Tyson 21

Human(e) Treatment of Animals?

Brittany TysonSpring 2014Phl 495Rider UniversitySenior Thesis (Philosophy)Dr. Good - AdvisorIn this thesis, I will examine the philosophical issue of animal rights. Part One is devoted to Peter Singer and Tom Regans arguments for animal rights. Singers focus is strictly on the pain and suffering of the animals while Regans view emphasizes that animals have inherent value and rights. Part Two explains Carl Cohens criticisms of Singer and Regan. Part Two goes on to examine the responses Singer and Regan make to Cohens criticisms. Part Three looks at a compromise position, offered by Mary Ann Warren, between Singer and Regans positions on the one hand and Cohens viewpoint on the other. In Part Four, I will argue that Warrens position seems to imply that it is morally acceptable to kill animals to fulfill important human needs but not to fulfil trivial human desires. It is easy to identify certain important human needs that justify the killing of animals as well as trivial human desires that do not justify the killing of animals. There is at least one human need/desire that falls in between these extremes. This is eating animals for food. I will present arguments that try to show that eating meat is a trivial desire and arguments that attempt to show that it is an important need, and indicate which position I think is stronger.ISome people would believe that because humans are the dominant species on earth, we are the only ones who are entitled to rights. This belief is known as speciesism. Speciesism is defined by Peter Singer as a prejudice or an attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of ones own species and against those of members of other species (Singer (2), 436). Singer disputes this theory. Singer explains that animals have the ability to suffer and that they have an interest in not doing so. In the same way that humans do not want to endure pain or suffering, neither do animals. The theory of utilitarianism requires humans to prevent animal suffering. If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration (Singer (1), 78-79). Singer gives an example about a rock with no feelings being kicked down a road and a mouse which clearly suffers when being kicked down the road. The mouse has the ability to feel pain while the rock does not. The suffering of animals is caused when humans use animals merely as a means to an end. Animals are mindlessly used for food and other things such as scientific or medical testing. Singer compares the use of an animal for experimental purposes and the use of an orphan human baby for experimental purposes. No one would say using an orphan human was morally justified and in the same way it is not justified to use animals in this way. As infants, humans have the same sense of pain as an animal does. In the book Animal Liberation by Singer, he gives vivid examples of animal suffering, such as the treatment of new born calves needed for the production of veal. Singer states, Each stall will be 1 foot 10 inches wide and 4 feet 6 inches long. It will have a slatted wooden floor, raised above the concrete floor of the shed. The calves will be tethered by a chain around the neck to prevent them turning around in their stalls. (The chain may be removed when the calves grow too big to turn around in such narrow stalls.) The stall will have no straw or other bedding, since the calf might eat it, spoiling the paleness of his flesh (Singer (3), 129). To Singer, the suffering of these new born calves is immoral, unnecessary and cruel. These calves are suffering physically, mentally and emotionally during the short 3 months of life that veal production permits. The fact that some people like the taste of veal does not justify the suffering veal calves endure. He goes on to say, It is not merely the act of killing that indicates what we are ready to do to other species in order to gratify our tastes. The suffering we inflict on the animals while they are alive is perhaps an even clearer indication of our speciesism than the fact that we are prepared to kill them (Singer (1), 79). Many uses of animals are for things that are not necessary for human life. Singer points out that animal suffering is needlessly caused to benefit humans when there are ways around such suffering. Instead humans continue to act selfishly and only do things to benefit mankind. Along with Singer, James Rachels points to examples of needless animal suffering for human benefits. Rachels uses an example about the use of civet cats, he states, consider the treatment of the civet cat, a highly intelligent and sociable animal. Civet cats are trapped and placed in small cages inside darkened sheds, where the temperature is kept up to 110 by fires. They are confined in this way until they finally dieThese animals have the misfortune to produce a substance that is useful in the manufacture of perfume. Musk, which is scraped from their genitals once a day for as long as they can survive, makes the scent of perfume last a bit longer after each application.(The heat increases their production of musk) (Rachels 390-391). This example is precisely the type of attitude towards animal suffering that Singer rejects. The longer lasting scent of perfume does not justify the torture and death of civet cats. This sort of behavior is morally wrong according to Singer. The fact that some people like to smell better longer clearly does not justify the torture of civet cats. Speciesism is attacked by other philosophers such as Tom Regan. His argument goes beyond that of Singers. Regan explains that animals have inherent value and rights. Animals are incapable of doing certain things that humans can achieve but this does not mean that they have no value. Regan compares this to different types of humans. Some humans are more intelligent than others but this does not give them more inherent value than another. When people claim that only humans have inherent value, they are demonstrating speciesism, which is reprehensible. Regan claims that, All who have inherent value have it equally, whether they be human animals or not (Regan (3), 112). It would be morally wrong to say that humans have more inherent value than animals. Once something has inherent value it cannot be taken away or said to be less valued then another species. Regan gives his theory of subject-of-a-life which asserts that humans and animals have characteristics that entitle both species to rights. Regans theory states, individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference and welfare-interest; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone elses interests (Regan (2), 243). Regan points out that any being who is the subject-of-a-life has inherent value. Animals and humans have enough characteristics in common to show that if humans have rights, animals should too. We contradict ourselves if we say humans have rights but animals do not. Regan clarifies the common characteristics between humans and animals in his book The Case for Animal Rights, by saying, we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others. We want and prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and expect things. And all these dimensions of our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our untimely deathall make a difference to the quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as individuals. As the same is true of those animals that concern us (the ones that are eaten and trapped, for example), they too must be viewed as the experiencing subjects of a life, with inherent value of their own (Regan (2), 448-449). For Regan, animals have a right to life because of these common characteristics. The importance of inherent value is a strong point in the view for animal rights. Regan explains, we must recognize our equal inherent value as individuals, reasonnot sentiment, not emotionreason compels us to recognize the equal inherent value of these animals and, with this, their equal right to be treated with respect (Regan (3), 113). Regan explains that animals deserve to be treated with respect and not used for human desires. Animals used for science experiments are not being treated with respect but instead are being mindlessly harmed and killed to benefit humans. IICarl Cohen is a philosopher who is strictly against animal rights. He attacks both Regan and Singer. Cohens argument against Regan starts from the claim that to have rights, one must be able to form and make moral judgments. Cohen explains, To be a moral agent is to be able to grasp the generality of moral restrictions on our will. Humans understand that some acts may be in our interest and yet must not be willed because they are simply wrong (Cohen (2), 35). Cohen uses this as an attack on what Regan has said. If these animals do not know that they have been wronged, then they are incapable of having rights. In the case of suffering, the animal has no idea that it is being wronged because it does not understand the issue at hand. The animal cannot respond or argue against the use or suffering that it endures because it cannot comprehend the moral judgments. Cohen gives a couple of examples of humans making moral judgments that animals can never make. He gives an example of humans wanting to be rich but they do not steal because they know that that is the wrong thing to do. Another example given is when humans return lost items to others even if it is something they could use for their benefit. The right choice is for the human to give back what is not theirs which can only be understood through moral judgments. Animals will never be able to fully weigh a situation because they have no comprehension of moral judgments. Cohen goes on to say, The capacity for moral judgment that distinguishes humans from animals is not a test to be administered to human beings one by one. Persons who are unable, because of some disability, to perform the full moral functions natural to human beings are certainly not for that reason ejected from the moral community. The issue is one of kind. Humans are of such a kind that they may be the subject of experiments only with their voluntary consent. The choices they make freely must be respected. Animals are of such a kind that it is impossible for them in principle, to give or withhold voluntary consent or to make a moral choice. What humans retain when disabled, animals have never had (Cohen (1), 484).In Singers work, we find an answer to Cohens criticism of Regan. Singer explains that those who are in a coma or brain damaged are unable to give consent or make moral judgments. These humans would have no way of speaking up for themselves in the same way that animals do not have a voice. No one would say that these people do not have rights because they are unable to make such moral judgments that Cohen has used as examples in the previous paragraph. If these people have rights then animals should have rights in the same respect. Singer explains that agreeing with a claim like one that Cohen has made is just an example of speciesism, when he states, The experimenter, then, shows a bias in favor of his own species whenever he carries out an experiment on a nonhuman for a purpose that he would not think justified him in using a human being at an equal or lower level of sentience, awareness, ability to be self-directing, etc (Singer (1), 80). In this way showing bias to humans and their ability to make moral judgments is just a form of speciesism. So therefore Singer argues that there is no way to justify experimentation on animals due to their inability to make moral judgments if it does not apply to those humans who as well cannot make these judgments. Cohen tries to refute what Singer is saying by statingWhen balancing the pleasures and pains resulting from the use of animals in research, we must not fail to place on the scales the terrible pains that would have resulted, would be suffered now, and would long continue had animals not been used. Every disease eliminated, every vaccine developed, every method of pain relief devised, every surgical procedure invented, every prosthetic device implantedindeed, virtually every modern medical therapy is due, in part or whole to experimentation using animals (Cohen (1), 487).What Cohen is saying is that we owe humans moral regard. This means that we have a duty to the human race to help support and heal their lives. In this way experimenting on animals to find new cures and medicines to help promote and save human lives is our duty as a society. Cohen also disagrees with Singers position that the suffering of animals is unjustified. Cohen believes that the vast amount of human lives saved from the use of testing on animals is worth the cost of the animals suffering and/or death. To directly quote Cohen, he states; Experiments using animals are not merely helpful; they were and remain a necessary condition for most critical advances in protecting human health (Cohen (2) 12). Here Cohen explains that testing on animals is essential to promote human life and not present obstacles to it. He explains that there is no other way to find cures for the disease/illness that occurs in the world. Cohen explains that, The elimination of horrible disease, the increase of longevity, the avoidance of great pain, the saving of lives, and improvement of the quality of lives (for humans and for animals) achieved through research using animals is so incalculably great that the argument of these critics, systematically pursued, establishes not their conclusion but its reverse: to refrain from using animals in biomedical research is, on utilitarian grounds, morally wrong (Cohen (1), 487). If we did not experiment on animals to save or prolong lives, it would show we did not care about our fellow humans. We have duties to our fellow people. Cohen continues to explain that without animal experimentation, we would be doing wrong to the human species. He states that Every advance in medicineevery new drug, new operation, new therapy of any kindmust sooner or later be tried on a living being for the first time. That trial, controlled or uncontrolled, will be an experiment. The subject of that experiment, if it is not an animal, will be a human being. Prohibiting the use of live animals in biomedical research, therefore, or sharply restricting it, must result either in the blockage of much valuable research or in the replacement of animal subjects with human subjects. These are the consequencesunacceptable to most reasonable personsof not using animal research (Cohen (1), 488). Cohen is using extremes to further his point that animals are the only way to help promote human life. Without the use of animals for testing, would result in the use of humans for testing which damages human life. Regan disputes this idea by explaining the use of toxicology in his book The Case for Animal Rights, Animals are routinely used to test for the possible toxicological (literally, poisonous) threat posed by a variety of commercially manufactured items intended primarily for human use or consumption. Two kinds of substances are tested: therapeutic and nontherapeutic. The former are drugs that may alleviate or cure pathological conditionsThe class of nontherapeutic products includes everything else. The following is a representative list of nontherapeutic products tested for toxicity: insecticides, pesticides, antifreeze chemicals, brake fluids, bleaches, Christmas tree sprays, church candles, sliver cleaners, oven cleaners, deodorants, skin fresheners, baby preparations, bubble baths, freckle creams, depilatories, eye makeup, crayons, fire extinguishers, inks, suntan oils, nail polish, mascara, hair sprays and rinses, zipper lubricants, paints, thermometers and childrens novelties. For simplicitys sake, therapeutic items will normally be referred to simply as drugs, while nontherapeutic items will be referred to as products (Regan (2), 369-370). In this quote, Regan points to the countless unnecessary items created for human use. Many of these items are not necessary for human life, nor do they prolong human life enough to cause such suffering of animals. Regan answers Cohens criticism in a similar way to Singer. He compares the ability of animals to give consent to the ability of mentally ill or senile humans. Both lack the ability to give consent. Regan goes on to say that just because testing on animals benefits humans, this does not make it morally acceptable. He states, Because the animals are treated routinely, systematically as if their value were reducible to their usefulness to others, their rights are routinely, systematically violated. This is just as true when they are used in trivial, duplicative, unnecessary or unwise research as it is when they are used in studies that hold out real promise of human benefits (Regan (3), 113). Even if it benefits humans, it is still not okay to violate or have lack of respect for nonhuman animals. These animals have no way in speaking up for themselves and cannot give consent when it comes to the use of their bodies. Regan believes that there must be another way around animal testing in order to help find cures and promote human life. IIIMary Anne Warren comes up with a compromise between Singer and Regans positions on the one hand and Cohens on the other. She first explains that animals have less of a right to liberty than people. The example she uses says, The human right to liberty precludes imprisonment without due process of law, even if the prison is spacious and the conditions of confinement cause no obvious physical suffering. But it is not so obviously wrong to imprison animals, especially when the area to which they are confined provides a fair approximation of the conditions of their natural habitat, and a reasonable opportunity to purse the satisfactions natural to their kind (Warren 467).In this example the animal rights are clearly not violated in any way because the animal is not being harmed but this would not be the case for the human being who was arbitrarily imprisoned. The animal is provided with everything it needs in that confined area. Humans have more of a right to liberty because they understand the concept of liberty. Warren goes on to say, Human dignity and the fulfilment of the sorts of plans, hopes and desires which appear (thus far) to be uniquely human, require a more extensive freedom of movement than is the case with at least many nonhuman animals. Furthermore, there are aspects of human freedom, such as freedom of thought, freedom of speech and freedom of political association, which simply do not apply in the case of animals (Warren 467). In Warrens compromise, animals are given rights but not to the extent that humans are. Depending on each species, they should be given the amount of freedom that is required for them to live a life of quality. She gives examples of animals that may need more freedom of movement than others such as migratory birds and great whales but even these animals will be not be wronged if such needs are obtained. The second part of Warrens compromise position states that animals have less of a right to life than people. Warren explains that, Animals, it may be argued, lack the cognitive equipment to value their lives in the way that human beings doanimals appear to lack the sorts of long-range hopes, plans, ambitions and the like, which give human beings such a powerful interest in continued life. Animals it seems, take life as it comes and do not specifically desire that it go on (Warren 468). The compromise gives animals a right to life but only to a certain extent because the animal does not have as much intrinsic value as a human. If the animal had more of a desire to live, then Warren would give the animal more rights to life. She explains, animals do have a right to life but that it is generally somewhat weaker than that of human beingsweak enough to enable us to justify killing animals when we have no other ways of achieving such vital goals as feeding or clothing ourselves, or obtaining knowledge which is necessary to save human lives (Warren 469). Warrens compromise justifies the killing of animals only when necessary for human life. If an alternate route can be taken that does not affect the limited rights of the animal, then that route must be taken. An interesting issue arises from the second part of Warrens compromise. She seems to be saying that it is morally acceptable to kill animals to fulfill important human needs but not to fulfill trivial human desires. The many possible explanations for killing animals must be considered individually so that we may decide which are trivial human needs and which are important. Who will decide what counts as important and what counts as trivial? There will be many different opinions as to whether certain uses of animals are fulfilling important needs or simply satisfying trivial human desires. James Rachels points to many uses of animals to prove they are made to suffer for reasons that do not address important human needs when he states,Animals are wrenched from their natural homes to be made objects of our entertainment in zoos, circuses, and rodeos. They are used in laboratories, not only for experiments that are themselves morally questionable, but also in testing everything from shampoo to chemical weapons. They are killed so that their heads can be used as wall decorations, or their skins as ornamental clothing or rugs. Indeed, simply killing them for the fun of it is thought to be sport (Rachels 393).The examples Rachels gives are all clearly trivial desires which indicates that such use of animals is clearly not morally justified. It is easy to look at the extremes like using animals to help save lives as important and using civet cats to smell good as trivial. These two examples are on opposites sides of the spectrum of whether animal rights are important. In the article Vegetarianism, James Rachels argues, Although cruelty to animals is wrong, it does not follow that we are never justified in inflicting pain on an animal. Sometimes we are justified in doing this, just as we are sometimes justified in inflicting pain on humans. It does follow, however, that there must be a good reason for causing the suffering, and if the suffering is great, the justifying reason must be correspondingly powerful (Rachels 390). Rachels uses his example of the civet cats that are trapped and killed in a warehouses just to make perfume smell good a little longer to illustrate the relationship between suffering and human needs. The suffering of the civet cats is greater than the human need to smell good. This reason would have to be considered trivial because the desire is not as great as the suffering inflicted. James Rachels goes on to say, The argument is simple: Causing suffering is not justified unless there is a good reason, and the production of perfume made with musk causes considerable suffering; our enjoyment of this product is not a good enough reason to justify causing that suffering; therefore, the use of animals in this way is wrong (Rachels 391).When continuing to look further into what is considered important and what is trivial, the real test occurs when looking at using animals as a source of food. Rachels proposes that humans should take on a vegetarian diet because the suffering of the animals for meat production outweighs the enjoyment that human receive from eating meat. Rachels states, The fact that we enjoy the way meat tastes is a reason that will not even come close to justifying the cruelty that is part and parcel of contemporary meat production (Rachels 389). When looking at the actual mistreatment of each and every kind of animal used in meat production factories, Rachels finds the whole thing a trivial desire. Humans can live off a nonmeat diet and still be just as healthy, maybe even healthier than those who are not vegetarian. Many philosophers support Rachels position; in the article Moral Vegetarianism, Reconsidered, David DeGrazia gives a vivid example about the life of a pig living in the world of meat production: Hog Y will spend his life indoors in crowded pens of concrete and steelhe is castrated without anesthesiaHog Y is weaned and separated from his mother before being taken to a very crowded nursery. There his tail is cut off, his needle teeth are clipped, and an ear is notchedagain without anesthesiaUpon reaching a weight of fifty pounds with the help of a growth hormone, he is taken to a finishing pen[with] slatted floor with no beddingHog Y is roughly herded into a truck with over 100 other hogs. The day-long journey is unpleasant for Hog Y, who gets into fights with other hogs while receiving no food, water, rest or protection from the summer sun (DeGrazia 502). In this example, it is clear that the suffering of the pig is horrific. The enjoyment humans get from eating pork, say, does not measure up to the suffering that is endured by the pig. When looking at this example the brutality of the situation is heightened. These animals are being put through endless torture until their deaths. To make matters worse, they are not given anesthesia to help prevent the pain and suffering. James Rachels refers to the suffering of chickens for the production of meat, In order to produce animals by the millions, it is necessary to keep them crowded together in small spaces. Chickens are commonly kept eight or ten to a space smaller than a newspaper page. Unable to walk around or even stretch their wingsthe birds become vicious and attack one anotherTo minimize the damage they can do to one another, the birds beaks are cut off (Rachels, 391-392). Rachels shows the suffering the birds endure from humans as well as other animals. These examples make a strong case that eating animals should be counted as a trivial desire because the animal suffering outweighs the pleasure we get from eating them. In contrast to being a trivial human desire, there are several ways in which eating meat can be considered morally justified since it is an important human need in some cases. For some people a meat diet is necessary for survival. Families that are poor may only survive on a meat diet because it is less expensive than a vegetarian diet. Eating meat is much cheaper, while the consuming of vegetables is more costly. The poor who are starving can also only live off a meat diet. It is much cheaper for those who are starving to buy a fast food dollar meal burger than a five dollar salad. Large families with multiple children would also suffer from the cost of a vegetarian diet. More mouths to feed is already extremely costly and to not eat meat as well would cause the price of living for them to skyrocket. As Michael Martin notes, in the article A Critique of Moral Vegetarianism, "...there are cases in which it wouldbe right to kill an animalone such case would be where human life depended on the nourishment that animals give when killed and eaten (Martin 15). Consider those especially who need special diets such as one high in protein; these people would find a meat diet to be an important human need. Meat is the highest form of protein there is and even with a healthy vegetarian diet, it would be hard for someone to retain as much protein as found in animal meat. A final example of why eating meat could be considered an important human need would be those who hunt for food. In certain times of the year, hunting is the only way to survive for those who must procure their own foods. In all of these situations the obvious choice for a human would be a meat diet rather than a vegetarian one. So, is eating meat an important human need or a trivial human desire? I draw a tentative conclusion here. I think that the most sensible position here is that if people are able not to eat meat without seriously harming the quality of their life, then they have a duty not to eat it because it will reduce animal suffering. However, if people are in some of the circumstances described above (financial straits, need for protein, the necessity of hunting), there is no such duty. Our human duty is to become vegetarians if possible for ones living situation. In the book Animal Liberation, Peter Singer explains, Although we cannot identify any individual animals whom we have benefited by becoming a vegetarian, we can assume that our diet has some impact on the number of animals raised in factory farms and slaughtered for food (Singer (2), 177). A vegetarian diet for all would stop most if not all factory farms from continuing to torture and kill helpless animals. The fewer amount of humans who eat meat, would cause a fewer need for cheaply produced animal meat. Singer goes on to say The smaller the demand, the lower the price and the lower the profit. The lower the profit, the fewer the animals that will be raised and slaughtered (Singer (2), 177). Our human duty not to eat animals would amount to millions of animal lives saved from torture and/or death. Not only would it help the animals but as well help those families who are poor and cannot afford a non-meat diet. The price of meat would go down due to the lack of meat eaters in the world, making it cheaper for the poor to be fed. The duty to become vegetarians would help to solve human starvation because foods would become cheaper and easier to access for those who are literally starving to death. My position as well is to help prevent the suffering of animals in trivial desires such as entertainment purposes. Animals used in entertainment would become completely banned. Animals are being used in everyday life for entertainment purposes that are not seriously looked into would be considered inhumane. When looking deeper into a few uses of animals in entertainment, the animal cruelty is heightened. Animals are used in a variety of human entertainment purposes such as horse-drawn carriages, circuses, zoos, sea world, animal actors, dog fights, bull fights, cock fights, rodeos, horse racing and sports. Something as simple as horse drawn carriages is a trivial need that should not be allowed. In the article The Cruelty of Horse-Drawn Carriages, PETA explains the unnecessary suffering that is brought a upon these horses, Horses are forced to toil in all weather extremes, dodge traffic, and pound the pavement all day long. These gentle animals suffer from respiratory ailments because they breathe in exhaust fumes, and they develop debilitating leg problems from walking on hard surfaces. In some cases, horses have even dropped dead from heatstroke after working in scorching summer heat and humidity (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (2)).The treatment of these horses for entertainment would be banned because the use would not be considered as prolonging human life. Quite frankly, there is no real need for horse-drawn carriages when todays technology can create plenty of different ways of getting from place to place. The use of animals in entertainment is nothing but abuse and mistreatment of animals for reasons that are not considered important for human life to prosper. Another example of animal cruelty is circus arises in circuses: Bears, elephants, tigers, and other animals do not voluntarily ride bicycles, stand on their heads, balance on balls, or jump through rings of fire. They dont perform these and other difficult tricks because they want to; they perform them because theyre afraid of what will happen if they dont (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (1)). These animals are being forced to suffer every day in meaningless human entertainment actives. None of the animal entertainment purposes is worthy of the animal suffering endured. Thus the use of animals in entertainment would not be considered humane which creates our human duty not to use these animals in this way. My position on the humane treatment of animals as well pertains to the use of animals for clothing purposes. The use of animals for clothing would only apply to those humans who need certain clothing to survive. Humans living in a cold climate may need the use of furs, leather, skin and wool to survive the harsh winters. The homeless may need warmer clothes made from animals to stay warm at night. With this being said, any other need for animal clothes should be banned. The human desire to look fancy or elegant by wearing animal furs and leathers is not enough to say torturing these animals is right. PETA lists a few examples of animals used for purposes of clothing, To kill snakes for their skins, hunters invade their homes and often nail them to trees and skin them alive before tossing them in a pile to die. The snakes can suffer for days before succumbing to shock or dehydrationLizards are known to live up to 33 years in the wild, but lizards killed for their skins are usually clubbed on their heads or have their spines severed with chisels as soon as they reach marketable sizeAlligators are often kept in filthy, crowded tanks on alligator farms before being clubbed and skinned alive (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (3)). These animals are being skinned alive for non-prolonging human life reasons that do not justify the suffering. An alligator being skinned alive to make name brand Louis Vuitton shoes is not a good enough reason to treat these animals in a non-humane way. There are numerous ways in which the production of animal based clothing is considered not to be humane. Another example is the use of fur for a name brand Bloomingdales fur jacket. On the PETA Website, a brief description of the animal fur production is given, Animals onfur farmsspend their entire lives confined to cramped, filthy wire cages. Fur farmers use the cheapest and cruelest killing methods available, including suffocation, electrocution, gas, and poison (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (4)). Once more, the killing of these animals in such harsh ways does not measure up to the animal suffering. A final animal use that my position takes a stand on is the use of animals for experimental purposes. The philosopher with whom I most closely agree on this subject would be Tom Regan. Regan points to the endless list of trivial uses of animals for experimental purposes such as hair products, hygiene purposes, and cleaning products. All of these are human desires that are not necessary for human survival. Our human duty is not to experiment on animals unless it is something that prolongs human life such as a cure for Aids, cancer or any other deadly diseases.

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