Reviewed by Jonathan Young

Shadow Eliteby Janine Wedel (2009)

Claims

“Shadow elites” play a key policy-making role in some areas

Changes in society and government have increased the chances for a shadow elite to control a policy area

Shadow elites go around the normal structures of bureaucratic control

Who are the Shadow Elite?

Dimension Flexians Flex NetsRelationships Personalizing

BureaucracyIntricate spine

Agenda and information control

Privatizing information while branding conviction

Shared conviction and action

Formal positions and power base

Juggling roles and responsibilities

Resource pool

Rules and accountability

Relaxing rules in the spaces between official and private institutions

Hybrid habitat

Other Key Ideas

Flexians are in, not of, organizations

Coincidences of interest

Reshaping bureaucracy

Power through access to information

Other Key Ideas

Focus is on executive branch activity, not writing legislation

Privatization of the functions of the state

Merging of state and private power Might-be-state, might-be-private entities Might-be-official, might-be-unofficial

roles

Why is there an increase in “flex” activity? Redesign of governing

Outsourcing Deregulation Rise of executive power

End of the Cold War

Advent of ever more complex technologies

Embrace of “truthiness”

Consequences Private or mixed control over state resources

Contractors, rather than government officials, hold vital information

Policy is developed outside of government decision-making channels

Bureaucracy is unable to monitor or control the “shadow government”

Evidence

Social anthropologist

Studied Eastern Europe beginning in the 1980s

Interviews, news stories, and personal observation

Examples…Privatization in Russia Harvard Institute for International

Development received US AID money to support economic reforms

Small group of Russian officials and American consultants leading multiple commissions – a flex net

Shared economic and policy ideology

Harvard team controlled U.S. policy on economic reform aid

Privatization in Russia

Flex net in President’s office, drafting decrees Diverged from US AID policy

NGOs headed by flex net members had power to make major privatization decisions

Privatization decisions benefitted those with ties to the flex net; did not result in broad benefits to ordinary Russians

The Neocon Core

Flex net centered around Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith

Ideology of American military supremacy and preemptive war

Positions in government and NGOs Drafting and publicizing policy positions Raising media attention Lobbying members of Congress

The Neocon Core Personalized policy making

Marginalized bureaucratic procedures Independent intelligence assessments

Created their own bodies of expertise and influence

Increased number of political appointees with fewer bureaucrats

Information campaign – “truthiness”

The Neocon Core Flexnet

So, what can be done?

Stronger regulation Increased openness More oversight of contractors Investigation by government, media

and NGOs

Evaluation

This is a pretty specific phenomenon

Convincing examples, but hard to know how common flex nets are

Discomfort with changes from “the way things used to be”

The Bigger Policy Picture How are policy decisions really

made?

Flex activity can be used to pursue financial gain…but also ideologically motivated

Looks at the interaction between private interests and government activity Private interests may be business

interests or may be other interests

Questions & Discussion

I have a hard time knowing if there are other policy areas dominated by flex activity…can you think of any?