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Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of Demography (IDEM) Higher School of Economics (HSE) Moscow, Russia [email protected] First International Conference on Political Demography and Social Macro- Dynamics Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Moscow, December 13-14, 2013

Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

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Page 1: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future

Sergei V. ZakharovInstitute of Demography (IDEM)

Higher School of Economics (HSE)Moscow, Russia

[email protected]

First International Conference on Political Demography and Social Macro-Dynamics

Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration

Moscow, December 13-14, 2013

Page 2: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

The Demographic Demise of the Soviet Union

I strongly support the idea. Demographic differences, backed by cultural differences made it impossible for the existence of the USSR.

It should be noted that Russian demographers have always talked about it. Fundamental works on the demographic problems of the USSR, even the ones that were published during the period of Soviet censorship, devoted to these issues.

See, for example: A.Volkov, A.Vishnevsky (eds.) Human Reproduction in the USSR (1983).

Only need to have in mind that for obvious reasons, the Russian experts could not do political conclusions

2

Monica Duffy Toft

Page 3: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

History and Demography in the Caucasus as a Political Minefield: The Case of the Sochi Olympics

The role of demographic factors in social change in the North Caucasus is very high. Just as proved their influence in North Africa and in other regions of the world.

The erosion of traditional values and the destruction of the traditional organization of the demographic system not only leads to the emergence of the avant-garde political forces, which is important for the modernization of society, but also to the consolidation of conservative forces, who are losing their power.

Time is working against the latter. Unfortunately we live in a period of confrontation. To what extent do we have the resources and tools to reduce the negative consequences of this conflict?

3

Georgi Derluguian

Page 4: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Russian Youth Movements: Hope or Hype?

Youth movements, organized and supported by power - an important channel for obtaining resources, social capital. They are an effective way to lift the career of a young person.

Can we talk about the fundamental differences with the Soviet period??

4

Jennifer Dabs Sciubba

Page 5: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Russia’s Recent Fertility Increase – Why it Occurred and Can it be Sustained?

At the macro level demographic statistics we have strong evidence that pronatalist policy influenced period indicators of fertility. Cohort fertility indicators, taking into account the data for 2012 (outstanding increase in period fertility rates) also showed a positive reaction , albeit a weak one.

Historical trend towards lower ultimate cohort fertility in Russia apparently stopped at the level of 1.6 births per woman.

5

V.N. Archangelskiy, J.V. Zinkina, A.V. Korotayev

Page 6: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Russia’s Recent Fertility Increase – Why it Occurred and Can it be Sustained?

At the same time, there is no clear evidence on the microdata level, namely on economic policies (in particular, the parent capital ) had a strong positive response. Until today, the econometric analysis does not give grounds for optimism. Neither the intentions nor the realization of intentions did not change principially.

Future changes in fertility under the sign of great uncertainty. While we can not say that the generations born in the 1980s will have more children than their parents .

We also worrying that fertility increased more significantly in those regions where it was above average before the policy intervention, especially in rural areas.

6

Page 7: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Completed Cohort and Period Total Fertility in Russia (average number of births to a woman by age 50): birth cohorts 1841-1982 (extrapolation with fixed ASFR as of 2012), period 1897-2012

7Source: Zakharov S.V. (2008). Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition. Demographic Research. Vol. 19, p.910 (http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol19/24/ ). (Updated for 2012 data)

18

70

18

80

18

90

19

00

19

10

19

20

19

30

19

40

19

50

19

60

19

70

19

80

19

90

20

00

20

10

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980

Calendar Year

Bir

ths

per

wo

man

Birth Cohort

Period

Cohort

19

60

19

65

19

70

19

75

19

80

19

85

19

90

19

95

20

00

20

05

20

10

1

1,2

1,4

1,6

1,8

2

2,2

2,4

2,6

2,8

1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Calendar Year

Bir

ths

per

wo

man

Birth Cohort

Period

Cohort

1,85 - 1,9

1,6 - 1,65

Page 8: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Different Indicators of Total Fertility: Cohort versus Synthetic Measures, Russia, 1979-2012

8

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

1

1,2

1,4

1,6

1,8

2

2,2

2,4

1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985

Calendar Year

Bir

ths p

er w

om

an

Female Birth Cohort

CTFR actual

CTFR expected (fixed ASFR for 2012)

PTFR

PTFRst (1959 cohort age pattern as a standard)

Period Mean Birth Order

adjPTFR (B-F method)

Period indicators

Cohort indicators

Page 9: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Cumulated Period ASFR, Russia: 1979-2012, per 1000

9

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

by 20

by 25

by 30

by 35

by 40

by 50 (PTFR)

Page 10: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Cumulated Cohort ASFR, Russia: Cohorts1945-1990, per 1000

10

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

1945195019551960196519701975198019851990

Female birth cohort

by 20

by 25

by 30

by 35

by 40

by 50 (CTFR)

Page 11: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Differences in Cumulated cohort ASFR between base (1960) and subsequent cohorts 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985

11

-0,6

-0,5

-0,4

-0,3

-0,2

-0,1

0

0,1

15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Bir

ths

per

wo

man

Age

c1960

c1965

c1970

c1975

c1980

c1985

Page 12: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Period Parity Progression Ratios, 1979-2012(transitions to the next birth for women)

12

0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

0,9

1

19

79

19

82

19

85

19

88

19

91

19

94

19

97

20

00

20

03

20

06

20

09

20

12

PPR 0-->1

PPR 1-->2

PPR 2-->3

PPR 3-->4

PPR 4-->5

Page 13: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 20, 25, 30, 35, 50: Transition 01

13

00,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,9

1

1955

1957

1959

1961

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

Female birth cohort

PPR 0-->1

by 20

by 25

by 30

by 35

by 50

Page 14: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 20, 25, 30, 35, 50: Transition 12

14

0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

1955

1957

1959

1961

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

Female birth cohort

PPR 1-->2

by 20

by 25

by 30

by 35

by 50

Page 15: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 50: Transition 23

15

0

0,05

0,1

0,15

0,2

0,25

0,3

1955

1957

1959

1961

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

Female birth cohort

PPR 2-->3

by 20

by 25

by 30

by 35

by 40

by 50

Page 16: Session 2:Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of

Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 25, 30, 35, 40, 50: Transition 34

16

0,10,120,140,160,18

0,20,220,240,260,28

0,3

Female birth cohort

PPR 3-->4

by 25

by 30

by 35

by 40

by 50