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DECENTRALIZATION IN AFRICA: SEQUENCES AND POLITICAL INCENTIVES

Paper prepared for the ECPR General Conference Glasgow, 3-6 September 2014

J. Tyler Dickovick Department of Politics Washington and Lee University DickovickT@wlu.edu

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines African decentralization through the lens of historical-institutionalism, with emphasis on the extent to which decentralization sequences and timing shape the extent

of autonomy for sub-national governments in multi-level systems. The paper addresses several challenges to sequential arguments about decentralization to Africa. A key issue is endogeneity

and complexity in terms of how decentralization is measured and periodized across its political, fiscal, and administrative dimensions. To provide a closer fit between sequential theory and African realities, the paper then highlights new variables that must complement time and sequence. Looking at decentralization processes that are open-ended and ongoing across various dimensions leads to a modified sequential argument that combines changes over time with key comparative-static variables, namely the interaction of regime incentives for decentralization and the dynamics of political party systems.

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DECENTRALIZATION IN AFRICA:

SEQUENCES AND POLITICAL INCENTIVES

INTRODUCTION

The recent boom in decentralization around the developing world has captivated scholars and policymakers, and has given rise to much theorizing about the causes of these reforms. Scholars

have examined cases worldwide in an effort to understand the origins and causes of decentralization. Leading arguments about causes have relied heavily on rationalist-institutionalist and historical-institutionalist theory, with the former often emphasizing proximate causes in the form of incentives that might lead central governments to decentralize, while the latter examine the more distal historical trajectories that condition government choices (cf. Boone 2003; Eaton 2004; O'Neill 2005; Treisman 2007). Among these approaches, one recent theory deservedly garners particular attention: the sequential theory, forwarded by Tulia Falleti (2005, 2010). In Falleti's argument,

decentralization can be meaningfully assessed in three conceptually familiar dimensions political, fiscal, and administrative and the sequence in which decentralization occurs across these dimensions is the principal predictor of how much autonomy eventually accrues to subnational governments. The dependent variable may thus be characterized as the overall degree to which governance is decentralized, with the independent variables begin the timing and sequencing of reforms. Where subnational elections (political decentralization) comes first, power and authority tend to be genuinely decentralized, whereas when elections come later in the sequence, power and authority remain centralized. This theory, developed with reference to major Latin American cases, provides real leverage in

understanding decentralization's causes, but it can also benefit from further testing in other geographic regions to interrogate scope conditions and point towards theoretical refinements.

In this spirit, this paper offers an empirical critique of the sequential theory using comparative evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, and builds upon this to offer a theoretical critique that aims

to further our knowledge of the interplay between sequencing and decentralization.

Following a brief review of the achievements of the sequential theory, the paper highlights how and why the theory seems to have more limited applicability to Africa than to Latin America. The paper then focuses on three theoretical critiques, using Africa as the empirical referent. The first

is the continued difficulty of delineating and periodizing the origins of decentralization; though studies of sequences are deeply historical in nature, the question of reverse causality persists.

The second challenge is scoring and measuring the independent variable sequence, particularly with regard to open-ended and ongoing processes of decentralization. A third

critique then builds upon the theory, incorporating another historical context (Africas neopatrimonial states) into the argument, along with institutional variation in the dynamics of

political party systems. In short, the paper builds on the historical-institutional perspective by widening the historical/institutional scope to account for more empirical variation. This can

begin to address African cases and the theoretical challenges identified above.1

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SEQUENCING AND DECENTRALIZATION: THE THEORY AND ITS ACHIEVEMENTS

The first task in testing and building upon this sequential theory is to understand its original formulation. While multifaceted, the sequential theory of decentralization is comprised of three

main causal elements: the different sequencing of various types of decentralizing reforms; the coalitions of actors that originated and propelled those reforms; and the historical

circumstances under which they acted. With its emphasis on the timing and sequencing of different events and the feedback loops and reactive effects engendered by these events, the theory is emblematic of how historical-institutional variables shape a range of social and political outcomes (see also Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000, 2004; Thelen 2003). Through a sophisticated treatment of the origins and trajectories of different sequences, the theory explains variations i n the extent to which power is devolved to elected subnational governments. At issue is the sequence between political (P), fiscal (F), and administrative (A) decentralization. When the sequence of these decentralization reforms is favorable to

subnational coalitions - or when these coalitions can act collectively to ensure a favorable sequence - then robust decentralization results and subnational governments secure power, resources, and authority. Conversely, other sequences can hamstring subnational governments, leaving the center in control despite nominal decentralization. To simplify the discussion, the most significant distinction seems to be between cases where administrative decentralization precedes political (A precedes P) versus where political precedes administrative (P precedes A), with the fiscal aspect generally closely accompanying administrative decentralization.2 P preceding A augurs well for collective action and collaboration in a subnational coalition: the fact of such a sequence demonstrates that subnational actors have been able to ensure their autonomy before accumulating

responsibilities, and subsequently strengthens the bargaining position of these actors vis -a-vis the center. Where A precedes P, this signifies central government control over the early stages

of a process - with the center offloading responsibilities before conferring autonomy - and gives the center continued leverage throughout the decentralization.3

The stated scope condition for the sequential theory is that some decentralization must be

attempted; so long as this is true, the theory should work across geographic and historical circumstances. Yet a key layer of Fallettis argument places Latin American decentralization sequences in proper historical perspective: decentralization emerges at different historical

moments, with conditioning factors at various levels of analysis. Sweeping international forces and changes (the end of the Cold War, e.g.), condition the historical moment, as may domestic

factors such as democratization processes, or long-term trends of economic development. In Latin America, the relevant context was the decline of the developmental state and the

emergence of the post-developmental state. This came with the rise of the neoliberal era in the 1980s. Of course, the modal African state in the years before decentralization was quite the

opposite of developmental; it was neopatrimonial and personalistic. This gives reason to test the sequential theory for empirical fit under other types of state apparatuses, with an eye

towards either confirming evidence or making needed amendments .4

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A main achievement of the sequential theory is its ability to explain widely divergent outcomes in terms of subnational autonomy that emerge from decentralization processes. The theory is

also has the appeal of many historical-institutional arguments: the ability to trace causal outcomes to early and influential moments (see Pierson 2004). Such moments may be

exogenous shocks or chance events, or they may be critical junctures or moments through which multiple cases pass in historical time, during which outcomes are indeterminate (cf.

Collier and Collier 1991).

WHY AFRICA DIFFERS: HISTORICAL BACKDROP OF DECENTRALIZATION IN AFRICA The sequential theory is deeply historical, and historical evolution is part of the causal argument. Accordingly, it can be quite consistent with the theory that Africa would witness different decentralization outcomes in light of its different historical experience. The Latin American cases of decentralization emerge in a period of post-developmentalism. This poses an intriguing issue for the application of the theory to Africa. Certainly, we must interrogate whether the theory

applies in cases where states have professed developmentalism as a goal, but have had markedly lower rates of success than in Latin America (or East Asia). The historical backdrop for Africa is quite distinct even from the seemingly disparate experiences in Latin America, and may help define the scope conditions for the sequential theory. In particular, Africa has a much less robust history of local governance and countervailing local elites that can meaningfully oppose central rule. That is, the history of governance is more centralized. As noted in many of the seminal works of African politics, the underpinnings of regimes have been the ability to extend patronage networks through kinship and other identity groups (cf. Chabal and Daloz 1999).5 Subnational government - local, district/prefectural,

provincial, and regional - has been an underpowered set of institutions.

Decentralization in Africa has thus been much more top-down than bottom-up as a result of this less developed politics of opposition. More specifically, it has rarely emerged from the strength

of a subnational coalition or from a socio-political coalition acting in opposition to the governing regime. The prospects that decentralization might be pushed by those outside of the national

power elite were significant in such countries as Brazil and Colombia, with their deeply entrenched regional elites and fragmented or alternating party systems that were not undone even by state militarization or authoritarian rule; even in Argentina and Mexico, significant

possibilities existed for subnational and opposition forces to engage in reactive processes. By contrast, African decentralization has been best understood as an adaptive response of regimes

to changing political circumstances, powered by the rational expectations of central government elites and not by subnational forces. It has been a political strategy with various modalities

(Boone 2003). While geography and history are not the sole determinants of political destiny, this set of realities may place most African countries in a quite different realm of politics from

the post-developmental Latin American states where the sequential theory originated, and may thus illuminate the scope conditions and certain limitations of the sequential theory.6

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Decentralization seems to follow from top-down decision making in Africa even in circumstances

where opposition to a regime has proved powerful. These come from the cases where significant (and often violent) contestation for national power has occurred and has resulted in

regime change. In these circumstances - to be found in the likes of Ethiopia in the 1990s and after the Biafra war in Nigeria regional, ethnic, or other subnational groups have presented a

vital threat to regime stability, and have sometimes succeeded in toppling regimes. Where such opposition had a strong ethno-regional component, decentralization has sometimes followed.

Yet even in these cases, the calculus of decentralization has been driven by central government efforts to perpetuate and maintain the regime. As Brancati (2009) has noted, the decision to decentralize in multi-ethnic societies is peace by design, the addition of a safety valve. Africas decentralization sequences are thus entangled with other variables, but are regularly consequences of central government choice. These decentralization sequences do not emerge as elite choices in a vacuum, but rather respond to broader social and political realities, including regime types and regime politics, colonial and other historical legacies, and the structure of political institutions such as parties and party systems.

This calls into question whether the decentralization sequence is the underlying causal variable in decentralization, or rather an intervening variable that mediates the impact of other more fundamental causes. In Africa, for instance, the likelihood of a robust (political-first) sequence may increase with federalism and population s ize, a history of social strife, and an anglophone colonial legacy (as in Nigeria), whereas a history of francophone unitarism and a relatively lower level of civil conflict may be likelier to engender a more limited decentralization from an administration-first sequence (as in Burkina Faso). Other variables may drive the logic, even where variations in decentralization sequence correlate with the outcome.

Many of Africas decentralization initiatives accompanied the wave of political liberalization and democratization in the early 1990s. The particular dynamics of a simultaneous interplay of

democratization and decentralization (as happened in countries such as Ghana, Mali, and South Africa) is unlikely to be replicated in most countries. At the same time, decentralization often

accompanied post-conflict reconstruction (in countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Uganda). In these cases, decentralization went hand-in-hand with efforts to build legitimate

governing authority and ensure stability. Again, this was less focused on intergovernmental jockeying in normal politics, with its emphasis on service delivery, relative autonomy, and political and economic development. The particular historical timing and the sequence of

changes may have driven largely by these initial regime goals; even if sequences then correlated with outcomes as predicted by the sequential theory, the distal causal factors -

liberalization and regime stabilization - were indispensable elements of the causal chain.

In short, the most salient differences between the Latin American cases and the African cases is that any meaningful subnational coalition for decentralization in Africa constituted an exi stential

threat to the regime. Where decentralization has been meaningful, it has been because its goals were regime stability. Otherwise, decentralization has been a modest set of reforms overseen by

central governments. Decentralization in post-developmental Latin America seems to take place

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in the realm of normal politics, where competing coalitions seek advantage against the

backdrop of a relatively stable institutional frame and negotiated regime transitions.7 In Africa, decentralization has either lacked those coalitions as meaningful actors, or has gone hand in

hand with the destabilization of the entire institutional frame. This affects how the sequential theory operates on the continent.

DECENTRALIZATION SEQUENCES IN AFRICA: CRITICAL APPRAISAL AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY

Decentralization in Africa can be expected to operate differently from the Latin American cases where the sequential theory developed, largely because of the contrasting historical circumstances. African states in the 1990s (when decentralization was initiated in most countries) exhibited quite different characteristics from the Latin American cases before. Given Falletis circumspection, this is foreseen and accommodated by the sequential theory, as different historical moments (and specifically different types of states) are hypothesized to engender different politics. The critical appraisal here is thus modeled as a set of posited amendments, designed as a preliminary test of how the theory may best operate when

extended beyond its original context. Two principal critiques emerge here, and both are empirical in nature. The first is that top-down control of decentralization persists across various sequences. This critique emerges from a limited number of cases that do not fit the model. The trend in Africa is for much less variation on the dependent variable, even where the variation on the independent variables exists and would predict different outcomes. The second critique focuses on the causes, noting that - far from being cleanly identifiable - sequences cannot be measured with empirical precision in most cases at present. Sequences in Africa rarely follow easily distinguishable patterns between P, F, and A: sequences be more complex, more reciprocal, may be simultaneous rather than

sequential at all, or may be simply partial and incomplete. I treat these two concerns below.

Party Time: Partial Decentralization and Central Control in Dominant Party Systems

The most direct empirical challenge to the sequential theory from Africa comes from cases of quite limited decentralization despite sequences deemed most favorable for SNG. Nearly all

cases of decentralization in Africa resulted in very limited devolution of power even when political decentralization came first in the sequence (or was simultaneous with other areas in a big bang sequence). In these decentralization sequences, subnational actors gained political

power followed by revenues and responsibilities, but this did not result in a base for substantial devolution. More generally, central governments find significant ways to delimit and control

decentralization regardless of sequence (including those where political decentralization occurred first). The impact of the decentralization sequence is attenuated by the salience of

other variables and the continued ability of African central governments to exert top-down authority. This begins to suggest that the theory requires an African amendment to explain the

lack of more thorough decentralization when the sequence would predict strong devolution.

To capture the nature of this control, we can consider ways central governments delimit

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decentralization in each of the three areas: political, fiscal, and administrative. For political

decentralization, African states are commonly led by top-down political parties operating without coherent opposition in a dominant-party system; this complicates the prospects for any

significant coalition in favor of decentralization (whether subnational or opposition), except under relatively exceptional circumstances of total regime change. On the fiscal side,

subnational governments have very limited tax bases to raise their own revenues, and central governments exert substantial controls over any fiscal transfers needed to guarantee these.

Finally, central administrative controls abound, leaving subnational governments hemmed in on all sides by forms of decentralization that leave central power predominant. This pattern is found across all sequences in Africa, and the components of top-down control are detailed below. These three areas of central control are mutually reinforcing: in top-down dominant party states, subnational coalitions have a weak fiscal base that does not get strengthened in part due to a weak political base (such as weak territorial representatives), which leaves the administrative state (not elected officials) the primary force behind persistent centralization. The reason for the difference resides in the tight linkage in Africa between party and state and in

the dominance of single parties.8 Regular alternation between institutionalized parties is rare in Africa, and coherent and meaningful opposition is lacking even in most democratic countries. Most cases of alternation result from serious fragmentation of party systems and the creation of personalist vehicles for presidential runs.9 Most party systems in Africa have a clear dominant-party, or have party systems with very low degrees of institutionalization and a highly centralized authority in the office and person of the president. This is unsurprising in the many authoritarian and semi-authoritarian polities on the continent, but also holds in the more democratic countries such as Botswana, Namibia, Senegal, and South Africa. The impact - from the perspective of the theory - is to facilitate top-down control over subnational elected officials.10 An example is Ethiopia, which has a strongly federal constitution and substantial

empowerment of subnational governments (regional states and woredas), but also a dominant party that controls over 99% of the seats in the national parliament and is comparably dominant

at the subnational levels.

The sequential theory argues that sequences affect the level of autonomy through the mechanism of subnational politician behavior. It holds that political-first sequences lead elected

subnational politicians to aggregate subnational voices and interests. Yet in Africa, this rarely holds. Subnational politicians are primarily interested in maintaining clientelistic relationships with national party elites, and with channeling national decisions down to local populations.

Even in a hypothetical political first decentralization sequence in Africa , local elected officials would often not challenge the national dominant-party elite, due to its effective control over

both the electoral system and states patronage resources.11

In short, a common outcome in African decentralization is a lack of meaningful decentralization even under the most favorable of sequences. Even those systems quite likely to feature

subnational autonomy exhibit a tendency towards top-down administrative centralism. South Africa is a key example. Democratic, federal, and the subject of a big bang decentralization

with the new constitution in the 1990s, the country is among the most decentralized on the

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continent. Nonetheless, tight administrative control over provinces comes in the form of

mandatory multi-year budgeting, national standards for service provision inputs and outputs, constant collaboration and information-sharing between levels of government, and centralized

wage bargaining between public sector unions and government; this set of administrative controls combines with dominant-party politics (of the African National Congress) and low fiscal

autonomy of the provinces to leave subnational autonomy quite circumscribed (Ahmad 2003; Dickovick 2011). This can be understood only in light of a top-down dominant party.

Unfinished Business: Decentralization in Time and Over Time The second challenge to the sequential theory is about measurement of both the independent and the dependent variables, and especially periodization of cases into with regard to when decentralization (political, fiscal, and administrative) actually occurs in time. Decentralization sequences and their consequences are complex and open up the possibility of measurement error if indicators are not specified a priori. In Africa, sequences are not neat processes that can be quickly captured by schemas such as P-F-A or A-F-P. Indeed, this concern is recognized in

the theory itself, as Falleti classifies as response paths and positive feedback paths in which reactive processes rebound to shape a complex sequence. This issue arises for measuring the extent of decentralization (with uneven implementation and variations across sectors) and the proper periodization of the timing and sequencing of decentralization (with issues revolving around complex, reciprocal, and simultaneous sequences). Measuring of the extent of decentralization On the extent of decentralization, the central issue is adjudging whether decentralization has occurred when it is legislated de jure versus achieved de facto. First, measuring decentralization

across the three dimensions involves at least some degree of analytic judgment about whether decentralization has occurred, especially in countries where legal frameworks are robust, but

financial and administrative devolution are modest on the ground. A common experience in African countries has been the announcement of a major decentralization law (or set of laws)

that is intended to devolve responsibilities and the requisite resources to accompany these, but which in fact results in little more than a nominal, legalistic shift with few implications for the

transfer of resources. An example comes from the compelling decentralization processes in one of Africas most democratic countries, Senegal. Decentralization laws in 1996 transferred nine major public service responsibilities to subnational governments, at least in nominal terms.

Responsibilities included health, education, and infrastructure, including roads and water provision. The laws stated that the requisite resources should accompany the transfer of

responsibilities, and indeed local governments were ensured of revenues from local property taxes, the head tax (taxe rurale), and a guarantee of intergovernmental transfers through the

Decentralization Endowment Fund, the Fonds de dotation de la dcentralisation (cf. Dickovick 2011). By the set of formal-legal indicators used in the sequential theory, fiscal decentralization

was concurrent with the devolution of administrative responsibilities. However, Senegals decentralization has convincingly been viewed as the center effectively offloading unfunded

mandates to subnational governments, and to a very limited extent, given that the central state

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retains authority over the civil service, as happens in most African cases (Ribot 2002).

Decentralization has occurred de jure in many African cases, but has not been realized de facto, and this presents a dilemma for how to measure sequences.12

Second, implementation of decentralization can lag in a number of ways. As noted,

francophone Africa provides examples - including Benin and Mali - where decentralization laws have been passed de jure, but have had little transformational impact de facto, even where

decentralization has been initiated (interviews Robert Houessou, Joseph Tossavi, Didier Verse, 2010). These experiences at least partially echo the Senegalese experience noted above. Yet perhaps the clearest and most intriguing case is Mozambique, which has been an overtly asymmetric decentralization even in the political form. While most countries have decentralized on a nationwide basis de jure, Mozambiques FRELIMO government opted to enstate elections for certain areas (autarquias, mostly in urban and peri-urban areas), but not wall-to-wall across the entire national territory. Most rural areas remain under the domain of districts, and hence under the deconcentrated central state. The Mozambican example of asymmetric decentralization serves not simply as an exception, but rather as an exemplar of the variety of

ways decentralizations sequence invites measurement difficulties in Africa. Asymmetric decentralization - interpreted broadly - is normal in Africa. In francophone west Africa, capital cities and metropolises (Dakar, Cotonou, Bamako, e.g.) adopt significant public sector responsibilities early on in decentralization sequences, while rural local governments may initially do scarcely more than elect a mayor, hire a clerk, and issue birth and death certificates. South Africa witnessed substantial political decentralization for some of its people (under apartheid) at the local level of government at one moments in time, but this was followed by fuller universal political decentralization at another level - the province - with the advent of democracy. In Ethiopia, the extent of political decentralization has been asymmetric both across states and across levels of government (Dickovick and Gebre-Egziabher 2014).

Finally, decentralization sequences can vary by sector, and sometimes dramatically. An African

country may initiate fiscal and administrative decentralization in some small sectors of expenditure responsibility, but not in health and education. This makes it exceedingly difficult to

determine whether devolution has occurred in the fiscal and administrative categories, unless one chooses to theorize only on a sector-by-sector basis; it may be possible to come up with a

theory of decentralization in education, but African cases show this should not be confused with a theory of decentralization. Falleti addresses this with the reasonable solution of looking at health and education as the two major areas subject to decentralization. However, this fits

oddly in the context of the African state, where the main continuing cost drivers in education - teachers and personnel - typically remain under the purview of the central state bureaucracy,

even after devolution. (This recalls the situation outlined above, where the extent of decentralization is at issue.) Examples have included even relatively advanced decentralization

processes in both Ghana and Tanzania, where civil service reform has been ongoing, many years after district-based decentralization was enacted. Many variations in decentralization will also

take the shape of variations within sectors, of course, as the financing and administration of a particular public sector responsibility (such as education or health) make be partial or take place

over time; it is to this wider range of how sequences may evolve over time that I turn next.

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Measuring the timing of decentralization

Periodizing decentralization relates to the prior question (of how much decentralization happens), but also presents additional measurement problems of its own. The first issue in

measuring sequences is simply that we must account for (nearly) simultaneous decentralization across the three areas. African cases have given rise to several simultaneous decentralization

processes, in South Africa, Ethiopia, and Senegal, for instance. These big bangs may be seen as likely to lead to great decentralization, and they do moreso than other sequences in Africa, but African countries remain less decentralized than in Latin America. Many more processes in Africa are nearly simultaneous or overlapping, as many processes have gone through the aforementioned bouts of incomplete implementation, or partial enactment (such as framework laws without enabling legislation). If fiscal and administrative decentralization can be said to happen over a period of time, then most processes are simultaneous; if they are indicated to have happened at a legislative moment, then they fail to capture the empirics of the case.

Simultaneity does not detract from the sequential theory, but adds to it. As noted in the subsequent section, these big bang decentralization reforms are typically responses to underlying causal factors that are likely to push decentralization: they are reflective of regimes that are either proactively or reactively attempting to ensure regime stability and maintenance by accommodating the pressures from regional groups. Beyond simultaneous decentralization, a general difficulty arises with the reciprocal and complex nature of many sequences.13 For instance, a country may be measured as following a sequence F-A-P, but may move substantially farther on A than on F, then return to more F, and so on. By way of empirical example, how best should an analyst account for the example of

federalism and decentralization in Ethiopia? In this country, a constitutional process in the early 1990s mandated a big bang decentralization to take place simultaneously across the political,

fiscal, and administrative areas. Yet this was implemented unevenly acros s the areas, and built upon administrative units that existed before any other decentralization was attempted? Is this

simultaneous, or a case of an administrative-first sequence? To further complicate the situation, the country undertook a second wholesale decentralization process in the early 2000s,

this time to the district level rather than the state level. This process too was ambiguous in terms of which areas proceeded in which order.

Among the three elements, political decentralization seems to have the clearest indicators for when it occurs in time.14 Political decentralization may occur, for instance, when subnational

elections are held and elected officials assume their posts. By contrast, fiscal and administrative decentralization are much harder to pin down as having happened or not (and when), and are

therefore susceptible to measurement error. This in turn can lead to selecting indicators of decentralization that fit the preferred causal model. Table 1 shows some of the complexity of

the decentralization sequences in 13 African countries.

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Table 1 The Decentralization Sequence in 13 African Countries

Country Simultaneous or

Sequential? Notes

Benin Sequential A before P; limited F; challenge in periodizing F

Botswana Sequential A before P; limited F; challenge in periodizing F Burkina Faso Sequential A before P; limited F; challenge in periodizing F

Ethiopia Simultaneous Nearly simultaneous (1990s)

Ghana Simultaneous Nearly simultaneous (1990s); challenge in periodizing F Kenya Simultaneous Nearly simultaneous (2010)

Mali Simultaneous Nearly simultaneous (1990s); challenge in periodizing F Mozambique Sequential A before P; limited F; challenge in periodizing F

Nigeria Simultaneous Nearly simultaneous (1970s, 1990s) Senegal Simultaneous Nearly simultaneous (1990s); challenge in periodizing fiscal

South Africa Simultaneous A first pre-1994; nearly simultaneous in 1994; challenge in periodizing

Tanzania Sequential A simultaneous with P in 1994-97; limited F follows Uganda Simultaneous Nearly simultaneous (1990s)

Key: P Political (SNG elections); F Fiscal (SNG revenues); A Administrative (SNG responsibilities) Of course, precise measurement and periodization is a feature of historical-institutional

approaches, which owes much of its strength to an ability to detect patterns in processes operating over time. Such approaches often favor measures and indicators that are less

quantifiable (than comparative-static models, e.g.), but can be especially powerful at preventing error and allowing for precision through detailed measurement of variables over a

period of time; these are the among the many merits of such approaches. But arguments built on timing and sequencing require precise periodization, which can prove exceedingly sensitive to an analysts judgment when taken across multiple interlocking areas and slow-moving processes in short time windows (as with the three forms of decentralization in Africa). While demonstrating usefulness and fit for the Latin American cases, the theory comes under greater

empirical pressure when exposed to the large number of cases coming from Africa: either empirical fit weakens or choices about periodization and measurement become increasingly

suspect. This serves as the basis for revisions that may facilitate extending sequential theory to Africa.

REVISING THE SEQUENTIAL THEORY

Potential revisions to the sequential theory emerge directly from the sections above. The first is

a theoretical response to the section on why Africa is different: the need to understand central government motivation in treating decentralization as an existential threat rather than

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one arena among many in the domain of politics. The other two revisions treat the issues of

extent and timing of decentralization, as just elaborated: the institutional backdrop of the party-state, and the possibility of simultaneous and complex sequences. These add variables to

the sequential theory, but in a way that extends empirical fit to a large number of African countries, thus retaining parsimony. As explained in the conclusion, it actually further embeds

the original historical-institutional arguments in greater historical and institutional detail.

Revision #1: Stability and Legitimacy as Central Government Imperatives Where meaningful decentralization has occurred in Africa, it can generally be explained by national elite efforts to enhance stability, ensure governability, and legitimize the regime. On the other hand, most decentralization decisions are not intended first and foremost to reconfigure the governance of public services. The motivation behind central government decisions to decentralize matters, and it is important to offer a thicker set of possible motivations than the desire by central governments to minimize the amount of power devolved to subnational officials. In fact, the strength of one of the leading competing theories of

decentralization (ONeill 2005) is in its treatment of central governments that may have reason to making the seemingly puzzling choice to devolve away power. Decentralization need not only occur when central governments lose intergovernmental games, but can also occur when central governments see decentralization as a strategy or tactic for regime maintenance. Africa shows this in many cases. Some come from the continents three most significant federal systems - Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa - which deserve particular attention given the prevalence of federal systems (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) among the four cases examined by Falleti. In each of these cases, a governing elite with prospects for electoral dominance instituted a new federal dispensation in the 1990s, offering a

radical decentralization of power, at least de jure. Nigerias military and civilian elites in the PDP (Peoples Democratic Party), Ethiopias EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic

Front), and South Africas ANC (African National Congress) each took power in countries riven by internal conflicts rooted in ethno-regional identities. Yet all three of these new regimes, the

dominant party quickly developed electoral hegemony and centralized revenue collection. They also established strong rules for monitoring the spending of federal units, though Nigerias

chaotic political economy allows for personalism and clientielism. Even in countries where decentralization has in fact been very limited, regime stability has been

an important factor in shaping reform. This can be found in relatively democratic cases such as Mali, where concerns about the threat to stability from Tuareg groups in the 1990s was a major

impetus for decentralization (Seely 2001). The reforms ultimately did little in the way of devolving real power, despite significant movement at the time (cf. Wing 2008). Similar

phenomena can be found in less democratic circumstances, such as in Mozambique, where the end of civil war (Reaud and Weimer 2014). And in countries that are not post-conflict

environments, such as Burkina Faso and Tanzania, the stability of the regime continued to play an important role in shaping the parameters of decentralization (Englebert and Sangare 2014;

Reaud and Weimer 2014).

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Decentralization thus becomes another institutional arena in which structural patterns of African governance reimpose themselves. As Chabal and Daloz (1999) note, certain pathologies

of African governance are capable of manifesting themselves under different formal institutional arrangements; if such patterns as centralized governance can transmit across even

regime changes from authoritarianism to democracy, they can also remain robust even when certain formal institutions of governance are nominally decentralized. This is documented to

have occurred with foreign aid and donor conditionality, for instance, as African governments have used a variety of tactics to circumvent the intended outcomes of donor action. History matters in a structural sense as well, and weighs heavily on African decentralization. This confirms the importance of the research agenda laid out by his torical-institutionalists and gives support to the endeavor behind the sequential theory. On the other hand, it also highlights that the complex outcomes often cannot be traced to relatively neat sequences. Rather, structural variables are required, as are understandings of deep historical antecedents.

Revision 2: Parties, Party Systems, and Institutional actors The second set of factors needed to explain African decentralization isinstitutional actors. The most important are patterns of party dominance and the interactions between parties and states, but also important are the prospective subnational coalitions that might push decentralization. Africa has a long history of one-party and dominant-party states, and while these also exist in Latin America (as in Mexico), it seems the integration of party and state has complicated African decentralization, particularly in unitary states. Dominant parties that are electorally dominance and have continuous and repeated access to state institutions are able to merge two centripetal forces that are mutually reinforcing: top-down political control over

subnational politicians electoral fortunes, and top-down administrative control over subnational politicians fiscal resources. In addition, subnational coalitions are generally weaker

than in Latin America. Where there is little history of powerful subnational elected officials, reactive sequences and unintended consequences of decentralization that empower

subnational governments are likely to be much more attenuated.15 Taken together, these create institutional environments in which subnational politicians are very unlikely to be

empowered, regardless of decentralization sequence. The theory of decentralization thus needs to take into account the institutions of governance

that give rise to different propensities for subnational collective action. Latin America has a longer history of semi-autonomous local politics in this regard. Africas history is one of

relatively weak articulation between central state and local society, with many of the most robust local institutions operating in the vacuum left by the states relative weakness (cf. Boone

2003; Herbst 2000). Both regions have seen efforts by central states to establish clientelistic relationships with local elites, but the variations in modalities and the contrasting development

experiences of the continents have given rise to much greater salience for power coalitions in Latin America that identify with the subnational cause per se.

15

Dominant party systems and weaker subnational coalitions are two variables that can account

for much of the weakness of African decentralization. even in cases of big bang decentralizations where the sequential theory would predict meaningful devolution. By way of

amending the sequential theory, these institutional actors could be seen as establishing the backdrop against which different sequences play out. In a sense, this returns us to a

consideration of the comparative-static models of decentralization that take institutions or electoral incentives at a given moment in time as the key independent variables (Garman,

Haggard, and Willis 2001; ONeill 2005) While less dynamic than historical-institutional models, these approaches are surely correct that institutions such as party systems matter as well; the resolution is consider both, recognizing that parsimony may be sacrificed, but that incorporating institutions may facilitate much greater empirical fit across a range of cases from other regions. Revision 3: Complex and Simultaneous Sequences African cases tend towards simultaneous or nearly simultaneous decentralization across the

three dimensions. Fiscal decentralization rarely precedes administrative decentralization in any significant way, but usually accompanies it, at least de jure. And both tend to emerge from decentralization laws that also create elected subnational positions. Thus, P, F, and A have gone together in Africa. Given the limited nature of decentralization, it may stretch credulity to call these big bang decentralizations, but they do have a similarly simultaneous structure. In Falletis work, the possibility of complex sequences is perhaps illustrated most clearly in the Argentina case, where secondary schooling is decentralized long after primary. Falleti characterizes the decentralization as the first cycle (i.e., when primary school was administratively decentralized), but a different interpretation might hold that decentralization

had not occurred until secondary schooling was decentralized; the empirical fit of this crucial case depends upon the characterization of when exactly administrative decentralization

happened.16

Noting the presence of complex, reciprocal, and simultaneous sequences leads to two specific proposals. The first is to explicitly formulate a theoretical argument for simultaneous

sequences, or sequences in which the various forms of decentralization overlap significantly. The logic for simultaneous or non-sequenced decentralization reforms is as follows. By contrast with sequenced decentralization reforms where contestation over intergovernmental authority

is set against a backdrop of more or less clear rules, these big bang decentralizations are likely to occur as a result of regime-level imperatives, typically when the very stability of the regime

or (pre)dominant party is in question. They often occur at moments of regime change, and the expected value of decentralization would be quite high at these moments in a comparative

sense. Though even Africas simultaneous sequences resulted in quite limited decentralization, these moments were themselves surely the peak of decentralizing zeal.17 The second is to

account for complex sequences by the underlying power relations that serve as the political and historical backdrop for the theory. Where sequences are difficult to decipher, a more tractable

independent variable may be structural in nature.18

16

IMPLICATIONS

This empirical and theoretical critique aims to build upon the sequential theory, and would be incomplete if it simply noted that additional variables are required to stretch the scope of the

theory and ensure its empirical fit across more cases. Two things may be said on this point. The first regards sample size. Testing decentralization sequences against African cases has the

advantage of offering 48 sub-Saharan countries against which to test arguments. While political-fiscal-administrative sequences alone are argued not to account for the variations across these cases, a theory that incorporates sequences into considerations of colonial and post-colonial histories and institutional environments may have considerable leverage over a large number of country experiences. As Faletti (2010) notes with regard to case selection, it may be appropriate to pay particular weight to large and substantively significant cases (i.e. Brazil may matter more than Suriname and Nigeria more than Lesotho), but raw expansion of the number of observations will be welcome. Second, parsimony need not be sacrificed if a theory can be constructed around the motivations of governing elites, especially parties under

institutional constraints. ONeills (2005) theory, which finds decentralization to be an outcome of parties that are nationally weak(ening) and subnationally strong, retains its salience here. While Falleti finds political party systems do not correlate with decentralization in Latin America, the emphasis on political party motivation is effective.19 From a policy perspective, the implications of this critique of the sequential theory are numerous. The joint emphasis on stable historical factors and persistent institutional realities in Africa suggests that policy advice on institutional design is likely to be relatively ineffective. While Falleti is duly cautious about reactive sequences and unintended consequences, the sequential theory has clear policy implications for advocates of decentralization that will

empower local actors: begin with political decentralization, and make sure function follows finance, rather than the other way around. (Conversely, the policy takeaway for power-jealous

central governments would be to invert that sequence.) This analysis of African cases makes a much more ambiguous observation about policy design, holding that African governments are

likely to preside over very limited decentralization even in the presence of optimal policy design. These political realities constitute a word of caution about expectations that subnational actors

can be empowered and their autonomy enhanced. Decentralizing governance in Africa will require attention to sequences as a necessary, but not

sufficient, condition for increasing local autonomy. It also will require the establishment of countervailing political powers that can resist central control and point political accountability

downward. This would include in particular: party systems with bottom-up features for candidate selection; state and civil service reform to make personnel downwardly accountable

to local officials, and in most all cases guarantees of intergovernmental fiscal transfers to ensure the revenue autonomy of local governments in places where local tax bases are low. That is,

ongoing incentive structures need to be established as matters of institutional design in the political, administrative, and fiscal arenas.

17

Applying the sequential theory to Africa, one finds that the theoretical elements that travel

best may be those that are not about the sequences themselves, but the other aspects of Falletis multifaceted argument. The relative strength of national and subnational coalitions,

combined with the historical backdrop of the state apparatus, can account for much of why Africas decentralization sequences are weaker across the board: subnational actors have been

historically subjugated to the state and the state apparatus has historically been top-down and clientelistic. The Latin American sequences played out against a backdrop of the downsizing of

central state power (the postdevelopmental, increasingly neoliberal s tate) and in a region where subnational coalitions had at least prospects for political salience. In Africa, the retraction of the state occurred against the backdrop of quite weak state institutions, and in a region where subnational coalitions had scant prospects for political relevance. These realities seem to go farther in explaining the cross-regional variation than the sequence of decentralizing changes. In postdevelopmental states, decentralization sequences go a long way towards explaining institutional designs and their consequences. In Africa, where even the decentralization sequences most favorable to SNG have not had the anticipated effects, a more comprehensive

set of changes to political structures would be required for decentralization to devolve power meaningfully. That African cases would require especially large investments in institutional overhaul is a finding that is echoed across a range of areas (cf. van de Walle 2001, e.g.) . The constraints to decentralization in Africa are numerous, going beyond the sequence of decentralization and including the fundamental structures of party and state, and the historical interaction of both. As Africanists might emphasize, institutional designs and governance reforms can all too easily be hemmed in by constraints that are enduring enough to be called structural. A revised version of the sequential model is outlined in four steps and can be schematized as in

Table 2 and Figure 1 below. It shows how the autonomy that results from processes of decentralization depends on several variables. The decentralization sequence is incorporated

into this argument, but to explain African outcomes, that sequence must be more fully embedded in other histories and institutions. The key variables include the historical moment in

a country or region (as represented in the type of state being post-developmental or neopatrimonial); the imperatives leading to decentralization; the coalition and sequence (which

are reflected in the original theory, but have greater observed variation); and the party system.

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Table 2

Sequences of Decentralization: Revised Model Historical moment

Imperative Coalition Sequence Party systems

Autonomy

Post-

developmental

Normal

politics

Subnational

coalition

Sequential Two/multi High

Post-developmental

Normal politics

National coalition

Sequential Two/multi Low

Neopatrimonial Stability Subnational coalition

Simultaneous (big bang)

Dominant Party or

Collapsed

High

Neopatrimonial

Stability National

coalition

Sequential Dominant

Party

Low

Neopatrimonial Normal politics

National coalition

Sequential / reciprocal

Dominant Party

Very Low/ None

Step 1: What is the extent of state-building? Latin American cases can be categorized, roughly, as post-developmentalist. African cases constitute a different category on this variable: they were broadly neopatrimonial when decentralization processes were initiated. This difference affects the long-run prospects for decentralization. In Africa, these formal institutions are less significant, but countries still have tendencies toward high degrees of state centralism, even where central states are weak (as in most countries), and even in cases of larger divided societies (such as Nigeria and Ethiopia). Predicted effects:

1a) post-developmentalist states (Latin America, e.g.) tend toward greater decentralization. 1b) neopatrimonial states (Africa, e.g.) will tend towards greater continuity of centralism

1c) other stat types (developmental in East Asia, e.g.) will affect the level of centralism

Step 2: What are the imperatives driving decentralization?

The next step is imperatives or incentives to decentralize. This is not simply a matter of political incentives of national and subnational actors in terms of normal politics, but also whether decisions about decentralization are occurring in times of normal politics at all. In particular,

some decentralization scenarios occur there are imperatives of national stability. In Africa, this is seen in the many instances where decentralization is a matter of necessity for national unity.

Predicted effects:

2a) Security/stability imperatives states will lead toward greater decentralization 2b) Subnational pressures for decentralization lead toward relatively robust decentralization.

2c) Contingent central incentives for electoral or temporal gain lead to limited decentralization. 2d) Lacking incentives for central governments or regimes to decentralize leads to centralism.

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Step 3: What is the decentralization sequence?

The decentralization sequence then enters the model as the key intervening variable in a

historical-institutional sequence. Building on Falletis model, the sequence will affect the ultimate degree of decentralization, but simultaneous processes and incomplete processes

should be added as explicit possibilities. Adding simultaneous decentralization and reciprocal processes allows for explication of the large number of cases in Africa.

Predicted effects: a) simultaneous or near-simultaneous processes will lead to the most decentralization b) political-first sequences tend toward the decentralized end of the spectrum c) administrative-first sequences tend toward the more centralized end of the spectrum d) Reciprocal or partial sequences yield little decentralization.

Step 4: What is the shape of institutions that condition decentralization?

The proximate cause of decentralization is then the institutions that shape behavior. These can range from federalism (institutions that strongly guarantee or buttress decentralization, as brought about by the prior variables in the model) to electoral systems in unitary states with more or less decentralizing effects (district-based versus nationwide proportional representation, e.g.) to highly centralized dominant-party systems. The predicted effects here are obvious, and well-established in comparative perspective; to a substantial degree, the causal link to the decentralization outcomes is a half-step. Predicted effects: a) dominant-party systems will tend toward greater centralism

b) collapsed systems and regimes tend toward decentralism c) competitive party systems tend toward moderate amounts of decentralization

Figure 1 below offers a schematic view of this preliminary model.

20

Figure 1 Revised model of African Decentralization

Note: the added variations on the variables from revising the theory are in bold. To conclude this preliminary examination, there are three situations that arise commonly in Africa that have required particular examination. Big Bang decentralizations that accompany regime changes are the first significant example. Falletis sequential theory casts these as P-F-A, but they can also be considered nearly simultaneous, with the decisions made through

constitutional bargaining processes (Constituent Assemblies, e.g.); the implementation comes as a P-F-A sequence, but the decision is for simultaneous decentralization, these decisions

reflecting open political processes with considerable contestation and participation from multiple actors. A second is modest forms of decentralization come with less change that is

somewhat reversible (though also stickier than dominant parties or regimes might prefer). These are found across regions in cases of contingent political incentives to decentralize that

may get locked in by sequences that create some meaningful (yet limited) pro-decentralization institutions. A third frequent category is continued centralism, or failed decentralization. Here, the modal path is neopatrimonialism (with an insignificance of formal state institutions) to

contingent incentives or lack of incentives, to a partial sequence, to dominant-party states, and ultimately to continued centralism. Explaining these outcomes requires a theory of

decentralization in time that embeds the historical-institutional sequential theory even more deeply in Africas particular historical and institutional configurations.

History

"Post-developmental" states

Neopatrimonial states

Imperative

Security

Domestic pressure (democratization)

Political opportunism (normal politics)

External pressure

Sequence

Simultaneous

Sequence: Political first

Sequence: Admin. first

Sequence: reciprocal/multiple

Institutions

Federalism

Unitary, decentralized electoral

Unitary, centralized electoral

Dominant party-state

Outcomes

Robust decentralization

Weak decentralization

Continued centralism

21

References

Ahmad, Junaid. 2003. Creating Incentives for Fiscal Discipline in the New South Africa, pp. 325-352 in J. Rodden, G. Eskeland, and J. Litvack, eds. Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Beer, Caroline. 2003. Electoral Competition and Institutional Change in Mexico. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press. Brancati, Dawn. 2009. Peace By Design: Managing Intrastate Conflict through Decentralization. New York: Oxford University Press. Boone, Catherine. 2003. Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chabal, Patrick and Jean-Pascal Daloz. 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Collier, Ruth Berins and David Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Dickovick, J. Tyler. 2011. Decentralization and Recentralization in the Developing World: Comparative Studies from Africa and Latin America. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press. Dickovick, J. Tyler and Tegegne Gebre-Egziabher. 2014. Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Centripetal Forces, pp.69-89 in J.T. Dickovick and J.S. Wunsch, eds., Decentralization in Africa: The Paradox of State Strength. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Eaton, Kent. 2004. Politics Beyond the Capital: The Design of Subnational Institutions in South America. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Englebert, Pierre and Nestorine Sangar. 2014. Burkina Faso: Decentralization under Tight Oversight, pp.45-68 in J.T. Dickovick and J.S. Wunsch, eds., Decentralization in Africa: The Paradox of State Strength. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Falleti, Tulia. 2005. A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective, American Political Science Review 99(3): 327-346. Falleti, Tulia. 2010. Decentralization and Subnational Government in Latin America . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fessha, Yonatan and Coel Kirkby. 2008.A Critical Review of Subnational Autonomy in Africa, Publius: The Journal of Federalism 38 (2): 248-271. Garman, Christopher, Stephan Haggard, and Eliza Willis. 2001. Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Theory with Latin American Cases, World Politics 53(2): 205236.

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Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mahoney, James. 2000. Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, Theory and Society 29(4): 507-548. Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen. 2010. A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change, pp. 1-37 in. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds.Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ONeill, Kathleen. 2005. Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pierson, Paul. 2000. Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, American Political Science Review 94(2): 251-267. Pierson, Paul. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Reaud, Beatrice and Bernhard Weimer. 2014. Mozambique: Decentralization in a Centralist Setting, pp. 137-158 in J.T. Dickovick and J.S. Wunsch, eds., Decentralization in Africa: The Paradox of State Strength. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Ribot, Jesse. 2002. African Decentralization: Local Actors, Powers and Accountability . Geneva: UNRISD. Seely, Jennifer. 2001. A political analysis of decentralisation: coopting the Tuareg threat in Mali, The Journal of Modern African Studies 39(3): 499-524. Treisman, Daniel. 2007. The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wing, Susanna. 2008. Constructing democracy in transitioning societies of Africa: constitutionalism and deliberation in Mali. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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1 Throughout, this criticism is not directed at Falletis original examination of Latin American cases, but rather to

test how the framework may be best applied, adapted, and amended to test other cases. 2 There is some disagreement among scholars about how administrative decentralization should be conceptualized

and operationalized. Falleti views administrative decentralization as the expenditure side of the public ledger; that is, virtually all public spending. By contrast, many public administration scholars consider administrative decentralization to refer mainly to human resources responsibilities for planning and budgeting, and for managing civil servants and consider expenditures to be part of fiscal decentralization. The distinction does not

affect the argument here, but this paper follows Falleti's approach. 3 This groups the Fiscal and Administrative aspects of Falletis theory together temporarily as representing the

decentralization of revenues and expenditures. 4 Outcomes may differ, for instance, between a poor country that decentralized rapidly in a post-1989

democratization versus a wealthy country that decentralized in the 1960s. With respect to development, for instance, there is a correlation between the most industrialized and largest African economies Nigeria and South Africa and the presence of more extensive decentrali zation to states and provinces; this relates to the emergence

of federalism for these two cases. 5 Despite the weakness of opposition, central states are paradoxically weak as well, having long exhibited an

inability to broadcast power into the countryside and build formal authority (Herbst 2000). 6 It may be worth considering in broader comparative perspective whether the significant features of the Latin

American cases are the post-developmental period, or rather the specific set of institutional actors that accompanies that period of development: emergent contestation of l iberal democracy, as contrasted with the less l iberal and less pluralistic form of contestation that accompanies the (post-)neopatrimonial state in Africa. 7 In Brazil, decentralization took place alongside democratization, but the negotiated and protracted nature of the

democratic transition was stil l quite distinct from several violent contestations in Africa and even from the shift in power in South Africa. 8 In Latin America, this is seen historically in Mexico with the PRI and at times in Argentina with the Peronists, b ut

even in these cases decentralization took on new salience in a period when the dominant party was waning. 9 Ghana is an outlier for its relatively stable system of two-party alternation and consistent subnational bases for

the national party in oppositi on. 10

The economically successful nation of Botswana is the most confounding case here, as it democratized,

decentralized, and developed economically on an earlier time frame than most other cases here. But upon examination, Botswanas exceptionalism does not yield immediate comparative insights, vis --vis other unitary cases, into the outcomes of decentralization. 11

Even in some regimes that are quite competitive nationally, many subnational elections lack competitiveness. An example here is Ghana, where recent national elections are have been very closely contested between two leading parties, yet each of the parties predominates in its own home region (with the capital city of Accra and certain other regions serving as swing regions). The lack of competitiveness locally means that a candidates real contest is in

earning the nomination of the regionally-dominant party. In such situations, if national party elites exercise power over subnational nominating procedures, then the effect is similar to a dominant party system. This returns us to an understanding of decentralization much more rooted in party systems and party competitiveness than in the

historical-institutional sequence (cf. Garman, Haggard, and Will is 2001; Beer 2003). 12

Senegal could simply be viewed as never having decentralized at all, given these limitations. This would make it a negative case, and would place it beyond the reach of the sequential theory; this would ensure the case does not harm the sequential theorys empirical fit, but would also mean that the theory loses the ability to speak to most

of the 54 countries of Africa, even those that have led the continent in formal -legal decentralization. 13

Reciprocal and complex processes relate to the simultaneity as well. If sequences exhibit feedback mechanisms, it begs the question whether each form of decentralization is not simply playing out over a longer time period, rather than a discrete and short one. The more time frames for the sequences are stretched to include all aspects

of implementation, the greater the likelihood of overlapping and simultaneous processes across the three areas. 14

Falleti defines political decentralization somewhat more broadly than many others in the literature, going beyond subnational elections to a range of reforms empowering subnational officials.

24

15

African local governance draws on powerful sets of institutions such as customary and traditional authorities, and indigenous institutions. Yet these institutions are by their nature focused on the resolution of localized collective action dilemmas, and are thus much better suited to changing governance at the local level that they are

to the sort of macro-political articulation needed to reshape regime politics. 16

Of course, some judgment must be exerci sed here, lest it be argued that decentralization is always incomplete (say, until even tertiary education has been decentralized, e.g.). By such a measure, almost no countries in the

developing world would have completed decentralization in this sector. The argument is not about a particular measurement, but rather that the empirical fit is highly contingent upon the analysts identification of the moment of each form of decentralization. 17

Of course, sequences can arise at time of regime change as well (as Falleti notes for Brazil and even Mexico), but

in those circumstances, subnational coalitions are l ikely to be at the most powerful, again suggesting that the end result will be relatively consequential. 18

This is not to say the sequence is epiphenomenal, but rather that it may - in the African context, at least - be seen as ultimately a reflection of the conditions political conditions under which the national and subnational

coalitions emerged, and how these are reformulated over time. Here, we may be directed to more structural variables, such as urbanization and attempts to consolidate democratic practice. 19

The question of parsimony also has another aspect. One of the layers of Falletis argument is the historical

condition under which decentralization sequences originate. If Africa can be characterized as (post-)neopatrimonial, we must account for decentralization in these types of states; the fact that some of these variables are those found elsewhere in the decentralization literature further bri ngs the sequential theory into dialogue with those other approaches. Indeed, a sequential theory could actually require as many variables as there are types of state:

developmental, post-developmental, neopatrimonial, and the like. In a sense, a main added variable here is not a new variable at all, but simply adding variation on a key independent variable in the original theory. Considering that variable (type of state) allows the theory to extend its empirical fit while becoming more parsimonious; historical-institutionalism retains salience in showing how trajectories play out, but it would necessarily cede some

causal primacy to other variables such as party-state configurations.