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    Telecom Security A Primer

    29th May 2012

    Sony Anthony

    Director

    Management Consulting IT Advisory

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    Our Experiences

    The Very Very Basics

    Switching and Transmission Technologies

    Telecom Technologies

    Evolution of Telecom

    The Layers (Terminal, Access and Core)

    Telecom Architecture Threats

    Understanding the Stack and Protocols

    Protocol Analyzers and Tools

    Case Study - FemtoCells

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    Our Experiences Thus

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    History of Telecommunication

    Telegraph

    Telephone

    Mobility

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    History of our Experience

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    History of our Experience

    RIP, OSPF, BGP

    SAN, NAS, DAS

    Win, Linux, *NIX

    Routers, Switches,Firewalls

    Applications,

    Databases,Middleware

    SNMP, TCP/IP,

    Telnet, FTP, HTTP

    Virtualization,

    Replication,Mirroring, DataDe-Duplication

    IPV4 / IPV6

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    Future of our Experience

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    Future of our Experience

    Switching and Transmission Technologies: ATM, SDH, STM, PDH, T1, E1

    Data Speeds and Telecom Technologies: EVDO, EDGE, GPRS, GSM, TDM, WCDMA, PSTN

    Protocols: MTP, SCCP, ISUP, TCAP, INAP, ISDN, MAP, CAP, BSSAP

    Intelligent Network : SSF, SCP, SDP, IVR VOIP: SIGTRAN, MEGACO, H.248, MGCP, RTP

    Protocol Analyzers: Tektronix K15-2, Ethereal, Wire shark, Eye Spot

    The Stack: SS7, CCS7

    Microwave Equipment Vendors: NEC, ARYA, GTL, Envision, Aster, BNN

    Components: NSC, MSS, MGW, HLR, POI, BSC, AUC, SCP, MPBN, EIR, GMSC, VLR

    Ericsson Alcatel / Lucent Nokia / Siemens

    MSC - AXE 10/810MSS - AXE 810MGW CPP (R5/R6)MPBN Red Back RoutersMPBN Black Diamond SwitchesBlades APZ 2130/40/50/60

    NGN Architecture

    MSC DX 200 3GMGW IPA 2800

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    The Basics

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    The Generations

    Generation Technology Description and Working

    2G GSM Global System for Mobile Communication(Circuit Switched)

    2.5G GPRS General Packet Radio Service(Packet Switched for IP Services)Uses SGSN-GGSN or Serving Gateway GPRS Support Node

    3G UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System(CS + PS)Uses Transport options like ATM / TDM / IPNew RAN : NodeB / RNC

    4G LTE/SAE Long Term Evolution / System Architecture EvolutionOnly PSNew Core: Mobility Management Entity and SAE GatewayNew RAN : evolved NodeB / RNC

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    The Fundamentals on Channel Access Methods

    FDM: FrequencyDivision

    Multiplexing

    TDM: Time DivisionMultiplexing

    FDMA:1. Division of Frequency in to multiple (30) channels2. Each channel can carry a voice conversation or, with digital service, carrydigital data.

    TDMA:

    1. Chops up the channel into sequential time slices.2. User of the channel takes turns transmitting and receiving in a round-robin

    fashion. (Only one person using the channel at a time)

    3. (GSM uses TDMA Signaling)

    CDMA :1. Everyone transmit at the same time.2. CDMA is a "spread spectrum" technology, allowing many users to occupy the

    same time and frequency allocations in a given band/space.3. Assigns unique codes to each communication to differentiate it from others in

    the same spectrum

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    The Fundamentals on Planes

    Data / User / Bearer Plane

    (Network Traffic)

    Control / Signaling Plane(Control Signals)

    DataIN

    DataOUT

    Signaling ControlManage

    mentPlane

    Operationsand

    ManagementData

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    Switching and TransmissionTechnologies Wired End

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    Switching and Transmission Technologies ATM

    Functionality:

    Packets of fixed size of 53 bytes Assures no single type of data hogs the bandwidth

    Uses concept of Virtual Circuits

    Security Challenges:1. Eavesdropping (Tapping of fiber optic cable

    Equipment costs about $2000)2. Spoofing3. Denial of Service

    4. Stealing of VCs5. Traffic analysis

    ATM

    SONET/SDH

    STM

    T1/E1

    Description: Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) is alayer 2 technology which transfers data in cells of fixedsize

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    Switching and Transmission Technologies SONET/SDH

    Functionality:

    Guaranteed bandwidth Line rates of 155 Mbps to more than 10 Gbps Common circuits OC-3 (155 Mbps) and OC-12 (622

    Mbps) (OC-48 = 2048Mbps or 2Gbps Circuit) Automatic recovery capabilities and self-healingmechanisms

    Security Challenges:1. Eavesdropping2. Denial of Service

    Description: Synchronous Optical Network/SynchronousDigital Hierarchy delivers high speed services overoptical network

    ATM

    SONET/SDH

    STM

    T1/E1

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    Switching and Transmission Technologies STM

    Functionality:

    STM-1 has a bit rate of 1.544 Mbps and higher levelsgo up 4 at a time. Currently supported levels are STM-4, STM-16, STM-64

    and STM-256.

    Security Challenges:1. Eavesdropping2. Denial of Service

    Description: Synchronous Transport Module is a fiberoptic network transmission standard

    ATM

    SONET/SDH

    STM

    T1/E1

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    Switching and Transmission Technologies T1/E1

    Functionality:

    T1/E1 circuit based on Time Division Multiplexing T1 is primarily used in North America E1 is primarily used in Europe T1 circuit provides 1.544 Mbps of data consisting of 24timeslots of 64 kbps each and 8 kbps channel for control

    information E1 circuit provides 2.048 Mbps of bandwidth consistingof 30 channels.

    Security Challenges:1. Port Mirroring2. Data Sniff of Un-encrypted data channels3. Denial of Service

    Description: Type of circuit used for data transmission.ATM

    SONET/SDH

    STM

    T1/E1

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    Telecom TechnologiesWireless End

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    Telecom Technologies EVDO

    Functionality:

    Primarily used for broadband internet access Uses multiplexing techniques including CDMA and TDM EV-DO channel has a bandwidth of 1.25 Mhz

    Back-end network is entirely packet-based.

    Security Challenges:1. EV-DO base transceiver is prone to hacking and

    misuse

    2. WAP Servers and WML compromises.3. GSM Technology Security Issues prevalent

    (Confirm if this is a GSM Technology)

    EVDO

    EDGE

    GPRS

    Description: Evolution-Data Optimized is atelecommunication standard for wireless transmission ofdata through radio signals

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    Telecom Technologies GPRS

    Functionality: GPRS is a best-effort service 2G cellular technology combined with GPRS issometimes described as 2.5G The GPRS core network allows 2G, 3G and WCDMAmobile networks to transmit IP packets to external

    networks such as the internet.

    Security Challenges: Points of attack comprises of thefollowing: Mobile device and SIM card Interface between mobile device and SGSN GPRS backbone network

    Packet network that connects different operators Public internet

    Description: General Packet Radio Service is a packetoriented mobile data service for GSM users

    EVDO

    GPRS

    EDGE

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    Telecom Technologies EDGE

    Functionality:

    Considered a pre-3G radio technology Peak rates of 1 Mbps and typical rates of 400 kbit/s canbe expected.EDGE requires no hardware of software changes to bemade in GSM core networks. ??

    Security Challenges:1. GSM Technology Security Issues prevalent

    Description: Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution isa digital mobile phone technology that allows improved

    data transmission rates.

    EVDO

    GPRS

    EDGE

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    The Basics GSM and The Geographic Structure

    Originally defined as a pan-European open standard for adigital cellular telephone network to support voice, data,text messaging and cross-border roaming GlobalSystem for Mobile Communications (GSM), is nowone of the world's main 2G digital wireless standards.

    GSM is present in more than 160 countries andaccording to the GSM Association, accounts forapproximately 70 percent of the total digital cellularwireless market.

    GSM is a time division multiplex (TDM) system.Implemented on 800, 900, 1800 and 1900 MHzfrequency.

    GSM Architecture each cell is governed by a BaseStation or BTS.

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    The Basics GSM and The Geographic Structure

    Cell 1

    BTS

    Cell and Base Transceiver Station (BTS)

    In GSM architecture, every geographical area covered by the operators network is divided into smaller parts.

    Each of these parts has a Mobile Signal tower, responsible for providing connectivity between your Mobile hand set

    and the Network.

    This small area is called as a Cell and the Mobile Signaling tower assigned to each Cell is called a BTS.

    Location Area 1 Location Area 2

    Location Area

    Group of cells together represent

    a location area within GSM

    network.

    Cell 1

    BTS

    Location Area 1 Location Area 2HLR VLR

    MSC

    AUCEIR

    MSC (Mobile Switching Center)Service Area

    A group of many Location Areas

    (LAs) is called MSC area.

    Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN)

    A group of MSC areas serviced by the same

    operator refer to PLMN area it represents an

    entire set of cells, served by one network operator

    Incase of multiple operators in a country, there wil

    be more than one PLMN.

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    The Evolution of TelecomNetworks

    C f 2G N k d T i l Ch ll

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    Components of 2G Networks and Typical Challenges

    EIR

    AUC

    SGSN

    Terminal

    1.False BTS Active Attacks

    (Reveal the IMSI and currentTMSI)

    2.Cipher keys and AuthenticationData in Clear (Between andWithin Networks)

    3.Attacks on COMP128

    4.Encryption not extended till core(Clear text transmission of user

    and signaling data acrossmicrowave links) (e.g. in GSMBTS-> BSC)

    5.User Authentication with apreviously known Cipher

    6.IMEI is an unsecured identify

    7.Fraud and LI not considered inthe design of the 2G network

    8. No flexibility to upgrade andimprove security.

    Access Core IP Services

    Requirement - Voice

    Internet

    3GPPLayer

    BTSBSC

    GERAN

    DHCP

    DNS

    Char

    ging

    GSM

    Reference : TR 33.120

    C t f 3G N t k d T i l Ch ll

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    Components of 3G Networks and Typical Challenges

    EIR

    AUC

    HSS

    SGSN

    MME

    IN-VAS

    Terminal

    1.Attacks persist primarily because

    of backward compatibility to 2G orGSM networks.

    2.Smart-Phones with capability toIntercept and Analyze traffic,

    3.Multiple IP based services enabledto facilitate user, data andmanagement channels.

    4.Denial of Service

    1.User De-registration requestspoofing2.Location update request

    spoofing3.Camping on a false BS/MS

    4.Passive and Active IdentifyCatching

    5.Impersonation of the Network

    6.Impersonation of the User

    Access Core IP Services

    Requirement Voice + Data

    Internet

    Corporate Networks

    3GPPLayer

    NBRNC

    BTSBSC

    UTRAN

    GERAN

    DHCP

    DNS

    Char

    gingApplication SPs

    EvolvedPacketSystem

    GSM

    UMTS

    C t f 4G N t k d T i l Ch ll

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    Components of 4G Networks and Typical Challenges

    EIR

    AUC

    HSS

    SGSN

    MME

    IN-VAS

    Terminal Access Core IP Services

    Requirement Data Continuous

    Internet

    Internet

    Corporate Networks

    3GPPLayer

    H(e)NB

    eNB Sec-Gw

    NBRNC

    BTSBSC

    UTRAN

    GERAN

    E-UTRAN

    DHCP

    DNS

    Char

    gingApplication SPs

    EvolvedPacketSystem

    GSM

    UMTS

    1.Femto Cell Device compromise

    2.UE Tracking

    3.IMSI catching

    4.Force Handovers to compromisedeNB.

    5.Capture of System information andcompromise of credentials

    6.Physical attacks

    7.Configuration attacks

    8.Protocol attacks

    Reference : TR 33.820

    Components of Non 3GPP Layers

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    Components of Non-3GPP Layers

    EIR

    AUC

    HSS

    SGSN

    MME

    AAA

    ePDG

    IN-VAS

    Terminal

    1. Authentication Bypass

    2. Gateway Bypass

    3. Route APs connectionto 3GPP Network

    Access Core IP Services

    Risks

    Internet

    Internet

    Corporate Networks

    3GPP

    Layer

    n-trustedLayer

    TrustedL

    ayer

    Non-3GPP

    CDMA2000

    WIMAX-WLAN

    H(e)NB

    eNB Sec-Gw

    NBRNC

    BTSBSC

    UTRAN

    GERAN

    E-UTRAN

    DHCP

    DNS

    Char

    gingApplication SPs

    EvolvedPacketSystem

    GSM

    UMTS

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    Break

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    The Terminal Layer

    The Terminal Layer User Equipment (UE)

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    The Terminal Layer User Equipment (UE)

    Mobile Station or User Equipment (UE)

    Mobile Station comprises of 2 components a Mobile phone and a SIM (Subscriber

    Identification Module) card.

    While a mobile phone is a device that enables communication between two people

    through telecom network, a SIM card is a smart card that stores unique subscriber

    information in order to identify subscriber and permit communication.

    SIM Card (described in subsequent paragraphs)

    Receiver and Transmitter used to perform functions such as

    receiving and transmitting voice and data communication.

    On-board memory chips used to store internal mobile software

    and other user data like contact list, messages, pictures etc.

    A SIM card contains

    information like authentication

    key, security algorithms, etc.

    which are used to authenticate

    the subscriber.

    Such information is stored on

    the card prior to sale.

    The Terminal Layer User Equipment (UE)

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    The Terminal Layer User Equipment (UE)

    MSISDN (Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network)

    Generally known as Mobile phone number. It is a unique number for each mobile

    subscriber. It is composed of the following components:

    CC (Country Code) + NDC (National Destination Code) + SS (Subscriber Number)

    For example: +91 80 98455 65222

    International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)

    A unique 15 digit number associated with all GSM network mobile phone users. IMSI is

    stored in the SIM and is used by the network to identify the subscriber.

    It is composed of the following components:

    IMSI = MCC (Mobile Country Code) + MNC (Mobile Network Code)+ MSIN (Mobile

    Subscriber Identity Number)

    For example: 89914 50004 01062 (9419 9)

    IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity)

    A unique 14 to 17 digit code / or serial number used to identify an individual Mobile Phone

    to a GSM network. (3561 880 4850 4945)

    2041271796002QA

    The Terminal Layer User Equipment (UE) States of Operation

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    State 1 Detached

    1. Mobile Station (MS) is not within the network coverage area.

    2. This also refers to the state when the mobile phone is switched off.

    Detached

    NOTE: the mobile station is notconnected to network, hence no

    process is established here

    The Terminal Layer User Equipment (UE) States of Operation

    The Terminal Layer User Equipment (UE) States of Operation

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    State 2 Idle

    1. When you switch on the mobile station, it moves to Idle state from Detached state.

    2. In this state mobile station is within the network coverage area but is not being used (e.g. making or receiving a call,data communication etc)

    When your mobile station is switched on, it attaches itself to the nearest BTS tower in the location area. This process of

    attaching the phone to nearest BTS tower is called Registration.

    Further, when you move from one location area to another, your mobile station, on a continuous basis sends a message to

    the nearest BTS tower. The network updates the changing information about the subscriber and this process is called

    Location Updating.

    Registration Updating

    IdleDetached

    NOTE: the mobile station is notconnected to network, hence no

    process is established here

    The Terminal Layer User Equipment (UE) States of Operation

    The Terminal Layer User Equipment (UE) States of Operation

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    State 3 Active

    1. When your mobile station is used to make or receive a call, send or receive data, it moves to Active state

    from Idle State.

    In active state, whenever you use the mobile station to either receive or make a call, then the MSC finds out

    the Location Area (LA) in which you are present and connects you to other network elements within the

    Location Area. This process is called Paging.

    Registration Updating Paging

    IdleDetached

    NOTE: the mobile station is notconnected to network, hence no

    process is established here

    Active

    y q p ( ) p

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    The Access Layer

    Telecom Components (2G/GSM/CDMA)

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    p ( )

    BTS

    BSC

    Functionality

    1. Radio reception and transmission2. Signal Processing3. Signal Link Management4. Synchronization5. Encodes, Encrypts, Multiplexes, Modulates and

    feeds the RF signal to the antenna

    Security Challenges:1. Physical Tampering MW equipment

    2. Fake BTS3. IMSI Catcher4. Over-The-Air Cloning

    The Base Transceiver Station (BTS) is the transmit andreceive link for a mobile communication system. Its adevice that actually communicates with the cell phone.The BTS connects to a BSC and communicates in an(Abis Interface)

    BTS Base Tranceiver Station

    GPS War Driving Nano BTS in a Nano

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    Telecom Components (2G/GSM/CDMA)

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    BTS

    BSC

    Functionality1. Handovers of Calls from one BTS to other2. BSC passes on your call to Mobile Switching Center

    (MSC).3. Manages Radio resources for BTS4. Assigns frequency and timeslots to MS

    Security Challenges:1. OpenBSC Software2. Cipher keys and Authentication Data in Clear

    (Between and Within Networks)3. Attacks on COMP1284. Encryption not extended till core (Clear text

    transmission of user and signaling data acrossmicrowave links) (e.g. in GSM BTS-> BSC)

    BSC is used to control a group of BTS. It providesconnection between BTS and other network elementsthat are needed to complete the call.

    BSC Base Station Controller

    Telecom Components (3G/UMTS)

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    Functionality1. Modulation and spreading2. RF Processing

    3. Inner-loop power control4. Rate matching5. Macro diversity combining/splitting inside Node B

    Security Challenges:1. Unknown

    A UMTS (3G) mobile connects to the Node B to transmitor receive a voice call or carry out a data-modeconnection.

    RNC

    Node BNode B

    Telecom Components (3G/UMTS)

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    Functionality

    1. Closed loop power control2. Handover control3. Admission control4. Code allocation5. Packet scheduling6. Macro diversity combining/splitting over number of

    Node Bs

    Security Challenges:1. Unknown

    Comparable to Base Station Controller in GSM. It isresponsible for L2 processing of user data and RadioResource Management.

    RNC

    Node BRNC Radio Network Controller

    Telecom Components (4G/LTE)

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    Functionality1. Radio resource management2. IP header compression and encrypting of user data

    stream3. Selection of an MME at UE attachment4. Routing of user plane data towards SAE gateway

    5. Measurement and measurement reportingconfiguration for mobility and scheduling

    Security Challenges:1. Placing a lot number of eNodeB in a large L2 domain

    results in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)attacks.

    2. IP address of neighboring cell sites can be extractedthrough Automatic Neighbor Relation (ANR)messages for use on dynamic ACLs that will onlyallow communication between defined neighboringcell sites.

    eNode B is the base station in the LTE/SAE network.

    eNode B

    eNODE B

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    The Core Layer

    CDMA Network Architecture

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    Core Components:

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    CDMA

    HA - Locates the place where the Mobile Nodeopens its account;

    MSC - Authenticates the subscriber to establishthe call.

    GMSC Switch which interrogates subscriber HLRto obtain routing information (transit calls).

    HLR - Centralized database that stores andmanages all subscriber related information

    required to set up calls. VLR - Database containing subscriber informationof all subscribers currently located in the areaserved by MSC.

    AuC - Authenticates each SIM card that attemptsto connect to the network.

    EIR - Optional database containing mobileequipment identity information.

    PDSN - Implements the switching of packet dataservices of mobile subscribers.

    AUC

    EIR

    HLR/VLR

    HA

    SGSN/GGSN

    PGW

    SGW

    MME

    MSC/GMSC

    PDSN

    PCRF

    2G and 3G Network Architecture

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    Core Components:

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    GSM

    MSC/MGW - Performa call control function and

    authenticates the subscriber to establish the call. GMSC Switch which interrogates subscriber HLR

    to obtain routing information (transit calls). HLR - Centralized database that stores and

    manages all subscriber related informationrequired to set up calls.

    VLR - Database containing subscriber informationof all subscribers currently located in the area

    served by MSC. AuC - Authenticates each SIM card that attempts

    to connect to the network. EIR - Optional database containing mobile

    equipment identity information. SGSN - Delivery of data packets from and to the

    mobile stations within its geographical servicearea.

    GGSN - Interworking between the GPRS networkand external packet switched networks.

    AUC

    EIR

    HLR/VLR

    HA

    SGSN/GGSN

    PGW

    SGW

    MME

    MSC/MGW/GMSC

    PDSN

    PCRF

    Core Components:

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    3G

    MSC/MGW - Performa call control function and

    authenticates the subscriber to establish the call. GMSC Switch which interrogates subscriber HLR

    to obtain routing information (transit calls). HLR - Centralized database that stores and

    manages all subscriber related informationrequired to set up calls.

    VLR - Database containing subscriber informationof all subscribers currently located in the area

    served by MSC. AuC - Authenticates each SIM card that attempts

    to connect to the network. EIR - Optional database containing mobile

    equipment identity information. SGSN - Delivery of data packets from and to the

    mobile stations within its geographical servicearea.

    GGSN - Interworking between the GPRS networkand external packet switched networks.

    AUC

    EIR

    HLR/VLR

    HA

    SGSN/GGSN

    PGW

    SGW

    MME

    MSC/MGW/GMSC

    PDSN

    PCRF

    4G/ LTENetwork Architecture

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    Core Components:

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    4G

    MME- Manages the subscriber session controlplane functionality,

    HSS - It is the concatenation of the HLR and AuC . HLR part of the HSS is in charge of storing

    and updating when necessary the databasecontaining all the user subscriptioninformation.

    AuC part of the HSS is in charge ofgenerating security information from useridentity keys. This security information isprovided to the HLR and furthercommunicated to other entities in thenetwork.

    SGW - Receives and routes all UE packet dataand serves as a mobility anchor while UEstransition between eNodeB.

    PGW - Routes data packets from the SGW toexternal services .

    PCRF - Server manages the service policy andsends QoS setting information for each usersession and accounting rule information.

    AUC

    EIR

    HSS

    HA

    SGSN/GGSN

    PGW

    SGW

    MME

    MSC/MGW

    PDSN

    PCRF

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    Telecom Components

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    Functionality1. Subscribers supplementary services2. Subscribers identity3. Subscribers location information (MSC service area)4. Subscribers authentication information.

    Security Challenges:1. HLR/VLR Database Compromise2. Wrong Entry flushed in to the Database3. Access control to HLRs should be based on user profiles, using at least a unique username and a password as

    authentication data4. Remote access to HLR should be protected from eavesdropping, source and destination spoofing and session

    hijacking. Achieved by limiting the range of protocols for communication with HLR

    It is a centralized database that stores and manages all subscriberrelated information required to set up calls. It acts as a personal storefor subscriber information until such subscription is cancelled.

    1. VLR is a database containing subscriber information of all subscribers currently located in the area served by MSC.2. The most important information is about current location of the subscriber.3. Whenever a MSC detects a new subscriber in its network, in addition to creating a new record in the VLR, it also

    updates the HLR of the mobile subscriber, apprising it of the new location

    HLR / VLR/HSS Home / Visitor Location Register (CDMA/2G/3G)

    AUC

    HLR

    HA

    EIR

    MSC

    PDSN

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    Telecom Components

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    Functionality1. It provides information to allow the mobile phones to access the network.2. AuC generally performs its functions when you switch on your mobile station.3. AuC is responsible for the generation of the parameters used for the privacy and the

    ciphering of the radio link.

    4. To ensure the privacy of the mobile subscriber a Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity(TMSI) is assigned for the duration that the subscriber is under control of the specificMobile Switching Centre (MSC) associated with the AuC.

    Security Challenges:1. Number of employees having physical and logical access to AuC should be limited such that it is then reasonable

    to use an AuC which is not integrated with HLR.

    2. Operators should carefully consider the need for encryption of AuC data. Some vendors use default encryption.3. The encryption is questionable since the algorithm is proprietary and confidential.4. If decided to use an add-on ciphering facility, attention should be paid to cryptographic key management.5. Authentication triplets can be obtained from AuC by masquerading as another system entity (namely HLR). The

    threat is present when HLR and AuC are physically separated.

    AuC is a network element which is used to authenticate each SIM card that attempts toconnect to the network.

    AUC

    HLR/VLR/HSS

    HA

    EIR

    MSC

    PDSN

    AuC Authentication Center (CDMA/2G/3G)

    Telecom Components (CDMA)

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    Functionality1. Broadcast the accessible information of MN.2. Setup the tunnel between FA&HA.3. Transfer the data from other computer to the MN via the

    tunnel.

    The home agent locates the place where the Mobile Nodeopens its account; receive the registration information fromMN,

    HA Home Agent

    AUC

    HLR

    HA

    EIR

    MSC

    PDSN

    Telecom Components (CDMA)

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    Functionality1. Provides the interface between the radio network and the

    packet data network

    The PDSN implements the switching of packet data servicesof mobile subscribers.

    PDSN Packet Data Service Node

    AUC

    HLR/VLR/HSS

    HA

    EIR

    MSC

    PDSN

    Telecom Components

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    Functionality1. GGSN maintains routing necessary to tunnel the Protocol

    Data Units (PDUs) to the SGSN that services a particularMS

    2. SGSN tasks include packet routing and transfer, mobility

    management (attach/detach and location management),logical link management, and authentication and chargingfunctions.

    The Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN) is a maincomponent of the GPRS network. It is responsible for theinterworking between the GPRS network and external packetswitched networks,A Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) is responsible for thedelivery of data packets from and to the mobile stations within

    its geographical service area.

    SGSN/GGSN Service/Gateway GPRS Support Node (2G/3G)

    AUC

    HLR/VLR/HSS

    HA

    EIR

    MSC

    SGSN/GGSN

    Telecom Components (4G/LTE)

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    Functionality1. Authentication,2. Authorization3. Ciphering4. Security key management

    MME manages the subscriber session control planefunctionality, which uses the S1-C (C is for Control Plane)interface to communicate through the eNodeB to the UE.

    MME Mobile Management Entity

    SGW

    HSS

    PGW

    MME

    PCRF

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    Telecom Components (4G/LTE)

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    Functionality

    1. Performs packet filtering,.2. Policy enforcement and lawful interception,.3. Charging support, and packet screening.

    Routes data packets from the SGW to external servicessuch as the Internet, IP Multimedia Systems (IMS), orPSTN.

    PGW PDN Gateway

    SGW

    HSS

    PGW

    MME

    PCRF

    Telecom Components(4G/LTE)

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    SGW

    HSS

    PGW

    MME

    PCRF

    Functionality The Policy Decision Function (PDF)

    Network entity where the policy decisions are made. As the IMS session is beingset up, SIP signaling containing media requirements are exchanged between the

    terminal and the P-CSCF. Some time in the session establishment process, the PDF receives requirements

    from the P-CSCF and makes decisions based on network operator rules, such as:Allowing or rejecting the media request, using new or existing PDP context for anincoming media request, checking the allocation of new resources against themaximum authorized.

    The Charging Rules Function (CRF) Provide operator defined charging rules applicable to each service data flow.

    Selects the relevant charging rules based on information provided by the P-CSCF, such as Application Identifier, Type of Stream (audio, video, etc.),Application Data Rate, etc.

    Manages the service policy and sends QoS setting information for each user session andaccounting rule information.

    PCRF Policy and Charging Rules Function

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    Call Routing

    Call Routing-1

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    EIR AUC HLR VLR

    DHCP

    DNS Mail Content

    Data Center Infrastructure

    BTSModem

    Amplifier

    BTS

    Modem

    Amplifier

    BTS

    Modem

    Amplifier

    MobilePhone

    MobilePhone

    MobilePhone

    BSC

    BSC

    MSC

    MSC

    GMSC

    Mediation Rating/Billing

    Printing Data warehouseNetworkSwitch

    NetworkSwitch

    BTS Base Transceiver StationBSC Base Station Controller

    BSS Base Station SubsystemMSC Mobile Switching CenterGMSC Gateway Mobile Switching CenterPSTN Public Switched Telephone Network

    BSS Infrastructure EIR Equipment Identity RegisterAUC Authentication Center

    HLR Home Location RegisterVLR Visited Location RegisterDHCP Dynamic Host Control ProtocolDNS Domain Name SystemMIS Management Information System

    Internet

    PSTN

    OperatorB

    IP PhoneWAP

    Local Area Routing

    Multi LocalAreaRouting

    MultiOperatorRouting

    Multi Local Area Routing

    Multi Operator Routing

    MIS

    Support Infrastructure

    Business Infrastructure

    Call Routing-2

    Check if the

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    VLR

    EIR

    AuC

    BTS

    SUBSCRIBER

    (A Number)

    BSC

    HLR

    BTS

    SUBSCRIBER(B Number)

    SIM card

    authentication atthe time of switch

    on

    Connect to BTSbased on the

    location of the

    subscriber

    Link with

    BSC Link withMSC

    Communicationwith VLR

    Check with HLR

    to determineMSC of BNumber

    Check if theequipment used

    is approved

    If no profile ofsubscriber exists

    in VLR thendownload from

    HLR

    Transfer call toMSC (2)

    Communicate

    with BSCBSC

    Connect toBTS

    ContactSubscriber (B

    Number)

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    Break

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    Telecom Architecture and

    Threats

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    GSM Security Challenges

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    Only provides accesssecurity communications

    and signaling traffic in thefixed network are notprotected

    Does not address activeattacks, whereby somenetwork elements (e.g.

    BTS: Base Station)

    Only as secure as the fixed

    networks to which theyconnect

    Difficult to upgrade thecryptographic mechanisms

    Terminal identity cannot betrusted

    Lawful interception only

    considered as an after-thought

    Lack of user visibility (e.g.

    doesnt know if encryptedor not)

    2G(GSM) Security v/s 3G(UMTS) Security

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    Security Enhancements in 3G

    Fake Base

    Station

    A change was made to defeat the false base station attack. The security

    mechanisms include a sequence number that ensures that the mobile canidentify the network

    Stronger CiphersKey lengths were increased to allow for the possibility of strongeralgorithms for encryption and integrity

    Security onDevice

    Mechanisms were included to support security within and betweennetworks.

    Security fromOutside to Inside

    Security is based within the switch rather than the base station as in GSM.Therefore links are protected between the base station and switch.

    IntegrityIntegrity mechanisms for the terminal identity (IMEI) have been designedin from the start, rather than that introduced late into GSM

    What good are these security enhancements when operators today

    run Insecure 2G and Security Enhanced 3G networks in parallel.

    Result : Weakened Network Architecture

    Emerging Threats and Classification- Telecom

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    T6Data

    modification ona networkelement

    T1Flooding an

    interface

    T2Crashing anetwork element

    T3Eavesdropping

    T4Unauthorized data

    access

    T5Traffic

    Modification

    T7Compromise viaimplementation

    flaw

    T8Compromise via

    managementinterface

    T9Malicious

    insider

    T10Theft of service

    Telecom

    EmergingThreats

    Availability

    Confidentiality

    Integrity

    Loss of Control

    Loss of Service

    Attack analysis and Security concepts foMObile Network infastructures

    supported by collaborative InformationexchAnge (AsmonI)

    Emerging Threats and Classification- Telecom

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    Ranking of Threats

    Ranking ofNetworkElements(Critical)

    Ranking of

    Network Elements(Less Critical)

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    Understanding the Telecom

    Stack and Protocols

    Intelligent Network (IN)

    Description: The Intelligent Network (IN) is the

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    Description: The Intelligent Network (IN), is thestandard network architecture specified in theITU-T Q.1200 series recommendations. It is

    intended for fixed as well as mobile telecomnetworks.

    IN is supported by the Signaling System #7 (SS7)protocol between telephone network switchingcenters and other network nodes owned bynetwork operators.

    Functionality: Allows operators to differentiate themselves by

    providing value-added services. Intelligent Network Nodes Modular and more secure network The initial use of IN technology was for number

    translation services

    The Stack

    SS7Description: Signaling System No 7 (SS7) is a set of

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    Functionality: The main purpose is to set up and teardown telephone calls. Other uses include numbertranslation, local number portability, prepaid billingmechanisms, short message service (SMS), and avariety of other mass market services.

    Security Challenges:1. Internet-PTN convergence allows attackers inroads

    via entities with poorly secured SS7 networks.2. ISDN connections are also points of unauthorized

    entry.3. Advanced services like call forwarding have intrinsic

    vulnerabilities attackers can create havoc bymodifying SCPs containing forwarding destinations.

    4. Anyone capable of generating SS7 messages andintroducing them into a network can disrupt PTNservices.

    SS7

    CCS7

    Description: Signaling System No. 7 (SS7) is a set oftelephony signaling protocols which are used to set upmost of the world's public switched telephone networktelephone calls. (The Link )

    The Stack

    SS7Description: In Common Channel Signaling (CCS) there

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    Functionality: Higher signaling capacity. More number of speech/data channels as there is only

    one signaling channel. Central offices can exchange information , not related

    to speech/data between themselves e.g. subscriber

    data. Various high end features like roaming are possible by

    using CCS7.

    Security Challenges:1. DoS-Attack2. Flooding with SCTP-Chunks3. MitM-Attack: Eavesdropping

    4. MitM-Attack: Unrecognized Data Alteration

    CCS7

    SS7Description: In Common Channel Signaling (CCS) thereis a common signaling channel which takes care of all thesignaling information to be exchanged duringcommunication. All other channels can be used forspeech or data as required. (The Link Information)

    SP(SPC=100)

    SRP

    (SPC=400)

    STP(SPC=300)

    STP(SPC=2

    00)

    SEP(SPC=500)

    SIGTRAN and Protocols

    SIGTRAN

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    Functionality: SIGTRAN uses IP transport protocolcalled Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP),which is used to carry PSTN over IP. (AND SCTP issomething like HTTP)

    Security Challenges: SCTPscan tool (from backtrack) can be used forscanning for services IAM Attack : Capacity DoS -> Similar to SIP flooding REL attack: Targeted Call release -> Terminate a userconversation SRI attack: Tracking of users

    HLR attack: Fake location update -> redirects calls toanother country, until phone reboots

    SIGTRAN

    MEGACO

    MGCP

    RTP

    Description: Derived from Signaling Transport . Providesreliable datagram service and user layer adaption forSignaling System 7(SS7) and ISDN communications

    protocol. (IF SS7 is IP, SIGTRAN is IPV4)

    SIGTRAN and Protocols

    SIGTRAN

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    Functionality:

    Although H.248 performs the same function as MGCP, ituses different commands and processes and supports abroad range of networks.

    Security Challenges: Malformed request to port 2944/tcp used by MEGACOis known to cause Denial of Service attacks

    Description: Media Gateway Control Protocol (H.248) isused for controlling media gateways in Internet Protocoland PSTN.

    SIGTRAN

    MEGACO

    MGCP

    RTP

    SIGTRAN and Protocols

    SIGTRAN

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    Functionality:

    Call control via Call Agent Uses Session Description Protocol (SDP) for specifyingand negotiating the media streams Typical architecture consists of Call Agent and MediaGateway.

    Security Challenges: MGCP Cas susceptible to DoS attacks and malformedpackets

    Description: Media Gateway Control Protocol is asignaling and call control protocol used within VoIP thatinteroperates with PSTN. MEGACO

    MGCP

    RTP

    SIGTRAN and Protocols

    SIGTRAN

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    Functionality: Extensively used in communication and entertainmentsystems such as telephony, video conferenceapplications etc,. RTP is used in conjunction with RTCP RTP is originated and received on even port numbersand the associated RTCP communication uses the next

    higher odd port number.

    Security Challenges: Call tampering Man-in-the middle attacks DoS attacks

    Description: Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) definesa standardized packet format for delivering audio andvideo over IP networks. MEGACO

    MGCP

    RTP

    Protocols MTP

    MTPD i ti M di T i ti P i t MTP b id th

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    Functionality: Passes streaming data to other connection MTP trancodes a-law to mu-law (and vice versa) andadjusts packet sizes as required by the two connections MTPs extend supplementary services, such as callhold, call transfer, call park, and conferencing

    Security Challenges:

    SCCP

    ISUP

    TCAP

    INAP

    ISDN

    MAP

    Description: Media Termination Point. MTPs bridge themedia streams between two connections.

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    Protocols ISUP

    Description: ISDN User Part (ISUP) is part of SS7 whichMTP

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    Functionality:Common messages transmitted in ISUP areInitial Address Message (IAM) Subsequent Address Message (SAM) Address Complete Message (ACM) Answer Message (ANM) Release (REL)

    Release complete (RLC)

    Security Challenges: Eavesdropping Man-in-the-middle attacks ARP spoofing attacks

    Caller id spoofing SIP registration hacking

    Description: ISDN User Part (ISUP) is part of SS7 whichis used to set up calls in Public Switched TelephoneNetworks. SCCP

    ISUP

    TCAP

    INAP

    ISDN

    MAP

    Protocols TCAP

    Description: Transaction Capabilities Application PartMTP

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    Functionality:

    Supports non-circuit related information exchangebetween signaling points using the Signalling ConnectionControl Part (SCCP) connectionless service TCAP also supports ability to invoke features in anotherremote network switch

    Security Challenges:

    Description: Transaction Capabilities Application Part(TCAP) is a protocol in the SS7 suite

    SCCP

    ISUP

    TCAP

    INAP

    ISDN

    MAP

    Protocols INAP

    Description: The Intelligent Network Application PartMTP

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    Functionality:

    Part of SS7 protocol suite Typically layered on top of TCAP Provides logic for controlling telecommunicationservices migrated from traditional switching points tocomputer based service

    Security Challenges:

    Description: The Intelligent Network Application Part(INAP) is a signalling protocol used in the intelligentnetwork architecture. SCCP

    ISUP

    TCAP

    INAP

    ISDN

    MAP

    Protocols ISDN

    Description: Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)MTP

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    Functionality:

    Circuit switched telephone network Comprises of BRI and PRI BRI 2B + 1D (192 Kbps) PRI T1 (23B + 1D), E1 (30B + 1D)

    Security Challenges:

    Description: Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)is a communication standard for simultaneoustransmission of voice, data and other network services

    over traditional circuits.

    SCCP

    ISUP

    TCAP

    INAP

    ISDN

    MAP

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    Protocol Analyzers and

    Tools

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    P1 Telecom Auditor

    Description: P1 Telecom Auditor is a SS7 andSIGTRAN vulnerability scanner and security

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    SIGTRAN vulnerability scanner and securityauditor. Today, the security situation of SS7 andSIGTRAN is identical.

    P1 Telecom Auditor offers Telecom and Mobileoperators the capability to assess and analyzetheir security in their core network and signalingperimeters, continuously.

    Deployment: Easily deployed with a single lightweight Virtual

    Appliance using VMware technology and aweb-based control and reporting server usingSaaS technology.

    Integrates seamlessly in the SignallingInfrastructure

    Requires an IP address and a Signalling PointCode

    Ready for deployment in both legacy SS7 andstate-of-the-art SIGTRAN, UMTS/CDMA 3G,IMS and LTE environments.

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    Technology, Protocols and Equipment(Quick View)

    Native SS7 and SIGTRAN security auditing solutionMission-based and Permanent scanning

    Elements STP MSC, MGW MMSC, SMSC, FDA HLR, HSS, AUC, EIR IN, VAS, Billing Platforms

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    gSS7 Interconnect security analysisNetwork Element, DPC and SSN exposure tests from an external perspectiveTelecom Network Elements vulnerability analysisExternal and Internal security auditTelecom product analysisSS7 external information gatheringWeb based admin, campaign control and reportingReliable, repeatable scanner results, clear deliverablesProtection methods against DoSAudit staging for controlled environment assessmentMultiple Signalling Point Code supportCDR tagging to prevent charging

    Protocols SS7 Message Transfer Part 3 (mtp3), SCCP,

    TCAP, ISUP, TUP, MAP, OMAP, INAP, BICC,CAMEL, BSSAP, RANAP, UMA SIGTRAN SCTP, M3UA, M2PA, M2UA, IUA

    (ISDN, Q.931), SUA, V5UA GPRS GTP-U, GTP-C, GTP, GPX DNS AAA Radius, Diameter VoIP / ToIP SIP, H323, Skinny / SCCP, H248,

    MGCP, MEGACO Core network protocols MPLS, LDP, BGP,

    VPLS, L2TP, GRE, IPsec, SAAL, LDP, BGP

    g FMS, LIG GGSN, SGSN SG, AS, ASP, SN GRX and IPX routers, GRX, 3G and IPX DNS,

    SGW, PGW / PDG / PDN GW, ePDG, GPRSbilling gateways

    Internet Gateways, PS domain routers,Proxies, Legacy PS equipment, WAP GW

    ATM switches

    Billing Centre, Billing systems, reconciliationsystems

    IN, AIN, CAP and CAMEL systems BSC, BTS, Node B, RNC, LTE e-Node B SBC, SIP AS, SIP gateways Call Session Control Function equipment: P-

    CSCF, I-CSCF, S-CSCF

    HNB, eHNB, UMA Femtocells, UMA supportsystem, BRAS-AC, PDC

    Legacy equipment, X25, XOT Circuit Switched (CS) / Packet Switched (PS)

    networks and interfaces

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    Thank You

    (2010) KPMG, an Indian Partnership and a member f irm of the KPMG network ofindependent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG

    International), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved.

    The KPMG name, logo and "cutting through complexity" are registeredtrademarks or trademarks of KPMG International Cooperative ("KPMGInternational").