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Seventh Annual

SBIMUN

Background Guide

Uni ted Nat ions Gener al Assem bly 1st Com m i t tee (DISEC)

Head Chai r : Amy KooCo-Chai r : Calvin Chiu

Seventh Annual Session - SBIMUN

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Chair?s Let ter

Honorable Delegates,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the 2016 SBIMUN Conference! My name is Amy Koo, and

I will be your Chair for the General Assembly First Committee: Disarmament and Internat ional

Security Committee (DISEC). I am current ly a second-year student majoring in Polit ical Science, and

this is my second year part icipat ing in Model United Nations. In my first year of MUN, I had the

opportunity to attend several conferences, including AggieMUN and SoCalMUN, and also

co-chaired a committee at GauchoMUN, our annual high school MUN conference. I am current ly

serving as the Under Secretary-General of Travel (Logist ics) for SBMUN, along with holding a

posit ion in the Associated Students? Office of the Student Advocate at UCSB.

The issues our committee is attempting to address are fascinat ing, not only because they are

complex and serious agenda items, but also because the issues we will be discussing have major

effects in crisis zones across the world at this very moment. I encourage you to think creat ively

about potent ial draft resolut ions to the issues at hand and act ively develop pract ical solut ions. I am

looking forward to the discussions and resolut ions you will bring to the table. If you have any

concerns or quest ions, please do not hesitate to contact the Dias. I look forward to meeting you all!

Sincerely,

Amy Koo

Chair, United Nations General Assembly 1st Committee: DISEC

[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]


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Co-Chair?s Let ter

Fellow delegates,

I am glad to see you here at SBIMUN 2016. My name is Calvin Chiu and I am current ly a

polit ical science major, and the Under Secretary-General for Media and Technology for UCSB Model

UN. I am also one of your Co-Chairs for the First Committee of the United Nations General

Assembly: Disarmament and Internat ional Security, or DISEC. This will be my first conference in this

capacity as a Co-Chair, and I look forward to meeting all of you.

As we reflect upon an unstable geopolit ical landscape, the issues we discuss over the course

of the next several days will take on a special relevance to us. The problems we face are complex, but

they are not unsolvable. Even if solut ions seem hard to come by in the real world, we can offer our

proposals on how we can alleviate these issues of security and instability that confront us. Who

knows, one day your plan might become reality.

So think crit ically this weekend as we embark upon this pursuit of a marketplace of ideas as

history has its eyes on you.

Sincerely,

Calvin Chiu

Co-Chair, United Nations General Assembly 1st Committee: DISEC

[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]


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Introduct ion to the General Assembly First Committee (DISEC)

The First Committee is one of the six subsidiary bodies of the United Nations General

Assembly. Among other things, the General Assembly discusses and makes recommendations on the

principles of cooperat ion for maintaining peace and security, including disarmament. The init ial

resolut ion adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 called for ?the eliminat ion from nat ional

armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruct ion.? Every

year since then, the General Assembly adopts 40-50 resolut ions regarding disarmament and the

nonproliferat ion of nuclear and other types of weapons by either a majority vote or by consensus.

The First Committee mainly deals with the issues regarding disarmament along with global

challenges and threats to peace that affect the internat ional community meanwhile collaborat ing to

develop solut ions to the challenges in the internat ional security regime and in relat ion to the powers

and funct ions of any other organ of the United Nations. It considers ?the principles governing

disarmament and the regulat ion of armaments,? and makes recommendations based on these

principles to member states and the Security Council.

The First Committee provides the capability for each Member States in regards to the

discussion of policies on disarmament-related matters often leading to cooperat ion and compromise

in the proposals of language and tools that allow a better understanding of the issues. It offers the

opportunity for states to build consensus, to reach common principles and to agree on acceptable

behavior by Member States. Thus, rather than ensuring ?security? through the size of their arsenals,

Member States can discuss how to arrive at cooperat ive security arrangements that minimize

spending on weapons, reduce product ion, trade, and stockpiles of arms, as well as increase global

security. The Committee works in close cooperat ion with the United Nations Disarmament

Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament.


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Topic 1: Concerns over the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in Conflict Zones

Background of the Topic

In January 2013, the United Nations Security Council, with support from the United States,

approved the use of unarmed, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) during the United Nations

Organizat ion Stabilizat ion Mission in the Democrat ic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The aim

of using drones in this mission was to augment situat ional awareness on the ground and,

consequently, to have the ability to protect civilians and peacekeeping troops. Furthermore, the

inclusion of UAVs was meant to aid with the monitoring of armed groups and the trafficking of arms

as well as to assess the movements of displaced refugees with the plans of better addressing their

needs. Such a form of technology had humanitarian goals during the init ial uses as it even allowed for

more efficient assessments of numerous environmental challenges, such as the damages from

floods, fires, droughts, and other natural disasters.

Due to the sensit ive react ions generated by the cont inued use of armed UAVs in Afghanistan,

Pakistan and Somalia, however, the United Nations decided that drones used by UN peacekeepers

would predominant ly be ?flying cameras? to improve situat ional awareness. The concern of an

increase in the use of UAVs in conflict zones centers on the presence of armed UAVs across the

world. When the deployment of drones in the Democrat ic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was first

announced, several other Member States in the region, including Rwanda, declared opposit ion to the

act ion, arguing that Africa should not become a laboratory for intelligence devices from overseas.

China, Guatemala, Pakistan and the Russian Federat ion have also raised more recent concerns

regarding the deployment of UAVs.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles were first designed and constructed during WWI. These earliest

models were intended for use as "aerial torpedoes", similar to an early version of the modern cruise


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missile. Today, UAVs are often preferred for missions that are too "dull, dirty or dangerous" for

humans. Such technology originated most ly in military applicat ions, although their use is expanding

into the commercial, scient ific, recreat ional, agricultural, and other sectors, including for uses t ied to

policing and surveillance, aerial photography, and drone racing. Several countries have begun using

UAVs as unmanned armed drones in conflict , including the United States, Israel, the United Kingdom,

Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Many individuals in the military sector see

these drones as delivering precision strikes without the need for more intrusive military act ion.

These vehicles have been in the spot light of controversy due to the unmanned nature of the

technology along with the number of deaths attributed to drone strikes and the use of Unmanned

Aerial Vehicles in civilian areas.

United Nations Involvement

In the United Nations? 66th Session, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping

Operat ions announced in the General Assembly First Committee?s Report of the Special Committee

on Peacekeeping Operat ions its intent ion to use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones, during

future peacekeeping operat ions. Subsequently, in January 2013, the United Nations announced that

it would deploy UAVs for surveillance in the Northern and Southern Kivu provinces of the

Democrat ic Republic of Congo to improve awareness and promote deterrence toward those with

malicious or militant intent ions in the area. The UN further deployed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to

the northeastern part of the Democrat ic Republic of Congo (DRC) for surveillance in aid of its

mission MONUSCO.

The Security Council established MONUSCO on July 1, 2010, building on the prior United

Nations Organizat ion Stabilizat ion Mission (MONUC), to reflect the new phase reached in the

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Democrat ic Republic of Congo. The UN is aware of the reputat ion of drones and UAVs for targeted

killing, especially outside of the United States, but has said that it sees the use of drones for

surveillance as necessary and that in effect, the technology is not more than just objects with

cameras to survey the area and improve the safety of its troops in the region. The drones allow the

United Nations to follow the movements of armed groups, populat ions, and the arms that are being

carried by people on the ground solely from visual contact being made by the cameras attached to

the UAVs from a height close to three kilometers above the ground. This inevitably allows the UN to

guide its troops into safety and to accurately warn of imminent danger or sett lements that are in

danger.

The use of drones in connect ion with the United Nations comes after earlier instances this

year when UN soldiers were used for the first t ime in batt le to enforce the responsibility given to

the internat ional organizat ion to protect the civilians in conflict areas. There are also less-publicized

instances where the presence of UAVs has been found including numerous other United Nations

peacekeeping missions designated with the purpose of surveillance. For instance, on August 31,

2006, Resolut ion 1706, passed by the United Nations Security Council, mandated the use of aerial

surveillance vehicles ?to monitor the trans-border act ivit ies of armed groups along the Sudanese

borders with Chad and the Central African Republic?, in part icular, through regular ground and

aerial reconnaissance act ivit ies.

Case Study: Drone Legality in the United States of America

The init ial use of unarmed drones and UAVs by the United States began with the CIA being

act ive in the territory of Afghanistan in 2000, which would later carry further into the use of armed

drones following the September 11th attacks. The CIA first used an unmanned armed drone in a

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targeted killing or an air strike in 2002 with the intended target being Osama Bin Laden whom was

believed to be located in Afghanistan. Since the first air strike by an unmanned armed vehicle, the

United States has conducted approximately 424 strikes in Pakistan, approximately 140 in Yemen,

approximately 32 strikes in Somalia, and approximately 600 in Afghanistan. The use of armed

drones in combat zones by the United States is a point of content ion in the internat ional sphere.

Part icularly in regions of warfare and armed conflict , the use of any unmanned vehicles is a point of

concern for the various civilians in the region, as there is an uncertainty about the type of vehicles in

the area as well as the use of the information gathered by such. Though there has been a recent shift

in drone use to a more commercial and private use, it is current ly illegal to operate a drone as a

civilian above 400 feet and beyond the line of sight for any commercial reason unless they have

received permission from the Federal Aviat ion Administrat ion (FAA).

The FAA issues ?cert ificates of authorizat ion? to public ent it ies, such as NASA, National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrat ion (NOAA) and other federal agencies, police departments

and universit ies. In ant icipat ion of increasing drone use, Congress has tasked the FAA to determine

by 2015 how civilians can use drones and other UAVs beyond the restrict ions of airspace and

licensing requirements.

In the private sector, there are concerns about the use of UAVs in the United States as many

of the concerns stem from the privacy that is deteriorated by drones that can go where satellites

and car cameras cannot, as well as the potent ial use of drones for domestic terrorism. In January

2015, a $400 remote-controlled quad copter landed on the White House grounds causing a panic

and just 10 days earlier, officials from the US military, the Department of Homeland Security, and

the FAA gathered for a ?summit? on a danger that had been consuming them privately for years: the

potent ial use of hobbyist drones as weapons of terror or assassinat ion. The conference was open to

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civilians, but explicit ly closed to the press and in various examples, the officials played videos of

low-cost drones firing semi-automatic weapons, which revealed that Syrian rebels can have the

capability of acquiring and import ing consumer-grade drones to launch attacks.

Case Study: MONUSCO and the Use of UAVs as Surveillance Technology

The United Nations Organizat ion Stabilizat ion Mission in the Democrat ic Republic of the

Congo (MONUSCO) is a peacekeeping mission in the Democrat ic Republic of Congo (DRC) that

notably is the first UN peacekeeping mission to integrate UAVs as technology with the purpose to

gather information. The UAVs were first deployed in 2013, and used primarily in the Kivu provinces

of the DRC. Several countries expressed concerns about the deployment of UAVs by the United

Nations, saying that the UN should not be an act ive gatherer of intelligence, due to the ambiguity

surrounding UN intelligence. In part icular, Rwanda, China, Guatemala, Pakistan, and Russia have

more recent ly expressed concerns.

Surveillance drones had already been used by a European Force and Belgian troops,

however, one of the drones was shot down, and one of the drones crashes, injuring and killing

several civilians in Kinshasa.

Art icle 57(2)(a) of the Addit ional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (August 12, 1949), and

Protocol I to the Protect ion of Vict ims of Internat ional Armed Conflicts (June 8, 1977) set forth the

requirements, with respect, to attacks during conflict of an internat ional nature. Under these

requirements, known as the ?principle of precaut ion in attack?, UAVs would significant ly increase

the precaut ionary obligat ions of peacekeepers. In the case of the recent fight ing in eastern region of

the Democrat ic Republic of the Congo, no report has emerged that MONUSCO personnel

deliberately targeted civilians with no military value. The act ions of MONUSCO seem to only have

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resulted in the internal displacement of civilians and no report has emerged that peacekeepers have

killed civilians. Therefore, some argue that the relat ive success of the use of UAVs in MONUSCO

just ifies the use of UAVs in future peacekeeping missions.

Security of Information Gathered by UAVs

The use of UAVs raises issues about the privacy of the civilians in the areas when UAVs are

being used. Without transparency of what the recorded data is being used for and who will have

access to the data recorded, the safety of civilians and their privacy becomes compromised. Because

the United Nations only needs the permission of the State to monitor with UAVs, the individual

privacy of the civilians on the ground is often neglected. Addit ionally, because the data collected by

UAVs may potent ially alter the act ions taken by peacekeepers and rebel groups, there is a concern

about the negative impact of UAV-collected data on civilians. One example of a privacy concern can

be cited regarding MONUSCO, where there were potent ial concerns of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

and their surveillance around Lake Kivu, which borders Rwanda, as the quest ion of whether they

would or even could report information about movement in another State, like Rwanda, became a

prominent focus.

The use of UAVs also raises issues about who will have access to the data collected by UAVs

and how they will use the data. There is a worry about the overuse of UAVs and drones since each

can be cheaper to operate than their manned counterparts. For example, a manned vehicle may cost

up to $35,000 to operate, compared to $4,300 for a government manned vehicle (only includes

direct costs), and $2,600 for an unmanned aircraft . Despite the perceived lower cost of UAVs, their

use often requires extensive funds for the analyzat ion of the collected data as well as a concern that

the publicity of UAV-collected data will cause unpredictability in conflicts and put more civilian

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populat ions at risk. Member States also have a concern about the information collected by UAVs,

and whether the use of the data by the United Nations will intrude on state sovereignty.

In part icular, the conflict of interests lay simply in the use of the information collected by

UAVs. If the United Nations chooses to use the collected data to determine future act ions of

peacekeepers and monitor rebel groups, there are concerns about where the information will be

stored, who will be able to access the information, and who will be able to act on the information

collected.

Current Status

United Nations peacekeeping missions have used UAVs for surveillance in other, less

publicized instances, but often during periods of peace. For example, the United Nations Security

Council in S/Res/1706 mandated the use of drones and other Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for the

purpose of aerial surveillance to monitor trans-border act ivit ies of armed groups along the

Sudanese borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). The deployment of drones in

the DRC represents a defining moment in UN peacekeeping and aerial surveillance during ongoing

conflict . The use of UAVs in Eastern Congo is the first of its kind as the United Nations tries to

streamline its global forces of nearly 100,000 deployed personnel, who are grappling with

increasingly intractable missions in over a dozen countries. In November 2013, one year after

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels dealt UN and Congolese soldiers a devastat ing defeat by capturing

the city of Goma, the novel attack-minded Force Intervent ion Brigade of the United Nations retook

the city and forced the remaining rebels to surrender. A month later, the first UN drone went

airborne.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), as the United Nations calls them to dist inguish them from

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weaponized drones, have since been deployed consistent ly, even though their 125-mile range is a

limitat ion in the DRC, which is the size of Western Europe.

Humanitarian organizat ions have started to use UAVs for data collect ion and information

tasks that include real t ime information and situat ion monitoring, public information and advocacy,

search and rescue, and mapping in Hait i, the Philippines, and other states. The use of UAVs raises

serious pract ical and ethical issues that humanitarian organizat ions must address through

transparency, community engagement, and guidelines for privacy & data security.

With the progress of MONUSCO, the data that the UAVs collected became a point of

content ion among some member states. On the United Nations Security Council, the Russian

Federat ion and the Peoples? Republic of China have raised privacy concerns, as has Rwanda, over

UAVs in the DRC. Rwanda, in part icular, has numerous reasons to be caut ious, as the presence of

drones has been felt around the region of Lake Kivu, along the Rwanda-DRC border. The tension

cont inues in the Central African Republic (CAR), which borders South Sudan, Sudan and Chad,

part icularly because the bordering countries around the CAR are suspected of fostering rebellion.

Despite the capabilit ies of UAVs, MONUSCO officials insist that such drones are not peering into

Rwanda, which is consider a prominent source of the illicit arms in the DRC.

Addit ionally, the potent ial lethal use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and drones has come

under scrut iny in the Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the United Nations

General Assembly, as a Human Rights expert from the UN has argued that the internat ionally

recognized rule against arbitrary killing also applies to extraterritorial at tacks by such weapons

systems. Although ?drones are not illegal?, Christof Heyns, the UN Special Rapporteur on

Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execut ions, said, ?the core quest ions are about the law, policy

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and pract ices around their use?, especially in extraterritorial counter-terrorism operat ions by

Member States employing or intending to employ such weapons systems.

Quest ions to Consider

1. Should the United Nations have the ability to use UAVs in both wart ime situat ions and

peacet ime situat ions?

2. In which ways should the information gathered by UVAs be used by the United Nations?

3. In what capacity should UAVs be used in wart ime situat ions and peacet ime situat ions?

4. Is the init ial low cost of UAVs worth the controversy surrounding the use of UAVs in conflict

and peace situat ions?

5. Considering the issues surrounding drone use in the United States about non-military

personal ut ilizing UAVs for combat and terror, is it just ified for the UN to cont inue using

UAVs in their peacekeeping missions?

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Topic 2: Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century

Background of Topic

The United Nations has sought to eliminate such weapons since the organizat ion was

established. In fact, Resolut ion 1 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1946

inst ituted the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to deal with issues related to the

discovery of atomic energy among other prominent agenda items. The Commission attempted to

propose the strict enforcement of nuclear weaponry for peaceful purposes and the resolut ion

decided that the Commission should develop proposals for ?the eliminat ion from nat ional

armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruct ion.?

Since the Non-Proliferat ion Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970, three major Member

States? India, Pakistan, and the Democrat ic Peoples? Republic of Korea (DPRK)? continue to

conduct nuclear tests, as each was not originally a party to the Treaty. Moreover, the DPRK had

once been a party to the NPT, but later withdrew in 2003. After withdrawing from the NPT, it has

conducted at least four underground nuclear tests, with the results of these tests being ambiguous

in terms of the capacity and effect iveness of their nuclear weaponry.

Israel is also widely presumed to have nuclear weapons, though it maintains a policy of

deliberate ambiguity regarding this, and is not known definit ively to have conducted a nuclear test.

According to the Stockholm Internat ional Peace Research Inst itute's 2014 SIPRI Yearbook, Israel is

est imated to have approximately 80 nuclear warheads. Furthermore, according to the 2014 Bullet in

of the Atomic Scient ists Nuclear Notebook, the total number of nuclear weapons worldwide has

est imated at 10,144 across the armaments of the members of the internat ional community.

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United Nations Involvement

A number of mult ilateral t reat ies have since been established with the aim of prevent ing the

proliferat ion and test ing of nuclear weapons, meanwhile promoting progress in regards to nuclear

disarmament. These include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferat ion of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in The Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, also

known as the Part ial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

(CTBT), which was signed in 1996 but has yet to enter into force. The CTBT will enter into force 180

days after the 44 states listed in Annex 2 of the treaty have rat ified it . These "Annex 2 states" are

states that part icipated in the negotiat ions on the CTBT between 1994 and 1996 and possessed

nuclear power reactors or research reactors at that t ime. As of 2015, eight Annex 2 states have not

rat ified the treaty: China, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, and the United States have

signed but not rat ified the Treaty; India, the DPRK, and Pakistan have not signed it . Due to these

states not signing or rat ifying the treaty, it is considered a symbolic, but ineffect ive act ion in nuclear

disarmament.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferat ion of Nuclear Weapons is based on a three-pillar system,

focusing on non-proliferat ion, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.

Crit ics of the nuclear-weapon states (Recognized by the NPT as China, France, the Russian

Federat ion, the United Kingdom, and the United States) sometimes argue that the NPT has failed

due to these states and their lack of efforts toward disarmament, especially during the post?Cold

War era. Such failure, these crit ics add, further provides the just ificat ion for the

non-nuclear-weapon signatories to quit the NPT and develop their own nuclear arsenals.

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and

Underwater prohibits, prevents, and abstains Member States part ied to the Treaty from carrying

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out nuclear weapons tests or any other nuclear explosions in various environment where such

explosions would cause radioact ive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the Member

State that conducts the explosion. It further calls for Member States to refrain from causing,

encouraging, or in any way part icipat ing in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapons test explosion,

or any other nuclear explosion, which would take place in any of the above-described environments.

Case Study: Democrat ic People?s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

The United Nations Security Council has adopted five major resolut ions since 2006 that

impose and strengthen sanct ions on Democrat ic People?s Republic of Korea for cont inuing to

develop its nuclear weapons program and call on Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear program ?in a

complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner" and refrain from ballist ic missile tests. The first two

resolut ions were passed short ly after several North Korean nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009,

meanwhile, the third came a month after North Korea successfully launched a satellite in December

2012. North Korea is prohibited from such launches under previous UN Security Council

Resolut ions because the technology in a satellite launch vehicle has potent ial dual-use applicat ions

to the development of ballist ic missiles. Further documents were passed after the most recent

nuclear test by the DPRK in February 2013 and the most recent efforts have resulted in the

adoption of a document in March 2016 that was in response to a nuclear test and satellite launch

early in the year.

The Security Council under Chapter VII, Art icle 41 of the United Nations Charter passed all

five of these documents unanimously and while legally binding, Member States are prohibited from

using force to carry out the obligat ions of the resolut ions. These documents call upon the

Democrat ic People?s Republic of Korea to rejoin the nuclear Non-Proliferat ion Treaty (NPT), which it

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acceded to in 1985 but withdrew from in 2003 after U.S. allegat ions that the country was pursuing

an illegal uranium enrichment program.

The Security Council has also called for DPRK to return to negot iat ions in the Six-Party Talks,

which include South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States. The talks

began in 2003 and aimed to peacefully dismantle the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Lit t le

progress was made unt il September 2005, when the six part ies achieved a breakthrough and issued

a joint statement on agreed steps for the denuclearizat ion of the Korean Peninsula. Pursuant to the

joint statement, in February 2007 negotiators reached an agreement with North Korea to shut

down its nuclear program in exchange for humanitarian aid. Progress on this front broke down,

however, in 2009 when North Korea completely withdrew from the talks in response to

internat ional condemnation of its attempt to launch a satellite in April 2009.

To this date, several United Nations Security Council resolut ions have been largely

unsuccessful in prevent ing North Korea from advancing its nuclear weapons and ballist ic missile

programs; however, the sanct ions enacted on the DPRK have slowed development in these areas.

The United Nations cont inues to closely monitor these programs. The 1718 Committee, established

by Security Council Resolut ion 1718 in 2006, oversees the implementat ion and enforcement of

sanct ions against the Democrat ic People?s Republic of Korea and the committee mandate has been

renewed on an annual basis; current ly extended unt il April 2017. A Panel of Experts, established by

Security Council Resolut ion 1874 in 2006, produces regular reports to the Security Council on the

status of the sanct ions and enforcement. In a February 2015 report, the Panel found that ?the

Democrat ic People?s Republic of Korea cont inued to defy Security Council resolut ions by persist ing

with its nuclear and ballist ic missile programmes,? and also found ?no evidence that the country

intends to cease prohibited act ivit ies.?

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Case Study: Islamic Republic of Iran

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted seven resolut ions as part of

internat ional efforts to address Iran?s nuclear program. The central demand by the council in the

first six was that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program, as well as undertake several

confidence-building measures out lined in a February 2006 Internat ional Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) Board of Governors resolut ion ? including the reconsiderat ion of the construct ion of its

heavy-water reactor and the rat ificat ion of the IAEA Addit ional Protocol. The council init ially laid

out these calls in a nonbinding Security Council president ial statement adopted in March 2006.

However, in Resolut ion 1696, the Security Council called on Tehran to suspend its

enrichment program and verify its compliance with the IAEA Board of Governor?s requirements. It

encourages Iran to take such steps as confidence building measures and even calls on Member

States to follow their exist ing domestic law and internat ional law to ?exercise vigilance and prevent

the transfer of any items, materials, good and technology that could contribute to Iran?s

enrichment-related and reprocessing act ivit ies and ballist ic missile programs.? The document warns

the Islamic Republic of Iran that its failure to comply by August 31, 2006 could result in punit ive

Security Council measures, such as economic sanct ions.

Resolut ion 1737, adopted in response to Iran?s failure to comply with Resolut ion 1696,

consequently echoes the principal provisions of the earlier resolut ion, requiring Iran to suspend its

uranium enrichment processes and take numerous other confidence-building measures. The

resolut ion goes further than the requests by the IAEA as it requires Iran to suspend work on its

heavy-water reactor projects rather than just reconsider them, meanwhile also calling for the

rat ificat ion of the Addit ional Protocol of the IAEA by Iran. The resolut ion imposes sanct ions against

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both the State of Iran and Iranian individuals or ent it ies that have been determined to be providing

support for proliferat ion-related act ivit ies within Iran. It requires all Member States to prevent the

supply, sale, or transfer of designated nuclear and ballist ic missile-related goods to Iran and does

permit States to export nuclear and ballist ic missile-related goods that are not itemized in the

resolut ion?s control lists if: certain guidelines are followed, end-user controls are put in place, and

the 1737 Committee is not ified. In addit ion, the Director-General of the IAEA must report to the

IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council within 60 days of the resolut ion being issued on

whether Iran has suspended its enrichment and heavy water-related act ivit ies. The UNSC will

review Iran?s act ions based on the findings of that report and can decide to either suspend or

terminate the resolut ion?s sanct ions if Iran has been deemed compliant. In the event that Iran has

not complied with the sanct ions, the United Nations Security Council is empowered to adopt further

measures as it sees fit .

On July 20, 2015, the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolut ion 2231, which

endorsed the comprehensive nuclear deal (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Act ion, or

JCPOA) that was reached between Iran and the P5+1 on July 14, 2015, and lays the groundwork for

the Security Council to lift nuclear-related sanct ions on Iran when Tehran completes key steps under

the deal that restrict its nuclear act ivit ies. The arms embargo will remain in place for five years after

implementat ion and the sanct ions on Iran's ballist ic missile program will remain for eight years.

These sanct ions are "nuclear-related" as they were put in place under Resolut ion 1929 and in

further inserts the necessary language, which lays out the procedure to re-impose sanct ions if

deemed necessary.

Current Status

The humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament has now been formally established

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in the UN context by the adoption of the document ent it led, Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear

Weapons, with 136 votes in favor and 18 against when placed to a vote in front of the United

Nations General Assembly. 121 Member States have sought to take the discussion about the

humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons to the next level by committ ing to work together to ?fill the

legal gap for the prohibit ion and eliminat ion of nuclear weapons?, through the ?Humanitarian

Pledge?, which was submitted and adopted with 128 votes in favor and 29 against.

However, the cont inuing threat of nat ions with nuclear capabilit ies has been a matter of

concern for the United Nations Security Council. One of numerous examples has the UNSC, as a

result of recent concerns and potent ial threats, passing a number of resolut ions regarding the

Iranian Nuclear Program. On account of a failure to meet the requirements of the Internat ional

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and a lack of compliance with the provisions of

S/Res/1696, the United Nations Security Council has subsequently imposed embargos and

sanct ions on Iran; despite these embargos and sanct ions, Iran has cont inued to increase their

nuclear program.

Another instance of the UNSC attempting to stop countries from developing nuclear arms is

with the situat ion of the Democrat ic People?s Republic of Korea. Despite numerous bans on nuclear

test ing and talks to end their nuclear program in exchange for humanitarian aid, the Security Council

has been largely unsuccessful in stopping the growth of nuclear arms in the arsenal of the DPRK.

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Questions to Consider

1. Should nat ions cont inue to be able to have a nuclear program for peaceful purposes?

2. Because the proliferat ion of nuclear weaponry has stabilized relat ionships between

superpowers, how will the disarmament of nat ions affect relat ionships between nat ions?

3. Is there a reasonable cause for developing nat ions like Iran to use nuclear power plants as a

source of energy?

4. What steps should be taken if these nat ions develop the capability to develop nuclear

weaponry?

5. Considering the previous act ions taken by the UN in the cases of Iran and DPRK, are

sanct ions efficient in prevent ing the proliferat ion of nuclear armory? If not, what course of

act ion should be taken against nat ions accused of nuclear proliferat ion?

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Documents

Seve SBIMU N - UCSB Model United Nations - Home - UC ... AnnuUal N Background Guide United Nations General Assembly 1st Committee (DISEC) Head Chair: Amy Koo Co-Chair: Calvin Chiu