A PRoJECT oF THE ASIA FoUNDATIoN

With a presidential election looming next year in Seoul, the

South Korean news media has begun to speculate on who will

be the next president. Most of these stories have focused

solely on potential candidates. They have listed names of

politicians and tried to analyze their strengths and weak-

nesses. In most cases, however, little attention has been paid

to analysis of issues or trends shaping public opinion. To

make any meaningful forecast regarding the December 2012

South Korean election, we must know not only who will run

for office but also how the voters are seeing the issues.

To better understand Korean opinion, the Asan Institute for

Policy Studies undertook a nationwide public opinion survey

in the fall of 2010 (The Asan Annual Poll 2010). According to

conventional wisdom, conservatives and liberals in Korea can

be defined by their attitudes toward North Korea and the

United States. Conservatives are understood as hardliners to-

ward North Korea and supporters of the United States, while

liberals are more sympathetic to North Korea and have a rela-

tively stronger anti-U.S. sentiment. Conservative ideology is

also believed to be generally more dominant among the older

generation. The Asan Annual Poll 2010, conducted from Au-

gust to October 2010 through face-to-face interviews of 2,000

adults nationwide, revealed several interesting findings with

regard to changes in Korean electorates.

First, the 2010 survey reveals that Koreans are pragmatic in

their attitudes toward the United States. Even those surveyed

who did not favorably view the United States, for instance,

those who saw the U.S as an obstacle in North-South rela-

tions, believed that the ROK-U.S. alliance is necessary in the

future. 87.2 percent of respondents supported the alliance in

the future, including the 86.5 percent who consider them-

selves to be liberals. This favorable and pragmatic attitude to-

ward the ROK-U.S. alliance might have been reinforced by

North Korea’s hostile acts in 2010 as well as by South Kore-

ans’ weakening confidence in deterrence capability against

North Korea. Only 23.3 percent of Koreans believed that the

South Korean military can deter North Korean provocations

without U.S. help. It must also be noted that Koreans appear

to separate their feelings toward the U.S. and their support for

the ROK-U.S. alliance, a tendency that is stronger among gen-

erations in their 20’s and 30’s. For example, survey findings

showed that younger generations do not like the U.S as much

as older generations do (52.3 percent and 48.8 percent of the

20’s and 30’s age groups respectively said they like the U.S.,

compared to 66.6 percent of the 60’s age group), but acknowl-

edge the necessity of the ROK-U.S. alliance as strongly as

their older counterparts.

Second, security is not the only issue that divides Koreans ide-

ologically. In fact, when it comes to defining their ideological

stance, social and economic issues are more important. This

trend is stronger among the younger generation, most notably

those in their 30’s. As for security issues, recent increases in

North Korean provocations appear to have driven a shift to-

ward conservative attitudes across all generations, making it

difficult to distinguish liberal and conservative camps in the

FEBRUARY 2011 - Vol. 3, No.1

SHIFTING POLITICAL GROUND IN SOUTH KOREA:

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE

WOO JUNG-YEOP

security area. In contrast, our survey revealed significant dif-

ferences among generations and between conservatives and

liberals on social issues such as abortion, gay rights, migrant

workers, and individual freedom and public order.

What explains these observations? The main factor is that

generations in their 20’s and 30’s are playing a totally differ-

ent political game compared to their older counterparts.

About a decade ago, younger generations, including the so-

called “386” generation who were born in the 1960s and went

to college in the 1980s, and older generations were engaged in

the same game of democratization. As the democratization

process in Korea is closely related to relations with the United

States and North Korea, important elements of that process

are North-South security issues and pro or anti-Americanism.

Before the advance of the 386 generation in the late 1990s

and early 2000s, Korean politics were strongly influenced by

the older generation who pursued hardline security policy and

pro-Americanism. As the power of the 386 generation in-

creased, soft security policy and anti-Americanism also be-

came more prominent.

South Korea’s 386 generation is now in their 40’s. Unlike 386

counterparts, the current younger generation in their 30’s and

20’s did not experience the struggle toward democratization

and lived their formative period in pretty much consolidated

democracy. Having experienced fully-democratized civil soci-

ety, they have very different policy views on North Korea and

the United States. They have moved beyond the ideological

battle of a decade ago, as a result of which pragmatism toward

the United States and North Korea, and social concerns, are

more important for them.

What are the implications for how ROK-U.S. alliance issues

will surface in the presidential election in 2012? It is still too

early to say what will happen in the remaining 22 months, but

one thing we can be sure of is that security perceptions are

going to play a different role than in the past. It is especially

difficult to determine how those in their 20’s and 30’s will re-

spond to security issues. This was observed in last year’s local

elections in June, when younger generations reacted totally

unexpectedly to the March 2010 Cheonan sinking and re-

flected different security perceptions from those of older gen-

erations. Specifically, younger generations appeared to pay

more attention to the social issues derived from security is-

sues. On the one hand, security issues arose because of the

Cheonan incident, but social issues arose at the same time as

younger generations believed that the government tried to use

Cheonan as a political opportunity and oppress the public’s

political freedom. As seen in the election outcome, public re-

action to the latter was stronger.

If there is no strong stimulus from North Korea, public per-

ception toward the ROK-U.S. alliance will be a constant vari-

able in 2012. As long as the ROK-U.S. alliance remains a secu-

rity issue, younger generations will unlikely react exception-

ally, but once it becomes a social issue, the story will be totally

different. It is important for political parties to serve younger

generations’ demands in politics. What they demand now fo-

cuses on neither democratization nor national security. To

mobilize and to appeal to those younger generations, political

parties should provide them with various social policy

choices. The political game will be very different once younger

generations attach themselves to specific social policies. Polit-

ical parties of Korea should be prepared for such changes.

WOO Jung-Yeop is a Research Fellow at the Asan Institute

for Policy Studies in Seoul.

NEWS & EVENTS

FEBRUARY 21-22, 2011—COUNCIL FOR SECURITY CO-

OPERATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC—LAS VEGAS, NV

13th MEETING OF THE STUDY GROUP ON WMD

CSCAP will hold its 13th meeting of the Study Group on Coun-

tering the Proliferation of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pa-

cific. Scott Snyder, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy Director, will

serve as a U.S. participant. Event details are available at:

www.cscap.org.

FEBRUARY 28-MARCH 1, 2011—THE ASAN INSTITUTE

FOR POLICY STUDIES—WASHINGTON, DC

U.S.-JAPAN-ROK DIALOGUE

The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and

International Studies, and the Japan Institute of International

Affairs will hold a U.S.-Japan-ROK dialogue as part of the

Asan Institute’s ongoing trilateral series. Scott Snyder, Center

for U.S.-Korea Policy Director, will serve as a U.S. panelist.

This event is closed to the public.

MARCH 5, 2011—NATIONAL UNIFICATION ADVISORY

COUNCIL—DENVER, CO

FORUM ON KOREAN UNIFICATION

The Denver Chapter of the National Unification Advisory

Council will hold an international forum on Korean unifica-

tion. Scott Snyder, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy Director, will

serve as a panelist on U.S.-Korea unification policy.

MARCH 16-19, 2011—INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCI-

ATION—MONTREAL, CANADA

ISA ANNUAL CONVENTION 2011

Le Centre Sheraton / Fairmont Queen Elizabeth / Marriott

Chateau Champlain | Montreal, Quebec

The International Studies Association will hold its 2011 an-

nual convention in Montreal on “Global Governance: Political

Authority in Transition.” See-Won Byun, Research Associate

of The Asia Foundation’s Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, will

present a paper on China-DPRK strategic partnership.

MARCH 18-19, 2011—WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL—SAN

FRANCISCO, CA

WORLDAFFAIRS 2011 CONFERENCE

The St. Regis San Francisco

The World Affairs Council of Northern California will hold its

annual meeting, “WorldAffairs 2011: Challenges to American

Power,” in San Francisco. Scott Snyder, Center for U.S.-

Korea Policy Director, will serve as a panelist.

PUBLICATIONS

Scott Snyder (February 9, 2011), " Shaky Restart to Inter-Ko-

rean Talks," First Take, Council on Foreign Relations.

Scott Snyder (January 27, 2011), “ Hu-Obama Summit: Impli-

cations for Managing North Korea,” Asia Unbound, Council on

Foreign Relations.

Anthea Mulakala (January 19, 2011), “ Development Coopera-

tion and Aid Effectiveness in Asia,” In Asia, The Asia Founda-

tion.

V. Bruce J. Tolentino, Nina Merchant-Vega, Veronique Salze-

Lozach, Johan Kharabi, and Katherine Loh (January 5, 2011), “

In 2001, Hard-Earned Resilience Will Carry Asia’s Economies

through the Crisis,” In Asia, The Asia Foundation.

G.S. Park and C.S. Moon (January 2011), “Carrying Out Social

Justice for North Korean Refugees in South Korea: Global and

Local Spheres of Civil Society,” in Global Civil Society 2011:

Globality and the Absence of Justice, New York: Palgrave

Macmillan.

Troy Stangarone (December 2010), “ Rewriting Policy: Private

Sector Influences in the KORUS FTA,” Paper originally pre-

sented at a workshop on “The Role and Influence of Domestic

Stakeholders on the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” Center for U.S.-Korea

Policy and the East Asia Institute, Seoul, February 2010.

Alyson Slack (December 2010), “ The American Media and

U.S.-South Korea Relations.” Paper originally presented at a

workshop on “The Role and Influence of Domestic Stakehold-

ers on the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” Center for U.S.-Korea Policy

and the East Asia Institute, Seoul, February 2010.

Andrew Yeo (December 2010), “ Is Enough at Stake? U.S. Civil

Society and the U.S.-ROK Alliance.” Paper originally presented

at a workshop on “The Role and Influence of Domestic Stake-

holders on the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” Center for U.S.-Korea Pol-

icy and the East Asia Institute, Seoul, February 2010.

For a complete list of publications, please visit:

www.centerforuskoreapolicy.org.

VIEWS ON THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE

“North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program is in-

creasingly a direct threat to the security of the United States

and our allies.”

--President Barack Obama, Press Conference with Presi-

dent Hu Jintao, Washington DC, January 19, 2011.

“A strong Korea-U.S. relationship is beneficial to relations be-

tween Korea and China…the ultimate goal of Korea-U.S. rela-

tions is not to compromise China-Korea relations but to deter

an outbreak of war and maintain peace.”

--President Lee Myung-bak, “ Dialogue with the President,”

February 1, 2011.

“It's extremely important for the United States as we pursue

our policies towards North Korea to coordinate with the gov-

ernment of South Korea.”

--Robert King, Special Envoy for North Korean Human

Rights Issues, Remarks on the Productive Relationship with

South Korea, Seoul, February 8, 2011.

“Americans need to understand that North Korean matters

are not just an international security issue but also a sensitive

domestic issue for people in South Korea.”

--Lee Jeong Gwan, Consul General of the Republic of Korea

in San Francisco, Interview with New America Media, February

6, 2011.

CenTer For KoreA PoliCy

The Asia Foundation

1779 Massachusetts Ave NW, Suite 815

Washington, DC 20036 USA

TEL: (202) 588-9420

FAX: (202) 588-9409

info@centerforuskoreapolicy.org

Scott Snyder, Director

See-Won Byun, Research Associate

Jill O’Donnell, Program Associate

Kevin Shepard, Program Associate

Kyu-toi Moon, Intern

David Kim, Senior Advisor

For more information on Center activities please visit: www.centerforuskoreapolicy.org.

The Center for U.S.-Korea Policy is based in the Washington DC office of The Asia Foundation with seed funding from the Smith Richardson Foun-

dation. The Center accepts donations from the public and private sector for its programs and operations. Inquiries should be directed to Scott Snyder

at ssnyder@centerforuskoreapolicy.org.

This newsletter is produced by the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy to provide updates and analysis on current policy issues related to the U.S.-ROK al-

liance partnership. All views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

To be added to the newsletter listserv, please contact info@centerforuskoreapolicy.org.

The Asia Foundation

1779 Massachusetts Ave NW, Suite 815

Washington, DC 20036 USA

The Center for U.S.-Korea Policy aims to

deepen and broaden the foundations for institu-

tionalized cooperation between the United States

and South Korea by promoting a comprehensive

U.S.-ROK alliance partnership on emerging global,

regional, and non-traditional security challenges. A

project of The Asia Foundation, the Center is

based in the Foundation’s Washington DC office.

The Asia Foundation is a private, non-profit, non-

governmental organization committed to the devel-

opment of a peaceful, prosperous, just, and open

Asia-Pacific region. Drawing on 50 years of experi-

ence in Asia, the Foundation collaborates with pri-

vate and public partners to support leadership and

institutional development, exchanges, and policy

research.

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