SETA Policy Brief 62 Web

7/29/2019 SETA Policy Brief 62 Web

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S E T A | F o u n d a t i o n o r P o l i t i c a l , E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l R e s e a r c h | J a n u a r y , 2 0 1 3 | w w w . s e t a v . o r g | B r i e N o : 6 2

USTurkey Relations in the AKParty Decade

Kadir stn, Kl Bura Kanat

Policy BriefSETA


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S E T AP O L I C Y B R I E F

2

Kadir stn, Kl Bura Kanat

J a n u a r y , 2 01 3 | B r ie N o: 6 2

ABSTRACTTurkeys relations with the United States over the last decade witnessed wild swings and shits. Turkeys past decade under theAK Party coincided with the US invasion o Iraq, the nancial meltdown in the US (which transormed into a global economiccrisis) as well as a relative decline o the US stature in the world. This period also overlapped with dramatic changes in theMiddle East, as the ousting o longstanding authoritarian leaders led to the emergence o a generation o new leaders acrossthe Arab world. Today, a new Turkey as a regional power is aced with a new US eort to reconsider its role in the region andaround the globe. In this analysis, our goal is to take a broad view o the AK Party decade in USTurkey relations and contributeto the debates on the uture o the relationship and its potential implications or the region.

US-TURKEY RELATIONS

IN THE AK PARTY DECADE

2 0 1 3 A l l R i g h t s R e s e r v e d

S E T A | N e n e h a t u n C a d d e s i N o : 6 6 G a z i o s m a n p a a / a n k a y a 0 6 7 0 0 A N K A R A T R K Y EP h o n e : + 9 0 3 1 2 . 5 5 1 2 1 0 0 | F a x : + 9 0 3 1 2 . 5 5 1 2 1 9 0 | w w w . s e t a v . o r g | i n o @ s e t a v . o r g

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION | 3

EVE OF THE AK PARTY DECADE | 4

A WATERSHED MOMENT: THE MARCH 1, 2003 RESOLUTION | 5

DIVERGENT VISIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE REGION | 6

FORGING A NEW RELATIONSHIP | 8

A NEW REGION | 10

CONCLUSION | 12


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U S - T U R K E Y R E L A T I O N S I NT H E A K P A R T Y D E C A D E

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INTRODUCTION

Turkeys relations with the United States over the last decade witnessed wild swingsand shits, as a result o domestic transormations in Turkey, historic regional changes,and the posture o US oreign policy. Turkeys past decade under the AK Party coincided with the US invasion o Iraq, the nancial meltdown in the US (which transormedinto a global economic crisis) as well as a relative decline o the US stature in the world.This period also overlapped with dramatic changes in the Middle East, as the ousting olongstanding authoritarian leaders led to the emergence o a generation o new leaders across the Arab world. While the sectarian violence that erupted ater the invasiono Iraq shook the ault lines o the regional order, the Arab revolutions transormedentire political systems, creating a new era in Middle Eastern politics. During the pastdecade, Turkey gained candidacy status in the European Union, made great strides inconsolidating its democracy, strengthened its economy, increased its diplomatic clout,and came onto the world scene as a regional power. A new Turkey as a regional poweris aced with a new US eort to reconsider its role in the region and around the globe.

During the AK Party decade, Turkey began to revise its oreign policy doctrines anddecisionmaking mechanisms in line with changes in its domestic politics and in the

Middle East. Especially in its relations with the Middle East, Turkey became more involved in attempts to resolve regional problems. These overlapping transormations inthe global and regional order as well as changes in Turkish politics and oreign policyinuenced the nature o the relationship between the United States and Turkey. In the1990s, USTurkey bilateral relations experienced problems largely resulting rom anoverdue revision o the postCold War international system period in the wake o anemerging multipolar world; the relationship entered into a crisis period. While the parties today still search or a new paradigm to describe the relationship and dene thenature o the USTurkey partnership, they continue to cooperate on issues o mutualinterest and concern.

With the election o Barack Obama in 2008, the leaders o both countries improvedthe level o communication and cooperation on regional issues. As a result, USTurkeyrelations are probably in the best shape they have been in recent memory. As Presi

US-TURKEY RELATIONS IN THE AK

PARTY DECADE


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dent Obama embarks upon his second term, the AK Party is well positioned to be thedominant party in Turkish politics. In this analysis, we scrutinize what we consider to

be some o the most signicant turning points in the USTurkey bilateral relationshipover the AK Party decade. Our goal is to take a broad view o the AK Party decade inUSTurkey relations and contribute to the debates on the uture o the relationship andits potential implications or the region. This overview should give us a sense o whatmay come next.

EVE OF THE AK PARTY DECADE

When the November 2002 elections brought the AK Party to power, TurkishAmericanrelations were in a state o distress. While the last years o the Clinton administration

and the rst year o the Bush administration brought the countries closer together,there were signicant problems waiting to be resolved. The US had started to recalibrate its policies towards many countries ater the end o the Cold War but relationswith Turkey were somewhat neglected. The US attempted to continue its relationshipwith Turkey using the same modus operandi it had during the Cold War. Turkey andthe US maintained short term close cooperation during the rst Gul War largely due tothe personal rapport between Turkish President Turgut zal and US President GeorgeH. Bush, or which Turkey paid dearly in economic terms in its atermath. In the mid1990s, when PKK activity increased in its southeast, Ankara was disappointed with thelevel o US support or its ght against terrorism. In addition, the constant reiteration othe Armenian issue in the US Congress generated a public backlash in Turkey.

In the 1990s, or some in Turkey, the only way to elevate Turkeys standing in Washington was thought to be through the Israeli connection. The long established tutelarysystem in Turkey allowed a military to military relationship with Israel and the US without much civilian input or oversight. The Turkish view o the Israeli inuence in US politics led to a trilateral relationship between Turkey, Israel, and the US in the late 1990s,mostly ocused on security and military cooperation. In the last years o the Clintonadministration, relations improved ater Clintons visit to Turkey and his speech to theTurkish Grand National Assembly. His visit to the towns that were destroyed during the1999 earthquake, especially, created good will among the Turkish people. Followingthis, the Clinton administration also played an active role at the EU Helsinki summit in

order to help Turkey acquire candidacy status in the EU.

Following the US elections in 2000, with a new administration in the White HouseTurkishAmerican relations improved as a result o two signicant events. First, in February 2001, Turkey aced its worst economic catastrophe in its history ollowing a crisis between President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister Blent Ecevit. The USadministration helped Turkey obtain the necessary loans rom the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to aid recovery. Second, ater the September 11th attacks in the US,Turkey was one o the rst countries that expressed support or the USs pursuit o theperpetrators o 9/11. The Bush administrations declaration o a global war on terrorresonated with the Turkish state establishments stance on terrorism. Turkey allowed

US military orces to use Turkish air bases, supported the US operations in Aghanistanby contributing troops, and later shared important responsibilities within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

The longestablished

tutelary system inTurkey allowed a

military to militaryrelationship withIsrael and the US

without muchcivilian input or

oversight.


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The rst majorrit in the newmillenniumbetween Turkeyand the USoccurred as aresult o US plansto topple SaddamHussein byinvading Iraq.

However, the rst major rit in the new millennium between Turkey and the US occurred

as a result o US plans to topple Saddam Hussein by invading Iraq. There was widespread

opposition to US military action against Iraq in public opinion and among the Europeanallies. At the outset o various media reports o a possible US attack on Iraq, Turkish

leaders made cautious statements o concern and expressed that the attack may have

negative consequences or the territorial integrity o Iraq and the uture o the Middle

East, noting that it would especially have catastrophic results or neighboring countries.

For the Turkish security establishment and the Turkish public, the memory o the First

Gul War, which had resulted in a huge loss in trade and was thought to be responsible

or the strengthening o the PKK in the Southeast, was still very much alive. Moreover,

ear o the possible disintegration o Iraq and ormation o an independent Kurdish state

in Turkeys south was considered a major threat to Turkeys territorial integrity. In several

instances, Prime Minister Ecevit had made similar statements expressing such concernsin his dialogue with President Bush and his envoys.

A WATERSHED MOMENT: THE MARCH 1, 2003 RESOLUTION

Following the AK Partys election victory in November 2002, the Bush administration

extended an invitation to the partys leadership. By this time, the Bush administrations

ocus was shiting to Iraq, making Turkey a key ally to be counted on during the im

pending invasion. Although the chairman o the AK Party, Tayyip Erdoan, was barred

rom running or public ofce at the time (or having served jail time or inciting vio

lence by reciting a poem in a public address), he was warmly welcomed by the Bush

administration at the White House. During Erdoans visit to Washington, the most sig

nicant agenda item was Turkeys position regarding the orthcoming US operation in

Iraq. The closed meeting between Bush and Erdoan led to speculation about Turkeys

commitment to support the Iraq War. However, the Turkish government vehemently

denied that any promise or commitment had been made by Erdoan or by his del

egation on this matter. Following this meeting, intense negotiations and bargaining

between the newly ormed Turkish government and the US administration were held.

While the Turkish government continued to negotiate with the US, the new AK Party

government also aced pressure rom the Turkish public and media that was largely

opposed to the invasion.

Starting in the late 1990s, Turkish public opinion began playing a more active role in

shaping Turkish politics and oreign policy. The support o Turkish public opinion or

the EU membership and the integration process was vital or the Turkish government

to pass EU reorms, such as the criminal law amendment to abolish the death penalty,

despite some reluctance rom the state establishment. In addition, the Turkish pub

lics reaction to the Israeli government during the Second Intiada and the nature o

TurkishIsraeli relations orced the political leaders in Turkey to pay more attention to

the Palestinian problem, which also transormed the relations between Turkey and Is

rael. Although the September 11 attacks were condemned in Turkey, Turkish support

or the operation in Aghanistan generated public debate about Turkeys role and the

degree o its involvement. Despite these earlier moments o Turkish publics inuence,oreign policy decisions were largely let to the state establishment. However, the de

bate on the impending US invasion o Iraq was a dramatic turning point in terms o the


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Mutual trust hadbeen severelydamaged due

to divergingperspectives

regarding theuture o Iraq and

the region as awhole.

publics inuence on the USTurkish relationship. The debate galvanized Turkish publicopinion rst against a US operation in Iraq and then against the possibility o Turkeys

support o this operation. Formed under the banner o new antiwar organizations, dierent civil society groups reacted against US policy in the region and their goal was toprevent the Turkish government rom supporting it. Demonstrations brought togetherthousands o people rom dierent walks o lie and the pressure on the newly electedparliamentarians grew intense.

The Turkish publics attention to the Iraq War was one o rst steps in transormingTurkish oreign policy during this era, which was misunderstood by many in Washington and Western capitals. It is oten overlooked that the majority o Turkish societyopposed the Turkish governments support or Operations Desert Shield and DesertStorm in 1990. Twelve years later, the Turkish public began to exert substantial pressure

on the government on issues pertaining to oreign policy. The negotiations betweenTurkish ofcials and the US government were labeled as shameul acts and the Turkishpublic considered the depictions o Turkey in the US media humiliating. On March 1,2003, the Turkish parliament voted against the governments proposed resolution toallow US troops to open a northern ront rom the Turkish soil.

That vote marked the beginning o a major rit that would not be repaired or severalyears. Although the US expressed its respect or the democratic process in Turkey, itsdisappointment was clear. The US launched its attack against Iraq without Turkish support; low intensity tension between the two countries continued. The crisis reached itsclimax on July 4th o the same year when the US armed orces detained Turkish soldiersin Northern Iraq, putting hoods over their heads. Also known as the hood incident,this event brought TurkishAmerican relations to an all time low. Attempts to containthe crisis ailed. While unavorable opinions toward the US increased dramatically ollowing this incident, some pundits in Washington engaged in who lost Turkey? andshit o axis discourses on Turkey. The Turkish position on the Iraq War and the Turkish publics reaction were interpreted as Turkey turning away rom the Western world.Some even started to call Turkey the sick man o Europe. For many in Turkey, the negative attitude in policy circles and the media against Turkey was an attempt to punishTurkey or its lack o support or the US invasion o Iraq.

Following the intensiying insurgency in Iraq and increased clashes between insurgentsand US troops, the Turkish public became more reactive to the ongoing war. Even ater

the invasion, however, Turkey did not turn its back on the political developments in Iraq.Turkey was proactively engaged (or instance, through the Neighbors o Iraq conerences) to ensure stability and a quick recovery in Iraq. Turkey developed its relations withthe Kurds in Northern Iraq and was instrumental in bringing together the Sunni opposition groups to participate in the political process. Meanwhile, highlevel ofcials in theBush administration, including Vice President Dick Cheney, continuously blamed Turkeyor being responsible or the extension o the duration o the conict. In spite o severalattempts by both sides to repair relations, mutual trust had been severely damaged dueto diverging perspectives regarding the uture o Iraq and the region as a whole.

DIVERGENT VISIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE REGIONAnother important point o divergence between the US and Turkey during this transitional period took place as a result o their policy dierences regarding the relations


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Turkeys goal oeconomicallyintegratingdierent states inorder to orm aconictree zonein the MiddleEast contradictedthe US policy ointernationallyisolating rogue

regimes in theregion.

with the other states and actors in the Middle East. Turkeys goal o economically inte

grating dierent states in order to orm a conictree zone in the Middle East contra

dicted the US policy o internationally isolating rogue regimes in the region. Turkeysproactive engagement with some o these regimes, such as Syria, was interpreted as a

major deviation rom the Western orientation o its oreign policy.

In the early 2000s, Turkey pursued to revive the rapprochement with Syria that it had

initially launched in the late 1990s. Economic interaction and border stability between

these two countries created a winwin situation. The rapid development o diplomatic

relations was welcomed and enriched by social and cultural interactions between the

two populations. Turkey also regarded Syria as a possible gateway or engaging eco

nomically with the rest o the Middle East. Under these circumstances, Turkey was resis

tant to any attempts by the US to isolate or sanction its new trading partner. However,

or some in Washington, Turkeys increasing integration with Syria and its attempt tostop its international isolation together with its opposition to launch US troops rom

Turkey during the Iraq War were signs o shiting its oreign policy orientation towards

rogue regimes. Turkeys Syria policy created a new bout o lowlevel tension between

Turkey and the US and contributed to urthering mutual distrust. The overt expres

sion o discontent on the US side or Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezers visit to

Syria was especially perceived as an intervention into Turkish politics that continued

to strain relations.

Another signicant rit in USTurkey relations emerged rom the evolving TurkeyIsrael

relationship during the same period. TurkishIsraeli relations experienced their best

years during the mid and late1990s when the two countries signed multiple security and military cooperation agreements and launched a new strategic partnership to

change the balance o power in the Middle East. However, in the late 1990s, the issues

that had brought Israel and Turkey closer together started to subside. For instance,

Syria was considered a common security threat in the early 1990s and was one o the

reasons or the strategic rapprochement between Israel and Turkey. Ater the Adana

Protocol was signed between Turkey and Syria, however, bilateral relations started to

improve dramatically and TurkishIsraeli relations lost its common other. Moreover,

the Second Intiada and the rising level o violence in the region strained the relation

ship urther. In the meantime, the public and political reaction to Israel started to also

be directed toward the US. The decline in TurkishIsrael security relations, which in act

brought a degree o normalization, could not be replaced with a more diversied relationship. For most o the 1990s, the trilateral nature o the relationship between Turkey, Israel, and the US was considered its strongest dimension. However, rising regional

violence triggered by Israels heavyhanded policies against Palestinians caused these

relations to deteriorate. Ater each instance o violence erupted in the region the bases

o trilateral relations was urther damaged considering that Turkey had traditionally

criticized Israeli policies whenever they led to conict. In contrast, whenever there was

more hope or peace, Turkeys relations with Israel improved, which in turn strength

ened Turkeys image in Washington.

With Turkeys new policy o involvement in the Middle East, Turkeys approach to the

ArabIsraeli conict took on additional dimensions. Turkey made inroads in the MiddleEast in order to resolve the disputes between dierent actors. Turkish oreign policy

makers considered talking with every actor to be one o the most signicant steps to


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The US and Turkeyclearly did not see

eye to eye whenit came to the

regional issuessuch as the Israeli

Palestinian conictand Syria.

achieve this goal. This included Hamas, which the US and Israel recognized as a terroristorganization, and other parties in the PalestinianIsraeli conict as well. Hamass elec

toral victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2005 heightened tensionsbetween the US and Turkey. The Turkish government considered Hamas a legitimatepolitical party and invited the political leader o Hamas to Ankara. The US governmentreacted to the visit and through dierent channels made analogies between Hamas

and the PKK. Moreover, dierent members o the US Congress also demonstrated theirreactions to this visit. For Turkey, on the other hand, the visit was an attempt to quellthe violence in the region and contribute to the peace process. Although many in the

US considered the visit the end o a possible role or Turkey in the peace process, Turkeymaintained relations with Israel.

Being able to talk to dierent sides became one o the assets o Turkish oreign policy.

Turkey was interested in putting to good use its inuence over Syria by brokering peacetalks between Israel and Syria. However, this ailed dramatically when Israel launched

the Operation Cast Lead against Gaza in last days o 2005. The operation drew a bitterresponse and strong condemnation rom Turkey. Amongst US policy circles, this wasyet another sign o Turkeys drit away rom proWestern policies. The US justication

or the heavyhanded Israeli policies in the name o Israels right to exist did not resonate elsewhere, especially in Turkey. The US and Turkey clearly did not see eye to eyewhen it came to the regional issues such as the IsraeliPalestinian conict and Syria.

FORGING A NEW RELATIONSHIP

During the last two years o the Bush administration, there were occasional, albeit,

symbolic gestures to prevent the relationship rom deteriorating even urther. Condoleezza Rices visit in 2007 and the strategic vision document that was signed markedattempts to overcome the crisis that had started with the US invasion o Iraq and to

solve the problem o mutual distrust between the parties. Countering terrorism especially t the Bush administrations war on terror agenda and Turkey sought increasedinternational help rom the US and European allies on that ront in its ght against the

PKK. Signs o a truly changed USTurkey relationship, however, came with the election o Barack Obama in 2008, initially delivering on his promise or a more multilateralapproach to oreign policy. President Obamas rst overseas visit was to Turkey and it

was regarded as a welcome development among the Turkish public and policymakers.President Obama called the USTurkey relationship a model partnership, signaling anew US approach to Turkey. Obamas rst term witnessed serious challenges, threaten

ing to damage this vision. However, the special personal rapport between PresidentObama and Prime Minister Erdoan helped US and Turkish policymakers overcomeand respect their dierences. The relationship would continue to be tested by major

crises but the long list o successul cooperation between the two countries ensuredthat moments o crises remained manageable.

The Gaza otilla raid in May 2010, where Israeli special orces killed eight Turkish andone TurkishAmerican citizens on board a civilian ships humanitarian aid mission to

Gaza, created a major source o disagreement between the US and Turkey. Turkey expected a US condemnation o the Israeli attack on the Gaza otilla similar to those othe European allies but the US leadership elt caught between two strong allies, Turkey


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QuestioningTurkeys relationswith the Westernalliance becamecommonplacewhen the Flotillaraid was ollowedby Turkeys Novote on sanctionsagainst Iran at theUnited Nations

Security Council(UNSC).

and Israel. Instead, the US tried to calm down both sides without denouncing the attack publicly, which rustrated Turkey more. The deaths o eight Turkish and one Turkish

American citizens were unprecedented rom the Turkish perspective, as it was the rsttime in Turkish republics history that a oreign army attacked its civilian citizens. Thelargely proIsraeli views in Washington exacerbated tensions with Turkey, which threatened to downgrade relations with Israel unless the Israeli government apologized, paidcompensation, and lited the blockade on Gaza. To this day, this remains the Turkishpolicy on this incident. Turkey expected the US to pressure the Israeli side but the administration did not eel that it was in a position to do so or domestic political reasons.

The US Secretary o State, Hillary Clinton, is known to have spent much eort brokering an agreement between the two sides but to no avail. During the teen monthssince the Flotilla raid until the leak o the Palmer Report, Turkey restrained itsel rom

responding while continuing to criticize Israels policies. Gestures (Turkeys oer to helpwith the Carmel re in Israel) and secret meetings between Turkish and Israeli diplomatswere not absent. The Palmer Commission at the UN was conceived to create a politicalopening or both sides to come to an agreement, with which the US continued to workquietly behind closed doors. Having declined the Israeli request to extend the commissions mandate or another six months, Turkey announced its sanctions against Israelby downgrading diplomatic relations and reezing or canceling military contracts withIsrael. As the US administration worked to nd a solution, most o Washingtons talk onTurkey revolved around whether Turkey was turning away rom the West.

Questioning Turkeys relations with the Western alliance became commonplace when

the Flotilla raid was ollowed by Turkeys No vote on sanctions against Iran at theUnited Nations Security Council (UNSC). Turkey was a nonpermanent member o theUNSC and had worked to broker a deal with Iran over the nuclear issue. In June 2010,a comprehensive sanctions resolution was brought to the UNSC by the US. Americandiplomats had been working or about nine months to deliver the Russian and Chinesevotes. Turkey had also been working since 2009 alongside Brazil, another nonpermanent member, to broker a condence building measure between the P5+1 and Iranthrough a nuclear swap deal. The deal was originally an American proposal that wouldhave Iran exchange its enriched uranium or uel rods that could only be used or civilian purposes. On the eve o the sanctions vote at the UNSC, Turkey and Brazil signedthe Tehran Declaration, where the nuclear swap deal would happen albeit with modi

cations that the US argued were unacceptable. The US was dismissive o the declaration, which it interpreted as a political ploy by Iran to avoid sanctions and divide theinternational community. This was probably the Iranian calculation but Turkeys argument was that this was the rst time Iran signed an agreement placing any restrictionson its nuclear activity. Ultimately, this was simply a condence building measure ratherthan a ulledged solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

Dierences o opinion between the US and Turkey on the Iranian nuclear issue resultedin Turkeys No vote against the sanctions. As the Mavi Marmara incident and TurkeysUNSC vote occurred so close to each other chronologically, they created a lot o tension in USTurkey relations. The good that came out o these episodes, however, was

that both the American and Turkish leaderships understood that they needed to ensure much more requent contacts and exchange o ideas. While there was much talkin Washington about Turkeys eastern drit and even the need to punish Turkey in


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When and iTurkishIsraeli

relations were tobe restored, theywould operate as

a separate trackoutside the US

Turkey relationship.

some circles, both leaderships were mindul o the need to have a rank discussion.

That discussion came in Toronto in June 2011 between President Obama and Prime

Minister Erdoan, where they reportedly had a rank conversation about the bilateralrelationship. The conversation was ultimately productive, as the bilateral relationship

grew stronger ever since.

A very recent critical turning point in USTurkey relations was Turkeys acceptance to

host the NATO radar in Krecik, as part o its missile deense shield. Discussions had

been ongoing and Turkey asked NATO or Iran to not be identied in relation to the

missile deense system. Russia also had concerns about the radar and wanted certain

guarantees rom the Obama administration about the nature o the missile deense

system. Russian and Iranian criticisms were surely a concern but this, Turkey would

argue, was a NATO project and it was deensive in nature. It would not threaten any

neighboring country. Turkeys timing o the announcement to host the radars couldnot be better as it announced sanctions against Israel on the same day. This was a clear

message to the US that it would remove Israel rom its relationship with the Western

alliance, and ultimately rom its bilateral relationship with the US. While the downgrad

ing o relations with Israel was big news, the positive decision on the radar was even

bigger. This largely stopped the criticism o Turkey in the US oreign policy circles about

Turkeys alleged shit away rom the West. Strategic decoupling o Israel rom the US

TurkeyIsrael trilateral relationship would have structural implications. Now, the US

Turkey relationship could truly become a bilateral relationship independent o either

countrys relations with Israel. The conventional wisdom o the 1990s that the road to

Washington went through Tel Aviv rst was now largely gone. When and i TurkishIsraeli relations were to be restored, they would operate as a separate track outside the

USTurkey relationship.

A NEW REGION

The USTurkey relationship took on a resh dynamic with the onset o the Arab Spring

in early 2011. Ensuing Arab revolutions altered the regional security and political struc

ture in the Middle East, seriously challenging the USsponsored security ramework in

the region. Authoritarian leaders deriving their legitimacy rom acquiescence to the

regional order (orged to acilitate Israels security, ree ow o oil to world markets, and

ght against terrorism) were no longer legitimate in the eyes o the masses. The most

signicant regional development o the 2000s had undoubtedly been the US invasion

o Iraq. Iraqs invasion and the ensuing civil war had regional ramications, which Tur

key could not escape. Having learned its lesson rom the rst Gul War, when it lost a lot

o trade business because o sanctions and suered rom PKK activity out o northern

Iraq, Turkey would not sit idly by this time around. In an eort to ensure Iraqs unity,

Turkish leadership was heavily involved the orging o a Sunni ront and their participation in Iraqi politics. These eorts were accompanied by strong economic and political

ties with the Kurdish leadership in Northern Iraq. While the invasion brought Iraq under

Irans orbit in an unprecedented way, Turkeys clout among the Kurds and Sunnis has

also been very strong. Turkey proved itsel as a stabilizing orce in Iraq, a largely welcome development or the US policymakers that sought to withdraw rom Iraq as soon

as possible. When the revolutions and turmoil were unleashed throughout the region


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Turkeyspearheadedintensive eortsto convince theAssad regime toaccommodatethe peoplesdemands to avoidthe quagmire wehave witnessedever since. Turkeys

eorts provedinsufcient as theregime saw this asan existential ghtor its own survival.

in early 2011, Turkey emerged once again as a stabilizing orce. The tone in Washingtonwould now change to regard Turkey as a stable, secular, Muslimmajority democracy to

actually be celebrated.

Turkeys approach to the Arab revolutions has demonstrated that the countrys policyis ocused on contributing to peace and stability while standing by the legitimate demands o the Arab peoples. Turkey had been working closely with authoritarian regimesover the past decade with the perspective that engagement would help countries suchas Iran and Syria integrate into the region and the global system both economically and politically. This approach helped Turkey build deep relations with most o itsneighbors and was instrumental in its economic and political rise in the 2000s. TheUS was suspicious o this approach and interested in conronting such regimes underthe President Bushs Freedom Agenda. But when elections brought to power Islamist

groups, such as Hamas in Palestine and threatened autocratic rulers such as Mubarakin Egypt, the US reverted to its policy prioritizing stability over democracy. Turkish oreign policy did not traditionally have a democracy promotion agenda so there was noserious domestic criticism o Turkish engagement policies. When the Arab Spring camealong, however, Turkey was swit in acknowledging the regional earthquake or whatit was. From then on, it was clear to Turkish policymakers, regimes deemed illegitimateby their people would not survive. Though reluctantly at rst, the US adopted a similarstance while trying to ensure its core interests.

The earliest challenge or Turkeys stance came rom Libya. Turkey had economic interests and more than twenty thousand citizens waiting to be shipped out o the country

at the onset o the conict. In the meantime, Turkey tried to broker an agreement withQadda and the rebel ghters. When France, under President Sarkozy, attempted tolead a European coalition against the Libyan regime, Turkey worked to bring the operation under the NATO umbrella and participated in the operation. Turkeys initial reaction to military intervention was in line with its traditional noninterventionist posturebut once it saw no other alternative, Turkey was adaptable and did not try to block theoperation. This brie disagreement with the Western allies was not as consequential orTurkeys relations with the US. It was clear that Turkey would pursue policies in its ownnational interest, which could be at odds with those o the European countries or theUS. This did not mean Turkey was trying to hamper Western interests rather seeking itsown while developing a language that meaningully responded to newly empowered

peoples legitimate demands.

When the revolution spread to Syria, Turkey was conronted with the most seriouschallenge o the Arab Spring. This was the regime with which Turkey had the deepest relations and leverage. Turkey spearheaded intensive eorts to convince the Assadregime to accommodate the peoples demands to avoid the quagmire we have witnessed ever since. Turkeys eorts proved insufcient as the regime saw this as an existential ght or its own survival. The deeply authoritarian and repressive Syrian regimeunder Bashar AlAssad proved itsel just as merciless as it was under Haez Assad. Inthe summer o 2011, Turkey adjusted course and called on Assad to step down, a stepwelcomed by the Obama administration. Critics have argued that Turkish calculations

about the regimes expiration date were shortsighted. We should remember, however,once Turkey decided to endorse the new revolutionary movements elsewhere, it couldnot choose to do otherwise in Syria. From the US perspective, Turkey emerged as not


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The USpolicymakershave come toacknowledge

that Turkey willwatch out or its

own interests anddisagreements

between the twocountries will arise.

only a strong partner but also a democracy deeply committed to the emergence ostable and democratic governments in the wake o a true regional revolutionary wave.

The remarkable shit in Washingtons discourse ocused on Turkeys shit o axis towards Turkey as a model country should be understood in this context. At the sametime, the Obama administration is much more interested in working with allies andregional powers to share the burden in dealing with regional issues. Turkey has soughtto have a say in regional aairs and expected the US to acknowledge the New Turkeywith its diverse set o aspirations, interests, and policies that may not necessarily alignwith those o the US. While this understanding has been established to a large extent,serious regional and bilateral challenges remain. The conict in Syria, Iraqs stability andunity, Irans nuclear program, and the rozen i not dead peace process are only someo the regional challenges Turkey and the US have to ace. At the bilateral level, Turkey

seeks US support on dealing with PKK activity in Northern Iraq through security cooperation. In addition, potential conicts with Iran and on the IsraeliPalestinian ront stillhave the potential to derail the USTurkey relationship. The Middle East will spend thenext decade on reconstruction, economic development, and establishment o participatory democratic institutions. The USTurkey relationship will be critical in this processespecially i the counterrevolutionary orces in the region do not prevail over the newpolitical orces.

CONCLUSION

USTurkey relations have become more diverse than ever during the AK Party decade,as a result o the historic changes taking place in the Middle East and around the globe.Turkeys increased economic, political, and diplomatic clout has transormed it into amajor player in regional aairs and the country aspires to become a global player overthe course o the next decade. The US approach to the Middle East has undamentallychanged rom an interventionist agenda to bring democracy to the region under theBush administration to a more minimalist outlook under President Obama. During bothadministrations, USTurkey relations have undergone the major tests we have outlinedin this analysis. Relations proved largely resilient thanks to a longstanding relationshipunder NATO but Turkey has a much more independent outlook on many o the issueso common concern. At the same time, the Obama administrations attitude showed

that this could be an asset, especially the Turkish leaderships willingness to take risksand bear responsibility on many issues. Major disagreements have allowed the US tosharpen its understanding o Turkish viewpoints, shiting away rom the Cold War perspective. The AK Party leadership has insisted that the increasingly globalized worldno longer gives Turkey the luxury to pursue a heavily western oriented oreign policy.Instead, it must pursue a diversied oreign policy that considers all o its borders: east,west, north, and south. The US policymakers have come to acknowledge that Turkeywill watch out or its own interests and disagreements between the two countries willarise. Especially when Turkey has proven time and again that it has no interest in jeopardizing its strong ties with the EU and the US, Turkeys independent approach to many

regional issues will have to be swallowed.During President Obamas second term, the US seems poised to conduct a much moreminimalist approach to the region, as a whole, as it gears to shit its ocus towards Asia.


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Today, the USTurkey bilateralrelationshipis strong andindependent oTurkeys relationswith Israel or o theEU membershiptrack.

This will surely take a long time and the crises that plague the Middle East will not goaway. Especially with its security guarantees or Israel, its interests in the Persian Gul,

and its pledge not to allow an Iranian nuclear bomb, the US may have to get involved inthe Middle Eastern aairs more than the administration would like. US posture wouldrequire regional actors to be even more active and Turkey would have to conrontcounterrevolutionary orces on its own as we have witnessed in Syria. And Turkey mayeel the need to utilize its western alliances strength (as in the case o stationing oNATO missiles in Turkey against a potential Syrian attack). I the conict in Syria evolvesinto a regional conict, it may be one that no single regional power can contain. Thiscould be a source o uture disagreement between the US and Turkey. US policies onSyria, Iraq (and PKK activities in Northern Iraq), Iran, and the ArabIsraeli conict maycause urther disagreements.

Today, the USTurkey bilateral relationship is strong and independent o Turkeys relations with Israel or o the EU membership track. This is a signicant development orthe bilateral relationship, as it can be activated in the context o Middle Eastern aairs.Turkey has become an integral actor with whom the US needs to work in Iraq, in theIsraeliPalestinian conict (Turkeys behindthescenes work in the most recent Gazaare up should be remembered here), and in Egypt. What this means is that Turkeyand the US have a much broader set o common interests outside the traditional securityoriented rameworks. As their relations become varied and more complex, thereis always more potential or misreading one anothers policies or intentions. However,both sides have learned to live with and overcome such dierences during the AK Partydecade. This is unlikely to change but Turkey, with its aspiration to become a regionaland global power, is likely to keep regional issues on the US agenda. I both sides canreassure one another that they are mindul o each others interests and concerns, theUSTurkey relationship has the potential to contribute to regional peace and stability.


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Turkeys relations with the United States over the last decade witnessed wildswings and shits. Turkeys past decade under the AK Party coincided with theUS invasion o Iraq, the nancial meltdown in the US (which transormed intoa global economic crisis) as well as a relative decline o the US stature in theworld. This period also overlapped with dramatic changes in the Middle East,as the ousting o longstanding authoritarian leaders led to the emergenceo a generation o new leaders across the Arab world. Today, a new Turkeyas a regional power is aced with a new US eort to reconsider its role in theregion and around the globe. In this analysis, our goal is to take a broad view

o the AK Party decade in USTurkey relations and contribute to the debateson the uture o the relationship and its potential implications or the region.

Kadir STNKadir stn is the Research Director at the SETA Foundation at Washington, D.C. He alsoserves as an Assistant Editor o Insight Turkey, an academic journal published by the SETAFoundation. Mr. Ustun holds a masters degree in History rom Bilkent University and anM.Phil rom Columbia University. He is currently pursuing a doctoral degree in Middle EastStudies at Columbia University. His research interests include civilmilitary relations, socialand military modernization in the Middle East, USTurkey relations, and Turkish oreignpolicy. Mr. Ustun has contributed to various SETA reports and his writings have appearedin Sabah Daily, insideIRAN.org, AlMonitor.com, Al Jazeera English, Insight Turkey, and CairoReview o Global Afairs. He is also coeditor o an edited volume History, Politics and For-eign Policy in Turkey published by the SETA Foundation.

Kl Bura KANATKl Bura Kanat is an Assistant Proessor o Political Science at Penn State University, Erieand a research scholar at the SETA Foundation at Washington, D.C. He received his doctoraldegree in Political Science rom Syracuse University. He holds a masters degree in PoliticalScience rom Syracuse University and a masters in International Aairs rom Marquette University. He completed his undergraduate education in the International Relations Department o the Middle East Technical University. His research interests include oreign policydecisionmaking, oreign policy change, and domestic politics and oreign policy interaction. Dr. Kanats writings have appeared in Star, Sabah, Todays Zaman, Zaman Daily, Radikal

Daily, Insight Turkey, and Foreign Policy. He is also coeditor o an edited volume History,Politics and Foreign Policy in Turkey published by the SETA Foundation.

Documents

SETA Policy Brief 62 Web