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Electronic Discussion sitesMedia
NGOs
MilitaryLaboratoryNetworks
WHO Collaborating Centres/Laboratories Epidemiology and
Surveillance Networks
WHO Regional & Country Offices
Countries/National Disease Control
Centres
UNSister Agencies
FORMALFORMAL
GPHIN
Partnership for global alert and response to infectious Partnership for global alert and response to infectious diseases: network of networksdiseases: network of networks
INFORMALINFORMAL
Surveillance network partners in Asia
Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance (MBDS)
Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN)
ASEAN
APEC
SEAMIC
SEANET
EIDIOR
FluNet
Reports of respiratory infection, WHO global surveillance networks, 2002–2003
• 27 November
– Guangdong Province, China: Non-official report of outbreak of respiratory illness with government recommending isolation of anyone with symptoms (GPHIN)
• 11 February
– Guangdong Province, China: report to WHO office Beijing of outbreak of atypical pneumonia (WHO)
• 14 February
– Guangdong Province, China: Official confirmation of an outbreak of atypical pneumonia with 305 cases and 5 deaths (China)
• 19 February
– Hong Kong, SAR China: Official report of 33-year male and 9 year old son in Hong Kong with Avian influenza (H5N1), source linked to Fujian Province, China
(Hong Kong, FluNet)
Intensified surveillance for pulmonary infections, WHO 2003
• 26 February
– Hanoi, Viet Nam: Official report of 48-year-old business man with high fever (> 38 ºC), atypical pneumonia and respiratory
failure with history of previous travel to China and Hong Kong
• 5 March
– Hanoi, Viet Nam: Official report of 7 medical staff from French Hospital reported with atypical pneumonia
• Early March
– Hong Kong, SAR China Official report of 77 medical staff from Hospital reported with atypical pneumonia`, WHO teams arrive
Hong Kong and Hanoi, and with governments advise on investigation and containment activities
Global Alert Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS)• 12 March: First global alert
– describing atypical pneumonia in Viet Nam and Hong Kong
• 14 March
– Four persons Ontario, three persons in Singapore, with severe atypical pneumonia fitting description of 12 March alert reported to WHO
• 15 March
– Medical doctor with atypical pneumonia fitting description of 12 March reported by Ministry of Health, Singapore on return flight from
New York
Global Alert, 15 March 2003
1) Atypical pneumonia with rapid progression to respiratory failure
2) Health workers appeared to be at greatest risk
3) Unidentified cause, presumed to be an infectious agent
4) Antibiotics and antivirals did not appear effective
5) Spreading internationally within Asia and to Europe and
North America
• 15 March: Second global alert
• Case definition provided
• Name (SARS) announced
• Advice given to international travellers to raise awareness
• 26 March
Evidence accumulating that persons with SARS continued to travel from areas with local transmission, and that adjacent passengers were at small, but non-quantified risk
• 27 March
Guidance provided to airlines and areas with local transmission to screen passengers leaving in order to decrease risk of international travel by persons with SARS
Global Alert: Global Alert: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
Global Alert: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
• 1 April:
Evidence accumulating from exported cases that three criteria were potentially increasing international spread:
– magnitude of outbreak and number of new cases each day
– pattern of local transmission
– exportation of probable cases
• 2 April to present:
Guidance provided to general public to postpone non-essential travel to areas with local transmission that met above criteria
SARS: cumulative number of probable cases worldwide as of 12 June 2003 – Total: 8 445 cases, 790 deaths
China (5328)
Singapore (206)
Hong Kong (1755)
Viet Nam (63)
Europe:10 countries (38)
Thailand (9)
Brazil (3)
Malaysia (5)
South Africa (1)
Canada (238)
USA (70)
Outbreaks before 15 March global alert
Colombia (1)
Kuwait (1)
South Africa (1)
Korea Rep. (3)
Macao (1)
Philippines (14)
Indonesia (2)
Mongolia (9)
India (3)
Australia (5)New Zealand (1)
Taiwan (688)
Outbreaks after 15 March global alert
Mongolia (9)
Russian Fed. (1)
Probable cases of SARS by date of onset,Hanoi: n = 62
1 February – 12 June 20031 February – 12 June 2003
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 Feb. 11 Feb. 21 Feb. 3 March 13 March 23 March 2 April 12 April 22 April 2 May 12 June
Num
ber o
f cas
es
Probable cases of SARS by date of onset,Singapore: n = 206
1 February – 12 June 20031 February – 12 June 2003
Source: Ministry of Health, Singapore, WHO
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1 Feb. 13 Feb. 25 Feb. 9 Mar. 21 Mar. 2 Apr. 14 Apr. 26 Apr. 8 May 20 May 29 May
Num
ber o
f cas
es
12 Jun.
Probable cases of SARS by date of onset,Canada: n = 227*
1 February – 12 June 20031 February – 12 June 2003
Num
ber o
f cas
es
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 Feb. 13 Feb. 25 Feb. 9 Mar. 21 -Mar. 2 Apr. 14 Apr. 26 Apr. 8 May 20 May 1 Jun. 12 Jun.
* As of 12 June 2003, 11 additional probable cases of SARS have been reported from Canada for whom no dates of onset are available.Source: Health Canada
Probable cases of SARS by date of onset,Taiwan: n = 688
1 February – 12 June 20031 February – 12 June 2003
Num
ber o
f cas
es
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1 Feb. 13 Feb. 25 Feb. 9 Mar. 21 Mar. 2 Apr. 14 Apr. 26 Apr. 8 May 20 May 1 Jun. 12 Jun.
Probable cases of SARS by date of onset,Beijing: n = 2,522
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
30-Mar-03 13-Apr-03 27-Apr-03 11-May-03 25-May-03 8-Jun-03
date of report
nu
mb
er o
f ca
ses
156 closecontacts
of HCW and
patients
Index case from
Guangdong
Index case from
Guangdong
Hospital 2Hong Kong
4 HCW +2
Hospital 2Hong Kong
4 HCW +2
Hospital 3Hong Kong
3 HCW
Hospital 3Hong Kong
3 HCW
Hospital 1Hong Kong
99 HCW
Hospital 1Hong Kong
99 HCW
Canada12 HCW +
4
Canada12 HCW +
4
Hotel MHong Kong
IrelandIreland
USAUSA
New YorkNew York
Singapore34 HCW +
37
Singapore34 HCW +
37
Viet Nam37 HCW +
?
Viet Nam37 HCW +
?
BangkokHCW
BangkokHCW
4 otherHong Konghospitals28 HCW
4 otherHong Konghospitals28 HCW
Hospital 4Hong KongHospital 4
Hong Kong
B
I
K
F G
ED
CJ
H
A
SARS: chain of transmission among guests SARS: chain of transmission among guests at Hotel Metropole, Hong Kong, 21 Februaryat Hotel Metropole, Hong Kong, 21 February
GermanyHCW +
2
GermanyHCW +
2
As of 26 March,
249 cases have been traced to
the A case
Source: WHO/CDC
Probable cases of SARS by date of onset,Hong Kong: n = 1 753, as of 9 June 2003
Num
ber o
f cas
es
01 Feb. 13 Feb. 25 Feb. 9 Mar. 21 Mar. 2 Apr. 14 Apr. 26 Apr. 8 May 20 May 1 Jun. 9 Jun.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Structure and Composition
• Enveloped
– Spike proteins resemble solar corona or crown
• 120-160 nm
• Positive-strand RNA (27-32 kb)
• Cytoplasmic replication
• Budding into ER and Golgi
• Notoriously difficult to propagate in culture
• High frequency of recombination
• Cause colds and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
Coronavirus Infections• Pathogenesis
– Limited knowledge
– Highly species-specific
– Typically mild upper respiratory infections (“colds”) that remain localized
• Exception: SARS
– Immunity is not durable
• Many people become resusceptible after a few years
• Laboratory Diagnosis
– ELISA - may not discriminate past infections
– HA
– PCR
– Virus isolation is difficult (often impossible) and requires great expertise
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome• Initial outbreak in SE Asia
– Hong Kong and Singapore first reported
– Disease originated in China
– Originally thought to be from wild game markets
• Palm civet cat (which isn’t a cat) - Paradoxurus hermaphroditus
• Raccoon dog (which isn’t a dog) - Nyctereutes procyonoides
– It is a bat virus
• Chinese horseshoe bats (Rhinolophus sinicus)
• No virus isolation
– Amplification of coronavirus RNA from anal swabs
– Serology
– It is highly-similar, but not identical to SARS-CoV
» Mutations have most likely occurred in transmission from bats to civets to humans
» Reverse genetics of SARS-CoV and some bat viruses has been done
– No animal pathogenesis model
Coronavirus Phylogeny
Chymotrypsin-like protease (3CLpro), RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (Pol), spike (S), and nucleocapsid (N)
SARS Pathogenesis
• Virus is transmitted by respiratory and fecal routes
• Infection is mediated by human angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (hACE2) receptor
– High expression
• Lung alveolar epithelial cells
• Intestinal enterocytes
– Low expression
• Blood vessels (virtually all organs)
• Pneumonia
– Cause of death is lung failure
SARS: what more we know 3 months later
1) Atypical pneumonia with rapid progression to respiratory failure:
– Case fatality rate by age group:
– 85% full recovery
– Incubation period: 3–10 days
2) Health workers appeared to be at greatest risk
– Health workers remain primary risk group in second generation
– Others at risk include family members of index cases and health workers, and their contacts
– Majority of transmission has been close personal contact; in Hong Kong environmental factors caused localized transmission
< 1% < 24 years old6% 25–44 years old
15% 45–64 years old> 50% > 65 years old
SARS: what more we know 3 months later
3) Unidentified cause, presumed to be an infectious agents
– Aetiological agent: Coronavirus, hypothesized to be of animal origin
– PCR and various antibody tests developed and being used in epidemiological studies, but PCR lacks sufficient sensitivity as diagnostic tool
4) Antibiotics and antivirals did not appear effective
– Studies under way to definitively provide information on effectiveness of antivirals alone or in combination with steroids, and on use of hyperimmune serum
in persons with severe disease
– Case detection, isolation, infection control and contact tracing are effective means of containing outbreaks
– Meeting 30 April at NIH to examine priorities in drugs and vaccine developments
SARS: what we are learning
• In the world today an infectious disease in one country is a threat to all: infectious diseases do not respect international
borders
• Information and travel guidance can contain the international spread of an infectious disease
• Experts in laboratory, epidemiology and patient care can work together for the public health good despite heavy
pressure to publish academically
• Emerging infectious disease outbreaks often have an unnecessary negative economic impact on tourism, travel and
trade
• Infectious disease outbreaks reveal weaknesses in public health infrastructure
• Emerging infections can be contained with high level government commitment and international collaboration if
necessary