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SELECTED CASESIN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW I

(under Prof. Atty. Ticman)

Articles 3-6

EDUARDO P. DIEGO vs. JUDGE SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO

Facts:1. This is an Administrative complaint against Judge Castillo for allegedly

knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/orrendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law:a. Accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr.

(both Filipinos). 13 years after, a Divorce Decree was obtained by thelatter in Texas, allegedly dissolving, cancelling and annulling the saidmarriage.

b. 9 years after Lucena contracted again marriage with Jorges brotherManuel Diego.

2. With regard to such incidents, Jorge filed a complaint against Lucena forbigamy. Judge Castillo dismissed the same.

3. The main basis for the acquittal was good faith on the part of the accused.Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense of the accused that sheacted without any malicious intent. Accused Lucena, he said, hadsufficient grounds to believe that her previous marriage to Jorge had

been validly dissolved by the divorce decree and that she was legally freeto contract the second marriage with Manuel. Hence this, respondentJudge said, amounted to a mistake of fact.

4. He further stressed that knowledge of the law should not be exactedstrictly from the accused since she is a lay person, and that ineptitude

should not be confused with criminal intent.

Issue:Whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable forknowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.

Held:Respondent Judge had been less than circumspect in his study of the law and

jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case.

With respect to the contention that the accused acted in good faith incontracting the second marriage, believing that she had been validly divorced

from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to

know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes aviolation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment: For conviction to lie, it must beproved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it isunjust. It must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to lawor is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made withconscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.

Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decisionmust still be proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove thesame warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint. There is,therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust

judgment.

Gross Ignorance of the Law: The error must be gross or patent, malicious,deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the

judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrativesanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court. The errorcommitted by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the sameconstitutes ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant

disciplinary action.

WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is herebyFINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN

WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt withmore severely.

UNITED STATES vs. AH CHONG

Facts:1. Defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters,

No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place PascualGualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. Noone slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied asmall room toward the rear of the building.

2. On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant wassuddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room.He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard noanswer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was beingpushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.

3. The defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leapedto his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that


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moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair whichhad been placed against the door.

4. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, thedefendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out,

was his roommate, Pascual. The defendant then and there admitted thathe had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under theimpression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the doorof their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.

5. The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, andfound guilty by the trial court of simple homicide. At the trial in the court

below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, PascualGualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent todo a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

Issue:Whether Ah Chong can be held criminally responsible despite his defense ofmistake of facts.

Held:

We hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability,provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due tonegligence or bad faith.

Ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficientto negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredientof the offense charged cancels the presumption of intent, and works anacquittal.

The defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information inthe firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleepingroom was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his

life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that inview of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to thedefendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminalintent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimateright of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he

would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act;and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessnessor even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the meansadopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he

believe threatened his person and his property and the property under hischarge.

WHEREFORE , the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed bythe trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime

with which he is charged.

MELBA QUINTO vs. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVERPACHECO

Facts:1. Eleven-year-old Edison Garcia and his playmate Wilson Quinto saw

respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of adrainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing withthem inside the drainage culvert. Wilson assented.

2. Pacheco, along with respondent Andres and Wilson, entered thedrainage system. After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding afish, came out of the drainage system and left without saying a word.Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emergedagain, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead.

3. Respondent Andres laid the boys lifeless body down in the grassy areathen went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother,and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to thedrainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her.

4. No criminal complaint was filed against respondents for Wilsonsdeath. Not until NBI made investigations which later filed a criminalcomplaint for Homicide against Andres and Pacheco.

5. Respondents filed a demurrer to evidence which the RTC granted onthe ground of insufficiency of evidence. CA affirmed the same saying,The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt butrather on a finding that the accused did not commit the criminal acts

complained of.

Issue:Whether or not respondents are criminally liable.

Held: No.

A person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural andlogical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done

be different from that which he intended.

"Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or

events, while "logical" means that there is a rational connection between


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the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felonycommitted must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximatecause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken byan efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which theresult would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting firstand producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events inmotion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, eachhaving a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. There must

be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act of theoffender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim.

The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injurywhen:

(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committedand the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or factabsolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.

The stones could have caused the victim to slip and hit his head on thepavement. Since there was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with

water must be very slippery, aside from the fact that the culvert is round. If

the victim hit his head and lost consciousness, he will naturally take in someamount of water and drown.

It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committedserious crimes for no reason at all. However, the absence of any ill-motive tokill the deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no

violence was perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this case, thepetitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of eitherrespondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was invited to jointhem in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent Andres usedto go to their house and play with her son before the latters death.

PEOPLE vs. RAFAEL & SIMEON MARCO and DULCISIMOBELTRAN

Facts:1. There was a fiesta being celebrated, but it was raining. Constancio

Sabelbero was approached by Simeon Marco who asked him if he was theone who boxed the latter's brother the previous year. Constancio denied.Then Simeon asked if he had cigarettes and when he said he had none,Simeon said, "I have cigarettes; here is my cigarette", as he pulled out aone-foot long hunting knife. Frightened, Constancio ran away andSimeon chased him. As Constancio was passing by the place were

appellant Rafael Marco, the father of Simeon, was standing, Rafael struck

Constancio with a round cane, hitting him on the left ear and leftshoulder.

2. Vicente, the father of Constancio, happened to be standing in thecrowd and heard shout of "Fight! Fight!" He saw Simeon about to stabConstancio, so he grabbed the hand of Simeon that was holding theknife.

3. At this juncture, Rafael Marco approached Vicente armed with a caneand a hunting knife. Sensing danger, Vicente shouted to his sonConstancio, who had been hit by Rafael, and his other son Bienvenido,

who appeared on the scene, to run away because the Marcos werearmed. Constancio was able to run away. So also Vicente. Bienvenido

who was being chased by Rafael was stabbed by the latter, and when heparried the blow, he was wounded on the left hand. After being stabbed

by Rafael, Bienvenido still tried to run farther, but unluckily, his footgot caught in a vine on the ground and he fell, whereupon, out ofnowhere, Dulcisimo Beltran, who was accused with herein appellantand who did not appeal his conviction, arrived and stabbed Bienvenidonear his anus. Beltran was followed by Simeon, who stabbedBienvenido on the left breast and the upper part of the left arm.

Afterwards, Rafael, Simeon and Beltran ran away. Bienvenido stood upslowly and walked zigzagly towards the store of Pinda and when hearrived in front of the store, he fell to the ground and later died.

4. The RTC found respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of thecrime of Murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength.

Issue:Whether or not the in the Phase of the incident that led to the death ofBienvenido appellant, Rafael Marco, may be held liable for murder, asfound by the RTC.

Held: No.

From the foregoing, this Honorable Court will that the stabbing of thedecedent by the three accused was not simultaneous. Rather, it wassuccessive, with appellant inflicting the first blow. And, Beltran andSimeon were nowhere around yet. It was only after the decedent fell downthat the latter two came and successively stabbed him. The manner in

which the incident occurred indicates that there was no pre-conceived planamong the three accused to kill the decedent. It strongly suggests, on theother hand, that Beltran and Simeon participated suddenly, unexpectedlyand without any previous agreement.


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Appellant cannot be held liable for the death of decedent under the RevisedPenal Code.

Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful actdone be different from that which he intended.

The stabbing of the decedent by the appellant which caused a slight woundon the former's hand was intentionally made; hence, felony. However, theensuing death of the decedent was not the direct, natural and logicalconsequence of the wound inflicted by the appellant. There was an activeintervening cause, which was no other than the sudden and appearance andparticipation of Simeon Marco and Beltran. And there is authority that if theconsequences produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact absolutelyfrom the criminal case the offender is not responsible for such consequence.

We are constrained to hold that he had no homicidal intent. He can be heldcriminally responsible only for the wound on the back of the left hand of thedeceased. Hence, if at all, appellant is only guilty of Slight Physical Injuries,

but not Murder.

PEOPLE vs. PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON TAN

Facts:1. A boy was detained for only about three hours and was released even

before his parents received the ransom note. But it spawned a protractedtrial spanning all of 8 years and led to the conviction of the two accused.

2. The victim was Enrico Paulo Agra, who was 8 years old at the time of theincident. The accused were Pablito Domasian and Samson Tan, the latterthen a resident physician in the hospital owned by Enrico's parents.

3. While Enrico was walking with a classmate, he was approached by a manwho requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on amedical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in atricycle. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead oftaking him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced himinside.

4. Having suspicions, Grate, the tricycle driver, immediately reported thematter to two barangaytanods when his passengers alighted who laterpursued the same. Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico

behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met hisparents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already lookingfor him.

5. In the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra receivedan envelope containing a ransom note, demanding P1M. The testshowed that the ransom note had been written by Dr. Samson Tan.

6. A crime of Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention was subsequentlyfiled. RTC found the accused guilty as charged.

7. Upon appeal, the accused maintains that in any case, the crime allegedis not kidnapping with serious illegal detention as no detention in anenclosure was involved. If at all, it should be denominated andpunished only as grave coercion.

Issue:Whether both accused are criminally liable for the crime charged.

Held: Yes.

The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention may consist notonly in placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining him ordepriving him in any manner of his liberty. Although the victim was notconfined in an enclosure, he was deprived of his liberty when Domasian

restrained him from going home.

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any privateindividual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprivehim of his liberty:

Par 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or apublic officer.

Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful actdone be different from that which he intended.

Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping withserious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot beconsidered an impossible crime because there was no inherentimprobability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate orineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the

victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already beenconsummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.


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SULPICIO INTOD vs. CA and PEOPLE

Facts:1. Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig,

Salvador Mandaya met with a Aniceto Dumalagan. The latter told thegroup that he wanted a certain Bernardina Palangpangan killed becauseof a land dispute between them.

2. All armed with firearms, the group arrived at Palangpangan's house.Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. The groupfired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was inanother City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and hisfamily. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one

was hit by the gun fire.

3. At trial, RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. CA affirmed thesame.

4. Petitioner seeks modification of the said Decision.Issue:

Whether Intod is criminally liable.

Held:Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Criminal Responsibility shall beincurred:

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense againstpersons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of itsaccomplishmentor on account of the employment of inadequate orineffectual means.

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce anoffense against person or property because:

(1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible ofaccomplishment: or(2) the means employed is either

(a) inadequate or(b) ineffectual.

The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the nighthe and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherentlyimpossible.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of theoffense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of thispetition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by theoffender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. Theremust be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order toqualify the act an impossible crime.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place wherehe thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was notpresent in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibilitywhich rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. Andunder Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient tomake the act an impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was AttemptedMurder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening causeindependent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article4.

WHEREFORE, We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime.Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown byPetitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) monthsofarresto mayor.

ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD vs. PEOPLE & CA

Facts:1. Petitioner effectively concedes having performed the felonious acts

imputed against him, but instead insists that as a result, he should beadjudged guilty of frustrated theft only, not the felony in its

consummated stage of which he was convicted.

2. On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon weresighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within theShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, asecurity guard who was then manning his post at the open parking areaof the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing anidentification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU),hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known Tide

brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space,where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside thesupermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons


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ofTide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area inthe open parking space.

3. Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boardedthe cab and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was

waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons ofTide Ultramatic inside the taxi,then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, whoproceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. WhenLago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner andCalderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alerthis fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon wereapprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. Thefilched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases ofTide Ultramatic,one (1) case ofUltra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases ofdetergent, the goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00.

4. Both were charged with theft. RTC found them guilty of ConsummatedTheft finding credible the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses andestablishing the convictions on the positive identification of the accusedas perpetrators of the crime.

5. Before the CA, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted offrustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was neverplaced in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen (citing Dioand Flores cases). CA rejected this contention and affirmed petitionersconviction.

Issue:Whether under the given facts, the theft should be de emed as consummatedor merely frustrated.

Held:

The accused should be convicted of Consummated Rape.

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.Theft is committed by any personwho, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation ofpersons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another

without the latters consent.

Its elements are:(1) that there be taking of personal property;(2) that said property belongs to another;(3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and

(5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violenceagainst or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

Certain cases to ponder:a. Adiao case - a customs inspector abstracted a leather belt from the

baggage of a foreign national and secreted the item in his desk atthe Custom House. At no time was the accused able to get themerchandise out of the Custom House, and it appears that hewas under observation during the entire transaction. RTC said itis only Frustrated Theft. SC concluded it is Consummated Theft.

b. Sobrevilla case - the accused, while in the midst of a crowd in apublic market, was already able to abstract a pocketbook from thetrousers of the victim when the latter, perceiving the theft, caughthold of the accuseds shirt-front, at the same time shouting for apoliceman; after a struggle, he recovered his pocket-book and letgo of the defendant, who was afterwards caught by a policeman.RTC said it is only Frustrated Theft. SC concluded it isConsummated Theft.

c. Dio case - a driver employed by the United States Army, haddriven his truck into the port area of the South Harbor, to unload atruckload of materials to waiting U.S. Army personnel. After hehad finished unloading, accused drove away his truck from thePort, but as he was approaching a checkpoint of the Military Police,he was stopped by an M.P. who inspected the truck and foundtherein three boxes of army rifles. RTC said it is ConsummatedTheft. CA held that it is only Frustrated Theft.

d. Flores case - a checker employed by the Luzon StevedoringCompany, issued a delivery receipt for one empty sea van to thetruck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty sea van ontohis truck at the terminal of the stevedoring company. The truck

driver proceeded to show the delivery receipt to the guard on dutyat the gate of the terminal. However, the guards insisted oninspecting the van, and discovered that the empty sea van hadactually contained other merchandise as well. RTC convictedFlores of Consummated Theft. CA however, held that it was onlyFrustrated Rape.

Synthesis of theDio andFlores rulings is in order. The determinativecharacteristic as to whether the crime of theft was produced is the ability ofthe actor to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were onlymomentary.

NeitherDio norFlores can convince us otherwise.


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For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission inthe frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theftproduced? Theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal propertydue to its taking by one with intent to gain. It is immaterial to the product ofthe felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of executionfor theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since thedeprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts ofexecution.

Chief Justice Aquino: in theft or robbery the crime is consummated afterthe accused had material possession of the thing with intent toappropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing wasfrustrated.

We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitionerwas completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physicalpossession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of timethat he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and longenough to load these onto a taxicab.

Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking is deemed completefrom the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has noopportunity to dispose of the same.

Unlawful Taking is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which isthe deprivation of ones personal property, is the element which produces thefelony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful takingas an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.

We can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theftcannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.

WHEREFORE, petition Denied.

RODOLFO C. VELASCO vs. PEOPLE

Facts:1. Complainant Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his owner

type jeep in front of his house when a motorized tricycle stopped nearhim. Accused Rodolfo Velasco dashed out of the tricycle, approached thecomplainant and fired at him several times with a .45 caliber pistol. Theaccused missed with his first shot but the second one hit the complainantat the upper arm, causing him to stumble on the ground. The

complainant stood up and ran, while the accused continued firing athim but missed.

2. The shooting incident was reported to the police which laterapprehended the accused. At the City Jail where the accused wassubsequently brought, the private complainant Frederick Marambaidentified and pointed to the accused as the one who fired at him,hitting him on the upper left arm. This was also corroborated by

Armando Maramba, the driver of the tricycle in which the accusedrode.

3. RTC found the accused guilty of Attempted Murder. CA affirmed thesame in toto.

Issue:Whether accused is guilty of Attempted Murder.

Held: Yes.

Petitioners asseveration that it is unthinkable for him to shoot privatecomplainant because he has no motive to harm, much less kill the latter, he

being a total stranger, deserves scant consideration. It must be stressedthat motive is a state of (ones) mind which others cannot discern. It is notan element of the crime, and as such does not have to be proved. In fact,lack of motive for committing a crime does not preclude conviction. It is

judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for no reasonat all. Even in the absence of a known motive, the time-honored rule is thatmotive is not essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identityof the culprit. Motive assumes significance only where there is no showingof who the perpetrator of the crime was.In the case at bar, since petitionerhas been positively identified as the assailant, the lack of motive is nolonger of consequence.

Petitioner claims that as a navy man who is trained to kill enemies of thestate, a "protector of the people," he could not have acted in the manner

which the prosecution pointed out. He said it is against human experienceto attempt to kill a person in the presence of a witness and in broaddaylight, and that it is preposterous that after firing seven shots at closerange, he failed to fatally hit the private complainant. We are notconvinced. What he is saying is that the bungled killing cannot be thehandiwork of an experienced soldier like him. Such an argument does nothold water. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of hisprevious, or even present, good moral character and exemplary conduct.The fact that petitioner was a navy man -- a protector of the people -- doesnot mean that he is innocent of the crime charged or that he is incapable of

doing it.


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Finally, petitioner submits that if ever he committed a crime, he merelycommitted attempted homicide. Still We are not convinced. The lower court

was correct in appreciating treachery in the commission of the crime due topetitioners swift and unexpected attack.

Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing to perform allacts of execution as to produce the felony by reason of some cause other thanhis own desistance, petitioner committed an attempted felony. Petitioneralready commenced his attack with a manifest intent to kill by shootingprivate complainant seven times, but failed to perform all the acts ofexecution by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, poor aim andthe swiftness of the latter.

The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is notsufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since theaccused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have broughtabout death.

RENATO BALEROS, JR. vs. PEOPLE

Facts:1. At about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December,

accused Baleros forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T.Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, didthen and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced thecommission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to havecarnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts ofexecution by reason of some cause or accident other than his ownspontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against her will andconsent to her damage and prejudice.

2. An information was filed accusing Baleros of Attempted Rape which RTCfound him guilty of. Upon appeal however, the CA reversed said decisionfinding him guilty only of Light Coercion.

3. But, still he contends his conviction of Light Coercion.Issue:

What crime is Baleros guilty of.

Held:The indicting Information for attempted rape against the petitioner in theinstant case contains averments constituting and thus justifying his

conviction for unjust vexation, a form of light coercion, under Article 287of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner argues, however, that the Information, as quoted above, does notallege that the complained act of covering the face of the victim (Malou)

with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical caused her annoyance, irritation,torment, distress and disturbance. We wish to stress that malice,compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in an Information for unjust

vexation.

Unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsionfor the reason that the term is broad enough to include any human conduct

which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, wouldunjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.

The paramount question [in a prosecution for unjust vexation] is whetherthe offender's act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, ordisturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed.

That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to herclassmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she

filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed,if not distressed, by the acts of the petitioner.

Petition Denied.

ESMERALDO, ISMAEL and EDGARDO RIVERA vs. PEOPLE

Facts:1. At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food.

Edgardo mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife forsupport. Ruben resented the rebuke and hurled invectives at Edgardo.

A heated exchange of words ensued.

2. At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store tobuy food and to look for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was withhim. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and his two brothers, Ismael andEdgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben.Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to theground. In that helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben three times with ahollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael continuedmauling Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted: "Awatin sila!

Awatin sila!" Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael threwa stone at him, hitting him at the back. When policemen on board a

mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.


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3. Ruben was brought to the hospital and survived with wounds as a resultof the attack.

4. RTC found all the accused guilty of Frustrated Murder. CA, however,modified the same to Attempted Murder.

Issue:Whether the accused are guilty of Attempted murder instead of Frustratedmurder.

Held:They are guilty of Attempted Murder.

An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in theirconsummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to killthe victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction ofinjuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove bydirect or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumedfrom the commission of a felony bydolo.

Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, interalia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and numberof wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, atthe time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstancesunder which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the

victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill ispresumed.

In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum ofevidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. That the head

wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not haveproduced his death does not negate petitioners criminal liability fo r

attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on thehead, petitioners are still criminally liable for attempted murder.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of afelony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution

which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident otherthan his own spontaneous desistance. The essential elements of an attemptedfelony are as follows:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly byovert acts;

2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should producethe felony;

3.

The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause oraccident other than his spontaneous desistance.

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:1. That there be external acts;2. Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended

to be committed.

ADELMO PEREZ Y AGUSTIN vs. CA and PEOPLE

Facts:1. On or about April 14, 1988, accused Adelmo Perez (uncle of victim)

without the permission of anyone, entered the room of Julita Tria andonce inside, embraced and kissed her on the neck, held and mashedher breast and compelled her to l ie down, and thereafter kissed her lipsand neck and with the intent of having carnal knowledge with her,touched her sex organ and tried to remove her panties therebycommencing the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts

but said accused did not accomplish his purpose, that is, to have acarnal knowledge with her, it was not because of his spontaneous and

voluntary desistance but because the said Julita Tria succeeding inresisting his criminal attempt and also due to the timely arrival of hermother to the damage and prejudice of the said Julita Tria y Balagao.

2. An information for attempted rape was filed which RTC found Adelmoguilty of. This was later affirmed by CA.

Issue:Was the crime committed by the petitioner attempted rape or acts oflasciviousness.

Held:

Only Acts of Lasciviousness.

No woman would ordinarily complain to the police and concoct a story thatan uncle attempted to rape her, or subject herself to medical examinationof her private parts, unless righteous indignation compelled her.

Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when theoffender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, anddoes not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony

by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneousdesistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of executionto produce the felony.8 Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused

must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina


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of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneousdesistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed.

There is no showing in this case that petitioners sexual organ had eventouched complainants vagina nor any part of her body.

Petitioners acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissingher, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touchingher sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do notconstitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actuallycommenced to force his penis into the complainants sexual organ. Rather,these acts constitute acts of lasciviousness.

The elements of said crime are:(1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;(2) that it is done:

(a) by using force and intimidation or(b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwiseunconscious, or(c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and

(3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.

All these elements are present and have been sufficiently established in thiscase. Petitioner clearly committed lewd acts against the complainant.Moreover, petitioner employed force when he committed these acts on thecomplainant. In fact, as found by the trial court, there were bruises oncomplainants neck and navel which belie petitioners claim that thecomplainant consented to these acts.

Although the information filed against petitioner was for attempted rape, hecan be convicted of acts of lasciviousness because the crime of acts oflasciviousness is included in rape.

PEOPLE vs. HENRY ALMAZAN

Facts:1. On 28 September 1996, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Vicente

Madriaga and a certain Allan played chess in front of the former's house.Spectators were Vicente's son Noli and a neighbor named Angel Soliva.

While the game was underway, Henry Almazan unexpectedly arrived andbrandished a .38 caliber revolver in front of the group. Almazan's fightingcocks had just been stolen and he suspected Angel, one of the spectators,to be the culprit. Thus he said, "manos-manos na lang tayo,"aimed hisgun at Angel and pulled the trigger. It did not fire. He tried again, but

again it failed.

2. At this juncture, Vicente Madriaga stood up and tried to calm downHenry, but the latter refused to be pacified. Angel ran away and Henryaimed his gun instead at Noli. Noli cried for mercy, for his life and thatof his daughter, but to no avail. Henry shot Noli at the left side of hisstomach sending him immediately to the ground. His daughter,unscathed, held on to Noli, crying. Henry then turned on Noel and shothim on the left thigh. Noel managed to walk lamelybut only toeventually fall to the ground. Thereafter, Vicente Madriaga called onhis neighbors who brought Noli and Noel to the hospital. Noli howeverdied before reaching the hospital, while Noel survived his injuries.

3. Trial ensued for Murder and Frustrated murder which RTC foundHenry guilty of respectively. Henry testified that the gunshot woundobtained by Noel was a product of self-defense on the formers part.This the RTC found as devoid of merit.

Issue:Whether accused is guilty of Frustrated murder insofar as the victim Noelis concerned.

Held:The accused-appellant should be held liable for Attempted murder, notfrustrated murder.

For the charge of frustrated murder to flourish, the victim should sustain afatal wound that could have caused his death were it not for timely medicalassistance. This is not the case before us.

The court a quo anchored its ruling on the statement of Dr. Ticman oncross-examination that the wound of Noel could catch infection or lead tohis death if not timely and properly treated. However, in his directtestimony, Dr. Ticman declared that the wound was a mere minor

injury for which Noel, after undergoing treatment, was immediatelyadvised to go home.15 He even referred to the wound as a slight physicalinjury that would heal within a week16and for which the victim was in nodanger of dying.

Clear as the statement is, coupled with the fact that Noel was indeedimmediately advised to go home as he was not in any danger of death, wehave no reason to doubt the meaning and implications of Dr. Ticman'sstatement. His statement that Noel could catch infection was based on purespeculation rather than on the actual nature of the wound which wasa mere minor injury, hence, not fatal.


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According to jurisprudence, if the victim was wounded with an injury thatwas not fatal, and could not cause his death, the crime would only beattempted.18 The observation that the conviction should be for slight physicalinjuries only is likewise improper as the accused-appellant was motivated bythe same impetus and intent, i.e., to exact vengeance and even kill, ifnecessary, when he shot Noel Madriaga.

Wherefore, the accused is guilty of Murder (Nolis death) and of AttemptedMurder (Noels injury).

PEOPLE vs. AGAPITO LISTERIO y PRADO and SAMSON DELATORRE y ESQUELA

Facts:1. At around 5:00 p.m. of August 14, 1991, Marlon Araque y Daniel and his

brother Jeonito Araque y Daniel were in Alabang, Muntinlupa to collect asum of money from a certain Tino. Having failed to collect anything fromTino, Marlon and Jeonito then turned back. On their way back while they

were passing Tramo near Tinos place, a group composed of AgapitoListerio, Samson dela Torre, George dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre and

Bonifacio Bancaya blocked their path and attacked them with lead pipesand bladed weapons.

2. All the accused herein, who were armed with bladed weapons, stabbedJeonito from behind. Jeonito sustained three (3) stab wounds on theupper right portion of his back, another on the lower right portion andthe third on the middle portion of the left side of his back causing him tofall down. Marlon was hit on the head by Samson dela Torre andBonifacio Bancaya with lead pipes and momentarily lostconsciousness. When he regained his senses three (3) minutes later, hesaw that Jeonito was already dead. Their assailants then fled after theincident. Marlon Araque who sustained injuries in the arm and back, was

thereafter brought to a hospital for treatment and survived the attack.

3. RTC found the accused guilty of Murder and Attempted Homicide,although the information for the latter offense was that of FrustratedHomicide, on the basis that none of the wounds sustained by Marlon

were fatal.

Issue:Whether the lower court was correct in making accused guilty of AttemptedHomicide.

Held.

It must be Frustrated Homicide.

The reasoning of the lower court on this point is flawed because it is not thegravity of the wounds inflicted which determines whether a felony isattempted or frustrated but whether or not the subjective phase in thecommission of an offense has been passed. By subjective phase is meant[t]hat portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act

which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed bythe offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummatedcrime. From that time forward, the phase is objective. It may also be said

to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he hascontrol that period between the point where he begins and the point

where he voluntarily desists. Ifbetween these two points the offender isstopped by reason of any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, thesubjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not sostopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated.

The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustratedfelony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign orextraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission ofcrime and the moment when all the acts have been performed whichshould result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such

intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point ofperforming allof the acts which should produce the crime. He is stoppedshort of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.

To put it another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes thesubjective phase of the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist

by the intervention of outside causes before the subjective phase is passed.

On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phase iscompletely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothinginterrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjectivephase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the

intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. He did allthat was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as aconsequence it was due to something beyond his control.

PEOPLE vs. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO

Facts:1. On 25 April 1996, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P.

Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, wentdown from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolatedrinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo

Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to


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be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was ahelper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busypreparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko,ayo'ko!" prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw PrimoCampuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whosepajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while hisshort pants were down to his knees.

2. According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina.Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and

boxed him several times. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thusprompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living withintheir compound, to chase the accused. Seconds later, Primo wasapprehended.

3. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results. Still RTCfound him guilty of statutory rape.

Issue:Whether Campuhan is guilty of Statutory rape, as the act indeed wasconsummated.

Held: No.

He must only be held guilty of Attempted Rape.

We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge tookplace, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, noris the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the externalgenitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient toconstitute carnal knowledge. But the act of touching should be understoodhere as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the femaleorgan and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.

Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be noconsummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts oflasciviousness.

Quotes for consummated rape:1. Touching of the female organ.2. Introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum.3. Bombardment of the drawbridge.4. Shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency.5. Strafing of the citadel of passion.

A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failedto discharge its onus of proving that Primo's penis was able to penetrateCrysthel's vagina however slight. Thus we cannot conclude without anytaint of serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all achieved. To holdotherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the prosecution but torun roughshod over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumedinnocent.

Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is

attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directlyby overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which shouldproduce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other thanhis own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape andonly of attempted rape are present in the instant case, hence, theaccused should be punished only for it.

PEOPLE vs. Jesus DELA CRUZ, Demerold AYADO & AbecidueoAJEDO jr

Facts:

1. Antonia Natura and her husband, Felipe Natura, went to the house ofCouncilman Francisco Ponseja. On their way home, they met the threeaccused, Jesus dela Cruz, Demerold Ayado and Abecidueo Ajedo, who

were standing by the road. Upon meeting them, accused dela Cruzsaid, "Good evening (Tatang) father," Felipe Natura answered, "Goodevening my son (Barok)".

2. Then, de la Cruz said to Felipe, "you, after the election, as if you hateme already." Felipe answered, "No my son, you forget that already." Atthis juncture, accused Ayado tapped the shoulder of Felipe, while de laCruz at that same moment shouted, "Vulva of your mother" andsuddenly boxed Felipe. Ayado, jointed by Ajedo, likewise, boxed Felipe.

While the three accused were boxing and mauling Felipe, Antoniapleaded for the three accused to stop but the three accused did notlisten to her.

3. She then looked for someone to help them. After the lapse of severalminutes, when Antonia noticed that everything was quiet, she returnedto the place where her husband was, but the three accused were nolonger there. She embraced her husband and noticed blood on his faceand body. She ran again to look for help. Felipe was brought to thehospital, yet died the next morning.

4. An information for Murder was charged against herein accused whichthe RTC found them guilty of.


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5. Defense of accused: (a) Bias on part of Antonia as the lone witness. (b)Self-Defense.

Issue:Whether the accused are guilty of the crime as charged.

Held: Yes.

Antonia Natura's relation to the victim does not necessarily disqualify her onthe grounds of bias and undue interest. The testimony of a lone eyewitness, ifpositive, reasonable and credible, is sufficient to support a convictionespecially if the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and had

been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner.

In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of Antonia Naturaconvincing and trustworthy enough to warrant a conviction. We find noreason to disturb such finding as there is no showing that exceptions to therule on conclusiveness of findings of facts of trial courts exists.

This Court cannot likewise accept the plea of self-defense of accused-

appellant Jesus dela Cruz. In a long line of cases, it has been held that wherethe accused admits to the killing of the victim but invokes self-defense, it isincumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that heindeed acted in defense of himself. As the burden of proof is shifted to him,he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness ofthat of the prosecution.

In the instant case, the unlawful aggression came not from the victim butfrom the accused-appellants. The version of Dela Cruz is simply incredible. If

We were to subscribe to it, then the victim would have sustained only one (1)injury the stab wound. The autopsy report belies this.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE vs. CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito"

Facts:1. Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at

the St. Joseph's College at Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was aPhilippine Constabulary (PC) soldier.

2. In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at herboarding house after a party. While knocking at the door of her boarding

house, all of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck.

She then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of anotherboarder.

3. She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairswith him. With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they enteredcomplainant's room.

4. With one hand holding the knife, appellant undressed himself. He thenordered complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-

shirt. Then he pulled off her bra, pants and panty.

5. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. Hemade her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. She followed hisorder as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position,however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of hispenis entered her as she kept on moving.

6. Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mounthim. In this position, only a small part again of his penis was insertedinto her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his hands flat on thefloor. Complainant thought of escaping which she was able to do and

got help from policemen after running away from the accused notminding her state of being fully naked. When the policemen who wereinside the building opened the door, they found complainant nakedsitting on the stairs crying.

7. The accused was charged with Rape. RTC found him guilty ofFrustrated Rape. The trial court was of the belief that there is noconclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victimand thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only. The CAhowever modified this to Consummated Rape.

Issue:

What was Orita be convicted of, Frustrated or Consummated Rape.

Held:It must be Consummated Rape. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of aman in having sexual bodily connections with a woman.

Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnalknowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from thatmoment also all the essential elements of the offense have beenaccomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because hehas performed the last act necessary to produce the crime.Thus, the felonyis consummated. In a long line of cases, We have set the uniform rule that

for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any


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penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of thelabia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or lacerationof the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.Necessarily, rape isattempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all actsof execution was performed.The offender merely commenced thecommission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature,elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence onthe matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever

be committed.

Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v.Eriawhere We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being noconclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party.However, it appears that this is a "stray" decision inasmuch as it has not beenreiterated in Our subsequent decisions.

Article 8

PEOPLE vs. ANTONIO & GEORGE COMADRE, & DANILOLOZANO

Facts:1. 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe,

Gerry Bullanday,3 Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having adrinking spree on the terrace of the house of Roberts father.

2. Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, GeorgeComadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of thehouse. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed anobject which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled

by scaling the fence of a nearby school.

3. The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping ahole in the roof of the house. Robert, Jimmy, Gerry, Rey and Lorenzo

were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious. Robert Agbanlog diedbefore reaching the hospital.

4. The 3 accused denied participation by citing their individual alibis.5. Charge: Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder6. RTC gave credence to the prosecutions evidence and convicted

appellants of the Complex Crime of Murder with Multiple AttemptedMurder. Conspiracy was also found to have occurred. It held that themere presence of George and Danilo provided encouragement and asense of security to Antonio, thus proving the existence of conspiracy.

Issue:Whether or not there was indeed conspiracy.

Held:Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements ofconspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rulethat to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather thanmere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required.

A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. Itmust be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission ofthe crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime doesnot make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship.


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No. The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did nothave any participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore beset free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their closerelationship with Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy consideringthat they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime.

Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it would be betterto set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than toconvict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit. There being no

conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime.

Complex Crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder against Antonio.George an Danilo are acquitted for lack of evidence to establish conspiracy,hence ordered immediately released.

PEOPLE vs. NORBERTO jr, EDILBERTO & ELPIDIO MANERO,SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEAGO, ROGERBEDAO, RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO VILLAMOR, JR., JOHNDOE and PETER DOE [SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFRENPLEAGO and ROGER BENDAO

Facts:1. 11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the Manero brothers,

along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago andRoger Bedao, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocadesconferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., private secretary to the MunicipalMayor of Tulunan, Cotabato. Plans to liquidate a number of suspectedcommunist sympathizers were discussed. Death Note: "NPA v. NPA,starring Fr. Peter Geremias (Italian priest), Rufino Robles Bantil(Catholic lay leader), Domingo Gomez (lay leader), Fred Gapate, Renealias Tabagac and Villaning (all messengers)." The conspirators agreed toEdilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter

Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead. This waslater posted in a wooden placard outside the eatery.

2. Bantil confronted them why his name was included in the placards.Edilberto brushed aside the query; asked "Bantil" if he had any qualmsabout it, and without any provocation, he drew his revolver and fired atthe forehead of "Bantil" but was able to parry the gun (right finger andlower right of ear were hit).

3. Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He enteredthe house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accusedPleago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway.

Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and

burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved andrejoiced.

4. Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr.But the latter simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-downsignal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: What is it you want,Father? Do you want me, Father, to break your head?" Thereafter, in aflash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped tothe ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted

Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted overthe remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times,kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shatteredthe head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. AsNorberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothersdanced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim frompossible assistance.

5. Charge: Murder, Attempted Murder and Arson. These the RTC foundaccused guilty of.

Issue: Whether or not there was conspiracy.

Held: Yes.

There was direct proof to link them to the conspiracy. There is conspiracywhen two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime anddecide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit togethereach and every act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an accusedparticipates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, andunity in its execution is present.

The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a

community of design as evidenced by the concerted acts of all the accused.It is clear that appellants were not merely innocent bystanders but were infact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali and theattempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers and theirmilitiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a fighting stance to discourageif not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. Theysurrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the otheroccupants from leaving so that the wounded Robles may die ofhemorrhage. Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of thecommission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy.The appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in theattempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants may not


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have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed acommon intent to commit the criminal acts.

PEOPLEvs. FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMINSAMSON y MAGDALENA

Facts:1. The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay

were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times theyslept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was heldin the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite.

2. Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sittingin the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Theaccused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. Thesepersons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As thegroup saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him.

3. Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accusedPugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns

wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion toldPugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouringthe gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making ahuman torch out of him.

4. Charge: Murder. RTC rendered a decision finding both accused guilty onthe crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay themitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.

Issue:Whether or not conspiracy is present.

Held:There is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy orunity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellantsimmediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity

between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at thescene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugayand his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, therespective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from differentacts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each ofthem is liable only for the act committed by him.

The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of theaccused Pugay. Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris

wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of thedeceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stingingsmell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even

before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligencenecessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act thatmay be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun ofthe deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is onlyguilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 ofthe Revised Penal Code.

There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson hadsome reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, thereis adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that theliquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammablesubstance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter onfire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be concededthat as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased'sclothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal

responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the veryleast some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in theRevised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what tookplace in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 ofthe aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall beincurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although thewrongful act done be different from that which he intended.


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Article 11

PEOPLE vs. MARIVIC GENOSA

Facts:1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983.

In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily. Butapparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and theirfights would become violent.

2. Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said heprovoked her, he would slap her, and sometimes he would pin her downon the bed, and sometimes beat her.

3. November 15, 1995: Ben and his friend Arturo Basobas went to acockfight after receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of

beer before heading home. When they arrived at the house of Ben, hefound out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him.

4. Upon returning home with her cousin Ecel Arano, Marivic (who was then8 months pregnant) found Ben in his usual behavior when drunk. This

time however, he was angry because of the thought of always beingfollowed by Marivic, who was on her part only worried that he might beoverly drunk and that it might end up again on a battering incident. Thenit happened indeed. This time, however, Marivic was able to overcomethe aggression after a flurry of threat upon her life and that of her unbornchild. Ben, unfortunately died in the course of the struggle betweenMarivic. Two days later, the body of Ben was found in the same housethey rented, this time it was already deserted by Marivic and herchildren.

5. Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer foracquittal on a novel theory -- the battered woman syndrome (BWS),

which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts,however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there wasno unlawful aggression--no immediate and unexpected attack on her byher batterer-husband at the time she shot him. Absent unlawfulaggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.

6. Charge: Parricide7. RTC, finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, it gave

credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed thedeceased while he was in bed sleeping.

8. Hence, this Automatic Review.

Issue:Whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus

Held:The appeal is partly meritorious.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not initself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner.

Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.

From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further thatcrucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman atthe time of the offense--she must have actually feared imminent harm fromher batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to saveher life.

Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resortsto self-defense must face a real threaton ones life; and the peril sought to

be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, theRevised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-

defense:

Art. 11.Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur anycriminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, providedthat the following circumstances concur; First. Unlawfulaggression;Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employedto prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on thepart of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. Itpresupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack--or an imminent

danger thereof--on the life or safety of a person. In the present case,however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was asufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and herfatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his

violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time,he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even theimminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longerin a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrensbedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a greatprobability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have


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ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS,further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is notrequired. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern.To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before shecan defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder byinstallment. Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim inprevious battering episodes) prior to the defendants use of deadly force must

be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the requiredimminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of

BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawfulaggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened tokill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he hadkept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant atthe time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus.[79]Hisabusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of bothMarivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscationovercoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separateroom, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felther blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear

that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she priedopen the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon andused it to shoot him.

We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does notwarrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense--complete or incomplete--on the part of the victim. Thus, Marivicskilling of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.

Wherefore: RTC affirmed, convicting Marivic of Parricide. MitigatingCircumstance due to a psychological paralysis because of cumulativeprovocation upon her that diminished her will power. Extenuating

Circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to havenaturally produced passion and obfuscation, which overwhelmed her and puther in the said emotional and mental state.

Notes:

Battery an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her childresulting to the physical and psychological or emotional stress.

Battered Woman Syndrome a scientifically defined pattern of psychologicaland behavioral symptoms found in women loving in battering relationshipsas a result of cumulative abuse.

Battered woman: a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forcefulphysical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to dosomething he wants her to do without concern for her rights.

The BWS is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which hasthree phases:

(1) the tension-building phase (TENSION);(2) the acute battering incident (VIOLENCE); and(3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase

(FORGIVENESS).

PEOPLE vs. CA and ELADIO C. TANGAN

Facts:1. December 1, 1984 (11:30 p.m.) Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was

driving alone on Roxas Boulevard. He had just come from BuendiaAvenue on an intelligence operation. At the same time, GenerosoMiranda, a 29-year old optometrist, was driving his car in the samedirection along Roxas Boulevard with his uncle, Manuel Miranda.

2. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers werethrown in Generosos way, causing him to swerve to the right and cutTangans path. Tangan blew his horn several times. Generoso sloweddown to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook Generoso,

but when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried fouror five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking hislane.

3. As he approached Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to make a U-turn. Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out of the car with hisuncle. Tangan also stopped his car and got out.

4. As the Mirandas got near Tangans car, Generoso loudly retorted,Putang ina mo, bakit mo ginigitgit ang sasakyan ko? Generoso andTangan then exchanged expletives. Tangan pointed his hand toGeneroso and the latter slapped it, saying, Huwag mo akongdinuduro! Sino ka ba, ano ba ang pinagmamalaki mo? Tangancountered, Ikaw, ano ang gusto mo? With this, Tangan went to hiscar and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat.

5. Contention of Prosecution: Tangan pointed such gun at Generoso andfired the same in at the latters stomach in short range. Contention ofDefense: There was a grapple for possession of the gun and during thestruggle both lost possession of the same which caused the gun to fallin the ground that immediately exploded hitting Generoso therefor.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jan2004/135981.htm#_ftn79http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jan2004/135981.htm#_ftn79http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jan2004/135981.htm#_ftn79http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jan2004/135981.htm#_ftn79


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6. Charge: Homicide with use of Unlicensed Firearm and Illegal Possessionof Firearms.

7. RTC acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but convicted himof homicide. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficientprovocation on the part of the offended party and of passion andobfuscation were appreciated in his favor.

8. CA affirmed the RTC decision.Issue:

Whether Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense.

Held: No.

The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from theperson defending himself but from the victim.

A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. Likewise, the

exchange of insulting words and invectives between Tangan and GenerosoMiranda, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawfulaggression, except when coupled with physical assault. There being no lawfulaggression on the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense falls.

The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persondefending himself is not supported by evidence. By repeatedly blocking thepath of the Mirandas for almost five times, Tangan was in effect the one whoprovoked the former. The repeated blowing of horns, done by Generoso, may

be irritating to an impatient driver but it certainly could not be considered ascreating so powerful an inducement as to incite provocation for the other

party to act violently.

The word sufficient means adequate to excite a person to commit a wrongand must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity.

Moreover, Generosos act of asking for an explanation from Tangan was notsufficient provocation for him to claim that he was provoked to kill or injureGeneroso.

Wherefore, CA and RTC are affirmed (Homicide)

PEOPLE vs. JACINTO NARVAEZ, FERNANDO CUTON, andEFREN NARVAEZ

Facts:1. Prior to the fatal night ofJune 24, 1992, appellant Fernando Cuton

and the victim Wilfredo Mantillas had a fist fight. In the coursethereof, Virgilio Pejoro heard Cuton utter the words Hindi kitatitigilan.

2. At around 9:00 p.m. of June 24, 1992, Arnel Mendoza, on his wayhome dropped by the shanty of Domingo Anarna , in order to see andconvince the victim Mantillas who was then staying thereat, to sleep inthe house of his (Mendozas) cousin at Sitio Bodega. Mendoza was thenfearing for the safety of Mantillas, who however refused and insistedon staying behind.

3. After staying in the said shanty for about half anhour, Mendoza left. While he was about seventy (70) meters away, heheard several gunshots. Mendoza looked back and saw five (5)men. He was able to identify appellants Jacinto Narvaez, FernandoCuton and Efren Narvaez, and their co-accused Justiniano Pillena, but

was unable to identify the other malefactor.

4. Afraid that he might be seen and harmed by the above-mentionedmalefactors, Mendoza moved farther, approximately one hundred fiftymeters away from the shanty. After the said assailants had left, somethree (3) minutes from their arrival, he went back to the shanty andsaw the bloodied body of Mantillas at the door of the hut, sprawled onthe ground.

5. Charge: Murder6. RTC accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of prosecution

witness Mendoza and disregarded appellants defense of alibi, findingall the accused guilty of the crime charged.

Issue:Whether the accused are guilty of Murder.

Held:No.

If the distance and darkness prevented Mendoza from seeing what theassailants carried, then the same distance and darkness alsoprevented Mendoza from recognizing the faces of theassailants. Mendozas testimony in court is incredible as well as


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inconsistent on a very material matter with his sworn statement to the police.

In sum, Mendozas identification of the appellants as the assailants of thevictim Wilfredo Mantillas is improbable due to the factual situation describedby Mendoza himself.

The mind cannot rest easy if a case is resolved against the accused based onevidence replete with glaring inconsistencies, missing links and loose endsthat refuse to tie up. For only when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt

can we be morally certain that only those responsible are heldanswerable. When the prosecution fails to present such proof, the chargemust be dismissed.

The participation of appellants in the killing of the victim Wilfredo Mantillasnot having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, we hold that the appellantsshould be absolved.

Wherefore, the said appellants are ACQUITTED on the crime charged on theground of reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE vs. CUNIGUNDA BOHOLST-CABALLERO

Facts:1. Cunigunda Boholst and Francisco Caballero, both at the age of twenty,

were married on June 7, 1956. Later they were blessed with a daughter.Their marriage, however, was not a happy one. It was marked byfrequent quarrels caused by her husband's "gambling, drinking, andserenading", and there were times when Francisco maltreated and beatCunigunda.

2. In the evening of January 2, 1958, she went out carolling with her friend,Crispina Barabad. They divided the proceeds thereafter then later

decided to go home. But before she could leave the vicinity of the houseof Crispina, she met her husband Francisco, who upon seeing her, heldher by the collar of her dress and asked her: "Where have you beenprostituting? You are a son of a bitch."; she replied: "What is your

business. Anyway you have already left us. You have nothing to do withus"

3. Upon hearing these words Francisco retorted: "What do you mean bysaying I have nothing to do with you. I will kill you all, I will kill you all"

4. Francisco then held her by the hair, slapped her face until her nose bled,and pushed her towards the ground, to keep herself from falling she heldon to his waist and as she did so her right hand grasped the knife tucked

inside the belt line on the left side of his body. Because her husbandcontinued to push her down she fell on her back to the ground. Herhusband then knelt over her, held her neck, and choked her saying."Now is the time I can do whatever I want. I will kill you"

5. Because she had "no other recourse" as she was being choked shepulled out the knife of her husband and thrust it at him hitting the leftside of his body near the "belt line" just above his left thigh. When shefinally released herself from the hold of her husband she ran home and

on the way she threw the knife.

6. In the morning of January 3, she went to town, surrendered to thepolice, and presented the torn and blood-stained dress worn by her onthe night of the incident.

7. Charge: Parricide8. RTC found Cunigunda guilty of the crime as charged. Now she prays

that she be acquitted based on her plea of self defense.

Issue:

Did appellant stab her husband in the legitimate defense of her person?

Held: Yes.

Quod quisque ob tutelam sui fecerit, jure suo ficisse existimetur!

An examination of the record discloses that the trial judge overlooked anddid not give due importance to one piece of evidence which more than thetestimony of any witness eloquently conf

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