, is the partisan.vii In December, 1941, one month before the Wannsee conference, Himmlers appointment book carried the cryptic note Jewish question/to be exterminated as partisans.viii As escaping Jews reinforced the partisans, the Nazis linked the expediency of exterminating Jews to their counterinsurgency activities. The view that

The Jews are without exception identical with the concept of partisan was a key assumption of the architects of the German counter-insurgency campaigns.ix

Local Collaboration during World War II

The shortage of German military personnel necessitated an increased reliance on

local collaborators. The Schutzmannschaften, auxiliary police forces, were designated as

an instrument, operating under the Gendarmerie, intended to carry out the dirty work (Schmutzarbeit) of the occupying forces,x including the execution of Jews and

Communists.xi Central assignments were anti-partisan warfare, searching the ghettoes and sealing them off during Aktionen, to executions at the murder sites.xii

While the Schutzmannschaften had constituted a fairly small force, they were

drastically enlarged after the summer of 1942. From July 1942 to the end of that year, the

overall strength of the Schutzmannschaft-Einzeldienst increased from about 30,000 to

over 200,000 men.xiii While half of the men worked in fire brigades, the dramatic growth

of the Schutzmannschaften mirrored the growth of the pro-Soviet partisan formations. By

October, 1942 there were 55,562 local police in Ostland, (i.e. the Baltics and Western

Belarus) but only 4,428 Germans, i.e. a ration of 1:13.xiv With the exception of the Soviet

POWs, the Schutzmnner were recruited on a voluntary basis.xv

The activities of the very institution of the Schutzmannschaft are one of the lesser-

known episodes of the Holocaust.xvi While there are considerable documentary evidence

and witness accounts to establish the participation of the Schutzmannschaften in Nazi war

crimes,xvii their direct participation in anti-Jewish actions is poorly documented in the

surviving German records. The German occupation authorities left relatively little

information about the local auxiliaries. Our knowledge of the anti-partisan activities is

still limited. Only in exceptional cases are the names of individual soldiers, other than

their commanders mentioned. After the war, the West German authorities paid limited

attention to war-time killing of civilian Slavs. Unlike the murder of Jews, killing of local

Slavs was generally not regarded as having been carried out on racist grounds. Anti-

partisan activities were considered as conventional war crimes, and something to which

the Federal German prosecutors in Ludwigsburg generally paid little interest.xviii The fact

that many of the crimes on the local level were committed not by Germans, but by local

collaborators was something that further diminished the interest in Germany for these

crimes.xix Until the late 1960s, a large part of the evidence was kept in inaccessible Soviet

archives.xx Soviet war crimes trial records of former Schutzmnner were long

inaccessible, and much of the Belarusian and Russian archives remain off-limits to

scholars. Historians are only beginning to use the materials from Soviet war crimes

trials.xxi In addition, many documents were destroyed during, or immediately after the

war.xxii At the end of the war, many members of the Schutzmannschaften retreated with

the German army. A survey of about 200 Schutzmnner indicated that over 30 per cent of

them remained in the west after the war.xxiii Few, if any, were held accountable for their

actions. Western countries have yet to try a single Schutzmann for war crimes.xxiv

Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201

On June 30, 1941, in Lviv, the Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, (OUN(b)) issued a declaration of Ukrainian statehood, modeled on the

Slovak and Croatian precedents. The OUN(b) had hoped for German recognition of their

pro-Nazi state, which they intended as a totalitarian ally of Nazi Germany. To the

disappointment of the OUN(b), the Nazi leadership refused to recognize their state,

seriously complicating the OUN(b)s relations with its major sponsor. The German refusal to accept the Ukrainian declaration of statehood led to a conflict with the

leadership of the Nachtigall battalion, a collaborationist formation, consisting almost

exclusively of members of the OUN(b). The Nachtigall battalion was dissolved. On

August 13, 1941, it was ordered to return from Vinnytsia to Neuhammer, where it was

disarmed at gunpoint. Its members were then transported to Frankfurt an der Oder. On

October 21, 1941, the soldiers were reorganized as the 201st Ukrainian Schutzmannschaft

Battalion, which consisted of four companies. The formal commander of the battalion

was Sturmbannfhrer (major) Ieven Pobihushchyi, under the supervision of the German

Hauptmann Wilhelm Mocha.xxv Roman Shukhevychs title was that of Hauptmann (captain) of the first company and deputy commander of the legion.xxvi Even though

enrollment was voluntary, of the some 300 remaining members of the Nachtigall

division, only about 15 declined to sign up for service in the Schutzmannschaften.xxvii The

members themselves named the battalion after Ievhen Konovalets, a co-founder and the

first leader the OUN, an organization to which almost all of its members belonged.xxviii

To the battalion were added 60 Soviet POWs from Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk oblasti, selected by Shukhevych.xxix Several future UPA commanders served in Schutzmannschaft

Battalion 201, besides Roman Shukhevych himself, there was also Oleksander Lutskyi, the organizer and first Commander of the UPA-West, based primarily in Galicia, and his

successor Vasyl Sydor, who commanded UPA-West in 1944-49.xxx

After training in Germany, Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 was assigned to

Belarus on February 16, 1942. The soldiers signed a one-year contract with the

Germans.xxxi The Schutzmnner themselves were disappointed with this assignment,

having hoped to be stationed in Ukraine. Pobihushchyi wrote in his memoirs that

With bitterness in my heart and with serious thoughts I returned to Frankfurt [an der Oder], and there I received the order, that on March 19, 1942, we would be sent to a so-called Einsatz, i.e. military assignments. The location of our assignment was not given, since only the commander had the information. Even though I was the commander, I did not receive the order. Only Mocha had seen it. This was the way the Germans treated the commander of the legion.How disillusioned we were when we found out that we were not going to Ukraine, but Belarusxxxii

The men of Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 wore German police uniforms

without national symbols. On March 16, 1942, the battalion was ordered eastwards and

arrived in Belarus, it they replaced a Latvian Schutzmannschaft battalion. Under the

command of General J. Jakob it was spread out over 12 different points in the triangle

Mahiliou-Vitsebsk-Lepel, guarding a territory of 2,400 square kilometers,xxxiii at the time of the implementation of the Holocaust of the Belarusian Jews.xxxiv

There is no consensus in the sources about the activities of the battalion. Andrii

Bolianovskyis magisterial work on Ukrainian military formations in the service of Nazi Germany dedicates but a few pages to the divisions whereabouts in 1942.xxxv Frank Golczewski describes the activities of Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 as fighting partisans and killing Jews, but does not provide a source for this claim.xxxvi Several veterans of Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 made it to the west after the war. Whereas

30-40 veterans of Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 were alive in 1980, only 4 remained by

2004.xxxvii

The veterans were acutely aware of efforts to track down collaborators and

perpetrators.xxxviii Most published veteran memoirs avoid any specific mention of the

battalions geographic whereabouts. Pobihushchyis 1982 memoirs do not provide any details about where the division was stationed in Belarus. Many memoirs refer back to

the accounts from Schutzmann Teodor Krochaks diary, an edited version of which appeared in the 1953 collection, which Pobihushchyi helped to craft.xxxix Myroslav

Kalba, a non-commissioned officer in Nachtigal and the Schutzmannschaft battalion 201,xl who has edited six books on the formation, which the nationalists prefer to refer to

as DUN, Druzhuny Ukrainskykh Nationalistiv generally either avoids listing the battalions specific geographic whereabouts in 1942 or uses abbreviations, referring to the cities K. M. L, the villages Zh. V, P small city B or the locality H.xli Unsurprisingly, the veterans own accounts of their whereabouts in Belarus make no mention of atrocities, but present the battalions tasks as being of a military nature. Ievhen Pobihushchyi describes the military assignment as

defending the major bridges across the rivers Biarezina and Dzvina and to prevent Bolshevik partisans from destroying them. That was the main assignment, and for that purpose, the legion was distributed over an area nearly 50 kilometers long, and approximately 50 kilometer wide, and the soldiers were quartered in the villages in groups of 40, since their task was to protect the local administration. In addition, to the assignments of the legion belonged a constant combing of the forests from Bolshevik partisans. Such combing operations (besides, being very dangerous) required no less than two formations (80 men), which, in turn, weakened our positions in the villages, the so-called Schtzpunkte. Still regardless of various difficulties, the entire time that is from March 22 to December 31, 1942 the Legion painstakingly and in an exemplary fashion had to carry out its military service in such a way that the Bolshevik partisans would not be able to destroy another large bridge.xlii

There were indeed pressing military matters, which also required attention. The

so-called Vitsebsk or Surazh Gate was a forty-kilometer-long breach in the German front

line between Velizh and Usviaty in the RSFSR between the German Army groups

North and Center. It opened up as a result of a shock attack by the third and fourth Soviet Armies in the winter of 1941-1942, and remained open from February to

September 28, 1942. Through this opening in the front, Soviet ammunition, weapons,

sabotage groups and medical supplies were transported behind the enemy lines.xliii There

were various partisan formations in the region. Partisan Detachment 406 carried out

military operations on the Minsk-Vilnius, Maladzechna-Polatsk, and Minsk-Lepel railroad lines. Over the course of the war, they attacked 148 highway bridges and blew up

three railroad bridges. One of their more spectacular attacks was carried out on October

14, 1942 when they destroyed 9 automobiles and 70 Nazis on [the] Pukhavichy-Omel'na road.xliv It is quite possible that members of Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 may have been a target. Schutzmannschaft battalion veterans reported several attacks on August 25

and October 2, in U. and Zh.xlv The accounts contain no information on reprisal actions by the Schutzmannschaften, even though this was a standard practice.

Yet, even the memoirs of the Schutzmnner themselves indicate that the battalion

had alternative assignments beyond the safeguarding of the infrastructure. Pobihushchyi

wrote that his soldiers found out that in the vicinity there was a camp for Soviet POWs. According to Pobihushchyi, Shukhevych attempted to have 45 Ukrainians POWs there

released to join the Schutzmannschaft, but was prevented from doing so as a punishment

for refusing to participate in an operation of forced grain requisitions from the local

Belarusian population.xlvi

Interrogated by the MKGD by the very end of the war, Nachtigal and

Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 veteran Oleksandr Lutskyixlvii gave the following account of the activities of the battalion:

In mid-April, 1942 we were brought from Minsk to the city of Lepel, where we were divided into four groups. Each group was assigned particularly important military objects to be safeguarded, but the primary task was to fight the Soviet partisan movement in the Lepel, Ushycha, and Beshankovichy raiony. Personally, I belonged to a group of the legion of approximately 90 people, brought to the south of the city of Lepel, in the village Veleushchyna, where I took part in the safeguarding of roads, the protection of the representatives of the German command, which moved along the roads from place to place. Several times I was sent out on assignments to liquidate Soviet partisans. The information we received was passed on to the staff of the legion, located in the city of Lepel.xlviii

Lutskyi stated that in October of 1941 the entire legion was put under the disposal of the SS, and the Germans used us to fight Soviet partisans. At that point our

battalion was already named Schutzmannschaft battalion 201.xlix The Soviet interrogators were more interested in the veterans role in Nachtigal in 1941 and in the UPA from 1943 than in their whereabouts in 1942. The reports therefore provide little

information of the activities of Schutzmannschaft battalion 201. Schutzmann Volodymyr

Pavlyk told his Soviet interrogators that [i]n 1941 and 1942 he served in the German armed formations as a commander of a platoon and company. In that period I, as a

platoon and company commander did not participate in the battles against partisans and

the Red Army, but helped form them and sent them into battle against the Red partisans.l The interrogation reports from that of other veterans, such as Schutzmann Omelian

Polovyi, make no mention of the activities of battalion 201.li Some correspondence between the 201 battalion and their German superiors has

survived. The last report from Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 was sent on November 3,

1942, at which point the unit was stationed 20 kilometers north of Lepel.lii On December 1, 1942, the contracts of Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 expired. Its volunteers had

originally agreed to serve until December 31, 1942. Yet, in late 1942 the German

authorities increased the recruitment of forced labor in the occupied territories extending

the Schutzmannschaftens term of service for an indefinite period.liii They therefore declined to renew their contracts. The Schutzmnner also had grievances with the

leadership style of the Germans. Pobihushchyi himself complained that

[t[he last straw, which led to the dissolution of the entire legion [Schutzmannschaft battalion 201] was the terrible occurrence, unforgivable crimes that the German command allowed to be carried out against the riflemen of the legion. At the funeral of one fallen volunteer there wasnt even a Ukrainian banner on his bier, only a German one. One of [our Ukrainian Schutzmnner] pushed the swastika bands in under the wreath. When a

German policeman saw this, [the Ukrainian Schutzmann] was terribly abused. No appeals or pledges from the Ukrainian side helped. It was deemed an insult to the German state. The rifleman was jailed andshot. From that moment on the attitude of the soldiers of the [Schutzmannschaft battalion 201] to the Germans changed.liv

This, according to Pobihushchyi, contributed to the battalions refusal to renew the contract

We decided to abstain from [further] service, since military honor required it. We did not receive answers to our inquiries about why our leaders were arrested, our dear ones were arbitrarily sent to work deep into Germany, why wounded Ukrainian soldiers were not allowed to be treated in the same hospitals as the Germans, but taken to hospitals for aliens. The Legion did not want to fight for such a New Europe, with different categories of citizens and soldiers. At the front we all faced death equally. Yet the wounded had different rights and received different treatment. lv

Around Christmas, 1942, Obergruppenfhrer von dem Bach-Zelewski informed

Pobihushchyi that the battalion would be dissolved. On January 6, 1943, the battalion was

sent to Lviv where most members arrived January 8. The officers left Belarus on January 5, the last soldiers January 14, 1943.lvi The 201st battalion was disbanded and taken to

Lviv, where its officers were arrested and placed in the jail on Lontsky Street. Some, including Roman Shukhevych, managed to escape and went underground.lvii The officers

were formally arrested for declining to continue their service, but appear to have been

treated quite leniently by the Germans. The forms under which we were arrested were quite delicate we only had to surrender our weapons, and with an escorting officer from the German officer we traveled to Lviv, wrote Pobihushchyi.lviii

The German authorities reported to Berlin that while the better treatment of the Ukrainians by the local administration is not without effect,lix the disbanding of Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 caused indignation and extensive disquiet among Galician Ukrainians, also the intelligentsia.lx The German command suggested that the

men of Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 should gather in Lublin to form a new unit. This

time its members declined to renew their contracts, even if several continued to volunteer

their services to Nazi Germany until 1945. Evhen Pobihushchyi joined the ranks of the

Waffen SS Galizien, progressing to the rank of major.lxi

Counterinsurgency or mass murder?

While the source material of the whereabouts of Schutzmannschaft battalion 201

is incomplete, some of the correspondence between the battalion and its German

commanders has been preserved. According to Myroslav Kalba, the DUN, that is Nachtigall and Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 lost 450 soldiers and officers, i.e. two thirds of it members over the entire period 1941-1945.lxii Many of these losses were due

to desertions, most of which took place after 1943. However, during its ten-month tenure

in Belarus, Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 lost only 49 men, while 40 were wounded.

This should be contrasted with to the over 2,000 partisans it killed.lxiii Even if all the losses of Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 were due to war deaths, this means a

discrepancy in the casualty ratio between its members and enemy bandits of over 1:40. Such disproportional losses between German and collaborating forces and bandits is largely in line with what we know about the activities of other Schutzmannschaft

battalions. The imbalance is also reflected in von dem Bach-Zelewskis personal records, which he kept as Bevollmchtiger fr Bandenbekmpfung. On October 30, 1942 von dem

Bach-Zelewski noted 26 casualties from Schutzmannschaft battalion 201, 4 Germans and

22 fallen members of the Schutzmannschaften. Enemy losses were listed as 89 dead and 20 wounded.lxiv A routine report on the activities of Schutzmannschaft battalion 201,

von dem Bach-Zelewskis report appears in a folder of fifteen Meldungen an den Fhrer ber Bandenbekmpfung to Reichsfhrer-SS Himmler, who passed them on to Adolf Hitler personally. It contains a series of information bulletins from German-led police

forces in occupied Belarus and Ukraine.lxv The reports illustrate the nature of the

counterinsurgency activities in which Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 was involved. Meldung number 51 is a summary of anti-partisan warfare in Russia-South,

Ukraine, and the Bezirk Biaystok, which is a summary of the police activities in that region from September to November, 1942. Passed to Hitler on December 29, 1942, it

shows the realities of the Bandenbekmpfung. The number of Jews outweighs all other

groups executed, and the number of bandits executed after an Aktion far outweighs the number of people killed in action.

Bandits Killed in combat 1,337 Executed prisoners 737 Executed later 7,827 Bandit helpers Arrested 16,553 Executed 14,257 Jews Executed 363,211 Deserters 140 German casualties Dead 174 Wounded 132 Missing 13 Schutzmannschaft Dead 285 Wounded 127 Missing 133lxvi

Meldungen 36, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 55, 56, 57, covering Russland-

Mitte and Gebiet Weissruthenien for the fall of 1942, report 28, 360 enemy casualties and

381 own losses; a ratio of 1:74.lxvii Meldung 51a, which appears in the same folder, summarizing the entire region Russland-Sd, Ukraine, and Biaystok, shows a ratio of killed Schutzmannschaft and Germans to killed bandits and bandit helpers (excluding the category of Executed Jews) of over 1:52. If we include the 363,211 executed Jews in the column of Bandenverdchtige, or suspected bandits, the ratio is 1:843.lxviii

It may also useful to compare the ratio of dead Schutzmannschaften to bandits with the more infamous anti-partisan Aktionen, such as Operation Cottbus in 1943, during

which 6,087 bandits were registered as killed in action while only 88 German officers and soldiers and 40 non-Germans Schutzmnner were killed and 152 wounded, a

casualty ratio of 1:47. In operation Cottbus, 90 per cent of the people killed were

unarmed.lxix Christian Gerlach calculates that between 10 and 15 per cent of the victims

of the partisan hunts in Belarus actually were partisans.lxx Regular warfare or

counterinsurgency campaigns do not generate such staggering imbalances. Rather, they

show the genocidal consequences of the war of annihilation, in line with Keitel, Himmler,

and Hitlers directives. German historian Manfred Messerschmidt makes the following assessment of the Schutzmannschaften

In evaluating the operations of the Schuma battalions one has to consider that they were involved in a ruthless scenario of terror. This included the compulsory use of specific language. They had to speak of gangs [Banden]. Annihilation operations were called pacification or re-establishment of security and order.lxxi

Former Schutzmnner in UPA

In the spring of 1943, the men of the Schutzmannschaft battalion 201, who had

crossed over from Belarus to Volhynia came to constitute the heart of the OUN(b)

security service, the Sluzhba Bezpeki, or SB.lxxii As the result of a campaign of mass

desertion from the German collaborating forces following Stalingrad, several thousand

deserting Ukrainian policemen flocked to the ranks of the UPA, forming its backbone.lxxiii

From March 15 to April 15, 1943, close to 4,000 Ukrainian former Schutzmnner joined

the UPA.lxxiv Former Schutzmnner and other forms of auxiliary policemen, who had

joined the UPA on OUN(b) orders constituted about half of the UPA and OUN(b) leaders

in the fall of 1943: 23 per cent had a background in regional and local auxiliary police

formations, 18 per cent had been trained in German intelligence and military schools at

the beginning of the war, 11 per cent in the Nachtigall and Rolland Battalions, 8 per cent

in the regional or local administration in Nazi-occupied Ukraine, and one per cent had a

background in the Waffen-SS Division Galizien.lxxv The skills acquired in 1941-1942

became useful in the UPAs ethnic cleansing of the Poles of Volhynia.lxxvi John-Paul Himka writes that

Of course, infiltrating the Ukrainian police formations meant taking part in anti-Jewish actions. Apparently, this did not constitute an obstacle of conscience for the radical nationalists. In fact, taking part in some actions was probably useful, since weapons could be confiscated during ghetto clearings and added to the stockpile.lxxvii

Singled out by his German superiors for his particular heroism in battle,lxxviii

Pobihushchyi summarizes his own experiences of the Einstze in Belarus in the following

way:

The struggle against the partisans was extraordinarily good education for our officers and soldiers. It taught us a lot. Too bad, that my notes were lost at the time I was interned. Our education, battle experience was very useful to all of our soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers, who continued their military paths in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army or the I UD UNA [The first Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army]lxxix

By 1943, as the German violence escalated, the OUN(b) appeared increasingly concerned

with the image of the Schutzmannschaften. By now, Soviet Belarusian partisans

habitually referred to the Schutzmannaschaft batallion 118 in ethnic terms as

Ukrainians and Ukrainian police.lxxx The OUN(b) now began to disassociate itself from the Schutzmannschaften. A Ukrainian police can exist only in a Ukrainian state, OUN(b) propaganda stated.lxxxi

Conclusion

Researching the whereabouts of Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 in occupied

Belarus in 1942 is in many ways a difficult piece of detective work. Not only are the

sources scarce, a number of actors Soviet authorities, Ukrainian nationalists and the

veterans themselves have all tried to distort the historical record.lxxxii Under the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010) it was government policy to glorify

Shukhevych, who the president posthumously turned into a national hero in 2007. The

government-orchestrated Shukhevych cult was accompanied by a campaign by official

historians to produce a hagiographic representation of Shukchevychs life. His activities in the Schutzmannschaften have been ignored and glossed over, and the presence of a

handful of Jews in the UPA presented as evidence that the OUN could not have been

involved in anti-Semitic activities.lxxxiii OUN involvement in pogroms, the fascist nature

of the OUN and its collaboration with Nazi Germany was downplayed or denied.

Nachtigalls involvement in the murder of Jews in the summer of 1941 has been the subject of an emotional debate. The Polish Sejm has described UPAs ethnic cleansing of the Volhynian Poles in 1943 in terms of genocide.lxxxiv By comparison, Shukhevychs role as a Hauptmann of Schutzmannschaft Battalion in 1942 has generated marginal

attention. Yet, a few conclusions can be made from this episode.

Shukhevych appears to have had a violent temper, and to have abused his soldiers

physically.lxxxv Under his command, soldiers of the Nachtigall battalion carried out mass

murder of Jewish civilians in the Vinnytsia area in 1941.lxxxvi Under Shukhevychs leadership the UPA carried out a campaign of mass murder in Volhynia and Galicia in

1943-1944, in which 60,000-100,000 Poles and thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of

Jews lost their lives.lxxxvii It is reasonable to assume that also Schutzmannschaft battalion

201, like other Schutzmannschaft battalions and Nachtigall, its previous incarnation was

involved in a ruthless scenario of terror, aimed not only against bandits (partisans and Jews), but also passive bystanders.lxxxviii The leadership of the OUN(b) Shukhevych,

Bandera, Lenkavskyi, and Stetsko shared the Nazi stereotypes of the ydokomuna, of Jews as the tools of Moscow and/or Bolshevism, and the latter two openly approved of

the German extermination of the Jews.lxxxix Like the Nazis, the OUN(b) leadership

equated the fight against communism with the struggle against Jews and Muscovites.xc

To the Schutzmannschaften, the struggle against communism was linked to the killing of

Jews. In Belarus, the exterminating of Jews and partisans were overlapping tasks. Anti-

partisan operations were often carried out as extermination campaigns, or outright

massacres. Jewish civilian victims of these massacres were often murdered under the

pretense that they were also partisans. The Schutzmannschaften and their German

commanders tallied up massacred Jews as partisans. The ratio of 1:40 killed bandits to Schutzmnner in Battalion 201 indicates mass murder and executions, rather than

conventional counter-insurgency campaigns. In line with Keitels instructions of mass retribution, the numbers also resemble those of other Schutzmannschaften in occupied

Belarus. They were part of a greater scheme, that of Generalplan Ost, which foresaw the

deportation and extermination of entire ethnic groups and communities.xci Given the

training of much of the UPA and SB OUN leadership by Nazi Germany, it is no

coincidence that the patterns and tactics of the OUN and UPAs ethnic cleansing of the Volhynian Poles resemble the anti-partisan tactics of the Schutzmannschaften. Within

their ranks, a significant part of the UPA leadership had been accustomed to the use of

disproportionate violence, attacks on civilians, and the use of collective retribution. The

ethnic cleansing of the Volhynian Poles, Jews, Armenians, and Czechs carries the

hallmarks of the SS and Schutzmannschaftens tactics of anti-partisan warfare.

i See, for instance Timothy Snyder, To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943-1947, Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, (1999): 86-120; John-Paul Himka, Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews During the Second World War: Sorting Out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors, in The Fate of the European Jews, 1939-1945: Continuity or Contingency, ed. Jonathan Frankel (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Studies in Contemporary Jewry 13 (1997): 170-189; Ivan Katchanovski, Terrorists or National Heroes?: Politics of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine, paper presented at the World Conference of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York, NY, April 15, 2010. Forthcoming, Nationalities Papers.

ii On the controversies surrounding Nachtigall and the Lviv pogrom, see Philip-Christian Wachs, Der Fall

Theodor Oberlnder (1905-1998): ein Lehrstck deutscher Geschichte (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2000), 55-71 and Per Anders Rudling, The Shukhevych Cult in Ukraine: Myth Making with Complications, paper presented at the conference World War II and the (Re)Creation of Historical Memory in Contemporary Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, September 25, 2009. Available online, http://ww2-historicalmemory.org.ua/abstract_e.html (Accessed October 11, 2009)

iii A typical biography in the nationalist press could like this: On assignment from the OUN,

[Shukhevych] travelled to Gdansk, and in June 1941 he became the deputy commander of the so-called Ukrainian Legion. It gathered the best Ukrainian youth in emigration in Poland and Germany. After training them they marched east together with the German army. The legion reached Vinnytsia, but Hitler did not like him, and punished him by liquidating the battalion. In 1943 Roman Shukhevych was elected head of the Bureau of the Leadership of the OUN, and in the fall he occupied the position as Supreme Commander of the UPA. Sign. Ukrainska Dumka, Roman Shukhevych-Taras Chuprynka, Ukrainski visti, no. 22, May 29, 1975: 7.

iv Ales Adamovich, Zapisnye knizhki raznykh let, Nman: Ezhemesiachnyi literaturno-khudozhestvennyi

i obshchestvenno-politicheskii zhurnal, no. 7, (July 1997): 14.

v Philip W. Blood, Hitlers Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe (Washington, DC:

Potomac Books, Inc., 2006), 79.

vi I. N. Kuznetsov and V. G. Mazets, eds. Istoriia Belarusi v dokumentakh i materialakh (Minsk: Amalfeia,

2000), 542, citing TsGAOR SSSR, f. 7445, op. 2, d. 140, l. 502-504; Erla des Chefs des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht Keitel ber Vergeltunsmanahmen bei Widerstand gegen die deutsche Besatzungsmacht, vom 16. September 1941, in Johannes Schlootz ed., Deutsche Propaganda in Weiruland 1941-1944: Eine Konfrontation von Propaganda und Wirklichkeit (Berlin: Freie Universitt Berlin, 1996), 13.

vii Helmut Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen: Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges 1938-1942

(Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1993), 218.

viii Blood, Hitlers Bandit Hunters, 54.

ix Hannes Heer, Killing Fields: The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belorussia, 1941-1942, Holocaust

and Genocide Studies 11 (1997): 88, citing Kommandatur des Sicherungs-Gebietes Weiruthenien-Abt. Ic. Lagebericht, 20. 2. 1942, BA-MA, RH 26-707-15, p. 4.

x Martin C. Dean, The German Gendarmerie, the Ukrainian Schutzmannschaft and the Second Wave of

Jewish killings in Occupied Ukraine: German Policing at the Local Level in the Zhitomir Region, 1941-1944, German History, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1996): 178.

xi Richard Breitman, Himmlers Police Auxiliaries in the Occupied Soviet Territories, Simon Wiesenthal

Center Annual, vol. 7 (1997): 27.

xii Yehoshua Bchler, Kommandostab Reichsfhrer-SS: Himmlers Personal Murder Brigades in 1941,

Holocaust and Genocide Studies Vol. 1, No. 1, (1986): 94, citing the Stahlecker report, and Prague Military Archives, V. H. A.: Pol. Reg. Mitte 13/74 and 5/36. Martin Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-44 (New York: St Martins Press, 2000), 77. See also Dean (1996), 181, 192.

xiii Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust (2000), 122.

xiv By comparison, the balance was 1:1 in The General Gouvernment and Norway, 1:4 in the

Reichsprotektorat Bhmen-Mhren and the Netherlands, Serbia 1:6, France 1:15, and Russia 1:20, Petras Stankeras, Litovskie politseiskie batalony 1941-1945 gg. (Moscow: Veche, 2009), 37.

xv "The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (applicant) v. Vladimir Katriuk (respondent) (T-2408-96)

Federal Court of Canada Trial Division, Nadon, J. January 29, 1999, Federal Trial Reports, Vol. 156 (Fredricton, NB: Maritime Law Book Ltd, 1999), 178-179.

xvi The little-known role of the Gendarmerie and the Schutzmannschaft demonstrates the open or ill-

concealed nature of the genocide in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. The Jews were killed by shooting in pits close to their neighbours. As German forces, especially Security Police , were so thin on the ground, most of the available local manpower had to be utilized to carry out such as vast programme. Martin C. Dean, The German Gendarmerie,191.

xvii Report by Gebietskommissar Carl, October 30, 1941, in Ernst Klee et al, (eds.) Schne Zeiten:

Judenmord aus der Sicht der Tter und Gaffer (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1988), 164-167.

xviii Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the final Solution in Poland

(New York: Perennial, 1998), 150.

xix Ruth Bettina Birn, Zaunknig an Uhrmacher. Grosse Partisanaktionen 1942/43 am Beispiel des

Unternehmens Winterzauber, Militrgeschichtliche Zeitschrift No. 60 (2001): 99-101.

xx Mats Deland, Purgatorium: Sverige och andra vrldskrigets frbrytare (Stockholm: Bokfrlaget Atlas,

2010), 60.

xxi Alexander Victor Prusin, Fascist Criminals to the Gallows!: The Holocaust and Soviet War Crimes

Trials, December 1945-February 1946, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2003), 1-30; Karel C. Berkhoff, Dina Pronichevas Story of Surviving the Babi Yar Massacre: German, Jewish, Soviet, Russian, and Ukrainian Records, in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (eds.) The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press in Association with the United States Holocaust Museum, 2008), 291-317. Other than Deans pioneering work on the Schuma in Belarus, there is also Stankeras 2009 book on Lithuanian Schutzmannschaften. See also Per Anders Rudling, The Khatyn Massacre: A Historical Controversy Revisited, Journal of Genocide Research (Forthcoming).

xxii Stankeras, Litovskie politseiskie batalony, 5.

xxiii Martin C. Dean, Der Historiker als Detektiv: Fluchtweger der einheimischen Schutzmannschaften und

anderer deutschen Polizeieinheiten aus der besetzten Sowjetunion, 1943-1944. http://www.fantom-online.de/seiten/scienc2.htm (accessed November 7, 2007)

xxiv Richard Breitman, Himmlers Police Auxiliaries in the Occupied Soviet Territories, Simon

Wiesenthal Center Annual, vol. 7 (1997): 33.

xxv Andrii Bolianovskyi, Ukrainski viiskovyi formuvannia v zbroinykh sylakh Niemechchyny,, 1939-1945

(Lviv: LNU im. I. Franka, 2003), 143; Sergei Chuev, Ukrainskii Legion (Moscow: Iauza, 2006), 180.

xxvi Ievhen Pobihushchyi-Ren, Mozaka mokh spomyniv (Ivano-Frankivsk: Lileia-HB, 2002), 62.

Pobihushchyi, the former commander of the Roland battalion, served as an officer in Schutzmannschaft battalion 201, and became an officer in the Waffen-SS Division Galizien in 1943. Bolianovskyi, Ukrainski viiskovyi formuvannia, 60, 143, 360. The commanders of the other three companies were Hauptmann Bryhyder, who later continued as an officer in SS Galizien, Vasylyi Sydor and Volodymyr Pavliuk. DA SB Ukrany: F. 5, spr. 67418, T. 1, ark. 208-241, in Volodymyr Serhiichuk (ed.) Roman Shukhevych u dokumentakh radianskykh orhaniv derzhavno bezpeky (1940-1950) Tom I. (Kyv: PP Serhiichuk M.I., 2007), 529.

xxvii Parmen Posokhov, Shukhevych. Beloe piatno v biografii, FRAZA, August 15, 2007

http://fraza.org.ua/zametki/15.08.07/40788.html?c=post&i=113503 (accessed November 18, 2007)

xxviii Chuev, Ukrainskii Legion, 180; Volodymyr Viatrovych, Roman Shukhevych: soldat, Ukranska

Pravda, May 2, 2008. http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2008/4/25/75222.htm (accessed May 6, 2008), Ren, 115; Bolianovskyi, Ukrainski viiskovyi formuvannia, 143.

xxix Bolyanovskyi, Ukrainski viiskovyi formuvannia 144; Stepan Kotelets-Lisovyi, Mii spomnyn z

legionu: U Krakovi i Komanchi, in Myroslav Kalba, (ed.), U lavakh druzhynnykiv: spohady uchasnykiv (Denver: Vydavnytstva Druzhyn ukrainskykh natsionalistiv, 1982), 91.

xxx Katchanovski, Terrorists or National Heores?, 13-14, see also Petro Sodol, Ukrainska povstanska

armiia, 1943-49. Dovidnyk. (New York: Proloh, 1994).

xxxi Mykola Posivnych, Roman Shukhevych (30.VI.1907-5.III.1950) in Petro J. Potichnyj and Mykola

Posivnych (eds.), Litopys Ukransko Povstansko Armi, Tom 45, Heneral Roman Shukhevych Taras Chuprynka Holovnyi Komandyr UPA (Toronto and Lviv: Vydavnytstvo Litopys UPA, 2007) 29, citing Myroslav Kalba, Druzhyny Ukranskykh Natsionalistiv (Detroit: DUN, 1994), 45-53, 75-80.

xxxii Pohibushchyi, Mozaka mokh spomyniv (1982/2002), 64.

xxxiii Bolianovskyi, Ukrainski viiskovyi formuvannia, 144; Chuev, Ukrainskii Legion, 183.

xxxiv R. A. Chernoglazova (ed.) Tragediia evreev Belorussii v gody nemetskoi okkupatsii (1941-1944):

Sbornik materialov i dokumentov (Minsk: Ia. B. Dremach and E. S. Halperin, 1995), 169-181.

xxxv Bolianovskyi, Ukrainski viiskovyi formuvannia, 143-151.

xxxvi Frank Golczewski Die Kollaboration in der Ukraine, in Christoph Dieckmann, Babette Quinkert,

Tatjana Tnsmeyer (eds.), Kooperation und Verbrechen. Formen der Kollaboration im stlichen Europa 1939-1945 (Gttingen: Wallenstein, 2003), 176. However, Golczewski does not provide a footnote or source for this claim.

xxxvii Myroslav Kalba, DUN v rozbudovi UPA (Detroit and Ternopil: Dzhura, 2005), 109-112; Kalba in

Ievhen Pobihushchyi-Ren, Mozaka mokh spomyniv. Tom druhyi. (Munich and London: Ievhen Pobihushchyi-Ren and the Association of Ukrainian Former Combatants in Great Britain, 1985, 264.

xxxviii In his post-war correspondence with Pobihushchyi, Myroslav Kalba refers to the activities of the

Wiesenthal Centre as a Jewish assault that knows no limits. Volume two of Pobihushyis memoirs contains a section on his correspondence with other former Schutzmnner. In his attack Wiesenthal lies to create a narrative which Nachtigal and Roland leave a trail of blood all the way to Kyiv and Babyn Iar. The Jewish assaults know no limits, Myroslav Kalba and his wife Iryna wrote Pobihushchyi-Ren on February 23, 1983. Pobihushchyi-Ren, Mozaka mokh spomyniv, 268.

xxxix Teodor Krochak, Vytiahy z shchodennyka 1941-1943 rr. Pro pobut u Legioni DUN, in Myroslav

Kalba (ed.), U lavkah druzhynnykiv; Druzhyny Ukranskykh Nationalistiv v 1941-1942 rokakh (n.p: Vyd-ia Druzhyny ukranskskykh nationalistiv, 1953), 59, 63, 65, 69, 72. There are some uncertainties regarding the authorship of this volume. In addition to an unsigned foreword, this collection of memoirs lists four authors, Ievhen Pobihushchyi, Teodor Krochak, Karlo Malyi and Ievhen Ren. Later in life Ievhen Pobihushyi used the name Ievhen Pobihushchyi-Ren. In his 1982 memoirs, Pobihushchyi-Ren writes that the 1953 volume had three authors, namely himself, Krochak and Malyi. He also informs his readers that unsigned forward was written by Stepan Lenkavskyi. Pobihushchyi-Ren, 53. Likely, the Ievhen Pobihushyi and Ievhen Ren of the 1953 volume was the same person.

xl Anatolii Kentii and Volodymyr Lozytskyi, From UVO fighter to sumpreme commander of the UPA,

in P. Sokan and P. Potichnyj, (eds.), Zhyttia i borotba Henerala Tarasa Chuprynky (1907-1950): dokumenty i materialy Litopys UPA, nova seriia, 10,(Kyiv and Toronto: Litopys UPA, 2007), 95; Bolianovskyi, Ukrainski viiskovyi formuvannia, 59.

xli Krochak, Vytiahy z shchodennyka, 59, 63, 65, 69, 72; Kalba, U lavakh Druzhynykiv, 102, 104, 105,

106. In 2008, Kalba added that All other companies were placed far from Borovkiv, such as Zhar, Komenia, Voronezha and others. Myroslav Kalba, Nakhtigal v zapytanniakh i vidpovidiakh Myroslava Kalby (Lviv: Halytskka vydavnycha spilka, 2008), 45. Ievhen Pobihushchyi-Ren, Mozaka mokh spomyniv (Munich and London: Ievhen Pobihushchyi and the Association of Ukrainian Former Combatants in Great Britain, 1982), 87, 97, 103. The first volume of Pobihushchyi-Rens memoirs appeared in a second edition in 2002. Myroslav Kalba, My prysiahaly Ukrani: DUN 1941-1942 (Lviv: Memuarna biblioteka NTSh, 1999), 63, 69, 70, 79; A 1982 collection of veteran memories, edited by Kalba follows the same trend, containing little information on its activities in Belarus, focusing more on the battalions whereabouts in 1941 and its dissolution. Most of the contributions are non-committal as to its specific whereabouts, or use abbreviations. However, a certain Vasyl (no last name provided) mentions being stationed in Zhary, Letel [sic?] and the city Voronezh on the Biarezina river around Easter, 1942, and Krochak locates his first baptism of fire to the southeast of Zhariv, by Homol, where none of us had been before. A chapter by Stepan Kotelets-Lisovyi mentions a few localities in Belarus the villages Cherven, Komen, the village Porych, not far from Komen,Borovka, Zhary, and the village Voronezh on the Biarezina river, but does not give the dates for its specific whereabouts. Myroslav Kalba, U lavkah druzhynnykiv: spohady uchasnykiv. Materialy zibrav i vporiadkuvav Myroslav Kalba. (Denver: Vyd-ia Druzhyny ukranskykh natsionalistiv, 1982), 91-95, 102, 104, 105, 106, 117, 119, 144.

xlii Pobihushchyi-Ren, Mozaka mokh spomyniv (1982/2002), 65.

xliii David Meltser and Vladimir Levin, The Black Book with Red Pages (Tragedy and heroism of

Belorussian Jews) (Cockneysville, MD: VIA Press, 2005), 249.

xliv Meltser and Levin, The Black Book, 106.

xlv Krochak,Vytiahy z shchodennyka, 76, 82.

xlvi Pobihushchyi-Ren, Mozaka mokh spomyniv (2002), 65

xlvii Petro Sodol, Ukranska Povstancha Armiia 1942-1942: Dovidnyk. (New York: Proloh, 1994), 99.

xlviii Bolianovskyi, Ukrainski viiskovyi formuvannia, 144, citing TsDAHO Ukrany, f. 57, op. 4, spr. 340,

ark. 29-30; DA SB Ukrany: F. 5, spr. 67418, T. 1, ark. 208-241, in Volodymyr Serhiichuk, Roman Shukhevych u dokumentakh radianskykh orhaniv derzhavnoi bekpeki (1940-1950) Tom I. (Kyiv: PP Serhiichuk M. I., 2007), 529.

xlix Protokol doprosa obviniaemogo BODNARA Antona Andreevicha 29 iuinia 1945 goda, DA SB

Ukrany, F. 5, Spr. 67418, t. 1, ark. 138-146, in P. Sokhan and P. Potichnyj (eds.), Litopys UPA, Nova seriia, tom 9, Borotba proty povstanskoho rukhu i natsionaluistychnoho pidpillia: protokoly dopytiv

zaareshtovanykh radianskymy orhanamy derzhavno bezpeky kerivnykiv OUN i UPA 1944-1945 (Kyv and Toronto: Litopys UPA, 2007), 320, 328, 63.

l Protokol dopolnitelnogo doprosa Pevlyk Vladimira Ivanovicha 8 avgusta 1945 goda, DA SB Ukrany, Lviv, Spr. P-36445, ark. 97-98 zv., in Sokhan and Potichnyj (eds.), Litopys UPA, Nova seriia, tom 9, 564-565, 73.

li Sokhan and Potichnyj (eds.), Litopys UPA Nova seriia, tom 9, 78.

lii Meldungen an den Fhrer ber Bandenbekmpfung, Nr. 37 (E-spiel), Nov. 3, 1942 and Nr. 36,

Ergebnisse im Gebiet Russland Mitte, Gefecht des Schutzmannschafts-Battallions 201 20 km Nrdlich Lepel, Nov. 3, 1942, Serial 124, Roll 124, Reichsfhrer-SS u. Chef der Deutschen Polizei Feld-kommandostelle. T-175, Item EAP 161-b-12/250, 1st frame, 2598495, Guide to German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria, VA. No. 33, Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police (Part II), (Washington, DC: The National Archives, National Archives and Record Service General Service Administration 1961), 4. http://www.archives.gov/research/microfilm/t175-2.pdf (Accessed January 17, 2010)

liii Dean The German Gendarmerie, (1996), 179.

liv Ievhen Pohibushchyi, Druzhyny Ukranskykh Natsionalistiv na Bilorusi, in Kalba (ed.) Druzhyny

Ukranskykh Natsionalistiv u 1941-1942, 38.

lv Pohibushchyi, Druzhyny Ukranskykh Natsionalistiv na Bilorusi, in Kalba (ed.) Druzhyny

Ukranskykh Natsionalistiv, 38.

lvi Pobihushchyi in Kalba (ed.), U lavkah druzhynnykiv (1953), 40; Pobihushchyi-Ren Mozaka mokh

spomyniv (2002), 85.

lvii Posivnych, Roman Shukhevych (30.VI.1907-5.III.1950) in Potichnyj and Posivnych (eds.), Litopys

Ukransko Povstansko Armi, Tom 45, Heneral Roman Shukhevych Taras Chuprynka Holovnyi Komandyr UPA (Toronto and Lviv: Vydavnytstvo Litopys UPA, 2007) 29, citing Myroslav Kalba, Druzhyny Ukranskykh Natsionalistiv (Detroit: DUN, 1994), 45-53, 75-80; Chuev, Ukrainskii legion, 184.

lviii Ievhen [Pobihushchyi]-Ren, Spohady pro generala Romana Shukhevycha, in Kalba (ed.) Druzhyny

Ukranskykh Natsionalistiv u 1941-1942, 123.

lix Der Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD im Generalgouvernment an das

Reichssicherheitshauptamt Amt VII Berlin. February 2, 1943, Meldungen aus dem Generalgouvernement fr die Zeit von 1. Bis 31. Januar 1943. P. 0310, p. 8, reproduced in Heinz Boberach (ed.), Regimekritik, Widerstand und Verfolgung in Deutschland und den besetzten Gebieten [microform]: Meldungen und Berichte aus dem Geheimen Staatspolizeiamt, dem SD-Hauptampts der SS und dem Reichssicherheitsamt 1933-1944, Teil II: Besetzte und angeglierdete Gebiete (1939-1945) Mikrofische 006.

lx Mit grossem Unwillen wurde die Auflsung des ukrainischen Bat. 20 [sic!] der Schutzmannschaften in

der Ostukraine [sic!] aufgenommen. Die Festnahme des Offizierskorps, das frher die bekannten Roland-Nachtigallunternehmen gefhrt hat, stiess auf allgemeines Unverstndnis und fhrte insbesondere unter den Kreisen der Intelligenz in Lemberg zu einer weitgehenden Beunruhigung, die sich erst nach Freilassung der Offiziere allmhlich legte. Ibid, p. 8-9, P. 0310, 0311.

lxi DA SB Ukrany: F. 5, spr. 67418, T. 1, ark. 208-241, in Serhiichuk, Roman Shukhevych, Tom I., 529-

530.

lxii Kalba, DUN v rozbudovi UPA, 68.

lxiii I. K. Patryliak, Viiskova diialnist OUN(b) u 1940-1942 rokakh (Kyiv: Kyvskyi natsionalnyi

universytet imeni Tarasa Shevchenko, Instytut istroi Ukrany NAN Ukrany, 2004), 386.

lxiv Meldung Nr. 36, Ergebnisse im Gebiet Russland Mitte. Gefecht des Schutzmannschafts-Batallions 201,

20 km nrdlich Lepel, Feld-kommandostelle Nov 3, 1942 Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police [Reichsfhrer-SS und Chef der deutschen Polizei] United States National Archives and Records Administration (Henceforth NARA), EAP T-175, item161-b-12/250, reel 124, frame 2599081; Blood, 90-91, citing Tagesbuch von dem Bach (TVDB), Bundesarchiv, Berlin (Lichterfelde) A R20/45b, 55-95.

lxv This folder, containing materials captured by the US Army, bears annotations showing that Hitler had

seen it. US National Archives, MF-3293, T-175, roll 124, Reichsfhrer-SS Chef der Deutschen Polizei, Feld-Kommandostelle, NARA EAP T-175, item 161-b-12/250, frames 2598495 to 2599093. www.archives.gov/research/microfilm/t175-2.pdf (Accessed January 17, 2010)

lxvi Meldung 51a, Russland-Sd, Ukraine, Bialystok vom 1.9. bis 1.12. 1942, December 29, 1942.

NARA, RG 242, T175, reel 81, frame 2601524. Also cited in Blood, 90.

lxvii NARA MF-3293, T-175, roll 124, frames 2599081, 2599082, 2599007, 2598963, 2896965, 2598940,

2598915, 2598937, 2598916, 2598925, 2598926, 2598836, 2598837, 2598814-2598815, 2598775- 2598778, 25987783-25987784, 2598709, 2598710, 2598703-2598704, 2598692-2598693, 2598653, 2598655.

lxviii Reichsfhrer-SS Chef der Deutschen Polizei, Meldungen 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49,

51, 55, and 56, issued November 3, 1942 to January 17, 1943. NARA MF-3293, T-175, roll 124

lxix Manfred Messerschmidt, expert report, cited in The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration

(applicant) v. Vladimir Katriuk (respondent) (T-2408-96) Federal Court of Canada Trial Division, Nadon, J. January 29, 1999, Federal Trial Reports, Vol. 156 (Fredricton, NB: Maritime Law Book Ltd, 1999), 183.

lxx Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 907.

lxxi Minister vs. Katriuk, 184, citing Manfred Messerschmidt expert report on Schutzmannschaft

battalions 115 and 118.

lxxii Marples (2007), 195;

lxxiii Other Schutzmannschaft battalions saw mass desertions around the same time. On Schutzmannschaft

battalions 115 and 118, see Duda and Staryk, 132, 152. On Schutzmannschaft battalion 103, see Ivan Kachanovskyi, Ukraintsy ne veriat v mify ob OUN i UPA, Fraza.ua, October 14, 2009, http://www.fraza.ua/print/14.10.09/76064.html (Accessed January 22, 2010) See also Katchanovski, Terrorists or National Heroes?

lxxiv Serhiichuk (ed.) Roman Shukhevych, Tom I. ,11. Timothy Snyder gives a somewhat higher number,

around 5,000 Ukrainians from the Schutzmannschaften deserted to join the UPA in March, 1943. Timothy Snyder, To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943-1947, Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, (1999): 97.

lxxv Katchanovski, Terrorists or National Heroes?

lxxvi Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations; Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999

(Princeton, NJ: Yale University Press, 2003), 162; Franziska Bruder, Den ukrainischen Staat erkmpfen oder sterben!: Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1929-1948 (Berlin: Metropol, 2007), 184.

lxxvii John-Paul Himka, Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews During the Second

World War: Sorting Out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors, in The Fate of the European Jews, 1939-1945: Continuity or Contingency, ed. Jonathan Frankel (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Studies in Contemporary Jewry 13 (1997): 179.

lxxviii Wolf-Dietrich Heike, Sie wollten die Freiheit: Die Geschichte der Ukrainischen Division 1943-1945

(Dorheim: Podzun-Verlag, n.d), 42.

lxxix Pobihushchyi-Ren, Mozaka mokh spomyniv (1982/2002), 72. The Ukrainian National Army was the

name the members of the 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (Galizische Nr. 1) chose for their organization on March 17, 1945. In their own writings, they avoid using the term SS.

lxxx Nationalnyi Arkhiv Respubliki Belarus (NARB), f. 1450, vop. 4, d. 168, ll. 70, 72, 153.

lxxxi TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 2, spr. 1, ark. 246-247, as cited in Vitalii Nakhmanovych, Do pytannia pro

sklad uchasnykiv karalnykh aktsii v okupovanomu Kyievi (1941-1943) in V. R. Nakmanovych et al, (eds.) Druha svitova viina i dolia narodiv Ukrany: Materialy 2- Vseukransko naukovo konferentsi m. Kyv, 30-31 zhovtnia 2006 r. (Kyiv: Zovnishtorhvydav, 2007), 254.

lxxxii Former Nachtigall and Schuma 201 veteran Myroslav Kalba, one of the few surviving veterans of

Nachtigall and Schutzmannschaft battalion 201, who was present in Lviv on June 30th, 1941, deny that that well-documented pogrom took place, and claims not to have seen anyone killed. Myroslav Kalba, Nakhtigal v zapytanniakh i vidpovidiakh Myroslava Kalby (Lviv: Halytska vydavnycha spilka, 2008), 23-25. Survivors of the Lviv pogrom remember these events very differently, and emphasize the role of Ukrainian militiamen in the pogroms. On eye witness testimonies and photographs from the Lviv pogrom See Ivan Khymka [John-Paul Himka] Dostovirnist svidchennia: reliatsiia Ruzi Vagner pro lvivskyi pohrom vlitku 1941 r, Holokost i suchasnist: studii v Ukraini i sviti No. 2, vol. 4 (2008): 43-79. That memories are selective and self-serving is well-known. On how participants in well-documented events suppress their memories to make them conform to a particular political agenda, see John-Paul Himka and Eva Himka, Absense and Presence of Genocide and Memory: The Holocaust and the Holodomor in Interviews with Elderly Ukrainian Nationalists in Lviv, Fifth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar of Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, October 29, 2009.

lxxxiii For an example of this see, for instance, Volodymyr Viatrovych, Stavlennia OUN do evreiv:

Formuvannia pozytsii na tli katastrofy (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo Ms, 2006), 77-79, but see also Taras Kurylo and John-Paul Himka [Ivan Pavlo Khymka] Iak OUN stavylasia do ievreiv? Rosdumy nad knyzhkoiu Volodymyra Viatrovycha. Ukraina Moderna vo. 12 (2008): 252-265. We know the names of four Jews who served in UPA. This is presented as evidence that the OUN and UPA could not have been anti-Semitic. The UPAs murder of thousands of Jews is overlooked, ignored, or denied by nationalists historians and OUN apologists. Per Anders Rudling and John-Paul Himka, The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Holocaust, paper presented at the 41st National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS), Boston, MA, November 13, 2009.

lxxxiv Bronisaw Komorowski, Marszaek Sejmu, Uchwaa Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 15 lipca

2009 r. w sprawie tragicznego losu Polakw na Kresach Wschodnich Website of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie6.nsf/nazwa/2183_u/$file/2183_u.pdf (accessed October 18, 2009)

lxxxv In his diary, OUN(b), Nachtigal, and Schutzmannschaft battalion 201 member Viktor Kharkiv

(Khmara), describes how he was physically abused by Shukhevych. After visiting the barber without telling his superiors Kharkiv (Khmara), other members of his battalion go looking for him. Returning from the barber shop, I run into captain Shukhevych, who has been told about the fact. On the spot he attacked me, asked me how I could have managed to get out, despite the explicit prohibition of leaving the sealed-off limits around the casern. I began explaining that I had only been to the barber. Captain Shukhevych did not

listen to that and punched me in the face. TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 57, ark. 18. Thanks to Grzegorz Rossoliski-Liebe for this reference.

lxxxvi Viktor Kharkiv (Kharma) wrote in his diary: At the time of our march eastwards we saw with our

own eyes the victims of the Judeo-Bolshevik terror, and the sight of it so strengthened our hatred to the Jews, that in two villages we shot all the Jews we encountered. I recall one example. At the time of our march through one village we saw many vagrant people. Asked where they were going, they answered that the Jews were threatening them and that they are afraid of spending the nights in their houses. As a result of that, we shot all the Jews we encountered there. TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 57, ark. 17. Also in Ivan Kazymyrovych Patryliak, Viiskova diialnist OUN(b) u 1940-1942 rokakh (Kyiv: NAN Ukrany, 2004), 361-362.

lxxxvii Grzegorz Rossoliski-Liebe, Den polnisch-ukrainische Historikerdiskurs ber den polnisch-

ukrainischen Konflikt 1943-1947, Jahrbcher fr Geschichte Osteuropas, No. 57 (2009): 54-85; John-Paul Himka The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Holocaust, Paper presented at the 2009 National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Boston, MA, November 13, 2009.

lxxxviii Other Schutzmannschaft battalions from the General Government, such as 203 and 204 consisted of

Trawniki men, many of which came to staff the death camps of Sobibor and Beec. Frank Golczewski, Shades of Grey: Reflections on Jewish-Ukrainian and German-Ukrainian Relations in Galicia, in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (eds.), The Shoah in Ukraine: history, testimony, memorialization (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008), 114-155. On the activities of Schutzmannschaft battalion 115/118, see Per Anders Rudling, The Khatyn Massacre: A Historical Controversy Revisisted, Journal of Genocide Research (Forthcoming)

lxxxix Gabriel Finder and Aleksander Prusin, Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: The Ukrainian Police and the

Holocaust, East European Jewish Affairs, Vol. 34 No. 2 (2004): 102; Karel Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk,The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude towards Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stetskos 1941 Zhyttiepys, Harvard Ukrainian Studies vol. XXIII, no. 3-4 (1999): 171.

xc The OUN(b) blueprint for its wartime activities, Borotba i diialnist OUN pid chas viiny from May,

1941, authored by Shukhevych, Stetsko, Lenkavskyi and Bandera, outlined the creation of an OUN Peoples militia, the establishment of internment camps, set up for Jews, asocial elements and captives. [Tabir internovanykh, pryznachenyi dlia zhydiv, asotsialnykh elementiv ta polonenykh] It demanded Ukraine for the Ukrainians!...Death to the Muscovite-Jewish commune! Beat the commune, save Ukraine![Ukraina dlia Ukraintsiv!...Smert moskovsko-zhydivskyi komuni! Byi komunu, spasai Ukrainu!], demanding a dogs death for the Muscovite-Jewish outsiders [moskovsko-zhydivskykh zaid]. TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 3833, op. 2, spr. 1, ark. 57-76. Kopiia. Mashynopys and TsDAVO Ukrainy, f. 3855, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 1-2. Kopiia. Mashynopys. Both published in Stanislav Kulchytskyi et al (eds.), OUN v 1941 roki. Dokumenty, Chastyna 1. (Kyiv: Natsionalna akademiia nauk Ukrainy, Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 2006), 143, 159, 165.

xci On Generalplan Ost, see Czesaw Madajczyk (ed.), Generalny Plan Wschodni: Zbir dokumentw

(Warszawa: Glwna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce, 1990) and Czesaw Madajczyk, General Plan East: Hitlers Master Plan for Expansion, Polish Western Affairs, vol. III, no.2 (1962), accessed online, http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/GPO/gpoarticle.HTM (August 28, 2009).