The PCI to the Government,It Costs What It Costs

The failure of the Italian Communist Party to become a permanent party of government: 1976-1979

Senior Thesis by David LoVermeIn the Department of History at Columbia University

Under the Guidance of Professor Samuel Roberts

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13 April 2009

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my seminar leader Professor Samuel Roberts, and my

subject area advisor Professor Nancy Collins, for their help and guidance over the course

of this process. I would also like to thank Professor Victoria de Grazia whose European

History classes have continually inspired my undergraduate experience.

I owe a great debt to Professor Lorenzo Pubblici of the University of Florence for

introducing me to this topic. He remains one of the most inspiring and talented

professors that I have had the pleasure of taking. His devotion to his students is

unparalleled, and his passion for history is contagious.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their unwavering love and support.

Without them, I would not be the person that I am today.

This work is dedicated to my grandmother, Maria LoVerme, for being a constant

inspiration and never doubting me, even when I have doubted myself.

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Abstract

By 1976, the Italian Communist Party had transformed itself from a small oppositional force, closely tied to the Soviet Union, into a powerful autonomous political party, carrying the banner of the Italian left, and perched on the doorstep of government. Its experience as a weak semi-participant in the new Christian Democrat government, however, ultimately led to the Party’s electoral decline in 1979 and beyond. In examining this period, historians have overemphasized the importance of the kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades as well as the role of the United States and the Soviet Union. Consequently, they have generally overlooked the primacy of the PCI’s loss of oppositional flare, both politically and culturally, as the foremost cause of the PCI’s failures. Furthermore, historians have failed to delve deeply enough into the logic of the Party’s decision to coalesce to the weak Christian Democrat government and a much closer examination is required.

Holding the kidnapping and murder of Christian Democratic President Aldo Moro as the primary cause for the PCI’s decline assumes a loss of support from a sector of the electorate that the Party never enjoyed, and a will to include the Communists that Moro never possessed. Likewise, to attribute the PCI’s decline to the unfavorable manner in which the United States and USSR viewed the Party’s entry into majority government places too much emphasis on international conditions without recognizing the prime importance of domestic politics on voting trends. Therefore, the decline of the PCI derived first and foremost from its failure to maintain its oppositional character, both politically and culturally, in the eyes of voters. By attempting to toe the line between radical and conservative, and occupy the terrain between government and opposition, the Party doomed itself. The PCI isolated its traditional supporters by becoming too moderate, but its relatively weak position frustrated any efforts to gain support from the more moderate elements of society. Finally, the Party found itself unable and unwilling to connect with the new oppositional culture of the youth. Thus, as a result of this loss of oppositional character, the PCI dropped 4% in 1979, beginning a continual decline that would follow it to the end of the Cold War Era.

As a party so historically animated by opposition, the PCI’s choice to risk this attribute on such a weak offer from the Christian Democrats is peculiar. Ultimately, it was the result of the Party’s perceived need for a gradual slide into government through alliance, inspired by the lessons of the Allende coup in Chile; the PCI’s desire to be seen as the party of unity, willing to sacrifice its ego and work in coalition to reinvigorate the nation; and of its concern that the reshuffling of the Socialist Party might lead to a renewed alliance that threatened to negate the forward progress of the Communists.

Ultimately, it is necessary to correct the historical record in recognizing the primacy of the PCI’s loss of oppositional character and to understand the rationale behind the decision, in order to understand the current plight of the Italian Left. Only then can one begin to comprehend the political system that views a center-right government, tainted by corruption, as the inevitable norm. Likewise, it is necessary for the Left to realistically confront its past and recognize the errors of the PCI in order to cease looking backwards and invoking nostalgia, and to begin challenging the political order with something new and innovative.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgments………………………………… 2

Abstract…………………………………………… 3

I. Introduction…………………………………. 5

II. Opposition No More………………………… 10

III. A Fateful Decision…………………………... 27

IV. The Italian Case in the Context of Europe... 39

V. Conclusion…………………………………… 44

Bibliography……………………………………… 47

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I. Introduction

When the Italian Communist Party was kicked out of the Postwar Italian Unity

Coalition, it was a strong but relatively small force, isolated from the government

because of its close ties to the Soviet Union. By 1976, it had broken many of those ties

and become a fairly autonomous and reformed party on the doorstep of government,

advocating non-alignment and carrying one third of the Italian electorate. Given its vast

transformation, the Italian Communist Party, (Partito Comunista Italiana or PCI),

represents one of the most interesting anomalies of the Cold War. Despite its meteoric

rise and substantial westernizing reforms in the late 1970s, and its agreement to a semi-

participation in the weak, center-right government of Christian Democrat Giulio

Andreotti, the PCI failed in its attempt to become a legitimate and lasting component of

the majority government. In examining this failure, historians have overemphasized the

importance of the kidnapping and assassination of prominent Christian Democrat Aldo

Moro by the Marxist terrorist group, the Red Brigades, as well as the role of the United

States and the Soviet Union. Consequently, they have not sufficiently stressed the

primacy of the PCI’s loss of oppositional flare, both politically and culturally, which led

to its electoral decline and the end of any possible entry into government. Additionally,

despite acknowledging the great risk involved in the PCI’s choice to accept such a weak

role in the Andreotti government, historians have failed to devote ample attention to the

reasoning behind this decision, thus a deeper analysis of the Party’s logic is required.

This thesis will argue, therefore, for the primacy of the PCI’s loss of its political and

cultural oppositional in causing its electoral decline from 1979 onward and will provide a

close examination of the party’s decision to coalesce to the Andreotti government.

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Historians of the PCI during this period have most often attributed the Party’s

failure to permanently enter the majority government to one, or a combination, of three

factors. Initially, the most salient argument was that the kidnapping and assassination of

DC President Aldo Moro by the extreme leftist terrorist group the Red Brigades caused a

backlash against all forms of Marxism while killing off the only politician crafty and

creative enough to engineer such a delicate scenario as the “historic compromise.” The

long and intriguing investigation following Moro’s death and the elaborate conspiracy

theories it spawned helped lend credence to this argument. The more actors who were

supposedly involved, ranging from the CIA, to the Christian Democrats, to extremists

from both sides of the political spectrum, helped reinforce and even inflate perceptions of

Moro’s abilities and intentions. Thus, the argument holds, in his assassination, Italy lost

not just a skilled politician, but rather someone that more resembled a political superman.

Given the common perception that Moro was in favor of alliance with the Communists,

his death must necessarily have been a major cause of the PCI’s failure to become a

permanent governing power. Former Communist and current Italian politician Walter

Veltroni sums up this argument particularly succinctly, writing, “The death of Moro also

signaled the end of the politics of the ‘historic compromise’1.”2

Other scholars, while recognizing the tragedy of Aldo Moro’s death, have

nonetheless argued that the failure of the PCI occurred, not as a result of Moro’s death,

but was precipitated rather by the global political climate and the opposition of the United

States and the Soviet Union to any Communist entry into Italy’s majority government.

This view argues that the PCI found optimism in the concept of Détente, hoping that the

1 Enrico Berlinguer, and Veltroni, Walter (ed.) La Sfida Interrotta: Le Idee Di Enrico Berlinguer, Saggi (Baldini & Castoldi); 30. (Milano: Baldini & Castoldi, 1994).2 All translations from Italian are my own, unless quoted from an English language source.

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chilling of tensions would allow for a more-open minded world view that could accept a

reformed Communist party in a Western European nation. This interpretation of Détente,

however, was diametrically opposed to that of the superpowers, which held that a

relaxation of tension was possible only because of an unfaltering status quo. Any

changes to this, under which heading a Communist entry into Italy’s majority

government would certainly fall, were therefore categorically unacceptable. The United

States, still very much dominated by the bipolar mentality of the Cold War, was afraid

that such an action would turn Italy into a full-blooded Marxist republic that might then

infest all of Europe. In contrast, the Soviet Union and other hard-line Communists saw

the “Eurocommunist”3 reforms of the PCI as a betrayal of Marxist-Leninism and felt that

its continued use of the term “Communist” was heretical. Furthermore, it was afraid that

an Italian government including reformed Communists would present a bad example for

its Eastern European satellites, where it had already forcefully put down two popular

uprisings.4

In the 1990s many former Communists championed this view, looking back

nostalgically at the Eurocommunist period as a great opportunity lost, but nonetheless

one that could be learned from.5 Their books idealize Berlinguer and his movement, and

perhaps even mythologize the period, often connecting Berlinguer to such leftist leaders

as German Social Democrat Willy Brandt and French Socialist Francois Mitterand. The

3 Eurocommunism is the term given to the new ideologies adopted by many Western Communist parties in the 1970s. In general, it consisted of democratizing reforms, a belief in the idea of a national road to socialism, autonomy from the Soviet Union, and often times even acceptance of NATO. More specifically however, Eurocommunism was something of a blanket term that lacked full programmatic continuity among its diverse practioners.4 Hungary in 1956 and more recently Czechoslavakia in 19685 For examples of this see Berlinguer, La Sfida Interrotta: Le Idee Di Enrico Berlinguer. and Pietro Folena, I Ragazzi Di Berlinguer: Viaggio Nella Cultura Politica Di Una Generazione, Saggi (Baldini & Castoldi), (Milano: Baldini & Castoldi, 1997). among others.

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writings reflect the efforts of these politicians to seek direction from the past in a new

post-Cold War political system.6 More recently, Italian scholar Silvio Pons has also

championed this view but from a different angle. His work casts a critical glance on

much of the previous scholarship and calls for a factual revision of the work done on the

subject that transcends politics and is committed instead to sifting the truth from the

mythology, specifically in regards to the treatment of Enrico Berlinguer.7 Pons, while

bestowing due praise upon Berlinguer, nonetheless points out the innate contradictions in

the idea of Eurocommunism that rendered the program itself too ambiguous to succeed.

The third group of thought, into which I place myself, argues that the Party’s loss

of support was the direct result of its loss of oppositional flare. The PCI had always been

a party of opposition, and indeed gained a great deal of credibility from its role in the

antifascist resistance. Therefore, the Party’s image changed drastically when it entered, if

only in small part, into the Christian Democrat led coalition. While the Party had little

power over the government, its agreement to abstain from a vote of no confidence

implied its tacit consent in the eyes of many Italians. Additionally, on the occasions

when the Party was afforded some sway in political policy, it failed to strongly champion

many historically leftist issues such as individual liberties in the face of increased

antiterrorism legislation. It did, however, accept seats on the directing board of Italy’s

first television station RAI 1 as well as other posts. Thus, the Party alienated many of its

supporters, losing 4% of its votes in 1979, mostly to the Radical Party, which strongly

advocated for many of the traditional issues ignored by the PCI in the prior three years.8

6 Silvio Pons, "Berlinguer E La Fine Del Comunismo," (Torino: G. Einaudi, 2006). p. xiii7 Ibid.8 Grant Amyot, The Italian Communist Party: The Crisis of the Popular Front Strategy (London: Croom Helm, 1981). p. 222

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Most scholars making this argument, however, have generally placed it within a

list of other reasons, including the aforementioned Moro and Superpower arguments,

sometimes even subjugating it to them. Likewise, they have failed to provide real insight

as to why the Party agreed to enter into such a weak coalition.9 Historian Stephen Gundle

of the University of London presents a modified version of this argument in a recent

work. He argues that, even more so than in the political realm, the PCI’s inability to

connect culturally with the youth and the new oppositional forces doomed it to

governmental failure and decline.10

In this thesis then, I will first present my case for the primacy of the Loss of

Oppositional Character argument, deconstructing the Moro and Superpower arguments

before presenting my interpretation of the Loss of Opposition argument. Next, I will

examine the Party’s decision to support the Andreotti government, starting with

Berlinguer’s initial plans for a compromise in 1973, and continuing through the 1976

electoral campaign, as well as the post election negotiations. Finally, I will briefly

examine the Communist parties in other western European countries in order to provide

context for the Italian case, before ultimately concluding with a discussion of the ongoing

significance of the issue.

9 See for example John A. Baker, Italian Communism: The Road to Legitimacy and Autonomy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989).10 Stephen Gundle, Between Hollywood and Moscow: The Italian Communists and the Challenge of Mass Culture, 1943-1991, American Encounters/Global Interactions (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000).

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II. Opposition No More

In understanding the failure of the Italian Communists to enter permanently into the

majority government, the 1979 national elections are critical. While the PCI election

results in 1979 were down only 4% from its 1976 totals, the vote marked a monumental

change in the course of Italian politics and ended any chance of continued electoral gains

for the Communists and hopes of further entry into government. Since the end of the

Second World War, the PCI had continually gained percentage points in each national

election. Over the years, even as the Party evolved, shifting it views toward an

acceptance of non-alignment, NATO, and even the Christian Democrats, (Democrazia

Cristiana or DC), its steady electoral climb continued unhindered. By 1976, with 34.4%

of the total vote, the Party was more suited for government than ever before, both

electorally and politically, in large part due to its democratic reforms. Likewise, the

upward trend only promised to continue, as the Party consistently garnered a higher

percentage of the youth vote than it did among the general population. This created a

myth of inevitability that suggested the Party could only increase its totals as older voters

died off, passing the mantle to a new, more Communist-friendly, generation. In the 1979

elections, however, the PCI’s percentage of the youth vote fell to less than that of the

general population, thus shattering the myth of inevitability.11 Therefore, while the

Communists at the time were still hopeful for their future prospects, their failure to

successfully insert themselves in the majority government in the period between 1976

and 1979 effectively closed the book on substantial future growth and governmental

participation.

11 R. N. Gardner, Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005). p. 223

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Figure 2: Italian Electoral Results in National Elections by Party (in percent)

Party 1946 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979

DC 35.2 48.5 40.1 42.3 38.3 39.1 38.8 38.7 38.3

PCI 18.9 31.012 22.6 22.7 25.3 26.9 27.2 34.4 30.4

PSI 20.7 12.7 14.2 13.8 14.513 9.6 9.6 9.8

PSDI — 7.1 4.5 4.5 6.1 5.1 3.4 3.8

Others 25.2 13.4 20.1 16.3 16.5 19.0 19.3 13.9 17.7

DC=Christian Democratic Party, PCI=Italian Communist Party, PSI=Italian Socialist Party, PSDI=Italian Social Democratic Party

Table demonstrates Italian Voting Patterns and the PCI's consistent rise before declining in 197914

While I argue that the PCI’s loss of oppositional character in the eyes of the

electorate, more than any other reason, led to the results of 1979 and the decline of the

Party, many historians have failed to emphasize this primacy, putting it on the same level,

or even subjugating it to other causes. In the case of the Aldo Moro theory, they argue

first that his kidnapping and death at the hands of the Red Brigades turned the country

against all forms of Marxism, and second, that it simultaneously robbed the country of

the only politician who had both the desire and political savvy to engineer a lasting

coalition.

While Moro was both beloved and tremendously important, this argument

overemphasizes his influence on the fate of the Communists and their attempts at

12 In the 1948 elections the PCI and PSI presented themselves as a coalition party and therefore the chart represents their combined total for that year.13 In the 1968 elections, the PSI and PSDI presented themselves as a coalition party and therefore the chart represents their combined total for that year.14 Gardner, Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War. p. 21

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government. Certainly the actions of the Red Brigades concerning Aldo Moro and others

horrified the Italian people, including those with leftward sympathies, however the PCI

was extremely vocal in its condemnation of the group. The Party even opposed repeal of

the 1975 Reale law, which allowed for a great extension of police powers, ostensibly to

combat terrorism, which nonetheless contradicted previous Party positions on individual

liberties.15 Those who were unconvinced of the distinct differences between the PCI and

the Red Brigades and who felt that the terrorist actions were in any way indicative of the

Party’s desires are unlikely to have been among the Party’s supporters in 1976, and

therefore would not have represented a great loss in 1979. Likewise, the majority of

those voters who abandoned the PCI in the 1979 elections actually shifted leftward to the

Radical Party, which increased almost 2.5%, while the majority of the other parties, not

including the Communists, remained relatively static respective to their 1976 totals.16

Additionally, while Aldo Moro was quite likely the most talented and savvy

politician in Italy at the time, and perhaps the only one capable of engineering a lasting

DC-PCI coalition, it is unclear that he favored this outcome and indeed evidence suggests

that he did not. Furthermore, it is likely that Moro was actively working to stall the PCI

advance. In his book, Mission Italy, Richard Gardner, President Carter’s ambassador to

Italy, describes his first meeting with Moro on April 14, 1977. He writes, “Moro

categorically excluded the possibility that the DC would accept a political alliance with

the PCI.”17 Gardner also describes another meeting with Moro, on February 2, 1978, less

than two months before his abduction and murder. The ambassador writes that, even as

Moro was making the case for further inclusion of the Communists, he was simply trying

15 Amyot, The Italian Communist Party: The Crisis of the Popular Front Strategy. p. 22216 Baker, Italian Communism: The Road to Legitimacy and Autonomy. p. 317 Gardner, Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War. p. 74

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to buy time, predicting an electoral shift away from the PCI in as little as a year’s time. It

was, however, important to rein in the government and curb the chaos in the country.

Thus, for this reason, Moro wanted to cautiously bring the PCI into the majority

government, while effectively still keeping them out of any positions of true power, most

notably the cabinet.18 Therefore, Moro’s kidnapping and assassination, while unarguably

of great importance to Italy and its political landscape in general, was nonetheless not the

primary reason for the Communists’ failure to match or improve their electoral gains and

succeed in carving a permanent place in Italy’s majority government, as many scholars

have argued.

The Superpowers argument, while carrying more weight than the Moro argument,

has weaknesses as well, and should certainly not be given equal or greater credence than

the Loss of Opposition argument. In the case of the United States, there can be no

disputing the fact that neither the Ford nor the Carter administrations wanted to see the

Communists enter the government. Indeed, Ambassador Gardner writes of specific

meetings with top DC leaders, including Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti during which

he told the Prime Minister, “Should the PCI role in government increase, it would

obviously have a substantial impact on our bilateral relations. This would be a sad and

regrettable development and would be to the long-term disadvantage of both countries.”19

However, as I have argued above, it was the results of the 1979 national elections that

ultimately doomed the Communists to a continued life of opposition and dwindling

electoral support. Therefore, outside pressures were only as important as the effect they

produced on the voting public.

18 Ibid. p. 15919 Ibid. p. 128

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Despite its continued attempts to appear firm and clear, most Italians viewed the

Carter Administration, with its new doctrine of “neither interference, nor indifference”, as

ambiguous at best on the issue of Communist participation in government. Even before

he was elected president, Il Corriere della Sera, one of Italy’s leading newspapers,

published an article entitled, “Carter: ‘It wouldn’t be a catastrophe if the PCI were a part

of the government’.”20 Weak and confused wording in Carter’s early policy statements

only served to further this impression, as did incendiary articles such as one published in

the Washington Post, on March 31, 1977, that accused Ambassador Gardner of having

made a “Pro-Communist speech”. The article set off a firestorm in the Italian press,

which the ambassador spent the majority of his first two years attempting to rectify, with

limited success.21 Thus, among the general population, few Italians had a clear idea of

America’s position on PCI participation in the government. It is unlikely therefore, that

they voted based on the possible international outcomes of the Italian election, but rather

on more immediate domestic issues. It is on the basis of these issues that the PCI

disappointed its supporters.

In the case of the Soviet Union, it is certainly true that the Socialist superpower

did not want the PCI to enter into any government outside the Marxist-Leninist model,

but it is less clear that this desire had any adverse effects upon Italian voters. The Soviet

Union was afraid that a reformed Communist party operating collaboratively with a

bourgeois capitalist party, in a NATO government, would provide a bad example for its

Eastern European satellites. While this break with the Soviets caused some heated debate

within the leadership of the PCI, it was decidedly less contentious among the general

20 "Carter: It Wouldn't Be a Catastrophe If the Pci Were a Part of the Government," Corriere della Sera, 15 July 1976.21 ———, Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War. p. 63-64

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population. Indeed, if anything, the disapproval of the Soviet Union might even have

helped the Party.

One of the main means through which the PCI attempted to legitimate itself as a

viable governing party was by asserting its autonomy from the Soviet Union, even going

as far as to criticize certain Soviet actions and policies. In a conference of Communist

parties in Berlin during the closing days of June 1976, Berlinguer addressed the audience,

claiming that it was not a gathering of some fictitious bound organism, but rather, “a free

meeting between autonomous and equal parties that would not determine orders or

directives for anyone.” He went on to refute any pretext of Soviet hegemony and

reasserted the PCI’s right to criticize as it saw fit.22 Ugo La Malfa, president of the small

but influential Italian Republican Party and long time critic of the Communist Party,

nonetheless supported the idea of a PCI entry into majority government. In an April 1978

article in Foreign Affairs, La Malfa praised the Party for its democratic reforms and

Berlinguer in particular for his courage in boldly stating his ideological differences with

the Soviet Union, even in Moscow during the celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the

October Revolution.23 For La Malfa then, like a great many other Italians, differences

with Moscow, far from being a concern, actually increased support for the PCI. Thus,

while the Soviet Union’s antipathy for a PCI entry into the majority government helped

to create unfavorable international conditions for the PCI, its effect on the electorate was

minimal and even, in some cases, positive for the Communists.

22 "Berlinguer Explains Eurocommunism with Some Points of Divergence Concerning the Soviet Union," Corriere della Sera, 1 July 1976.23 U. La Malfa, "Communism and Democracy in Italy," Foreign Affairs 56 (1977).

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As I have argued above, it was the electoral drop in 1979 that doomed the

Communist Party, and therefore one must understand the Party’s failure to satisfy and

appeal to its voters in order understand its failure to become a permanent figure in the

majority government. Given voting trends, the

Party believed whole-heartedly in the myth of

inevitability. It was confident in its readiness to

take the next step into government, and that its vote

totals would only continue to rise in subsequent

elections. The PCI demonstrated this attitude

clearly with a political cartoon it published just after

the 1976 elections in Rinascita, its weekly

intellectual magazine. The cartoon, by Vannini,

shows an increasingly worried old man,

representing the DC, attempting to keep away a

constantly enlarging hammer and sickle, with rainy

weather representing the 1972 elections, and a

sunrise representing 1976.24

While all evidence did point to generally increasing voting trends, since its forced

removal from the postwar “National Unity Coalition” in 1948, the Communist Party had

always been animated by its spirit of opposition. For many Italians, this was exactly the

reason for the Party’s appeal. Indeed, the PCI underwent so many changes and reforms

over the course of the years leading up to 1976, that its oppositional role was one of the

Party’s few constant elements. Over the years, the PCI played that role with great

24 Vannini, "L'Italia Del 20 Giugno," Rinascita, 25 June 1976.

- Political Cartoon by Vannini, from Rinascita, 25 June 1976

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effectiveness, providing needed criticism and leading the charge for individual and

workers’ rights, as well as honesty and exposure of corruption in government. While

Italians were often hesitant and sometimes even afraid to vote for the Communist Party,

(a fear that the DC manipulated at election time), most nonetheless appreciated the

oppositional role of the Communists, and even admired them for it.

The Christian Democrats, in contrast, despite being constantly reelected as the

majority government, were known better for their corruption and clientelism. Those

parties that allied with the DC often became aggravated and saw their efforts frustrated

by the entrenched system of the incumbent party, as was the case with the socialists in the

1960s and the Italian Republican Party in the early 1970s. Indeed, the reputation of the

DC was so bad that many parties, not just the PCI, played on the stereotype in their

campaigns during the lead-up to the 1976 elections. The Italian Liberal Party ran an

advertisement in Il Corriere della Sera, which stated simply, in boldface type, “You will

vote liberal. Because Italy has no need for Communists. (And how can anyone bring

themselves to vote for the DC?)”25 The level of disgust with government, and the

Christian Democrats in particular, was astronomical. Mixed with the country’s economic

crisis, this antipathy for those in power rendered playing any role in government far from

desirable, but at the same time cracked the door of government for a possible PCI entry.

However, if the Communists had any hope of successfully straying from their historical

position of opposition to one more closely linked to the government, they would have to

overcome a steady prejudice against parties in power in addition to the current

anticommunist prejudice that they already suffered.

25 "Tu Voterai Liberale," Corriere della Sera, 1 June 1976.

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In the period leading up to the 1976 elections, the PCI, foreseeing a strong

showing, but realizing realistically that they were unlikely to overtake the DC, proposed

an emergency government of unity, in which they would ally with the Christian

Democrats. However, they presented themselves as the force that would take the lead in

cleaning up politics and rescuing the country from its crisis. In a June 1975 interview

with Time Magazine, Party Secretary Enrico Berlinguer set the tone for what the people

should expect from the PCI when in government:

In the first place, on an internal policy level there would be important social reforms such as housing, schools, health, city planning, for example…we would promote the moral cleansing of Italian political, social and judicial life…There is a tie between common crime and political disorder, and until such a time as we eliminate corruption—particularly at the top—we cannot expect major changes at the level of crime in the streets.26

During the campaign, the party distributed numerous pamphlets explaining its proposals

and detailed solutions to very specific problems including the plight of fisherman and

women’s rights.27 This tactic helped prove the sincerity of the Party’s assertion that it

sought to represent the interests of everyone, but it also set high expectations for the Party

that would be difficult to meet, especially in a government it did not lead.

As the dust settled from the 1976 elections and all the political maneuvering that

followed, the government that emerged, led by Christian Democrat Giulio Andreotti, was

nothing less than bizarre. Called a government of “no non-confidence,” Andreotti’s

power rested on an agreement by the Communists and Socialists to abstain from any vote

of confidence, thus keeping the government on shaky ground but standing nonetheless.

While the PCI was not technically a part of the majority government, its agreement to

abstain meant that it was no longer truly in the opposition either. Indeed, the

26 "Berlinguer: 'We Are Not in a Hurry'," Time Magazine, 30 June 1975.27 "Don Enrico Bids for Power," Time Magazine, 14 June 1976.

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appointment of Communist Pietro Ingrao to the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies

and the Party’s decision not to vote against the DC government implied a tacit consent to

the majority and, by extension, to its actions. The DC asked the PCI to curb union

requests for salary increases and other demands, as it held considerable sway with the

labor movement, under the pretext that these limitations were absolutely necessary to free

Italy from its economic crisis, and that the changes would be only temporary. The

Christian Democrats, however, made few concessions in return for the efforts of the

Communists. Many of the PCI’s proposed reforms were contrary to the longstanding

clientelism of the DC and the ruling party therefore failed to implement them, in some

cases for lack of desire, and in others because the system was so entrenched that it was

literally impossible to change without complete political turnover.28 As a result, those

believing in the reforms promised by the PCI were frustrated and lost faith in the Party

that, if not directly responsible for the stalled reform effort, had at least lost its voice of

protest which had been heard so loudly over the past thirty years.

Like the people themselves, the Communist Party was also frustrated by the lack

of effort and ability on the part of the DC to make good on promised reforms. Even as

Berlinguer continued to urge patience among the workers that he was continually asking

to forgo pay increases or even suffer wage cuts, the Communist secretary realized the

volatile nature of the situation and the potential damage that it could inflict upon his

party. Knowing that the Christian Democrats relied on a continued Communist

abstention to remain in power, he attempted to press the issue, outlining a plan for

“Austerity,” in which he called on all strata of Italian society to equally share the burden

of rescuing the country from economic crisis rather than the totality of its weight falling

28 Amyot, The Italian Communist Party: The Crisis of the Popular Front Strategy. p. 221

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squarely upon the shoulders of the working class. Berlinguer argued that this would

represent a true reshuffling and reversal of the status quo. In his concluding remarks to a

gathering of intellectuals in Rome in January of 1977, Berlinguer told the crowd,

“Austerity means rigor, efficiency, seriousness, and it means justice; that is to say it is the

opposite of all that which we have known until now, and that has brought us to this grave

crisis.”29 Furthermore, he argued that the plan would not be merely a stop gap measure,

but would represent a fundamental reform of the current system that would not just divide

the burden of the crisis, but eventually elevate the workers and close the vast gap of

inequity. He went on to assure the crowd of the permanence of his plan saying that it

represented, “A new economic and social development, for a rigorous healing of the

state, for a profound transformation of the organization of society, for the defense and

expansion of democracy: in a word, as a means of justice and liberation of man and of all

his energies that are today mortified, dispersed, and wasted.”30 Like the Party’s campaign

promises of reform however, Berlinguer was unable to coerce the Christian Democrats

into instituting his program, even when they surrendered more (though still relatively

little) power to the PCI in mid 1978 in exchange for its direct support. Thus, in the eyes

of the electorate, Austerity became just one more of the PCI’s failed promises.

As with its tacit consent to the DC, even in the face of its failure to institute

reforms, the PCI also suffered a loss of face in its support for antiterrorist measures.

With the Red Brigades, carrying out bombings, kidnappings, and even murders on an

almost daily basis, certainly there was little sympathy for the terrorists. Additionally, the

PCI’s strong stance against the Red Brigades and full cooperation in investigations, while

29 Berlinguer, La Sfida Interrotta: Le Idee Di Enrico Berlinguer. p. 10330 Ibid. p. 104

LoVerme 22

necessary to emphasize the distinct difference between its brand of Marxism and the

overtly violent brand of the terrorists, in doing so sometimes gave up too much of its

traditional values. The Party failed to support the abolition of the Reale law of 1975,

which vastly expanded the power of the police force, who had the reputation of abusing

their power. Additionally, the law raised the severity of penalties for a number of crimes.

Traditionally, this would have been the kind of law that the PCI would have fought

against because of its risks to the common people. Instead however, the Radical Party, a

small but increasingly popular progressive force led the charge against the act, ostensibly

taking the mantle of the people’s opposition that the PCI had abandoned, collecting over

500,000 signatures to hold a national referendum on its repeal.31 Thus, in the eyes of

many Italians, especially those with more left leaning inclinations, the PCI was no longer

the party of true reform and radical change, but was quickly becoming just another

governing party, typical of Italian politics in its ineffectiveness.

31 Amyot, The Italian Communist Party: The Crisis of the Popular Front Strategy. p. 222

LoVerme 23

- "The Metal Mechanics of Rome" Forattini, 4 December 1977. This political cartoon shows Enrico

Berlinguer who, despite his Communist newspaper and portrait of Karl Marx, has lost all his radical

character and is instead drinking tea in a robe and slippers like the bourgeoisie.32

As in the political realm, despite its previous success in identifying itself with the

most progressive cultural movements, as a party of government, the PCI found the new

opposition culture less and less accessible. While the Party counted many of the

country’s leading artists and intellectuals among its ranks, such as filmmaker Pier Paolo

Pasolini and renowned novelist Alberto Moravia, its links with the dominant cultural

movement, that of the youth, were weak and disappearing. From 1968 on, the character

of the cultural opposition of the youth changed drastically. While student revolutionaries

still generally considered themselves as creatures of the left and counted the workers as

their allies, the problems of this new generation were not that of equal wages and

32 Forattini, "I Metalmeccanici Di Roma," in Gardner Papers (New York: Columbia Law School Library, 1977).

LoVerme 24

suppression of the lower classes, but rather suppression of the individual. Like in the

United States, most were the children of relatively wealthy families. They were the

champions of the now familiar slogan, “The personal IS political,”33 and they fought

against what they saw as retrograde attitudes on divorce, abortion, sex, feminism and free

expression. As a party based on the idea of the struggle of the collective whole and

whose views on sexual relations did not at all match those of the “free love” movement,

the PCI could not, and in some cases, did not desire to relate to this new movement.

Many Party members either believed the issues would all eventually fall under the banner

of the general proletarian struggle or simply disagreed with them entirely.34

Indeed, the PCI also failed to meet the cultural demands of the new movement in

its actions toward reforming RAI-1, Italy’s first state controlled television network.

Many on the left, including the youth movement, were frustrated by the highly political

nature of the channel and the great biases it showed. Additionally, activists felt that the

channel portrayed a distorted view of Italian life that did not resemble, in any shape or

form, the changing nature of Italian Society. While the Communists initially took up the

banner of those fighting for drastic reform to eliminate advertising and make the channel

more educational, it stopped far short of the mark, leaving many disappointed. Instead,

the Party accepted only mild reforms in return for a few seats on the Council of

Administration, which was, nonetheless, still dominated by Christian Democrats and

Socialists.35 Thus, the Party only reinforced its image of being entrenched in the

33 Paolo Tonini and Arengario bibliographic study, Dopo, Marx, Aprile: Libri E Documenti Del Movimento '77, Giugno '76-Maggio '78 (Gussago: Edizioni dell'Arengario, 2007). p. 7134 Gundle, Between Hollywood and Moscow: The Italian Communists and the Challenge of Mass Culture, 1943-1991. p. 14635 Ibid. p. 152

LoVerme 25

government and valuing political influence, or even the illusion thereof, above genuine

efforts at reform.

The PCI’s most grievous failure in the eyes of the cultural opposition, however,

was its response to the struggles of the university students. In addition to the students

being the main champions of the new value system, the institution of the university itself

was generally in danger. In December of 1976, DC Minister of Education Franco

Malfatti proposed restricting university entry, which until then had been free and open to

anyone.36 Ostensibly, the proposal was designed to better the quality of education and

encourage the students to take a more serious attitude toward their studies. Instead,

however, the proposal sparked widespread protest and occupations of universities across

Italy. The protests were especially strong in Bologna, a relatively small city in central

Italy dominated by one of the oldest universities in Europe. Despite having historically

received the support of university students, the Communist Party was not particularly

sympathetic to them, believing the institution to emphasize hierarchical class divisions,

and resenting the refusal of many students to do manual labor, even as they protested

their unemployment.37 In light of the PCI’s attitude toward the universities, as well as its

other perceived failures, the protests quickly expanded their scope, becoming both a

vehicle for furthering the new culture of the youth and for chastising the Communist

Party for its failures and willingness to compromise in exchange for political kickbacks.

36 Ibid. p. 16037 Ibid. p. 161

LoVerme 26

As the protests and the government response became more and more violent, the

PCI continued to alienate itself in the eyes of the youth. The Party stood by as police

forces brutally suppressed protestors, and even, at times, supported such violent measures

more vehemently than the Christian Democrats. Protest and violent confrontation had

become so much the norm at universities across Italy that one artist created a political

cartoon depicting the “new curriculum” of the University of Rome in September of 1977.

Among other subjects, the illustration

represented applied physics by a police officer

assaulting a student with a nightstick, and

geology by students hurling stones from

behind a barricade.38 Rather than recognize

the legitimacy of the protests, the PCI, which

had supported so many strikes and

occupations in the past, condemned the

students, going as far as to label them

“fascists” in its daily newspaper, L’Unità.39

While the Party’s hard stance against the

student protests helped to reinforce its anti-

terror credentials and its devotion to

maintaining order amidst the chaos of Italian

society, it also cost the PCI its reputation as the friend of social movements, as well as a

crucial component of its electorate.

38 Tonini, Dopo, Marx, Aprile: Libri E Documenti Del Movimento '77, Giugno '76-Maggio '78. p. 6339 Amyot, The Italian Communist Party: The Crisis of the Popular Front Strategy. p. 224

- University of Rome, September 1977

LoVerme 27

Thus, it was the PCI’s loss of oppositional character, both politically and

culturally, in entering into such a weak coalition with the Christian Democrats, that cost

the Communists crucial votes in the 1979 election, and with them any chance of

permanent government inclusion. It supported unpopular measures without significant

power to execute its own agenda. The Party tried to present itself as being

simultaneously revolutionary and conservative, ultimately devoted to a radical

transformation of society, but one achieved through non-radical means. While some

Italians appreciated Berlinguer’s complex arguments and attempts at explaining the plan,

the majority saw the PCI, during the period from 1976-1979, as oxymoronic. It

simultaneously failed to convince radicals of its revolutionary nature and conservatives of

its moderate reforms, prompting doubt, and even disdain, from both camps. Italian

Republican Party president, Ugo la Malfa, ironically a believer in the reformed nature of

the Communist party and a supporter of its inclusion in government, was nonetheless

prophetic when he wrote in an article in Foreign Affairs, “In present circumstances the

Communists can only be, as it were, put on trial for their alleged intentions.”40 In the

Party’s attempt to prove its intentions to the center-right of Italian society, the PCI

indicted itself in the eyes of the Left, which subsequently passed its judgment in the

elections of 1979, sentencing the Party to a life of dwindling electoral support outside the

majority.

40 La Malfa, "Communism and Democracy in Italy."

LoVerme 28

- "We must be revolutionary and conservative." Forattini, 28 February 1978. Cartoon shows Berlinguer representing the paradox of the PCI's philosophy41

III. A Fateful Decision

Certainly, the PCI had much to gain should its foray into government have been

successful, and one should not expect the clarity of hindsight in the decisions of the past.

At the same time, however, for a party fully conscious of the importance of opposition

and resistance to its success, it is perplexing that the PCI would risk this tradition for

something as ambiguous as a government of “no non-confidence.” Indeed, on July 11,

1976, three weeks after the election, but two weeks before the PCI finally agreed to

41 Forattini, "Dobbiamo Essere Rivoluzionari E Conservatori," in Gardner Papers (New York: Columbia Law School Library, 1978).

LoVerme 29

abstain, L’Unità published an article entitled “It is now that the DC should lay down its

power arrogance”. The article called the Christian Democrats’ proposal for government,

in which the PCI should continue to be in the opposition, but simultaneously not act in an

oppositional manner, arrogant and categorically absurd. In a line directed towards those

DC politicians who doubted the democratic reforms of the Communist Party, the article

went on to comment, “Certainly this would not enter into the canon of a traditional

parliamentary democracy.”42 Party member Claudio Napoleoni made this point even

more clear when Rinascita quoted him in a July 2, 1976 article asking, “But for what

reasons must the PCI commit the folly of assuming the responsibility of government line

without being able to participate in its construction?”43 What then caused the Party to

change its mind and accept this basic formulation only a few weeks later, despite its

obvious risks?

Indeed, this is a question that historians have generally failed to analyze

sufficiently. In his book, The Italian Communist Party, Grant Amyot writes, “The

situation following the election of 20 June 1976 presented both opportunities and risks

for the PCI.”44 He elaborates on these for the better part of the next two pages, but,

nonetheless, he never enunciates what made the party value the opportunities over the

risks. John A. Baker, in his similarly titled work, Italian Communism, offers a more

precise explanation, arguing that the objective of the Party was not the modest political

rewards it received in support for its abstention, but rather it was, “To move beyond this

preliminary stage at an appropriate time to full participation in the government, with a

42 Emanuele Macaluso, "It Is Now That the Dc Should Lay Down Its Power Arrogance," L'Unità, 11 July 1976.43 Aniello Coppola, "Il Rapporto Col Pci," Rinascita, 2 July 1976.44 Amyot, The Italian Communist Party: The Crisis of the Popular Front Strategy. p. 212

LoVerme 30

more advanced ‘historic compromise’ program.”45 While this view, shared by many

historians, offers a clearer response than that of Amyot, given the obviously risks, it fails

to adequately explain why the party decided that such a weak and ambiguous formulation

represented enough of a preliminary stage from which to begin. For this reason, a deeper

inquiry is required.

While the PCI did not make its formal decision to abstain until August 4, 1976,

and evidence suggests that it was not until early July of the same year that it even began

to seriously consider abstention as a viable option, the decision nonetheless traces it roots

all the way back to Chilean coup of 1973. As a Socialist president who came to power

legally through electoral means in a traditionally Western country, Chile’s Salvador

Allende was a symbol of pride and hope for Italian Communists. However, his removal

and murder by right extremists, through extralegal means with the suspected (and later

proven) aid of the CIA, was both disillusioning, but also instructive for Italian

Communists. It warned the Party that a mere electoral victory, although encouraging, did

not represent an unobstructed path to power.

After the coup, in the fall of 1973, Berlinguer published a lengthy article in

Rinascita, entitled “Reflections after the fact of Chile”, in which he presented his

interpretation of the events and prescribed a plan of action for Italy to avoid such a fate

should the Communists gain an electoral majority. According to him, the problem in

Chile was that the new government, even though it had achieved an electoral victory, did

not enjoy enough popular support to act as an effective buffer against the ultra-right

reactionary elements, who were then able to act extra-legally without enough popular

outrage to quell their actions. According to Berlinguer then, in its first foray into

45 Baker, Italian Communism: The Road to Legitimacy and Autonomy. p. 101

LoVerme 31

government, the PCI would need to create a much broader consensus, so as to completely

alienate the far right and render their influence minimal. In outlining this theory, he

wrote,

Our essential work—and it is a work that can be accomplished—is therefore to organize around a strong program for the democratic healing and renewal of the whole society and of the State, the grand majority of the people, and to correspond to the program and the majority a rallying of the political forces capable of realizing it. Only this line and no other can isolate and overcome the conservative and reactionary groups, can give solid democracy and invisible force, can advance the transformation of society.46

This could not be accomplished by a quick 51% “left alternative”, but rather must take

the form of slow slide into government and, “a ‘democratic alternative, that is of the

political prospective of collaboration and an alliance with the popular forces of

Communist and Socialist inspiration with the popular forces of Catholic inspiration, and

furthermore with groups of other democratic orientations.”47 Thus, Berlinguer

introduced, for the first time, his proposal of a “Historic Compromise” in the form of a

coalition with the Christian Democrats. Foreshadowing the decision to abstain that the

PCI would make in 1976, he acknowledged that the Party should not rush into anything,

but also cautioned, “We need not think that the time for this is indefinite.”48

Anticipating the objections of the Party’s hard-liners, Berlinguer also sought to

justify his new approach in the global history of Communism. He argued that this new

model was not a betrayal of Marxist-Leninism, but rather followed in Lenin’s footsteps,

arguing that the founder of Soviet Communism provided the example that one must

sometimes compromise to move forward. “The object of a revolutionary force,” he

46 Rodolfo Mechini (ed.), I Comunisti Italiani E Il Cile. A Cura Di Rodolfo Mechini, Punto; 96. (Roma: Editori riuniti, 1973). p. 1947 Ibid. p. 3748 Ibid. p. 43

LoVerme 32

wrote, “is animated always by the vision of the possible.”49 Berlinguer also received

support in his justification from long time party member Gian Carlo Pajetta, who wrote in

L’Unità that no one was talking about a synthesis of values with the DC, only a political

alliance for the good of the country. “It is no secret to anyone,” he asserted, “that popular

unity has never represented a compact political bloc without any divergences and

differences.”50 Thus, the two sought to justify the new strategy by presenting it as both

necessary, but also consistent with the goals of both national and international socialism.

By the elections of 1976, the far right had significantly weakened in Italy and the

probable election of Jimmy Carter in the United States suggested greater international

tolerance for a PCI entry into government, nonetheless, the fears underlying Berlinguer’s

proposal remained in his and the party’s mind. Certainly, as they made the final decision

to abstain despite having not been offered a single cabinet position, Berlinguer’s warning,

“We need not think that the time for this is indefinite,” was resonating in the minds of the

Party’s leaders.

Once it had adopted this new policy of a “Historic Compromise” with the DC, the

PCI, despite remaining in the opposition for the next three years, never stopped espousing

its necessity. In the 1976 campaign season, the proposal took the form of an emergency

unity government, which, the Communists argued, was the only way to rescue Italy from

its crisis. The Party claimed that the sharply divisive system, which pitted roughly half

the country against the other half, was broken and indeed had not truly worked in its

entire thirty year existence. Instead, the PCI invoked nostalgia for the immediate post-

war period in which Italy was governed by a coalition of unity that included all of Italy’s

49 Ibid. p. 2750 Ibid. p. 54

LoVerme 33

parties, excluding of course the fascists. This, the PCI argued, should be the model for

going forward, rather than a model of corruption and anticommunist bias that had brought

about the crisis that the country was suffering. On June 2, 1976, Party member Gerardo

Chiaromonte made this case in an article in L’Unità, entitled “In popular and democratic

unity, the foundation and the power of the Republic”:

Thirty years ago, June 2, 1946, the Italian people conquered the republic and elected an Assembly that would expand with higher political, cultural and idealistic dedication and with a profoundly unitary inspiration, the Constitution. We’re talking about, as Togliatti wrote in those days, ‘A decisive forward movement on the path of political progress’ of the working class and of the whole Italian people…It was the victory of democratic unity, that had been formed to save the nation and reconstruct the country.51

If democratic unity could save the nation from the decimation wreaked upon it by the

Second World War, surely a return to such unity could rescue the country from its current

economic and terrorist woes.

While the Christian Democrats campaigned on a doomsday platform of fear, the

Communists continued to push their Emergency Unity proposal, painting themselves as

the party with the knowledge, ability, and sense of duty to accomplish it. The DC warned

voters that casting their ballot for the Communists could represent their last vote ever.

While the PCI certainly criticized the Christian Democrats and their outdated ideas, it

nonetheless maintained the necessity of keeping them a part of the government. In a

speech in Rome, Berlinguer challenged the proposition of any government without the

DC, saying, “There are those who say, ‘Unity yes, but against the DC’, believing

themselves with these remarks to be more revolutionary or advanced than we are:

however they make a woeful error, or if they say so in good faith, then they mislead

51 Gerardo Chiaromonte, "In Popular and Democratic Unity, the Foundation and the Power of the Republic," L'Unità, 2 June 1976.

LoVerme 34

themselves and others.”52 The Party positioned itself as the more mature and capable

political force that was ready to sacrifice its own ego for the good of the country.

This contrast in attitudes was also readily apparent in the campaign literature that

each party distributed. PCI advertisements were detailed and instructive, taking a

specific issue such as the plight of Italian farmers and explaining, step-by-step, the DC’s

failures and the new Communist plans to remedy those failures.53 The Party also released

pamphlets on how to vote with a detailed checklist of actions to ensure that the vote

would be cast properly and without problems.54 In contrast, the Christian Democrats took

a different approach, using hypothetical questions to strike fear into the heart of the

Italian electorate in order to gain the votes that otherwise may have gone to the smaller

lay parties. One such advertisement showed the combined vote totals of all the leftist

parties from the 1975 regional elections, which amounted to 47% of the total vote. The

ad then states, “There remains only 3.1% before Italy turns Communist. Is this what you

want?”55 A similar advertisement asks simply, in giant block letters, “AND AFTER?” It

warns that a Communist victory would, “Almost certainly provoke the end of détente and

surely the abandonment of Italy on the part of the West.” The ad closes by stating, “Your

responsibility in these elections is equal to ours.”56 Surely then, the differences in

campaign literature did paint the Christian Democrats as a paranoid party, concerned

more with the preservation of the current order, (or disorder in the eyes of many), than

with finding a solution to the problem at hand. Whereas, the Italian Communists

appeared a party willing to do what was necessary to extricate Italy from its current crisis.

52 Berlinguer, La Sfida Interrotta: Le Idee Di Enrico Berlinguer. p. 15953 "Il Voto Dei Contadini Al Pci Per Una Nuova Agricoltura," L'Unità, 12 June 1976.54 "Vota Comunista Vota Così," L'Unità, 15 June 1976.55 "È Questo Che Vuoi?," Corriere della Sera, 15 June 1976.56 "E Dopo?," Corriere della Sera, 1 June 1976.

LoVerme 35

- Above referenced PCI and DC campaign ads from L'Unità and Il Corriere della Sera, June 197657

Although it did not overtake the Christian Democrats, the PCI felt very confident

in the strength of the results, as it came within 4% of the DC which had only maintained

its 1972 levels, and had seen many of its allies fall to almost nothing. Indeed, many 57 See notes 53-56 for citations

LoVerme 36

voters had abandoned the Liberal and Social Democratic parties, giving their votes to the

DC, not out of support, but simply to prevent a Communist victory. Indeed, Italian

Communists took special joy when prominent DC leader Arnaldo Forlani commented

that the DC had eaten its children, (the smaller parties whose votes it absorbed), like

Count Ugolino, the 13th Century count who was most famous for appearing in Dante’s

Inferno.58 In addition to providing fodder for a comical Vannini cartoon in Rinascita, this

meant that the DC was relatively weaker in the face of the PCI, and the Communists

hoped this shift would translate into greater influence in the subsequent government.

- "The DC Eating its Children", Vannini, Rinascita, 2 July 197659

To the surprise of the Communists, the Christian Democrats proved to be

steadfastly hostile to any true PCI inclusion in the government, and seemed to prefer the

ambiguity of a non-government to the prospect of a truly representative emergency unity

coalition. The PCI’s initial reaction to the DC’s proposal of abstention was one of

58 Count Ugo appears in the lowest circle of hell where sinners are tortured by starvation. Dante rights that Count Ugo’s children were suffering so acutely that they begged their father to eat them in order to hasten their death. Although he leaves it ambiguous, Dante hints at the fact that, driven mad by hunger, the Count does indeed devour his children.59 Vannini, "La Dc Ha Fatto Come Il Conte Ugolino," Rinascita, 2 July 1976.

LoVerme 37

indignation, as I have discussed above, however, as it became clear that the Christian

Democrats were not going to budge on their refusal to bring the Communists into the

official majority, the PCI began tentatively to consider its options. While publicly firm,

Il Corriere della Sera reported, only a week after the elections, that the two parties were

like icebergs that appeared solid above the water, but revealed visible melting if one

could see beneath the surface.60 Weak as it was, the DC proposal, in combination with

the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and seven parliamentary commissions in the

hands of the PCI, did represent at least the minimal degree of reaching out on the part of

the Christian Democrats. Should the Communist Party have shunned this offer and left

the DC to create an even weaker formulation than the present, it would have risked losing

the image of the mature party, willing to engage with its rivals and make sacrifices for the

good of the country. Having worked so hard to create this image, and fearing that it

might not have such an opportunity again, when it was undeniable that the Christian

Democrats would not offer anything more, the Communists agreed to abstain rather than

be seen as the force preventing the desperately needed order of government.

Finally, the last major factor that played into the PCI’s decision to abstain was the

Italian Socialist Party, (Partito Socialista Italiana or PSI). While the Socialist Party

received only 9.6% of the vote, its totals could have vaulted the Christian Democrats over

the 50% mark and thus the DC courted the Socialists relentlessly in the immediate period

following the elections. Having allied with the Christian Democrats in the sixties

however, and been frustrated with the results, the PSI refused the DC’s offers to join the

government. Instead, the Socialists remained steadfast in their promise to refuse any

government that did not include the Communists. Like the PCI, the Socialists shared the

60 "First Signs of a Thawing between Christian Democrats and Pci," Corriere della Sera, 27 June 1976.

LoVerme 38

belief that only a government representing all the democratic parties of Italy, to which

group they believed the reformed Communists should now be added, could hope to

extricate Italy from its state of crisis. However, while attempting to appear firm on the

outside, internally the Socialist Party was in a state of crisis of its own.

Between the 1972 and 1976 elections, the PSI’s percentage of the electorate

remained at a static 9.6%, despite a significant leftward shift among Italian voters.

Likewise, that number itself was down 5% from the PSI’s totals in the 1968 elections.

The Socialist Party therefore felt it needed a distinct change in direction. On July 13, Il

Corriere della Sera quoted Party Secretary Francesco de Martino as saying, “It would be

an inadmissible error to retain any compromise or temporary accord with the DC.”61 The

very next day however, it reported that de Martino had stepped down and, after some

political jockeying, he was replaced by the younger Bettino Craxi.62 The new leader

highlighted the need for changes in the party and emphasized the importance of

autonomy from the DC, but also from the PCI, claiming that the Socialists had too long

been viewed as pawns of others. While the new leader did not indicate that the PSI

looked any differently at the DC proposals for coalition, his assertions of autonomy and

well-known differences with former Secretary de Martino were troublesome for the PCI.

Given the new leadership of the PSI, it was possible that the DC might make an offer to

its liking, in which case the new government would be formed, leaving the Communists,

once again, entirely on the outside.

61 "The Socialists Begin Their Exam of Conscience," Corriere della Sera, 13 July 1976.62 "Andreotti Begins Colloquiums for the New Government but the Resignation of De Martino Complicates the Crisis," Corriere della Sera, 14 July 1976.

LoVerme 39

Therefore, despite the apparent absurdity of the PCI decision to give up

opposition without actually being included to any great degree in the government after

having built and maintained itself precisely on the principles of opposition, it was,

nonetheless, a decision with deep roots and clear logic. After the Allende coup in Chile,

the PCI became convinced of the importance of a slow and careful slide into government.

Likewise, by the 1976 elections, having worked for three years to create an image of

itself as the party devoted to democratic unity for the renewal of the country, the

Communists ultimately could not bring themselves to endanger this image by turning

down the Christian Democrats’ proposal, weak though it was. Finally, the reshuffling of

the Italian Socialist Party raised the possibility, even if it was a remote one, of the

renewal of a DC-PSI alliance that could

close the door on Communist participation

in government that it had cracked open

with the 1976 elections. Hoping to use the

abstention as a launch point for the future,

the PCI, on August 4, 1976, finally agreed

to abstain. As the last party to do so, the

PCI therefore provided the final necessary

component for the government, and, in

doing so, committed itself to the

- Forattini, 3 June 1979

LoVerme 40

philosophy so perfectly embodied in Forattini’s 1979 cartoon, The PCI to the

Government, It Costs What It Costs.63

IV. The Italian Case in the Context of Europe

While the PCI was certainly the strongest Communist party in Western Europe, it

was not the only one, nor was it even the only one making a push toward government.

Indeed, the Italian Communists released a joint declaration with the Spanish Communist

Party in July 1975 and one with the French Communist Party four months later in

November. The declarations committed the parties to a democratic program that

highlighted their autonomy from Moscow and their devotion to civil, individual, and

political rights, to be placed on equal footing with economic rights.64 Many observers

dubbed this new ideology “Eurocommunism”, and some even begun to regard the

different parties as a cohesive unit. While this represents a greatly exaggerated

viewpoint, the Communist parties of France and Spain had both similarities and

differences respective to the PCI and it is worth briefly examining their concurrent

struggles in order to better understand that of the Italian Communists.

In the early 1970s, the French Communist Party, like its Italian counterpart, had

committed itself to a program of alliance. Unlike the PCI however, the Party had not

enjoyed constant electoral gains since the Second World War, but had remained

relatively stagnant at about 25% percent of the vote before 1956, and 20% thereafter.65

63 Forattini, "Il Pci Al Governo, Costi Quel Che Costi," in Gardner Papers (New York: Columbia Law School Library, 1979).64 Baker, Italian Communism: The Road to Legitimacy and Autonomy. p. 71-7265 In France, as it did around the world, the violent suppression of the Hungarian uprisings in 1956 by the Soviet Union put considerable stress on the Communist Party and sullied many people’s faith in Communism and any party associated with the Soviet Union.

LoVerme 41

What the French Communists did have in their favor, however, was the fact that they had

never before allied with the French Socialists as the PCI had for many years with the PSI.

Thus, unlike in Italy, the French Communist proposed a Left Union with the Socialists.

Despite considerable differences, the two parties were able to reach agreement on a

common program in June 1972.66 Thus, while the Italian Communists sought an alliance

because they had achieved enough electoral gains to do so with some hope of success, the

French Communist Party sought alliance precisely because it had not been successful in

rising on its own.

While the Left Union proved to be extremely successful, even garnering a higher

percentage of the 1977 local elections than that of the center-right, the success went

mostly to the Socialist Party, which saw itself boosted greatly by the accord, while the

Communists remained generally static. The Communist Party did make some gains with

its Eurocommunist reforms in 1975 and its increased criticism of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, Georges Marchais, the head of the Party, refused to attend the Berlin Conference

in 1976 for Communist parties.67 Nonetheless, even these gains were outshined by the

Socialists and their talented leader, François Mitterand.

By the start of the campaign season for the 1978 national elections, the Left Union

appeared to be in great position to win the election. Like Italy, the country was in

difficult economic straits, and the Left Union had succeeded in presenting itself as the

choice with the ideas and ability to rescue it. Internally, however, the coalition was in

major trouble. When it came to updating the Common Program of 1972, the Socialists,

more secure in their newly acquired electoral clout, were even more resistant to

66 George Ross, Workers and Communists in France: From Popular Front to Eurocommunism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). p. 24467 Ibid. p. 251

LoVerme 42

Communist demands. For their part, the Communists had become defensive because of

their loss of power respective to the Socialists, and thus more insistent in their demands.

Ultimately therefore, negotiations were stalled and the coalition broke down, giving way

to finger-pointing and vicious condemnation on both sides that continued through the

elections and allowed the current center-right majority to win.68

Ultimately, the French Communist Party chose to sacrifice its best hope of electoral

victory, for the assurance that it would not have to play a supporting role to another party

that it did not fully agree with. Ironically, this is the opposite of the choice that the Italian

Communists made, but ultimately both choices doomed the parties to electoral decline

and a life outside the majority government. While comparison of the two experiences

does little to suggest a path that may have worked better for either party, it does highlight

just how ingrained the alienation of the political left was in Italy and the exceptional

nature of the Italian case. Despite being much more powerful than its French counterpart,

the fact that there had never been a left government in postwar Italy caused the PCI to act

much more conservatively, accepting a weak alliance with a center-right party, while the

French Communists ultimately shunned their alliance with the center-left Socialists.

While the Spanish Communist Party shared some similarities with its

Mediterranean counterparts, it also operated from a distinctly different position. In

addition to facing anticommunist prejudice, the Spanish Communist Party was illegal in

Spain, which, unlike France and Italy, was an authoritarian dictatorship. As Franco, who

had ruled Spain since the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939, was aging and becoming

increasingly weak, there was hope in Spain for democratization after his death. The

assassination of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco in December 1973, Franco’s number two

68 Ibid. p. 267

LoVerme 43

and the best hope for continuing his regime, only reinforced this prognosis. Thus, a

hopeful Spanish Communist Party began to campaign vigorously for a coalition against

the regime.69

As it is hardly possible to be more right wing than an Authoritarian Dictator, the

Spanish Communist Party was able to propose a Unitary Opposition Alliance, as in

France, that nonetheless included center-right elements such as Christian Democrats, in

this way similar to the Italian case. As in both countries, the Party was eager to play the

leading role in such a coalition, however its zeal to commence pressuring the Franco

regime as soon as possible was frustrated by the wait-and-see attitude that most of the

other parties adopted. Unwilling to wait itself, the Communist Party formed the Junta

Democrática, which consisted primarily of the Communists and a diverse spread of

drastically different groups of relatively little power. The alliance proposed a twelve-

point program calling for parliamentary democracy, the legalization of all political

parties, and Spain’s eventual integration into the European Political and Economic

system.70

When the Socialists and other parties did decide to join an oppositional coalition

in 1975, they formed their own, rather than joining the Junta. This demonstrated the

differences, and even animosity between the Socialists and Communists, mirroring the

situation in France to some degree, at least in the lead up to the French elections of 1978,

but the relative political positions of the two parties were drastically different in Spain

than in both France and Italy. Indeed, with their Eurocommunist reforms and willingness

to reach out to the center-right, the Spanish Communists were actually considered less

69 Eusebio Mujal-León, Communism and Political Change in Spain (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983). p. 13570 Ibid. p. 137

LoVerme 44

radical than the Socialists.71 Despite this however, the Communists still suffered from

their past associations, while the Socialists thrived, cultivating the image of a resolute

party of change with a strong, pro-Europe tradition.72

After Franco’s death in late 1975, Juan Carlos, the descendant of Spain’s former

King, ascended to the throne, but quickly realized the need for reforms, and ultimately

allowed for a parliamentary election in 1977. The Communist Party, following a

campaign spent largely criticizing the Socialists, garnered just shy of 10% of the vote,

falling substantially short of the Socialists at 29%, and the Union of the Democratic

Center, constituted from the remnants of the Franco and Monarchist governments, which

received 34% of the ballots cast.73 The vote revealed the anticommunist prejudice still

present despite the Party’s newly asserted autonomy from Moscow, but also reflected the

sharply divided nature of the country which was basically split between the more radical

left and right, generally passing over the possibility of a moderate left that the Spanish

Communists had tried champion.

In comparison with Italy, Spain is a useful case because it allowed for a reformed

Western Communist Party to make an attempt at majority government in a situation in

which, unlike Italy and France, some change of government was inevitable. The fact that

the other parties had also been illegal, however, disadvantaged the Communists because

these parties had not had a chance to demonstrate their shortcomings in government as in

Italy and France. Each of these cases demonstrates the tremendous odds stacked against

Western Communist parties, but also shows how each could provide hope to the others,

given the fact that each Eurocommunist party seemed to be, in some way or another, on

71 Ibid. p. 15872 Ibid. p. 16373 Ibid. p. 157

LoVerme 45

the path to government. This general optimism, though perhaps misplaced, helps explain

the PCI’s willingness to chance risks over losing time, given that circumstances seemed

to suggest that the moment for change had come. Finally, the comparison demonstrates

the exceptional nature of the Italian Case, in that the PCI was the only Western

Communist Party that both outshined the Socialists, and experienced an actual role in

government, weak though it was.

V. Conclusion

In 1976, the Italian Communist Party received over one third of the total national

vote, and was a mere 5% away from being the country’s leading vote-getter. Its

agreement to abstain from a vote of confidence in the new government made history in

that it represented the first time a strong Communist party was brought into the majority

government of a Western bloc country, even if in a weak and ambiguous manner.

Naturally, historians have found this anomaly to be of great interest, but in their treatment

of the period, most have failed to adequately emphasize the importance of the Party’s loss

of oppositional character as the number one cause of its electoral decline and failure to

become a permanent part of the majority government. Furthermore, historians have also

failed to delve deeply enough into the rationale behind the PCI’s decision to accept the

DC’s proposal for government and to abstain from the vote of confidence, given the

profound and lasting effects of this choice. Upon close examination of the circumstances

and the statements of the Communist leaders of the time, as well as those of the other

major parties, it is clear that this decision was the combined result of three factors: an

LoVerme 46

overcautiousness on the part of the PCI in its demands of the DC, animated by the fear of

extralegal actions from the far right as had occurred in Chile; the party’s reluctance to

risk losing the mantle of the self-sacrificing force of unity that it had worked for three

years to construct; and finally, a nervous anxiety about the reorganization and potential

shift in the priorities of the Socialist Party.

A clearer understanding of this crucial period in Italian history not only corrects

some of the myths about the period, such as the distortion of the power and intentions of

both Aldo Moro and Enrico Berlinguer, but it also helps us to better understand some of

the byproducts of the bipolar world order. Despite Italy’s status as a democratic nation, a

single party dominated its government for over fifty years. Likewise, the importance of

the events in Chile to the Italian case also lends credence to the rising belief that the Cold

War was much more global than most historians have previously believed.

Finally, but perhaps most significantly, a clearer understanding of the PCI’s attempt

and failure to become a lasting component of the majority government is crucial to

understanding the current Italian political system. While the end of the Cold War

eliminated some of the obstacles for the Left, it stills holds the PCI as its roots. Likewise,

despite vast changes in both the national and international realms, the majority of Italians

still accept, at least tacitly if not openly, that the political schema of the Cold War, in

which corrupt center-right politicians lead the country, remains inevitable for Italy. This

continued belief is evidenced by the recent election of Silvio Berlusconi, a man who has

been tried twelve times for crimes related to corruption and fraud, to his third term as

prime minister.

LoVerme 47

In contrast, the Italian Left has failed as of yet to hold together a government for

more than two years. It continually looks to the past, often times to Berlinguer himself,

in order to evoke nostalgia for the possibility of unity and coalition. As the PCI showed

in the late 1970s, however, this is not an effective way to overthrow the Italian political

schema that remains slanted toward the corrupt parties of the center-right. It is no

coincidence that Walter Veltroni, a former Communist politician who published a

collection of selected writings of Berlinguer with the stated hope of finding guidance and

inspiration, was also the Italian Left’s candidate for Prime Minister and lost decidedly to

Berlusconi in the most recent Italian elections of 2008. It is imperative, therefore, that

the mistaken accounts of the Italian Eurocommunist experiment be corrected so that the

Left will cease to look back longingly, but will rather look forward to the future and

propose a system that represents a distinct break from Italy’s political past. Most Italians

do not want to relive this past and desperately desire an escape from the tired status quo,

but it can only be through a truly innovative proposal, which breaks radically from the

past, that the Italian Left can hope to win over the electorate and secure the reins of

government.

LoVerme 48

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LoVerme 49

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LoVerme 50

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LoVerme 51

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