Shipping Tan -The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust)

The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust), Feb. 2010 version

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The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust):

Or why is international cooperation difficult?

“Better Safe than Sorry” ---Folk Wisdom

Shiping Tang

School of International Relations and Public Affairs (SIRPA), Fudan University, Shanghai, China, 200433

Shiping Tang is Professor at School of International Relations and Public Affairs (SIRPA), Fudan University, Shanghai, China. Prior to his current appointment, he was Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where this article was largely completed. His latest publications include A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive

Realism (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict” (Security Studies, 2005), “Fear in International Politics: Two Positions,” (International Studies Review, 2008), “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis” (Security Studies, 2009), “Foundational Paradigms of Social Sciences” (Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2010), “Social Evolution of International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis” (European Journal of

International Relations, 2010), “Offense-Defense Theory: Toward a Definitive Critique” (Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2010), “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Toward an Integrative Theory of Ethnic Conflict” (Review of

International Studies,2010), and “The Positional Market and Economic Growth” (Journal of Economic Issues, 2010-11). He can be reached at [email protected] The author thanks Rajesh Basrur, Christer Jonsson, Terrence Lee, Mingjian Li, Evan Montgomery, Norrin Ripsman, and Brian Rathbun for their helpful comments. Earlier versions of the paper were presented in the 49th Annual Convention of International Studies Association in San Francisco, March 26-29, 2008 and the third joint Fudan University-Lund University workshop of “Building Peace: Conceptual and Operational Issues” at Fudan University, Shanghai, China, April 16-18, 2008. Special thanks also go to the audience in a seminar held at RSIS.


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Abstract

I propose a social evolutionary psychology of fear (and trust) as part of a

fundamental explanation for why international cooperation is difficult but

non-cooperation easy. I argue that for the sake of our survival, evolution has molded

our mind to detect and overreact to signs of danger while discounting signs of safety.

This core psychology of fear is then reinforced by three other traits: attribution biases,

ethnocentrism, and disinclination for systemic thinking. The result is a highly robust

and integrated social evolutionary psychology of fear. The social evolutionary

psychology of fear facilitates our mistrusting of others and limits our trusting of

others whenever there is uncertainty over others’ intentions, thus making international

difficult because cooperation generally requires some trust ex ante to materialize. As

a result, malign intentions are easy to detect and difficult to hide whereas benign

intentions are too easily dismissed and discounted thus ‘hard to detect’. I provide

evidences from both social psychology literature and international relations literature

to substantiate my hypothesis. I also derive specific hypotheses from the social

evolutionary psychology of fear (and trust) to be tested. Finally, I draw some

implications for theorizing social psychology via a social evolutionary approach.


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Outline

Introduction

I. Definitions and Clarifications

II. The Evolutionary Social Psychology of Fear and Trust

A. The Core Evolutionary Psychology of Coping with Fear

B. Toward an Integrative Social Psychology of Fear

a. Attribution Biases

b. Ethnocentrism

c. Lack of Systemic Thinking

III. Evidences from Psychological Literature

A. Evidences for a Core Psychology of Fear

B. Evidences for an Integrated Psychology of Fear-I

a. Attribution Biases and Ethnocentrism

b. Attribution Biases and Lack of Systemic Thinking

c. Ethnocentrism and Lack of Systemic Thinking

C. Evidences for an Integrated Psychology of Fear-II

a. Fear and Attribution Biases

b. Fear and Ethnocentrism

c. Fear and Lack of Systemic Thinking

IV. Evidences from IR Literature: Reading Threat vs. Reading Reassurance

V. Munich: Getting the Challenge Posed by Malign Intentions Right

VI. Implications

A. Toward a Social Evolutionary Psychology

B. Some Hypotheses for Experimental Testing

C. Trust and Fear in Social Theories

D. Containing Fear in International Politics

Conclusion


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Introduction

Fear and trust are essential for understanding any interpersonal or intergroup

relations.1 This article seeks to outline a social evolutionary psychology of fear (and

trust) from an evolutionary perspective, thus providing part of the fundamental

explanation for why international cooperation is difficult but non-cooperation easy.

Specifically, I propose that two general types of intention—benign intentions and

malign intentions--pose almost diametrically opposite challenges for our perception.

Malign intentions are easy to detect and difficult to hide whereas benign intentions

are too easily dismissed and discounted thus “hard to detect”. This general fact is part

of the fundamental reason why international cooperation is difficult while

international non-cooperation easy.

The ultimate cause behind this general fact lies in our evolutionary past. During

the long evolutionary process leading to modern human, we have been strongly

conditioned to detect and over-react to potential danger posed by others—be it human

or other non-human animal species--while ignoring and under-reacting to potential

friendliness from others, for the sake of our survival. This core psychology of fear is

then reinforced by three other psychological traits, resulting in a highly robust and

integrated social evolutionary psychology of fear. The social evolutionary psychology

of fear discourages our trusting of others but encourages our mistrusting of others,

and mistrust in turn breeds a sense of insecurity or fear of others, when others possess

the capabilities to do harm. Because robust and extensive cooperation generally

requires robust and extensive trust ex ante to materialize, the social evolutionary

psychology of fear in turn makes international difficult (Figure 1).

1 Here, fear specifically denotes fear for one’s survival or a sense of insecurity that is determined by the probability that another organism (i.e., an animal, an individual, or a state) is malign and the capabilities it posses to harm oneself. Many have used fear to refer things other than fear for survival. For a discussion on fear and other fear-related emotions (e.g., anxiety, terror, panic), see Öhman (2000). Different types of fear may have very different consequences for our psychology. Trust is a function of one’s estimation that the other side is benign (i.e., it will not threaten one’s life or interest). The opposite of trust is mistrust, and mistrust is a function of one’s estimation that the other side is malignant (i.e., it will threaten one’s life or interest). Trust and mistrust thus are two poles of a spectrum that is underpinned by one’s uncertainty over others’ intentions and they have an inverse relationship: trust reduces mistrust, and vice versa (Hardin 1992, 512-6; Kydd 2005, 6-12; see also Deutsch 1958, 265-7; Gambetta 1988, 217-9). The middle point of the spectrum is non-trust.


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The rest of the article unfolds as follows. Section 1 provides some important

caveats. Section 2 outlines an integrated social evolutionary psychology of fear and

trust. Section 3 and 4 present evidences for the psychology of fear and trust from

psychology literature and international relations (hereafter, IR) literature, respectively.

Section 5 further reinforces the central thesis by revisiting the case of Munich. Section

6 draws some implications for social psychology and social theories in general. A

brief conclusion follows.

I. Caveats

Several caveats are in order before I proceed further.

First, I am primarily interested in advancing the social evolutionary psychology

of fear as a theoretical framework for understanding the problem of cooperation in

international politics. Thus, although I explicitly adopt a social evolutionary approach

toward social psychology (and international politics) here, I can only define social

evolution and elaborate what constitutes a social evolutionary approach elsewhere,

partly because social evolution is vastly more complex than biological evolution. Here,

suffice to say that social evolutionary psychology is not Evolutionary Psychology

(hereafter, EP). EP is essentially an upshot of sociobiology, insisting that natural

selection is the only force that has shaped the evolution of our psychology (Buller

2005; Richardson 2007). In contrast, social evolutionary psychology is based on a

social evolutionary approach, rejecting a sociobiological approach toward human

society while insisting that natural selection is not the only force that has shaped the

evolution of our psychology: social forces have been equally indispensable.2

Second, three key aspects of evolutionary theorizing should be emphasized at the

very beginning, to minimize much lingering confusion (and doubt) about evolutionary

theorizing. By definition, evolutionary theorizing is necessarily post hoc. As such, the

power of evolutionary theorizing does not lie with its capacity for proving (in the

literal sense) the past and predicting the future. Rather, evolutionary theorizing tries to

2 Following Buller (2005), I use evolutionary psychology to denote a research field and Evolutionary Psychology (in capital initials) a paradigm.


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better non-evolutionary theorizing on three fronts: 1) organizing and synthesizing a

wider body of evidence than non-evolutionary theorizing; 2) providing a more

coherent, integrative, and fundamental explanation for a much more diverse

observations than non-evolutionary theorizing; and 3) generating testable hypotheses

that predict what have been evolved out there, and these hypotheses cannot be easily

generated by non-evolutionary theorizing.

Third, because I am interested in cooperation among groups, especially ethnic

groups and states, I take in-group and out-group identities as given in the discussion

below, assuming that individuals have internalized an in-group versus out-group

identity that has been solidified during the course of social evolution after a long

history of “us-versus-them” war (Diamond 1997). Group identities profoundly shape

our perception, attitude, and behavior toward other individuals and groups, depending

on whether they belong to our ingroup or an outgroup (see the discussion below).

Fourth, although I imply that insights from interpersonal interactions can be

extrapolated somewhat into intergroup interactions, I am deeply aware of the

interpersonal-intergroup discontinuity (Inkso et al., 2007) and that there are distinct

dissimilarities (and similarities) between perceiving individuals and perceiving groups

(Hamilton and Sherman 1996; Abelson et al, 1998). Consequently, we have to firmly

reject a purely individualistic approach toward intergroup relations (e.g., Fearon and

Latin 1996; Hardin 1995). I cite studies at the interpersonal level simply because some

lessons from interpersonal level can be extrapolated to group level. Moreover, as a

growing number of social psychologists have recognized and I concur, the right way

forward is to move away from the dichotomy of person versus group and think that

individuals make decisions as individuals within their groups.

Fifth, I take it as given that there are real differences among individuals to trust in

both interpersonal and intergroup settings. Due to differences in genetic makeup and

personal experiences (e.g., growing up in a nice neighborhood versus growing up in a

bad neighborhood), some individuals are more willing to trust others and less likely to

over-react toward potential danger posed by others. More trustful individuals are more


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likely to be “doves”; whereas more distrustful individuals “hawks”. 3 Yet, this

difference, I shall emphasize, despite being real, does not nullify the social

evolutionary psychology of fear: even doves tend to distrust.

Finally, I intentionally exclude “motivated biases” (e.g., domestic politics need)

that can influence decision makers’ perception of fear. I insist that the fundamental

traits that are singled out in the discussion below are really more fundamental, and

without these fundamental traits, motivated biases will not have an operational

foundation. Moreover, existing IR literature has shown that most “motivated biases”

tend to reinforce—although they do sometimes weaken--the fundamental psychology

of fear (e.g., Jervis 1976, Lebow 1981, Stein 1988; Larson 1997). As such, the net

result from the interaction between the social evolutionary psychology of fear and

“motivated biases” remains that decision-makers do unconsciously exaggerate threat

posed by others and they can reduce their fear about possible threat posed by others

only by acting consciously.

II. The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear

Most of, although perhaps not all, our social psychological traits are the result of

our evolutionary past, and they serve two critical purposes: survival (as individuals

and groups) and mating (as individuals).4 As such, some of our most prominent

psychological traits must have some benefits for our survival. From the point of view

of survival, fear for one’s survival or fear of death from the danger or threat posed by

others and the environment is absolutely essential for our survival. As a result, during

3 More recently, Oxley et al (2008) showed that more fearful individuals are more likely to be conservatives and hawks whereas less fearful individuals are more likely to be moderates and doves. Admitting that there are real personality differences among individuals due to their different genetic makeup and socialization experience does not invalidate the social evolution paradigm—rather, it validates it. After all, without varieties or differences among individuals, selection in evolution becomes impossible. For an earlier discussion on evolution and personality, see Tooby and Cosmides 1990a; Buss 1995, 18-23. In an earlier short article, Kahneman and Renshon (2007) contended that hawks usually won debates on the use of force. Their elaboration, however, does not really provide a compelling explanation why it is so. Existing literature has revealed two traits for predicting personalities along the dimension of dove versus hawk--social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). The relationship between SDO and RWA has been an intensively researched area, and a possible integration of the two theories may be emerging. 4 Some evolutionary biologists hold that survival is subordinate to reproduction (e.g., Dawkins 1996 [1976]). Such a notion is invalid. See the discussion in section 6 below.


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our evolutionary past, our abilities for detecting and reacting against danger have been

robustly selected, and fear may be the most fundamental psychological trait that

evolution has bestowed upon Homo sapiens. From this perspective, an integrated

social evolutionary psychology of fear can be developed.

A. The Core Psychology of Fear

When judgments are made under uncertainty, there are two general types of errors

(false positive/type I and false negative/type II). A profound dilemma posed by

uncertainty is that a decision maker cannot simultaneously minimize both errors:

decreasing the likelihood of one error inevitably increases the likelihood of the other

error. To resolve this dilemma, evolution has primed our brain toward making the less

costly error: evolution has bestowed us with an “error-management capacity”

(Haselton and Buss 2000; see also Andrews 2001).

Because failing to detect and react toward danger can be devastating and

potentially fatal, our brain is willing to risk false positive (i.e., elicitation of a fear

response toward a stimulus that eventually turned out to be harmless) rather than false

negative (i.e., failure to elicit the defense response toward a stimulus that eventually

turned out to be harmful) when facing an unknown other. While making a false

positive error may waste some resources on an unnecessary defense response; making

a false negative error risks of being harmed and thus death. Consequently, when

facing potential danger from others, we inevitably bias our perception toward making

false positive errors. In other words, our brain has been robustly conditioned to

over-detect and overreact toward danger through arousing fear: ‘Better Safe (and

Wrong) than Sorry (but Right)’ (Öhman and Mineka 2001; see also Haselton and

Nettle 2006, esp. 52-7).

Because our brain has been wired to systematically over-detect and overreact

toward danger, it must also have been wired to systematically underestimate security.

As a result, we are inclined to mistrust others but disinclined to trust others: we are

quick to suspect and react toward others suspicious behaviors but we will be extra


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cautious when it comes to embracing others’ benign gesture. Although this does not

mean that we can never trust each other or that we will never be deceived by a foe, it

does mean that we are far less likely to embrace others’ behaviors that may signal

benign intentions. In other words, it will take far more evidence to convince us that

the other side is not malign--not to mention benign--than what will be required to

convince us that the other side is malign.

This core psychology of fear is the ultimate cause why the two kinds of intentions

pose diametrically opposite challenges for us. Due to this core psychology of fear, we

are fare more likely to exaggerate and over-react to than ignore and under-react to

the danger posed by others, and we are far more likely to doubt and dismiss than

embrace others’ gestures that signal benign intentions. As a result, malign intentions

are difficult to hide while benign intentions are too easily dismissed and discounted.

B. Toward an Integrated Social Psychology of Fear

The core evolutionary psychology of fear is reinforced by other psychological

traits, and these traits too contribute to our survival, partly by interacting with the core

psychology of fear. I single out three groups of trait: attribution biases, ethnocentrism,

and disinclination for systemic thinking.5

a. Attribution Biases and the Psychology of Fear

Explaining our own and others’ behavior is an attribution process. Inferring

others’ intentions from their behavior, which partly explains others’ behavior, is thus

an attribution exercise. Because decision makers tend to take other states’ behavior as

intentional, inferring the intentions behind other states’ presumably intentional

behaviors is a constant task for decision makers in international politics.6

Social psychological research has demonstrated that our attribution attempts are

5 There may be other traits that directly or indirectly contribute to the integrated psychology of fear. I merely suggest that the three traits singled out here are the more fundamental ones. 6 Our explanation mode for explaining others’ unintentional behavior is quite simple: we simply state its cause (Malle, Knobe, Nelson 2007). For attribution, the dichotomy of dispositional vs. situational is more valid than the dichotomy of internal vs. external (Sabini, Siepmmann, Stein 2001).


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often biased and these “biases” are both prevalent and robust. Yet, are these “biases”

or “errors” really mere errors or biases? If all these “errors” or “biases” are merely

errors or biases--which by implication, are inimical to our survival and reproduction,

they should have been eliminated or at least considerably weakened during the course

of evolution. In light of the fact that these “errors” remain robust in our psychology,

isn’t it possible that these errors may have well served some important functions that

facilitate our survival and reproduction? Put it differently, can’t these errors and biases

actually be adaptations or evolved psychological mechanisms that have contributed to

our survival and reproduction?7

I advance that many of our attribution biases have indeed contributed to our

survival, partly by reinforcing the core psychology of fear. Attribution biases directly

interact with the core psychology of fear to reinforce our biases for over-detecting

and over-reacting toward potential danger posed by other individuals or groups. Such

an evolution-derived understanding of course at least partly explains why these biases

remain hard-wired in our psychology.

When it comes to explaining others’ intentional behavior, we tend to attribute

dispositional intentions to others’ “unfriendly” thus undesirable behavior--the other

side has behaved unfriendly because it is inherently malignant. In contrast, we tend to

explain way others’ “friendly behavior” with situational factors: the other side has

behaved friendly not because it is inherently benign but because it has to. This sharp

contrast between explaining others’ desirable behavioral and explaining others’

undesirable behavioral strongly guards us against the possibility that the other side

may have always been malign or it may become malign (and behave badly) at any

time. By attributing dispositional malign intentions to others’ “unfriendly”, and often

even ambiguous, behavior, we prolong the time that our mind remains alert versus

others. By attributing situational causes to others “friendly” behavior, we shorten the 7 An earlier attempt to understand the functions of attribution (biases) failed to even consider an evolutionary perspective (Forsyth 1980). More recently, Andrews (2001) attempts to link the fundamental attribution error (FAE) with evolution, but he failed to link attribution with survival although he came really close. For similar questionings of our labeling many psychological mechanisms and traits as “errors” or “biases” thus implying that they are counterproductive for our survival and reproduction, see Cosmides and Tooby (1996); Krebs and Denton (1997); Haselton and Buss (2000); Haselton and Nettle (2006); Haselton and Funder (2006).


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time that our mind remains relaxed versus others and make sure that our mind can be

easily aroused to be alert again.

From an evolutionary point of view, attribution “biases” and errors thus

rigorously facilitate our survival, when they interact with the core psychology of fear.

They keep our mind alert toward potential dangers posed by others by preventing our

mind from trusting others too easily and lapsing into complacency for too long.

b. Ethnocentrism and the Psychology of Fear

Human beings are feeble as individual predators (or hunters), when compared to

other predators such as tiger, lion, and leopard. As such, only groups of humans could

have survived the early period of our evolutionary past. Belonging to a group provides

one with many benefits, from security via cooperation to a sense of belonging (Marks

1987, 83-89; Stevens and Fiske 1995).8 Ingroup is thus a form of social resource

(Correll and Park 2005). Because ingroup needs some cooperation, and thus trust,

among members with the group to sustain, social exchanges within the ingroup are

characterized by a bias toward trust rather than fear or distrust: the group is a kind of

container of “generalized reciprocity” (Yamagishi & Kiyonari 2000). Having an

ingroup identity, however, must entail an outgroup identity: the two identities cannot

exist without the other. This clear differentiation of “us versus them” is at the core of

ethnocentrism (Sumner 1906, 12; Campbell 1965, 298-300; LeVine and Campbell

1972, 12-21), which is essentially egocentrism (i.e., “me-versus-others”) at the group

level (Krebs and Denton 1997, 22-4). Thus, ethnocentrism itself, which is

fundamentally centered upon ingroup versus outgroup identity, is a production of

social evolution, driven by the need of survival as individuals within groups (Sumner

1906, 12; see also Brewer and Caporael 1990; 2006; Caporael & Brewer 1995).

Ethnocentrism’s interaction with the core psychology of fear can be

straightforwardly understood, and these influences are automatic unless one 8 To some extent, Stevens & Fiske (1995) presents an integrated social evolutionary psychology of living within groups, thus complements with the framework offered here. Unfortunately, although they did point out that the need to belong is fundamentally connected with the need to survive, they did not engage with fear at all: their social survival perspective is really about how to live better within groups, rather than about how to survive as individuals within groups. See also Caporael (1997).


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consciously tries to minimize then (Devine 1989; see also Krebs and Denton 1997).

Foremost, (partly) by interacting with the core psychology of fear, our

ethnocentrism generally leads us to extend some trust to members of our ingroup but

not to those of an outgroup (Brewer 1981; Insko et al 1990; Stevens & Fiske 1995;

Yamagishi & Kiyonari 2000). Ethnocentrism thus favors cooperation among members

in an ingroup but hinders cooperation with an outgroup.

Second, individuals value their own group’s interest but neglect other groups’

interest. As such, when it comes to understanding others’ behavior, we generally lack

empathy—the ability to see things from others’ angle. We thus tend to neglect others’

legitimate interests--including their fear of ourselves, when trying to interpret others’

behavior. Without taking others’ interest into account, we then tend to discount

possible legitimate reasons behind their behavior and emphasize their possible malign

intentions: all of us are victims of “naïve realism”, as Lee Ross and his colleagues

noted (Ross and Ward 1995; Robinson et al, 2005).

Third, because ethnocentrism demands loyalty to our own group, we-- especially

decision makers--fear that we may fail to safeguard our group’s interest by being

“soft” on an outgroup as our opponent. As such, decision makers tend to be more

sensitive to others’ “unfriendly” and “undesirable” behaviors and more cautious in

embracing and reciprocating to others’ friendly and desirable behaviors.

Finally, ethnocentrism prevents critical thinking about our own behavior: we

instinctively justify our own behaviors as rational and righteous, or at the worst,

“without any other choices” (Ross and Ward 1995). Ethnocentrism thus prevents us

from pondering whether our own behavior might have somehow contributed to

others’ undesirable or ambiguous behavior. Being unable to see more external reasons

for others’ undesirable or ambiguous behavior, we once again end up in exaggerating

the possibility that their “unfriendly”, “undesirable”, or even ambiguous behaviors

have been caused by their malign intentions while discounting the possibility that

their behaviors might have been provoked by some of our own behaviors.

c. Simplistic Thinking and the Psychology of Fear


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We have a general disinclination to think in a systemic or global way (Jervis

1997). In other words, we have a habit of “simplistic thinking”, a phenomenon that is

much more general and prevalent than what has been captured under the label of

heuristic or schematic thinking in standard social psychology literature (e.g., Nisbett

and Ross 1980; Simon 1990). Simplistic thinking is also a product of evolution. At the

very beginning of our species when stable food supply tends to be lacking, saving

effort and thus energy is conducive to our survival in the jungle in the long run.

Because thinking systemically requires far more effort thus more energy than thinking

linearly, we have developed this general disinclination to think systemically as a form

of “effort-reduction” for our mental process (Shah and Oppenheimer 2008; see also

Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996). Evolution has primed us to “produce the best

inferences (…) for the least investment.” (Gilbert 1989, 207)

Simplistic thinking fits flawlessly with our need to cope with potential danger.

Facing a potential danger, thinking simplistically or even reflexively is a virtue

because it allows us to react to potential danger faster, whereas deep thinking when

facing a potential danger can be debilitating, sometimes fatal.

When it comes to attributing intentions to others’ behavior, simplistic thinking

means that we generally do not ask whether the other side’s “unfriendly” and

“undesirable” behavior may be a rational reaction to a situation he faces (sometimes

conditioned by his fear of ourselves and others). Moreover, when attributing

intentions to others’ behavior, we tend to focus on the more observable part of others

(i.e., immediate behavior, military capability) and avoid more systemic inquiries into

the hidden causes behind others’ behaviors. Instead, we often jump to the conclusion

that he must have behaved badly because he is inherently malign.

Most critically, simplistic thinking hinders us from avoiding some of our

attribution biases, reducing our ethnocentrism, and preventing us from containing our

fear about others, because all these tasks require a more systemic thinking than our

brain normally performs. This will be true even if we know that our cognition usually

suffers from all those biases and errors, not to mention that most decision makers

have only the faintest idea about the existence of those biases and errors.


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III. Evidences from Psychology Literature

Each of the four psychological traits has been amply demonstrated, but do they

really interact to form an integrated social psychology of fear? From an evolutionary

perspective, the answer can only be affirmative. Major psychological traits are bound

to interact, because such interactions are conducive to, if not indispensable for, our

survival: a compartmentalized brain in which different functions or functional areas

do not interact with each other is at a seriously, if not fatally, disadvantageous position

for coping with the complex environment we face.

This section provides evidences for an integrated social psychology of fear from

psychology literature. These evidences can be divided into three categories: 1) those

indicating a core psychology of fear; 2) those indicating that the other three major

psychological traits that have been identified as part of the integrated psychology of

fear do interact with each other; and 3) those indicating that the core psychology of

fear does interact with the other three major psychological traits singled out.

A. Evidences Indicating a Core Psychology of Dear

Without any doubt, fear is one of our primary emotions (Öhman 2000;

Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006). As such, we should not be surprised that our fear has

an evolutionary foundation.

Perhaps the most compelling and direct evolutionary evidence for a core

psychology of fear is that our brain has been robustly wired to detect danger posed by

snakes and spiders, bearing strong imprints from our history as a species in the jungle.

Ophidiophobia (fear of snake) and arachnophobia (fear of spider) are evident in other

primates, indicating the long history of this primitive fear/phobia (Öhman and Mineka

2001; LoBue and Deloache 2008). These phobias are phylogenetic or “hard-wired”:

they do not require any prior learning experience and they are present in infants who

have yet to become locomotive (Menzies and Clarke 1995).

A closely related phenomenon is that individuals can detect threatening faces (e.g.,


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angry faces) faster and more accurately than neutral and especially friendly ones:

threatening faces stand out in the crowd (Öhman, Lundqvist, and Esteves 2001; see

Hansen and Hansen 1988 for the pioneering study).

A second stream of evidence for a core psychology of fear comes from the fact

that we have developed a sophisticated and yet almost automatic mechanism for

detecting others’ untrustworthy behaviors such as non-cooperation, cheating, (verbal

or physical) deception, and betrayal in social interactions. Although these behaviors

usually pose only non-lethal threat against us, our brain has developed a robust

defense against these behaviors because these behaviors do threaten our welfare and

can potentially threaten our life.

To begin with, our brain possesses an automatic attention bias for detecting

non-cooperative behaviors by others, and hence untrustworthy players or

non-cooperators (Vanneste et al. 2007). More importantly, there is a strong correlation

between noncooperative behavior and fear-related emotion: non-cooperators are seen

as more threatening and thus arouse more fear (Verplacetse et al, unpublished).

Moreover, “cheaters are looked at longer and remembered better.” (Chiappe and

Brown 2004) In other words, once we recognize somebody as untrustworthy (thus

potentially dangerous), we tend to remember his/her face clearly and persistently.

Such a differentiation in reacting to potential threatening individuals and to

non-threatening individuals can only be understood as a result driven by an

evolutionary need for self-protection: we need to remember the faces of those

trust-violators vividly so that we will not be harmed by them again.

Perhaps most strikingly, individuals almost always underestimate their ability to

detect cheating although they can actually detect deception quite accurately. In two

experiments, 86% and 90% of the participants believed that it is very difficult to

detect deception although they were able to detect deceptions in 89% and 87% of the

trials, respectively (Verplacetse et al. 2007). Individuals can even detect verbal

deception quite accurately: Without any previous training, individuals can detect

deceptions more than 53% of the time (Bond and DePaulo 2006). This contradiction

again exemplifies the need for detecting danger—it keeps the mind constantly alert.


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A third stream of evidence is that we almost inevitably become more reluctant to

trust after being betrayed, deceived, and cheated, and this general reluctance to trust

not only applies to the perpetrators of those betrayals, deceptions and cheatings, but

spreads more generally to other individuals. This is most evident among individuals

whose trust was violated: Individuals who have been sexually abused or have learned

to distrust from other experiences (e.g., growing up in a ghetto) will usually become

very reluctant to trust others again (Janoff-Bulman 1992).

A fourth stream of evidence is the prevalent, profound, and often automatic

“negativity bias” or “positive-negative asymmetry” (Peeters & Czapinski 1990;

Taylor 1991; Baumeister et al 2001; Rozin and Royzman 2001). Negative entities

(events, objects, and personal traits) have more potency in arousing our brain and

their impact lasts longer than positive entities (i.e., “negativity potency”). Negative

entities also dominate positive ones in our cognitive integration (i.e., “negativity

dominance”).9 There should be little doubt that part of this “negativity bias” is an

evolved mechanism to keep our brain alert to potential dangers because negative

entities are more likely to indicate potentially dangerous, if not life-threatening, things

than positive entities (Roese 1997, 135).

Finally, consistent with an evolutionary explanation of the psychology of fear,

fear has a robust molecular and neural foundation in brain with amygdale at the center

of our fear-processing machinery (Cheng et al 2003; de Gelder et al., 2005; Delgado

et al., 2008; reviewed in Schafe & LeDoux 2008). Fear often automatically causes

flight reaction from the body (de Gelder et al., 2005). More importantly, fear

processing is intimately linked with long-term memory-formation: fear-related

memory formation requires de novo mRNA and protein synthesis (Duvarci, Nader &

LeDoux, 2008), strongly indicating that our brain has evolved to store both long-term

(e.g., snakes) and short-term (e.g., a bad experience) information about possible

dangers. Not surprisingly, “negativity bias” too has a robust neuro-physiological

9 In section 6 below, I argue that the “negativity bias” should be more finely delineated. Rozin and Royzman (2001) listed two additional manifestations of this bias, “greater steepness of negative gradients” and “greater negative differentiation”. Not all of the negative biases are connected to the social evolutionary psychology of fear.


14

foundation (Ito et al 1998; Baumeister et al 2001, 336-337; Smith et al 2003).

All these observations are consistent with a social evolutionary psychology of

fear. Our brain has been robustly programmed to pay more attention and remain

consistently alert or even “hyper-vigilant” toward possible danger around us rather

than become complacent. This “negativity bias” given to potential danger is

widespread, consistent, “automatic”, and often profound.

B. Evidences Indicating an Integrated Psychology of Fear-I

There exist compelling evidences that the three traits signaled out as part of the

integrated psychology of fear do interact with each other, thus indirectly indicating

that an integrative psychology of fear exists. The logic is straightforward: If the three

traits interact with each other, then there is no reason why they do not interact with the

core psychology of fear.

a. Attribution Biases with Ethnocentrism

Egocentrism is fundamentally a concern for one’s own interest, and

ethnocentrism--a mentality of taking one’s in-group as the center of the universe

(Sumner 1906, 12-13), is egocentrism at the group level (Messick and Mackie 1989).

As Sumner’s initial exposition strongly suggested, ethnocentrism must affect

attribution regarding in-group and out-group. After Allport’s classic (1958 [1954]) and

Pettigrew’s extension (1979), many studies have unambiguously revealed that

ethnocentrism does interact with attribution (reviewed in Hewstone 1990; Brewer

1999; Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002), although most studies focus the interaction

between egotism and attribution whereas studies that explicitly address the interaction

between attribution and traits of ethnocentrism other than egotism have been scant.10

The interaction between egotism and attribution has been well documented: there

10 Egotism is about defending one’s ego (i.e., a self-serving bias). Because defending one’s ego is a form of symbolic self-interest, egotism can be understood a central sub-trait of egocentrism. Many of the work discussed here implicitly treat egotism as the most salient trait of egocentrism and ethnocentrism. I differentiate egotism from egocentrism/ethnocentrism, with the understanding that the later subsumes the former. For elaboration on ethnocentrism and group identity in group conflict, see LeVine and Campbell (1972); Brewer (1986); Tajfel and Turner (1986).


15

is a general self-serving or egotistic bias in our attribution. We tend to attribute

positive outcomes achieved by groups with which we have been associated to our

own behavior but to dissociate us from negative outcomes (Miller 1976; Schenkler

and Miller 1977; Sicoly and Ross 1977; Ross and Sicoly 1979). We also tend to

attribute our own socially desirable behaviors--especially those that have led to

positive outcomes--to our dispositional traits, while attributing our undesirable

behaviors--especially those that have led to negative outcomes--to situational causes

(Stevens and Jones 1976). The other side of the ego-defending bias is to denigrate

others’ ego: doing so achieves the same purpose of elevating our own ego over others

(Fein and Spencer 1997). Thus, we tend to attribute others’ undesirable behaviors,

especially those that have led to negative outcomes, to their dispositional traits. Such

a pattern of attribution helps us elevating our ego relative over others’ ego or at least

preventing us from losing our ego relatively: our biases and errors in attribution have

an explicit ego-defending function (Forsyth 1980; Greenwald 1980). From an

evolutionary point view, this makes perfect sense: maintaining a high self-esteem

relative to others is conducive to our engaging and excelling in the competition for

survival and reproduction (Krebs and Denton 1997).

These ego-defending biases in attribution are much more pervasive at intergroup

level than at interpersonal level, and together they constitute “ethnocentric attribution

bias”. This bias is so robust and pervasive that Pettigrew (1979) called the “ultimate

attribution error (UAE)”, and UAE has withstood scrutiny much better than the

perhaps better known “fundamental attribution error (FAE)” (Hewstone 1990;

Chatman and von Hippel 2001).11 We tend to attribute negative outcomes that both

our ingroup and an outgroup have been associated mostly to the behaviors by the

outgroup. Moreover, we are far more likely to have biases when explaining other

groups’ undesirable behaviors (Ross and Fletcher 1985; Maass et al., 1989; 1995;

1996; Weber 1994). These attribution biases undoubtedly serve the purpose of

protecting our identifications with our ingroup. 11 Marriage constitutes a form of grouping. Thus, it is not surprising that couples often explain each other’s positive behavior with internal/dispositional factors whereas negative behaviors with external/situational factors (Taylor and Koivumaki 1976).


16

Although Lee Ross and his colleagues fail to even mention ethnocentrism in their

interpretation of the results, there is little doubt that “reactive devaluation” of others’

conciliatory proposals testifies the interaction between ethnocentrism and attribution.

When a peace proposal that was actually proposed by Israelis was presented to Israeli

Jews and pro-Israel Americans as a proposal from Palestinians, the proposal was

viewed unfavorably (i.e., “biased in favor of Palestinians). When the same proposal

was presented to Israeli Jews and pro-Israel Americans as a proposal from Israelis,

however, it was viewed as favorably and “even-handed” (Moaz et al., 2002).

The overall result from the interaction between ethnocentrism and attribution is a

profound double standard of “us-versus-them” when it comes to judging one’s own

and others’ rhetoric and behaviors. This double standard has been demonstrated in the

United States versus Soviet Union (Oskamp 1965; Larson 1997, 193-4), the United

States and South Vietnam versus North Vietnam and Vietcon (Ashmore et al 1979),

Israel versus Palestine (Moaz et al, 2002), and non-German Jews versus non-Jewish

Germans (Doosje & Branscombe 2003).

b. Simplistic Thinking and Attribution Biases

Both the fact that human judgment under uncertainty relies on many heuristics

and the fact that attribution also relies on many heuristics have been well documented

long back (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Ross 1977; Nisbett and Ross 1980).

Unfortunately, after Fischhoff and Ross’s initial attempts to integrate the two subfields

of inquiry (Fischhoff 1976; Ross 1977, 198-204), no sustained attention has been

given to the possible interaction between cognitive heuristics and attribution biases.

Nonetheless, it is clear that many of our cognitive heuristics can be deployed as

part of an “effort-reducing” mechanism for understanding others’ intentions and

motives (Shah and Oppenheimer 2008). Indeed, many earlier experiments of Tversky

and Kahneman involved attribution, although in a somewhat reverse way. In many of

their experiments, subjects were asked to identify which type of individual (i.e. a

Chinese studies professor or a psychology professor) better fits with a given profile.

Apparently, the task of identifying which individual better fits with a given profile


17

cannot possibly be separated from the task of sticking few attributes to a supposedly

typical individual. Similarly, consumers use brand name and country of origin to

judge products’ quality, thus essentially attributing quality to products by relying on a

few heuristics (Chang 2004; Maheswaran et al 1992).

c. Ethnocentrism and Simplistic Thinking

If our reasoning does depend on heuristics, then it should not be a surprise that

these heuristics are usually derived from our own experiences and readings into the

world: at the very least, they are more available thus accessible than those of others.

Since ethnocentrism is part of our own identity thus experience, it is no surprise that

some of ethnocentrism’s most central traits are tied to heuristics. As a result, we tend

to explain others behavior with some very pernicious mental shortcuts.

Categorization, label, and stereotype, critical components of prejudice and

ethnocentrism are all based on “highly available and exaggerated beliefs” (Allport

1958 [1954], 191), and they are essentially heuristics (Pettigrew 1979, 463).12 Our

brain depends on categorization (Allport 1958 [1954], 19),13 and after we are done

with categorization, we have to label categories of individuals or groups with

linguistic labels--and these labels are usually prejudiced and biased: they are “nouns

that cut slices” (Allport 1958 [1954], 174-177; see also Maass et al, 1989; 1995).

These labels then serve as heuristics for perceiving others, and they form part of the

foundation of stereotypes and thus prejudice (Allport 1958 [1954]). Not surprisingly,

these heuristics are most salient when it comes to explaining behaviors by individuals

from an outgroup (Pettigrew 1979; Hewstone 1990; Tajfel 1982, 3-7; Devine 1995).

Indeed, stereotyping itself is an energy-saving heuristics (Macrae, Milne, and

Bodenhausen 1994). The fact that we tend to form stereotypes about other groups

based on our experiences with one or two individuals from those groups too reflects

the interaction between ethnocentrism and simplistic thinking (Rothbart et al, 1978).

12 As such, one can argue that ethnocentrism is a collective of pernicious heuristics. 13 Allport (ibid, chap. 10) also noted the interaction between simplistic thinking and prejudice.


18

B. Evidences Indicating an Integrated Psychology of Fear-II

Although the integrated psychology of fear has yet to be systematically studied in

psychology literature, there are evidences suggesting that the core psychology of fear

and do interact with attribution and ethnocentrism. Unfortunately, there seem to be no

direct study on the possible interaction between fear and simplistic thinking,

At the interpersonal level, the most direct evidence indicating that the psychology

of fear interacts with attribution comes from the studies of “hostile/sinister attribution

bias” in children and adults. We have a general tendency to attribute hostile/sinister

intentions to others’ hindering thus undesirable behaviors, even though those

behaviors may be totally unintentional or at least their intentionality is ambiguous: we

tend to be paranoiac (Dodge et al., 1986; Epps & Kendall 1995; Kramer 1998;

Kramer and Messick 1998).14 Apparently, “hostile/sinister attribution bias” is a form

of defensive mechanism aroused by fear, even if the fear is unfound: when we

attribute hostile intentions to others’ undesirable behaviors, we elevate the level of our

alertness toward others thus reduce the probability that we will be taken advantage of

by others again.

A second stream of evidence indicating that the psychology of fear interacts with

attribution comes from studies on the interaction between suspicion and attribution.

Steven Fein and his colleagues showed that suspicion that an actor might have ulterior

motives does affect perceiver’s attribution, by triggering a more sophisticated

attribution process (e.g., Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990; Hilton, Fein, & Miller 1993;

Fein & Hilton 1994; Fein 1996). Suspicion constitutes the primary component, if not

synonym, of distrust (Kramer 1998, 252; see also Fein 1996, 1165), and suspicion that

others may want to harm us will inevitably entail some fear. Thus, although existing

research does not directly test the impact on attribution of the suspicion that others

may want to harm us, it is reasonable to speculate that such suspicion will bias us

toward believing that others are more threatening than they really are (Fein 1996, 166).

14 Evidently, the “sinister attributional error” is essentially the “hostile attributional bias” into adulthood. Kramer (1998, 267-8) noted the parallel between the two attributional errors/biases, without linking them via either developmental or evolutionary thinking.


19

After all, the motive to do us harm is the most ulterior motive that others can possess!

Indeed, when “perceivers believe that actions or motives of the actor could affect

them, suspicion may cause perceivers to see the actor in a more negative light, even if

the perceivers are not convinced that the actor’s behavior was indeed affected by

ulterior motives.” (Fein and Hilton 1994, 167) In international relations in which

group survival and ego is at stake, suspicion and the fear derived from it will likely be

reinforced by group dynamics, thus further biasing us toward guarding against the

potential danger that can be posed to us by others.

Related and much more extensive evidence that supports an intimate interaction

between the core psychology of fear and attribution comes from the literature on

“negativity biases”. Apparently, negative outcomes promote more extensive

retrospective elaboration and attribution, whereas positive outcomes rarely do (Roese

1997; Baumeister et al 2001, 340-343; Rozin and Royzman 2001).

The studies on the interaction between trust and attribution can be understood as

studies on the interaction between the core psychology of fear and attribution because

trust is the opposite of mistrust and mistrust contributes to fear. Numerous studies on

the interaction between trust or lack of trust and attribution, usually based on some

variants of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game, support the conclusion that trust or

lack of trust significantly influences our attribution regarding others’ behavior (Kelley

and Stahelski 1970a; 1970b; for review, see Lindskold 1978). Violation of trust also

prompts victims to greater attributional search for the causes of the violation

(Janoff-Bulamn 1992; see also Peeters & Czapinski 1990; Taylor 1991, 70-71).

Regarding the interaction between fear and egocentrism, Dodge & Somberg

(1987) showed that threat to the ego exacerbates “hostile attribution bias”. Meanwhile,

Fenigsteini & Vanable (1992) showed that egocentrism heightens fear, often to the

level of mild paranoia.

At the intergroup level, perhaps the most direct evidence indicating the social

evolutionary psychology of fear comes from “sinister/hostile attribution bias” and

“reactive devaluation” among negotiators. Seasoned negotiators consistently believe

that their opponents are more strategic, wicked, and obstructive than themselves,


20

especially when their opponents have been unwilling to yield.15 In contrast, when

their opponents did offer compromises and concessions, seasoned negotiators

consistently devalue those compromises and concessions, judging them to be

insufficient and mostly driven by situational factors (especially by negotiators’

toughness) rather than by opponents’ desire to compromise or intentions to cooperate

(Ross and Ward 1995, esp. 275-8). Obviously, “sinister/hostile attribution bias”

corroborates with the notion that malign intentions are hard to hide whereas “reactive

devaluation” with the notion that benign intentions are easily dismissed or discounted.

Together, these two traits perfectly corroborate with the two key predictions of the

social evolutionary psychology of fear

In addition, there are strong evidences indicating that fear is a potent factor in

driving the interaction between ethnocentrism and attribution. Members of groups are

deeply concerned with the survival of their in-groups and other forms of non-lethal

threat posed against their in-groups—threats can be real or imagined, and this fear of

ingroup’s survival is enough to arouse the defensive component of the ethnocentric

attribution bias (Weber 1994, 500-502; Quillian 1995; Corneille, Yzerbyt, and

Geneviève Buidin 2001; Hewstone, Rubin and Willis 2002, 586; Stephan and Stephan

2000). Ethnocentrism and fear about ingroup’s survival also unambiguously reduces

individuals’ willingness to trust outgroups and individuals from outgroups. In Israel,

the heightening of Jews’ fear of their group survival, aroused from the shifting

demographical distribution of Jewish and Arab population and a growing Arab

militancy in the middle-1980s, made Jews far less willing to trust Arabs (Smooha

1985). Overall, we tend to be somewhat paranoiac in intergroup interactions (Kramer

1998; Kramer and Messick 1998). This makes perfect evolutionary sense: being

somewhat paranoiac is conducive to our groups’ survival. Indeed, it is interesting to

note that the widely recognized interindividual-intergroup discontinuity may be

mostly underpinned by fear and greed (Wildschut and Insko 2007).

15 I put Ross and Ward’s work under the category of intergroup level because most negotiations they interviewed are negotiators for corporations. Although Ross and Ward (1995) failed to link negotiators’ tendency to attribute sinister or hostile intentions to their opponents with the “sinister/hostile attribution bias”, it is apparent that the tendency is a manifestation of the bias.


21

Finally, from real life cases in international politics, Jervis (1976, 343-9) and

Larson (1997) uncovered abundant evidences that in confrontational inter-state

relationships (which by implication entails some fear), attribution biases,

egocentrism/ethnocentrism, and simplistic thinking do interact with each other among

decision-makers. Decision-makers generally attribute the causes of desirable

outcomes to their own effort and stop there. At the same time, however,

decision-makers also generally attribute the causes of undesirable outcomes to our

lack of influence and others’ malign intentions and then stop there. Apparently, when

we attribute the causes of desirable outcomes to our own influence, we not only

elevate our ego but also reduce the possibility of systemic thinking because systemic

thinking may lead to a reduction in our estimation of our influence. At the same time,

when we attribute the causes of undesirable outcomes to our lack of influence and

others’ malign intentions, we protect our ego and reduce the possibility of systemic

thinking because systemic thinking may lead to a recognition that we might have a

hand in causing the undesirable outcome. Both outcomes, however, point to the

conclusion that we are nice and they are bad, thus reducing the chance of building

trust and cooperation between the two groups.

IV. Evidences from IR Literature:

Reading Threat vs. Reading Reassurance

So far, I have relied on experimental evidences from social psychology in

constructing an integrated social psychology of fear. Yet, no amount of experiment in

social psychology can truly capture the complexity of international relations. As such,

more direct and crucial evidence for an integrated social evolutionary psychology of

fear (and trust) in international relations will have to come from IR literature itself,

and the most direct and strongest evidence will be that decision makers do read two

different kinds of signals--signals of threat that signal malign intentions and signals of

reassurance that signal benign intentions--differently.

In interstate interactions, states face the problem of reading the credibility of each


22

other’s moves (rhetoric and behavior): how can one state know that the other state

means what it just said or did? The social evolutionary psychology of fear outlined

above predicts that reading credibility of a signal of threat and reading credibility of a

signal of reassurance will present states with diametrically opposing challenges: states

are likely to exaggerate the threat posed by others but underestimate the goodwill

from others. Existing IR literature provides evidences that this is indeed the case.

Credibility, be it credibility of a signal of threat or a signal of reassurance, is a

relational rather than a dispositional concept: a signal’s credibility is not in the mind

of the signal’s sender but in the mind of the signal’s receiver. A signal’s credibility is

its receiver’s estimation of the degree of sincerity behind the signal. Moreover, there

are two types of credibility: behavioral vs. bargaining/signaling (Tang 2005, 38-40).

Behavioral credibility derives from a state’s past behavior in conflict or cooperation.

Bargaining/signaling credibility derives from a state’s present signal. When states

engage in reading others’ signals, they are dealing mostly with bargaining credibility.

From the literature on costly signaling of resolve in conflict (e.g., Schelling 1966;

reviewed in Powell 2002), it becomes apparent that decision makers and IR scholars

deploy a common equation to assess the credibility of a signal of threat: the credibility

of a state’s threat is a function of the multiple of the state’s perceived (military)

capability, interest, and resolve, discounted by the external constraints the state faces

(Tang 2005, 38; 2008, 454). More formally, TC , the credibility of a state’s signal of

threat in its opponent’s mind, is determined by the equation below (equation 1):

)opponent its perceived as state by the faced constraint lsituationa the

intentions resolve interest capabilitymilitary states a(

×××= fCT

From the discussion on cost, risk, and credibility of reassurance signals that

signal benign intentions for cooperation (e.g., Deutsch 1958; Giffin 1967; Gambetta

1988; Mitchell 1991; Larson 1997, 26-30; Hardin 2002, 11-13, 113-29; Kydd 2005,

chap. 7; Yamagishi et al 2005), it is apparent that the credibility of a reassurance


23

gesture depends on its cost, risk (i.e., potential loss if the gesture is not reciprocated),

potential gain (e.g., savings in resources regardless whether the other side reciprocates

plus other benefits when the other side reciprocates), and situational constraint faced

by its sender (i.e., the degree that the reassurance signal is driven by situational

necessity), again all as perceived by its receiver. Thus, a proper equation for

estimating the credibility of a reassurance signal, AC , is (equation 2):

)receiver by the perceived asinitiator by the faced constraint lsituationa the

receiver by the perceived as all gains, sattempt' the-risk cost sattempt' the(

+= fCA

In other words, the credibility of a reassurance signal is determined by the sum of

its perceived cost and its perceived risk, minus its perceived potential gains to the

sender, and then discounted by the perceived degree of situational constraint faced by

the sender. Apparently, the more the reassurance attempt is perceived to be driven by

situational necessity, the less credible the reassurance attempt is.

From these two structurally different equations, one conclusion becomes apparent.

Because there is no discounting factor in the equation for calculating the credibility of

another state’s threat, we are far more likely to exaggerate than to underestimate it. In

contrast, because there is a situational discounting factor (i.e., situational constraint)

in the equation for calculating the credibility of another state’s reassurance signal, we

are far more likely to underestimate it than to exaggerate it.

Worse yet, from the literature that examines actual costly signaling in cooperation

in the real world (e.g., Jervis 1976, 35-43; Mitchell 1991; Larson 1997; Kydd 2005,

chap. 7 & 8), it is apparent that the equation that decision makers and, quite often

scholars too (e.g., Montgomery 2006, 163-4), actually deploy to assess the credibility

of a reassurance signal is not equation (2), but the following one (equation 3):


24

)receiver by the perceived asinitiator by the faced constraint lsituationa the

receiver by the perceived as all gains, sattempt' the-cost sattempt' the(fCA =

In other words, when reading others’ reassurance signals, we tend to discount or

even ignore the risk associated with such signals. At the same time, however, we tend

to exaggerate the potential benefits that sender can gain from a reassurance signal.

Moreover, we tend to underestimate the cost of a reassurance signal to the sender.

Most apparently, we tend to dismiss the other side’s concession such as reduction in

some military capabilities and adopting a more defensive troop deployment posture as

insignificant and reversible, thus essentially meaningless. Further, we usually do not

take the potential cost for reversing a reassurance signal into account.

Yet, undoing a reassurance gesture almost always carries some genuine cost. For

instance, while reducing troops may actually save some precious resources, it is still

genuinely costly because it will be costly to re-increase them, both financially and

diplomatically. Likewise, redeploying some already pulled back forces significantly is

costly, financially and diplomatically. Because forward re-deployment of forces is

more likely to indicate a shift toward a more aggressive posture, a state that redeploys

its troops forwardly is likely to be perceived as aggressive. Indeed, even breaking a

public verbal promise or pledge carries some diplomatic cost. As such, this potential

cost of reversing an already sent reassurance attempt must be counted as part of the

total cost of a reassurance attempt. Otherwise, it will be hard to understand why

irreversible reassurance or self-binding commitments carry more credibility both in

conflict and in seeking cooperation (Mitchell 1991, 418-424; Larson 1997, 28; Moaz

and Felsenthal 1987; Schelling 1966; Stein 1991, 441-4). Similarly, it will be hard to

understand why states’ willingness to codify and regularize some cooperative

behaviors and norms signals some benign intentions too. Our tendency to neglect the

cost of reversing a reassurance attempt inevitably underestimates the attempt’s cost.

Overall, our psychology of fear drives us to under-estimate the credibility of

others’ reassurance signals: We have an instinct to devalue others’ conciliatory

proposals or concessions (Ross 1995; Ross and Stillinger 1991; Ross and Ward 1995).


25

Indeed, long before Lee Ross and his colleagues coined the phrase of “reactive

devaluation”, Robert Jervis anticipated it in the context of international relations:

“tension-reducing initiatives will be less effective since the perceiver is likely to

believe that they show, not that the other actor is friendly, but that the perceiver’s

policy of firmness is working.” (Jervis 1976, 346-8, quote from 347; see also Mitchell

1991, 409, 428n10)

Not surprisingly, when a peace proposal that was actually proposed by Israelis

was presented to Israeli Jews and pro-Israel Americans as a proposal from

Palestinians, the proposal was viewed unfavorably (i.e., “biased in favor of

Palestinians). When the same proposal was presented to Israeli Jews and pro-Israel

Americans as a proposal from Israelis, however, it was viewed as favorably and

“even-handed” (Moaz et al., 2002).

A classical example of “reactive devaluation” from the real world was Forest

Dulles’s reaction toward Khrushchev’s reduction of over one million Soviet Union

troops in 1956. John Foster Dulles dismissed the move as a move that could be “easily

reversed and discontinued”. Moreover, Dulles focused on the potential savings from

which the Soviet Union can gain from the reduction but totally ignored the potential

risk associated with this move when it was not reciprocated by the United States and

its allies (Larson 1997, 29, chap. 2). A more recent example was from the aftermath of

the Falklands/Malvinas War. Although both Britain and Argentina were eager for

some kind of de-escalation after the war, neither side took gestures from the other side

to be gestures for real reconciliation (Mitchell 1991).

IR specialists also tend to fall into the trap of this “reactive devaluation”. Both

Richard Bitzinger (1994) and William Wohlforth’s (1994/95) read Gorbachev’s

decision to unilaterally destroy more intermediate range nuclear missiles than what

Reagan had initially demanded right after their Revkjavik Summit as as solely derived

from West’s tough bargaining tactics and the economic (thus external) constraints that

Gorbachev faced, thus devaluing Gorbachev’s concessions even with hindsight!

Finally, even sophisticated (Western) IR scholars often tend to infer whether a

reassurance attempt from the other side was costly enough from whether it was


26

deemed to be credible enough and/or reciprocated by one’s own side. For instance,

Montgomery to assert that Khrushchev’s troop reduction in 1956 was not sufficiently

costly simply because it was not perceived by the United States to be so (Montgomery

2006, 177). Likewise, Richard Bitzinger (1994, 77) asserted that Gorbachev’s initial

reassurance signal was not reciprocated because Regan and many of his advisors

deemed it to be incredible. Yet, an obvious possibility why Khrushchev failed to

convince the United States of his benign intentions may be that then Secretary of State

John Foster Dulles was simply too hawkish or too fearful to trust any reassurance

attempt from Khrushchev, short of total submission. Similarly, Gorbachev might have

failed to convince the United States of his benign intentions because then Secretary of

Defense Casper Weinberger and National Security Advisor Alexander Haig were

simply too hawkish or too fearful to trust any reassurance attempt from Khrushchev,

short of total submission (Larson 1997, 32, 237, 243).

Hence, while a reassurance attempt must have been sufficiently credible to

succeed in convincing the other side that one is benign, it is misleading to infer that a

reassurance attempt must have not been costly enough because it did not succeed in

convincing the other side that one is genuinely benign. By inferring whether a

reassurance signal by the other side is sufficiently costly from its success in

convincing one’s own side that it is genuinely benign, one neglects the obvious

possibility that the one’s own side was too aggressive or too fearful that even a very

costly reassurance attempt, short of total submission, would not have succeeded. This

general tendency to infer whether a reassurance attempt by the other side is costly

enough from its success most likely reflects the work of ethnocentrism and attribution

biases among IR scholars, implicitly underpinned by fear.

Overall, the contrasting pattern of reading the credibility of a threat and the

credibility of a reassurance is consistent with the social evolutionary psychology of

fear outlined above. Existing IR literature thus provides considerable evidence for the

social evolutionary psychology of fear outlined above.


27

V. Munich: Getting the Challenge by Malign Intentions Right

A frequently invoked and thus abused analogy for justifying hard-nosed policies

against another state when one is unsure of another state’s intentions has been the

tragedy of Munich leading to the outbreak of World War II. In this section, I revisit

Munich. By doing so, I reinforce the notion that malign intentions is difficult to hide,

a key prediction of the social evolutionary psychology of fear.

Munich can have three possible interpretations, and only one of them supports the

notion that malign intentions are easy to hide. The other two interpretations actually

point to the exact opposite.

The first interpretation is that the Munich tragedy resulted because Chamberlain

was fooled by Hitler--that is, Chamberlain did not recognize Hitler’s malign

intentions. Obviously, only this interpretation supports the notion that malign

intentions are difficult to detect.

The second interpretation is that Chamberlain was not sure of the exact extent of

Hitler’s greed or ambition although he recognized Hitler’s malign intentions. This

interpretation does not support the claim that malign intentions are easy to hide, and it

centers on Chamberlain’s uncertainty over Hitler’s scope of expansion and resolve for

expansion, rather than his intentions to expand. To take this interpretation to be

equivalent to the first interpretation is to commit the error of conflating intentions

with interest or resolve.

The third interpretation is that the Munich tragedy resulted not because

Chamberlain was unsure of Hitler’s malign intentions or because he was unsure of the

exact extent of Hitler’s greed although he recognized Hitler’s malign intentions, but

rather because (he believed) Britain and France lacked the military capabilities and

thus the resolve to resist Hitler in Munich.16 Again, this interpretation does not

support the claim that malign intentions are easy to hide.

The first interpretation of the Munich tragedy now looks increasingly untenable,

16 With hindsight, Britain and France would have been better off by fighting in Munich rather than a year later when they did half-heartedly (Murray and Allet, 2000). Obviously, a more sound explanation is a combination of the second and the third interpretation.


28

in light of newly available evidences. For instance, David Edelstein (2002) opted for

the first interpretation, noting that Hitler before 1939 recognized the value of not

revealing his malign intentions completely. Yet, Edelstein himself came very close to

show that Hitler had already revealed his malign intentions by 1936 through a series

of moves from 1933 to 1936. Hitler withdrew from disarmament conference in

October 1933, demanded Germany to have a 300,000-man army in March 1934,

instituted conscription and built an air force in 1935, and re-remilitarized Rhineland in

March 1936. Moreover, Hitler played with peace rhetoric only after a genuine

alarming behavior. In light of the logic of reading intentions (Kydd 2005; author, a),

Hitler’s behaviors before 1936 clearly revealed his malign intentions and other states

should have read his malign intentions unambiguously.

And this is indeed what had happened. As early as 1934, and certainly by 1936

when Hitler had re-militarized Rhineland, most French and British decision-makers,

including none other than Neville Chamberlain himself, had concluded that Germany

posed a grave threat to European peace (Layne 2008, 404-5; Ripsman and Levy 2008,

150; see also Edelstein 2002, 29).17 By the time of Munich, France and Britain

leaders had no doubt about Hitler’s aggressiveness, although uncertainty on the scope

of Hitler’s ambition still abounded. By any measure, uncertainty about Hitler’s

intentions (i.e., being fooled by Hitler’s pretension of benign intentions) was not a

major cause of the Munich tragedy. In other words, Britain and France might have

failed to stand firm against Hitler for a variety of reasons; but failure to recognize

Hitler’s malign intentions and the threat posed by him was not one of them. While

Hitler recognized the value of concealing his true intentions; he was never as good at

it as Edelstein believed him to be. Edelstein has misinterpreted Munich as a case

indicating that malign intentions are hard to detect.

The third interpretation, which is more commonly held (for good reasons) and

more reasonable, attributes a major cause of France and Britain’s appeasement to

Hitler in Munich to the two countries’ domestic pathology and real constrains (e.g., 17 Although Layne (2008) and Ripsman and Levy (2008) differ on the exact motivation of British “appeasement” policy toward Hitler, they agree on a key point that the British recognized the clear and present danger posed by Hitler as early as 1933 and certainly by 1936 the latest.


29

Britain’s imperial overextension) rather than their uncertainty over Hitler’s malignant

intentions. Indeed, Edelstein (2002, 28) himself explicitly admitted (casually, of

course), it was domestic pathology and real constrains that had prevented Britain and

France from arming themselves adequately.

Both Britain and France were saddled by domestic pathologies before Munich. In

both countries, elites were divided over the priority of their defense, and the general

public and many powerful interest groups that were strongly against war (Schweller

2006). A perhaps more powerful cause might have been the division between Britain

and France. Many British elite “accepted the legitimacy of many of Germany’s

grievances about the Versailles settlement,” (Layne 2008, 427), and the English

Channel certainly provided Britain with a sense of security that France does not enjoy

(Levy and Thompson 2005). Moreover, Britain was still recovering from the Great

Depression in 1929, while still trying to maintain its vast empire. Perhaps most

importantly, Chamberlain wanted to avoid war because he understood that another

great power war would have meant not only the end of the British Empire but also the

end of Britain as a great power. Considering the severe external constraints that

Britain faced at that time, Chamberlain thus might have done his best to preserve the

British Empire (Layne 2008; Ripsman and Levy 2008). The gap between Britain and

France’s determination to confront France undoubtedly created divisions between

Britain and France.

Britain and France’s domestic pathologies, external constrains, and strategic

divisions were then perhaps reinforced by two perceptual pathologies. First, Britain,

France, and the Soviet Union all believed that the distribution of power on the

European continent was still multipolar when it was indeed bipolar, that is, only

Hitler’s Germany and the Soviet Union were great powers on the continent, and

Britain and France were no longer great powers (Schweller 1998). Because Britain,

France, and the Soviet Union believed the European continent was still multipolar, all

of them tried to buck-pass the heavy burden of resisting Hitler to others (Posen 1984,


30

232-3; Christensen and Snyder 1990; Schweller 1998; Mearsheimer 2001, chap. 8).18

Second, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union believed that WWII would again be a

war of attrition just like WWI. Each of the three powers thus believed that the other

could stand on its own—at least for a while--against Hitler and Hitler could not score

quick and decisive victories (Christensen and Snyder 1990, 156-65; Posen 1984,

232-3).19 If this is the case, then one does not have to jump into the fighting too

quickly, and it is much better to sit on the sideline and let the others do the fighting.

Together, these two perceptual pathologies reinforced Britain and France’s inclination

to avoid war with Hitler, as far as possible.

The combined outcome of these causes was an inadequate or ineffective response

(with hindsight) or “under-balancing” against the looming threat posed by Hitler. In

Munich, Britain and France thus “had” to appease Hitler simply because they were

ill-prepared for fighting Hitler: (they believed that) they lacked the capability, and

thus resolve, to resist Hitler. Hitler was able to move forward with his evil designs

because France and Britain were not well prepared to stop him, not because they did

not know his devilishness. Surely, the fact that Britain and France did not really fight

Germany after declaring war on Hitler when Hitler invaded Poland in September 1939

(i.e., the “Phony War”) indicated that Britain and France were not ready to fight Hitler

even after Poland, both capability and resolve wise.

Thus, the most notorious case of appeasement was not caused by the defenders’

uncertainty about their adversary’s aggressive intentions but rather by their lack of

capability and resolve to resist. Munich does not support the notion that malign

intentions are difficult to detect. Indeed, for the average guys on the street and most

decision makers, Munich’s principal lesson is that one cannot retreat before a looming

danger (Khong 1992), and this reading is also the right one. Munich does not support

the notion that a deceptive aggressor can easily fool his opponents (Khong 1992).

By contending that the history of WWII before 1939 when Hitler invaded Poland 18 Schweller contended that European powers believed that the European continent was still multipolar when it was actually bipolar, whereas others contended that the European continent was really multipolar. These two arguments lead to the same conclusion: buck-passing dominated. 19 Thus, Stalin was stunted by the quick collapse of France: “Couldn’t they put up any resistance at all?” (Christensen and Snyder 1991, 157)


31

indicates that malign intentions are difficult to gauge, many have misinterpreted

history, unintentionally or intentionally. They have exaggerated the difficulty of

reading other states’ malign intentions, thus also the danger of seeking cooperation via

intentions-reading and trust-building.

Interestingly enough, this misinterpretation of Munich and the fact that Munich

remains such a powerful political symbol or myth actually reflects the social

evolutionary psychology of fear. Fear is so powerful that some fear can last long after

the source of the fear has been gone: we fear the “ghost of predators past” (Byers

1998). Just as we still retain our phobia of snake although most of us as city dwellers

are unlikely to encounter snakes in their daily life, we fear the prospect of facing

another Hitler although Hitler may be one-of-a-kind and we are highly unlikely to

encounter another Hitler (Jervis 1976, 233; Layne 2008, 434). Certainly, Munich

remains one of the most favorite political myths that politicians like to invoke when

trying to sell assertive or even aggressive policies they favored: they intuitively know

that fear—rather than trust or sense of security-arouses the public (Layne 2008,

436-7). All of them understand that Munich perfectly serves the purpose of constantly

alerting us to the possible danger of falling into complacency. Most likely, many IR

specialists—because they are ethnocentric consciously or subconsciously--have been

constantly trying to warn their respective states from underestimating possible threat

by altering us to the possibility of another Munich.

VI. Implications

The social evolutionary psychology of fear outlined above has implications for

both social psychology and international relations. In this section, I shall focus on its

more immediate implications, leaving its implications for more fundamental issues

(e.g., the role of human nature in social theories) to later work.

A. Toward a Social Evolutionary Psychology

The notion that fear is fundamentally driven by evolution is not new. Indeed, after


32

observing his two-year-old son’s fear of caged zoo animals and noting that fear is one

of the earliest feelings which children experience, Darwin (1877, 288) perceptively

speculated: “May we not suspect that the vague and very real fears of children, which

are quite independent of experience, are the inherited effects of real danger and

adjective superstitions during ancient savage time [of our ancestors]?”

Yet, despite the assault by EP (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Buss 1995),

evolutionary thinking has not made much an inroad in social psychology. The notion

that our major psychological traits are fundamentally driven by evolution has yet to

take a firm root in social psychology: most studies make no attempt to link the

psychological traits under examination with evolution, not to mention social evolution.

Social psychologists have yet to really “give Darwin his due.” (Kitcher 2003)

The social psychology of fear is no exception. Some have attempted partial

synthesis of the psychology of fear (e.g., Marks 1989; Janoff-Bulman 1992, 55-59,

65-69; De Becker 1997; Öhman and Mineka 2001; Barrett 2005; Haselton and Nettle

2006, 52-7), but they are exceptions. 20 Moreover, they mostly focus on the

psychology of fear at the individual level rather than the group level (see below).

Similarly, when explaining the origin of “negativity bias”, Skowronski and

Carlston (1989) failed to consider an evolutionary explanation altogether. Rozin and

Royzman (2001) listed an adaptive/evolutionary, a developmental, and a neural

explanation for the origin of “negativity bias”. Baumeister et al (2001) criticized

existing explanations of the origin of “negativity bias” and did toy with an

evolutionary explanation, but eventually failed to pursue it seriously.

Terror-management theory (TMT) does try to link death with human psychology,

by insisting that human social motivation has a “terror-management” root (Solomon,

Greenberg, and Pyszczynski 1991; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon 1997).

Unfortunately, TMT has either conflated our fear of untimely death (thus yearning for

survival) with our anxiety or terror about our eventual death (thus yearning for

immortality) or has mistakenly over-emphasized the latter over the former (Leary and

20 Gudykunst (1995) developed an anxiety/uncertainty management theory, and he failed to link his theory with fear, not to mention evolution.


33

Schreindorfer 1997, 26-7). Yet if we have to differentiate fear from anxiety, terror, and

panic (Öhman 2000), then our fear of death has to be studied separately from the

terror from our awareness of our eventual death. Moreover, our fear of death must

hold ontological priority over the terror from our awareness of our mortality: the latter

comes much later than the former in individuals’ mental development. Certainly, ever

since ancient Greece, man has understood that our fear of death and our terror from

our realization of our eventual mortality have very different implications for human

behavior (Ahrensdorf 2000). If TMT is a theory centered upon the terror of eventual

death rather than a theory centered upon fear of immediate death, then TMT is better

understood as a theory for cultural traits (e.g., religion, rituals), and much of its

supporting evidence is better understood as so.

Meanwhile, although EP has been making some progresses and some bold (thus

questionable) claims about our psychology, it for a long time has mostly focused on

the psychology of mating rather than that of survival (e.g., Buss 2003[1995]; Dawkins

1996 [1976]). In the Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology edited by David Buss

(2005), there were three entries on survival but seven entries on mating. More

strikingly, in the Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology edited by Dunbar and

Barrett (2007), there were eight entries on mating but no entry on survival at all! It

seems as if that EP’s adherents believe that we can reproduce without first securing

our survival! Yet, survival must come before reproduction: unless an individual can

survive into adolescence, he/she cannot reproduce (Caporael and Brewer 1995, 31).

After all, even David Buss, a prominent EP proponent who sometimes seemed to be a

firm believer in the reproduction first thesis (e.g., Buss 1997), often put survival

ahead of reproduction when he slipped (Buss 1995, 6; 9; 2003 [1995], 152)

Furthermore, EP and social psychology in general has focused on individuals,21

reflecting the dominance of the individual/person-paradigm in social psychology

(Steiner 1986). Not surprisingly, most existing studies of fear and survival too made

little effort to link with group dynamics. Yet, if human psychology had mostly

evolved for surviving within small groups (Brewer and Caporael 1990; Caporael and 21 This is especially true for EP, which tends to focus on mating: mating is an individual thing.


34

Baron 1997), then the psychology of surviving as groups must have left important

imprints over our psychology. If so, studying social psychology of fear at group level

and exploring the impact of group dynamics on individuals’ psychology of fear is

equally, if not more, important as studying individuals’ psychology of fear as if it is

independent from group dynamics. 22 In light of the profound

interindividual-intergroup discontinuity that intergroup relations tend to more

competitive and less cooperative than interpersonal relations (Wildschut and Insko

2007), such a practice will not be able to contribute too much to our understanding of

cooperation and conflict between humans, often as groups.

Moreover, ethnocentrism exists only in ethnical groups, nation, and states, and the

boundaries among these groups are more rigid thus more difficult to trespass (Tajfel

and Turner 1986, 8), Yet most groups in laboratory experiments are of only

experimental origin and members with these experimental groups do not have the

same kind of bonds as found within members of ethnic groups. Hence, while

laboratory studies of intergroup interactions do offer important insights into the

dynamics of intergroup interactions between ethnic groups in the real world, they

cannot possibly provide an adequate picture about the later. To advance our

understanding about cooperation and conflict between ethnic groups, social

psychologists should design their experiments more realistically to reflect the

hardened boundaries and ethnocentrism between ethnic groups, states, and nations.

The social evolutionary psychology of fear outlined above represents one of the

few attempts that explicitly set out to integrate social psychology via survival, at both

the individual level and the group level. Thus, perhaps the foremost implication of our

proposed framework is that it is possible, if not more compelling, to integrate the

fragmented field of social psychology via survival. Such an integrative approach

sheds new lights on why some of our psychological traits—often labeled as “errors”

and “biases”--have been so robust and prevalent. For instance, it is straightforward to

think that egocentrism (especially our general lack of empathy), loss aversion, and

22 TMT (Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski 1997) has tried to link with group dynamics (e.g., group’s world view, culture). But TMT deals with terror from mortality rather than fear of death.


35

counterfactual thinking are all somehow connected to serve the purpose of facilitating

our survival (and mating). It is thus high time for psychologists to take the

evolutionary psychology of survival at both individual and group level seriously

because many observations in social psychology, especially those bear the label of

“errors” and “biases”, simply do not make much sense unless in the light of our need

to survive as individuals and groups in evolution, to paraphrase the late Dobzhansky.23

Finally, we hope that our research can encourage social psychology to explicitly

address some of the bigger and more pressing questions faced by human society. At

the beginning of social psychology as a science, many leading voices have asked and

investigated big questions (e.g., Allport 1958; Deutsch 1958; LeVine and Campbell

1972). As social psychology becomes more specialized, however, it has generally

avoided big questions, and the coming of evolutionary psychology has not changed

this situation. Our discussion shows that social evolutionary psychology can offer

fundamental insights into some of the most fundamental problems in social life (i.e.,

conflict and cooperation, war and peace).

B. Some Hypotheses for Experimental Testing

As noted in the very beginning, all evolutionary theories are necessarily post hoc.

An evolutionary framework does not “literally” prove something: The strength of an

evolutionary framework lies with that it offers a coherent explanation and generates

testable predictions regarding some specific phenomena. In this section, I offer

several hypotheses that can be derived from the social evolutionary psychology of fear.

Confirmation of these hypotheses would then at least indirectly support the existence

of the social evolutionary psychology of fear. A general testing strategy shall try to

assess whether these predicted expressions of the social evolutionary psychology of

fear are present not only in adults, but also often in young children, and sometimes

even infants.24 In general, these expressions should be present at both interpersonal

23 Here, I shall echo Haselton and Funder (2006) in insisting that unless we can somehow link biases and errors we have discovered so far with evolution, we are better served by not keeping adding to the growing list of biases and errors. 24 A more convincingly test would be to test whether these traits are present in other primates,


36

and intergroup level, with the effect at intergroup level being perhaps more profound.

a. Perceiving Hostile Intentions versus Perceiving Benign Intentions

The most straightforward prediction from the social evolutionary psychology of

fear is that we recognize possible signs of malign intentions (and thus danger) more

rapidly and accurately than we can recognize possible signs of benign intentions.

There already some preliminary direct evidences for this. The “face in the crowd

effect” and our superb ability to detect cheating, deception, and non-cooperation

strongly suggests that we can recognize possible signs of malign intentions (and thus

danger) more accurately than possible signs of benign intentions (see section 2 above).

This contrast is even evident in our most intimate relationships—marriage. In

marriage, intentions to convey hostility are perceived more accurately than intentions

to convey positive feelings (Bodenhausen et al 1987).

b. Refining the “Negativity Bias”

Most existing studies of “negativity bias” or “positive-negative asymmetry” do

not differentiate negative events or outcomes that are brought about by other

individuals or organisms from negative events or outcomes that are brought about by

non-agents such as natural disasters (e.g., Peeters & Czapinski 1990; Taylor 1991;

Baumeister et al 2001; Rozin and Royzman 2001). The social evolutionary

psychology of fear predicts that once we do differentiate the two broader categories of

negativity, we will uncover a more profound asymmetry in individuals’ coping with

these two categories of negativity.

Existing studies have proved convincingly that negative entities usually entail

sophisticated counterfactual thinking, post hoc (Roese 1997; Baumeister et al 2001;

Rozin and Royzman 2001; Epstude and Roese 2008). If we differentiate negative

events or outcomes that are brought about by other individuals or organisms from

negative events or outcomes that are brought about by non-agents such as natural

disasters, we shall predict the following differences in subjects’ upward counterfactual including their youngsters. This, however, may be very difficult, if not totally infeasible.


37

thinking regarding the two types of negative events. Overall, negative outcomes that

are brought about by other individuals or organisms should predict more sophisticated

upward counterfactual rethinking of the event and re-evaluating one’s own detecting

capabilities (Table 1). Obviously, this post hoc rethinking serves the purpose of

enhancing our survival by improving our chance of avoiding potential future losses

(Roese 1997; Epstude and Roese 2008).25

c. “Reactive Inflation” versus “Reactive Devaluation”

As noted above, the presence of “sinister/hostile attribution bias” and “reactive

devaluation” among individuals and seasoned negotiators constitutes the most direct

evidence indicating the social evolutionary psychology of fear comes: these two traits

almost perfectly fit into the two key predictions of the psychology of fear (Framer

1994; Ross and Ward 1995). The psychology of fear predicts that these two traits

should be present among all of us, not just seasoned negotiators: their expression of

the two traits have been merely hardened by their experience of hard bargaining in the

past. Moreover, reactive inflation, which subsumes “sinister/hostile attribution bias”,

should be more potent than “reactive devaluation”.

“Reactive devaluation” for others’ conciliatory proposals and concessions can be

explored more specifically. Most of the time, the reason why we tend to react coolly

to these gestures is because we do two things. First, we tend to underestimate the cost

and risk that others are taking when they make the concession or offer. We tend to

believe that others are giving up little. Second, we tend to overestimate the potential

gains that others can reap from the move and the potential cooperation if we

reciprocate their move. Third, we tend to overestimate the situation constraint they

face when they make the gestures--we tend to believe that others make conciliatory

proposals and concessions only when they have no others choices. These traits have

been discovered among decision makers and seasoned negotiators (see above), and

they should be readily observed in laboratory settings. 25 In other words, we anticipate future loss from possible future events and take actions to prevent those events thus losses. Thus, loss aversion, which is fundamentally underpinned by the social evolutionary psychology of fear, is far deeper than what prospect theory has captured so far.


38

The other side of coin is that we fall into the trap of “reactive inflation” when

others behave “undesirably” by behaving unfriendly or unaccommodatingly toward us,

even if our own demand upon others may be (objectively) totally unreasonable. In

general, we tend to inflate the potential threat posed by others’ provocative, and

sometimes ambiguous, behaviors by doing two things. First, we tend to exaggerate or

inflate the evil intentions and capabilities (thus the potential threats they can pose)

behind others’ not-so-nice behaviors by ignoring possible situational factors behind

those behaviors. Second, we tend to find additional evidence, usually from others’

past actions and other cues that we used to ignore, to bolster our reading into others’

actions (see also table 1). The existing literature on “hostile/sinister attribution bias” is

already pointing to such a mechanism, and we should have little difficulties in

uncovering these traits of “reactive inflation of threats” in laboratory.

This combination of “reactive inflation” and “reactive devaluation” can also be

deduced from the literature on suspicion and attribution and the literature on

“negativity biases”. Steven Fein and his colleagues showed that suspicion that an

actor might have ulterior motives often triggers a more sophisticated attribution

process (e.g., Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990; Hilton, Fein, & Miller 1993; Fein &

Hilton 1994; Fein 1996). Although existing research does not directly test the impact

on attribution of the suspicion that others may want to harm us, it is reasonable to

speculate that such suspicion will bias us toward believing that others are more

threatening than they really are, especially when we suspect (or fear) that others’

actions may affect us now or in the future (Fein 1996, 166; Fein and Hilton 1994,

167). The net result is once again a heightened alertness against the potential danger

that can be posed to us by others.

From the literature on “negativity biases”, we know that negative outcomes

promote more extensive retrospective elaboration and attribution, whereas positive

outcomes rarely do (Roese 1997; Baumeister et al 2001, 340-343; Rozin and

Royzman 2001). Again, although existing research does not directly test the impact of

“negativity biases” on attribution, it is reasonable to speculate that an earlier negative

encounter with an actor will bias us toward believing that he is more threatening (than


39

he really is) if our present encounter turns out to be again negative.26

More specifically, we can advance two predictions regarding the directionality of

this interaction between suspicion (or negativity) and attribution: suspicion leads to

over-attribution of malignant intention to others, just like a previous negative

encounter. Hence, a previous negative encounter with another actor leads us to 1)

over-attribute malign intentions to him/her when our present encounter is again

negative (i.e., again, undesirable rhetoric/behaviors from the same actor); 2)

under-estimate benign intentions to him/her when our present encounter is positive

(i.e., this time, desirable rhetoric/behaviors from the same actor).

Finally, “reactive inflation” and “reactive devaluation” together should predict

that it will be relatively easy to arouse individuals or mobilize the public with fear but

extremely difficult to arouse individuals or mobilize the public with a sense of

security. Indeed, more often than not, sense of security placates or dampens rather

than arouses or mobilizes. Thus, we try to calm down individuals who have suffered a

negative outcomes by saying “everything will be ok” but try to move individuals who

are reluctant to move by saying “if you do not move, bad things will happen”.

d. Delayed Acceptance versus Hasted Acceptance

The social evolutionary psychology of fear, in conjunction with the theory of

cognitive congruity/dissonance/balance (Osgood and Tannebaum 1955; Festinger

1957; Heider 1958)--which can be understood as an expression of egocentrism in

self-perception (Bem 1967; Steele and Liu 1983; Greenwald et al, 2002), shall predict

three related hypotheses.

First, we will be reluctant to believe that others are now behaving nicely if they

have behaved “badly” or even just “suspiciously” before. In contrast, we will readily

believe that others are now behaving badly and “suspiciously” even if they have

behaved nicely before. Second, we will be reluctant to attribute benign intentions to 26 This reinforcing effect of negative events can be understood as a form of Baynesian learning: more negative encounter with another actor leads to a stronger belief that the actor is malignant or at least unfriendly. This effect underpins why two sides in a rivalry will gradually come to view each other with deep suspicion and often hatred. I thank a reviewer for pushing me toward making this statement. Another way of putting this is that an earlier negative encounter increases our suspicion of the other.


40

others’ benign behavior if our initial impression of others has been negative. In

contrast, we will be readily to attribute malign intentions to others’ “bad” or even

ambiguous behaviors even if our initial impression of others has been positive. These

two outcomes can be understood as a diachronic (i.e., successive) expression of

“negativity dominance” within “negativity bias” (Rozin and Royzman 2001, 299), and

they are underpinned by a more fundamental phenomenon: We tend to emphasize the

possibility that intentions can quickly change from benign or neutral to malign but not

the other way around. All three expressions automatically project more danger onto

others than others really can pose, thus keep our mind alert.

There already exist some, although piecemeal, evidences for this prediction. From

folk wisdom, we know that it takes only one bad deed to destroy one’s good image

among others while it takes ten good deeds to make up for one’s bad deeds, either in

impression formation or in long-term relationship such as friendship and love. From

literature--which at least partially reflects folk wisdom, we know that some bad deeds

are deemed unforgivable and condemned one to hell (reviewed in Baumeister et al

2001, 328-331; Rozin and Royzman 2001, 307-312). Moreover, violation of trust

almost invariably looms larger than confirmation of trust in our mind (Kramer and

Messick 1998, 244).

From the history of the Cold War, we know that many in the West were very

reluctant to accept that Gorbachev was “for real” Because Soviet leaders before

Gorbachev had behaved aggressively. Meanwhile, many in the West were also

reluctant to reciprocate to Gorbachev’s benign gestures--even though they recognized

Gorbachev’s gestures to be benign, because they believed that he could easily switch

back to aggressive policies (Larson 1997, chap. 6; see also Lebow 1981; Kydd 2005).

Finally, regarding the prominent problem of the uncertainty over others’ intentions, IR

scholars--whether from the more pessimistic realism camp or the more optimistic

non-realism camp--have almost uniformly emphasized the possibility that others’

intentions can change any time from benign or neutral to malign but almost never the

other way around (for a review, see Tang 2008).


41

e. Fear and Simplistic Thinking

As noted above, there have not been many studies that specifically address the

possible interaction between fear and simplistic thinking. As such, direct testing of

this possible interaction will constitute a partial but direct confirmation of the social

evolutionary psychology of fear.

The social evolutionary psychology of fear predicts that the presence of possible

threat posed by others should facilitate simplistic thinking about others’ behaviors.

When others seem to pose a threat to our welfare and survival, our instinct is to either

avoid/escape, and if possible, to counter the possible threat, and we shall spend

relatively little effort in trying to fathom the true motives behind others’ behaviors.

Again, there are indirect evidences supporting this hypothesis. In most studies of

stereotyping and prejudice in inter-ethnic group relations, the presences (perceived)

realistic or symbolic threat is perhaps omni-present in the background among

subjects’ mind (Stephan and Stephan 2000), and stereotypes are mental short-cuts.

C. Trust and Fear in Social Theories

Over the past decades, trust has come to occupy a critical place in social theories

(e.g., Barber 1983; Coleman 1990; Fukuyama 1995; Misztal 1996; Hardin 2006;

Hollis 1998; Larson 1997; Luhmann 1979; Kydd 2005, chap. 7; Putnam 2000;

Seligman 1997; Sztompka 1999; Uslaner 2002; Wendt 1999, chap 7; Wheeler and

Booth 2007). Because fear and trust are inseparably but inversely linked, the social

evolutionary psychology of dear has important implications for understanding the role

of trust in society and social theories.

First and foremost, trust and fear should be studied together rather than separately.

Although many often held trust as the solution to fear, risk, and many other things

(e.g., Luhmann 1979, 18-39; Seligman, Tonkiss & Passey 2000; Wendt 1999, chap. 7),

they have often failed to recognize that fear and trust are inseparably and inversely

linked. Too often, discussion on trust has failed to admit that fear--as a primary


42

emotion--holds ontological or psychological priority.27 Without taking the notion that

fear and trust are inherently linked and that fear is a primary emotion whereas trust is

a secondary emotion into their heart, many have given a utopian sentiment to trust.

They essentially take trust as the solution to many social ills but fail to admit that fear

inherently limits on the scope and depth of trust in social life, thus underestimating

the difficulty of overcoming fear and building trust in domestic or international

settings (e.g., Putnam 2000; Wendt 1999, chap. 7). Trust is no panacea toward utopia.

Second, there cannot be a purely rational choice approach toward trust and

mistrust simply because there cannot be a purely rational choice approach toward fear.

Rational choice-based treatments on trust (e.g., Coleman 1990; Elster 1989; Hardin

2002; Kydd 2005), interesting and impressive as they are, cannot possibly capture the

whole dynamics of trust. Trust, being constrained by the social evolutionary

psychology of fear and fear being a primary emotion, cannot but have an emotional

component (Lewis and Weigert 1985, 970-1; Wheeler and Booth 2008, 232-4). At the

same time, however, trust cannot be purely based on emotion either (e.g., Hollis 1998).

Precisely because fear is a primary emotion, only some rational control over fear can

overcome fear somewhat and lead to some trust.28 To adequately understand trust, we

need to bring the psychological approach and the rational choice approach together

(Lewis and Weigert 1985; Good 1988, 46-7; Gambetta 1988; see also Mercer 2005).

Third, if interpersonal trust is difficult, inter-group trust is even more so, due to

group identities and ethnocentrism: ethnocentrism inevitably favors ingroup trust but

outgroup distrust (Brewer 1981). Attempts by Deutsch (1958, 1973) and Axelord

(1984) to extrapolate lessons of forging cooperation among egoistic individuals to

forging cooperation among states or ethnic groups have vastly underemphasized the

impact of group on our behavior. Likewise, lessons on trust and cooperation within an

group (e.g., an organization, an ethnic group) will be of limited relevance for trust and

cooperation between groups. Similarly, lessons on trust and cooperation between

27 Many have recognized that trust is inherently tied to taking some risk in trusting others (e.g., Luhmann 1979, 18-39; Seligman 2000). Still, risk is not fear despite risk entails some fear. 28 In other words, trust is a “self-conscious” emotion. Unfortunately, the latest collection of essays on self-conscious emotions has no entry on trust (Tracy, Robins, & Tangeny, 2007).


43

non-ethnic groups (e.g., women, bankers, clerks) will be of limited relevance for trust

and cooperation between ethnic groups and states (Tajfel 1982, 13-15).

Finally, because trust is conditional or situational, trust can only be limited in

scope and depth (Hardin 2000). This means that trust is usually local (i.e., trust is

constrained by social distance). As such, trust in the overall society system, usually

called “system trust” or “political trust” (Luhmann 1979; Lewis and Weigert 1985,

973-4; Levi and Stoker 2000), may be very different from interpersonal trust, not the

least because the trustee in “system trust” is not a person but an artificial entity. So far,

many have banked on “system trust” or “political trust” a great deal without spelling

much of the psychological, conscious, and social foundation of it.

Overall, we have only mastered fairly limited knowledge on fear and trust in

human society. Hopefully, the preceding discussion can stimulate more research on

fear and trust in human society, either at interpersonal or intergroup level, thus

contributing to a better understanding of conflict and cooperation between groups,

including ethnic groups and nation states.

D. Containing Fear in International Politics

Although I have mostly focused on the difficulties of achieving cooperation, the

discussion here obviously has also implications for understanding thus preventing

conflict. The security dilemma/spiral mechanism has long been singled out as an

important mechanism of exacerbating tensions and thus leading to conflicts among

states (Butterfield 1951; Herz 1951; Jervis 1976; Glaser 1997; author, b). Apparently,

the security dilemma critically depends on the social evolutionary psychology of fear:

If we do not tend to unconsciously exaggerate potential threat posed by others, the

security dilemma/spiral mechanism will not have its vicious self-reinforcing dynamics.

This dynamic implies that reducing fear is conducive to building more trust (via

cooperation) among states whereas politicians’ unintentional and intentional

exacerbating fear works against building more trust among states.

Moreover, international politics as a system has firmly evolved from an offensive


44

realism world where the logic is “you-either-kill-or-be-killed” into a defensive realism

world where the logic is “to-live-and-to-let-live” (author, c). This suggests that states

can afford to and thus should take a more optimistic view about today’s world and

toward each other. In other words, states can afford to and thus should trust each other

a bit more. By doing so, they may come to realize that they can cooperate with each

other far more extensively and cordially than they have ever thought. In today’s

defensive realism world, it should be in states’ collective interest if they can manage

to fear each other a bit less and trust each other a bit more.29

Our discussion has three immediate implications for containing fear, and thus for

facilitating cooperation and preventing conflict, in international politics.

First, leaders should consciously learn to manage their fear of other states,

including the different psychological traits that make of the social psychology of fear.

Here, reducing our ethnocentrism is perhaps second only to reducing our core fear

because ethnocentrism exercises so much pernicious effect upon our understanding of

other groups.30 Unfortunately, because fear is a primary emotion, politicians often

resort to fear to get elected or stay in office (Robin 2004). And patriotism, as an

expression of ethnocentrism, has always been a potent weapon in galvanizing the

public for hard-line and aggressive policies, since the time of Perciles.

Second and related to the first, elite and the public in a country must be extremely

vigilant when some politicians try to inoculate and arouse fear in the public.

Unfortunately, due to the fact that fear is a primary emotion, this trick of “threat

inflation” has been politicians’ favorite tacit for mobilizing the public for conflict, the

latest case being the selling of the Iraq War by the Bush administration to American

public (Kaufmann 2004; Krebs and Lobasz 2007; and Thrall 2007; see also

Christensen 1996). Even more unfortunate, and again due to the fact that fear is a

29 By now, many readers may have already begun to doubt whether I have advanced a too optimistic picture of the world. If you have, then it again shows the power of the psychology of fear! By contending that decision-makers can afford to trust other states a bit more in today’s world, I am not arguing that trust is more righteous than fear. Trust does not have a moral approbation because trust is conditional (Hardin 1992, 512-6). My argument that more trust from decision makers in today’s world is justified is based on an evolutionary reading into the evolution of international politics as a system. 30 As John Herz (1959, 249) perceptively noted very early on, putting oneself into the other’s place should “take some of the sting” out of a security dilemma. See also Jervis 1976, 83; Kydd 2005, 51.


45

primary emotion, those who voice against fear-mongering will be in an inherently

disadvantaged position in the “marketplace of ideas” in time of danger and crisis.31

Third, in general, states should be vigilant, firm, but moderate. More specifically,

when one is unsure of another state’s intentions, one should not hastily adopt an

inflexible hostile stand against it. Instead, one should actively deploy reassurance to

signal its benign intentions and then to read the other state’s intentions from its

reaction toward one’s reassurance signals (author, unpublished; see also Kydd 2005,

chap. 7 & 8). If reassurance does reveal the benign nature of the other side, one can

then move its relationship with the other side into a more cooperative mode. One

adopts a hard-nosed policy only if one is pretty sure that the other side in malign. If

one adopts a hard-nosed policy when one is unsure of the other side’s intentions, one

risk exacerbating the security dilemma, thus ending up with arms race or even

unwanted war (Jervis 1976, chap. 3).

Conclusion

How to cope with the uncertainty about others’ intentions and the fear derived

from it lies at the heart of international politics. Regarding this central problématique,

the gospel in existing IR literature is that gauging others’ intentions is inherently

difficult (partly because they can change), and this gospel underpins the argument that

cooperation is difficult, if not impossible, in international politics (Mearsheimer 2001,

chap. 2; Jervis 1999; Tang 2008). From a concern for the fundamental challenge of

conflict and cooperation in human society, I have proposed that the gospel that others’

intentions are inherently difficult to gauge is under-specified and thus misleading. To

properly understand the problem of uncertainty about others’ intentions, we have to

unpack intentions into two broad types: malign intentions and benign intentions.

These two types of intention pose almost diametrically opposite challenges for states.

Malign intentions are easy to detect and difficult to hide whereas benign intentions

are too easily dismissed and discounted thus “hard to detect”. The fundamental cause

31 For some calls for deflating fear, see Thomas Friedman, “9/11 Is over,” New York Times, September 30, 2007; Fareed Zakaria, “The Only Thing We Have to Fear…” Newsweek, June 2 2008.


46

behind this phenomenon is the social evolutionary psychology of fear. The social

evolutionary psychology of fear limits our trust of others while facilitating our

mistrust of others. Moreover, mistrust encourages fear, and fear limits not only trust

but also our incentives to engage in trust-building behaviors: fear is self-confirming

thus potentially self-reinforcing (Gambetta 1988, 234). Our general reluctance to

explore the possibility of cooperation with other groups, rather than some structural

characteristics of international politics, is the real fundamental cause behind the

difficulty of achieving cooperation in international politics.

Although I have mustered enough evidence to make a credible case for a social

evolutionary psychology of fear, more direct testing of hypotheses derived from it will

be needed. Ideally, testing these hypotheses should be designed to fit with real

situations of inter-ethnic or international relations as realistically as possible.

Preventing conflict and forging cooperation is a perennial and fundamental challenge

in human society, including international politics. Social psychologists and students of

international politics have to take on this tall task, together.


47

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Figure 1: The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear

Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear

Mistrust

Sense of

Security

Fear or Sense

of insecurity

Others’ capabilities to

do harm

Uncertainty over

others’ intentions

Provocation and

Competition

Trust

Reassurance and

cooperation


68

Table I: Two Types of Counter-factual Thinking after Negative Events

Negative events brought about

by another actor

Negative events brought about

by nature/bad-luck

Psychological Aspects

Self-pity/anger against self: why

had not one recognized that the

other actor was malignant (so

that one could have prevented

the outcome)?

Bad luck: should be more

careful but there is little one

could have done to avoid the

event.

Recall other negative traits of

the other actor: prolonging our

alertness against the other actor

Recall other signs of bad

omens.

Fear/anger/hatred against the

other actor: why was he/she so

bad or cruel?

Memories: lasting and often

slow in relapsing

Memories: depending on the

severity of the event, but

generally less long lasting than

memories of negative events

incurred by other actors.

Behavioral Aspects

Striving to improve our

detecting capacity of bad traits.

Overall impact will be marginal.

Guardedness, we will be less

willing to trust the other actor

and other actors, especially

those who are associated with

the other actor.

Repeated mishaps increase the

attraction of magic, superstition

and religion.

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