Sentiment and Ideologyin the Nationalism of the

Independence Club (1896-1898)Vipan Chandra

The development of nationalism in Korea received its greatest impetus during thelatter part of the nineteenth century through the activities of the IndependenceClub. The Club sought both to foster a new nationalistic consciousness in theKorean population, by invoking among the citizenry a strong emotional attach-ment to the state, and to create an ideology befitting Korea's new nation-statestatus. Due, perhaps, to the Club's relatively brief existence, its emotional impactwas greater and more lasting than its ideological one. However, the sentiment ofpatriotism which the Club was instrumental in nurturing played a vital role in thedevelopment of Korean nationalism in the twentieth century.

1. The Nature of Patriotism and National Identity

Historians of Korea generally share the notion that late nineteenthcentury Korean nationalism found its most thoughtful and articulateexpression in the ideology and activities of the Independence Club (1896-1898). Led by So Chae-p'il (Philip Jaisohn) and Yun Ch'i-ho, two modern-minded Koreans who had obtained their higher education in the UnitedStates, and supported by many native-educated Korean nationalists, theshort-lived Club played a decisive role in shaping the early contours ofmodern Korean nationalism. The story of the Club, its leadership, and itsreform campaign has been told in detail elsewhere.1 My purpose here is toexamine some salient aspects of the Club's ideology with a view to eluci-dating their significance for modern Korean history.

It need scarcely be stressed that the sentiment of patriotism is analmost universal phenomenon. A cursory look at the national anthemsand other accolades that patriots all over the world and throughout theages have paid their countries easily bears this out. Of course those whohave found the sentiment harmful or execrable have been just as universal

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and vociferous. Everywhere it seems the sentiment of patriotism has stoodat the core of the ideology of nationalism. Whether or not patriotism andnationalism are interchangeable terms, it is undeniable that without theformer the latter cannot exist. More than anything else, nationalism is atbottom a feeling, an emotion. It could be persuasively argued that in allits dimensions—military, political, economic, social, and cultural—nationalism represents the more concrete ramifications of an essentiallyaffective or psychological trait of human behavior.

Very simply stated, this affective or psychological trait springs froma human need to seek identifiable, comforting patterns amid the be-wildering and confusing variety of experience and to use those patternsfor personal identity and security, both material and emotional. Thuspatriotism may be seen as the last circle in a series of concentric circles,beginning with the smallest one—that of the child's quest for security,attachment, and identity. As the child grows, he or she progressively learnsof the host ofconcrete and diffuse factors which are shared with many otherhuman beings: language, myths and history, hopes and aspirations, re-ligious and secular rituals, territory, and even perhaps physical traits.This consciousness encourages both positive and negative behavioraltraits. Those who share, among other factors, an ecological, social, andcultural heritage gradually are recognized as belonging to a shared ab-straction called fatherland or motherland. This entity is then perceivedas essential to the survival and well-being of all its members. Thus loyaltiesthat one at first feels toward one's parents and family become applied tothis abstraction, through a chain of links moving from neighborhood andvillage to town or city and province or state, to the country at large.

Concomitantly, those who do not share this heritage come to belooked upon as foreign, alien, strange. At a benign level of patriotism thisis merely an awareness of difference, a feeling of "we" and "they." Butthere is always a potentially hostile feeling lurking behind such a classi-fication, and in a crisis, real or imagined, the "we" and "they" equationthreatens to escalate and explode into "we" versus "they." Both peacefulcompetition and war among nations manifest this hostility, the formeroften in subtle, subconscious forms, the latter in overt forms.2

This is of necessity a summary statement of the psychology ofnationalism, but it should nevertheless serve as an illuminating search-light on the patriotic sentiment and ideology of the Independence Club.

2. Toward a New National Identity: The Club's Accent on KoreaThe protection ofKorean independence and sovereignty was the first

and overriding objective of the Independence Club. Its primary goal wasto instill in the minds of all Koreans a lasting awareness of and attach-ment to Korean independence and sovereignty. It saw as its first task the

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creation of a new nationalistic consciousness throughout the country.The dimensions of its endeavor were psychic and emotional, and culturaland historical, as well as solidly economic, political, and military. I will,however, focus my observations here largely on the psychic and emotional,and historical and cultural dimensions, for it is in these areas that theClub first urgently saw the need for a new way of thinking.

A. THE PSYCHIC AND EMOTIONAL DIMENSION

Both So and his chief colleague Yun strongly believed that, thoughKorea had in the past produced patriotic heroes, Koreans in generallacked an active patriotic sentiment. They found little expression amongKoreans of a positive love for their country, if by such love is meant adesire and effort for the advancement of the national interest in a spiritof competition with other nations. The Club's informal organ, the Tongnipsinmun, and its English version, The Independent, frequently deplored thelack of this trait in the Korean national character. As one editorial putsit, "Loving one's nation is the highest [form of] love. But Koreans lovetheir own life more than their country's."3 Another editorial elaboratedupon this theme:

All people on this earth [work] for their country, but our people, unaware ofthe weakness of humiliation that befalls our nation and the stripping of herrights by foreigners, merely seek the well-being of their own selves. This is lowerthan beastly behavior. If we exerted ourselves [on behalf of our nation] itcould become an enlightened, strong, and prosperous nation [munmyöngkaehwa Ui puguk kangpyöng], but since we have chosen to stay inert how can[our nation] become [so]? If from today, the people [of this country], joininghands together, work to preserve its independence forever, then theirdescendants can perform their functions as the people of a worthy nation.4

This editorial was attacking both unscrupulous state officials whoabetted foreign schemes in Korea and the general populace which wasalienated from and indifferent to the government's larger actions.5 Indeed,the editorial was putting forward the notion that government officialswere able to get away with their antinational deeds only because the gen-eral public was not sufficiently aroused, a situation demanding strongcorrective action.

The Club leadership did not wash its hands of the matter by merelylamenting the absence of concern on the part of the people for the fate oftheir nation. They took corrective steps through a series of imaginativeactions. The very genesis of the Club was the desire to achieve this aim, atfirst by using highly affective symbols. As is well known, the Club's originsprang from the desire of So Chae-p'il and his progressive colleagues toerect a new gate, called Tongnip-mun (Independence Gate), roughly on thespot where another symbol had stood for centuries, the Mohwagwan (Hallfor Cherishing China)—a symbol designating the subservient status of

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Korea vis-à-vis the Celestial Empire. The Club directed the focus of bothgovernment and public emotion to the idea of independence by construct-ing in addition a meeting hall called Tongnip-gwan (Independence Hall),and by calling its informal mouthpiece Tongnip sinmun (The Independent).Its formal organ, a monthly magazine, was called Tae Chosön tongniphyophoe hoebo (Report of the Korea Independence Club). The import ofthe Club's own name scarcely needs comment.

Recognizing the need for cultivating young minds, the Club or-ganized a debating society as an intellectual forum. Through this society,the Club hammered home to its audiences such themes as the meaning andvalue of independence. It also constantly tried to reinforce the psycho-logical acceptance of the accomplished fact of national independence,gained as a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. For this psychictransition the Club chose to focus the Korean people's attention on theroyal house, national history and language, and patriotic songs as sym-bolic embodiments of independence.

The value of political symbols in cultivating a sense of nationalidentity and loyalty to one's country has long been evident to both thepractitioners and students of political psychology and mobilization. Tothe leaders of the Independence Club there was no better living focus forthe Korean people's loyalty to their nation than the Yi royal house.If the royal house could be visibly identified with the change in Korea'sinternational status, the Club leaders seem to have reasoned, that shouldlead to a palpable change in the Korean people's perception of the rightsaccruing to their nation as a free state. Any onslaught on these rights wouldthus be viewed as an attack on the royal house itself and hence unaccept-able. Not only should this be sound psychological preparation against anypossible foreign designs upon Korea, but it should also isolate and neutral-ize those within Korea who were still clinging to the traditional attitudeof subservience to China or were otherwise wary of national independence.

This strategy worked well and accounted for a relatively smoothlaunching of the Club and easy sailing in its initial stages. The Club soughtand obtained, for example, a donation of 1 ,000 won from the crown princefor the Independence Hall and had him write the signboard for the build-ing. These were small but significant acts. So adroitly interpreted them asexpressions of royal favor for the concept of independence and for theClub, and he forcefully conveyed this interpretation to his audiences. Healso decided to broaden and deepen the national impact of the Club'sroyal endorsement by holding public celebrations commemorating KingKojong's birthday and the founding of the Yi Dynasty, and by backingthose who were promoting the idea of elevating Korea's title to an empire.

On September 2, 1896, in order to celebrate Kojong's forty-fifthbirthday, nearly 2,000 people, under the auspices of Korean and foreign

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Christians, gathered at the site where the Independence Hall was to beconstructed. The festivities were simple. There were speeches by Rev. (Dr.)Horace Underwood, a Christian missionary, So, and Yi Chae-sun, a vice-minister of the government, and there were patriotic songs composed forthe occasion by several Korean members of the congregation. The eventmoved So so much that he spoke in contradiction to his own indictmentof Koreans for not being patriotic enough, an indictment which we haveseen he vented so unsparingly elsewhere. With unconcealed contempt forChina, and mixing Christian evangelism with political rhetoric to explainthe significance of such a public celebration—perhaps the first ever of itskind in Korea—So editorialized:

The Koreans are quite unlike Chinamen in the matter of patriotism. They aretruly loyal to His Majesty and patriotic to their native land, but they have neverbeen taught to show their feelings in public demonstration .... This meeting showstwo important facts. First, that they have a desire to meet together in a publicplace and join their hearts and voices in praying for their King and their countryto the King of Kings. They realize the mightiness of God and believe theirsupplications will be answered. Secondly, the officials, merchants, artisans, andcoolies [are] united together under one tent for the purpose of demonstratingtheir patriotic feelings and sentiments, forgetting all about their differences andcastes. What makes Korea so weak as a nation is that the people are not unitedin their sentiments. The Government may change once every day and the peoplelook at them with indifference and apathy. The same feeling exists with theofficials. How much the common man may suffer does not concern them. Anation cannot become a power with such a state of sentiments. The cause ofthis is that they do not appreciate the common fate in which they are boundtogether. But when they begin to realize that they are parts of one fabric andone nation, they will stand when their hearts are united in the common causeof patriotism, and they will fall when divided. That is not all; if they shouldunderstand that they are the children of the same Heavenly Father, andbelievers in the same Savior, mutual love and sympathy will naturally springup. Yesterday's meeting was a sign of the gradual implanting of these ideasin Koreans and we consider it an anchor of hope for Korea's future.6

The following year's celebration, again organized in the name of"Christian citizens of the city of Seoul," featured speeches by Yun Ch'i-ho and Rev. Henry Appenzeller, another missionary. Yun, referring tocitizenship, loyalty, and nation said:

Citizenship means the supporting column of the whole fabric [of the nation]and it must not be defiled or disgraced by slavish sentiment or despicable acts ....True love for King and country lies in the faithful performance of our dutieswhatever they may be. Nation signifies the King, the Government, the people,and the territory. The Koreans must understand that His Majesty whosebirthday they [are] celebrating is their own King and ruler. The Council of Stateand other Departments are part of their own Government, the inhabitants [of]this land are their own fellow countrymen and the three hundred [sic] Ii of thelength and breadth of Chosun is their own native land.7

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To both Sö and Yun it was a matter of anguish that for an entiretwelve month period—from February 1896 to February 1897—the Ko-rean monarch had to live under the protection of the Russian envoyin Seoul. Fearing Japanese machinations against his life, Kojong hadsought and obtained temporary asylum in the Russian legation. It wasSo who spoke on this question. He was not yet fearful of any sinister plotsby Russia against Korean independence. Russia was not yet making itsweight felt in Korea. The amiable Carl Waeber, the Russian envoy, ap-peared to be concerned primarily with the safety and well-being ofKojong,and this had forestalled any immediate fears about Russian intentions. Itwas rather the symbolism of the monarch to all appearances fleeing fromhis own subjects to the security of what was legally foreign territory inthe midst of his own kingdom that disturbed So. He was apprehensive ofthe international disdain that this episode could generate and the damag-ing impact it could have on the newly popular psychology of independencethat he was so assiduously cultivating. In an audience with Kojong soonafter the latter's flight to the Russian legation, So claimed to have told him:

Please return to the palace. This country is Your Majesty's land and its peopleare your own people. Abandoning this land and these people is not proper [forYour Majesty]. If you leave the people and the land, will the result not be theextinction of the country? ... As the ruler of a country, if you don't reside in [yourown] palace but stay in a foreign country's legation not only will this be a sluron our face but will make foreigners hold us in ridicule.8

Later So would moderate his stand and endorse the situation as necessaryin view of the potentially greater danger to Korean sovereignty and theking's safety posed by possible Japanese plots.

Meanwhile, the Club's efforts to promote independence on an emo-tional level received a big boost from a successful campaign by progres-sives, within the government and without, to elevate Korea to an empireand Kojong to an emperor. The idea was not new. In 1895, soon after theassassination of Queen Min, the cabinet had memorialized Kojong, urginghim to assume the title of emperor. The gist of their plea was that the tradi-tional title of wang, or king, connoted a status inferior to that of the Chineseemperor, and only the assumption by the Korean ruler of the title of hwang-je, or emperor, would convince the people that their country was in-dependent of all and inferior to none. Their watchword, in the words ofThe Korean Repository, was "No emperor, no independence."9

Though the majority of the cabinet had approved the proposal, andthough October 26 had been designated for the coronation ceremony,the event never materialized, "through the intervention of certain in-fluences."10 It is very likely that these influences were the opposition of thedie-hard Koreans still loyal to China and the timid personality of Kojong

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himself, who had at the time only an uncertain grasp of the full implicationsof Korea's newly gained freedom from the stern hand of China.

The subject remained unmentioned until the spring of 1897 when,according to The Independent, "a number of patriotic people" memo-rialized the throne and revived the proposal. Kojong rejected the proposalbut the petitioners persisted. Slowly the matter gained momentum andpetitions from the general public as well as government officials inundatedthe palace. Finally Kojong yielded when, on October 3, the prime ministerhimself led the entire government in memorializing the king for the ninthtime to accept the proposal. The China loyalists had been isolated andovercome due, perhaps, in no small measure to the campaign of the In-dependence Club. Kojong could thus now assert himself.

So, as the one unquestioned spokesman of the Club at this time,commended the government for thus "upholding the dignity of the nationas an independent state." To those foreigners who might be struck by theapparent "absurd" nature of the change in title, he pointed to its symbolicsignificance and urged the treaty powers to accord recognition to it. 1 1

Kojong was crowned emperor of Korea on October 12, 1897, amidproper sacrifices to Heaven. An imperial edict announced the renamingofKorea from Chosön wangguk (The Kingdom ofKorea) to Taehan cheguk(The Empire of Taehan), and the use of kwangmu (Bright Valiance) as thenew reign title. The royal red gave way to dragon yellow. The altars ofthe god of earth and god of grains were raised from plain sa and chik tot'aesa and t'aejik. Queen Min's rank was posthumously raised to hwanghu(empress) and the wangt'aeja (crown prince) became hwangt'aeja (imperialprince).12 Korea's independence was now supposed to be loud and clear toall, at home and abroad.

How much of this Korean symbolism was inspired by the Japaneseexample of a transcendental emperor, demanding and receiving the un-swerving and undivided obedience of his subjects, cannot be ascertained.It must be mentioned here, though, that both So and Yun had in theirearly youth been educated in Japan and could not have failed to see theimpact of an autonomous imperial throne on the minds and hearts of theJapanese people. Shrouded in the myth of divinity and an unbrokenlineage, and accountable to no one, the Japanese emperor must haveappeared to them endowed with extraordinary powers, in comparison towhich the Korean ruler had a very weak and meek stature.

Sö's own pursuit of the conquest and conversion of minds throughthe judicious use of symbolism is also seen in his quest for patriotic songs."Independence arches and patriotic songs," he wrote, "cannot make acountry independent but it is exactly these things which appeal to thepublic and give them a taste for independence."13 Stressing the need to"catch'em young," So called upon schools to teach students patriotic

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songs which they should "sing in concert every day or two. They must haverespect for the country before they can love her and they must love herbefore they will be willing to make sacrifices for her."14 He asked allKoreans to compose patriotic songs and submit them to the Tongnipsinmun. Many responded and some of the compositions were, as notedearlier, sung at the ground-breaking ceremony for the Independence Gateand at the royal birthday celebrations. Others were printed in the Tongnipsinmun for the benefit of the general public. x 5

The words "loyalty and patriotism" became the Club's officialslogan. In March 1898 it issued a silver-lined badge to its members, withthe phrase tongnip hyöphoe: ch'ung-gun aeguk (The Independence Club:Loyalty to the Ruler, Love for the Country) inscribed against a back-ground of Korea's national flag.16

B. THE CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS

So, Yun, and other core leaders of the Club also wanted symbolsof national independence to serve as stimulants to the people to reflect ontheir history and culture. It was necessary, in their judgment, to focus theinterest thus generated on the purely indigenous elements of Koreanculture and history, and to foster a progressive view of history among thepeople. This was the substance of the cultural and historical dimensions ofthe Club's nationalism. How did they explore these dimensions?

According to Chu Si-gyöng, the Club's leading scholar of the Koreanlanguage, the key element in a nation's independence was its possessionof a distinct language. He called Korea's reliance on classical Chinese asits official language a sign of "cultural slavery." Language to Chu wasthe "essence of independence" [tongnip ùi song].11 It was with this con-sciousness that he undertook the study of Korean. His mentor So, whilerefraining from making such a sweeping statement, nevertheless alsoconsidered the possession of a unified language for speaking and writingone of the categorical imperatives of an independent national culture. Sowas convinced that the use by all classes of people of a common lan-guage, idiom, and script would lead to national solidarity, strength andprosperity. The Tongnip sinmun tried to elevate the ordinary citizen'sestimation of the Korean language and script throughout the land and es-tablish them as mediums of expression for all, "the high and the low,the noble and the despised" [sangha kwich'ön].

Sö's efforts, aided by Club scholars such as Chu and Chi Sök-yong(1855-1935), were largely responsible for removing the unwarranted buttraditional stigma of lowliness from the use of han 'gül. To them, the termönmun (vulgar script) traditionally applied to the script obviously had anodious meaning. The Club therefore popularized the terms kug'ö (nationallanguage), kungmun (national script), and han'gül.

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY21

The Tongnip sinmun described han'gúl as the "best [script] in theworld and with scholarly merit."18 It reasoned further that the abolition ofthe complex and hard-to-learn Chinese script, hanmun, and the exclusiveuse of the simple and easily-learned han già, "designed for our sake by thegreat sage [King Sejong]," would prevent the waste of "precious and ur-gent time" by facilitating the spread of literacy and learning. If the timethus saved were spent on studying such things as "[the role of] legislativeassemblies in government, interior affairs, foreign affairs, financial affairs,law, navy and army, sea navigation, hygiene, economics, handicrafts,trade, agriculture, and various other businesses" the way would be openednot only for individuals to become wealthy but ultimately also for thewhole nation to attain the goal of "enlightenment, prosperity, and power"[munmyöng pugang].

It was this kind of learning that the Tongnip sinmun saw as thematerial for forging the "cornerstones and pillars of our nation's indepen-dence," for making "our nation's prosperous and strong dignity andenlightened honor shine in the world."19 The supporters of hanmun anddetractors of han 'gül were seen by the paper as impediments to this pro-cess. These detractors were termed an elitist group unconcerned aboutthe nation and interested only in maintaining their privileged status and"oppression over the entire nation."20

The Tongnip sinmurìs successful use of han'gúl as a medium forcommunication was certainly good evidence to the average Korean readerthat the claims made on behalf of the script were, though a bit hyperbolic,not mere empty boasts. Yet the age-old disdain and neglect of han'gúl bythe government and literati had made a certain clumsiness about the useof the script equally evident. Today's readers of the Tongnip sinmun andother contemporaneous han'gúl writings cannot but be struck by, forinstance, their quaint orthography, or better, orthographies. There wereno reliable books of Korean grammar or dictionaries to aid the spellingor usage of school teachers or young writers, and the extensive currencyof Chinese-based vocabulary in all written expression caused difficultiesin switching over to purely han g«/-based communication. Even the pro-gressive Confucianists in the Club, men who were in principle sympatheticto the idea of linguistic nationalism and the eventual nationwide use ofthe Korean script, appear to have found it galling and impractical to jumpimmediately on the han'gúl-orúy bandwagon. Namgung Ök's Hwang-song sinmun, therefore, used the mixed Chinese-Korean script, andChöng Kyo's two-volume history of the declining years of Yi Korea waswritten exclusively in hanmun. The Club's Hoebo likewise carried articlesin han 'gül, hanmun, and the mixed script.

It fell to Chu Si-gyöng to start the process of laying a sounder andmore enduring foundation for the emergence of a truly national Korean

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language written in han 'gül. Chu realized that without a proper grammarand guidelines for standardized usage a genuine and rich national literarytradition would be difficult to develop. In 1898 he wrote the text of thefirst major grammar for modern Korean, later published under the titleKugömunpöp.21 To wean Koreans away from Chinese culture and to createin them a sense of modern national cultural identity, the nurturing of theKorean language thus became a matter of great importance to the Club.Its effectiveness was perceived as limited, however, as long as it lackedharnessing to another potential force for identity: national history. Hereagain the Club's views found forceful expression through the pens of Soand Yun.

To both So and Yun it was reprehensible that Koreans often showeda better awareness of the history of China than of their own country. Tothem this was unquestionably another reason why Koreans seemed to holdtheir own nation in poor regard. This ignorance was not only useless andunprofitable but positively harmful to the nation. Under the Sö-Yunstewardship, the Tongnip sinmun frequently deplored this situation andvigorously called for its correction. As one issue of the paper wrote underSö's editorship:

The people of Taehan scarcely think of Taehan as their own country, and thereare many [in this country] who indulge in dastardly conduct towards the landand the people of Taehan, and believe that it is difficult [for this country] toreceive a treatment of equality [in the world]. [So] the idea that only withabsolute dependence on another country and only under the control of thatcountry can [this country] sustain itself is due not to the lack of foreign learninghere but to the fact that the people of Taehan, not being aware of their owncountry's history, treat their compatriots with scorn, and believe that the taskof [national] restoration cannot be accomplished by these people. However, ifone looks into the history of Taehan there is no absence of sagacious and greatfigures .... What we hope is that the people of Taehan will closely study thefamous loyal heroes in the history of Taehan, and, like them, carry out theirwork dauntlessly. Then doubtlessly Taehan too will receive [respectful]treatment from the world. Learning about the historic exploits of such famousloyal subjects as Ch'ungmugong Yi Sun-sin, Cho Chungbong, and ImKyöng-öp . . . and revering and emulating [our own] history's trulylionhearted and royal heroes rather than the famous figures of Han, T'ang, andMing will be in accord with the principles of righteousness.22

Earlier, Yun had expressed a similar view in a speech given at afunction celebrating the founding of the Yi Dynasty. "The reason," hesaid, "why the Korean people have come to such a pass is nothing but thatinstead of studying, as [people in] other countries do, their own famouspersons and the condition and situation of their own country, we merelylearn about things Chinese .... We are totally unaware of the things in ourcountry that evoke honor and pride, and all we have is this evil [Chinese]learning. I hope that Koreans will have a system of learning that will make

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY23

them study not merely things foreign but the history of their own countryas well, so that they can know that Chosön is their country."23 The So-Yun objection to the study of Chinese history at the expense of Koreanhistory was thus twofold: the spirit of national self-denigration and sub-servience to China that had bred in Korea, and the enervating and reac-tionary effect on Korea caused by the reverence for Confucianism whichinevitably accompanied it.

Sin Ki-sön (1851-1909), the minister of education in early 1896,seemed to personify for So the obscurantism that he associated with sub-servience to China and her Confucian culture. Originally a member ofKim Ok-kyun's Enlightenment Party, by the mid- 1890s Sin had changedhis colors and joined the ranks of the conservatives. In the summer of1 896 he addressed a memorial to the throne attacking the cutting off ofhair and the wearing ofWestern uniforms by soldiers, police, and students,and the use of han 'gül and the adoption of the Western calendar as expres-sions of ungratefulness to China and as "barbarian" practices. He wentfurther and called the use of han'gúl a "beastly" practice. Such innovat-ions, he claimed, would lead not only to the destruction of the venerableChinese classics but also of government itself.24

To So it was intolerable for the nation's education to be under thedirection of a man like Sin. He wrote a scathing rejoinder to Sin, attackinghis affront to the memory of the great King Sejong, and advising him thatsince he valued the Chinese calendar so much he ought to relinquish hisKorean citizenship and migrate to China. So suggested to Sin that if hecared to look at China closely he would see that she was "tottering to herfall" and that "the boasted classics which have striven for three thousand

years to elevate Korea have only plunged her deeper and deeper into themire."25

Elaborating this theme two months later, So sharpened his attackon what he called the Confucian system. "What advantage has this study,this worship of Confucius, this attachment to this doctrine, this elevationinto a fetish of his words been to Korea? Here as in China the bubble burst

at the first prick of the spear. The utter collapse of these two Confucian-ridden states [as] Japan delivered her attacks exposed the delusiveness,the worthlessness of [the] so-called Confucian education."26

Sin retaliated against So and his supporters by editing and publish-ing at government expense a scurrilously anti-Christian and anti-Westernbook, entitled Yuhak Kyöngwi (The Warp and Woof of Confucianism).In it he referred to Europeans as "birds and beasts" and their languagesas "the chirping of fowls." He called Christianity "vulgar, shallow, anderroneous," and "a type of Barbarian vileness." China was praised as"grand and glorious and the largest and richest" empire in the world, andas "the center of civilization."

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Sö's response appeared in the form of another editorial, confrontingSin with unrebuttable facts cited with unrelenting sarcasm. He wrote:

Mr. Sin has a fine contempt for Europe and Europeans but let us see howit would work practically. He wears cotton pants which were probably wovenin Manchester. The watch he wears was perhaps made in Switzerland. He lightshis pipe with matches from Vienna unless he prefers the cheaper Japaneseproduct. He reads by the light of American kerosene oil, he probably wearsa piece of amber from the Baltic in his top knot; if it were not for Europeanglass he would not be able to look out of his windows in winter; his friends, theinsurgents in the country [the Righteous Army remnants of the Tonghak], arearmed with weapons made in Europe and his sovereign is the guest of one ofthese "low down, bird chirping" Europeans.

This man is a good representative of the Hermit Kingdom. We hadsupposed that Korea had cast off its ancient asceticism but here we have a manwho wants Korea to crawl back into her shell and sleep another 1,000 years.We are on the whole pleased at his ravings for he is overdoing it and hasteningto his fall.27

It is unlikely that the So-Yun censure of Confucianism was sharedwholeheartedly by the other core leaders of the Club. However, if theyfound that attitude extreme and felt any ambivalence towards it, they neverappear to have openly expressed it. It caused no visible fissures in the unityof the core leaders. In the matter of the study of Korean history this unityappeared clearly and unmistakably in their shared notion of the necessityfor a critical reconstruction of the nation's past. They aimed at fosteringa view of Korean history that would generate pride in the accomplish-ments of the nation's past and at the same time point out its failings. TheTongnip sinmun cautioned against the established East Asian tradition ofglorifying the past at the expense of the present, and encouraged its readersto think of the future as holding progress in store. It also urged the peopleto look at Korean history as a segment of world history and to study thelatter too, in order to learn appropriate lessons and plan for the future.Again it was So who gave eloquent expression to this theme. He wrote:

Without a knowledge of national history, a youngster's love for hiscountry . . . will hang merely upon selfish interests. He knows nothing about hiscountry's struggles, her successes, her failures. He knows nothing about herneeds or her natural advantages. Native land means to him little beyond a fieldfor personal and selfish aggrandizement. His native land has in his mind nopersonality so to speak. There is no La Belle France, no John Bull, noColumbia ....

Now the youth must be taught the history of their own country. Theymust get a glimpse of the centuries of development. They must be first in a positionto compare the past with the present ... Let a history of his country be put into thehands of every Korean youth and he will find in it much to be proud of andenough of error and wrong to give him an ambition to do his part toward makingthe future better than the past.28

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY25

The need for a new book reevaluating Korean history was obvious.The Club stepped forward to try to fulfill this need. Core leaders ChöngKyo and Namgung Ok, and men from the subleadership group, such asHan Ch'i-u and Yi Mu-yong, with the aid of scholar-patriots Hyön Ch'ae(1856-1925), Pak Ün-sik (1859-1926), Chang Chi-yön (1864-1921), Ch'oePyong-hön (1858-1927), and Ch'oe Kyóng-hwan (181 1 -1999), worked ona Korean history project. The result was the production in 1896 of thefive volume Taedong yöksa (History of the Great Eastern State), formallyauthored by Ch'oe Kyöng-hwan and edited by Chöng Kyo.

The Taedong yöksa was not designed as a popular history text.It dealt entirely with the mythical and ancient phases of Korean his-tory and was written in hanmun. It was a scholarly, rational attempt atarousing nationalistic pride among the conservative China-worshippingConfucianists—like Sin Ki-sön—who still overwhelmingly composed theKorean elite. It squarely took issue with the traditional China-centeredview of Korean history by focussing attention on the Tan'gun myth inexplaining the origin of the Korean nation, by describing Kija simply asa "sage of culture," and referring to China simply as "China" (sina) in-stead of as Chunghwa [The Elegant Middle (Kingdom)], the reverentialappellation favored by the general body of Confucian literati in China andKorea. The manuscript also upheld the theory of the political and culturalindependence of the "Three Han" period of Korean history.

In his preface, Chöng Kyo attributes the writing of this text to theinfluence of the nationalistic spirit of the Independence Club. Under HyönCh'ae, who was then an official of the compilation bureau {p'yönjipkuk) inthe education ministry, it was planned to print 2,000 copies of the text fornationwide distribution. However, the opposition of the education min-ister, Sin, is said to have put an end to the project, and it was not until 1905that the book saw the light of day.29

To strengthen the psychology of patriotism and foster a new conceptof nationalism among all Koreans, the Club also proposed many concretereformist ideas and schemes in the military, political, and economic areas,and conducted a vigorous campaign against the Korean collaborators ofthe Russian envoy. This campaign became quite strident and achievedmuch success, but it is outside the scope of this article to dwell upon it.One point, however, needs mention here. In none of the proposals of theClub does one find even a trace of traditional xenophobia. On the con-trary, one is impressed by the Club's open-minded and cosmopolitanapproach to nationalism. The attitude of the Club's leaders is one of re-spectful curiosity toward the outside world generally and of categoricalenthusiasm about learning from the rich scientific, technological, andpolitical heritage of the West. The praise that So and Yun sometimesshowered on the West on occasion even sounds rather fulsome. Under

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Sö's leadership, for example, The Independent once wrote:

History tells us that wherever Western civilization has made its appearance,the place was transformed into a new country altogether .... We hope thetime will come when Western civilization will penetrate every corner of thecontinent of Asia and make use of the Creator's beautiful soil for the good ofHis people the world over.30

Yun later echoed this theme:

What we want is the rich, nay revolutionizing, ideas of the West introducedand naturalized, as it were, in Korea .... [We need] the epoch-making andworld-moving thoughts of the Occidental races.31

Unlike in Japan, where some champions of bummei kaika (Civili-zation and Enlightenment) in the 1870s and early 1880s had advocateda wholesale remaking of the nation after the Western models, and in China,where some enthusiasts in the May 4th era of modernization showed athoroughgoing rejectionist attitude toward their own culture,32 the Clubretained a balanced and wholesome attitude on the question of foreignborrowing. Despite its unreserved praise for Western civilization, the Clubdid not want Koreans to distance themselves from their own tradition

as such, only from the debilitating elements ofthat tradition. For the mostpart the Club saw these as stemming from Chinese and Confucian as-pects of Korea's culture. Hence arose the unsparing harshness of its attackon China and Confucianism. The Club saw the material and intellectual

gifts of the West as welcome aids for Korea's advancement, and the"powerful sentiment" of patriotism that So and his colleagues sought tocultivate in the country was thus meant first to make "resistance to en-croachment possible" and then to enhance the power and prosperity ofthe nation.33

There was, however, no suggestion whatever in the Club's activismof a quest for the enhancement of national power through aggression andexpansionism. The ultrachauvinism and shrill jingoism of a Saigo Taka-mori or even of a Fukuzawa Yukichi, or the calculated expansionism ofthe Meiji oligarchs were conspicuously absent from the Club leadership.34Their brand of patriotism and nationalism came close to the ideal espousedby Ernest Renan—peaceful, constructive, warmly cosmopolitan, and ar-dently friendly toward the West.

4. Assessment of the Club's Ideology of NationalismThe preceding account of the Independence Club's thinking on

patriotism and nationalism reveals several distinctive features of thepolitical consciousness of the newly emerging, forward-looking elite in latenineteenth century Korea, an elite that was both small and at irrecon-

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY27

cilable odds with the traditional conservative elite. The political con-sciousness of both groups was largely shaped by the crisis that they sawfacing Korea, a crisis stemming from Korea's forced "opening" by Japanin 1876 and its gradual participation in a system of modern internationalrelations under unequal treaties. This new situation placed onerous bur-dens on the small, resource-poor, inexperienced, and distraught leadershipof the vulnerable Korean peninsula. The arch conservatives among theleaders of the Korean society wanted the country to beat an impossibleretreat into the pre- 1876 political and cultural system. The progressives,best represented by the Independence Club, took the new order as a givenand wanted to exploit it to Korea's advantage by creating and fosteringthe framework of a new nationalism, a framework they hoped would helplaunch their country on what they perceived was the only desirable courseopen to the nation: modernization.

Patriotism, as I said before, is the nucleus of all expressions of na-tionalism. If patriotism means love for one's country, and if one expressionof this love is a readiness to fight to defend one's country against externalaggression or internal subversion, then patriotism was certainly not un-known to Koreans as an admirable quality. Students of Korean historyand culture know well that during its long existence as a nation it hasproduced its fair share of patriotic heroes, in both fact and legend. Whatthen is meant by the term "new nationalism?"

At least three characteristics of traditional Korean nationalism, es-pecially during most of the Yi dynasty, set it apart from modern national-ism. First, though traditional Korean nationalism projected Korea as adistinct territorial, political, and cultural entity, or nation, it did not em-brace the idea of the legal equality of all states in international relations,an idea central to modern concepts of nationalism. In the limited inter-national arena—East Asia—in which Korea essentially conducted her for-eign relations she was separate but unequal. China was Korea's suzerainand Korea was its vassal. Or, using the more appropriate Confucian termi-nology, the former was the elder brother and Korea the younger.

This status had Korea's own voluntary, often enthusiastic, endorse-ment. Stemming both from a feeling of indebtedness to China's great cul-ture, whence Korea drew its own intellectual and cultural nourishment,and from the political wisdom or rationality of obtaining the friendship,patronage, and protection of a big power looming over her own small andvulnerable state, this attitude over time had become hardened into acardinal and sacrosanct principle of state policy. The phrases sadaejuüi(Philosophy of Serving the Great) and mohwa chöngch'aek (Treasuring theFlower Policy), so often used in describing this principle in Yi Korea, arepithy statements of the degree to which Koreans had internalized the con-cept of subordination to and veneration of China.

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This attitude had not undergone much radical change among eitherthe elite or the populace at large even after the formal opening of Koreaby Japan in 1 876. Structurally and attitudinally, because of the continueddomination of the country by China until 1895, Korea remained verymuch in the old framework. The settlement of the Sino-Japanese War of1894-95 for the first time legally elevated Korea to unambiguous inde-pendence. That this independence was soon to be grossly misused byJapan is beside the point here.

National pride, dignity, self-reliance, and self-assertiveness, the nat-ural concomitants of the concept of the equality of nations, were thuslacking in Korea's posture toward other states. When, therefore, legal andpolitical independence from China was thrust upon it in 1 895, the imme-diate effect was to leave the court, bureaucracy, and people of the countryall confused. Both as an idea and as a value, independence became dif-ficult to handle. It did not—and could not—instantly create new emo-tional moorings for Koreans, moorings whose source of strength would beinternal rather than external. The result was a helter-skelter search byKorea's ruling circles for substitute "elder brothers" abroad. Thus thetendency of the various political factions of the country to seek foreignalignments, especially involving neighboring powers, seems to have issuedas much from an emotional necessity to have a strong nation assume therole of Korea's benevolent protector as from a desire to aggrandize theirown power.35 This tendency had to be fought and overcome. Koreans hadto be awakened to their nation's new international status as a cherishable

value before they could be expected to stand up, unassisted, to any chal-lenge to their country's integrity. It was this task that the IndependenceClub sought first and foremost to accomplish and it was in this sense aboveall that its nationalism was new and modern.

Second—and this necessarily stemmed from the sadae attitude—traditional Korean nationalism had been one of withdrawal and seclusion

from the non-East Asian world. Barring intimate relations with China anda tightly restricted trade and ritualistic intercourse with Japan, Korea hadkept itself aloof from the rest of the world until the late nineteenth century.Again, what had begun perhaps as a rational, self-protective policy de-signed to insulate Korea from the dangers of unnecessary foreign entangle-ments, eventually became fossilized as a rigid and irrational stance againstall things alien, which clearly meant Western. The more stubborn of theKorean Confucianists saw China as the source of all virtue and the rest

of the world, especially the West, as the source of all evil. They refused tosee the dangers inherent in such a simplistic attitude, even in a world thatwas fast changing around them. The telltale evidence of a weak China'stragic humiliations at the hands of a strong and aggressive West and, later,

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY29

Japan, failed to have any salutary impact on their adherence to an out-moded philosophy and way of life. Those few Confucianists who kept theirminds open and tried to prod their government into heeding the warningsof the times were often ostracized and frustrated.

The champions of an isolationist policy were not defeated until 1876.Yet even in defeat they remained defiant, as seen in the continued vehe-mence of the wijöng ch'öksa school during the 1880s and 1890s. There wasalways a lurking danger that unless such obscurantist elements were con-tinuously battled and kept at bay, if not overcome, they might attemptto regain their strength, and even with the best of intentions lead thenation on a path of self-destruction. The Korean people had to be fullyawakened to the lack of vision and the pitfalls in the brand of nationalismespoused by the obdurate Confucian literati.36 This was the second impor-tant objective of the Independence Club's nationalism. Its philosophy ofnationalism was marked by the modern qualities of openness and cosmo-politanism. Openness also implied humility and a willingness to learn fromthe more advanced nations. The Club's core leaders depicted the entireworld, but especially the Western world, as a vast school where Koreashould be a diligent pupil, learning and imbibing the best. By rejectingparochialism and fostering openness, they sought to cultivate a positivedesire in Koreans to participate actively in the affairs of the world, andto work for the enhancement of the power and status of their country inthe international community.37

Third, traditional Korean nationalism did not rest on a natural soli-darity between the government and the people. So Chae-p'il, the Club'sforemost spokesman, saw the nation divided between the "squeezers" and"squeezed": he and his associates saw that to the man in the street thegovernment was something remote, oppressive, and often cruel. The au-thority of the rulers and the obligations of the ruled constituted the sole,relentless theme of the relationship between the government and thepeople. There was no concept of popular or civil rights to soften the harsh-ness of this equation and make the average person view the government asan instrument to be used in achieving personal security and well-being.Nor did the ordinary citizen have any role whatever in determining whatwas good for the nation. This, too, naturally was the exclusive preserve ofthe privileged few who governed. Consequently, the attitude of the peopletowards the government was one of suspicion, distrust, and hostility,rather than empathy.38

Modern nationalism takes as one of its basic tenets a feeling of soli-darity between the government and the people. It also presupposes thatwithout a feeling of participation, or at least involvement, on the part ofthe people in the affairs of the state, this solidarity cannot be achieved.

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It rests further on the belief that without such solidarity no nation canachieve the true recognition and esteem of other nations. Channels—concrete, psychic, and symbolic—must therefore be devised to gratify thepeople's irrepressible desire for a say in the affairs of state. The Indepen-dence Club sensed this innate urge in the Korean people and sought togive articulate expression to it. To the Club the exercise of civil libertiesby a nation's citizens was the fundamental source of national power andprosperity.

The nationalism of the Independence Club was thus a forward look-ing, progressive ideology, designed in the long run to facilitate the crea-tion of a national citizenry out of a body of abject subjects and fosterpopular participation in the affairs of the nation.

It is true that the Club's ideology was not a particularly rich orsophisticated worldview. Ideas were expressed disjointedly, tersely, and atdifferent times, without regard to whether or not they formed a coherentphilosophy. This, however, is to be expected when the primary breedingground of ideas is the editorial page of a newspaper. Another reasonfor this may be that the Club, after all, was a short-lived organization,engaged mostly in a national consciousness-raising endeavor. The firststage of any such enterprise is inevitably focused on the affective ap-proaches. The cognitive level—the level where study, intellectual explora-tion, and reflection are critical—had barely been investigated, mostly bythe Club's debating society, when the Club was suppressed by the govern-ment in late 1898. Only upon the completion of this second, reflectivestage could there have been any serious effort at evaluation which mighthave led to a coherent, balanced stock-taking of Korea's heritage, aweighing of its strengths and weaknesses, and the presentation of a trulyworkable vision and plan for its future construction.

Few of the Club's ideas for Western-type reform saw the light of day,due to reasons we cannot go into here.39 One wonders, however, whatwould have happened if Korea had undergone the kind of rapid andmultisided Westernization that Japan went through in the Meiji era underthe goading power of patriotism. Basil Hall Chamberlain, an Englishobserver who came to Japan in 1873, noted twenty years later that theswift pace of change "makes a man feel preternaturally old; for here heis in modern times . . . and yet he can distinctly remember the MiddleAges .... Thus does it come about that ... we ourselves feel well-nighfour hundred years old."40 Lafcadio Hearn, then serving as a teacher inJapan, spoke of the "forced mental expansion" and the resultant psychicstrain that accompanied the modernization of Meiji Japan due to therelentless sentiment of patriotism that fueled it.41 Natsume Söseki, in hisnovels Kokoro (The Heart of Things) and Köjin (Passersby), addressed thequestions of "historical dislocation," split personalities, distrust, unease,

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY31

and loneliness that the heedless pursuit ofmodernity and "scientific prog-ress" had brought to Japan.42 Would Koreans have experienced similarmental anguish if the Club's patriotic sentiment had found the course itwas seeking? I pose the question but have no answer to offer, as yet.

When patriotism and nationalism become the prime movers ofchange and thus come to exercise the role of a transcendental yardstickfor evaluating ideas and actions, another danger lurks round the corner.Benjamin Schwartz, in his study of the Chinese reformist intellectualYen Fu, has aptly called it the Faustian dimension of statism.43 LikeGoethe's Faust, who sold his soul to Mephistopheles in order to gainaccess to knowledge, power, and immortality, those who keep their focuson patriotism and nationalism, without any vagueness or ambivalence,run the risk of unwittingly distorting the meaning of concepts critical topreserving the integrity of the individual. Thus, as I have described else-where, the Club's patriotic sentiment was so overriding and powerful thatits leaders defended even civil liberties and individual rights from a statistperspective, as indeed did many patriots in both China and Japan.44 Civilliberties, individual rights, women's rights—all became in their reckoningideas worth fighting for not so much because they were sound in them-selves, but because they would strengthen the state. As the experience ofJapan demonstrates, this kind of emphasis ultimately renders the individ-ual's conscience quite precarious and can prove highly inimical to thegrowth and preservation of personal integrity.45 In the Club's sentiment ofpatriotism there existed considerable potential for harm of this nature.

Be that as it may, the Club's intentions were noble and humane. Theflame of patriotism and nationalism that it carried aloft and helped spreadin Korea remained very much alive in subsequent decades, despite cease-less efforts by Japan to extinguish it, and continued to spread even wider.Twentieth century Korean nationalism owes much in this respect to thelegacy of the Independence Club.

NOTES

Author's Note: The author acknowledges with gratitude the help received from theCommittee on Korean Studies of the Social Science Research Council-American Councilof Learned Societies in the preparation of this article. Comments by Michael Robinson,Anthony Namkung, and Dennis McNamara were also very helpful in improving this paperfor publication.

Editor's Note: This article originated as a paper presented at a conference on "TheRoots of Modern Korean Nationalism, 1876-1920," sponsored by the Center for KoreanStudies at the University of California at Berkeley in April of 1984.

1. See, for example, Shin Yong-ha, Tongnip hyöphoe yön'gu (A study of the Indepen-dence Club) (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1976); and Vipan Chandra, "Nationalism and Popular Partici-pation in Government in Late 19th-century Korea: The Contribution of the IndependenceClub," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1977.

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2.For good treatments of patriotism and nationalism see the following works: LouisSnyder, The Meaning of Nationalism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968); Hans Kohn,Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1958); HansKohn, The Idea ofNationalism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961); Elie Kedourie,Nationalism (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1971); Boyd C. Shafer, Faces ofNa-tionalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972); Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Mythand Reality (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955); Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism:Interpreters and Interpretations (Washington, D.C: Service Center for Teachers of History,1959); Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Harper and Row, 1971);and Delmer M. Brown, Nationalism in Japan (New York: Russell and Russell, 1955), espe-cially Chapter I.

3.Tongnip sinmun (hereafter TS), May 11, 1897.4.TS, June 8, 1897. See also the issue of October 21, 1897.5.For rich details on the economic exploitation of Korea by foreigners and the role

played by Korean officials in that exploitation, see Shin Yong-ha, Tongnip hyöphoe yön'gu,pp. 276-331. For what follows I am much indebted to Shin's work, though the results ofmy own research are also included.

6.The Independent, September 3, 1896. See also the Korean Repository (hereafterKR), vol. 111(1896), p. 371.

7.The Independent, August 26, 1897. The Club also sponsored events in the latesummers of 1897 and 1898 celebrating the 505th and 506th anniversaries of the foundingof the Yi dynasty. See TS, August 14, 1897 and September 2, 1898; and The Independent,September 3, 1898. See also Yun's ligi (Diary) vol. V (August 13, 1897), (Seoul: NationalHistory Compilation Committee, 1975), p. 81.

8.Kim To-t'ae, So Chae-p'ilpaksa chasöjön (The Autobiography of Dr. So Chae-p'il)(Seoul: Susönsa, 1948), p. 211.

9.KR, vol. IV (1897), p. 385.10.The Independent, October 5, 1897.11.The Independent, October 5, 1897.12.KR, vol. IV (1897), p. 389; and Kojong sidae-sa, vol. IV (Seoul: National History

Compilation Committee, 1970), pp. 422-428.13.The Independent, August 3, 1897.14.The Independent, September 19, 1896. It is noteworthy here that the present

national anthem of Korea is attributed to Yun Ch'i-ho; see the Korea Times, October 17,1897. Yun is said to have composed the lyric in 1907.

15.See TS, May 9, July 4, 7, 16, and 23, August 1, and September 3, 5, 8, 15, and17, 1896.

16.TS, March 15, 1898.17.TS, April 24, 1897. See also Michael E. Robinson in this volume. For this and

the following section, my debt to Shin Yong-ha is more than any note can acknowledge.18.TS, April 24, 1897. See also the issue of September 5, 1897.19.TS, April 24, 1897.20.TS, April 24, 1897.21.Further details on Chu's work are available in Shin's many publications on the

Club.

22.TS, March 8, 1898. See also The Independent, September 19, 1896. Of the threemen mentioned in the TS editorial, Yi Sun-sin (1545-1598) was the naval general famousfor his exploits against the Japanese during the Hideyoshi invasions of the late sixteenthcentury; Chung-bong is the penname of Cho ?d? (1544-1592), who heroically was martyredwhile leading a Righteous Army [Üibyöng~\ group into battle against the same invaders;and Im Kyöng-öp (1594-1646) was a military figure who earned fame in a number of opera-tions against internal rebellion and external invasions, notably the Manchu invasion of1636. See Han'guk inmyöng taesajön (Encyclopedia of Korean Notables), pp. 664, 775, 905.

23.TS, August 17, 1897. See also Yun's speech at Kojong's birth anniversary, asreported in The Independent and TS of August 25, 1897.

24.TS, June 4, 1896, and The Independent, June 6, 1896. See also KR, vol. 3 (1896),pp. 170-171.

SENTIMENT AND IDEOLOGY33

25.The Independent, June 6, 1896. Also see TS, June 4, 1896.26.The Independent, August 6, 1896. See also the issue of July 13, 1897, for a similar

critique of Confucianism.27.The Independent, September 29, 1896. Foreign envoys lodged a strong protest

with the government against Sin and the book. The book was immediately withdrawn fromthe market and Sin soon tendered his resignation. Min Sang-ho, a charter member of theClub, was appointed acting minister of education. See The Independent, October 3 andOctober 8, 1896. See also Kojong sidae-sa, vol. 4: 275-276; and Homer B. Hulbert, ThePassing of Korea (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1969), p. 154.

28.The Independent, September 19, 1896. See also editorials in TS on July 25, Sep-tember 22, December 26, and December 31, 1896; August 16, 1897; and January 13, April2, and September 19, 1898.

29.See Chöng Kyo, Taehan Kyenyönsa, vol. 2, p. 8; and Shin, Tongnip hyöphoe Hisahoe sasang yön'gu(Seoul: Han'guk munhwa yön'gu-sa, 1973), pp. 93-94. After SinKi-sön'sdeparture, the education ministry did publish a book of its own, with an open and tolerantview of the world and with patriotic content. Meant to be used as a school text, this generalreader, entitled Kungmin söhak tokbon (A Reader in Primary Studies for the People), dealtwith such subjects as "The Land of the Great Chosôn," "The Story of His Majesty Sejong,""The Treaty Powers," "London," "The Life of ülchi Mundok," "[President] Garfield,"and "The Independence of America." See KR, vol. IV (1897), pp. 356-357.

30.The Independent, November 14, 1896.31.The Independent, July 13, 1898.32.For a good discussion of those Japanese who advocated wholesale westernization,

see Kenneth B. PyIe, The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity,1885-1895 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969). For a representative example ofthose Chinese who advocated a rejectionist position toward their own past, see JeromeCh'en, China and the West (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 89.

33.The Independent, August 3, 1897. See also Yun's ligi of February 20, 1898.34.From a champion of "civilization and enlightenment," Fukuzawa, by the mid-

1880s, had become quite a chauvinistic advocate of Japanese expansionism in Korea andChina. See PyIe, The New Generation in Meiji Japan, p. 173. For the jingoism of Saigo andothers, and for the calculated aggressiveness of the Meiji oligarchs, see William Theodorede Bary, Sources of the Japanese Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958),vol. II, chapters 25-27.

35.This attitude was displayed by many Korean reformists—from Kim Ok-kyunand others, to leading officials during and after 1894-95, to those who were active col-laborators with the Japanese between 1905 and 1910, especially the leaders of the Ilchin-hoe.Commenting on this tendency, Yun Ch'i-ho noted in his diary:Long centuries of dependence on China have made Coreans think and feel that Coreacan never be anything but a dependency of some great power. A Corean takes tonational vassalage as naturally as a duck takes to water.

See Yun's ligi, vol. V (1897), p. 114.36.Numerous editorials and comments in the TS and The Independent carried this

theme. For a representative example, see The Independent, January 8, 1898.37.Again both papers frequently expressed this view. They and the Club enthusias-

tically endorsed the idea of sending students to Japan and the West to acquire moderneducation. The Club also initiated a fundraising drive for supporting such students. See TS,January 20 and April 5, 1897; and The Independent, January 14, 1897, and January 13, June21, and June 25, 1898.

38.On this theme see Sö's essay, "What Korea Needs Most," in KR, vol. Ill (1896),pp. 108-110. For further discussion consult the works cited in note 1.

39.Further discussion may be found in the works cited in note 1.40.See PyIe, The New Generation in Meiji Japan, pp. 1-3.41.Ibid.

42.See John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia:The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 539-544.

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43.Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press, 1893), pp. 237-247.

44.See my article, "The Korean Enlightenment: A Reexamination," Korea Journal22, no. 5 (May 1982).

45.On this question see Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japa-nese Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. xi-xvii, 1-24; see also IenagaSaburo, The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese (New York: Pantheon Books,1978), especially chapters 2 and 10.