Shared Responsibilities: A national security strategy for the UK

8/14/2019 Shared Responsibilities: A national security strategy for the UK

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/shared-responsibilities-a-national-security-strategy-for-the-uk 1/19

Shared ResponsibilitiesA national security strategy for the UK

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SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations2

Thissummaryisdividedintofourparts:

• Asetofobservationsonthecurrentsecuritycontext

• Astatementofprincipleswhich,intheviewoftheCommission,shouldshapeand

underpintheUK’sresponsetothatcontext

• Asummaryoftheconclusionsreachedinthereport

• AlistofalltheCommission’srecommendations,whichturntheseconclusionsinto

callsforspecificactioninawiderangeofareas.

ObservationsonthecurrentsecuritycontextAspartoftheworkforourInterimReport,publishedinNovember2008,the

Commissionanalysedtheunderlyingdriversoftheinternationalsecurityenvironment

andmadeaseriesofbasicobservationsonthenatureofthechallengesnowfaced.We

standbythoseobservations1 today.Theyarethat:

• Aprocessofglobalisationandpowerdiffusionischangingthenatureofglobalorder,

dilutingthecontrolofnationalgovernments,deepeninginterdependenceacross

bordersandempoweringafarwiderrangeofactorsthanbefore.Theseactorsinclude

statesthatareemergingontotheworldstage,butalsoprivatecompanies,non-

governmentalorganisations(NGOs),terroristorganisations,criminalgangsandothers.

Theoverallresultisincreasedfreedomforsometodisruptordestroy,andreduced

statedominanceofthesecurityenvironment,sothatnostatetodaycanprovidefor

itssecurityneedsbyactingaloneandstateinstitutionsingeneralareunderpressure

toadapt.• Fragileandunstablestatesoutnumberstrong,accountableandstableonesinthe

internationalsystemtodaybymorethantwotoone,anddisorderlystatesarenowa

greaterthreattointernationalpeaceandsecuritythanisinter-statewar.

• Climatechange,globalpovertyandinequalityareexacerbatingthisproblemandthe

combinationofthesefactorswithresourcescarcityiscontributingtoaglobalconflict

environmentthatstilltakestoomanylives,displacestoomanypeopleandviolates

toomanyhumanrights.

• Transnationalcriminalnetworkshaveexpandedtheirtraffickingoperationsindrugs,

armsandpeopleandinmanycountriesareunderminingandcorruptingstate

governancearrangementsfromwithin,facilitatingandprofitingfromviolentconflict

intheprocess.• Aglobalisedneo-jihadiideologyhasemergedasasignificantdriverofthe

internationalsecuritylandscape.

• Wehavenowenteredasecondandfarmoredangerousnuclearageinwhich

proliferationnotonlytootherstatesbutalsotonon-stateactorsisagreaterdanger

thaninter-statenuclearconflict.

• Rapidadvancesininformation-andbio-technologiesarecreatingnewvulnerabilities,

makingcyber-crime,cyber-terrorismandnewformsofbiologicalwarfareallmore

likelyinthefuture.

• Thecombinationofglobalisation,urbanisationandevercloserhumancohabitation

withagreaterdiversityofanimalspeciesisexposinghumanitytogreaterrisksfrom

pandemicdisease.

• ComplexityhasenteredthephysicalinfrastructureofmodernlifeintheUKandour

relianceonstretchedandinterconnectedinfrastructureshasincreased.Morecritical

infrastructureisnowinprivatesectorhandsthanformanydecades,andthepriorities

1.Thefullanalysisthatunderpinsthese

observationsisavailableintheInterim

Report(ippr2008).

SummaryandRecommendations



3

ofcompanieshave,naturally,beenprofit,notresilience.Theresultisnewinternal

pointsofsocietalvulnerabilityandlessdirectstatecontroloftheservicesessentialfor

everydaylife.

Theseobservationsdescribeamuchchangedandevolvingworld.But,justas

importantlyforUKnationalsecuritystrategy,therelativeplaceoftheUKanditsmajor

alliesintheworldorderischangingtoo.Inthisreport,wedrawattentiontothe

followingimportantaspectsofthatcontext:

• ThepositionoftheUnitedStatesinworldaffairsischanging.

ItisourviewthattheUnitedStateswillremaintheworld’smostpowerfulnationfora

decadeormore,butitwillholdthatpowerinadifferentcontext,notasthesingle

superpower,butasthepowerofgreatestoverallimpactinamultipolarworldinwhich

newmajorplayersareemergingontheworldstage.

Theglobalfinancialcrisisandtherecessionthathasfollowedinitswakehave

acceleratedthetrendtowardsarelativedeclineinUSpoliticalinfluence.TheUSfaces

severeeconomicstrainsathomeandstrongerchallengestoitsgloballeadership

abroad.Atthesametime,itisbecomingmorefocusedonthegenuinelyglobalspreadofitsinterestsandalliances,andEuropeisbecominglesscentraltoitsoverallworld

view.

Thefulleffectsofthelong-termprocessesofchangeunderwaycannotbepredicted,

butitispossiblethatwiththesechangesintheUSpositionwemayalsobeseeing

thebeginningoftheendoffivecenturiesofdominanceofWesternpower,

institutionsandvaluesoverinternationalaffairs.

• Althoughstillsomeoftherichestcountriesonearth,theindividualcountriesof

Europe,includingtheUnitedKingdom,arelikewisecontinuingalongandgradual

processofdeclinerelativetootherpowersemergingontotheglobalstage.Both

demographictrendsandfuturerelativeeconomicgrowthpotentialsuggesta

continuationofthistrend,unlesscooperationamongtheEuropeanpowersleadsto

theEuropeanUnionemergingasamoreeffectiveplayerontheworldstage.

• ThereareharderconstraintsontheamounttheUK,theUSandtheEuropeanNATO

alliescanaffordtospendonsecuritythantherehavebeenformanydecades.These

constraintsaregrippingusjustassecurityrisksarediversifying,theglobalrecessionis

bitingandlong-termpressurestowardscompetition,conflictandstatefailureare

buildingupintheinternationalsystem.FinancialpressureswithinEuropemayalso

causeadditionalstrainsinthetransatlanticpartnership.

PrinciplesGiventhisoverallcontext,thisreportidentifiesandappliesprinciplesthatwebelieve

shouldunderpinUKnationalsecuritystrategyinthecircumstancesdescribed.These

principlesaresetoutbelow.Whiletheyfurnishaviewonthespecificissuesconfrontingustoday,theyalsoactasaguidetothelonger-termsecuritychallengesfacingtheUK.

1.TheobjectiveofanationalsecuritystrategyshouldbetoprotecttheUKpopulation

fromthefullrangeofriskssothatpeoplecangoabouttheirdailylivesfreelyandwith

confidenceunderagovernmentbasedonconsent.

2.Theriskstonationalsecuritymustbedefinedwidelyincurrentconditions,tocover

majorman-madethreatsandnaturaldisasters.

3.Inplayingourroleontheinternationalstage,Britishsovereigntymustbeexercised

responsibly.Thismeanshelpingothercountriesandpeoplestoaddresstheirown

problems,becauseinaninterconnectedworldtheneedsandwell-beingofourown

peoplearelinkedtotheneedsandinterestsofothers.

4.Amajorincreaseinlevelsofmultilateralcooperationisneeded.

5.ExtensivepartnershipworkingwithintheUK,withtheprivatesector,withcommunity

groupsandwithlocalgovernmentandcitizensasindividuals,mustlikewisebeafeature

ofsecuritypolicy.



6.Demonstratingandestablishinglegitimacyofstateactionisastrategicimperative.

7.Weneedtorefineourconflictpreventionpolicy.Whenwelltargetedandbasedona

goodunderstandingofthedynamicsofemergingproblems,preventiveactionsaves

money,livesandpoliticalrelationships.

8.Acommitmenttobuildingnationalresilience,especiallyinourinfrastructure,bymeasuresincludingeducatingandincreasingtheself-relianceofourcommunities,isan

integralpartofsecuritypolicy.

9.Weneedflexibleandwellcoordinatednationalcapabilities,forgingawiderangeof

policyinstruments,militaryandnon-military,intoacoherentwhole.

Inshort,theCommissionbelievesthatgovernmentneedstothinkbroadly,prepare

thoroughlyandactearly.Becausetoday’schallengesaremorediverseandcomplex,and

becauserelativestatepowerisnowmorelimited,governmentshavealsotocoordinate

theirinternaleffortmoreeffectivelyandtocooperateexternallywithmanyotheractors

whileatthesametimebeingcarefultodemonstratethelegitimacyoftheactionthey

take.

Thisconcept,ofadistributed2,coordinatedandlegitimateresponsehasbeenusedtoshapemuchofthestructureandcontentofthisreport.

PolicyconclusionsGiventhecontextandprinciplesoutlined,weconcludethat:

• Tohelpbuildadistributedresponseexternally,theUKmustinvestpoliticalcapitaland

resourcesineffortstobuildmoreeffectiveinternationalcooperation.Ifwecan

encourageotherstodothesame,wecanpushuppower,responsibilityandeffective

actiontomultilateralinstitutionsandextendtheirauthorityintopoorlyregulated

areasoftheglobalspace.Wesuggestitisimportanttodothisacrossawiderangeof

issues,includingenergycompetition,climatechange,nuclearproliferation,thecontrol

ofbiologicalandchemicalweapons,terrorism,transnationalcrime,cyber-securitychallengesandtheincreasinglyimportantusesofouterspace.

• TobuildadistributedresponseinternallyintheUK,andtodealwithchallenges

relatedtoresilience,counter-radicalisationandcounter-terrorismathome,central

governmentneedstodevolveanddelegatepowerandresponsibilitydownandoutto

localgovernment,communities,NGOs,businessesandcitizensandtoenlistallof

themaspartnersinthedeliveryofnationalsecurity.

• Tocoordinateourownwidelydispersednationaleffortandtobetterintegrateour

instrumentsatnationallevel,theUKneedstostrengthenthestrategiccentreof

governmentandtobreakdownthebarriersbetweendepartmentalstovepipes;to

conductnotaStrategicDefenceReviewbutaStrategicReviewofSecurityinthe

widestsense,whichincorporatesbutgoesbeyondarmeddefence;toestablisha

singlecross-governmentsecuritybudgetincorporatingallareasofspendingon

nationalsecurity,includingdefence;toreviewtherole,relationshipsandremitof

theDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DfID)sothatitsactivitiescanbe

moreeffectivelyintegratedwiththesecurityeffort;andtoenhancetheDiplomatic

Service,sothatitiscapableofthemoredemandingtaskswenowneeditto

perform.

• Onlegitimacy,wearguethereisaneedtothinkmorecreativelyandbemore

demandingofourselveswhenitcomestodemonstratingitinpractice.Thisismore

thanaquestionofvalues.Itispartofthewiderpoliticalstrategywithinwhichour

securitypoliciesmustsit.OurrecommendationsinChapter11ofthisreport,and

summarisedbelow,putfleshontheseideas.

Inadditiontotheseconclusionsonoverallstrategy,theCommissionhasreachedimportantconclusionsonarangeofmorespecificissues.

• OntheimmediatechallengeofAfghanistan-Pakistan,weconcludethatsuccessthere

requires:moreassistanceforPakistan;moreeffectiveintegrationoftheinternational

2.Adistributedresponseisonespread

overawideareaandsharedbya

numberofactorsatavarietyoflevels.

“Inshort,theCommissionbelievesthatgovernmentneedstothinkbroadly,preparethoroughlyandactearly”




effort;bettercoordinatedregionaldiplomacy;andtheuseofmilitaryforceonlywithin

awiderpoliticalstrategythatprotectsciviliansandbuildslegitimacyontheground.

Suchanapproachwillbeneededalsoinanyfutureinternationalinterventions.

• WecallforurgentinvestmentintheUK’sstrategicgasstoragecapacityandformore

cooperationonenergyattheleveloftheEuropeanUnionaspartofawiderpackageofmeasuresonenergysecurity.

• Ondefence,wecallforatransformationofthearmedforcesand,withinthecontext

ofthealliancesofwhichweareapart,forgreaterdefencecapabilityspecialisation.

Wepointtoover£24billionoffutureplanneddefencespendingthatneedstobe

re-thoughtaspartofafullStrategicReviewofSecurity.

Alliances

Onalliancerelationships,theCommissionhasexaminedthefollowingfiveoptionsfor

theUK.

1.TheUKcouldtrytoperpetuatethestatusquo,inwhichthecountrydependsona

versionofthetransatlanticalliancethatisheavilyreliantonAmericancapabilitiesand

resourcesandinwhichtheUKtriestoretainfull-spectrumdefencecapabilitiesbutona

muchsmallerscalethantheUS.

2.ItcouldpursueamajorstrengtheningofEuropeandefenceandsecuritycooperation,

notasanalternativetoNATObutasaroutetoreducingabsolutedependenceonthe

UnitedStateswhilecontinuingtobuildmoreeffectivemultilateralinstitutionsasa

longer-termproject.

3.Itcouldlooktosomeotherintergovernmentalgrouping,suchastheCommonwealth,

toplayagreaterroleorchooseadhoc arrangementsforspecificissues.

4.Itcouldtrytogoitaloneandonlylookforallieswhenabsolutelynecessary.

5.Itcouldpursueahedgingstrategythatassumesthatnofundamentalchoicesare

necessaryandleavesallfouroftheaboveoptionsinplay.

Inthisreport,wemakeadeliberatechoice.WearguethatOption2aboveservesthe

nationalsecurityinterestsoftheUKmoreeffectivelythananyother.Weneedto

buildbetterglobalinstitutionsacrossawidefront,butfortheforeseeablefutureUK

securitywillbebestservedbyourmembershipofthetransatlanticalliance.Thecosy

statusquo,however,inwhichtheUStakesmuchofthestrainwhileEurope

dissipatesitslimiteddefenceandsecurityresourcesonduplicatedcostsandColdWar

museumarmies,willnotbeavailableindefinitely.IfwedonotstrengthenNATOby

reinforcingitsEuropeanpillar,notjustondefencebutonwidersecurityissuestoo,

theresultwillbeneitherthestatusquonorsomeotherfantasyofwidercollective

securitycooperation.Therewillbeafuturecrisisthatleavesusvulnerabletoshifting

Americaninterestsandopinion,relativeUSdeclineandEuropeandisunityand

weakness,whenNATO’spoliticalgluefailstoholdandEuropeisleftmoreexposedthanatanytimesincetheSecondWorldWar.

TheBritishandEuropeanrelationshipwiththeUnitedStatesshouldthereforeremainthe

strongestpillarofournationalsecuritystrategy,butitcannotbetheonlyone.

StrengtheningoursecuritybaserequiresfarmoreeffectiveactionatEuropeanlevel.We

needtoinvestpoliticalcapital,diplomaticeffortandfinancialresourcesintheEuropean

SecurityandDefencePolicy.WehavetopersuadeourEuropeanpartnerstoraisetheir

minimumlevelsofsecuritycommitmentandresources.AndweneedtomodifytheUK’s

defenceposturetopursuegreatercapabilityspecialisationwithintheoverallalliance

effort,areducedscaleofcommitmenttofull-spectrumcombatcapabilities,andmore

targetedinvestmentinthekindsofcapabilitieswearelikelytoneedintheless

conventionalconflictenvironmentofthefuture.

Therearerisksinrelyingmoreonothers.Inreality,however,bothduringtheCold

Warandsince,wehavebeenlivingwiththoserisksformanyyears.Thereisagreater

danger,inourview,intakingtheUnitedStatesforgrantedorinattemptingtorely,

inevitablyinadequatelygiventheresourceconstraints,onanyeffortwecanmount

5




ourselves.NoEuropeancountry,includingthisone,hastheresourcestogoitalone

todayandattemptingtodosowouldbeamisjudgementofhistoricproportions.

Resources

Onthequestionofresourceconstraintsandthepublicfinances,weconcludethatthe

debateisjumpingtoofasttowardsraisingtaxesormakingcuts,skippingoverthe

questionofhowwegetmorevalueoutofwhatwealreadyspendonsecurity.Bothcuts

andtaxincreasesmaywellbenecessary,butbeforewegettothatstageweshouldbe

fullyexploringanapproachthat:

• Isbasedonaproperstrategicassessmentofthreatsacrossthewholesecurity

spectrumandthatdeploysourresourcesinawaythatisruthlesslytargetedatthose

threatsonacross-departmentalbasis

• Facesuptodifficultchoicesondefencepolicyandmoreeffectivelycoordinatesand

exploitssynergiesacrossdevelopmentandsecurityspending

• Makesbetter,moretargeteduseofotherresources.If,forexample,wecansave

moneybyreplacingtheIDcardschemewithmorepervasiveuseofbiometric

passports,thenthatoptionshouldbeexplored.IfwecansavemoneybybuildingmoreeffectivecooperationandcollaborationbetweentheMoDpolice,theBritish

TransportPoliceandtheCivilNuclearPolice,allofwhichplayaroleinprotecting

elementsofthenationalinfrastructure,weshouldlooktodoso.

Weshouldalsoadoptanapproachthat:

• Makesmoreofouralliancessothattheburdenismoreeffectivelysharedbetween

internationalpartners

• Coordinateswiderinternationalactionmoreeffectivelytoensurebetteroutcomesfor

themoneyweinvest

• Rationalisesourprocurementpolicytotargetessentialcapabilities

• Makesarealityofwellplannedandrelativelycheapeffortsatconflictpreventioninsteadofwastingmoneyandliveswhenconflictshavebrokenout

• Lookstospreadthecostsandeffortinareaslikeprotectionofthecriticalnational

infrastructure,energysecurityandmaritimepiracyfairlyacrossthepublicsector,

privatebusinesses,consumersandcitizens.

Wedonotpretendthatthesechoiceswouldmiraculouslyremovetheresourceproblem

weface,butaddressingthatproblemwithoutafundamentalre-thinkwillundermine

publicsupportforcontinuedinvestmentinnationalsecurityandwouldbeshort-sighted.

Itwouldalsobeamissedopportunitybecausethescaleofthefiscalpressurewe

currentlyfaceisanopportunitytogetonandtackletherangeoftaskswesetoutinthis

reportandshouldbedoinganyway.

RecommendationsThespecificrecommendationsthatflowfromtheseoverallconclusionsarepresented

below,intheorderinwhichtheyappearinthefullreport,wheregreatercontextand

detailforeachrecommendationisprovided.

Chapter3:DealingwiththechallengeofAfghanistanandPakistan

Recommendation1: TheGovernmentshoulddirectmoreresourcesatthesituationin

Pakistan,bothintermsofcapacitybuildingandoperationalsupporttohelpthe

Pakistanisecurityforcesdealdirectlywiththethreatfrommilitants,andintermsof

developmentassistance.TheborderareasofPakistanarenowtheepicentreofthe

challengeswefaceintheregion.ItisfromherethatbothAfghanistanandPakistanare

beingdestabilisedandfromthisareathatmilitantgroupscanplantheirattacks,bothin

theregionandintheWest.

Recommendation2: InrelationtoAfghanistan,whileacknowledgingtheneedforalong-

termcommitmentontheUK’spart,theCommissionbelievesweneedmuchmoreclarityand

realismonthenatureoftheendstatewearetheretohelpdeliver.Thefocusneedstobeon



7

helpingthewritofthedemocraticallyelectedgovernmentinKabulrunthroughoutthe

country,andonpreventingAfghanistanfrombeingusedasabasefromwhichtoattackus.

Itshouldnotbeontryingtoimplantourownculturalnormsinacountrythatisnotours.

Recommendation3:TheinternationalcommunityneedsasingleplanforAfghanistan,

developedinpartnershipwiththeAfghanauthorities,withtightlydefinedprioritiesand

adeterminationbyallmembersoftheinternationalcommunitytooperateitwithreal

unityofpurposeandvoice.Thereareover50countriesengagedinbilateralactivitiesin

Afghanistan,andmanymultilateralorganisationsareactivetoo.Thepowertodo

somethingaboutcoordinatingallthiseffortlieswiththeinternationalcommunity,not

withouradversariesontheground.

Recommendation4:Theuseofmilitaryforce,bothinAfghanistanandintheborder

areasofPakistan,mustbelockedmorefirmlywithinacoherentpoliticalplanthatis

designedtodefeattheadversariesweface.Thatplanshouldprioritisethesafetyand

protectionofAfghanciviliansandshouldbefullyexplainedtothepeopleofthecountry.

Recommendation5:TheUKgovernmentshould,withinternationalpartners,further

developitseffortsatnarcoticseradicationinAfghanistanbypursuingamultidimensional

strategyfocusedoncropdestruction,livelihoodsubstitution,anddealernetworkdisruption.ThiswillhelpbothtodevelopAfghanistan’slegaleconomyandtoundercut

theTaliban,whichprofitsfromthenarcoticstrade.

Recommendation6: TheGovernmentshouldsupportandencouragetheUStopursuea

widerregionalapproachtoimprovingthesituationinAfghanistanandPakistan.Many

neighbouringcountriesareaffectedbywhatisgoingonthereatthemomentandthe

regionhasseveralwider,interlockingsecuritychallengesthatrequireregionalsolutions.

India,China,Russia,IranandthecountriesofCentralAsianeedtobebroughtintoa

coordinatedprocess.

Recommendation7: TheUK’scapacityforcombinedcivilian-militarystabilisationand

reconstructionoperationsmustquicklygrowin-countryandincreasinglybeAfghanised

wherepossible.WehavebeengoodatwinningmilitaryvictoriesinAfghanistan,butlessgoodatbuildingastablepeaceafterwards.

Chapter4:Energysecurity

TheUKhasbeenusedtoplentifulsuppliesofenergy,oftenavailableclosetohomeand

atlow,stableprices.Thiseraisnowover.Wearebecominganenergy-importingcountry,

moreexposedtoarangeofrisksthataccompanyincreasedrelianceonothers.Of

particularconcernisthesupplyofgasfrommainlandEurope,whichwillbeagrowing

featureoftheUK’senergymixintheyearsahead.Consequently:

Recommendation8:TheUKshouldcontinuetopressforanintegratedandcoordinated

gasmarketacrossthewholeoftheEU.TheintegrationoftheEuropeangasmarketisa

foundationstoneofEUunityovercomingdecadesanditisinallmemberstates’interests

toensurethatEuropecannotbedividedbysuppliersseekingtoexertpoliticalinfluence.

Recommendation9:TheUKshould,asamatterofurgency,furtherdevelopitsstrategic

gasstoragecapacity,andgovernmentshouldsetatargetdateforachievingtherequired

capacity.Privatesectorproviderswillnotprovidethestrategicreserveweneed.Strategic

gasstorageisvitaltoensuringsupplyandtheavoidanceofpossibleenergyblackmail.

Recommendation10:TheGovernmentshouldfurtherdevelopalternativestogasin

powergeneration.Aspressuretocutcarbonoutputincreases,aswitchfromcoaltogas

islikelyinpowergeneration.Topreventthisfromfurtherincreasingourexposureto

importedgas,theUKneedstoexplorerenewables,furtherdevelopcarboncaptureand

storagetechnologyand,ifitpursuesmorenuclearpower,ensurethishappenswithout

creatingadditionalsecurityrisks.

Recommendation11: TheUKshouldfollowtheexampleofCaliforniaandestablisha

regulatorystructurethatgenuinelyincentivisesbothsupplycompaniesandconsumersto

saveenergyandincreaseefficiencylevelsintheuseofgas.Thisagainwouldcontribute

toreducedrelianceonimportedgasandthereforetoimprovednationalsecurity.




Chapter5:Defencepolicy

Itisclearthereisablackholeinthedefencebudget.Therehavealsobeenstrainsonthe

operationaleffectivenessoftheArmedForcesduetotheintensityofrecentoperations.

TheCommissionbelievesthissituationcannotcontinueasitis.

Recommendation12: AfullreviewoftheUK’sdefencerequirementsisneededurgently,

butthisreviewshouldformanintegralpartofawiderStrategicReviewofSecurity.It

shouldnotbeaStrategicDefenceReviewconductedinisolationfromtherestof

governmentthinkingonnationalsecurityrisksandresponses.Thedefencecomponent

ofthiswiderreviewshouldfocuson:increasedcapabilityspecialisation;capabilities

requiredtohandlerisksthatarespecifictotheUK;areducedcommitmenttothefull

spectrumofconventionalwarfightingcapability;anemphasisonpost-conflict

stabilisationandreconstructioncapabilities;andanewapproachtotheUK’snuclear

deterrent,Trident.Eachoftheseisaddressedinfurtherrecommendationsbelow.

Recommendation13: Thefuturedefenceinvestmentprogrammeshouldpursue

greaterUKdefencecapabilityspecialisationwithinthecontextofadeepeningof

EuropeandefenceintegrationandthewiderNATOallianceofwhichweareapart.

Weneedafocusoncommandandcontrolassets,tacticalground-airsupport,heavyliftaircraft,cyberwarfarecapability,andSpecialForces.Wealsoneedto

emphasisehighqualityServicepersonneltrainingandanincreaseinoverallService

numbers.

Recommendation14: TheGovernmentshouldgivehighprioritytothecapabilities

requiredtodealwitharangeofUK-specificsecuritychallenges.Thesemightinclude

majorcivilcontingencies,majorterroristincidentsonUKterritory,smallscaleriskstoUK

communitieslivingabroad,andsomeelementsofmaritimesecurity.

Recommendation15: TheGovernmentshouldthoroughlyre-examine,aspartofa

StrategicReviewofSecurity,itsprojecteddefenceequipmentrequirements.Thisre-

examinationshouldexploreallviableoptionsforcapabilitydowngradingandquantity

reductions,aswellasforcompletecancellationofsomeequipmentprogrammes.For

illustrativeratherthancomprehensivepurposes,wesuggestthatprogrammessuchastheFutureCarrier,theJointStrikeFighter,andpurchasesofType45Destroyersandof

Astuteclasssubmarinesshouldbeintheframe.

Recommendation16: TheUKshouldcreateaStabilisationandReconstruction

Force,onlytheheadquartersofwhichshouldbeapermanentstandingelement.

Thiswouldbeajointcivilian-militaryforce,partlystaffedfromatrainedcivilian

reserve,capableofbeingdeployedintostilldangerouspost-conflictenvironments

atshortnotice.

Trident

TheCommissionbelievesfirmlyintheneedtopursueaworldfreeofnuclearweapons

andintheneedfortheUKtoplayanactiveroleinbringingthatabout.Inthe

meantime,andinrelationtoTrident,theCommissionrecommends:Recommendation17:ThefutureofBritain’sindependentnucleardeterrentshouldbe

consideredasanintegralpartoftherecommendedStrategicReviewofSecurity.This

shouldconsider:

• Whether,astheCommissionbelievesisthecase,aminimumUKdeterrentisstill

needed

• Thebestandmostcost-effectivewaytoprovideit,includingconsiderationofwhether

weshouldreplacetheTridentsystem,asiscurrentlyplanned,seektoextendthelife

ofthecurrentsystemfurtherordecidethatsomeothersystemforprovidingBritain’s

deterrentinanucleararmedworldwouldbebettersuitedtothestrategic

circumstancesinwhichwethenfindourselves

• Theopportunitycostsofmaintainingourdeterrent,inallitspossibleforms,forothersectorsoftheUKdefenceandsecuritybudget.Thismusttakeintoaccountthecosts

thatwouldbeinvolvedindecommissioningTridentanditsfacilities.

Recommendation18: Inordertomaintaintheoptionofrefreshingthecurrentsystemas



9

3.AnEUBattlegroupisamilitaryforce

consistingofatleast1,500combat

soldiersdrawnfromEUmemberstates.

partoftheStrategicReviewofSecurity,theUKshouldcontinuewiththecrucial

ongoingpreparatoryworkontheconcept,designandassessmentphasesoftheTrident

refresh.

Recommendation19: Toprovidemaximumadditionalflexibilityinourposition,theUK

shouldalsonowrecommencedetailedexploratoryworkonthecostsandviabilityofa

furtherrun-on,beyond2024,oftheexistingVanguardsubmarinehulls,sothatthe

StrategicReviewofSecurity,shoulditconcludethatTridentistheappropriatewaytogo,

canalsoconsiderthisoptionifdesired.

Recommendation20: Finally,beforeanyfurtherdecisionofsubstanceistakenonthis

matter,Parliamentmusthaveafurtheropportunitytovote.

Chapter6:Deepeningalliancecooperation:NATO,theEUandthetransatlantic

partnership

Inlinewiththecommentsmadeearlierinthissummaryontheneedtostrengthenthe

EuropeanpillarofNATO,theCommissionmakesthefollowingrecommendations.

Recommendation21:RegardlessoftheoutcomeoffuturedeliberationsontheEU’s

TreatyofLisbon,theUKgovernmentshouldsupport,fullyengageinandifnecessaryleadmovestocreatepermanentstructureddefencecooperationamongapioneergroup

ofEuropeanUnioncountries.

Recommendation22: Pioneergroupdefenceministers,backedwherenecessarybytheir

nationalleaders,shouldalsopursueincreasedlevelsofinvestmentinpriorityareassuch

ason-the-groundforceprotection,improvedtransporttoandwithinthefieldof

operations,bettercommunicationsandintelligence,improvedlogisticsandmore

precision-guidedweapons.

Recommendation23: Onthesupplyside,weneeddeepercollaborationintheEuropean

defenceindustry,particularlyasthisrelatestolandandseasystems.Thereisstillwasted

researchanddevelopmentinvestmentinsmall-scalenationaldefenceindustriesinthese

areas,inflatedpricestotheEuropeantax-payer,andconsequentlymissedexport

opportunitiesforEuropeandefencemanufacturers.Thisallneedstobestrippedout,viaEuropeandefenceindustryconsolidation.

Recommendation24: Tohelpfreeupresourcesformuchneedednewinvestments,

Europeancountriesshouldeachpursuemorepoolingofresourcesandahigherdegree

ofrolespecialisation.Clearly,totalrelianceonrolespecialisationwouldbedangerousin

theabsenceofprioragreementonstrategyandcommitmentstodeployforces,but

provideditdevelopsincrementallyandtakesplaceonastrictlyvoluntarybasis,itshould

beencouragedandexpandedwhereverpossible.

Recommendation25: Atthestrategiclevel,thereisanurgentneedforanagreedEU

externalcrisismanagementdoctrine,whichwouldcovertherangeofissuesfrom

preventiveengagementandinterventioninhostileenvironmentstopeacekeeping,

conflictstabilisationandpost-conflictreconstruction.

Recommendation26:Toensurethatanydoctrineismorethancosmetic,thereisalsoa

needtoinvestintherightkindsofEuropeancapabilities.EUcountriesshouldincrease

thenumberofBattlegroups3 onstandbyatanyonetime,whileexpandingthesizeof

supportunitssuchaslogisticians,engineers,helicoptersquadrons,medicsand

intelligenceteamsthatmayberelevantnotonlytoshort-termBattlegroupinterventions

butalsotolonger-termstabilisationoperations.Individualcountriesshouldalsoinvest

moreinbuildingdeployablegendarmerie,policingandciviliancapabilitiesneededfor

post-conflictstabilisationandreconstructionoperations.

Recommendation27:TostrengthenEuropeanabilitiestodealwithlesstraditional

securitychallengesliketransnationalcrime,andtomakemoreeffectiveuseofborder

crossingpointsasopportunitiesforinterdictionsofarms,drugsandpeoplesmuggling,

theUKshouldbothmorefullyengageandsupporttheEUsecuritybodyFrontex’s

activitiesatthebordersoftheEuropeanUnionandpursueamuchenhancedandmore

centralisedrolefortheEuropeanPoliceOffice,Europol.




NATOreform

Recommendation28:There-thinkofNATO’sStrategicConcept,initiatedatthe60th

AnniversaryStrasbourg-KehlSummit,shouldbeusedasanopportunitytore-affirmthe

commitmenttocollectivedefence,asavehicletoclarifyandupdatetheorganisation’s

roleandmissionfortoday’schangedcircumstances,andtostimulatefurtherdebateon

whatNATOsolidarityandthecollectivesecurityguaranteemeaninpracticeincurrentconditions.SinceweliveinaworldwhereEuropeanandNorthAmericancountriescan

behithardfromaremotepointandwithlong-termeffects,solidarityrequiresNATO

membersbothtocommittothedefenceofhometerritoryandalsotobecollectively

willingandcapableofrespondingtonon-conventionaland‘outofarea’challenges.This

hastobecomeacorefeatureofbothdeterrenceandcollectiveself-defence,notan

optionalextra.

Recommendation29: Inthecontextoftheeconomicdownturn,thereintegrationof

FranceintoNATOmilitarystructuresandtheappointmentofafourstarFrenchgeneral

toleadAlliedCommandTransformationinNorfolk,Virginia,effortsatthetransformation

ofNATOcapabilitiesmustnowbeaccelerated.

Recommendation30:FargreaterconsiderationshouldbegiventohowNATO’smilitarycapabilitiescanbeusedincoordinatedfashionwithpolicing,civiliananddevelopment

instrumentsaspartofmoreeffectiveandintegratedstrategiesinconflict,post-conflict

andcomplexemergencysituations.

Recommendation31: NATOmustcontinueattemptstoreformitsinternalprocedures

andorganisation.Itcannotanylongerbethesametightlyorganised,consensus-based

organisation.Itneedsreformtoitspersonnelstructures,forceplanninganddecision-

making,aswellasitsfinancing.Inparticular,the‘costs-fall-where-they-lie’approach

needstobereplacedbyfinancialcontributionsthatarebasedonsizeofmembercountry

GDP.Thosecountries,suchastheUKandGermany,thatinsistonlimitingtheNATO

budgettonoughtpercentgrowthinrealterms,yearonyear,shouldalsodesistfrom

doingso.

Recommendation32:NATOmustkeepitsdooropentonewmemberswherethisisconsistentwithitsfundamentalidealsandpurpose.Thecriteriaofmembership,bothcivil

andmilitary,needtobemadeclearerandmoredemanding,butwheretheycanbemet,

newmembersshouldbeconsidered.Nonon-memberstateshouldhaveavetooverthis

process.

Chapter7:Strengtheningglobalcooperation

Actiononfragilestates

Theconsequencesflowingfromweakandfragilestatesareapotentiallygreaterthreatto

securitytodaythantheactionsofstrongones.Totacklethisissuemoreeffectively,the

Commissionbelieves:

Recommendation33:TheUKgovernmentshouldadoptapoliticalratherthanatechnocraticstancewhenengaginginfragilestatesanditshouldencourageotherstates

andinternationalinstitutionstodothesame.Providingassistancetoincumbent

governmentsintheseenvironmentscansometimespropupflawedandillegitimate

politicalregimes.Weneedtofindwaysofdeliveringfinancialaidthatareconditionalon

improvementsingovernance,citizenship,peaceanddevelopment.

Recommendation34:TheGovernmentshouldincreaseitsengagementwithandsupport

forregionalorganisationsthatpromotegoodgovernanceintheirspheresofinfluence.

OrganisationssuchastheAfricanUnion(AU),theNewPartnershipforAfrican

Development(NEPAD)andtheAfricanPeerReviewMechanism(APRM),whilestill

facingchallenges,havehadsomesuccessinfosteringaccountablepoliticalgovernancein

theirregionandwouldbenefitfromincreasedinternationalsupport.

Recommendation35:TheGovernmentshouldgivefullsupporttoapackageof

measuresdesignedtoreducecorruptionandincreaselegitimacyinweakandfragile

states.Corruptionintheseenvironmentsfurtherunderminesgoodgovernance,destroys

livesandcreatessecurityrisks.



11

Recommendation36: TheGovernmentshouldcommittomorepredictable,effectiveand

longer-termassistancetofragileandpost-conflictstates.Stableassistancepackagesare

particularlyimportantinpost-conflictenvironmentswheretooofteninternational

assistancebeginstotaperoffjustastheabsorptivecapacityofthestateisincreasing.

Recommendation37: Whereitisappropriatetodoso,theGovernmentshouldincrease

investmentinpooledresourcesforfragilestates.Donorcoordinationinthese

environmentsisoftenpoorandcommonaimsandobjectivesunclear.

Climatechangeandenergycompetition

Climatechangeisthemostpotentlong-termthreatfacinghumanityandthegreatest

challengetoouringenuityandleadership.Therearenoscenariosinwhichunchecked

climatechangeisgoodforeitherinternationalornationalsecurity.TheUKhaslimited

influenceonthisissueandanenforceableinternationalagreementonemissionstargets

isunlikelyintheshortterm.However,wecanstillactand,inourview,theUKshould

focusontwoissueswithoutwhichanyeffectiveinternationalactiononclimatechange

willbeimpossible:first,howmitigationandadaptationeffortsindevelopingcountries

aretobefinanced;andsecond,howlow-carbontechnologydevelopment,transferand

deploymentaretobeorganised.Consequently,theCommissionbelieves:Recommendation38:TheUKgovernmentshouldsupportthecreationofacoordinating

bodyforinternationalclimatefinanceflowsaimedatsupportingclimatechange

adaptationandmitigationactivitiesindevelopingcountries.

Recommendation39: TheGovernmentshouldprioritisesupportfortechnologytransfer

initiatives,especiallyinenergyefficiency.Whileemissionsreductionstargetsandcarbon

pricingissuesframeinternationalengagementonclimatechangeintermsofburden-

sharing,thedevelopmentoflow-carbontechnologytransformsthatengagementintoa

discussionaboutsharingtheindustrialgainsthatwillflowfromactiontomeetthecrisis.

Thisisinherentlymoreproductive.

Inaddition,becausethereisaseriousdangerofcompetitionandconflictoverfossilfuel

energysuppliesinfuture,particularlyoncetheglobaleconomycomesoutofrecession,theCommissionbelieves:

Recommendation40: TheGovernmentshouldplanforandadvocateatrulyglobal

forumforenergycooperation(withoutprecludingexpansionoftheInternationalEnergy

Agency).Thiswouldhelptolimitcompetitivepressurebyimprovinginternational

cooperationandcoordinationonthisissue.

Nuclearnon-proliferation

TheCommissionbelievestheGovernmentshouldvigorouslypursuethegoalofanuclear

weapons-freeworld.Thisisagoalthatmaytakegenerationstodeliverbutactionin

pursuitofitmustbeginimmediately.Intakingactiontohelpbringthisabout:

Recommendation41: TheUKGovernmentshouldvigorouslypursueastrengtheningof

theNon-ProliferationTreaty(NPT)provisionsonmonitoringandcompliance,toprovidegreaterassurancestoallpartiesontheeffectivenessoftheTreaty.TheInternational

AtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)AdditionalProtocol,requiringastatetoprovideaccessto

anylocationwherenuclearmaterialispresent,shouldbeacceptedbyallnationssigned

uptotheTreatyandthepolicygoalshouldbetomakesuchacceptancemandatoryat

theNPTReviewConferencein2010.

Recommendation42: TheGovernmentshouldprovidefurtherpracticalhelptothose

statesthatwishbutareunabletofullyimplementSecurityCouncilResolution1540on

thesafetyandsecurityofnuclearstockpiles.

Recommendation43:TheGovernmentshouldcontinuetoadvancethecaseforthe

internationalisationofthenuclearfuelcycleandforthecreationofnuclearfuelbanks

underIAEAcontrol.

Recommendation44: TheGovernmentshoulduseallitsinfluenceinsideNATOto

ensurethatthereviewofNATO’sstrategicconceptproducesaresultsensitivetoand

supportiveoftheneedforasuccessfulstrengtheningoftheNPT,boththroughoutthe

2010NPTReviewConferenceperiodandbeyond.

“Therearenoscenariosinwhichuncheckedclimatechangeisgoodforeitherinternationalornationalsecurity”



Inadditiontoanefforttopromoteastrategicdialogueonnon-proliferationamongthe

P-5(theUS,UK,France,RussiaandChina),moreover:

Recommendation45:TheGovernmentshouldalsofundandcontributetoasecond,

informaltrackofdiplomaticactivityinvolvingformerseniorofficialsandpolicyexperts

fromtheP-5plusIndia,IsraelandPakistan.

Biologicalandchemicalweapons

Biologicalandchemicalweaponsareagrowingconcern.Toaddressthechallengesinthis

area:

Recommendation46:TheUKgovernmentshouldusetheperiodleadinguptothe2011

ReviewConferenceoftheBiologicalandToxicWeaponsConvention(BTWC)topushfor

thecreationofaneffectiveverificationmechanismforthistreatyandtoimprovethe

monitoringofstatecompliancewithitsterms.

Recommendation47: TheGovernmentshouldtakestepstorestartstallednegotiationson

theestablishmentofanOrganisationfortheProhibitionofBiologicalWeapons,similarin

structuretotheOrganisationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeapons(OPCW)thatwas

setupin1997toensureimplementationoftheChemicalWeaponsConvention(CWC).Recommendation48: TheGovernmentshoulduseitspositionasaDepositoryStatefor

theBTWCtotakealeadindevelopingprogrammestoeducateindividualscientistsabout

thepotentialsecurityimplicationsoftheirwork.

Recommendation49:TheGovernmentshouldworkwithothermajorpowersto

eliminatetheloopholesrelatedtolawenforcementintheChemicalWeaponsConvention

(CWC),whichhaveencouragedsomestatestodevelopnewandincapacitatingchemical

agentsbasedonadvancesinneuroscience.

Cyberandspacesecurity

Aswebecomemoredependentonnetworkedtechnologiesandcommunicationsrouted

throughsatellites,twootherareasareripeforstrengthenedinternationalcooperation.

Thefirstoftheseiscyber-security.Onthis,webelieve:Recommendation50:TheUKgovernmentshouldincreaseitspoliticalandfinancial

supportforglobalactiontoenhance‘cybersecurity’,recognisingthehighpriorityalso

beingplacedonthisbytheObamaAdministrationintheUS.Asafirststep,concerted

actionataEuropeanlevelisrequiredthroughsupportingandbuildingonthegoodwork

ofEuropeanNetworkandInformationSecurityAgency(ENISA).

Onspacesecurity,wealsobelieve:

Recommendation51: TheGovernmentshouldpromotetheideaofafollow-ontreatyto

theOuterSpaceTreaty,andpursueanyandallotherpossibleformsofcooperative

dialoguetodeveloptheinternationallegalregimearoundthemilitaryusesofspace.

Chapter8:Resilience

Astherecommendationsaboveindicate,athemerunningthroughtheCommission’swork

hasbeenthatwelivetodayinacomplex,denselynetworkedandheavilytechnology-reliant

society.Extensiveprivatisationandthepursuitofcompetitiveadvantageinglobalised

marketshavealsoledustoparedownthesystemswerelyuponuntillittleornomarginfor

errorremains.Wehaveswitchedtoleanproduction,stretchedsupplychains,decreased

stockinventoriesandreducedredundancyinoursystems.Wehaveoutsourced,offshored

andembracedajust-in-timeculturewithlittleheedforjust-in-case.Thismagnifiesnotonly

efficiencybutalsovulnerability.Everythingdependsoninfrastructurefunctioningsmoothly

andtheinfrastructureofmodernlifecanbebrittle:interdependentsystemscanmakefor

cascadesofconcatenatedfailurewhenonelinkinthechainisbroken.

Criticalinfrastructure

TheCommissionbelievestheUKmustdomoretoaddressthechallengesthatflowfrom

thecontextdescribed.Inparticular,webelieve:

Recommendation52: TheUKgovernmentshouldreviewitspowerstomandaterealistic

minimumlevelsofresilienceinrelationtoallcriticalinfrastructuresandinrelationtoall




areasofinterdependencebetweendifferentinfrastructuresectors.Wherewider

interpretationoramendmentofexistinglegislationisnotsufficientandnewprimary

legislationisrequired,thisshouldbeincludedintheplannedfurtherBillonCivil

Contingencies.

Recommendation53:TheGovernmentshouldbringtogetherregulatorsofthedifferent

infrastructureindustriesandrequirethemtoenforcehigherresiliencestandardsintheir

ownsectors,aswellastoinvestigateandstrengthenresilienceinareasof

interdependenciesbetweensectorsandinsectorsupplychains.

Recommendation54: TheGovernmentshouldgofurtherandsignaltosectorregulators

thatitwouldwelcomeinvestmentbyutilityprovidersinrelevantareasoutsidetheirown

corebusinessareaswheresuchinvestmentwouldreduceinterdependenceonother

elementsoftheinfrastructure.Investmentbythepowergenerators,nationalgridand

energydistributioncompaniesinmobilecommunicationsthataremoreresilientagainst

powerfailure,forexample,wouldbewelcome.

Recommendation55:TheGovernmentshouldinstructtheOfficeofCommunications

(Ofcom)tomakeadequatespectrumavailabletoensureemergencyserviceaccessto

nextgenerationmobiletechnology.Thiswillbeincreasinglyimportanttotransmittingandreceivingthedatarequiredforsituationalawarenessandcoordinatedandtimely

emergencyresponseinthefuture,andmaybeespeciallyimportantforoccasionswhen

Airwavetrafficishighest,suchasduringtheLondon2012OlympicandParalympic

Games.

Recommendation56: TheGovernmentshouldworkwiththeOfficeofGasand

ElectricityMarkets(Ofgem)toensureasupportiveregulatoryenvironmentforrapid

investmentinSmartGrids.Bydiversifyingandlocalisingsourcesofenergysupply,this

technologycouldsubstantiallyincreasetheoverallresilienceoftheUK’senergy

infrastructure.

Recommendation57: TheGovernmentshouldtasktheCentrefortheProtectionof

NationalInfrastructure(CPNI)withthedevelopmentofsecurityrecommendationsaimedatmitigatingcommandandcontrolrisksassociatedwithSmartGridsastherehavebeen

concernsraisedinthisarea,iftheiruseissignificantlyexpanded.

Recommendation58: Industryshoulddevelopmarketingcommunicationscampaignsto

promotetheuseofSmartGridcapabilitiesbydomesticconsumers,includingtheuseof

attractiveoff-peaktariffsthatareassociatedwiththem.

Recommendation59: TheGovernmentshouldtasktheCPNItocarryoutathorough

analysisoftheextenttowhichspace-basedtechnologiesareembeddedinourcritical

infrastructureandconductacriticalassessmentofthequalityofexistingmitigation

planningagainsttheirloss.

Inordertoensurethatweaknessesinthesoftwarecodethatincreasinglyrunscritical

partsofourinfrastructureareminimised:

Recommendation60:TheGovernmentshouldalsoapproachtheEuropeanCommission

andtheincomingSwedishPresidencytosponsoraprogrammeforthecreationofa

rangeofsecureandreliablestandardsoftwaremodules(suchassimpleoperating

systems,databasemanagementsystemsandgraphicaluserinterfaces).Thesemodules

shouldbedevelopedusingformalmethodsandbemadeavailablefreeofcharge

throughanopensourcelicencetoencouragetheirwidespreaduse.

Enterpriseresilience

NotalloftheactionrequiredtomaketheUKmoreresilientshouldcomefrom

governmentdirectly.Thebusinesscommunitymustmakeimprovementstoo.To

encouragethis:

Recommendation61:TheGovernmentandbusinessorganisationsshouldworktogetheronacommunicationscampaign,specificallytargetingsmallandmediumsized

enterprises(SMEs),toovercomemisconceptionsabouttheresilienceofexisting

infrastructureservices.SomeSMEsassumethatbasicserviceswillbeprovidedunder

almostallcircumstancesandthatback-upplansarethereforenotrequired.

13




Recommendation62:TheGovernmentandbusinessorganisationsshouldencourage

majorpurchasersofinfrastructureservices(including,forexample,logisticsandpower

companies)todemandarangeofoptionsandservice-levelagreementsforthe

availabilityofresilientinfrastructureservicesagainstarangeofpricepoints.Thiswould

helptostimulateaprivatesectormarketformoreresilientservices.

Recommendation63: TheGovernmentshouldencouragetheprovisionoffinancial

incentives,suchasinsurancepremiumreductions,forSMEstoundertakebusiness

continuityplanning.

Recommendation64: TheGovernmentshoulddisseminatetoSMEsreal-lifecasestudies

ofinstanceswherecompanieshavefoundtheyhavebenefitedfromhavingbusiness

continuityplansinplace.

Recommendation65: TheGovernmentshouldproduce‘boardroombriefs’onresilience

forcompaniestouseintheircorporategovernance.

Recommendation66: TheGovernmentshouldpromoteBusinessContinuityPlanningas

anelementofCorporateSocialResponsibility,establishaschemeofChampionsof

Resilience,andencouragebigbusinessestoinsistonsatisfactionoftheBritishStandardonBusinessContinuity,BS25999amongtheirsupplierssotheirpurchasingpowerdrives

thisstandardmoredeeplyintothesupplychain.

Communityresilience

Sincecentralgovernmentcannotpreventalldisastersoralwaysbeonsiteimmediatelyto

providethenecessaryresponse,communitiesandcitizensneedtotakemore

responsibilityforresilienceintheirlocalareatoo.TheCommissionthereforebelieves:

Recommendation67:TheGovernmentshouldassistcommunitiestounderstandrisk-

orienteddecision-makingprocessesandoutcomesandenablethemtoaccessfundingto

buildcommunity-levelschemes,localnetworksandcapacitytocontributetoresilience

ontheground.

Recommendation68:LocalandRegionalResilienceForumsshouldreviewhowtheymightbenefitfromfurtherthirdsectorinvolvement,whatrelevanttraining

theycouldfacilitateforinterestedindividualsandvoluntaryandcommunitysector

organisations,andhowtheycouldmorewidelyconsultonanddisseminatetheir

emergencyplans.

Recommendation69: TheGovernmentshouldissuemoreadvicetothepublicon

basicpreparatoryactionsthatcouldbetakenatalocalleveltobolsterresilience.Itis

important,inthiscontext,thatwhenadviceisissuedtothewholepopulation,it

actuallyreachesthem.Effectivecommunityresiliencereliesoneffectiveinformation

provision.

Recommendation70:TheGovernmentshouldexaminetheextenttowhichexisting

goodpracticeinthefieldofcommunityemergencyresponseandsupportnetworks,such

astheKeswickFloodActionGroup,WRVS(whichgivessupporttotheelderly)andthe

RadioAmateurs’EmergencyNetwork(RAYNET),offermodelsforbroaderadoption.

Finally,onresilience,theGovernmentshouldencouragearesponsenotonlyfromlocal

communitiesbutalsofromtheUK’sinformationandcommunicationstechnology

community.Inparticular:

Recommendation71:Governmentshouldfacilitatethecreationofthecyberequivalent

of‘NeighbourhoodWatch’,byengagingpositivelywiththelaw-abidingtechnical

community(systemsadministrators,internetserviceproviders,‘white-hat’or‘ethical’

hackersandothers)toenlisttheirhelpinsecuringimportantsystemsandnetworks.

Chapter9:CounteringradicalisationandterrorisminsidetheUK

TheCommissionremainsconcernedaboutthe‘homegrown’terroristthreat,thequality

oftheGovernment’sunderstandingoftheradicalisationofBritishcitizens,andthe

strengthofthe‘Prevent’strandofitscounter-terrorismstrategy.Wefocusmanyofour

recommendationsinthisarea.Inparticularwebelieve:



15

Recommendation72: TheGovernment,CharityCommissionandMosquesandImams

NationalAdvisoryBoardshouldencourageandsupportmosquemanagement

committeestoemployBritishimamswhoareproficientintheEnglishlanguage,havean

understandingofmodernUKyouthcultureandaretrainedtobeabletodiscuss

controversialtopicssuchasjihadandhumanrightswiththeircongregations.Thiswould

helptoreconnectmoreestablishedinstitutionswiththeyoungMuslimpopulation.

Recommendation73: TheGovernmentshouldtrainfrontlineyouthworkersdealingwith

youngpeoplewhoarevulnerabletoradicalisingmessagesinhowtoaddresstheissues

involved,buildingonworkalreadyunderwaywiththeYouthJusticeBoard.

Recommendation74:TheGovernmentshoulddevelopfurthermaterialstoassistlocal

authoritiesandtheirpartnerstounderstandUKIslaminallitsdiversity,withits

associatedculturesandtraditions,andtounderstandwhichdenominationsandsystems

areconcentratedinwhichareas.

Recommendation75:TheGovernmentshouldcommissionfurtherresearchtounderpin

thiseffort.Thisshouldfocuson:

• TheradicalisingeffectsofglobaleventsatUKstreetlevel• Therelationshipsbetweennon-violentIslamistideologiesandterrorismintheUK

• Theprocessesofdisengagementfromviolenceandderadicalisation

• ThedynamicsofextremismamongmorerecentlyarrivedBritishimmigrantcommunities.

Withregardtoinformationsharing,webelieve:

Recommendation76:Thereshouldbefurthermovementfroma‘needtoknow’

approachtoa‘responsibilitytoprovide’mentality.GovernmentshouldsharewithLocal

AuthorityChiefExecutives,CouncilLeadersandPoliceBoroughCommandersmore

sanitisedinformationandintelligenceproductsregardingperceivedvulnerabilitiesto

radicalisationintheirrespectiveareas.

Recommendation77: Moregoodpracticeon‘Prevent’shouldbesharednationally:itiscurrentlyconcentratedinonlyasmallnumberoflocalauthorities,usuallythosethat

haveexperiencedterroristandcounter-terroristactivitydirectly,andthelessonslearned

needtobespreadmorewidely.

Recommendation78:TheGovernmentshouldexpandthenumberofhigh-securitypolice

andprisoncells.ThecustodysuiteofLondon’sPaddingtonGreenPoliceStationisnowno

longerbigenoughandthelackofappropriateprisoncapacityelsewheremeansthatBritain’s

convictedterroristsareexcessivelyconcentratedinBelmarshPrison.Thisconcentrationdoes

notsupportourwiderattemptstodealwiththeproblem,anditmayinfactexacerbateit.

Recommendation79: TheProbationService’ssmall,new,centralcounter-terrorismunit

shouldbesupportedtodevelopthecapabilityandcapacitytounderstandandsupport

growingnumbersofindividualsonprobationwhohavebeenreleasedfromcustodyafterhavingbeenconvictedforterrorism-relatedoffences.Somesuchindividuals,suchasAbu

IzzadeenandSaminaMalik,havealreadybeenreleased.Manymorewillbereleasedin

theyearstocome.

Recommendation80:TheGovernmentshouldexplainfurtherhowitsstatedwillingness

toaddresslegitimategrievances,includingwithregardtoUKforeignpolicy,willbe

carriedforwardinpractice.

Recommendation81:TheGovernmentshouldworkwiththepoliceandCrownProsecution

Servicefollowingterroristconvictionstoreleasemoreinformationtothepublic(fromwhom,

ofcourse,jurorsaredrawn)aboutthenatureofdisruptedterroristplots.Thiswouldassist

withpublicunderstandingofthenature,locationandseverityoftheterroristthreat.

Recommendation82: TheGovernmentshouldfurtherreviewitsuseoflanguageinthisarena,buildingontheworkofResearchandInformationCommunicationsUnit(RICU)

withintheHomeOffice.Wewelcometheannouncementthatphrasessuchas‘waron

terror’willnolongerbeused.




Recommendation83:TheGovernmentshouldreview,inconsultationwiththepublic,the

unintendedimpactsatcommunitylevelofexistingcounter-terrorismpolicyandpractice.

Recommendation84: ThepoliceandpartneragenciesmustnowrecruitmoreMuslim

staff.Whetherinspecialistdepartments,deliveringtrainingorperformingcommunity-

facingroles,thelanguage,lifeskillsandculturalandreligiousunderstandingsuchstaff

bringtothecounter-terrorismeffortisinvaluable.

Chapter10:Makinggovernmentmoreeffective

TheCommissionbelievesimprovedcoordinationoftheUKgovernmenteffortisvitalin

currentconditions.Notonlyaresecuritythreatsandhazardsmorediversebut

governmentitselfneedstointegrateawiderangeofpolicyinstrumentstobeeffectivein

response.Tostrengthenstrategiccoordinationofthenationalsecurityeffortandto

breakdowndepartmentalstovepipesinWhitehall,theCommissionbelieves:

Recommendation85: TheGovernmentshoulddeveloptheexistingMinisterial

CommitteeonNationalSecurity,InternationalRelationsandDevelopment(NSID)intoa

NationalSecurityCouncil(NSC)atgovernment’sheart.Thisshouldbechairedbythe

PrimeMinisteror,inhisorherabsence,byanotherveryseniorfigurefromtheCabinet.

ThecentraltaskoftheNSCshouldbetodevelopaclearviewonthenationalsecuritychallengesfacingthecountryandacross-departmentalstrategicresponse.

Recommendation86:TheGovernmentshouldreplacethepracticeofconducting

periodicstrategicdefencereviewswithaprocessofconductingaregularStrategic

ReviewofSecurity(SRS).Thisshouldhappeneveryfiveyearsandshouldincludebutgo

wellbeyondissuesrelatedtodefencetoconsiderthesecuritycontextinitsentirety.

Recommendation87: TheGovernmentshouldcreateasinglesecuritybudget,covering

theentirenationalsecurityterrain,asatooltoensurethattheNationalSecurityCouncil

hasfullvisibilityofallcurrentgovernmentspendingofrelevance,canmakeinformed

trade-offsbetweendifferentsecurityinvestmentpriorities,hasareadyfacilitytotransfer

financialresourcesbetweendepartmentalbudgetsifnecessaryandcandosointhemost

effectiveandopenlyaccountablewaypossible.Inaddition,webelievesomechangestotheworkoftheDepartmentforInternational

Development(DfID)arerequired.AswepointedoutinourInterimReport,global

povertyandinequalityaremajordriversofinstability,andviolentconflictisamajor

barriertodevelopment.WesupportmovestakenbyDfIDoverthepastfiveyearsto

understandthecausesofconflict,tomakeitsdevelopmentworkmoreconflict-sensitive

andtoshiftadditionalresourcestowardsfragileandconflict-affectedstates.Toensure

moreeffectiveintegrationofsomeelementsoftheworkofDfIDintothewiderUK

nationalsecurityeffort,however,theCommissionbelievesfurtherchangeisneeded.Asa

result,wealsorecommend:

Recommendation88: TheInternationalDevelopmentAct2002shouldbeamendedto

saythatthemissionoftheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentistopromote

developmentthroughpovertyreductionandthepromotionofconditionsofsafetyand

securityinthedevelopingworld.Webelievethischangeisnecessarytoremoveany

ambiguitythatmayexistoveraDfIDroleindevelopmentactivitiesnotdirectlyrelatedto

povertyreduction.

Recommendation89:TheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentshouldpublish

explicitcriteriafordecidingwhereitsresourcesareallocatedandforwhatpurpose.These

arecurrentlyabsent.Aspartofthischange,wewouldliketoseeaportionoftheDfID

budgetmadeavailableforactivitiesthatwouldnotordinarilybeclassifiedasaid,suchas

stabilisationandreconstructionactivitiesinconflict-affectedareas.Inordertomakesure

thatthisdoesnotunderminelongertermeffortsordiminishtheassistanceforfragile

andfailingstatesrecommendedinChapter7,thismayneedtobedonethroughthe

creationofaRapidResponseFund.

Recommendation90:GovernmentshouldconductareviewintohowDepartmentfor

InternationalDevelopmentandForeignandCommonwealthOfficeoperationsin

overseaslocationscanbemoreeffectivelycoordinated.Wearenotconvincedthat



17

runningparalleloperations,asiscurrentlythecaseinmanyplaces,isacost-effective

wayofoperatingordeliversthebestresults.

Webelievethattherecommendedchanges(alongwiththerecommendationthatthe

UKcreateajointcivilian-militaryStabilisationandReconstructionForce,putforwardin

Chapter5),whencoupledtoDfID’songoingeffortstoimproveitsroleandcontribution

onissueslikejusticeandsecuritysectorreformin-country,wouldimproveDfID’s

contributiontomeetingbothdevelopmentchallengesindangerousplacesandnational,

regionalorglobalsecuritythreats.

Beyondthis,webelieveotherchangestothemachineryofgovernmentarealso

necessary.Werecommend:

Recommendation91: TheCabinetSecretaryshouldhaveasingleseniorDeputyfor

NationalSecurityatPermanentSecretarylevel;andthenationalsecuritysecretariatin

theCabinetOfficeshouldbeexpandedtoprovideproperservicingandcoordinationof

businessfortheNationalSecurityCouncilandtoensurethatdecisionstakenbyitare

followedupacrossWhitehall.

TopromotemoreeffectiveexternalchallengetotheGovernmentonnationalsecurity,webelieve:

Recommendation92: TherecentlycreatedNationalSecurityForum,apanelofeminent

individualsfromoutsidegovernment,shouldhaveanindependentratherthana

ministerialchair,abudgetthatwouldenableittocommissionitsownexternalresearch,

andenoughofficesupporttoallowpublicationofitsownconclusions.

Recommendation93: TheGovernmentshoulddeveloptheideaofasingleUK

intelligencecommunity(bywhichwedonotmeanasingleintelligenceagency,whichwe

arenotinfavourof),withaclearlyidentifiedheadatpermanentsecretarylevel(who

couldalsobethechairpersonoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee[JIC]).

Recommendation94: ThesingleheadoftheUKintelligencecommunityshouldbegiven

responsibilityforcoordinatingallofthehorizon-scanningactivitygoingonacrossgovernment,inordertoensurethatitisproperlycoordinatedandthat,where

appropriate,issuesarebroughttotheattentionoftheNationalSecurityCouncil.

Recommendation95:TheGovernmentshouldincreasethecapacityoftheintelligence

communitytoanalyseandmakeuseofthehugeamountsofopensourceinformation

nowavailable.

Recommendation96:TheStrategicReviewofSecurityshouldtakeintoaccountthe

contributiontosecuritymadebytheUK’sdiplomaticcapabilitiesandensureadequate

levelsoffundingforthiscomponent.

Chapter11:Theroleandrequirementsoflegitimacyinnationalsecuritystrategy

IntheviewoftheCommission,quiteapartfrombeingcrucialtotheoperationofany

democraticstate,demonstrablelegitimacyofactioncanbeaninfluencemultiplierwhenitcomestoattemptstomanagetheinternationalsecurityenvironment.Inaworldwhere

poweriswidelydispersed,itisanimportantpartoftheroutetoissue-specificalliances

andpartnershipsandconsequentlytogreaterpolicyreach.Webelieve,therefore,that

legitimacyisastrategicnecessity,notapleasantbonus,andthatapparenttensions

betweenlegitimacyofactionandseriousnessofpurposeare,forthemostpart,illusory.

Inourview,legitimacyresidesinademonstratedcommitmenttoanumberofmore

specificideas.Theseinclude:

• Acommitmenttotheruleoflawathome

• Acommitmenttoarules-basedinternationalsystemandtoconformitywith

internationallaw

• Awillingnesstoupholdandprotectfundamentalhumanrights

• Acommitmenttomoredemocraticandtransparentpolicymaking,opentoawide

arrayofinputsandsubjecttoeffectivepublicscrutinyandaccountability.



TheUKhasmuchinitshistorytobeproudofinrelationtomanyoftheseareasandin

spiteofourcolonialhistory,weshowasolidunderstandingofandrespectforother

cultures.Equally,however,wedonotalwaysliveuptosuchidealsaswellaswemightin

practice.Themorewidelyacommitmenttotheseideasissharedandpractisedathome

andaroundtheworld,themorelikelywearetoenjoybothnationalandinternational

securitynowandinthelongterm.Consequently,theCommissionmakesrecommendationsinanumberofrelatedareas.Theseinclude:

Theruleoflawathome

TheCommissionbelieves:

Recommendation97: Suspectedterroristsshouldbetreatedassuspectedcriminalsand

shouldbedealtwithusingthestandardCriminalJusticeSystem.

Recommendation98: TheGovernmentshouldcontinuetoexplorewaysinwhich

interceptevidencemightbeusedincriminalproceedingswithoutprejudicingnational

security.

Recommendation99: TheGovernmentshouldputadraftConstitutionalBillofRights

andResponsibilitiesfortheUnitedKingdombeforeParliament,asacontributiontoeffortstowinheartsandmindsandtohelpcounter-radicalisation.

Publicaccountabilityandengagementinpolicymaking

Inthisarea,theCommissionbelieves:

Recommendation100:TheGovernmentshouldstrengthentheroleofciviceducationin

theNationalCurriculumtaughtinourschools,withtheaimofinstillinganawarenessof

thenationalandinternationalneedforinterculturalunderstanding.

Recommendation101: AshasalreadybeenmootedbyGovernment,asingleNational

SecuritySelectCommitteeshouldbesetupinParliament,madeupofmembersofboth

Houses,withamembershipalsodrawnfromacrossotherrelevantSelectCommittees.

Recommendation102:ThelevelofresourceandprofessionalsupporttotheIntelligence

andSecurityCommitteeshouldalsobeincreased,toallowittobetteroverseethecrucialbutalsohighlysensitiveworkoftheintelligencecommunity.

Recommendation103:TheGovernmentshoulddedicateadditionalresourcestothe

ForeignandCommonwealthOfficeoutreachprogrammeandexpanditintoabroader

ongoingprogrammewhichwouldsystematicallyinformtheBritishpublicabout

importantforeignpolicyquestionsandissuesandfacilitateamoreopendialogueand

exchangebetweeninterestedmembersofthepublicandFCOministersandofficials.

Arules-basedinternationalsystem

Atinternationallevel,wemayneedtoworkwithawiderrangeofpartnerstobuildthe

rules-basedorderthatweseek,includingthroughtheG20,theUnitedNationsandother

groupings.Buttwoissuesremainfundamentaltoourattemptstopursueprogressinthis

area.Thefirstrelatestotheuseofforceandthesecondtohumanrights.Onthese,theCommissionbelieves:

Recommendation104:Iftheuseofmilitaryforceisdeemednecessary,itshouldbe

basedontheprinciplesoftheUnitedNationsCharterorthespecificapprovalofthe

SecurityCouncil.Wherethelatterisnotpossiblebecausenationalinterestsparalysethe

SecurityCouncileveninthefaceofserioushumanrightsviolations,ahumanitariancrisis

oradevelopingthreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity,thenanyactiontakenshould

haveastrongclaimtolegitimacyinotherelementsoftheUNCharter,beconsistentwith

internationallaw,beproportionate,haveareasonableprospectofsuccess,andshould

onlybetakenasalastresortafterallpeacefulanddiplomaticavenuestoavertconflict

havebeenexhausted.

Onhumanrightsandtorture,theCommissionbelieves:

Recommendation105: TheGovernmentshouldensureitsownagentsareproperlytrained

asinterrogators,employonlylegalmethods,andchallengerobustlyallegedorsuspected

tortureorcruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentofprisoners,wherevertheyencounterit.




Recommendation106:TheGovernmentshouldsignandratifytheInternational

ConventionfortheProtectionofAllPersonsfromEnforcedDisappearance.

Recommendation107: TheGovernmentshoulduseitscloserelationshipwiththeUnited

StatestoencouragetheUStoratifyinternationaltreaties,conventionsandcovenantson

theRightsoftheChild(ratifiedbyallUNmemberstatesexcepttheUSandSomalia);

theEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen;ForcedDisappearances;

Protocol1totheGenevaConventions;andtheRomeStatuteoftheInternational

CriminalCourt(increasinglyimportantinaworldinwhichthepowerofnon-stateactors

isgrowing).

Recommendation108: TheGovernmentshouldalsoputmoreeffortintopromotingand

defendinghumanrightsaroundtheworldbyapplyingwhateverpressureitcanbringto

bearonregimesthatviolatethoserights.Thereisaparticularneedtodothisin

countriesintheMiddleEastandNorthAfricawithwhichwehavefriendlyrelationsbut

wheretoolittleisdonetorespecthumanrights.Althoughwemayhavelimitedcapacity

forinfluencebilaterallyinmanyofthesecases,weshouldseektoensurethathuman

rightsissuesareakeyelementshapingtheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy,apartof

EUactivitywithagreaterpotentialforregionalinfluence.Recommendation109: TheGovernmentshouldavoidattemptingtodeportsuspect

foreignnationalsonthebasisofmemorandaofunderstandingordiplomaticassurances

tocountrieswhichpractisetorture,unlesssucharrangementscanincluderobust

independentadditionalmonitoringtoensurethesafetyoftheindividualsinvolved.

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Documents

Shared Responsibilities: A national security strategy for the UK