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Severely wrong or slightly wrong?
Sanctions and Moral Behavior
Laetitia MulderTilburg University, The Netherlands
My previous research
Context: social dilemmas
Sanctions’ effect on trust
Alternative behavioral options
Sanctions and trust
Expectations of cooperative behavior“assurance” (Yamagishi)
Expectations of cooperative intentions“trust” (Yamagishi)
Sanction
+
_
“Removing the Sanction” Paradigm
No sanction:Trust
Sanction:Assurance
Phase 1: Phase 2:
No sanction:Trust
No sanction
No-sanction
Sanction
Condition:
Phase 2 trust(data of Study 3, Mulder et al. JESP in
press)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Low initial trust High initial trust
No sanction in phase 1 Sanction in phase 1
Phase 2 cooperation (data of Study 3, Mulder et al. JESP in press)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Low initial trust High initial trust
No sanction in phase 1 Sanction in phase 1
My previous research
Context: social dilemmas
Sanctions’ effect on trust
Alternative behavioral options
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
No garbagereduction
Garbage reduction
DumpingGarbage reduction
No garbage reduction
Moving to Belgium
Paying taxes Tax fraud
Expectations
Authority
Focus on moderating factors:
Alternative defective option
0,3 0,63
2,9
0,5
low expectations high expectations
no sanction
sanction
Contribution to group(in three—options condition)
6,196,55
4,12
7,2
low expectations high expectations
no sanction
sanction
Conclusions from my previous research
Sanctioning systems may foster negative motivational effects (i.e. distrust in cooperative intentions)
Social decisions more complex than a simple dichitomous decision. Essential for the issue of sanctions.
Present research
Influence of sanction on moral norms
Sanctions may trigger business-like considerations and induce a business frame (e.g. Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Frey, 1999; Fehr & Falk, 2000)
But may they also trigger moral considerations and induce a moral frame?
When does a sanction trigger a business frame and when a moral frame?
First factor of research: sanction size
Research question:
How does the size of a sanction on a certain rule affect moral considerations? How does it affect moral judgement of how “wrong” breaking the rule is?
How sanction size may affect moral judgements
Sanction indicates “how bad” certain behavior is.
Hypothesis: Large sanction higher moral judgments than a small sanction
2 experiments to test this
Experiment 1
Participant: unknown number of lottery tickets.
“Participants of an other experiment” no lottery tickets (i.e. no chance of winning)
Possibility to donate tickets to participants of other experiment.
Request: “please donate 2 tickets”
“When you donate less than 2 tickets: fine of €0,20 (small sanction) / €2,50 (large sanction)”Control condition: no fine, only the request.
Dependent variables
Moral dissapproval (5 items):Donating less than 2 tickets…- …seems morally wrong- …is something I would morally dissapprove of- etc.
Perceived moral dissapproval of experimenter (4 items):- The experimenters think that donating less than 2 tickets is very unfair- The experimenters morally dissapprove of donating less than 2 tickets to the other participants
Results
Moral dissapproval:no sanction: 3.41
small sanction: 3.47
large sanction: 4.27
Perceived moral dissapproval of experimenter :no sanction: 3.64
small sanction: 3.86
large sanction: 5.04
Experiment 2
The effect of sanction size on social dissapproval of someone who does not follow the rule.
Role of authorities: Sanction installed by authority. Therefore sanction shows the moral judgement of the authority. Whether people adopt this judgement, depends on their trust in authorities.
Hypothesis: Sanction size influences moral judgements to a greater extent when people have high rather than low trust in the authority.
Experiment 2
General trust in authorities (8 items):-“Generally I completely trust authorities’ decisions”-“Authorities often do not know what they are talking about”-“Authorities usually know what is best for the group”
Dependent variables:-Social dissapproval (preferring a rule-complier to a rule-breaker)-Moral judgement
Sanction size: small vs large
Experiment 2
Participant in observer role. Observed the following situation:
10 chips
Allocator:each chip €2
Recipient:each chip €?
division
Experimentator requested a 3/7 division
Fine of €0,50 or €5 (uncertain whether they would be monitored)
Allocator A (“Susan”) obeyed and proposed 3/7
Allocator B (“Eve”) disobeyed and proposed 5/5
Dependent variables
Moral dissapproval (7 items):That divider B donated less than 7 chips…- …I found morally wrong- …is something (s)he should feel ashamed of- etc.
Social dissapprovalWhich would you prefer:- a division of €3/ €3 with you and allocator A (“Susan”)- a division of €4/ €4 with you and allocator B (“Eve”)
Results
Figure 2: Moral judgment as a function of sanction size and general regard for authorities
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Small sanction Large sanction
Mo
ral
jud
gm
ent
low general trust inauthorities (SD = -1)
high general trust inauthorities (SD = 1)
Results
Figure 1: Social Dissaproval (percentage of participants choosing to split money with allocater A rather than B) as a function of sanction size and general regard for authorities
01020304050607080
Small sanction Large sanction
So
cial
dis
sap
pro
val
low general trust inauthorities (SD = -1)
high general trust inauthorities (SD = 1)
Conclusion
Sanctions can increase moral norms. Large sanctions increase moral norms more than small ones.
Especially when people trust authorities
Further research
Large sanctions may be excessive/unjust. Effect of sanction size may be moderated by perceived (in)justice of sanction.
Recognizing the goal behind rule/sanction? Influence self-benefitting or self-sacrificing leadership
Difference sanctions and rewards?
Do sanctions work through anticipated shame? And if so, do rewards work through anticipated pride?