Semaphore to Satellite Chapter 2 - Web viewThe Canadian Corps Signal Service, consisting of the Corps Headquarters Signal Company. and four Infantry Divisional Signal Companies, and

A Story of Canadian Military Communications 1903 – 2013

BGen William J. Patterson OMM, CD (Ret’d)

Published by The Military Communications and Electronics Museum Foundation

SATELLITETOSEMAPHORE

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chapte r tw o

The Canadian Corps Signal Service, consisting of the Corps Headquarters Signal Company

and four Infantry Divisional Signal Companies, and theCavalry Brigade Signal Section, is formed and serves in France, 1914 – 1916

s we have seen in the previous chapter, Canadian signallers, primarily

militiamen, gathered in Camp Val- cartier, as early as 12 August 1914, to form 1st

Divisional Signals Company (1 Div Sigs Coy). It consisted of 12 officers and 193 men as of 23 September, when the men

were assigned their regimental numbers and before the 1st Canadian Infantry Division (1 CID), Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF),

sailed from Que- bec City on 3 October. The Company was led by Maj F.A. Lister,

Assistant Director for Sig-

Maj T. E. Powers, OC No. 1 Section, 1 Div Sigs Coy.

Maj F.A. Lister, OC 1 Div Sigs Coy.

nalling, and Second-in-Command (2 i/c) Capt F.C. Kilburn, Royal Canadian Engineers (RCE), with Maj T.E. Powers, Canadian Signal Corps (CSC), and Capts E. Forde and G.A. Cline, CSC, and Capt W.W. Wilson, Paymaster. Attached, supernumerary, were 1 major, 2 captains, and 3 lieutenants, all CSC. There were 16 Sr NCOs, including 4 Permanent Ac- tive Militia (PAM), 3 of them from the Signal Corps School, and 2 CSC; 16 Jr NCOs, including 3 CSC; and 161 privates, including 27 CSC. For some reason, Sgt Maj Instr (SMI) G.C. Bir- beck, from the

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Signal Corps School, was

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added to the embarkation roll, although he did not join the unit until 26 October in Sal- isbury, England.

It may be somewhat surprising that only 32 CSC NCOs and men volunteered for 1 Div Sigs Coy. This statistic is in direct contrast to that of officers volunteering: 13 of the 18 officers on strength of the CSC eventually went overseas, plus one of the two officers in the CSC Reserve. Part of the reason could be that when enlisting some men did not mention their CSC affiliation; the Saint John Standard of 21 August 1914 listed an additional 16 men as part of No. 6 Company, CSC, who are on the Em- barkation Roll of 1 Div Sigs Coy. Another part of the reason was the low strength of the CSC in men. In 1913-14, it was acknowledged that only seven out of the twelve authorized Signal Sections were organized, and as less than a year had transpired before war broke out, likely most were still trying to build up to full strength. In addition, if men did not immediately volunteer in August – September 1914, the opportunity to serve with a signals unit was lost as the CSC was not allowed to recruit for the CEF. Undoubtedly, many of the CSC volunteered to serve in the CEF but were forced to join other units. One of the best sources of recruits was No. 6 Sigs Coy of Saint John, NB, which contributed 17 of the 26 men in No. 2 Section, 1 Div Sigs Coy. This group formed an ad hoc organization called The Ancient and Honourable Order of The Sacred Brick.1

While 1 Div Sigs Coy was being organized in Camp Valcartier, the War, that many had predicted would be over by Christmas, took an unexpected turn. Almost from the time Ger- man troops crossed the frontiers of France and Belgium on 4 August, the plans of both the Germans and the French were in jeopardy. French Plan XVII was based on a massive offensive action in the Ardennes with the objective of re-capturing Alsace-Lorraine lost to Germany after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. The French greatly underestimated the strength of the opposing German forces, which had been

1 See Appendix 13 for its history.

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strengthened from 9 to 25 divisions, and con- sequently, the attack was a total failure. The German von Schlieffen Plan of 1905 was based on massive right flanking attack through Belgium and Holland, which would come around the west end of the French Plan XVII thrust and catch it in the rear. Unfortu- nately, for the Germans, their 1914 commander, von Moltke, weakened the right flanking thrust by strengthening the centre, leaving only 53 divisions to carry out the original plan, which required 79 divisions. While the main German attack was still formidable forcing the Belgian Army to retreat back to Antwerp, it did not have the manpower to ex- tend its thrust far enough west to encircle Paris. The German Army met the British Ex- peditionary Force (BEF) at the Mons Canal on 22 August and by outnumbering both the BEF and the neighbouring French Fifth Army forced their retreat, but in orderly fashion. By 4 September, the French had accepted the fact that their offensive had failed, and realizing the danger of the German thrust, had re- grouped their forces so that the number of French and British troops equaled that of the main German Army.

The Battle of the Marne lasted until 10 Sep- tember, when the German High Command, realizing the drive to capture Paris was stalled, broke off contact with the Allies, and withdrew to favourable ground to organize a defensive line. Each side began the ‘race to the sea’ as each tried to out flank the other to the west. The end result was a line of German and Al- lied defences stretching from the Swiss border to the English Channel. By the end of 1914, trench warfare on the Western Front had begun in earnest and the two lines, sometimes only yards apart, remained with little variation for the next two years.

By 18 October 1914, 1 Div Sigs Coy found itself, with only 177 all ranks, assembled in tents at Bulford Camp on Salisbury Plain, a large open area in the County of Wiltshire, with no equipment or

horses. By 1 November, it had been issued with the equipment that it had brought from Canada: flags, heliographs, lamps, telescopes, binoculars, field tele-

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phones, field cable on drums for pack animal transportation, and a cable wagon for the telegraph section, which had 10 miles of single cable and 3 vibrator (telegraph) offices, one in the wagon and two portable sets with a 10- cell wet battery. Most of the equipment and the training associated with it was soon to be shown to be of little value on the Western Front. Visual signalling by heliograph was impossible because of the mostly flat terrain and prevailing weather. The use of flags and lamps were only possible in positions where the ter-

rain permitted it to be done out of sight of the enemy. The lamp was more often used, because the operator did not need to stand up, and it could be seen at night. The main means of communication was by telephone and telegraph carried by overhead wires, usually out of German artillery range, or by underground wire in the forward brigade areas.

On 1 November 1914, the strength of the Company was brought back up to 203 all ranks and 78 horses. Training for 1 CID, which for 1 Div Sigs Coy consisted mainly of con- necting the far-flung units of 1 CID by telephone, had begun in the face of the worst wet weather in living mem- ory. Beginning on 21 October, it rained on 89 of the next 123 days, and the Canadians lived in a sea of mud, where their uniforms never re- ally dried out. Between 4 and 6 December there

was a violent storm, that blew down tents and forced training to be cancelled for several days. Gradually, the troops were placed in huts, although 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade (4 CIB) stayed in tents until it sailed to France. The 1 Div Sigs Coy was more fortunate and were put into winter quarters at Enford, a few miles north of Bulford Camp on the main road from Amesbury to Upavon. Remarkably, cases of sickness were low and the morale of the men remained high. Part of the reason was the

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decision of the Divisional Com-

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mander, General Alderson, a British officer, to permit the establishment of wet canteens (sell- ing alcohol), unlike those of Camp Valcartier, which were dry.

About the same time as 1 CID was settling into its tents on Salisbury Plain, the Hon. Sam Hughes put out a call for volunteers for another division. On 23 October 1914, a Gen- eral Order was issued to raise another 14 battalions and the other arms and services required for the 2nd

Canadian Infantry Division (2 CID). The organization of 2 Div Sigs Coy began on 27 November in Ottawa. It was en- tirely a CE unit, commanded by Maj J.H.L. Bogart, RCE, and consisted of 9 officers, including 4 graduates of RMC, and 320 men, including CSM P.V. Harcourt, RCE. The Company sailed from Canada on 15 May 1915 and went under canvas on Dilgate Plain, near Shorncliffe, England on the 24th.

While CSM Harcourt was coping with 319 recruits in Ottawa, his fellow Sr NCO, CSM C. Shergold, RCE, was serving with the RE in France. When war broke out on 4 August, Shergold was in England attending a wireless- telegraph course. He managed to talk his way over to France on 16 August with the RE unit to which he was attached. Within two months he had been awarded the Distinguished Con- duct Medal (DCM) and had been Mentioned- in-Despatches (MiD), and on 21 October 1914 was commissioned in the field into the RE. On 1 January 1915, he was awarded the Military Cross (MC), the first member of the Canadian Army to be given these awards in the First World War, while serving with the British Army. After commanding the wireless detachment of the British Cavalry Corps Signals until 15 July, he was returned to England where he became part of the instructional staff of the Canadian Engineer Training Depot (CETD) (Signals) at Shorncliffe, England.

It was with their original signalling equipment that the 1 Div Sigs Coy landed at St Nazaire, France on 11 February 1915. Its strength had been increased from the 1914 war establishment of 5 officers and

155 men to 6 officers, 204 men, 107 horses, 32 bicycles, 9 motorcycles (MCs), and 12 wagons. Excess

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officers and men had been sent to Shorncliffe to await the opening of the CETD. Although the Company was under command of the Di- visional Senior Engineer Officer, it was given permission to wear the cap badge of the CSC. Subsequent divisional companies and all reinforcements wore the badge of the CE. 1 CID was given a period of three weeks to be indoc- trinated into the world of trench warfare by being attached, one brigade at a time, to British units in the line. Finally, on 3 March 1915, it took responsibility for 6,400 yards of the line in front of Fleurbaix, seven miles from Lille. 1 Div Sigs Coy was re-organized into its component parts, as were all the divisional signal companies throughout the war. Company headquarters, consisting of the company commander and 54 men, and No. 1 Section of 2 officers and 70 men, was responsible for communications from Division to Brigade, and was attached to Divisional Headquarters. Nos. 2, 3, and 4 Sections, each with 1 officer and 26 men, were responsible for communications from Brigade to its four battalions, and were attached one each to the three Brigade Head- quarters. In addition, there were seven specialists: a captain and a clerk, Canadian Army Pay Corps (CAPC); 2 interpreters; 2 medical assis- tants, Canadian Army Medical Corps (CAMC); and 1 vehicle technician, Canadian Army Service Corps (CASC). There were also 18 men attached from Base Details. The Divi- sional Headquarters (Div HQ) communication specialists consisted of: a Signal Master (officer), a Superintendent, 4 clerks, 37 operators, and 3 linemen.

While at Fleurbaix, 1 CID had a minor di- versionary role in the British 1st Army’s attack at Neuve Chapelle, 10 - 12 March 1915, which initially was a great success but due to the hes- itancy of the Corps commanders soon bogged down. From 14 to 17 April, 1 CID was moved to the area of Gravenstafel in front of Ypres. There, finding the most inadequate trenches and

dugouts in the midst of indescribable filth and unburied bodies, the Canadians pro- ceeded to convert their sector into a proper defensive position. 1 CID was responsible for 4,500 yards of the front line at the very point

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Capt E. Forde, OC No. 3 Section, 1 Div Sigs Coy.

of the Ypres Salient, that projected like a spear into the German defences, which looked into the Allied lines from three sides. It was in this situation that 1 Div Sigs Coy found itself on 22 April 1915.

After two months in France, Canadian Sig- nallers had become reconciled to the realities of communications on the Western Front. With the closeness of the opposing trenches and the Germans usually holding the domi- nating ground, it was nearly impossible to use visual signalling. Even telegraph was limited, not only by the shortage of trained operators but also by the necessity to erect poles beyond the range of German guns. Wireless was still in its infancy and distrusted by staff officers who refused to code messages. Telephone became the norm for communication, especially as magneto telephones were acquired from civilian sources. Likewise, civilian lines and exchanges were adopted but increasingly military exchanges and lines were constructed. Telephone cables had to be buried to prevent them from being torn up by vehicle and human traffic, and by shell fire. In the Ypres area, where the water

table was very high, wa-

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terproof cable had to be used and buried at least three feet deep or strung along the

sides of communication trenches. Either way the system required a great deal of

human effort to establish links from division to brigade to battalion and, most importantly, to the sup- porting artillery

batteries. Under these cir- cumstances, the use of Despatch Riders (DRs) on

motorcycles became more important and regular schedules were set-up. Good

communications became vital to the survival of front- line troops, in the case of a German attack or counter-attack, in order

to be able to call down artillery fire. One new element of communication was just

coming into its own - the use of homing pigeons. Already 12 birds were being kept

at brigade headquarters. It was a system, that in spite of difficulties (pigeons would

not home at night or in fog or smoke) grew exponentially; by 1918, over 20,000 birds

were in service in the Canadian Corps*. On 22 April 1915, 1 Div Sigs Coy HQ,

MajF.A. Lister and Capt F.C. Kilburn, with Maj T.E. Powers and No. 1 Section were at Divisional Headquarters (Div HQ) near Brielen, just outside Ypres, about 15 miles from the front lines. Lt A. Leavitt with No. 3 Section was with 2 CIB HQ near Fortuin, which was about 3 miles from the front and about the same distance from the boundary between 1 CID and the 45th

Algerian Division. Capt E. Forde with No. 4 Section was with 3 CIB HQ near Wieltje, which was about 5 miles from the front but only two miles from the boundary between 1 CID and the 45th Algerian Division. These two brigades were in the front line, while Capt

G.A. Cline with No. 2 Section was with 1 CIB in reserve with its HQ near

Vlamertinghe west of Ypres, about 16 miles from the front lines. At about 1600

hours, a violent German bombardment began on the French divisions to the

Canadians’ left and about an hour later 3 CIB observed a cloud of green vapour en-

veloping the Algerian Division. Gas

warfare, in the form of chlorine gas, had begun on the Western Front. It was a

weapon, that would as- sume more deadly forms, and was used by

*See Part 1 of Appendix 8 for a further explanation of the Pigeon Service.

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both sides until the end of the war. The two French divisions to the Canadian left were speedily driven from their defensive areas, and the German infantry following the spread of the gas were soon in position to pinch off the one Canadian and two British divisions that were occupying the Ypres Salient. Cana- dian and British units used a series of desperate and costly counter-attacks on the 23rd to halt the German advance at the left boundary of 1 CID. On the 24th, the Germans, still determined to cut-off the Salient, renewed the attack, and once again used gas, this time against the Canadians. Some ground was lost and it appeared that the German assault might be successful, but stubborn resistance by the Canadians and a counter-attack by a British force on the morning of the 25 th con- solidated the line, which held firm for the next ten days. Finally, on the 26th, 1 and 3 CIBs were withdrawn into reserve, to be followed the next day by 2 CIB, which had served 13 days in the Salient. By 4 May, the

Second Bat-

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tle of Ypres was over, and while some ground had been lost, the city of Ypres was held. Cana- dian casualties, almost equally divided among the three brigades, were 6,104 all ranks, 37 per cent of the entire division.

It was a grim beginning to the reality of trench warfare for Canadian Signallers. Hav- ing only a week to prepare the divisional communications, which mostly consisted of buried cable for telephone networks in the forward area, there was insufficient time to complete the task. Not only did the heavy German artillery destroy even buried cable but also the direction of the attack upset the normal lines of communication. After the end of the first day, German troops were within small arms range of 3 CIB HQ and its telephone centre. Although desperate attempts were made to repair broken lines in the areas of severe fighting, communications during the battle were chaotic. Even the use of DRs was limited by the closeness of German direct fire. Remarkably, the casualty rate was low, mostly because Coy

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HQ and Nos. 1 and 4 Sections were originally outside the main area of conflict. Three men were killed-in-action (KIA): Cpl F.A. Swale, SigmnN.H. Coutts, and Spr G.R. Grieve,* and an unknown number were wounded.

In June 1915, the Distin- guished Conduct Medal (DCM) was the only bravery award for non-commissioned ranks other than the Victoria Cross. It was awarded to six men of 1 Div Sigs Coy for heroic actions during the period 22 – 27 April: Pte H.M. Adams, who in 1916 was

DSO

DCM

fact that Maj Lister did not mention the Ger- man use of gas in the War Diary showed the strain he was under during those difficult days in the Ypres Salient.#

On 9 May 1915, 1 CID was moved about 20 miles south of Ypres to the area of Festubert. Here, from 15 – 25 May, the Division was involved in a series of attacks over ten days with the aim of taking 600 yards of German trench, part of a British Army endeavour to put pres- sure on the Germans while the French were mounting an offensive in the Arras sector. The end result for the Canadians was 2,468 casualties and only a tiny portion of German trench captured. The Division was then moved a little south to the Givenchy area, where on 15 June another attempt was made to gain some portion of the German trench

awarded the Military Medal (MM), Cpl E. Cass- tles, Pte W. Duncan, Cpl B.E. Kennedy, Pte A. McAtair, and Pte H.S. Quigley, who later was commissioned and awarded the Military Cross (MC). Two of the citations were for repairing broken telephone cables under fire, and the other four for carrying messages under fire, when the cables were beyond repair. Two of the officers were also cited. Maj F.A. Lister was awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO), established in1886 as an award for officers usually of the rank of major and above, although junior officers could be awarded it for great gallantry. After 1 January 1917, it could only be awarded for “action in the face of the enemy.” Both he and Capt F.C. Kilburn were awarded “Mentioned-in-Despatches (MiD), a very old award, which consisted of having one’s name published in the London Gazette. After the war, it was decided that those so honoured would be entitled to wear a bronze oak leaf on the Victory Medal and its associated ribbon. Although he did not receive a decoration, CSM H.T. May, later commissioned and awarded the MC, was mentioned in the War Diary for putting in a telephone wire under fire. It was an indication of the seriousness of the situation that the Company Sergeant Major was laying line. The

system. Once again, there was no success, in spite of the men being re-armed with the Lee- Enfield rifle, after the acknowledged failure of the Canadian Ross Rifle to sustain rapid fire at Ypres. With two failures in a row, offensive operations ceased and 1 CID was moved to the area of Ploegsteert, three miles from Armen- tieres. After taking over 4,400 yards of trench from the British, the Canadians were left in a quiet area for three months to recover from the bloodletting of the previous two months, during which there were nearly 10,000 casualties.

From mid-June until mid-September, the Division had time to build up its strength and to review its defence and attack practices. While Ypres was an unusual occurrence - a German attack which collapsed the adjoining division, causing a threat from a flank, still it was acknowledged that Canadian defences needed to be improved. After the attacks at Festubert, of which it was said, “it was not war, it was murder,” there also needed to be new methods of attack. It was to take some time to find the correct procedures to ensure success in the attack, but improvements to the defence could be put into effect immediately. The first thing to be put into practice was a system of defence in depth

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and a routine of ro-

*See Appendix 6 for a list of fatal casualties. # See Appendix 7 for a list of awards.

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1 Div Sigs Coy Signal Office underground.

tation from the dangers of the front line to the less dangerous support line, about 300 - 400 yards behind, and then to the reserve line, about 1,000 yards in rear. A battalion usually did six days in each position, and then, if possible, was removed to a reserve brigade position further back still. While the positions back of the front line would seem to be less dangerous, men there were expected to work at night bringing up supplies and ammunition, digging trenches and dugouts, and digging cable trenches into which was laid the telephone wire. This last duty required enormous amounts of work, which had to be done by the infantry, since there were insufficient men in the signal organizations. All of the work done by the men in the less dangerous positions had to be done in the open, making the men vulnerable to artillery fire. Men in the front lines were safer generally because they were below ground level. Artillery fire caused over 50 per cent of the casualties, the rest mainly by machine gun and rifle fire.

The Engineers fostered improvements in the design and building of trenches, dugouts, and headquarters by the copious use of barbed wire, sandbags, timber, and corrugated iron. Within the next two years, the standard for a good defence system was set: for every 1,000 yards of front line, there had to be 1.5 million yards of barbed wire arranged in great depth, and 6 million sandbags to build up parapets above ground level, particularly in areas where the water table was high. For bombproof dugouts and headquarters required 150,000 cubic yards of timber and 33,500 square yards of corrugated iron. The most essential tool was the spade; digging-in was the key to survival.

For Signallers, the biggest improvement was the decision to bury all telephone cable at least six feet deep. This decision was driven by the German’s increased use of the 5.9 inch howitzer, which produced a deep crater. The 1 Div Sigs Coy mandate of 28 July 1915 to bury the cables to a depth of

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three feet was in-

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creased to six feet and made mandatory within the Canadian Corps on 1 January 1916. It was acknowledged by the British to be one of the most important standards in keeping communications working in spite of the in- creasing use of heavier forms of artillery. It had an obvious drawback: the enormous amount of labour required to dig the cable trenches. After awhile, the infantry grew to hate the task of digging down to six feet, and only the most persuasive signal officers were successful in getting the job done.*

Another problem affecting the use of telephones in the front lines was the ability of the Germans to detect and listen to conversations. It was mid-1915 before it was realized that using the earth as a second conductor in the front lines to minimize the amount of cable used set up a process known as induction. By placing wire probes in the ground in front of their trenches, the Germans could listen to telephone conversations up to 600 yards away in suitable soil. Of course, Canadians could do the same thing, and Maj Lister wrote of trying the induction technique in September 1915. The most obvious solution was to run the earth wire several hundreds of yards to the rear before grounding it. The threat of induction was responsible for the introduction of voice procedure to train operators to avoid the use of sensitive information. The problem was serious enough to make it a court martial offence for anyone detected of giving away information to the Germans by poor voice procedure. Increasingly, divisional signal companies monitored the telephone lines to detect and correct voice procedure. A techni- cal solution to the problem was the invention of the Fullerphone; its use of Morse Code and a very weak current made it very difficult to detect, even with ground return circuits. The D Mk III telephone had a provision for sending messages in Morse Code and was useful when line connections were inadequate for voice transmission. Both of these solutions required the use of operators who could send and receive messages in Morse Code, which

*See Part 2 of Appendix 8.

meant additional training time. Of course, wireless was the answer as it required no land lines but did require the use of an aerial, which became a target for German artillery. Wireless also needed trained operators in Morse Code and because wireless signals were easily intercepted messages had to be en- coded. Although wireless sets were available in 1915, the use of wireless was disregarded and distrusted by staff officers because of its new- ness and unfamiliarity. It was not until 1916 and later that its usefulness was proven.

While 1 Div Sigs Coy was re-organizing and improving its standards of communication within the Division, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade with its attached Signal Troop landed in France on 17 June 1915. The Troop, a RE unit of 1 officer and 23 men, was formed at Canterbury on 10 April 1915 and served throughout the war. The cavalry, because of the nature of trench warfare, was little used during the war, although, on occasion, the officers and men were put into the line as infantry. The Troop suffered a fatal casualty on 22 December 1915, when its Canadian farrier, Pte W. H. LaBorde, died in a barracks fire. Two Canadians, LCpl D.B. Jones and Pte A.W. Mitchell were awarded the DCM in early1916. Gradually its personnel were replaced by Canadians, including Capt S.A. Lee, of the Fort Garry Horse, as Officer Commanding (OC) on 5 August 1917.

On 14 September 1915, 2 CID landed in France, after a period of nearly four months training in England. 2 Div Sigs Coy landed with the equipment it had brought from Canada, except its wagons were replaced with sturdier British ones. It began operations on 19 September at Westoutre with an establishment of 6 officers and 204 men. The Com- pany was barely in location before it suffered its first fatal casualty: Spr A. Cocks on 21 Sep- tember 1915. The arrival of another Canadian division meant it was necessary to form a Canadian Corps to be able to control and ad- minister two divisions. The Headquarters in- cluded a Corps Signal Company (CHQ Sig Coy), which was

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formed in England at the CETD. The CHQ Sig Coy, initially a RE unit

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consisting of a headquarters, one airline section, poles and overhead wire, two cable sections, DRs, and a pigeon detachment, also landed in France on 14 September. Other sections were added in France including a wireless section, two cable sections, a headquarters and three signal sub-sections for the Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery (CCHA) and its three artillery brigades. It became operational on 18 September at Bailleul, where it was responsible for all communications within the corps boundaries and to flanking corps, the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), and all special units. Its commanding officer, Maj R.H. Willen, King’s Royal Rifle Corps, a British officer, became the Chief Signal Officer (CSO) in the Canadian Corps, and was appointed Assistant Director of Signals (AD Signals) on 1 February 1916. Slowly, but surely Canadians began to replace British signallers until the unit was totally Canadian.*

After a period of relatively little action on the Western Front, the British and the French returned to the attack. On 25 September 1915, the British 1st Army attacked on a five- mile front centred on the Village of Loos. The French attacked further south in the Cham- pagne and Artois areas. Both offensives failed and were called off by 4 November with losses of 60,000 British and 200,000 French. Fortu- nately, the Canadian Corps was only required to make a number of demonstrations along the front to divert German attention from the attack at Loos. The British had not yet devel- oped plans for the attack that would ensure success, nor did they have sufficient artillery and supplies of ammunition to break the strength of the German defences.

Now with winter fast approaching, both sides settled down to improving their defences and trying to make the troops as comfortable as possible in a low lying area, where heavy cold rain turned the trenches into pools of water so deep that hip waders were the only way of keeping dry. Relative quiet on the West- ern Front did not mean

life without casualties

*See Appendix 12 for the Canadian Corps Signal Service organization.

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Capt Forde outside a telephone office holding a “rum jar.”

for 1 Div Sigs Coy. On 17 November 1915, SprH.J. Nicholson was killed, and on the 29th of the same month Spr W. H. North was killed. In December 1915, it was announced that a third Canadian division was to be formed mostly from units already in England, supple- mented with troops arriving directly from Canada. A 3 Div Sigs Coy had been formed in Ottawa and embarked for England on 11 March 1916 with 16 officers and 199 men under the command of Capt J. R. Biggs, CE. In accordance with overseas Signal policy, instituted in 1916 because of the low standard of training of signallers coming from Canada, the unit was disbanded and all personnel ab- sorbed into the general reinforcement stream. Anticipating this procedure would be followed, Maj T.E. Powers, who had become the 2 i/c following the move of Capt F.C. Kilburn to a RCE unit, was posted from 1 Div Sigs Coy on 3 December 1915 to organize the formation of 3 Div Sigs Coy in France, consisting of officers from 1 and 2 Div Sigs Coys and sig-

nallers mainly from the infantry and mounted

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rifles. On 6 December 1915, Maj F.A. Lister, who had been posted to command the CETD (Signals) unit, turned over the command of 1 Div Sigs Coy to Maj E. Forde, who appointed Capt G.A. Cline as 2 i/c. There was one further highlight to the month of December. On the 20th, an electric generator arrived at 1 Div HQ and electric lights were turned on for the first time on New Year’s Eve 1915.

At the same time as the formation of a third Canadian infantry division was underway, the government announced that a fourth division would be raised. Similar to 3 CID, 4 CID was to be formed from units already overseas and from units in Canada scheduled to go overseas. 3 CID was complete in France by 22 March 1916, but 4 CID was not organized until late April and did not take its place in the line until August 1916. A 4 Div Sigs Coy had been formed in Ottawa and sailed for

overseas on 20 May 1916 from Halifax. It was commanded by Capt W. P. Gill and consisted of 6 officers and 195 men. As with the original 3 Div Sigs Coy, it was broken up upon arrival in England. In the meantime, on 14 May, a new 4 Div Sigs Coy had been formed at Shorn- cliffe from a nucleus of officers from 2 Div Sigs Coy and men from the Signals Depot. It was commanded by Maj A.G. Lawson, RCE, and after a short period of training at Bramshott, left with the rest of 4 CID for France on 10 August 1916. When it landed, it was up to the latest establishment of 9 officers, 209 men plus four attached: two motor driv- ers, CASC, and two water details, CAMC, a total of 221 all ranks. In France, its strength was further increased by 6 wireless men, 4 pioneers, 4 telephone exchange operators, and 2 interpreters. While 3 and 4 Div Sigs Coys were being organized, additional Canadian signals

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Linemen in good spirits amid the rubble.

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A pigeon being released from a trench.

units for the CHQ Sigs Coy were being formed in England. On 25 January 1916, the Cana- dian Overseas Motor Airline Section, shortly to be renamed No. 57 Motor Airline Section, was formed at Shorncliffe. In February, the Cable Sections CA, CB, and CD were organized to replace RE sections in the CHQ Sigs Coy; all were in France by the end of May 1916. Cable Sections CE and CF were organized in Eng- land and sent to France on 9 October 1916 and 17 January 1917, respectively. With the arrival of the latter, the CHQ Sigs Coy was totally Canadian and its command of it en- trusted to a Canadian officer, Capt P.E. Earnshaw, MC, on 23 January 1917. A most useful and much-needed Signal Pool was established in France in February 1916 to ensure a supply of trained signallers as reinforcements.*

While every conceivable conventional means of improving communications was being tested by the rigours of trench warfare, the newest and most misunderstood method of communication – wireless – was slowly taking its place on the battlefield. As early as May

*See Appendix 11 for Principal Senior Appointments

of CEF Signal Units.

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1915, two enterprising sappers, J.N. Cartier and A.J. Mack of 1 Div Sigs Coy, built a receiv- ing set out of spare parts and issued news reports to 1 CID HQ from signals picked up from Nauen in Germany, Paris, and the UK. The unique value of wireless was its ability to send and receive messages without the use of cables, and so avoid the tedious task of digging cable trenches. On 15 November 1915, 17 men from 1 Div Sigs Coy and 6 from 2 Div Sigs Coy were selected for a wireless course con- ducted by the RE at 2nd British Army. With this nucleus, a Corps Wireless Section, of an officer and 23 men, was formed on 27 March 1916, and stations were set up at Corps HQ, 1 and 2 CID HQ, and at 3 and 4 CIB HQ, with a control station at 2nd Army. These early attempts at communication by wireless were frustrated by a shortage of accumulators, re- chargeable batteries, and the lack of charging stations. As a result, wireless stations were often down for long periods of time, when they were working messages were mostly of a routine nature or designed to improve the skills of the operators. Another virtue of wireless was to direct artillery fire, especially in the attack when troops went beyond the cable ends and artillery forward observation officers (FOOs) could not call down fire to neutralize enemy batteries or to support the infantry when subjected to German counter-attacks. By this time, the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) was using wireless to send reports to the artillery, but this method suffered from the inability of the pilot or observer to distinguish friend from foe at heights safe from ground fire.

During the first three months of 1916, the Canadian Corps of two divisions slowly increased in strength as units of 3 CID gained battle experience. On 22 March, the Corps consisted of three divisions in an area immediately south of the Ypres Salient. The winter had been spent developing aggressive pa- trolling techniques including the night trench raid, and by the summer the daylight trench raid. The Canadian Corps was determined to dominate No-Man’s-Land in order to train soldiers in offensive operations that all knew were bound to begin in the summer of 1916.

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Signal units expanded their use of six-foot deep cable routes to ensure good communications during heavy German shelling. All divisional signal companies made constant detailed references in their war diaries about the yards of cable buried and the work ex- pended. 1 Div Sigs Coy in June 1916 stated that Capt Cline and Lts Leeson, Macfarlane, and Stewart had worked night and day with infantry labour for nine weeks burying the main divisional line six feet deep for 6,290 yards, which required 10,890 man/nights of work The brigade lines covered 3,590 yards taking 4,430 man/nights of labour. The extraordi- nary amount of work required to complete a route meant that within a divisional area only one or two could be reasonably accomplished. Brigade and divisional headquarters came to accept the fact that they had to be located on a cable route. Although there was no heavy fighting during the period January to March 1916, the Canadian Corps suffered 2,760 casualties. 3 Div Sigs Coy suffered its first casualty: Cpl J.S. Groves on 17 January 1916. During the same period two members of 1 Div Sigs Coy were awarded the DCM: A/Cpl J.F. Norton and Spr F.J. Spencer.

The relative quiet of the period January to March 1916 was soon broken in the area of St Eloi, a little north of the Canadian Corps. There, the British had planned a scheme to rid themselves of a German salient that over- looked the British lines. The idea was to tun- nel under the German position, and by setting-off enormous quantities of explosives, create a gap in the German defences that could be exploited before the Germans had time to mount a counter-attack. On 27 March, six mines, tunnels filled with explosives, were fired and very quickly British infantry had seized four of the six craters. They thought they had them all but the ground was so dis- turbed by the explosions that the landscape became unrecognizable. For a week, intense fighting for a portion of the previously de- fended German position that was subjected to heavy German artillery fire, wore down every infantry battalion of the assaulting

British 3rd Division. The Canadian Corps was supposed

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to relieve its British neighbour after the battle for the St Eloi Craters had been won, but with the complete exhaustion of the British division, it was agreed that the relief would take place in the middle of the battle for the final bit of the German defences around Position 85, which was still holding out. On 4 April, the Canadian Corps assumed responsibility for the St Eloi Craters. From then until the 16th one Canadian battalion after another of 2 CID tried unsuccessfully to drive the Germans out of the area, and in the end gave up the strug- gle. During the entire time, there was confu- sion as to which crater was which, and which ones the Canadians held and which ones the Germans held. Communications were almost non-existent; only runners and pigeons managed to deliver messages. The lack of proper trenches in an area of extreme water condi- tions made the soldiers vulnerable to artillery fire, considered worse than at Ypres. The battle cost 1,373 Canadian casualties and a loss of morale for what had been a fiasco of misin- formation at the command level. The result was the removal of LGen Alderson as Corps Commander on 28 May 1916, and his replace- ment by LGen, the Hon. Sir Julian Byng.

On 2 June 1916, while the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 3 CID, MGen Mercer, and the Commander of 8 CIB, BGen Williams, were reviewing the defences at Mount Sorrel, the Germans unleashed a violent artillery barrage followed by an infantry assault. Mercer was killed, and Williams wounded and taken prisoner. The Germans advanced about 700 yards into the Canadian position, but failed to exploit areas of weakness. Two brigades of 1 CID were ordered to counter-attack at 0200 hours on 3 June and re-take the lost ground. The attack went in at 0700 and failed, but did seal off the gap in the Canadian front line. After the success of German artillery at St Eloi, the GOC of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), Sir Douglas Haig agreed to

additional artillery support for the Canadians. As a result, the GOC of the Canadian Corps Artillery had 218 guns to support another counter-attack. Before it could take place, the Germans struck again, on 6 June, at Hooge, a spur on the ex-

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treme left flank of the Canadian Corps. By ex- ploding four mines the Germans advanced their line and took the spur. Gen Byng decided that he would give up Hooge and con- centrate on recovering Mount Sorrel. After days of concentrated artillery bombardments, Canadian infantry of 1 CID assaulted the Ger- man positions at 2030 hours on 12 June. The attack was an unqualified success and by 13 June the Canadian position was restored. The fighting between 2 and 14 June cost the Cana- dian Corps nearly 8,000 casualties, but the success at Mount Sorrel proved that with good planning, sufficient artillery support, and re- alistic objectives the Canadian Corps could defeat the Germans at their own game. The 3 Div Sigs Coy had one killed, Spr J. Miller, on 3 June, and 12 wounded during the German attack on 3 CID.

From mid June until September, the Cana- dian Corps stayed in the Ypres Salient and began to use “lessons learned” to further training, especially artillery-infantry co-operation in the attack. The increased number of artillery batteries meant that the establishment of a divisional signal company could not pro- vide the additional telephone links. To improve the communications between the infantry and the artillery, another cable section of one officer and 24 men was added. Communication by telephone was made eas- ier during 1916 as magneto telephones were issued right down to the battalion level. To in- crease the number of trained signal officers and to enhance the standards of leadership, the practice of commissioning promising signallers from the ranks began in earnest. Two had been commissioned in the fall of 1915, and they were followed by 15 in the first half of 1916, three of whom served in the artillery, engineers, or the Royal Flying Corps (RFC). Early in 1916, the RFC put out a call for volunteers from the CEF. A total of at least 10 signallers volunteered to serve with the RFC, later the RAF; four were killed-in-action. In almost all cases, the candidates had been awarded gallantry decorations as other ranks, or soon gained similar awards as officers. One interest- ing re-occurring note in all the war

diaries was

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an entry following the commissioning from the ranks stating that the officer in question was sent on leave to buy his officer’s kit. Dress standards were important even in the trenches!*

There were three DCMs awarded in June to Pte J.G. Hood and to Sgts W. de F. Henderson and G.C. Massey of 3 Div Sigs Coy, both subse- quently commissioned. On 25 March 1916, the Military Medal (MM), a new award for other ranks for gallantry, was instituted. It ranked just below the DCM, which was not awarded casually as it ranked just below the Victoria Cross. Now there was a greater possi- bility of being singled out for a single display of bravery or steadiness under fire over an ex- tended period. In June 1916, five signallers were recognized: A/Cpl J.L. Collins, Cpl T.R. Craven, Sgt W. Fullerton, Sgt T.D. Lee, and SgtF.S. McPherson.

There were seven deaths, in addition to Sigmn J. Miller in 3 Div Sigs Coy, during the first half of 1916: LCpl H.T. Edwards, 1 Div Sigs Coy; Spr F. W. Naylor, 2 Div Sigs Coy; SprG.E. Grant, 1 Div Sigs Coy; and Sigmn L. Coop, CHQ Sig Coy. Cpl G.H. Davis, LCpl H.W. Frogley, and Sigmn S.G. Brewer, 2 Div Sigs Coy were killed together on 30 April, when a German shell made a direct hit on their signal dugout; one signaller, although wounded, sur- vived.

On 1 July 1916, to celebrate Canada’s birth- day, all the guns in the Canadian Corps fired three rounds at 12 noon. Just a month later, a Canadian “first” was short-lived. On 9 August 1916, Maj J.L.H. Bogart, RCE, who had formed and commanded 2 Div Sigs Coy in Canada and France, was appointed AD Signals replacing Maj R.H. Willen, a British officer. Capt G.A. Cline assumed command of 2 Div Sigs Coy on 10 August 1916. Unfortunately, after just six days, Bogart suffered a nervous breakdown and another British officer, LColW.L. de M. Carey, RE, was appointed.

During the summer, the Canadian Corps

was re-armed with new weapons, most impor-

*See Appendix 9 for a list of those commissioned from the ranks.

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tantly with the Lee-Enfield rifle. Although 1 CID had been re-armed earlier, the rest of the Corps was still using the Canadian Ross rifle. By this time, the Ross had been found want- ing, especially during rapid fire when it tended to jam and become inoperable. These improvements were essential as there was every indication that the Canadian Corps would be drawn into the Battle of the Somme. It began with a mammoth British Army assault on German defences on 1 July 1916, mainly to draw German reserves away from the intense battle at Verdun, where the French were being bled white to prevent a German victory. The opening day of the assault was a disaster as the new British divisions suffered nearly 60,000 casualties. The attacks continued until early September when most of the 1 July objectives had been captured after an advance of 7,000 yards, but at a cost of nearly 200,000 casualties. The battle of attrition did force the Germans to abandon their attack at Verdun, but at the Somme they still held the northern end of their position in the

area of Thiepval.

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It was to this area that the Canadian Corps was sent, over a distance of 50 miles, to relieve the exhausted Australian Corps. By 3 September, 1 CID had taken over 3,000 yards of the front, while 2 and 3 CIDs prepared to mount an attack on 15 September. 4 CID had arrived in France by the middle of August, but it was still in the Ypres Salient becoming accustomed to the routines and rigours of trench warfare.

At 0620 hours, 15 September 1916, 2 and 3 CIDs attacked with Courcelette as the objective. The assault was novel in two ways: the artillery fire plan called for a creeping barrage and tanks were used for the first time; it was highly successful. As a surprise move, there was a second Canadian attack at 1800 hours, also a success. At the end of the week, during which 1 CID was also involved, the Canadians had made daily gains greater than any the British Army had made to date. The effort advanced the front line by nearly one mile and took important ground, at a cost of nearly 7,000 casualties. Yet the main German strong points had not been taken. As a second phase

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to this part of the Battle of the Somme, the Canadian Corps was tasked to capture one- half of the German defences on Thiepval Ridge. The attack began at 1235 hours on 26 September and was partially successful. By this time, the Germans had discovered a way to avoid the devastating artillery fire that fell on the front line. When an attack was imminent they reduced the force holding the front line to the minimum, sending some men forward into No-Man’s-Land to occupy shell holes. In this way they avoided heavy casualties and were in a better position to halt the attack. The Canadians continued their attacks on the 27th, 28th, and 29th, and managed to take most objectives, but the most important, nick- named Regina Trench, remained in German hands. The month of September ended with the Germans still holding the vital ground in the area named Ancre Heights.

September had proved to be a difficult month for Canadian signallers. Moving from the Ypres Salient into a new area near Courcelette to take part in the Battle of the

Somme meant laying out new communication routes, digging in cables, and establishing new headquarters at the

brigade, division, and corps levels. If the attack at Courcelette was to be successful, communications up to the time of H-hour

had to be secure, and as the attack went forward cable had to be laid immediately

behind the assaulting troops if artillery fire was to be brought down on the inevitable

Ger- man counter-attack. The first real trial for wireless was at the Somme, where one

station did follow the troops into Courcelette. There it was realized that

putting out an aerial drew artillery fire, and moreover to encode and de- code Morse Code messages slowed the pas- sageof

information, especially as the operators had to do the coding and

encoding. In the pursuit of these endeavours there were 11 fatal casualties: 1 Div Sigs Coy, Lt G. Norton, Spr E. Kellett, and T.

Graham; 2 Div Sigs Coy, Cpl L.E. Vyall; 3 Div Sigs Coy, Spr G.

H. Meats and J.H. Paul. On 20 September 1916, Lt J.R. Allan, Paymaster, LCpl L.S. Bo- stock, and Spr C.E. Fitzpatrick, A. Milne, and

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A mobile pigeon coop and a DR with a basket of pigeons.

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E. Rogers were killed, and five men wounded, when German shelling hit 3 Div Sigs Coy’s horse lines. Also, two previous Canadian signallers serving with the RFC, Sigmn E.M. Des- brisay and Spr J.M. Strathy, were killed.

In December 1915, a gallantry award, the Military Cross (MC) was announced for junior officers and warrant officers. Similar to the March 1916 MM, it recognized individual acts of bravery or continuous periods of dangerous work carried out in the face of the enemy. In August 1916, Lt H.S. Quigley, DCM, was awarded the MC. There were 16 awards of the MM in August and September.

On 1 October 1916, the Canadian Corps resumed the attack with the Regina Trench as its objective. At 1535 hours, 8 CIB on the left made some headway on the extreme left flank of Regina Trench but lost the ground gained to a German counter-attack. 5 CIB in the centre fared a little better, capturing most of Kenora Trench, leading into Regina Trench, but could go no further. The battle was resumed on 8 October after 2 CID had been replaced by 1 CID. The attack went in at 0450 hours and had momentary success but as the day wore on German counter-attacks drove the Canadians back to their starting point. The total casualties for the two days were 2,000 and the Germans still had Regina Trench. On 10 October, 4 CID took over the ground occupied by both 1 and 3 CIDs, while they and the rest of the Corps, less the artillery, moved to an area between Arras and Lens, opposite Vimy Ridge. On 21 October, 11 CIB captured a large part of the Regina Trench and by organizing a blocking position prevented the Germans from moving down it, impeding their counter-attacks. On the 25th, a single battalion of 10 CIB made an assault which went nowhere, and operations ceased for two weeks as heavy rain drenched both friend and foe. The attack was resumed in better weather on 11 November, when the re- mainder of the Regina Trench was taken in a night attack that took the Germans by surprise. One final Canadian operation on the Somme took place on 18 November

when 4 CID attacking forward from the Regina

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DR Cpl Ewart, 3 Div Sigs Coy with the blue and white arm band and his pistol.

Trench took Desire Trench for a gain of 500 yards. On 28 November, 4 CID, after spending 40 days in the line and mounting two major attacks, was withdrawn to join the rest of the Canadian Corps.

The 4 Div Sigs Coy War Diary recorded sig- nificant detail about signal operations on the Somme. During the capture of Regina Trench, the Div Sigs Coy’s lines were 8 miles long, and were maintained by parties of 2 or 3 linemen, who lived in dugouts every three- quarters of a mile. Because of the extreme length of the lines and the wet soil, telephone signals were weak. Communications to the forward troops were only possible using runners and pigeons. The Officer Commanding (OC), Maj A.G. Lawson, RCE, broke down the location and tasks of his company personnel, all ranks, during the month of

November:

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3 Brigade Sections 90Horse lines 20Divisional signal office 30 Line maintenance 30DRs and Orderlies 30“Picking Up Parties”(old wire) 5Cooks, Batmen, Clerks 10 Total 215

The Company had only one fatal casualty on the Somme: Cpl W.A. Taylor on 15 November 1916.

The Canadian Corps’ operations at the Somme cost 24,029 casualties, 31 per cent of the total strength of 77,000, for taking a number of German strong points and a few trench systems, and advanced the front line about a mile. One positive result was that the CEF learned valuable lessons, mainly how not to attack German defences. The next offensive would see all four divisions attacking together with improved infantry tactics, improved ar-

tillery support, and improved communications, especially from brigade HQ forward, all vital to success. The last three months of 1916 had been less costly to Canadian Signallers in terms of casualties, in addition to Cpl W.A. Taylor there was: Capt W.W. Wilson, Paymaster for 1 Div Sigs Coy; Spr V.F. Posthill, CHQ Sig Coy; and Sgt W. Bird, Sigs Trg Depot.

On 18 November 1916, Sir George Perley, the Canadian High Commissioner presented awards. For his leadership at the Somme MajT. E. Powers received the DSO and also a MiD. There were 9 awards of the MC, 3 awards of the DCM, and 20 awards of the MM. For the first time a Bar to the MM was awarded to SgtsH.J. Faulkner and E.G. Weeks, and Cpl L.P Smardon. There were 10 awards of a MiD.

Another eight NCOs were commissioned from the ranks. Just as a reminder that not everyone was a saint, 1 Div Sigs Coy War Diary recorded that on 18 December 1916, the CSM was court-martialled for drunkenness, and reduced in rank to private.

Documents

Semaphore to Satellite Chapter 2 - Web viewThe Canadian Corps Signal Service, consisting of the Corps Headquarters Signal Company. and four Infantry Divisional Signal Companies, and