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structure still clings to the Soviet mili-tary legacy, with more than 300,000personnel remaining in uniform. It is apivotal state with substantial potentialto stabilize the region.

This article examines how DODexecutes the national military strategyin shaping the international securityenvironment relative to Ukraine. U.S.engagement strategy has been moder-ately successful and is worth continu-ing, but resources have not been lever-aged efficiently. The government inKiev has shrewdly exploited Americanefforts to its own advantage while

U kraine’s independent statusand location are key to thepermanent demise of the So-viet empire. A strategic hinge

between Central Europe and the part-ner states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia,it is also the second largest country inEurope and, except for Russia, has thelargest military outside NATO. Its force

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy C. Shea, USA, serves in the Resources and AssessmentDirectorate (J-8), Joint Staff, and recently completed an assignment as the Armyattaché in Kiev.

Shaping onNATO’s DoorstepU.S.-Ukraine RelationsBy T I M O T H Y C. S H E A

Cooperative Osprey ’98.

2d Marine Division (Charles E. Rolfes)

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Report Documentation Page

Report Date 00 00 2002

Report Type N/A

Dates Covered (from... to) -

Title and Subtitle Shaping on NATO’S Doorstep U.S.- Ukraine Relations

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Supplementary Notes The original document contains color images.

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Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 59

largely spurning attempts to influenceits external behavior or internal politics.

Sovereignty, Stability, andIndependence

Creating a peaceful, stable regionwhere an enlarged U.S.-led NATO re-mains the preeminent security organi-zation is an enduring American objec-tive. Additionally, the United Statesseeks cooperative Russian and Ukrain-ian relations with the Alliance. Toolsinclude forces stationed abroad andtroops deployed for operations and ex-ercises; military-to-military contacts;programs such as security assistanceand defense and international arms co-operation; and a regional academic fa-cility, the George C. Marshall EuropeanCenter for Security Studies.

America’s hopes for engagementare ambitious. The U.S.-Ukraine JointWorking Group on Bilateral Defenseand Military Cooperation produced avision statement that calls for actions toensure that Ukraine is “a stable, inde-pendent democratic, and economicallyprosperous state, meeting its legitimate

security needs and playing a construc-tive role in promoting both regionaland international political, military,and economic stability.” To that end,the country has created a civilian-con-trolled defense establishment increas-ingly interoperable with Euro-Atlanticsecurity organizations.

But achievements have notmatched expectations. Responsibilityfor the overall engagement strategy to-ward Ukraine remains fragmented. Allactions are supposed to complementthe Mission Performance Plan (MPP),approved by the ambassador for allFederal agencies operating under theumbrella of the country team in Kiev,

but MPP, NATO activity, and the U.S.European Command (EUCOM) Mili-tary Contacts Program all exist withoutone master.

In this vacuum, the Office of theSecretary of Defense (OSD) works toformulate sound engagement policy

and sponsors interagency workinggroup sessions. OSD manages the bilat-eral annual Ministerial Plan of DefenseCooperation, which includes a varietyof initiatives such as the InternationalMilitary and Education Program(IMET), the EUCOM-administeredU.S.-Ukraine Military Contacts Pro-gram, Foreign Military Finance (FMF)cases, Partnership for Peace (PFP), andother bilateral initiatives such as sup-port for Ukraine’s participation inKosovo Force (KFOR).

OSD receives little help in manag-ing engagement. No national bodyoversees the effort to integrate the po-litical, economic, and informational in-

struments of national powerwith the military. Likewise,EUCOM lacks the authorityand capacity to synchronizemilitary efforts with the work

of other Federal agencies. The defenseattaché office in Kiev, while not for-mally tasked or sufficiently manned,assists DOD in synchronizing in-coun-try activities but with mixed results.Most peacetime military engagement

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be an important aspect of the emerg-ing European security architectureand a goal of the NATO-Ukraine Char-ter, which provides a framework foran open-ended association throughconsultation and cooperation oncommon issues.

Progress in improving Ukraine’srelations with the West is not assured.The NATO bombing campaign in theBalkans had a negative impact onUkraine’s perception of the Allianceand disastrous consequences on yearsof progress in building support for en-gagement within its skeptical officercorps. The NATO information center inKiev sat unmanned while allied bombs

involving Ukraine, a military culturedominated by landpower, is PFP exer-cises, KFOR deployments, and otherpeacekeeping efforts—land operations.Inexplicably, the U.S. defense attaché isan Air Force officer who is generallynot a regional specialist and by skill setis ill-equipped to handle the myriad de-mands of a robust engagement pro-gram. He should logically be an Armyforeign area officer. The present condi-tion is symptomatic of the failure tothink through and fully integrate en-gagement initiatives.

Between Eagle and BearU.S. strategy toward Ukraine is de-

signed to prevent conflict, but it inher-ently risks confrontation with Moscowby compelling Russia to accept a weak-ened position regarding its regionalambitions. Russia’s view of being encir-cled by this cordon sanitaire along its“near abroad” encourages behavior to-ward the United States vis-à-vis Ukrainemore as a regional rival than a partnerfor stability. Additionally, Ukraine hassought to assert its independence.While not anti-Russian, it wants to bal-ance East and West, as evidenced in itsestablishing bilateral military interac-tion with the United States by signing a

memorandum of understanding andcooperation in 1993. Ukraine was thefirst spinoff from the former SovietUnion to join PFP in February 1994.Further symbolizing how criticalUkraine is to U.S. interests, Vice Presi-dent Al Gore and President LeonidKuchma formally established a sym-bolic strategic partnership in 1996.

Moscow will no doubt retain sig-nificant influence over Ukraine nomatter how close the Washington-Kiev relationship becomes. Neverthe-less, an enduring relationship be-tween NATO and Ukraine promises to

UkraineDefense Budget: $582 million for2000; the gross domestic productin 2000 was $3.2 billion ($4,762per capita).

Manpower: With a population of50,387,000, Ukraine has a total of5,472,000 men between 18 and 32years of age. Active militarystrength is 303,800. Reserve forcesnumber approximately 1,000,000.

Armed Forces: Ukraine has anarmy of 151,200 with 3,937 mainbattle tanks, a navy with 13,000sailors and one submarine, onecruiser, and two frigates; and anair force with 96,000 personneland 534 combat aircraft.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies,The Military Balance, 2001–2002 (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press for the International Institute forStrategic Studies, 2001).

Ukranian soldiers in Kosovo.

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fell. Support for active cooperationwith NATO among the corps fell from a

pre-Kosovo level of 24 to 12 percent inone poll. Half of the population nowviews the Alliance as an aggressive bloc.The events of September 11 have soft-ened attitudes, but many officers re-main wary of America and the Alliance.

The NATO liaison office has re-opened and is grappling with interop-erability issues. The Verkhovna Rada(parliament), following years of grid-lock, finally ratified the partnership’sStatus of Forces Agreement. This willfacilitate and simplify Allied activity inthe country. The robust UkrainianIndividual Partnership Program in one

year included 295 activities involvingexercises, training, education, civil

emergency plan-ning, defense sup-port, and commu-nications. However,Ukraine only exe-cuted half of the

events, revealing that it was grosslyovercommitted.

Considering that all this engage-ment activity is fully subsidized, thedismal execution rate suggests thatKiev cannot absorb so much atten-tion. EUCOM alone conducted morethan 3,000 activities throughout itsarea of responsibility. Both sides haverecently agreed to concentrate theirefforts and shift the focus from quan-tity to quality.

GatekeeperThe lead for peacetime military

engagement is EUCOM. Its role inshaping U.S. engagement efforts can-not be overemphasized. Some have

raised the argument that CINCs havelargely displaced the Department ofState as regional powerbrokers. CINCsview their engagement programs astheir highest priority. Each annuallydevelops a theater engagement planwhich links planned engagement toprioritized objectives. The CINC doesnot fund the bulk of these activitiesfrom his own budget but from a num-ber of programs, so money is not a se-rious constraint. The way engagementis currently financed inhibits fiscalcontrol and leads to waste.

The primary engagement activitieshandled by the EUCOM security assis-tance and logistics directorate are IMETand FMF. Flawed management of theseresources illustrates the problem. Thegreatest fault with international mili-tary education and training is the beliefthat many officer-graduates will rise topositions of prominence in their armedforces. IMET does not require retention

the way engagement is currently financedinhibits fiscal control and leads to waste

Peace Shield ’00,Ukraine.

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point for the command’s peacetime en-gagement program. JCTP by law cannotreplicate any activity funded by anotherprogram and the team is prohibitedfrom participation in exercises, provid-ing services or equipment, or conduct-ing training. The defense attaché inKiev and the Office of Defense Coopera-tion manage these activities. Sadly, thesituation does not fit the standard JCTPmold. Designed to be colocated withcounterparts on the general staff, MLTin Ukraine’s case was forced to accept

in exchange for a free education, andUkraine has done poorly at using thesehighly trained officers. Transparency inthe nomination process, clear and de-tailed guidelines outlining minimumqualifications, and accountability for re-taining and assigning officers should beinstituted as prerequisites for IMET. TheOffice of Defense Cooperation in Kievshould have veto authority over un-qualified candidates.

Foreign military financing can beincredibly slow, and Ukrainian inputsoutlining national priorities are sus-pect. The leadership will all too fre-quently attempt to shift priorities oroverturn so-called deliberate decisionsafter committing resources to an FMFcase, but before delivery. To permitthese military oligarchs to unilaterallyspend U.S. taxpayer-funded FMFmoney on their own priorities is a mis-take. The United States is in a betterposition to objectively decide how tospend the funds to support U.S. strat-egy, filter out poor choices, and chal-lenge questionable priorities. U.S.management of IMET and FMF wouldbe in Ukraine’s best interest.

Exercises are one of the best vehi-cles for training combined staffs and ex-posing Ukrainian officers to U.S./NATOtactics, techniques, and procedures.Ukraine traditionally hosts annualground forces and maritime exercises.But the cadre responsible for planningwith U.S. counterparts is small andshrinking. While the bilateral exerciseregime has grown in scope and com-plexity each year, senior leadership inKiev has become increasingly apathetictoward planning and execution. Manyof these same leaders focus exclusivelyon the operational details of the open-ing ceremony and exercise paymentsearmarked for the training area.

Additionally, the Department ofInternational Cooperation (DICMOD)inserted itself into bilateral exercise de-velopment in 1999 and limited generalstaff participation to NATO and multi-national exercises. The absence of gen-eral staff officers in bilateral exerciseplanning not only hurt the exercisebut was also a lost opportunity for im-proving NATO interoperability. This

development has diminished exercisequality and was viewed as a cynical at-tempt to qualify for funding entitle-ments in an unsuccessful bid to obtaincomputers and office equipment.

Another major initiative goneastray was the introduction of aEUCOM military liaison team (MLT). Acomponent of the Joint Contact TeamProgram (JCTP), it serves as the focal

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residency on the opposite side of Kievfrom the Ministry of Defense. Instead ofdirectly coordinating with planners, theteam relies on DICMOD apparatchiks toadminister the program. MLT membersserve in a temporary duty status with-out mastering the intricacies of dealingwith their counterparts. They lack Russ-ian or Ukrainian language skills andregional expertise. The team’s organiza-tion and activities need to be reorgan-ized and its efforts placed under theoperational control of the Office of De-fense Cooperation.

The George C. Marshall EuropeanCenter for Security Studies, located inGarmisch, Germany, teaches defenseplanning, organization, and manage-ment in democratic societies to EastEuropean military officers and govern-ment officials. The center provides auseful product to Ukrainian officers,but realigning the curriculum wouldoffer substantial benefits. A reinventedrelic of the Cold War, the center inad-vertently reinforces the dominant roleof Moscow and fosters the illusion of afunctional Commonwealth of Inde-pendent States. In partial recognitionof this problem, the center moved tohire a foreign service national to workwith the attaché in Kiev and customizethe program. As a practical matter, thecenter maintains Russian as the lingua

franca of the former Soviet republicsinstead of using national languagessuch as Ukrainian (English and Ger-man are also offered). While the costsare prohibitive to use all regional lan-guages, the strategic importance ofUkraine warrants the wider use of its

official tongue. The U.S. policy of pan-dering to the Russian Federation to fillseats at the center convinces othercountries that they are second class.Success should not be defined as maxi-mizing Russian participation in eventsor attracting mostly unreformable sen-ior officers to flagship courses. Instead,the school should invite officers fromregional groupings with orientationsarrayed against Russian domination ofthe region.

On Foreign GroundThe Yavoriv training area in the

western Ukraine was designated as thefirst NATO/PFP training center on theterritory of the former Soviet Unionduring the April 1999 NATO summit.

The United States strongly supportedthe Ukrainian desire to market the fa-cility. However, Kiev has not agreed tohost a NATO exercise there since Coop-erative Neighbor in 1997. Western Op-erational Command, which owns Ya-voriv, originally saw an opportunity toincrease revenues and enable infra-structure improvements. Exercise costsincluded amortization charges for coathangers and paintings hanging on bil-let walls. Ukrainian senior officers donot view extortionist practices as inap-propriate and shamelessly defend eventhe most dubious charges. Allied na-tions such as Canada, The Netherlands,and the United Kingdom, have avoidedthe inflated exercise costs charged bythe Western Operational Commandand sought training opportunities else-where. During Peace Shield, the UnitedStates met with hysterical resistancewhen it contracted for goods and serv-ices instead of transferring funds toministry bank accounts.

The legacy of the Soviet armedforces and the Committee for State Se-curity (or KGB) remains deeplyimbedded in the psyche of most sen-ior officers. Old party leaders poisonthe entire government. As James Sherrof the Conflict Research Studies Cen-

tre in the British Ministry of De-fence says, “In Ukraine officialand criminal structures have ef-fectively merged. Ukraine expectsthe West to take more risks on itsbehalf than it is prepared to take

itself. Neither Western assistance norpressure produces results.” AfterUkraine’s declaration of independ-ence, many senior officers elected tostay for opportunistic reasons. Thisnomenklatura, which includes the ma-jority of senior general officers servingtoday, are classic products of theSoviet military, more concerned withperks and privileges than showing ini-tiative and seeking responsibility.

U.S. engagement has been effec-tive in teaching the senior ministryleadership to use defense reform rheto-ric and buzzwords to maintain the in-centives and to keep the pressure offfor real action. Defense reform threat-ens these leaders directly, and theyhave a huge stake in misleading theUnited States into believing they are

general officers serving todayare more concerned with perksthan showing initiative

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shaping activity was loosely regulatedand allowed activity managers substan-tial discretion. Engagement activity hasbecome more regulated over time andresources less available. MeanwhileUkraine’s perception of its strategicvalue to the West has grow proportion-ally with its expectation of even greatermaterial incentives. This distortion hasresulted in mutual disappointment andalienation, a vicious cycle that threat-ens to spin out of control as each sideincreasingly views the other as insin-cere and exploitative. The amount ofmoney thrown at peacetime militaryengagement has convinced seniorUkrainian leadership that the UnitedStates has unlimited resources and thatthe decreasing incentives representWashington’s indifference.

What is needed now is less lectur-ing, greater U.S. humility, morethoughtful organizing, rewarding posi-tive change, and discouraging inappro-priate action. Because problems cutacross the entire government, neitherOSD nor EUCOM can solve themalone. For any strategy to succeed itmust be implemented using all instru-ments of U.S. power—and Ukrainemust respond across the entire spec-trum of its government. The seniorcivilian and military leadership havenot actively supported reform in thepast. Ongoing bilateral efforts haveshown some renewed signs that pointtoward progress. Kiev remains recep-tive to engagement, but the way aheadrequires more judicious use of incen-tives to motivate positive forces forchange and deny success to sophisti-cated elements interested in blockingreform or plundering resources. JFQ

not smart enough to grasp the concept,or they lack the necessary resources, orthey are valiantly struggling to achievereform along the edges.

On the other hand, junior andmiddle rank officers are progressive, en-ergetic, and patriotic. But the oppressivecommand climate punishes initiative,imposes silence, and causes frustration.Political officers—zampolit—of the for-mer Main Political Administration ofSoviet Armed Forces are now promotingtheir version of patriotism and loyalty.These political socialization responsibil-ities included marching the troops tovote in presidential elections in autumn1999 to support the Defense Minister’sfavorite relative.

In truth, archaic Soviet practicesstill flourish. The Byzantine structureof the Ministry of Defense functions asa loose coalition of stovepipe organiza-tions that answer only to the defenseminister. The U.S. military engagementapparatus has no clearly defined coun-terpart. The United States coordinateswith the general staff, the services, var-ious departments within the ministry,or as a last resort DICMOD for engage-ment activity. The proliferation ofdeputy defense ministers has furtherweakened the effectiveness of the Min-istry of Defense by diluting authorityand obscuring accountability and re-sponsibility. These structures haveevolved into competing organizations

incapable of lateral coordination. Theappointment of a new defense minis-ter, General Volodmyr Shkidchenko,who is widely viewed as a reformer,has prompted renewed optimism thatthings may change. Time will tell.

Still, corruption exacerbates thechallenges of working with a flawedinstitution. Ukraine finished second tothe last out of 90 countries with ascore of 1.5 out of 10, according to theannual corruption perception indexpublished by Transparency Interna-tional. This problem affects all aspectsof engagement from exaggerated exer-cise costs to the payment of officer perdiem. Without careful managementand scrutiny, peacetime military en-gagement could easily serve no pur-pose other than enriching a few well-placed and corrupt officers. Theseproblems are deep-rooted and com-plex. They are symptoms of ills thatwill not yield easily to a half-hearted,poorly managed engagement program.

Early U.S. efforts were effective inconvincing Ukraine to give up nuclearweapons in return for substantialmaterial incentives provided throughthe cooperative threat reduction pro-gram. Subsequent initiatives haveshown poorer results. In the beginning,

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