Semantics for clausally complemented verbsphilosophical.space/papers/SemanticsCCVerbs.pdf188 DANIEL BONEVAC shall use generalized quantifiers to handle most NPs, I shall maintain the

DANIEL BONEVAC

S E M A N T I C S F O R C L A U S A L L Y

C O M P L E M E N T E D V E R B S *

A wide variety of English verbs accept clausal complements. Some - believe, know, promise, cause, mean and prove, for example - have aroused great philosophical interest. Others - such as persuade, mum- ble, suggest and ask - seem more prosaic. But surely one cannot rest content with a semantics for philosophically exciting verbs that fails to harmonize with an adequate account of their duller cousins. In this paper, therefore, I shall examine a very large group of English verbs and attempt to outline a semantics for them all.

My analysis rests on three assumptions which I cannot defend in any detail here. First, I assume that (Chomsky, 1982) is correct that the immense syntactic complexity of clausal complementation is largely irrelevant to semantics. I thus assume the sentences in each of the following sets to coincide in truth-conditions:

(1) a. Reagan knows that Andropov is a former KGB man. b. Reagan knows Andropov to be a former K G B man.

(2) a. Martha found that Dr. Who was very exciting. b. Martha found Dr. Who to be very exciting. c. Martha found Dr. Who very exciting.

(3) a. McEnroe promised that he would improve his behavior. b. McEnroe promised to improve his behavior.

Second, I assume that Chomsky's analysis of the form of these sentences is essentially correct. That is, I assume them to have one of these two syntactic structures:

(4) a. NP INFL [vP V [g COMP [s NP INFL VP]]] b. NP INFL [vP V NP [~ COMP [s NP INFL VP]]]

where COMP = {for or +WH} ( - W H = that) and INFL = {+Tense}. Third, I assume that situation semantics (Barwise and Perry, 1983), together with a treatment of NPs as generalized quantifiers (Barwise and Cooper, 1981), offers a promising semantic framework for develo- ping an adequate treatment of clausally complemented verbs. Though I

Synthese 59 (1984) 187-218. 0039-7857/84/0592-0187 $03.20 ~) 1984 by D. Reidel Publishing Company

188 D A N I E L B O N E V A C

shall use generalized quantifiers to handle most NPs, I shall maintain the usual interpretation of proper names as referring to elements of the domain.

Due to several factors, the theory I shall describe remains program- matic. I shall not discuss matters of tense or of nominalization, both of which a full theory of clausal complementation surely requires. I believe, nonetheless, that my theory constitutes a framework into which these considerations will eventually fit.

1. S I T U A T I O N S E M A N T I C S

I shall present situation semantics as a theory of partial models. A model of a first-order language L is a pair (D, q) where D is a nonempty set (the model's domain) and ~p is a function from individual constants of L into members of D and from n-ary predicates of L into sets of n-tuples of members of D. We can easily think of ~ as mapping predicate-n-tuple pairs into {1, 0}, according as the n-tuple is or is not an element of the set ~ associates with the predicate. In standard treatments, this function is total. Situation semantics, however, treats any mapping of this kind, total or partial, as a situation type. Where 5C is a set of space-time locations and 5e the set of situation types, a course "of events is a partial function from ~ into 9 ~. Like Barwise and Perry (1983), I shall use 'E' to represent the set of courses of events and 'e ' , ' e" , etc., to range over E.

Barwise and Perry construe meaning as a four-place relation d, c ~b~ e between a discourse situation d, a set s of speaker connections, a linguistic item ~b, and a course of events e. 1 Discourse situations are states of affairs, i.e., ordered pairs (l, s), where l ~ ~ and s ~ 5e. They specify the "public aspects of an utterance" (Barwise and Perry, 1983): the speaker, the addressee, the words spoken, and the discourse location. Speaker connections are partial functions from referring words to their referents. I shall thus attempt to characterize meaning relations such as d, c [[a believes that ~b] e. In so doing I shall be attempting to say when a course of events supports the truth of a report containing a verb with a clausal complement.

I shall assume that members of the following syntactic categories occupy these semantic types:

O N C L A U S A L L Y C O M P L E M E N T E D V E R B S 189

Category Type

NP E x 2 D N E x D PN D Det E x 2 D x 2 D Adj E x E V~ D Vt D x D VP E x E x D

E x 2 E S E x 2 E

I shall not here attempt to present a fragment using these categories and types; until a way of handling tense merges with my theory, it cannot cope with many of the syntactic features of the sentences I want to consider. I assume that all NPs take values in contextually determined situations (Asher and Bonevac, 1983a, Asher and Bonevac, 1983b). On my view, almost all verbs taking clausal complements occupy types E x D x E, E x D x D x E, 2 E×DxE or 2 EXD×DxE.

2. A S E M A N T I C C L A S S I F I C A T I O N O F C L A U S A L L Y C O M P L E M E N T E D V E R B S

Verbs taking clausal complements play various roles, both semantically and syntactically. They nevertheless fall into several more or less well-defined semantic categories. I shall group them according to their verdicts on the following inferences, where a is the verb in question and 49 is the embedded clause.

(V) Veridical i ty: a a 49 ~ 49. (N) Nega t ion : a a-1 49---~ 7 ( a a 49). (E) Expor ta t ion: a a Q qJ---~ Q ( a a qJ). (&E) Conjunc t ion Exploi ta t ion: a a (49 & q s ) ~ ( a a 49 & a a qJ). (&I) Conjunc t ion Introduct ion: a ot 49 & a a qJ---~ a ot(49 & ~b).


(rE) (vI) (=E)

(SE)

Dis]unc t ion Explo i ta t ion: a a (4, v O) - ~ ( a a qb v a ot 0) . D i s j u n c t i o n In t roduc t ion: a ot dp v a ot tp---~ a ot ( q~ v ~) . Iden t i t y Exp lo i ta t ion: a a q ~ & t = t'---~ a a ~ b t / / t ' (where t and t' are proper names, i.e., rigid designators). Subs t i tu t ion o f S t rong Equ iva l en t s : a a ck & qb qJ---~ a a ~.

In general I shall say that a verb is ex tens iona l if it satisfies = E and SE, otherwise, in tens ional . Any verb satisfying V I shall call fac t i ve . Note that my usage of these terms differs from that common in the literature. It will be possible for substitution of contingently coreferential singular terms to alter truth value in sentences with verbs that are, from my point of view, extensional. So perhaps 'extensional', for the remainder of this paper, should be read 'weakly extensional'.

Given these tests, clausally complemented verbs fall into the following categories:

FACTIVE: NONFACTIVE:

EXTENSIONAL

Causal Elective Permissive Deontic Defiant

V, N, E*, &E, &I, vI, = E, SE N, E, &E, &I, vI, = E, SE E, &E, vI, = E, SE E, &E, &I, vI, = E, SE E**, &E, vI, = E, SE (perhaps E)

FACTIVE:

NONFACTIVE:

INTENSIONAL

Epistemic V, N, E*, &E, vI Emotive V, N, E*, &I Positive &E (at times &I) Logical &E, &I, vI Atomic Free Choice E**, &E, rE, = E Final N, E*, &E, vI Negative &I, vE

Here 'E*' indicates that the verbs in question validate exportation for only monotonic decreasing quantifiers (Barwise and Cooper, 1981). 'E**' indicates that they validate exportation only for monotonic increasing quantifiers. I shall begin with extensional verbs and proceed later to their more complex counterparts.


3. E X T E N S I O N A L F A C T I V E S

Extensional verbs are semantically invariant with respect to sub- stitutions of coreferential proper names and strongly equivalent sentences. They seem not to depend on any sort of mental or linguistic representation. As a result, support clauses for these verbs will probably look simpler than those for intensional verbs.

I shall begin by analyzing extensional factives, i.e., those verbs that validate not only = E and SE but V (and, as it happens, E*, N, &E, &I and vI) as well. I shall call these verbs causal for obvious reasons; examples include cause, make and force. They are problematic syntactically. Make seems to require structure (4)a., but force and cause apparently take (4)b. (Akmajian and Heny, 1975) in spite of the ungrammaticality of (5):

(5) *John forced Bill Mary to run.

which is ruled out by considerations of government and binding. The sentences in (6) thus have the S-structures in (7):

(6) a. Mary's insistence caused Alice to grow angry. b. A1 forced Fred to hand over his wallet. c. The devil made me do it.

(7) a. Mary's insistence {+Tense} [vP cause Alicei [~ {for} [s PROi {-Tense} to grow angry]]]

b. A1 {+Tense} [ve force Fredi [g {for} Is PROi {-Tense} [ve to hand over his wallet]]]]

c. The devil {+Tense} [vP make [g {for} [s me {-Tense} do it]]].

Note that all require an untensed complement and delete for. Make takes a naked infinitive complement, while the others require to.

To reflect these two syntactic structures, I shall present two support conditions. Both draw inspiration from Hintikka's analysis of knowledge and belief (Hintikka, 1962):

(8) a. d, c [a causes b ~b]] e iff Ve'((l, ([[cause~, a, b, e', 1)) c e --> d, c [tb] e')

b. d, c [a makes ~b] e iff Ve'((l, (~make], a, e', 1))e e ---> d, c ~b]l e').

These conditions say that 'a causes ~b', roughly, whenever all a's


cause-alternatives - the courses of events compatible with a's causal activity - support ~b. They give us exactly the logic we want, so long as we accept a veridicality constraint:

(9 ) a. VaVbVeVl ( ( l , (~cause]], a, b, e, 1))e e) b. VaVeVl( ( l , ([[make~, a, e, 1))~ e).

(9) says, in effect, that the actual course of events is a cause[make- alternative to itself.

Philosophers of language have spilled much ink over the de re~de dicto distinction, particularly as applied to modal and other intensional contexts. Interestingly, although causal contexts are extensional by my criterion, they too permit such a distinction. I have said that causal verbs satisfy exportation only for monotonic decreasing quantifiers, e.g., those constructed from the determiners no, few, at most n and little. But the status of exportation instances involving other sorts of quantifiers is far from clear. Consider:

(10) a. The SEC investigation caused all the investors in the fund to worry ~ All the investors in the fund were such that the SEC investigation caused them to worry.

b. The new law forces every Congressman to disclose sources of campaign contributions ~ Every Congress- man is such that the new law forces him to disclose sources of campaign contributions.

c. Lafitte made some of his prisoners walk the plank Some of his prisoners were such that Lafitte made them walk the plank.

d. The loss of our right engine forced us to throw some cargo overboard ~ Some cargo was such that the loss of our right engine forced us to throw it overboard.

(10)b. and d. fail, on one of their readings: the law does not force each individual Congressman to disclose his sources, since he can always resign his office as Congressman. Similarly, the loss of an engine may force us to throw something overboard without forcing us to throw any particular thing overboard; we might have many options. Force seems to lend itself especially well to this de dicto reading, since it often involves an agent, who can make choices.

But (10)a. and c. seem valid. To capture this, I shall try to formulate a


de re sense of causal verbs. The easiest way to accomplish this is to use a scope distinction. Thus, let th, the embedded clause, be Q 0- We can write the support condition for de re make:

(11) d, c ~a makes Q t)] e iff d, c [Q]({b e D/Ve'(( l , ([make], a, e', l>>e e--->d, c ~tp(b)] e')})

I have written this condition with only one quantifier. Nevertheless it easily extrapolates to one handling any number of quantifiers. For the sake of simplicity I shall continue to write such conditions for the single quantifier case.

Cause and force prove to be much more difficult to treat. They employ a syntactic structure that has a noun phrase intervening between the verb and the clausal complement. When the quantifier to be exported comes solely from within the clause (as in (10)d.), an analysis analogous to (11) works. When the quantifier comes from the intervening NP, however, we face a serious problem. That NP controls PRO within the clausal complement. Chomsky says little about the character of LF with respect to quantifiers. If we simply replace empty categories with their coindexed NPs, then the quantifier must export from two places at once. If these verbs function like persuade, we should treat the exportation as coming strictly from the intervening NP and ignore the empty category within the clausal complement. But causal verbs, as (10)b. demonstrates, seem to permit a scope distinction that persuade does not. Consequently, the condition that seems most natural, (12), gets things wrong:

(12) d, c ~a forces /3Np 4~]1 e iff d, c ~13]l({b ~ D/Ve'(( l , (~force], a, b, e', 1)) ~ e---~ d, c ~4~b/[3~ e')}).

This, obviously, makes exportation trivial. While (12) serves as an analysis of de re causality, therefore, it cannot elucidate its de dicto relative.

How can we capture the semantic function of generalized quantifiers in the intervening NP position? I can see two options. As I have been treating the syntactic character of force, it should naturally get the semantic type E x D x D x E. This makes a de re~de dicto distinction virtually impossible. Instead, we might try assigning force the semantic type E x D x (E x 2 °) x E, where E x 2 D is the type of NPs. This would lead to the rule


(13) Ve'((l, ([force]I, a [[/3], e', 1))e e--+ d, c [~b] e'

for a de dicto reading. Much more naturally, we might argue that force differs from persuade in a more interesting way. Force seems to fall between persuade and believe verb classes to two respects. First, force requires a link between the intervening NP and the clausal complement; persuade does not:

(14) a. His clever response forced me to rethink my position. b. *His clever response forced me that John might be right. c. His clever response persuaded me that John might be

right.

Second, pleonastic there occurs with believe, fails with persuade, but has a rather unclear status with force and cause:

(15) a. I believe there to be an accident at Forbes and Negley. b. *I persuade there to be an accident at ldorbes and Negley. c. ?I force there to be an accident at Forbes and Negley. d. :I cause there to be an accident at Forbes and Negley.

To account for this, I propose treating de dicto force as occupying type E x D x E. I propose, that is, that the intervening NP, which appears both as the object of force and as the subject of the clausal complement, plays a semantic role only in the latter role. If I am correct, then the rule for a de dicto reading of force with a generalized quantifier and a clause as complement should be:

(16) Ve'((l, ([[force~, a, e', 1)) e e--+ d, c [~b~ e').

Of course, this revision of the semantics for force and cause will effect (8)a. above, in the obvious way.

4. E X T E N S I O N A L N O N F A C T I V E S

I shall call elective verbs such as consider, elect, select, christen, appoint and name, which validate, among my test inferences, just N, E, &E, &I, vI, = E and SE. Since they allow substitution of coreferential singular terms and strongly equivalent embedded sentences, they are extensional; since they fail to satify veridicality, they are nonfactive. These verbs come close, perhaps, to being veridical. Given the right circumstances, anyone elected, christened, appointed or named X really is X.


Austin (1970), however, illustrates what can happen given the wrong circumstances: "some low type" can christen a ship the Generalissimo Stalin without it thereby being the Generalissimo Stalin. And Andro- pov can consider Afghanistan fair game without Afghanistan's being fair game.

It is not clear that elective verbs take clausal complements at all. Indeed, Chomsky's allegation that they have "small clauses" as complements constitutes a highly controversial portion of government- binding theory. Furthermore, tests for pleonastic there suggest that, if clausally comPlemented at all, these verbs require structure (4)b.

(17) a. *The President appoints there to be a member of the Cabinet.

b. *I christen there to be The Queen Elizabeth.

I shall nevertheless use Chomsky's analysis, to see to what extent it lends itself to semantic treatment. Nothing essential to my theory hangs on this choice, so long as these verbs have clausal complements of some sort.

Amplifying Chomsky's account for my own purposes, I shall take (18)a. as having the structure (18)b.:

(18) a. The committee elects Fred chairman. b. The committee {+Tense} [vP elect [s Fred {-Tense}

chairman]].

Note that there is no g here; alternatively, small clauses involve mandatory S-deletion. Note also that I have included INFL in S; Chomsky does not generally do this, and I cannot argue for my inclusion of it in any detail without discussing questions of tense. I do, however, wish to treat (19)a. and (19)b. as having the same semantic structure:

(19) a. The governor named a consumer activist Commissioner. b. The governor named a consumer activist to be Com-

missioner.

To explain the logical behavior of electives we need only notice that they are all de re. That is, arguments of the following form are valid:

(20) The President appointed someone ambassador to Zaire. Someone was such that the President appointed him ambassador to Zaire.


The complexities that arise for causal verbs thus do not affect electives. As a result, I shall state the support conditions (where /3 is an NP and qJ the remainder of the embedded clause):

(21) d, c ~a elects /3 ~0] e iff d, c ~/31]({b~D/Ve'((l,(~elect~, a, e', 1)) ~ e---~ d, c ~O(b)]l e')}).

Electives, that is, function exactly like de re causals, but without a veridicality constraint. (21) yields exactly the inferences we want, so long as we supplement it with a consistency constraint:

(22) V a V e V l 3 e ' ( ( l , (~elect~, a, e', 1))~ e).

Deontics are verbs such as beg, oblige, coerce, pressure and entreat that satisfy E, &E, &I, vI, =E and SE among my test inferences. They of course admit more than small clauses as complements. Nevertheless their semantics comes very close to that I have given for electives. In fact, the only difference between these sorts of verbs is that deontics do not validate N; there is no semantic requirement that a person's entreaties or obligations be consistent. My analysis of these, then, is identical to my analysis of electives except that deontics have no analogue of the consistency constraint (22).

Finally, deJiants - such as defy, refuse and dare - validate E (for at least monotonic increasing quantifiers), &I, rE, =E and SE. Their syntactic structure is somewhat unclear; pleonastic there is uncomfort- able but not outrageous:

(23) a. *The chairman defies there to be a meeting today. b. "*Bill dares there to be a fight.

In any case, they seem to take (4)a. (Akmajian and Heny, 1975). Their support conditions appear straightforward:

(24) d, c ~a defies ~b]l e iff Ve'((l,(~defy]l, a, e', 1))~ e-+ d, c

That is, 'Harry defies Mary to marry' gains support whenever every course of events compatible with Harry's defiance supports 'Mary does not marry'. I have allowed any quantifiers in ~b to retain narrow scope; monotonic increasing quantifiers nevertheless export. I feel unsure about inferences such as

(25) John dares no bully to cross that line. No bully is such that John dares him or her to cross that line.


In fact, I am not sure that I understand what (25)'s premiss means. Things get even worse if 'I dare' replaces 'John dares'. In so far as it has any meaning, it appears to require quantifiers to have wide scope. So perhaps we should revise (24) to force a wide scope reading.

Finally, permissives satisfy E, &E, vI, =E and SE. These verbs - such as allow and permit - also function as intensional nonfactives. I shall therefore postpone treating them until I discuss intensional verbs.

5 . P O S I T I V E I N T E N S I O N A L N O N F A C T I V E S

Positive intensional nonfactives respect, in general, only one inference I have mentioned: conjunction exploitation. A few, as I shall explain later, also countenance &I. A large number of verbs fall into this group, including believe, hope, say, promise, suppose, persuade, intend, and imagine. From a syntactic point of view, they function quite differently. Two syntactic distinctions bear some significance for semantics. First, most of these verbs require the structure (4)a.; a few require (4)b., and a few accept both. We thus find:

(26) a. John says that Mary is angry. b. *John says Bill that Mary is angry.

(27) a. *John persuaded that Mary had left. b. John persuaded Bill that Mary had left.

(28) a. John promised that Mary would go. b. John promised Richard that Mary would go.

Second, most positive verbs take tensed clauses, but some require untensed clauses, and a few, again, accept both. Consider

(29) a. Mary stated that John was angry. b. *Mary stated John to be angry.

(30) a. *Richard commands that Fred is more assertive. b. Richard commands that Fred be more assertive. c. Richard commands Fred to be more assertive.

(31) a. Mary insists that John plays tennis. b. Mary insists that John play tennis.

Obviously these features, among others, must register semantically. Here, however, I shall restrict myself to capturing only the first


distinction; capturing the second requires a theory of tense beyond the scope of this paper.

I shall begin by analyzing believe. According to Hintikka's well- known analysis, 'a believes that ~b' holds just in case ~b holds in all a's doxastic alternatives, i.e., worlds compatible with what a believes (Hintikka, 1962, Hintikka, 1969). Adapting this to situation semantics, we might say that a course of events supports 'a believes that ~b' if every course of events compatible with what a believes supports ~b. But this, of course, is essentially the analysis I have presented of verbs such as cause. It would make believe (weakly) extensional by validating =E and SE. I shall therefore supplement this strategy with one taking inspiration from Rudolf Carnap's treatment of intensionality (Carnap, 1947). I shall assume that intensional verbs involve some relation between an agent and a sentence. Additionally, I shall assume that beliefs are structured into clusters; agents tend to see logical relations between beliefs in the same cluster and miss them between beliefs in different clusters. My analysis is:

(32) d, c ~a believes that ~b~ e iff 3 f ~ ~believe]3e"Ve'((l, (believe, a, e", ~b, 1))e e & ((1, (f, a, e', 1))e e--~d, c ~d~] e'))

This says that e supports the truth of ' a believes that ~b' just in case a has a "representation" of ~ and has a cluster of beliefs which is such that ~ is supported by every course of events compatible with that cluster. '~Believe]' stands for a set of clusters, each of which relates an individual in a course of events to another course of events compatible with the beliefs in the cluster. Believe thus occupies type 2 E×D×E.

'Believe', in contrast, relates an individual in a course of events to a sentence. The support condition thus says that a believes that ~b just in case all of a's doxastic alternatives (relative to the cluster under consideration) support ~b and a is in an appropriate state. I mean the condition to be very general; I take no position concerning the nature of the state that relates a to ~. The course of events e", that is, may involve a's consciousness, a's functional state, a's brain state, a theoretical construct invoked by a theory of linguistic understanding, or any combination of these. 2 The relation between a believer and a sentence may be extremely indirect; nothing in my view precludes animals from having beliefs or persons from having beliefs correctly described by sentences they have never heard and perhaps cannot understand. Believe may relate agents to any state which functionally


(in the mathematical sense) relates to sentences. Furthermore, e" may represent ~b in various ways. A semantic analysis, in my view, should not demand any particular theory of how mental states represent or manipulate items that are linguistic or correlated with linguistic items in certain ways. I intend (32) to remain neutral between these possibilities. Many verbs, e.g., say and tell, will require representation relations that are purely linguistic.

As it stands, (32) validates none of our test inferences. Indeed, as I shall explain later, (32) constitutes a paradigm for most intensional verbs. By formulating a natural structural constraint on 'believe', however, we can capture &E.

(33) VaVIVeVe'((l, (believe, a, e', tb & ~b, 1))~ e((l, (believe, a, e', ~b, 1))~ e & it, (believe, a, e', ~b, 1))~ e)).

This says that people represent a conjunction in a "belief mode" just in case they so represent each conjunct.

This paradigm allows us to capture several different senses of believe. We might want to allow certain additional inferences, explaining Rocky's belief that he is about to lose a fight, for example, by invoking his beliefs (1) that his opponent is much stronger than he is and (2) that, if his opponent is much stronger, he will lose. We might also want to be able to infer that, since Rocky believes that his opponent is strong and that his opponent is mean, Rocky believes that his opponent is strong and mean. In short, we might want to credit Rocky with certain powers of inference. Yet we do not want to give him full logical powers; we do not want to validate SE and, so, allow us to conclude that, if Rocky believes that the axiom of choice is true, Rocky also believes that Zorn's lemma is true. (33) already asserts that an agent can conjoin beliefs within a given cluster. To allow an agent greater inferential powers within clusters, we can assume

(34) VaVIVeVe'(((I, (believe, a, e', ~b, 1))c e & ¢h~¢)-->(I, (believe, a, e', ~b, 1))c e).

This simply says that, within a given cluster, a person believes all the strong consequences of what he or she believes. We can still explain failures to draw inferences; the relevant beliefs simply occupy different clusters.

To construct an analysis of de re belief, we may alter these clauses so that certain generalized quantifiers have wide scope, as in the case of


causals. To construct an analysis of belief in the sense of rational commitment, we may make other adjustments. First, those who prize rationality have little concern for the mental state of the believer; they do not demand any mental representation. So, to handle their sense of rational commitment, we can simply drop the representation clause and, with it, all reference to believe. Second, we can force the agent to see the logical relations among beliefs by deleting clusters or, more simply, by adopting the constraint

(35) af([[believe] = {f})

which demands that people have only a single cluster of beliefs. The analysis thus becomes

(36) d, c ~a believes that tk] e iff 3f~believe~Ye'((l , (f, a, e', 1)) e e--+ d, c I[4~] e').

(36) validates &E, &I, vI, =E and SE. Although my analysis says little about the philosophical details of

believing, it manages to avoid the traditional afflictions of such accounts. First, many semantics for belief reports imply that anyone holding contradictory beliefs believes everything (Hintikka, 1975a). That is, they sanction the inference:

(37) a believes that ¢b & a believes that 7~b--+ a believes that ~b.

My analysis allows this argument to fail. Indeed, it does not even justify the inference from a believes that ~b and that 7~b to a believes that (~b & 7¢b) unless these beliefs occupy the same cluster. Intuitively agents tend to recognize the logical relations between beliefs in the same cluster while failing to relate beliefs across clusters. So, in the most likely cases, a person will have contradictory beliefs without being aware of their logical connection. My analysis thus helps to resolve Saul Kripke's belief puzzle (Kripke, 1979a). Obviously Pierre can believe that London is not pretty and that Londre est ]olie without believing everything. 3

Kripke, of course, is reluctant to ascribe contradictory beliefs to Pierre. Hintikka (1975a) goes so far as to deny that anyone can believe both ~b and --nob if their their logical connection is simple enough. But Smullyan (1978) offers an interesting argument that any reasonably modest person must have inconsistent beliefs: to count as modest, a person must believe (generically, as it were) that some of his beliefs are


false. Furthermore, (32)'s demands concerning representation preclude the validity of (37); a may have representations of ~b and 7~b without having any representation of ~0.

My analysis thus solves the problem of logical omniscience. Typic- ally, this takes two forms: first, anyone who believes ~b believes all ~b's logical consequences; second, that everyone believes all logical truths, at least of certain sorts (Hintikka, 1962, Hintikka, 1975a). Barwise and Perry (1983) offers a theory that solves these difficulties at the expense of allowing a more restricted sort of omniscience: anyone believing ~b still believes all ~b's strong consequences (Barwise, 1981, Barwise and Perry, 1983). It is difficult to tell whether this theory implies that everyone believes all "strong validities", i.e., sentences that every situation supports, since there may not be any; Barwise and Perry do not treat the conditional, so we cannot evaluate such candidates as '~b ~ ~b'. (32) eliminates all these problems, in two ways. Even though ~b may hold in all a 's doxastic alternatives, a may have no representation of 4'. Hence a may believe ~O without believing some strong consequence of qJ; a need only have a representation of ~O without having one of its consequence in the same cluster.

My analysis also avoids problems involving identity. Suppose that t and t' are rigid designators and that ' t = t" is true. Then, according to many accounts of belief, 'John believes that Cicero is a famous Roman orator ' implies 'John believes that Tully is a famous Roman orator'. The representation clause again saves my account.

Most positive intensional nonfactives share the analysis I have given for believe. But several verbs differ from believe in semantically significant ways. First, several verbs take syntactic form (4)b. rather than (4)a. These - tell, persuade and convince, for example - require some alterations to support conditions.

Suppose first that the NP following the verb is a proper name:

(38) d, c ~a tells b that 4~ e iff 3 f~ ~tell~3e"Ve'((l, (tell, a, b, e", d~, 1))~e & ((l, (f, a, b, e', 1))~ e--> d, c~tk] e')).

This says that a course of events e supports the truth of ' a tells b that ~b' just in case there is a representation of ~b (here probably physical or linguistic) that a tells b and every course of events that is compatible with what a tells b (in a given cluster of information) supports the truth of ~b. If the NP following the verb is not merely a proper name, it forces us to use a slightly more complicated characterization:


(39) d, c [a tells /3 that ~b] e iff [/3]({b~D/3f~]tel l]3e"Ve'(( l , (tell, a, b, e", 4~, 1))~ e & ((l, (f, a, b, e', 1))~ e - - , d , c ]4~] e'))}).

Alone, these conditions validate no test inferences. But the constraint I imposed on belief is equally natural here; a represents a conjunction to b just in case a represents both conjuncts to b. Given an analogue of (33), then, verbs such as tell validate &E. They appear, as do some senses of believe, to validate &I as well. We can capture this simply by eliminating clusters.

Sometimes these verbs look very much like those that require (4)a. Consider

(40) a. Mary persuades Alice to play tennis. b. Mary promises Alice to play tennis. c. Mary supposes Alice to play tennis.

Support conditions for the sentences in (40) differ substantially. These sentences have the following S-structures:

(41) a. Mary {+Tense} [persuade Alicei [{for} [PROi {-Tense} to play tennis]]]

b. Maryi {+Tense} [promise Alice [{for} [PRO/{-Tense} to play tennis]]]

c. Mary {+Tense} [suppose [{for} [Alice {-Tense} to play tennis]]].

Since I have not developed any general method for handling tense, I shall postpone treating one source of difference between the sentences in (41). For now I want to stress only that surface structure can be misleading; the logical forms of the above sentences lead to the following analyses:

(42) a. 3 f ~ [persuade[3 e"Ve'((l, (persuade, ]Mary], [Alice], e", Alice to play tennis, 1)) c e & ((I, (f, [Mary], [Alice], e', 1)) e e--+ d, c [Alice to play tennis] e'))

b. 3 f~[promise[3e"Ve' ( ( l , (promise, [Mary], [Alice], e", Mary to play tennis, 1))~ e & ((l, (f, ]Mary], [Alice], e', 1)) e e--+ d, c ]Mary to play tennis] e'))

c. 3 f ~ [SupposellVe"3 e'((l, (suppose, [Mary], e", Alice play tennis, 1))c e & ((l, (f, [Mary], e', 1))~ e--->d, c [Alice to play tennis] e')).


My analysis also applies to sentences involving WH-words. So far I have restricted attention to sentences with COMP = for or - W H (that). But my theory can handle sentences where COMP = + W H without major revision. I shall treat WH-words, in this context, as introducing a quantification (or, if you prefer, a free variable) into the support conditions. Consider

(43) Mary told us who to talk to.

This has the structure

(44) Mary {+Tense} [vP tell usl [s + WH(who)j [s PROi to talk to tjJ]]

If we put

(45)

'x ' in for 'who' and its trace here, we obtain

3f~]ltell]13e"Ve'((l, (tell, ]lMary]l, ~us], e", us to talk to x, 1))~ e & ((I, (f, I[Mary]l, [[us]l, e', 1))~ e ~ d, c, ~us to talk to x] e'))

which is the support condition for 'Mary told us to talk to x'. But (43) is roughly equivalent to '(3x)(Mary told us to talk to x)'. Where should we put the existential quantifier? If we place it to the left of 'V' then we require that, in every tell us-alternative, we talk to the same person. If we place it to the right of 'V', we may talk to different people in different tell us-alternatives. Suppose Mary told us to talk to the customer representative. Then, in each alternative, we talk to whoever is the customer representative in that alternative. In one course of events, we may talk to Fred, in another, to Ann, and so on. Since nonrigid terms can occupy 'x's position, we must place the quantifier to the right of 'V'.

Additionally, Mary may have told us to talk to several people. A simple existential quantifier does not suffice to handle cases where Mary tell us, say, who the assassins are. So we need to introduce a set of objects, in something like the following way:

(46) 3 f s [tell]13 e"Ve'3XVx((l, (tell, l[Mary]l, [us], e", us to talk to g(X), 1))~ e & (x s X~--> ((/, (f, ~Mary]], ~us], e', 1))s e---> d, c ]lus to talk to x]l e')))

or, in the general case (with structure (4)a.):


(47) d, c ]a a -WI)/~b(t)] e iff 3 f s [a]3e"Ve'3XVx((l, (a, a, e", ~b(g(X)), 1 ) ) s e & (xcX~--~((l, (f, a, e', 1))se~--~d, c ~qb(x)] e'))).

In these conditions g(X) is typically a name for an element of X or an NP that specifies X. Thus Mary may have told us to see Phil; she may also have told us, however, to see everyone on the board of directors without listing them. I intend g(X) to capture both possibilities. 4

6. O T H E R I N T E N S I O N A L N O N F A C T I V E S

I call an intensional nonfactive logical just in case, among my tests, it satisfies exactly &E, &I and vI. Relatively few verbs have this characteristic, but they bear great significance for logicians and seman- ticists: imply, entail, assume, and presuppose. Fortunately, they also share many syntactic features. All require the form (4)a., and all feel most comfortable with COMP = - W H and INFL = +Tense. Except for certain locative clauses, it appears that none accept COMP = +WH.

I characterize their support conditions as follows:

(48) d, c [a implies that ~b] e iff 3 f ~ [imply]3e"Ve'((l, (imply, a, e", 6, 1)) e e & ((I, (f, a, e', 1)) ~ e---~ d, c [~b~ e')).

As it stands, (48) sanctions no test inferences. We could validate &E, &I and vI by dropping the representation clause and assuming that [imply] = {f}. This, however, would make these verbs extensional. In addition, it would make the condition characterize a "strong" concept of implication conforming exactly to Barwise and Perry's. But the condition should allow for a variety of implication concepts. I want to be able to provide support conditions for intuitionistic, standard and relevance logicians' talk about implication as well. Consequently, we should adopt structural constraints conforming to the particular logical notion useful for evaluating these reports.

Furthermore, we must distinguish sentient from linguistic subjects. "Sentient subject" here is very broad, encompassing a person or animal and any of its characteristics. Thus, for my purposes, 'the tone of Holmes's voice' and 'Mary's suddenly abrupt manner' count as sentient subjects. The cluster analysis works well for these subjects, who imply and assume various things without necessarily seeing their inter- relationships. For linguistic subjects, however, clusters generally add


nothing to the account. Indeed, they may confound certain desirable inference patterns. We therefore need the constraint that ~a]] is a singleton when a is a logical intensional nonfactive with a linguistic subject. Furthermore, such verbs with sentient subjects seem to make use of the subject's mental state in a way that they do not with linguistic subjects. (49)a. appears to depend on a mental state, while (49)b. does not:

(49) a. Nick implied that he understood what I had been trying to say.

b. Russell and Whitehead's axioms imply that the universe is nonempty.

I thus propose an analogue of (33) as a constraint, together with

(50) V fc~a lV aV e 'V e ( ( l , (a, a, e', ~, 1))~ e--->(l, (a, a, e', t~ v ~, 1)) e e),

for sentient subjects. For linguistic subjects, these should be replaced or supplemented by constraints that mirror the semantics of a particular notion of entailment or presupposition.

Some intensional nonfactives fail to validate any test inferences. I call these atomic simply because they require no structural constraints; no matter what sense we give to the notion of mental representation, they force us to assume no connections between representations of sentences. From the perspective of these verbs, then, the realm of representations has no structure. Representations behave as if the sentences they represent are all atomic. Falling into this category are mean (in the sense of have the meaning, not in the sense of intend), repeat, prefer, like, infer and reason.

Because of its semantic interest I shall focus on mean. Even laying aside its senses having the force of intend, mean is indeterminate in an important respect. At times, it has the force of 'means in part', at times, of 'has the meaning'. Note that the sentences in (51) can all be true, but that those in (52) are mutually exclusive:

(51) a. The smoke rising from the woods means that something is on fire.

b. The smoke rising from the woods means that Johnny has been playing with matches again.

c. The smoke rising from the woods means that I wasn't


watching my son as carefully as I should have been. d. The smoke rising from the woods means that Smokey the

Bear is going to be very upset.

(52) a. 'Odi et amo' means that I hate and yet I love. b. 'Odi et amo' means that I hate. c. 'Odi et amo' means that I love. 5

If I am right, then this distinguishes linguistic from naturalistic meaning in an important way. In any case, I wish to analyze the sense of mean in which the embedded clause attempts to render the entire meaning the subject conveys.

I maintain that the support clause looks very much like those we have seen already:

(53) d, c 1[a means that 4}~ e iff 3fE1[mean~3e"Ve'((l , (mean, a, e", 6, 1))• e & ((1, (f, a, e', 1))• e---~ d, c 1[4}]e')).

This requires no constraints, and satisfies no test inference patterns. Describing mean, however, would require a theory of language far more complete than I can currently offer.

Nevertheless this analysis makes several advances over standard theories of meaning, many of which, by identifyi.ng the meaning of a sentence with a set of possible worlds, imply that logically equivalent sentences are synonymous. Even Barwise and Perry (1983), by taking ~b's meaning to be represented by 'd, c I[4}]] e', calls strongly equivalent sentences synonymous. (53), however, provides an interesting way of analyzing sentence meaning. Let 4' and 0 be sentences. Then we can say that 4} and 0 are synonymous, roughly, just in case there is some sentence ¢ such that both 4, and q~ mean that ¢. More precisely,

(54) cl, c 114} and ~ are synonymous] e iff 3¢(d , c 114} means that ~:ll e & d, c llg, means that ¢] e).

According to this definition of synonymy, 4} and ~ will be synonymous only if mean assigns them the same representation (namely, that functionally related to ¢).

Unless one construes semantics very broadly, (54) has the consequence that judgments of synonymy lie outside the sphere of semantics. Whether this is desirable depends on one's views on the nature of semantics and meaning. I suspect that philosophers of language have used 'meaning' equivocally, for a concept that belongs to semantics


proper and for a concept belonging to the theory of linguistic understanding, pertaining to mental, functional, physical, computational or representational states, which I shall call "speaker meaning".6 1 am not saying that semantic meaning and speaker meaning have no inter- relation. The hallmark of the intensional, as I see it, is a reference to the realm of linguistic understanding from within the realm of semantics. Thus my support conditions for intensional verbs have contained clauses making use of speaker meaning; I do not know whether one can account for intensional language without such appeals to understanding. In any case, my view leaves us with two concepts of synonymy: semantic synonymy, or sameness of semantic meaning, and speaker synonymy, or sameness of speaker meaning. (54) provides an analysis of speaker synonymy. For an analysis of semantic synonymy, is suffices to drop clauses pertaining to speaker meaning. This yields simply

(55) d, c ~b and ~b are synonymous~ e iff Ve' (d , c ~b~e' ~ d, c ~qJ~ er) .

(55) does make strong equivalents synonymous. But my distinction between semantic meaning and speaker meaning implies that a similar problem is likely to arise with any strictly semantic, i.e., extensional approach to synonymy. It also implies that, insofar as the term has been equivocal, synonymy traditionally involves sameness of both semantic and speaker meaning.

Permissives are verbs - like let, permit and allow - that seem to satisfy, depending on how they are read, either E (for monotonic increasing quantifiers), &E, rE, and =E or E, &E, vI, SE and =E. Hans Kamp, for example, notices the ambiguity of sentences of the form 'You may 4~ or q~' (Kamp, 1978). On one reading, this implies both 'You may th' and 'You may ~'; on another it follows from both 'You may ~b' and, independently, 'You may ~'. Examples such as these demonstrate that the point applies as well to permissive verbs with clausal complements:

(56) a. The law allows you to file form 1040, 1040A or 1040EZ. b. I'll let you take the exam on either Thursday or Friday.

(Call me next week to find out which.)

(56)a. implies that the law allows you to file form 1040; that it allows you to file 1040A; and that it allows you to file 1040EZ. Note, however, that (56)a. does not imply that the law allows you to file all three forms.


(56)b., in contrast, does not imply that I shall let you take the exam on Thursday and that I shall let you take the exam on Friday, much less that I shall let you take the exam on both days. Neither sense of permissives, therefore, validates &I, though the first - the "free choice permission" sense - validates vE (by, in fact, validating something much stronger: the inference

(57) a allows q~ v t0--~ (a allows ~b & a allows 0)),

while the second validates vI. Of these two senses, the second is far easier to analyze:

(58) d, c ~a allows 4) (= Q qJ)] e iff d, c ~ Q] ({ b ~ D/Vf ~ ~allow] 3e'((l, (f, a, e', 1)) c e & d, c [O(b)] e;)}).

This condition says t ha t ' a allows th' gains support whenever, no matter what prohibitions may be in effect, there is some course of events allowed by a that supports 4~- In addition, it provides that all permission statements are de re. If for any reason one wants a de dicto reading of these sentences, one can permit the quantifier narrow rather than wide scope. Note that the universal quantification over f is important to the logic of these verbs; without it vE would turn out valid. The dis- tribution inferences thus force us to assign permissives, in this sense, type 2 T M .

In their "free choice permission" sense, allow, permit and let require a different analysis. A substantial literature treats the question of how we can account for usages such as (56)a. I shall not attempt to adjudicate the issue here. Instead I shall present a technical trick that approximates my strategy for intensional verbs.

I shall analyze the special sense of permissives as follows:

(59) d, c ~a allows 4J~ e iff 3e'((l, (allow, a, e', 4J, 1))~ e & (l, ([allow], a, e', 1))~ e).

This says that ' a allows th' gains support whenever some course of events that a allows bears the proper relation to 4~- I have represented that relation as allow. Normally we would expect the relation to be just d, c ~4~] e', but that fails to yield the correct logic for free choice permission. Consequently we need to use another relation. Kamp employs, roughly, a relation of belonging to the set of permitted actions relative to (h. For my limited purposes here, however, it makes no difference what the exact nature of allow is. But to get the inferences we


need for free choice permissives, we must add some structural constraints concerning this mysterious relation:

(60) a. VaVeVe'Vl((l, (allow, a, e', 49 & ~, 1))~ e--)((l , Callow, a, e', 49, 1))c e & (1, Callow, a, e', if, 1))~ e))

b. VaVeVe'Vl((l, Callow, a, e', 49 v ~b, 1))E e--> ((4 Callow, a, e', 49, 1)) e e & (l, Callow, a, e', ~, 1)) e e))

Note that the support condition itself validates exportation for monotonic increasing quantifiers. These constraints, therefore, together with my support condition, make permissives in the free choice sense satisfy exactly the inferences we want.

I shall call an intensional nonfactive negative if and only ff it validates, among the test inferences, just &I and rE . Whereas positive nonfactives - believe, assert, promise, allege, etc. - often involve an attitude of affirmation, negative nonfactives involve an attitude of rejection or denial. Fear, doubt, deny, decline and refuse all fit this description. Since the last two verbs take clausal complements only in special cases, I shall focus on the first three as paradigm negative intensional nonfactives. Semantically, they function very similarly. Though I shall define support conditions for doubt, therefore, I mean them to apply to the others as well.

I claim that

(61) d, c ~a doubts that 49~ e iff 3 f ~ ~doubt~3e"Ve'((l, (doubt, a, e", 49, 1))~ e & (it, if, a, e', 1))c e--)d, c ~749] e'))

where doubt satisfies these structural constraints:

(62) YaVeVe'Vl(((l, (doubt, a, e', 49, 1)) ~ e v (l, (doubt, a, e', ~, 1))c e)---)(l, (doubt, a, e', 49 & qi, 1))~ e);

(63) VsVeVe'Vl((l, (doubt, a, e', 4)v ~b, 1))c e---)((l, (doubt, a, e', 4), 1)) e e & (4 (doubt, a, e', 0, 1)) e e)).

According to (61), a course of events supports 'a doubts that 49' just in case a appropriately represents 49 and every course of events compatible with o's doubts (within a given cluster) supports -749. (62) says that, if a represents either 49 or ~b as a doubt, then a so represents 49 & qJ. (63) says that, if a represents 49 v ~ as a doubt, then a so represents both 49 and ~. Together these principles imply that doubt satisfies &I and rE .


An intensional nonfactive is final if and only if, among my test inferences, it validates just &E, vI, E*, N and perhaps &I. Falling into this class are decide and conclude. These verbs look much like positive nonfactives, but with one important exception. A person may have contradictory beliefs, make incompatible assertions and promise inconsistent things, but cannot make contradictory decisions or reach incompatible conclusions. In cases where this seems to occur, we say instead that the person has reached no decision or conclusion at all. The following sentences seem contradictory:

(64) a. John decided to go to law school and decided not to go to law school.

b. Mary concluded that Fred was in love with Alice and that Fred was not in love with Alice.

I shall thus state the support condition for decide as follows:

(65) d, c ~a decides that ~b~ e iff 3 f c ~decide~3e"Ve'((l, (decide, a, e", q~, 1))s e & ((l, (f, a, e', 1))s e--~d, c ~d~] e')).

This stipulates that 'a decides that ~b' gains support just in case a appropriately represents ~b and every course of events compatible with a's decisions supports qb. To capture the logic of decide correctly, I need several constraints:

(66) VaVeVe'Vl(((l, (decide, a, e', ~b, ~l)) c e & (I, (decidel a, e', ~, 1))~ e)~--~(l, (decide, a, e', ~b & ~, 1))~ e);

(67) Vf~ ~decide~VaVeVl3e'((l;~(f, a, e', 1))E e).

(66) says simply that people represent, ina decide mode, a conjunction just in case they so represent each conjunct. (67) requires that decisions be consistent. Together these principles ~alidate &E, vI, E* and N. The status of &I, intuitively, is somewhat less clear; though the inference seems fine for decide, it seems more questionable for conclude:

(68) a. Reagan decided to send Marines to Beirut. Reagan decided to send Habib to Jerusalem. Reagan decided to send Marines to Beirut and to send Habib to Jerusalem.

b. The senator concluded that nobody understood his pro- posal. The senator concluded that the President knew some-


thing he didn't. The senator concluded that nobody understood his pro- posal and the President knew something he didn't.

(68)b. seems to require that the senator connect the two conjuncts in a way that (68)a. does not. In any case, if we want &I to hold, we need a further constraint saying that clustering makes no difference; there are no barriers to conjoining a person's decisions or conclusions:

(69) 3f([[decide]] = {f}).

Decide, unlike conclude, accepts C O M P = +WH. Once again the WH-words function as existential quantifiers, so we obtain the obvious analogue of (47).

7 . I N T E N S I O N A L F A C T I V E S

Quite similar to positive nonfactives in most respects are epistemic intensional factives. These verbs - know, see, remember, lind and prove, among others - satisfy V, N, E*, &E, vI and, perhaps, &I. They tend, syntactically, to be very flexible, fitting into a wide variety of constructions. All but show require structure (4)a.

(70) states the support conditions for the (4)a. epistemic verbs:

(70) d, c ~a knows that tb~ e iff 3 f ~ ~knowD 3 e"Ve'((l, (know, a, e", ~b, 1) )e e & ((1, (f, a, e', 1))e e-->d, c [~b]] e')).

To take an example, 'John knows that Chicago is large' gains support whenever John has a knowledge representation of 'Chicago is large' and every epistemic alternative - every course of events compatible with John's knowledge - supports 'Chicago is large'. Of course, the actual world is one such course of events, since known is factive. To say this we need a structural constraint:

(71) Yf c ~know~YaVeYl((l, if, a, e, 1)) ~ e).

And we need the familiar constraint concerning conjunction representation:

(72) VaVeVe'Yi((1, (know, a, e', qb & ~b, 1)) c e ~ ((/(know, a, e', ~b, i)) c e & (I, (know, a, e', ~b, 1)) ~ e)). "~

So far, my ~a lys i s makes epistemic factives satisfy E*, N, V and &E.


To get vI we need an additional and somewhat less natural constraint:

(73) VaVeVe'Vl((l, (know, a, e', tb, 1))e e--> (l, (know, a, e', ¢b v g,, 1)) e e).

At this point we have a choice. We might decide to validate &I, depending on our attitude toward inferences such as

(74) Mary knows that Alice is angry. Mary knows that Belgrade is the capital of Yugoslavia. Mary knows that Alice is angry and Belgrade is the capital of Yugoslavia.

We can do this by adopting a constraint ridding us of clusters:

(75) 3f(~know~ = {f}).

Alternatively, we might want to allow agents full logical powers for connecting bits of knowledge and drawing inferences within clusters while maintaining barriers between clusters to preclude logical omniscience. We can accomplish this by adopting the constraint.

(76) VaVeVe'Vl(((l, (know, a, e', th, 1 ) ) ce & ~b~q,)-->(l, (know, a, e', 0, 1))e e).

Adopting (76) probably yields the most natural semantics for most epistemic factives.

My semantics solves several traditional puzzles concerning the logic of knowledge. First, note that my account does not imply that everyone knows every logical or necessary truth (Hintikka, 1962); the combination of using support rather than truth conditions and employing a representation clause allows an agent to remain ignorant of what holds in every possible world (or, even, in every possible course of events). Second, my account does not imply that people know what they know. The KK thesis (Hintikka, 1962) amounts, in my theory, to the inference

(77) 3 f e ~know]13 e"Ve'((l, (know, a, e", ~b, 1)) e e & ((l, (f, a, e', 1)) e e---> d, c ~4'] e')) 3 r e ~know]13e"Ve'((1, (know, a, e", a knows that ~b, 1))e e & ((l, (f, a, e', 1))c e-->d, c ~a knows that tb] e')).

This fails, and for the right reason: a may have a representation of tb without having any representation of 'a knows that ~b'. Third, my theory distinguishes knowledge reports embedding strongly equivalent


sentences or sentences resulting from substitution of coreferential rigid designators. Even if Frank has a knowledge representation of 'Demon- sthenes and Cicero were famous ancient orators', he need not have any such representation of 'Demonsthenes and Tully were famous ancient orators'. For the same reason, my analysis allows knowers to fail to know logical or strong consequences of what they know.

Finally, my theory casts some light on inferences involving "knowing who" (Hintikka, 1962, Hintikka, 1975b). Although (78)a. clearly fails, (78)b. seems acceptable (Quine, 1976).

(78) a. Ralph knows that the man in the brown hat is a spy. The man in the brown hat is Ortcutt.

...... Ralph knows that Ortcutt is a spy. \"\ b. Ralph knows that the man in the brown hat is a spy.

-~:~ Ralph knows that the man in the brown hat is Ortcutt. Ralph knows that Ortcutt is a spy.

My semantics counts both arguments invalid, but (78)b. fails only because Ralph can fail to connect his knowledge that Ortcutt is the man with the brown hat with his knowledge that that man is a spy. That is, these items may occupy different knowledge clusters. If Ralph connects his bits of knowledge in the same cluster, however, (76) makes (78)b. go through.

To analyze 'Ralph knows who Ortcutt is' I must allow COMP to be +WH. Most epistemic verbs allow this possibility. Hintikka construes (79)a. as (79)b.:

(79) a. Ralph knows who Ortcntt is. 3x(Ralph knows that Ortcutt = x).

My analysis essentially agrees; following the pattern of (47) yields

(80) 3f~[know]3e"Ve'3XVx((l , (know, [Ralph], e", Ortcutt is g(X), 1) )~e & (x~X*-~((l, (f, ~Ralph], e', 1))ce--~d, c [Ortcutt is x] e'))). 7

'Ralph knows who Ortcutt is' thus fits the same pattern as 'John knows who to go to for help', 'Mary knows where she can find a good margarita' and 'Alice knows what the men threw into the river'. Of course, since 'Ortcutt' is a singular term, the set X in (80) must be a singleton. More simply, then, (79) has the support condition:


(81) 3 f ~ ~know]3e"Ve'3x((l, (know, l[Ralph], e", Ortcutt is g(x), 1)) e e & ((/, (f, ~Ralph]], e', 1)) ~ e---> d, c [[Ortcutt is x] e')).

Epistemic verbs report on subjects' epistemic states, in general, without reporting any emotional reactions. Some verbs, however, report pri- marily on subjects' emotional states and only secondarily on their epistemic states. These verbs satisfy V, N, E* and &I among the test inferences. They include regret and a wide variety of be + adjective combinations: be appalled, be surprised, be afraid and be happy, to name a few.

Emotive verbs, I contend, have support conditions very different from their epistemic relatives. Indeed, if I am correct, they share much with negative nonfactives. Oddly, several analyses work equally well for these verbs, from a logical point of view, though one or the other seems intuitively most natural for certain emotives. Roughly, I shall analyze 'John is surprised that we are leaving tomorrow' as 'We are leaving tomorrow, and John didn't expect it' and 'John regrets that he punched the dean' as 'John punched the dean, but he wishes he hadn't'. Emotives seem to come paired with certain nonfactives; John's regret-alternatives are courses of events which are compatible not with everything John regrets but with everything John wishes. Similarly John's be surprised- alternatives cohere with everything John expected.

I shall state the support conditions for these two kinds of emotives, then, as:

(82) a. d, c ~a regrets that ~b] e iff 3 f ~ ~regret]3 e"Ve'(d, c ~b~ e & (1, (regret, a, e", tb, 1)) ~ e & ((l, (f, a, e', 1)) ~ e---> d, c [[~th]] e'))

b. d, c ~a is surprised that tb] e iff Vjfe~be surprised]3e"3e'(d, c [~b] e & (l, (be surprised, a, e", oh, 1)) ~ e & (l, (f, a, e', 1)) e e & 7 d, c ~b] e').

The only structural constraint we need to get the logic right is one analogous to (62) concerning conjunction representation.

This analysis may seem surprising. Nevertheless, I have not been able to construct one similar to those for other verb classes while validating just the right inferences. If my analysis is correct, then emotives' evaluations should correlate with those for certain nonfactives: regret with wish, be surprised with expect, etc. We can state support conditions, however, independently of these connections.

ON C L A U S A L L Y C O M P L E M E N T E D V E R B S 215

8 . C O N C L U S I O N

I have attempted to articulate a semantic framework for analyzing verbs taking clausal complements. Though it remains incomplete, I hope that it will accommodate a theory of tense and nominalization. In the process I have tried to resolve several philosophical puzzles about knowledge, belief and meaning. Arguing for my resolutions in detail would make this paper indefinitely longer.

I would like to conclude by mentioning a number of open problems. First, I have ignored presupposition relations. Relatively few clausally complemented verbs give rise to presuppositions, but some - m a n a g e and regret - probably do. In handling factives I have not distinguished presuppositions from entailments. It may be, therefore, that my conditions for emotive intensional factives are incorrect; 'John is surprised that you're here' may amount to just 'John didn't expect you to be here', with a presupposition. 'You're here'. This raises the larger issue of how to represent presuppositions in situation semantics. I currently have no theory to offer.

Second, I find my theory of emotives unsatisfying for a different reason. 'John is startled that his ex-wife is remarrying' seems to imply or presuppose that John knows that his ex-wife is remarrying. My support condition, however, fails to demand explicitly any awareness of the circumstances on John's part. I would like to have an account that remedies this failing. I cannot see how to incorporate John's knowing into the condition without deviating from emotives' inference patterns, in particular, &I.

Third, I have repeatedly employed clauses of the form '(l, (~a], a, e', 1}} ~ e' to say that e' is one of a's a-alternatives to e. With many verbs - cause , for example - it seems most natural to think of one course of events causing another. The symbolism instead forces us to think of a course of events supporting the information that it causes another. (Barwise and Perry, 1983) has no relations between courses of events, but only relations within them. The universe of courses of events thus remains unstructured. I have tried to remain within Barwise and Perry's anarchistic realm. But some of my analyses might work better using relations between courses of events. Does the analysis of any aspect of natural language (tense or logical modality, say) force one to structure the universe of situation semantics? What consequences would such a structuring have? What kinds of structure would prove


most fruitful? I suspect that answering these questions will involve grappling with a substantial group of issues in metaphysics.

Finally, as these comments suggest, I have developed only one way of analyzing clausally complemented verbs. I have avoided Barwise and Perry's "formal individuals"; their use might lead to a rather different semantic theory. In particular, they might free the theory from reliance on quantification over courses of events, i.e., from "alternatives", and yield formal courses of events that could serve, for example, as objects of attitudes. I have also eschewed inconsistent courses of events in my construction. Such courses of events, or, better, "information states", might free the theory from believe and other relations belonging to the realm of linguistic understanding. I recommend the task of investigat- ing these options for handling intensionality.

N O T E S

* I have benefited from discussions with Richard Larson, Stanley Peters, Hans Kamp and Nicholas Asher. Nicholas Asher also read an earlier draft; his comments ifiapro~ed the paper significantly. I would like to thank the Center for Cognitive Science of the University of Texas at Austin for its generous research support. 1 As I shall explain later, I accept this view only with reservations. I shall use the framework of Barwise and Perry (1983) without, for the moment, committing myself on the question whether the evaluation function ~]] adequately represents "meaning". See my discussion of atomic intensional nonfactives below. 2 See, for example, Sellars (1974a), Sellars (1974b), Field (1977), Kamp (1981) for interesting analyses of such a relation. 3 A puzzle still arises, of course, unless we reject the strengthened disquotational principle. I think we should reject it, in the form in which it leads to Kripke's paradox, but that is a topic for another time. 4 My analysis has the virtue that both sorts of WH-phrases have the same semantic structure. Hintikka (1975c) treats them as having two different structures. In addition, Hintikka claims that only factive verbs accept COMP = +WH. But this fails to account for examples such as tell, explain, suggest, announce and estimate. 5 For a discussion of the peculiarities of these sentences, see Sellars (1974c). 6 For an excellent discussion of the distinction between semantics and the theory of understanding, see Asher (1982). Asher develops the notion of speaker meaning in analogy with Kripke's "speaker reference" (Kripke, 1979b). 7 Notoriously, 'Ralph knows who Ortcutt is' has several distinct senses. I here allow nonrigid terms to substitute for g(X); Ralph may know who Ortcutt is, in this sense, by knowing that Ortcutt is the pillar of the community who lives down the road. This does not imply that Ralph can single out Ortcutt in any epistemic alternative.

ON CLAUSALLY COMPLEMENTED VERBS 2,17

REFERENCES

Akmajian, A., and Heny, F.: 1975, An Introduction to the Principles of Transformational Syntax, MIT Press, Cambridge.

Asher, N. M.: 1982, Truth Conditions and Semantic Competence: Toward a Theory of Linguistic Understanding, Ph.D. thesis, Yale University.

Asher, N. M., and Bonevac, D.: forthcoming, 'Quantifiers in Situation Semantics I.' Asher, N. M., and Bonevac, D.: forthcoming, 'How Extensional Is Extensional Percep-

tion?'. Austin, J. L.: 1970, 'Performative Utterances,' in Philosophical Papers, Oxford University

Press, London, pp. 233-252. Barwise, J.: 1981, 'Scenes and Other Situations,' Journal of Philosophy 78, 369-397. Barwise, J., and Cooper, R.: 1981, 'Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Language,'

Linguistics and Philosophy 4, 159-219. Barwise, J., and Perry, J.: 1983, Situations and Attitudes, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.. Carnap, R.: 1947, Meaning and Necessity, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Chomsky, N.: 1982, Lectures on Government and Binding, Foris Publications, Dordrecht. Field, H.: 1977, 'Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role,' Journal of Philosophy 74,

379-409. Hintikka, K. J. J.: 1962, Knowledge and Belief, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. Hintikka, K. J. J.: 1969, 'Semantics for Propositional Attitudes,' in Models for Modalities,

D. Reidel, Dordreeht, pp. 87-111. Hintikka, K. J. J.: 1975, 'Knowledge, Belief, and Logical Consequence,' in The Intentions

of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 179-191.

Hintikka, K. J. J.: 1975, 'Objects of Knowledge and Belief: Acquaintances and Public Figures,' in The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 43-58.

Hintikka, K. J. J.: 1975, 'Different Constructions in Terms of the Basic Epistemological Verbs: A Survey of Some Problems and Proposals,' in The Intentions of Intenaonality and Other New Models for Modalities, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 1-25.

Kamp, H.: 1978, 'Semantics Versus Pragmatics,' in Guenthner, F., and Schmidt, S. J. (eds.), Formal Semantics and Pragmatics for Natural Languages, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp 255-287.

Kamp, J.: 1981, 'A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation,' in Groenendijk, J., Janssen, T., and Stokhof, M. (eds.), Formal Methods in the Study of Language, Mathematisch Centrum Tracts, Amsterdam, pp. 277-322.

Kripke, S.: 1979, 'A Puzzle About Belief,' in Margalit, A. (ed), Meaning and Use, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 239-283.

Kripke, S.: 1979, 'Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference,' in French, P. A., Uehling, T. E., and Wettstein, H. K. (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 6-27.

Quine, W. V. O.: 1976, 'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes,' in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp. 185-196.

Sellars, W.: 1974, 'Some Problems About Belief,' in Essays in Philosophy and Its History, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 128-147.

2 1 8 D A N I E L B O N E V A C

Sellars, W.: 1974, 'Reply to Quine,' in Essays in Philosophy and Its History, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 148-171.

SeUars, W.: 1974, 'Meaning as Functional Classification,' Synthese 27, 417-437. Smultyan, A.: 1978, What is the Name of This Book? Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.

Center for Cognitive Science University of Texas at Austin Austin, TX 78712 U.S.A.

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Semantics for clausally complemented verbsphilosophical.space/papers/SemanticsCCVerbs.pdf188 DANIEL BONEVAC shall use generalized quantifiers to handle most NPs, I shall maintain the