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A “Firewall” Between Politics and Administration? Citizen Attitudes during the 2005 Arroyo Legitimacy Crisis
Segundo E Romero, PhD Ateneo School of Government Ateneo de Manila University December 2012 [email protected]
Introduction
To what extent can trust in public administration moderate lack of trust in political authorities at times of extremely low political legitimacy? Can the bureaucracy continue to perform and be “firewalled’ from extreme popular mistrust of political leaders?
This paper uses the Asian Barometer 2005-‐2007 data set and a theoretical Southeast Asian regime support model that had been developed by Asian Barometer Southeast Asian scholars for analysing seven countries – Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. The model defines regime support as a combination of trust in institutions (presidents or prime ministers, courts, national governments, parliaments, civil service, and military) and belief that the current form of government is “best”). These components represent “specific support” and “diffuse support” for the regime. The model posits four clusters of independent variables – (1) government performance, (2) governance, (3) citizen politics and political attitudes, and socio-‐demographic variables as control variables.
In 2005, the trust ratings for the Philippines were the lowest among the seven countries -‐-‐ a balance of minus 62, that represented the difference between those who have high trust and those who have low trust). The belief in form of government ratings for the Philippines were a positive balance of 24. Using equal weights for these components, the overall regime support score for the Philippines was a balance of minus 57. This overall regime support score was lowest among the seven SEA countries included in the study.
The ABS survey was conducted in the Philippines in December 2005, months after the “ Hello Garci” scandal rocked the Arroyo Administration, leading to the resignation of 10 cabinet and other senior officials and the Philippines teetered on the brink of another people power episode. Yet, “people power” did not materialize, even when trust in the political authorities was lowest since Marcos was ousted in 1986.
A closer look at the data shows that the Filipinos appeared to have different trust ratings for political institutions compared to administrative institutions. The elective officials – President and Congress rated -‐21 and -‐19 respectively, while the appointive officials -‐-‐ Civil Service and the Military had +8 and +4 respectively. (See Table 1).1
1 The elective and appointive nature of the government positions is used here as a shorthand to distinguish the essentially “political” from the “administrative” institutions.
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Table 1. Trust in Political and Administrative Institutions
Asian Barometer Survey 2005-‐2007 Philippines N=1200
Values Presi-‐dent
Cong-‐ress
Natl Govt Courts Civil Service
Mili-‐tary
A great deal of trust/ quite a lot of trust
38 39 39 44 52 52
Not very much trust/ none at all
59 57 57 53 44 47
Balance -‐21 -‐19 -‐18 -‐9 +8 +4
Could the higher trust ratings in the public administration (civil service and the military) during this crisis period in the Philippines have enhanced the diffuse support component of overall regime support to forestall non-‐constitutional paths to regime change? Did citizens distinguish between political authorities and public administrators as objects of trust?
There are a host of questions about what the 2005 crisis meant for democratic governance in the Philippines. Was Philippine democracy in peril because of Arroyo’s legitimacy crisis? How did Arroyo’s strategies to salvage her presidency impact political and administrative institutions? Why did Filipinos not oust the Arroyo Administration through People Power? Was the absence of another People Power event in 2005 to terminate (or prolong) a regime an evidence of the consolidation of democracy in the Philippines? Is the Philippines finally out of the pattern of undemocratic detours in renewing governing elites -‐-‐ knee-‐jerk People Power events and rigging elections?
This study seeks to contribute some insights into these questions by exploring answers to the following specific queries:
1. At a time of low regime support, to what extent did Filipinos have different levels of trust for political institutions and administrative institutions?
2. Which segments of the population had different levels of trust for political and administrative institutions?
3. Did the difference in levels of trust for political institutions and administrative institutions contribute to diffuse regime support (belief in the current form of government as best?”
4. How important is the “trust gap” as a factor for belief in form of government compared to the other SEA regime variables?
5. What other independent variables are worth exploring as a factors for diffuse regime support at a time of low overall regime support?
Context
The Philippines’ transition from a dictatorship to an open democratic society in 1986 was firmly cemented with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution that was drafted to replace the 1973 Marcos Constitution. The 1987 Constitution effectively reinstituted the presidential system which operate on the principles of separation of powers and checks and balance among the
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three co-‐equal branches of government. It also restored civil and political liberties, as well as media freedom. In addition, it provided for the holding of free and open elections and the development of a multi-‐party system.
Apart from restoring many political institutions that existed in the 1935 Constitution, innovations to ‘institutionalize the spirit of people power’ were introduced in the 1987 Constitution such as sectoral representation in local government councils and party-‐list elections for 20% of the members of the lower house.2
Nonetheless, the road of transition was arduous. Apart from the fact that Marcos was president for 21 years or half of the 40 years since Philippine independence in 1946 until his downfall in 1986, the major forces behind the People Power Revolution differed on points of political ideology and social standings. Additionally, the military, severely corrupted by the dictatorship but played a decisive role in the culmination of People Power I, claimed its entitlements. In fact, the Aquino administration had to ward off nine coup attempts during its 6-‐year regime. Apart from the military problem, Aquino’s challenges also arose because the political system she put in place continued to discourage the emergence of stronger, more programmatic political parties that would have strengthened the re-‐democratization of the country.
On the other hand, Fidel Ramos tried to build a strong foundation for democracy by concentrating on a doable economic development blueprint. However, while international investors looked on his policies favorably, the Asian economic crisis in 1997 impeded further gains. However, Rocomora (1995) pointed out that while the Ramos administration proudly demonstrated the compatibility of development and democracy, it consistently relied on old-‐style pork-‐barrel politics in order to promote new-‐style economics. Also, Ramos’ campaign to shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government through Constitutional or Charter Change (dubbed ‘Cha-‐Cha’) was perceived by the electorate as Ramos wanting to extend his term rather than as political reform critical to reinforcing both the democratic and economic gains of the Ramos administration.
A second peaceful transition of power occurred in 1998 when Joseph Estrada overwhelmingly won the presidential election on the strength of his popularity with the Filipino masses. However, only two and a half years into his presidency, the House of Representatives impeached him on corruption charges. As the impeachment trial progressed in the Senate, it became apparent that Estrada had enough Senators supporting him to obtain a favorable verdict. In the midst of the trial, the prosecutors walked out and this prompted the people of Metro Manila to converge in EDSA (historic site of People Power I) to demand the resignation of Estrada. The popular outrage succeeded in bringing about a People Power II revolution that forced Estrada out of the presidency. Estrada was brought down by a coalition of civil society groups, big business, the Catholic Church, and the military. While many saw this as another victory for democracy, some attention was given to the fact that street demonstrations were not a constitutional means of removing the president. Replacing Estrada was Vice President Gloria Arroyo, a member of a different political party than Estrada.
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the legality of Arroyo’s assumption of the presidency but as a method for removing an elected president, People Power 2 was in fact extra-‐constitutional. As a result, Arroyo’s mandate was questioned and early on was assailed by coup rumors and 2 Abinales & Amoroso (2005). p. 266.
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destabilization plots. Then on May 1, or a little over 4 months into her assumed presidency, the violent reaction to Estrada’s arrest on plunder charges in late April dramatically revealed a huge chasm in Philippine society. A prolonged rally by his supporters ended in a bloody, riotous attack on the presidential palace.3
Still, Arroyo’s early performance earned approval from the Philippine business community, foreign governments, and multilateral institutions, but the less-‐than-‐democratic succession plus the May 1 pro-‐Estrada riot left lingering questions of legitimacy, and in the elections of May 2004 Arroyo pursued a new mandate with a near-‐fanatical intensity.
After a contentious five-‐way election Arroyo emerged with a small margin of victory over popular actor and political neophyte Fernando Poe Jr. An exultant Arroyo, facing a new six-‐year term, promised to put politics behind her and focus on confronting the growing threats of insurgency, terrorism, poverty, and fiscal crisis. However, during her nine-‐year reign, Mrs. Arroyo weakened democratic institutions. In fact, in 2005 the state of Philippine democracy has once more become an international issue. In its recent annual report on the global state of human rights and democratic freedoms, the U.S. think tank Freedom House has downgraded the Philippines from a “free” to a “partly free” country. The institute said that the negative status change was “based on credible allegations of massive electoral fraud, corruption, and the government’s intimidation of elements in the political opposition”.4
None of the three post-‐People Power I presidents before Arroyo ever polled negative public satisfaction ratings. On the eve of People Power II, Estrada still managed to pull a +9 satisfaction score. From October 2004 to June 2010, Arroyo maintained a consistent negative rating. The March SWS (Social Weather Stations) 2010 survey reported 69 per cent dissatisfied and 16 per cent satisfied with Arroyo's performance, for a net satisfaction score of-‐53. In the June 2010 survey, Arroyo's score improved to -‐17, a reflection, perhaps, of the Filipino's readiness to forgive and satisfaction that she was finally leaving office.5
It is paradoxical that Estrada still enjoyed a positive satisfaction rating just before People Power II that removed him from office, while Arroyo who consistently had extremely negative ratings was not herself been overthrown for arguably more serious crimes of electoral sabotage. (See Chart 1)6
3 Hutchcroft, Paul and Rocomora, Joel (2003). p. 282. 4 http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/philippines 5 De Jesus, Edilberto. (2011). p. 213. 6 Source: http://www.investphilippines.info/arangkada/part-‐iv-‐general-‐business-‐environment/governance/
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Chart 1
In the end the people just waited patiently for the 2007 mid-‐term national elections to indicate their displeasure, and for 2010 to elect a new president.
In the 2010 presidential election, then Senator Benigno Aquino III, only son of former President Corazon Aquino and martyred hero, Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. was elected the 15th president of the Republic of the Philippines with 42.08% of the total votes cast –-‐ the highest winning percentage since 1986. The official candidate of Arroyo’s political party finished fourth, behind even former President Joseph Estrada, who finished second with about a quarter of the total valid vote, despite having been removed from office in 2001 on charges of corruption and misconduct and convicted of plunder in 2007.7
The Bureaucracy under President Arroyo
When Gloria Arroyo assumed the presidency after ‘People Power II’, there was a good degree of optimism as she promised to transform ‘our politics of personality and patronage’ to ‘a new politics of party programs and process of dialogue with the people’. However, it was quickly back to traditional politics. Arroyo filled her Cabinet with familiar faces from previous administrations and powerful political families. Also, within her first term as president, she, some cabinet members, and her husband were accused of several cases of graft and corruption.8 As a result even before the 2004 elections, there was already enormous social polarization and feelings of mass discontent
7 Bertelsmann Stiftung. BTI 2012. p.2. 8 Quimpo, Nathan (2009). p.343-‐344.
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Although Arroyo was proclaimed winner of the 2004 elections, allegations of fraud persisted and protests continued. Then in June the next year (2005), the Hello Garci9 scandal broke out, as a result of which President Arroyo went on national television to say “I am sorry” for having committed a “lapse in judgment” -‐-‐ talking to an official of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) to ensure that her “votes are protected”. This action did not quell the overt challenges to her presidency that included calls for her resignation, a mass resignation of members of her cabinet (July 2005), and an impeachment case filed at the House of Representatives, in the months prior to the Asian Barometer Survey in December 2005.10
Considering that before the Hello Garci scandal, Arroyo’s net satisfaction rating already fell to -‐33 percent in the SWS survey for the month of May 2005, the opposition had reason to hope that these successive scandals and her increasing unpopularity would snowball leading to another People Power uprising. However, while dissatisfaction was high, there was no mass support at the grassroots level or among the military for another People Power uprising. Also, these calculated efforts apparently were no match to President Arroyo’s stubbornness.11
Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain Arroyo’s resiliency. This paper offers four hypotheses.
Firstly is the Masterful Politician Hypothesis that Mrs. Arroyo is really a masterful politician who actively mobilized government resources, dispensing funds in order to consolidate support among her congressional and local government allies. Under this rubric are the charges that she also resorted to a series of controversial actions inconsistent with democratic principles. She persecuted dissenters and critical media, tolerated the extrajudicial killings of left-‐wing personalities, and attempted to unilaterally change the constitution to suit her own political objectives. Abinales (2008) credits the “extraordinary resilience” of Arroyo to the nature of her political coalition with local government officials, which she maintained through state funds. He also pointed to the absence or brittleness of links between the anti-‐Arroyo forces and local political actors. Quimpo [2009] goes further to state that the Philippines “is now back to having a predatory state controlled by a rapacious elite, as it had during the Marcos dictatorship. Instead of just being a throwback to the ‘old corruption’ of the Marcos era, however, the current predatory regime represents a ‘new corruption’ adapted to the ways of economic and political liberalization.
A second hypothesis is the Firewalled Economy Hypothesis which holds that Arroyo survived because the economy was “firewalled” from politics. At the end of 2005, despite the political turmoil, the economy actually performed well as it grew at the rate of 4.1 percent and the GDP grew 5.1 percent. The biggest contributor to this growth is the remittances from the 8.4 million Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), which reached US$8.5 billion in 2004 or the equivalent of 9.2 percent of the country’s GDP. Hal Hill argues that the economy’s resilience is proof of its growing independence from the conflict among the political elites, and is due to the OFWs and competitive economic sectors that operate independently of government like IT and BPO. These sectors keep the economy moving even as politicians quarrel, acting as an ‘economic firewall’
9 "Hello Garci" refers to the alleged wiretapped conversations where vote rigging in the 2004 elections was discussed by, among others, a woman presumed to be President Arroyo and man presumed to be Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. (http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/27477/news/hello-‐garci-‐scandal) 10 http://services.inquirer.net/print/print.php?article_id=20101220-‐309964 11 Salazar, Lorraine (2006). p.229.
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against the volatile political situation.12
A third hypothesis is the Democratic Space Hypothesis, which holds that with Marcos’ Martial Law Regime in the background, the people still relished the democratic space under the regime. This hypothesis holds that while Filipinos say the government has a large impact on their lives, it is not a predominant factor in their personal economic situation, nor even in the country’s economic situation. Freedom is all Filipinos need to eke their own means of living. This freedom is primarily expressed in freedom to travel (e.g., by Overseas Filipino Workers) and engage in various means of livelihood, mainly in the informal sector.
A fourth hypothesis is that the Constitutionalism is Best Hypothesis which holds that Filipinos have recommitted themselves to constitutionalism, after experiencing the unresolved debilitating political instability by extra-‐constitutional means of regime change (People Power II). This hypothesis, requires that overall, government performance does not threaten well-‐being, safety, and freedom.
This means that “political noise” between government and opposition groups can be tolerated for so long as basic government services are sustained. This means further that the Civil Service has sufficient relative autonomy from the political leaders to perform their essential functions. This also means that local governments also respond to the needs of their constituents.
This study explores this hypothesis by examining the Filipinos’ evaluation of the Civil Service and of Local Governments -‐-‐ separately and in relation to the evaluation of political leaders -‐-‐ and whether this evaluation has had an influence on the belief of Filipinos that the current form of govenment is best.
This hypothesis gains support from Richard Rose and his colleagues who have put forward an argument about the competitive justification of democratic regimes. Referring to Winston Churchill’s famous line ‘Democracy is the worst form of government except all those forms that have been tried from time to time’, they argued many democracies survive not because a majority of people believes in its intrinsic legitimacy but because there are simply no preferable alternatives.
There are as much arguments for “relative autonomy” as well as for “effective capture” of the Civil Service under the 10-‐year Arroyo Administration.
The Effective Capture Perspective There are 1.4 million government employees in the Philippines, sixty-‐eight percent in national government agencies, seven percent in government-‐owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), and 25 percent in local government. Of the 6,000 or so managerial positions in the Philippine bureaucracy, some 3,500 are appointed by the President.13
12 Salazar, Lorraine (2006). pp.240, 244. 13 See <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080123-‐114181/CSC-‐chief-‐David-‐chides-‐Arroyo-‐on-‐appointments>
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The Philippine President, in the context of a highly centralized unitary form of government, has appointment powers that are extensive and deep into the bureaucracy. No less than then Civil Service Commission14 (CSC) chair Karina David charged President Arroyo for abusing her prerogative to make appointments in government, saying this was to blame for the politicization and unprofessional behavior in the bureaucracy. David said compared to previous administrations, the Arroyo administration has had the highest number of appointees, adding that more than 60 percent of Arroyo’s career executive service (top echelon of public managers) were not even eligible for appointment. Yet, there are 4,000 CES eligibles waiting to be appointed to these jobs.15 She said the bureaucracy is not insulated from politics, pointing directly and indirectly to the abuse of presidential discretion in government appointments. David also said the bureaucracy is saddled with an irrational and unrealistic pay scale that encourages timid and unthinking government bureaucracy.16 The use of government resources for political purposes has also been controversial under President Arroyo. These ranged from the use of Presidential discretionary funds, the Liquid Fertilizer Fund Scam, and the National Broadband Network Scandal (NBN-‐ZTE), and the Northrail Controversy.
The control of President Arroyo of the military has focused on political considerations in the appointment of the Chief of Staff, as well as the apparent encouragement for some units in the military to pursue left-‐oriented groups and individuals in a manner that breaches human rights.
The reach of President Arroyo into the Constitutional Commissions and the Supreme Court include the appointment of known supporters to key positions such as the Ombudsman. The length of her term naturally has given President Arroyo a more extensive opportunity to make Presidential appointments.
Control of Congress and Local Governments, which have their own bureaucracies, is largely exercised through pork barrel allocations. It has been known that cash in paper bags have been distributed to Local Government officials when they attend meetings in Malacanang.17
The Relative Autonomy Perspective
There have been continuing efforts to improve the performance of the Philippine bureaucracy. Every President since independence has initiated one or two reorganization and reform efforts. A major effort to purge the bureaucracy of misfits (‘notoriously undesirables”) was started by President Marcos under Martial Law. He also started a strategic effort to professionalize public management at the top level (undersecretary down to director level) by creating a Career Executive Service.
14 The CSC is a constitutional commission with independent status 15 Domingo, Ronnel. “CSC Chief David Chides Arroyo on Appointments.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. January 2, 2006. 16 Ibid. 17 http://maspnational.wordpress.com/2009/07/20/scandals-‐under-‐gloria-‐macapagal-‐arroyo-‐from-‐2001-‐2009/
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President Aquino and President Ramos also undertook their own reform efforts. Under President Aquino, the Administrative Code of 1987 was compiled as the basic reference for the entire Civil Service.
The enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 was a major impetus for examining and rationalizing the operations of government, as powers and functions were devolved to local governments – provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays nationwide. This effort has continued on towards better performance management, with the deployment of the Organizational Performance Indicator Framework (OPIF)18 covering the whole government, and the Local Government Performance Management System (LGPMS)19 for local governments.
Since the World Bank published a report on Philippine corruption in 2000 during the term of President Estrada, there has also been a renewed effort to address corruption in government. The appointment of Simeon Marcelo on 10 October 2002 as Ombudsman20 briefly highlighted the leadership role of that agency in the anti-‐corruption effort in government.
The Philippine bureaucracy has also attracted a lot of talented Filipinos in both national and local government. The end of the Marcos dictatorship made government service attractive to many Filipinos. The difficulty of running for public office (due to high cost of campaigning and presence of political dynasties) left careers in the bureaucracy the preferred avenues for service by many Filipinos.
The introduction of information and communication technology also dramatically improved the effectiveness and efficiency of the bureaucracy, particularly against the backdrop of governance across an archipelago of over 7,100 islands.
The biggest demonstration of the capacity of the Civil Service to be capable of action independent of the Presidency is the action of the so-‐called Hyatt 10. On July 8, 2005, at the height of the “Hello Garci” scandal where President Arroyo was accused of electoral fraud in the May 2010 elections where she was elected President, seven members of her cabinet together with three bureau chiefs announced their resignation and called on her to relinquish the Presidency to the Vice-‐President. The announcement was made during a press conference at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Pasay City, thus the name “Hyatt 10” that stuck with the group. The Hyatt 10 were Finance Secretary Cesar Purisima, Social Welfare Secretary Corazon Soliman, Education Secretary Florencio Abad, Budget Secretary Emilia Boncodin, Trade Secretary Juan Santos, Agrarian Reform Secretary Rene Villa, Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Teresita Quintos-‐Deles, National Anti-‐Poverty Commission Chair Imelda Nicolas, Internal Revenue Commissioner Guillermo Parayno and Customs Commissioner Alberto Lina. The Hyatt 10 later formed INCITEGov (International Center for Innovation, Transformation and Excellence in Governance) to continue advocating reforms in government.21
Background on the SEA Regime Support Model The SEA regime support model focused on why citizens in Southeast Asian countries have diverse levels and forms of support for their regimes; who has different levels of support, and what factors might affect the variation of their support. The model was applied to the second
18 http://www.dbm.gov.ph/?p=3207 19 http://www.blgs.gov.ph/lgpmsv2/cmshome/ 20 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simeon_V._Marcelo 21 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20090709-‐214576/How-‐Hyatt-‐10-‐was-‐formed>.
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wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) conducted from 2005-‐2007 which generated data sets for the following Southeast Asian countries -‐-‐Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia. The SEA Regime Support study, currently being prepared for publication, contains the results of the analysis with each of the countries mentioned contributing a chapter to the book. The dependent variable in the SEA regime suport model was “Regime Support”. This variable had two dimensions – support for political institutions and belief in the form of government. The variable “support for political institutions’ was constructed from trust ratings obtained through the ABS questionnaire for the following institutions: (1) the President (or Prime Minister), (2) the Courts, (3) the national government (in the capital city), (3) political parties (not any specific party), (4) Parliament, (5) the Civil Service, (6) the Military (or armed forces), (7) the police, (8) Local government, (9) Newspapers, (10) Television, (11) the election commission (specified by name), (12) Non-‐governmental organizations or NGOs. Measures taken to ensure construct validity across 7 countries eventually limited the institutions to (1) the Courts, (2) the President, (3) the National Government, (4) Parliament, (5) The Civil Service, (6) the Military. The variable “Belief in form of government” measured the extent to which the respondents saw their form of government as the “best”. This variable was constructed from responses to two questionnaire items: (1) “I have here some statements. For each statement, would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?”
(1) “Whatever its faults may be, our form of government is still the best for us.” (2) “You can generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right.”
The independent variables were grouped into three clusters, with several composite indicators as components:
I. Government performance a. Economic Evaluation (computed from 4 items) b. Government Responsiveness (2 items) c. Access to Services (4 items) d. Safety and Human Security (2 items)
II. Governance
a. Anti-‐corruption (computed from 3 items) b. Political competition (3 items) c. Horizontal accountability (2 items) d. Vertical accountability (3 items) e. Equality (2 items) f. Freedom (2 items) g. Rule of Law (2 items)
III. Political Attitudes and Citizen Politics
a. Political Traditionalism/Democratic-‐Authoritarian Orientations (computed from 7 items)
b. Social Traditionalism (5 items) c. Nationalism (3 items) d. Interest in politics (2 items) e. Social capital (1 item) f. Perceived Democratic Change (2 items)
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In addition, the following socio-‐demographic variables were used: (1) Age (17-‐95), (2) Gender (Male-‐Female), (3) Educational level (10 levels), (4) rural residence (urban-‐rural), (5) Income (by quintile), and (6) Subjective social status (10 point-‐scale). The results of the regression analysis for the Philippines in the SEA Regime Support study are shown in the following table:
Table 2. Factors for Regime Support22 Asian Barometer Survey Philippines December 2005 Survey, N=1200
Summary Table: Factors for Regime Support:
Coefficients, Significance*, Importance Ranks Table Variables Trust Rank Best Gov Rank Overall Rank Government Performance
Economic Performance
0.2852*** 8.662
1 0.1074*** 3.094
2 0.2314*** 7.08
1
Government Responsiveness
0.117*** 3.332
3 0.0904*** 2.442
3 0.127*** 3.639
3
Access to Services 0.136*** 4.395
2 0.0895*** 2.914
5
Governance
Corruption 0.0924*** 2.728
5 0.0614* 1.72
7 0.0935*** 2.775
4
Political Competition
0.0663* 1.889
5
Rule of Law 0.0936*** 2.947
4 0.0692** 2.198
7
Equality 0.0803** 2.315
4 0.0734** 2.247
6
Citizen Politics and Political
Attitudes
Political Traditionalism
0.0701** 2.193
6 0.1822*** 5.407
1 0.165*** 5.207
2
Nationalism 0.0632* 1.929
6
Control Variables
Income Level -‐0.0527 -‐1.528
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Note on Methodology
Could the higher trust ratings in the public administration (civil service and the military) during this crisis period in the Philippines have enhanced the diffuse support component of overall regime support to forestall non-‐constitutional paths to regime change?
One way of answering this question is to measure the trust gap between political leaders and public managers. One way to represent this gap to the greatest range, the trust rating for the President (most negative for political institutions) is deducted from the trust rating for the Civil Service, the administrative institution with the highest rating. The President is also conceptually the best representative of the politicians, while the Civil Service is the best representative of the bureaucracy among the the institutions for which trust ratings were obtained.23
22 See Segundo E Romero and Linda Guerrero, “Regime Support and Regime Survival in the Philippines” chapter in forthcoming book on Regime Support in Southeast Asia co-‐edited by Yun-‐han Chu, Bridget Welsh, and Alex Chang. 23 For instance, the “National Government” in the capital city is ambiguous as to its political and administrative composition. The
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Another way is to measure the trust gap between “Political Institutions” and “Administrative Institutions”, where political institutions are the President and Congress, and administrative institutions are the Civil Service and the Military.
The Trust Gap between the Civil Service and the President and alternatively the Trust Gap between Administrative Institutions and Political Institutions represent the extent to which the respondents can distinguish the trustworthiness of political leaders as against public managers.
This study extends the SEA regime support model by introducing six new independent variables, including thetrust gap variables and exploring their relationship with Filipinos’ belief in the current form of government as best. The idea is to check whether differences in trust for political institutions as against administrative institutions had any impact on belief in form of government, alongside the other independent variables that the SEA regime support model theorized had influence on this dependent variable. This study seeks to build on the analysis that has been undertaken to explore possible answers to the following questions:
1. At a time of low regime support, to what extent do Filipinos have different levels of trust for political institutions and administrative institutions?
2. Which segments of the population have different levels of trust for political and administrative institutions?
3. Does the difference in levels of trust for political institutions and administrative institutions contribute to diffuse regime support (belief in the current form of government as best?”
4. How important is the “trust gap” as a factor for belief in form of government compared to the other SEA regime variables?
5. What other independent variable is worth exploring as a factor for diffuse regime support at a time of low overall regime support?
To answer these questions, additional independent variables were constructed for this study.
1. Trust for Political Institutions 2. Trust for Administrative Institutions 3. Trust Gap between Administrative and Political Institutions 4. Trust Gap between Civil Service and the President 5. Evaluation of the President 6. Evaluation of Local government
These variables were computed as follows:
1. Trust for Political Institutions is the mean of Trust for the President and Trust for
Parliament. same is true of “Local Government.” The “Military” and the “Police” are certainly part of the bureaucracy, but these institutions may evoke other additional connotations and images in the minds of the survey respondents not associated with public administration.
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2. Trust for Administrative Institutions is the mean of Trust for the Civil Service and the Military.
3. Trust Gap between Administrative and Political Institutions is the difference between Trust for Administrative Institutions and Trust for Political Institutions
4. Trust Gap between Civil Service and the President is the difference between Trust for the Civil Service and Trust for the President.
5. Evaluation of the President is the mean of the Trust for the President and the item
that reads: “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the [name of president, etc. ruling current] government?”
6. Evaluation of Local Government is the mean of the Trust for Local Government and the item that reads: “The local government should have more authority over local decisions than it does now.”
The “National Government in the capital city” is difficult to classify as primarily political or administrative. Filipinos would most likely construe it to mean the President’s cabinet consisting of about 25 department secretaries (ministers) who serve at the pleasure of the President. While many of these are public managers who rose from the ranks, they also include politicians and political supporters of the President who are primarily used to control and manage departments for political purposes. Many of these secretaries serve without portfolios. In this study, National government is ambivalent and thus excluded from the categories political and administrative institutions. The courts were also excluded as not strictly belonging to the idea of a bureaucracy. The military is one of the two largest segments of the bureaucracy that is career and merit-‐based. While the Secretary of National Defense is a civilian appointed by the President, the appointment and promotion of military officers generally follows a jealously guarded merit system characteristic of military and foreign service bureaucracies.
All the variables were recoded to reverse data set codes as necessary to assign higher values to higher levels of the variable as appropriate to the underlying concept. All variables used in the analysis were converted to z-‐scores for comparability across composite variables that contained varying number of items.
The influence of the socio-‐demographic variables were explored using percentage analysis and chi square analysis. Two stepwise regression analyses were run, one using a model (Belief in Best Government Model II) consisting only of the additional independent variables listed above, and another model (Belief in Best Government Model I) consisting of the SEA Regime Support independent variables in addition to the new.
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Presentation of Data The following tables present the association of socio-‐demographic variables with “Best Government” and the “Trust Gap Between Administrative and Political Institutions Table 3. Best Government by Socio-‐Demographic Variables Asian Barometer Survey Philippines December 2005 Survey, N=1200 (Percentages)
Total Residenc
e Age Gender Monthly Household Income
Subjective Social Status
Education
Belief in Best Govern-‐
ment
Urban
Rural
17-‐40 yrs
41 and Older
Male
Female
Lowest Quintile
2nd Lowest
3rd-‐5th Quin-‐tile
Low
High
Up to High School
Beyond High School
Low 36.7
35.7
38.3
35.3
38.1
34.7
38.7
36.6
39.9
35.4
36.5 37.4 36.4
% 37.3%
High 63.3
64.3
61.7
64.7
61.9
65.3
61.3
63.4
60.1
64.6
63.5 62.6 63.6 62.7
Total 100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100 100 100
% 100%
N= 1150
704
446
589
561
579
571
702
263
147
896 254 764 386
Sig NS NS NS NS NS NS
About 37 percent of Filipinos had low belief in the form of government while 63 percent had high belief in the form of government. None of the socio-‐demographic variables – residence, age, gender, monthly household income, subjective social status, and education had any significant association with belief in form of government.
Table 4. Trust Gap Between Administrative and Political Institutions by Socio-‐Demographic Variables Asian Barometer Survey Philippines December 2005 Survey, N=1200 (Percentages)
To-‐tal
Residence Age Gender
Monthly Household Income
Subjective Social Status
Education
Trust Gap Between
Civil Service
and President
Urban
Rural
17-‐40 yrs
41 and Older
Male
Female
Lowest Quintile
2nd Low-‐est
3rd-‐5th Quin-‐tile
Low High
Up to High School
Beyond High School
Greater Trust in
President
16.9
14.3
20.8
16.9
16.8 15.3 18.5 19.1 13.3 13.2 16.8 17.1 17.9 14.8
Same 46. 44. 48. 46. 45. 44.8 47.3 45.8 44.7 50.0 46.1 45.9 46.9 44.4
15
Level of Trust
1 6 3 9 1
Greater Trust in
Civil Service
37.0
41.2
30.9
36.1
38.1 39.9 34.2 35.1 42.0 36.8 37.1 37.0 35.2 40.7
Total 100
100
100
100
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= 1098
680
447
573
554 569 558 690 264 144 870 257 749 378
Sig <.001 NS NS NS NS NS
In the variable Trust Gap between Civil Service and President, 17 percent had greater trust in the President compared to the Civil Service, 46 percent had the same level of trust, and 37 percent had greater trust in the Civil Service than the President.
Residence had a highly significant association with the Trust Gap between Civil Service and the President, with 41 percent of urban Filipinos compared to only 31 percent of rural Filipinos trusting the Civil Service more than the President. On the other hand, only 14 percent of urban Filipinos compared to 21 percent of rural Filipinos had greater trust in the President over the Civil Service.
This pattern makes sense as urban Filipinos, especially in Metro Manila, are more critical of the administration than those in the periphery. This is true not only of the Gloria Arroyo Administration, but historically. During the presidency of President Marcos and of President Arroyo, the anti-‐administration sentiment would be more pronounced because of the longer durations of their administrations (21 years in the case of Ferdinand Marcos and 10 years in the case of President Arroyo). This translates to greater frustration with government as economic and political problems remain unresolved, and the usual optimism that attends the renewal of governing elites does not happen.
16
The following tables present the regression analysis on “Best Government” (Models 1 and 2) and on Trust Gap between Administrative and Political Institutions.
Table 5. Belief in Best Government Model 124 Asian Barometer Survey Philippines December 2005 Survey, N=1200
Coefficientsa
Model 3 of 3
Unstandar-‐dized
Coefficients
Standardized Coef-‐ficients
t Sig.
Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta
Tole-‐rance VIF
3 (Constant) .023 .027 .846 .398 Zscore: Evaluation of Local Government .393 .029 .400 13.691 .000 .894 1.119
Zscore: Trust in Pol Ins -‐.218 .032 -‐.220 -‐6.777 .000 .722 1.386 Zscore: Trust in Adm Ins -‐.218 .033 -‐.223 -‐6.565 .000 .660 1.515
a. Dependent Variable: Zscore: Best Government
Belief in Best Government Model 1 shows Model 3 of 3 of the stepwise regression that was run on the 6 additional independent variables.
The model shows that Trust in Political Institutions and Trust in Administrative Institutions are second and third in importance. The coefficients are negative for both variables, suggesting that the lower the trust in political institutions as well as in administrative institutions, the higher is the belief in the current form of government as “best.”
What this seems to indicate is that low levels of trust for both elected officials and appointive officials in government are not accepted as part of the essence of the current democratic form of government as embodied in the 1987 Constitution. Rather than be perceived as evidence that the current form of government is not be worthy of admiration, the low trust levels are seen as “aberrations”. This is consistent with the fact that the democratic form of government under the 1987 Constitution is the embodiment of the People Power Revolt that toppled President Marcos in 1986. This interpretation also acknowledges the fact that the first two administrations under this new regime, the Corazon Aquino (1986-‐1992) and the Fidel Ramos (1992-‐1998) presidencies were among the best presidencies experienced by Filipinos over the past half-‐decade.
The variable “Evaluation of Local Government” is the most important factor, and it has a positive relationship with belief in best government. This points to the important governance role of local governments under the new constitution, which has mandated a policy of
24 See Table 3a in the appended Notes on Statistical Analysis for the Model Summary Table showing figures on variance explained associated with each step in the regression analysis.
17
decentralization, and which led to a significant shift of political power and resources to local governments under the the Local Government Code of 1991.
This regression model suggests that it is not the distinction between the way Filipinos perceive political and administrative institutions at the national level that matters, but the way national government and local governments have registered in the lives and minds of Filipinos.
It must be added that local government administration has seen much more tangible improvements in governance compared to the national government. Among the key indicators of this is the wide use of the Local Government Performance Management System (LGPMS) to monitor overall LGU performance that has systematically identified needs and gaps at the input, process, and output/outcome levels. Local governments, especially cities, have also dramatically improved their financial status and have delivered better public services to the people. The better mayors and governors are those that have been effective public managers, many of them coming from the ranks of NGOs and the business sector.
Table 6. Belief in Best Government Model 225 Asian Barometer Survey Philippines December 2005 Survey, N=1200
Coefficientsa
Model 7 of 7
Unstandardized Coefficients
Standar-‐dized Coef-‐ficients
t Sig.
Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta
Tolerance VIF
(Constant) .025 .034 .759 .448 Zscore: Evaluation of Local Government .331 .036 .339 9.074 .000 .825 1.212
Zscore: Trust in Adm Ins -‐.212 .042 -‐.216 -‐5.101 .000 .639 1.566 Zscore: Trust in Pol Ins -‐.172 .040 -‐.174 -‐4.280 .000 .699 1.431 Zscore: Government Responsiveness .109 .036 .110 3.032 .003 .873 1.146 Zscore: Political Traditionalism .095 .035 .095 2.724 .007 .938 1.066 Zscore: Freedom .084 .034 .085 2.435 .015 .933 1.072 Zscore: Vertical Accountability -‐.081 .035 -‐.082 -‐2.333 .020 .938 1.067
a. Dependent Variable: Zscore: Best Government It is clear from this list that Filipinos were concerned primarily by family economic situation, the national economy, and political stability.
Belief in Best Government Model 2 shows that with the new and original set of variables, Evaluation of Local Government, Trust in Administrative Institutions, and Trust in Political Institutions remain the most important factors, with the last two also having an inverse relationship with the dependent variable.
25 See Table 4a in Notes on Statistical Analysis.
18
Government Responsiveness is fourth most important (third in the SEA Regime Support Model regression). The higher the government responsiveness, the higher is belief in the form of government. This is not surprising, as government responsiveness represents the frontline, tangible component of government performance.
Government responsiveness referred to the the most pressing problem in the country. The 1200 respondents were asked, “In your opinion, what are the most important questions facing the country that government should address?” The first of three possible responses given were:
1. Inflation 34% 2. Unemployment 15% 3. Poverty and destitution 8% 4. Political instability/political divisions/ethnic tensions 6% 5. Management of the economy/economic development 6%
Political Traditionalism is fifth most important (first in the SEA Model). Political traditionalism represent the view that “culture” matters in regime support. Political attitudes are the matrix that provide long-‐term foundation for membership in the political community.
Freedom and Vertical Accountability are sixth and seventh in importance (not present in the SEA Model). The higher the freedom and the lower the perceived vertical accountability, the higher the belief in the form of government. Filipinos perceive freedom as one of the conditions that mark the current regime, while they perceive that vertical accountability is one of the weaknesses.
Table 7. Trust Gap Between Administrative and Political Institutions26 Asian Barometer Survey Philippines December 2005 Survey, N=1200
Coefficientsa
Model 6 of 6
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized Coefficients
t Sig.
Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta
Tolerance VIF
(Constant) -‐.049 .037 -‐1.306 .192 Zscore: Evaluation of Local Government .204 .037 .204 5.468 .000 .987 1.013
Zscore: Access to Services -‐.145 .040 -‐.137 -‐3.658 .000 .986 1.015 Zscore: Economic Evaluation -‐.116 .040 -‐.113 -‐2.908 .004 .917 1.091 Zscore: Interest in politics -‐.107 .039 -‐.104 -‐2.742 .006 .965 1.037 Zscore: Government Responsiveness -‐.083 .039 -‐.082 -‐2.127 .034 .921 1.086
Zscore: Perceived Democratic Change .075 .037 .076 2.030 .043 .992 1.008
26 See Table 5a in Notes on Statistical Analysis.
19
Coefficientsa
Model 6 of 6
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized Coefficients
t Sig.
Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta
Tolerance VIF
(Constant) -‐.049 .037 -‐1.306 .192 Zscore: Evaluation of Local Government .204 .037 .204 5.468 .000 .987 1.013
Zscore: Access to Services -‐.145 .040 -‐.137 -‐3.658 .000 .986 1.015 Zscore: Economic Evaluation -‐.116 .040 -‐.113 -‐2.908 .004 .917 1.091 Zscore: Interest in politics -‐.107 .039 -‐.104 -‐2.742 .006 .965 1.037 Zscore: Government Responsiveness -‐.083 .039 -‐.082 -‐2.127 .034 .921 1.086
Zscore: Perceived Democratic Change .075 .037 .076 2.030 .043 .992 1.008
a. Dependent Variable: Zscore: Trust Gap Bet Pol and Adm Institutions
What explains the Trust Gap Between Administrative and Political Institutions?
The higher local governments are evaluated, the higher is the trust gap between administrative and political institutions.
The lower are access to services, evaluation of family and national economic conditions, interest in politics, and government responsiveness, the greater is the trust gap between administrative and political institutions.
In other words, the trust gap between administration and political institutions is associated with poor economic performance by the government, largely on the part of the political institutions – in this case the President and Congress.
Is trust of the civil service among Filipinos contributing to their belief that the current form of government is best? Table 13 provides some answers.
Trust of the civil service does not figure among the primary factors for belief in best government, as determined through a stepwise regression procedure. The table of excluded variables shows the other variables that were included in the procedure but which did not meet the criteria for inclusion into the alternative models. The table shows Model 7 of 7 tables returned by the stepwise regression procedure, showing 7 of the key factors influencing belief in best government.
The primary factor is government responsiveness, which is based on answers to two survey items: (1) “How likely is it that the government will solve the most important problem you identified within the next five years?”, and (2) “How well do you think the government responds to what people want?”. This importance points to the utilitarian and developmental conception of government as the primary conception of what is a form of government worth supporting on a long-‐term basis.
20
Political traditionalism and social traditionalism are second and fourth most important factors. These two batteries test for deep-‐seated political and social attitudes of the respondents. Belief in the current form of government appears to be an automatic feature that has been cultivated over decades of socializaiton about authority and leadership, community vs individual interests, conflict and cooperation, as well as formal indoctrination on the virtues of democracy and the evils of authoritarianism. Traditionalist attitudes sustain a formal system of governance that promotes individual freedom, equality, and participation that tradition often discourages.
The third and fifth factors relate to trust in the national executive (Prime Minister or President) as well as trust in local government. It is likely that the referent for local government is not so much the local bureaucracy, but Governors, Mayors, and Local Council members, all elected officials.
These Trust in President and Trust in Local Government are the only factors with negative coefficients, meaning that the lower the trust for national and local political leaders, the higher is belief in the form of government. It is as if the respondents were making a clear distinction that lack of trustworthiness of political leaders which may be due to corruption, incompetence, and poor performance are not design features of the current form of government. The lack of trust in political leaders, in fact, heightened the believe in the form of government as best.
This attitude may have been brought home to the people by the impeachment and eventual removal through “People Power” of President Erap Estrada for plunder. A higher standard of ethical behavior has been set, facilitated by such devices as the Statement of Assets and Net Worth (SALN) that has increasingly become a powerful tool for ferreting out unexplained wealth among government officials. The successful impeachment and conviction of Chief Justice Renato Corona in 2011 was merely the maturation of anti-‐corruption devices that had been developed since the end of Martial Law, and which ironically were boosted by President Estrada when he launched an Anti-‐Corruption initiative in response to the World Bank Report on Corruption in the Philippines in 2000.
It must also be remembered that after Marcos was toppled by People Power led by the iconic Corazon Aquino, two Presidential terms consisting of 12 continuous years (Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos) were widely perceived by Filipinos as their best years so far under the 1987 Constitution.
The last two factors, freedom and political competition, are classic design features of the current form of government, as formally set forth in the 1987 Constitution. It stands to reason that Filipino respondents in December 2005 who perceived that there was freedom and political competition in the political system also expressed belief in the current form of government as best.
It must be explained that in the context of post-‐Martial Law Philippines, including the entire term of President Arroyo from 2001-‐2010, ordinary Filipinos experienced a dramatic improvement in their level of individual freedom and perceived a high level of political competition compared to the Marcos years. Among the key “freedom” areas are travel abroad (important for Overseas Filipino Workers); an atmosphere of liberality in daily life such as wide availability and use of celfones and toleration of the “informal economic sector” (sidewalk vendors, small businesses, peddlers), and formal and informal avenues for citizen participation that were a far cry from the systemic restriction and regulation during martial law years.
21
While trust in the civil service does not figure significantly in the regression model, it is significant that it is not perceived in the same negative light by Filipinos as the President and Local Governments. The absence in the regression may be modestly claimed as an indication of the “relative autonomy” of the bureaucracy from the unsavory image of politicians during the December 2005 period that marked the legitimacy crisis of President Gloria Arroyo. The crisis consisted of a deep and sharp loss of support for the Presidency and other political institutions such as the Congress and the Supreme Court.
It must also be pointed out that the effective de-‐linking of the Civil Service with the political leadership of President Arroyo is remarkable in the face of the attempts of President Arroyo, pointed out above, to control and use the Civil Service for highly political initiatives that were considered improper or illegal.
Yet, as a matter of political survival, President Arroyo also appointed some of the best qualified and talented people to her cabinet. At the height of her legitimacy crisis, or perhaps the trigger for the immediate crisis itself, was the event called the mass resignation of the Hyatt 10 – key and talented members of her cabinet that protested her involvement in the Hello Garci scandal. The mass resignation was apparently meant as a coup de grace, triggering a People Power III that, however, did not materialize.
Conclusion
At a time of low regime support, to what extent do Filipinos have different levels of trust for political institutions and administrative institutions?
Table 4 shows that 37 percent of Filipinos had greater trust in the Civil Service compared to the President, while only 17 percent had greater trust in the President compare to the Civil Service. A plurality of 46 percent actually had the same level of trust for the President and the Civil Service.
Which segments of the population have different levels of trust for political and administrative institutions?
Only residence (urban-‐rural) had a significant association with the trust gap between administrative and political institutions. This indicates that the trust gap is a meaningful concept that can be measured. In this case, it indicates that distance from the seats of government (Metro Manila and provincial capitals and cities) as well as the flow of information, are key to explaining the trust gap. Rural residents tend to have greater trust in the President, while urban residents tend to have greater trust in the Civil Service.
22
Does the difference in levels of trust for political institutions and administrative institutions contribute to diffuse regime support (belief in the current form of government as best?”
Tables 5 and 6 show that neither the Trust Gap between Administrative and Political Institutions nor the Trust Gap between the Civil Service and the President figured as significant factors for belief in the current form of government as best.
How important is the “trust gap” as a factor for belief in form of government compared to the other SEA regime variables?
Trust in Political Institutions and Trust in Administration, separately, are significant factors. That both these factors have an inverse relationship with Best Government may indicate that while there is a difference in trust scores, the trust gap may not be as meaningful a factor as each of the separate variables.
What other independent variable is worth exploring as a factor for diffuse regime support at a time of low overall regime support?
Table 5 and 6 show that the evaluation of local government is a variable that needs to be explored as a factor for best government that functions as a mitigating factor for poor trust ratings of national political and administrative institutions. This suggests that it is not the administrative and political divide that serves as a “firewall”, but rather the divide between central vs local governance (political and administrative) structures.
These findings are consistent with the Constitutionalism is Best Hypothesis as to why President Arroyo survived despite poor regime support. For so long as certain minimum levels of government performance are assured with the help of local governments and the bureaucracy, low political trust for political leaders will not lead to extra-‐constitutional transfers of power. There is a new found commitment among Filipinos to the current form of government, in particular a new found respect for the electoral mode of choosing political leaders. People Power as in People Power II leads to inchoate legitimacy and stability that eventually adversely affects the whole nation. The only other way People Power can be resorted to is to defend an electoral mandate, as was the case in the first People Power event, that restored to Corazon Aquino the mandate from the January 1986 snap presidential elections that Marcos refused to acknowledge.
23
References Bello,Walden 2005. “The end of People Power? Letter from the Philippines”. The Nation. October 31, 2005.
Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2008 — Philippines Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007.
Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 — Philippines Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012. [CHECK]
Bird, Kelly and Hall Hill 2009. Philippine Economic Development: A Turning Point? Southeast Asian Affairs 2009.
Conde, Carlos 2005. “News Analysis: Political Maturity Remains Elusive in Philippines.” New York Times. 18 July 2005.
De Jesus, Edilberto 2010. The Philippines in 2010: Reclaiming Hope.
De Leon, Corazon Alma. Reforms in the Civil Service: The Philippine Experience (1995-‐2001). http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan007437.pdf Gatmaytan, Dante B. 2006. It’s All the Rage: Popular Uprisings and Philippine Democracy. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association.
Domingo, Ronnel. “CSC Chief David Chides Arroyo on Appointments.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. January 2, 2006. <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080123-‐114181/CSC-‐chief-‐David-‐chides-‐Arroyo-‐on-‐appointments>
Habito, Cielito 2005. “The Philippines: The Continuing Story of a Crisis-‐Prone Economy”. Southeast Asian Affairs 2005.
Hutchcroft, Paul and Joel Rocamora 2003. Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines.
http://www.investphilippines.info/arangkada/part-‐iv-‐general-‐business-‐environment/governance/
Landingin, Roel. 25 July 2009. “Faster Growth under Arroyo: Reality or Statistical Illusion?” <http://pcij.org/stories/faster-‐growth-‐under-‐arroyo-‐reality-‐or-‐statistical-‐illusion/>
Linde, Jonas 2007. Coping with Change: Attitudinal Consolidation in Thirteen Post-‐Communist Countries. Arbetsrapporter Working Papers No. 110. March 2007.
McCoy, Alfred 2009. An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines. Wisconsin, USA: University of Wisconsin Press. Monsod. Toby C. The Philippine Bureaucracy: Incentive Structures and Implications for Performance. Muego, Benjamin 2005. The Philippines in 2004: A Gathering Storm. Southeast Asian Affairs 2005.
24
Nathan, Andrew J. 2007. Political Culture and Regime Support in Asia. Paper for the Panel on “Prospects for Political Reform” at the Conference on “The Future of U.S.– China Relations” USC U.S.-‐China Institute. April 20-‐21, 2007. Downloaded from http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/publications/nathan04.07.pdf on 22 March 2008.
Philippine Daily Inquirer. How Hyatt 10 Was Formed. July 9, 2009. <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20090709-‐214576/How-‐Hyatt-‐10-‐was-‐formed>. Quimpo, Nathan 2009. “The Philippines: predatory regime, growing authoritarian features”. The Pacific Review, Vol. 22 No. 3 July 2009: 335–353.
Reid, Ben 2006. “Historical Blocs and Democratic Impasse in the Philippines: 20 years after ‘people power’”. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 6, pp 1003 – 1020, 2006.
Rodell, Paul A. 2004. The Philippines: Playing Out Long Conflicts. Southeast Asian Affairs 2004.
Romero, Segundo and Linda Guerrero, “Regime Support and Regime Survival in the Philippines” chapter in forthcoming book on Regime Support in Southeast Asia co-‐edited by Yun-‐han Chu, Bridget Welsh, and Alex Chang. Salazar, Lorraine 2006. The Philippines: Crisis, Controversies, and Economic Resilience. Southeast Asian Affairs 2006.
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Valderama. Tita C. “Illicit List? Arroyo’s 977 ‘midnight’ Appointees. <http://pcij.org/stories/illicit-‐list-‐arroyo%e2%80%99s-‐977-‐%e2%80%98midnight%e2%80%99-‐appointees/>
25
Attachment A: Note on the Asian Barometer 2005 Survey in the Philippines
In the conduct of the survey, the Philippines was divided into four study areas: the National Capital Region (NCR), Balance Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. The targeted sample size of each study area was set at 300 voting-‐age adults (18 years old and older), for a total sample size of 1,200. Within each of the four study areas, multi-‐stage sampling with probability proportional to population size (PPS) was used in the selection of sample spots. In the NCR, 60 precincts were sampled from among the 17 cities and 21 municipalities in such a way that each city or municipality was assigned a number of precincts that was roughly proportional to its population size. An additional provision was that at least one precinct must be chosen within each municipality. Precincts were then selected at random from within each municipality by PPS. In the other three study areas, each study area was divided into regions. Sample provinces for each region were selected by PPS, with the additional provision that each region must have at least one sampled province. Within each study area, 15 municipalities were allocated among the sample provinces, and selected from within each sample province with PPS, again with the provision that each province must include at least one municipality. Sixty sample spots for each of the major areas were allocated among the sample municipalities. The spots were distributed in such a way that each municipality was assigned a number of spots roughly proportional to its population size. Sample precincts (urban) or sample barangays (rural) within each sample municipality were selected using simple random sampling.
Source: Andrew J. Nathan. 2007. Political Culture and Regime Support in Asia. Paper for the Panel on “Prospects for Political Reform” at the Conference on “The Future of U.S. – China Relations” USC U.S.-‐China Institute. April 20-‐21, 2007. Downloaded from http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/publications/nathan04.07.pdf on 22 March 2008.
Note on the Asian Barometer 2001 and 2005 Surveys 31 The Asian Barometer survey (ABS) represents the region’s first collaborative initiative to develop a regional network of democracy studies based on surveying ordinary citizens. Between June 2001 and February 2003, the ABS implemented its first-‐round comparative survey in eight East Asian countries and territories, namely Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong and China. The ABS launched its second-‐round survey in October 2005 and its geographical scope was enlarged to cover five more countries in the region. By July 2007 the fieldwork in South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and Japan was completed and the survey in China, Hong Kong, Cambodia and Malaysia are still underway. The ABS survey in Thailand was conducted in April and May of 2006, just four months before the military coup.
Source; Yu-‐tzung Chang and Yun-‐han Chu 2007. Traditionalism, Political Learning and Conceptions of Democracy in East Asia.
26
Attachment B: Reference Tables
Table 5A. Belief in Best Government Model 1 Asian Barometer Survey Philippines December 2005 Survey, N=1200
Model Summary
Model R
R Square
Adjusted R
Square Std. Error of the Estimate
Change Statistics R
Square Change
F Change df1 df2
Sig. F Change
1 .295a .087 .086 .93903000 .087 96.605 1 1015 .000 2 .440
b .193 .192 .88309026 .106 133.664 1 1014 .000
3 .476c .226 .224 .86531250 .033 43.093 1 1013 .000 c. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Evaluation of Local Government, Zscore: Trust in Pol Ins, Zscore: Trust in Adm Ins
Table 6A. Belief in Best Government Model 2 Asian Barometer Survey Philippines December 2005 Survey, N=1200
Model Summary
Mo-‐del R
R Square
Adjusted R
Square Std. Error of the Estimate
Change Statistics R
Square Change
F Change df1 df2
Sig. F Change
1 .267a .071 .070 .94383968 .071 50.979 1 666 .000 2 .426
b .181 .179 .88673761 .110 89.537 1 665 .000
3 .459c .210 .207 .87146269 .029 24.516 1 664 .000 4 .471
d .221 .217 .86602540 .011 9.364 1 663 .002
5 .480e .230 .224 .86187869 .009 7.395 1 662 .007 6 .485f .235 .228 .85972035 .005 4.328 1 661 .038 7 .491g .241 .233 .85684564 .006 5.443 1 660 .020 g. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Evaluation of Local Government, Zscore: Trust in Adm Ins, Zscore: Trust in Pol Ins, Zscore: Government Responsiveness, Zscore: Political Traditionalism, Zscore: Freedom, Zscore: Vertical Accountability
27
Table 7A. Trust Gap Between Administrative and Political Institutions Asian Barometer Survey Philippines December 2005 Survey, N=1200
Model Summary
Model R
R Square
Adjusted R
Square Std. Error of the Estimate
Change Statistics R
Square Change
F Change df1 df2
Sig. F Change
1 .185a .034 .033 .98014862 .034 23.678 1 671 .000 2 .225
b .050 .048 .97252168 .016 11.566 1 670 .001
3 .250c .062 .058 .96710493 .012 8.526 1 669 .004 4 .267
d .071 .066 .96314599 .009 6.511 1 668 .011
5 .278e .077 .070 .96083776 .006 4.213 1 667 .040 6 .288f .083 .075 .95859846 .006 4.120 1 666 .043 f. Predictors: (Constant), Zscore: Evaluation of Local Government, Zscore: Access to Services, Zscore: Economic Evaluation, Zscore: Interest in politics, Zscore: Government Responsiveness, Zscore: Perceived Democratic Change
