Security, profit or shadow of the past? Explaining the security strategies of microstates

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Security, profit or shadow of the past?Explaining the security strategies ofmicrostatesAnders Wivel a & Kajsa Ji Noe Oest aa University of CopenhagenPublished online: 23 Sep 2010.

To cite this article: Anders Wivel & Kajsa Ji Noe Oest (2010) Security, profit or shadow of the past?Explaining the security strategies of microstates, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 23:3,429-453, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2010.484047

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Security, profit or shadow of the past? Explaining thesecurity strategies of microstates

Anders Wivel and Kajsa Ji Noe OestUniversity of Copenhagen

Abstract Which factors determine the security strategies of microstates? Manymicrostates are either secluded island states or have very close political, economic andcultural ties to a larger neighbouring ‘protector state’. They have had, therefore, little usefor more traditional alliance arrangements. However, the patterns of security cooperationbetween states have shifted as the significance of flexible ad-hoc coalition-building as ameans to coordinate international interventions has increased. Consequently, the strategicsecurity challenges and opportunities for microstates have been transformed. Focusing onthe Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition, this article explores some of these challenges andopportunities. Three hypotheses regarding the decisions made by the respective microstatesto join international ad-hoc coalitions are studied: (1) participation provides increasedsecurity, (2) participation provides economic gains, and (3) participation reflects thelessons of past security challenges. The explanatory powers of each hypothesis areexamined using a comparative case study of 11 Pacific microstates.

Introduction

According to the United States (US), 49 states had officially joined the OperationIraqi Freedom coalition as of March 2003.1 Beginning in early 2002, the US hadworked systematically to convince its allies and friends that a regime change inIraq was necessary, linking Saddam Hussein’s regime to the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, terrorism and human rights violations. The USpresented its case against Iraq in the United Nations (UN); however, as it becameclear that it would be difficult to obtain a clear mandate to legitimize military actionagainst Iraq through the UN, the Americans decided to act through a ‘coalition ofthe willing’. This measure was taken in the face of strong opposition from bothclose North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, such as Germany andFrance, and great powers such as Russia and China. Despite the internationalcontroversy surrounding the intervention and the lack of a clear UN mandate, fivePacific microstates—the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federal States ofMicronesia, Palau, Tonga and the Solomon Islands—joined the coalition.

1 The exact number of coalition members has been disputed, as this depends highly onhow ‘coalition contribution’ is defined. The contributions on this list range from directmilitary contributions to the front line to material, political or diplomatic support. See,http://www.whitehouse.gov. , accessed March 2003.

Cambridge Review of International Affairs,Volume 23, Number 3, September 2010

ISSN 0955-7571 print/ISSN 1474-449X online/10/030429–25 q 2010 Centre of International Studies

DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2010.484047

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In light of the traditional neutral and passive security policies of microstates, itis somewhat puzzling why the five Pacific microstates decided to join the coalition.Historically, microstates have had close political, economic and security-relatedties to a neighbouring ‘protector’ state or have been secluded islands, so small andinsignificant that they have had no strategic security, economic or politicalimportance in international relations. Most microstates have had, therefore, littleor no independent foreign policy, and even fewer have implemented anyindependent security policy. Operation Iraqi Freedom has been one of the fewinstances in the post-Cold-War era in which any microstates participated in such acoalition,2 despite the widespread agreement among contemporary students ofalliances that the importance of ad-hoc coalitions has increased in recent years(Oest 2007, 9). This puzzle becomes even more interesting when we note that noneof the five microstates joining Operation Iraqi Freedom was subject to any directthreat or were directly involved in the conflict. At the same time, other Pacificmicrostates chose not to take part in the coalition. Thus, whereas the Republic ofthe Marshall Islands, the Federal States of Micronesia, Palau, Tonga and theSolomon Islands joined the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition, Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa,Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Nauru did not do so.

The aim of this article is to examine the explanatory potential of three hypotheseson the security strategy choices of microstates to join the ‘coalitions of the willing’:(1) participation provides increased security; (2) participation provides economicgains; and (3) participation reflects the lessons of past security challenges. Inparticular, we focus on the strategies that constitute the basis for the choice ofmicrostates to join international ad-hoc coalitions ‘that are forged with the solepurpose of fighting a specific war’ (Weitsman 2003, 80).3 We are interested in whatthis choice reveals about the strategic challenges and opportunities in the foreignpolicy of microstates.

Microstates have been marginalized not only in the practice of internationalrelations, but also in academic research. During the Cold War, superpower rivalrywas an important reason why most research efforts, not least in the US, were focusedon understanding and explaining the foreign and security policy of great powersand the problems they faced. Although the number of microstates grew rapidly as aconsequence of decolonization, the global character of the East–West and North–South divides meant that theoretical international relations debates often focused onthe character of the international system and the great powers, not on seeminglymarginal players such as microstates. Our research strategy is to conduct a focusedcomparative case study of the respective security strategies of 11 Pacificmicrostates—five of which joined the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition and six ofwhich did not. All of the states are independent microstates located in Oceania.4

2 In 1983, Fiji joined a US-led coalition, the Suez International Force (Tago 2007, 190). Other‘coalitions of the willing’ formed to conduct military interventions in the post-Cold-War erainclude the Gulf War in 1991, Somalia 1993, Haiti 1994, Bosnia 1995, Kosovo 1999 andAfghanistan 2001. Microstates only participated in the Haiti intervention (see Tago 2007, 190).

3 We understand coalitions as a subcategory of alliances and therefore argue that coalitionparticipation can be seen as an alliance strategy. For a discussion, see Oest (2007, 19–21).

4 Thus, we exclude the territories in the region governed by other states, for exampleNew Caledonia and French Polynesia (governed by France), and Guam and the NorthernMariana Islands (governed by the US).

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Why should we care about microstates and their participation in coalitions?One reason is that in order to understand the nature of international relations ingeneral and the formation and behaviour of coalitions and alliances in particular,we need to study not only the great powers, but also small states and microstates,which make up the vast majority of states and are therefore—at least collectively—too important to ignore (Neumann and Gstohl 2006, 3). This point becomes evenmore important when we note that the average size of states is shrinking (Lakeand O’Mahony 2004). A second reason is that the nature of coalition-building ininternational affairs is changing. The traditional view of alliance formation positsthat ‘[t]he primary purpose of most alliances is to combine the members’capabilities in a way that furthers their respective interests, especially theirsecurity goals’ (Walt 2009, 88–89). Security goals continue to be central to bothformal alliances and ad-hoc military coalitions, but, as argued by Atsushi Tago,coalitions can be formed for a number of reasons (Tago 2007, 179; see also Walt2009, 89). In particular, since the Cold War, coalition formation has beenincreasingly a matter of adding political legitimacy, rather than merely combiningmilitary capabilities (Keaney 2001, 3). Today, military contribution is not alwaysnecessary to participate in a coalition; at times, expressions of diplomatic supporthave been sufficient. For this reason, states that were previously left on the margins ofinternational affairs, because of their diminutive capabilities, may now play astrategically important role in the formation of alliances and military coalitions.Finally, we seek to add to the growing literature on military coalitions in theory andpractice by focusing specifically on microstates.5 Although some of these studiesinclude microstates in their more general analyses (see, for example, Tago 2007),none of them focuses specifically on the security strategies of microstates. A specificfocus on microstates, and in particular the study of ‘within difference’ of microstategroups, allows us to create the basis for more fine-grained hypotheses aboutsecurity strategy and coalition formation in the future, in particular if the resultsfrom qualitative case studies of specific types of states—such as this one—arecombined with more general analyses, including large-n studies. Thus, rather thanpresenting an alternative to the existing literature in the field, we seek to addspecification by studying 11 microstates and why they have chosen different securitystrategies.

Our theoretical point of departure is realism. In accordance with thisperspective, we assume states to be the primary actors in world politics, and weexpect the nature of the international system to have a major impact on the rangeof foreign policy options available to each state (see Waltz 1979, 121–122;Mearsheimer 2001, 35–36). The absence of a legitimate monopoly of violenceleads every state to focus primarily on its own security, because each state isultimately responsible for its own survival; ‘in anarchy there is no overarchingauthority to prevent others from using violence, or the threat of violence,

5 Important theoretical contributions to the study of international coalitions includeTago (2007), Lake (2009), Finnemore (2004) and Hagan et al (2003). Weitsman (2003),Morrow (1986), Snyder (1997) and Jervis (2007) all provide relevant discussions of thesubject. For examples of empirical studies of coalitions, see Pierre (2002), Mauer (1994) andDibb (2002). On the use and frequency of coalitions versus alliances in the post-Cold-Warera, see Menon (2003), Campbell (2004), Norris (2003), Kagan (2008), Tertrais (2004) andSandler (1993).

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to dominate or even destroy them’ (Grieco 1990, 38). Each state therefore worriesabout its relative power vis-a-vis other states, and power politics becomes themost important characteristic of international relations (see Doyle 1997, 43).Although we acknowledge the importance of the structure of the internationalsystem for state action, we agree with most contemporary realists that ‘anarchy isa permissive condition rather than an independent causal force’ (Walt 2002, 211).Systemic structure allows us to explain ‘the constraints that confine all states’(Waltz 1979, 122). However, in order to explain the particular choices of specificstates, we must include the ‘complex domestic political processes’ that ‘act astransmission belts that channel, mediate and (re)direct policy outputs in responseto external forces (primarily changes in relative power)’ (Schweller 2004, 164).

We proceed as follows. First, we discuss how to define microstates, arguingthat a relational definition enables us to avoid some of the most dangerous pitfallsof more conventional definitions when analysing microstate security strategies.Second, we explore the explanatory potential of each of our three hypothesesabout 11 Pacific microstates at the time of the formation of the Operation IraqiFreedom coalition in 2003. Finally, we sum up our findings and discuss theimplications for microstate security strategies.

What is a microstate?

In order to study the security strategies of microstates, we must have a definitionof what constitutes a microstate.6 Although it may appear self-evident thatmicrostates are very ‘small’ and/or ‘weak’ states—for example Andorra is amicrostate, whereas the US is not—there is no consensus definition of microstates.The borders between categories such as ‘microstate’, ‘small state’ and ‘middlepower’ are usually blurred and arbitrary (see Neumann and Gstohl 2006, 6).7 Inorder to differentiate between these categories and achieve a useful definition ofmicrostates—and in accordance with our realist point of departure—wedistinguish between two criteria for differentiating microstates from othertypes of states: power possession and power projection.8

6 Some definitions of microstates include assumptions about the (questionable)sovereignty of these states (see Neumann and Gstohl 2006, 6). The states discussed in thisarticle all fulfil the criteria for sovereign statehood established in Article 1 of the MontevideoConvention on the Rights and Duties of States: a permanent population, defined territorialboundaries, a government and the ability to enter into agreements with other states.

7 Very little research has focused on the microstate concept. Fortunately, however, thechallenge of defining this type of state is closely coupled to the study of power ininternational relations in general, and the discussions of great powers and small states inparticular. Thus, our argument will draw on this literature.

8 An alternative criterion for defining microstates may be the perception of foreignpolicymakers of the role of their state in international affairs as diminutive. Thus, Keohanedefines a small state as ‘a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in asmall group, make a significant impact on the system’ (Keohane 1969, 296; see also Knudsen1996, 5; Gartner, 1993, 303). However, this definition collapses the distinction betweenmicrostates, small states and middle powers, thereby leaving us unable to identify theparticular choices, challenges and opportunities related to the alliance strategies of microstates.Occasionally, definitions based upon subjective factors (the perception of power) such asKeohane’s are combined with objective factors (the material, quantifiable aspects of power).See, for example, Archer and Nugent (2002, 2–3) and Warrington (1998, 102).


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The most frequently applied criteria for defining microstates is undoubtedlythe possession of power resources, which measures capabilities such aspopulation, territory or gross domestic product (GDP). Among these measuresof power, population size is by far the most frequently applied definingcharacteristic of microstates. However, there is no consensus on how manyinhabitants define a microstate. For instance, Dag Anckar argues that a populationof less than one million inhabitants ‘is widely accepted in the literature’ as thedefining characteristic of microstates (Anckar 2004, 208; see also Neumann andGstohl 2006, 6). However, Ali Naseer Mohamed argues that a microstate should bedefined as a state with less than 1.5 million inhabitants (Mohamed 2002, 1),whereas Elmer Plischke sets the bar at 300,000 (Plischke 1977, 21). In theirliterature review, Iver Neumann and Sieglinde Gstohl have found that in Europemicrostates are sometimes defined by having a population of less than 100,000inhabitants (Neumann and Gstohl 2006, 6). Edward Warrington argues that amicrostate is characterized by ‘a size so diminutive as to invite comment’(Warrington 1998, 102), and Amalendu Misra—while acknowledging thatpopulation size is a frequently used indicator—admits that his own use of theconcept is somewhat arbitrary (Misra 2004, endnote 1).9

Arbitrariness logically follows from the power possession definition ofmicrostates. Power is difficult to measure, and its effects are almost impossible todistinguish from the calculations and perceptions of policymakers. Thus, mea-suring a state’s population, defence spending or GDP does not necessarily tell us agreat deal about how this state will behave, how much influence it will obtain orhow it is perceived by other states. It might not even tell us very much about thepower of the state. Moreover, there is no logical way of determining how littlepower a state should have before we can categorize it as a microstate. Why should1.5 million inhabitants be a more logical cut-off point than one million, 300,000 or100,000? Why would a state with 100,000 inhabitants react any differently than astate with 300,000 inhabitants? There is no logical cut-off point (see Mouritzen andWivel 2005a, 3), because, as argued by Neumann and Gstohl, ‘smallness is acomparative concept: micro-states are smaller than small states, and small statesare smaller than middle or great powers, but with regard to what and how much?’(Neumann and Gstohl 2006, 6).

One potential solution to this problem is to shift our focus from the power thatstates possess to the power they exercise. Thus, we might argue that being a greatpower, a middle power, a small state or a microstate only makes sense within aparticular spatio-temporal context: it is not a general characteristic of the state thatcan be deduced from (absolute or relative) quantitative criteria. A state may beweak in one relation but simultaneously powerful in another. As Hans Mouritzenand Anders Wivel argue, ‘[p]ower is exercised in relationships between one or

9 Alternatively, we may use relative criteria for defining microstates, that is thedistribution of capabilities (see Waltz 1979, 192). Thus, what matters is not the size of thepopulation, GDP or military expenditures in absolute terms, but, rather, how it compareswith the population, GDP or military spending of other states. Whereas relative criteria areoften used to define great powers and occasionally used to define small states, they are onlyrarely used in definitions of microstates. Moreover, just like definitions based on absolutecriteria, definitions based on relative criteria suffer from arbitrariness (see Mouritzen andWivel 2005a, 3).


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more poles and the state, whose behaviour we wish to explain’ (Mouritzen andWivel 2005a, 3–4). That which matters for the specific decisions pertaining tomicrostate security strategy is therefore which state(s) is/are able to project poweronto its/their territory.

For these reasons, we define microstates as placed at one end of a continuumwith superpowers at the other end. A superpower is a state that is never the weakpart in an asymmetric relationship when interacting with another state at theglobal, regional or sub-regional level. A middle power is a state that is alwaysthe weak state in an asymmetric relationship at the global level but typically thestrong state in an asymmetric relationship at the regional and sub-regional levels.A small state is a state that is the weak state in an asymmetric relationship at theglobal and regional levels but typically the stronger state at the sub-regional level.A microstate is a state that is always the weak state in an asymmetric relationshipwhen interacting with another state at the global, regional or sub-regional levels,unless dealing with other microstates. Thus, using microstates as an analyticalcategory is justified by the assumption that these states are permanently stuck asthe weak party in asymmetric relationships internationally and therefore forced toadopt strategies that cope with the permanency of their weakness. They share thispermanency of weakness as a basic condition in their foreign policy, but they mayrespond with different strategies, depending on the exact spatio-temporal context ofthe power asymmetry in which they are stuck. As summed up by Warrington,‘[t]he micro-state’s apparent vulnerability to contingencies arising in the outsideworld is the defining characteristic of its external relations’ (Warrington 1998, 102,original emphasis).10 Thus, we expect microstates to share fundamental challenges,but not necessarily to respond in the same manner across space and time.

Which factors determine microstate security strategies?

Which factors determined the security strategies of the Pacific microstates whenthey were deciding whether or not to join the international Operation Iraqi Freedomcoalition in 2003? We assess three hypotheses: (1) participation provided increasedsecurity; (2) participation provided economic gains; and (3) participation reflectedthe lessons of past security challenges. All three hypotheses are derived from ourtheoretical point of departure in realism.

The first hypothesis is the primary realist explanation of why states participatein international coalitions and alliances: participation is a means of achieving theirprimary goal of survival (Waltz 1979, 91; see also Walt 2009, 88–89). The secondhypothesis acknowledges that survival may not always be threatened in the shortterm and that states may therefore focus on maximizing their ‘latent power’through economic gains in order to provide the basis for military security in thefuture (see Mearsheimer 2001, 55). The third hypothesis recognizes that whenfaced with the complexities and uncertainty of an anarchic international realm,foreign policy decision-makers, working for the security and survival of the state,tend to rely on the ‘lessons of the past’ (see Mouritzen and Wivel 2005b, 38–40).

10 As noted by Warrington, the implications are not always purely negative: ‘it is both ableak reality and a useful device for gaining leverage with external partners’ (Warrington1998, 102).


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Thus, the successes and failures of the past serve as a guide for how to respond tothe challenges of the present. Because of its focus on anarchy and survival, thisthird hypothesis is generally consistent with a realist perspective on internationalrelations. At the same time, it is the primary proposition in one of the mostcomprehensive tests of minor power alliance choices in the 20th century done sofar (Reiter 1994).

These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. A state may increase its securitywhile simultaneously receiving economic benefits from coalition participation;participating in the coalition may even fit with the lessons that the foreign-policymakers and/or the population have learned from past experience. Inaccordance with our realist starting point, we expect short-term security andsurvival to take precedence over economics and lessons of the past when theprobability of conflict is high.11 Facing a high probability of conflict, states focus onsecurity rather than economics, because they cannot afford the luxury of focusingon the long term when facing an immediate threat to their security and survival.States focus on the military power of the present rather than ‘latent power’resources that may otherwise provide the basis for security in the future (seeMearsheimer 2001, 55–57). Moreover, there are fewer policy options when theprobability of conflict is high, and states become more likely to respond directly tothe external threat. Typically, the decision-making process is centralized andallows little room for debate over policy options (see Mouritzen 1997). For thisreason, arguments about the lessons of the past may be marginalized. Thus, just asthe individuals inside a burning house will run toward the exits because of‘[g]eneral fears of losing the cherished possession of life, coupled with the starkexternal threat to life’, foreign policy decision-makers facing ‘a dire anunmistakable threat to national survival . . . would rush to enhance or maximizenational power’ (Wolfers 1962, 13, 14).

These arguments are even more important for microstates than for other states,because permanent power asymmetry renders them dependent on the actions ofother states and leaves them unable to defend themselves. Thus, we would expectthem to face severe threats to their security more often than other states and at thesame time be less able to deal with these threats on their own. In sum, for statesfacing a high probability of conflict, we expect security concerns to overrideeconomic concerns and allow limited room for the lessons of the past. Conversely,states facing a low probability of conflict will tend to focus more on long-termeconomic benefits and allow greater debate on foreign policy decisions, therebyleaving room for a greater role for the lessons of the past.

Hypothesis 1. Coalition participation provides increased security

As Barry Bartmann notes, the enduring question when discussing microstatesovereignty is about security. ‘Is it possible for very small states to meet the mostelemental requirement of their statehood: the defence of their independence and

11 Our argument about the effect of the probability of conflict on microstate strategybuilds on the general discussion in Brooks (1997). The argument that state foreign andsecurity policy varies with external threats is widespread in the international relationsliterature. See for example Arnold Wolfers, who argues that an important reason‘why nations must be expected not to act uniformly is that they are not all or constantlyfaced with the same degree of danger’ (Wolfers 1962, 152).


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even the survival of their international legal personality?’ (Bartmann 2002, 361).As the weaker state in any asymmetric relationship, microstates are unable todominate other states or even to defend themselves. They lack influence overinternational events and compared to other states they have a narrow margin oftime and error due to their limited resources (see Jervis 1976, 172–173). Most statesseek to maximize their chances for security and survival by a combination ofinternal means, by strengthening their own capabilities typically through armsbuild-up, and external means, by forming or joining alliances with other states (seeWaltz 1979, 168). However, the majority of microstates have little or no militarydefence. Most microstates therefore depend on alliance participation in order tomaximize their chances of security and survival; a possibility that has beenimproved with the increased frequency of international coalitions of the willing.12

Microstates may face both internal and external threats to their security.External threats include actions from other states that seek to undermine ‘theability of a state to defend its territory and political autonomy from domination,attack, invasion, conquest, and destruction by foreign powers’ (Art 2005, 402).Internal threats include attempts to assassinate prominent members of govern-ment, coups, civil war, secessionist movements and the actions of oppositionleaders and parties which threaten to undermine the fundamental structures of thestate (David 1991, 240; Miller and Toritsyn 2005, 334–335).13 Our realist point ofdeparture leads us to two predictions about how these threats can be expected toaffect microstate security strategy. First, we assume that microstates primarilychoose security strategies based on external security threats at the global, regionaland sub-regional levels. In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, we assess the threatby examining the two main parties in the conflict: the US and Iraq. We define thethreat from the US in terms of its role as a key protector against military threats inthe region; that is, the US may threaten non-cooperative states by reducing militaryaid and training, postponing or cancelling new permanent military bases, or evenremoving current bases (see Newnham 2008). In addition, a close US ally such asAustralia may also threaten to reduce security provision to non-cooperative states.

We define the threat from Iraq in terms of an increased risk of internationalterrorism as a result of supporting the US. Such small and strategically insignificantstates are only likely to be a potential target for international terrorism as aconsequence of participation in the Iraq coalition if they have (a) American targetssuch as embassies or American military bases or (b) a considerable tourismindustry. The level of regional threat is assessed by focusing on regional conflictsand their relation to the microstates. Here, we focus mainly on the China–Taiwanconflict. The level of sub-regional threats is assessed by studying armed conflicts orviolent tension with neighbouring states. Our second assumption is that whenthe external threat level is low, internal threats may be decisive and a microstatemay choose to omni-balance; that is, to balance internal threats by external

12 Other non-Pacific microstates include San Marino, Monaco, Liechtenstein, Andorraand many Caribbean Islands.

13 David argues that external alliances are not necessarily formed in response to an increasingthreat from other states or an increase in their relative capabilities but often as a responseto domestic groups’ increase in power and challenge to the elite (David 1991, 233). David’s studyis based on alignment and realignment in the Third World (David 1991, 238, note 17).


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bandwagoning. The leaders rationally calculate which outside power is the mostlikely to keep them in power (David 1991, 6).

In the case of the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition, none of the 11 Pacificmicrostates faced a direct security threat from either Iraq or the US; that is, thethreat of invasion. However, US actions that could have influenced the externalsecurity of the microstates, such as repercussions or benefits from the US ifthe states did or did not participate, were relevant in relation to four of the statesparticipating in the coalition: the Federal States of Micronesia, Republic of theMarshall Islands, Solomon Islands and Palau, as well as one, Vanuatu, which didnot participate. The US provided military aid and training to all five of thesemicrostates, and, furthermore, the US had military bases in the Federal Statesof Micronesia and in the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

All of the 11 microstates had defence cooperation agreements with either the US,Australia or New Zealand, so their security was highly dependent on the leaderand two of the participants in the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition. The majority ofthe microstates do not have a defence force; Tonga and Fiji alone have their ownsmall defence forces.14 The existing defence cooperation with the US did appear tohave significance in states’ decisions whether or not to join the coalition. Themajority of the participating Pacific microstates had defence agreements with theUS—only Tonga did not—while among the non-participating states only one statehad a defence cooperation agreement with the US: Vanuatu. The most importantexample of defence agreements with the US was the Compact of Free Association(CFA). This is an agreement between the US and three of the Pacific Island states:the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federal States of Micronesia and Palau.According to the CFA, the US has full authority and responsibility for security anddefence, but the participating Pacific island states are free to conduct their ownforeign relations. However, the island states are obliged to do so under the terms ofthe Compact Agreement and to refrain from taking actions that would beincompatible with the security and defence responsibilities of the US. The SolomonIslands and Vanuatu had less extensive defence cooperation with the US, consistingof only aid, training and ad-hoc assistance. It did not seem to be significant whetherthe states had defence cooperation with New Zealand, which was a reluctant andlimited participant in the coalition, or Australia, which was a willing and majorfront-line contributor. Several microstates had cooperation agreements with boththese states, and five of the six microstates that did not participate had a defencecooperation agreement with Australia. Furthermore, only Vanuatu and theSolomon Islands did not have defence cooperation with Australia. Nauru, Tuvalu,Vanuatu, Tonga, Fiji, Kiribati and Samoa had defence cooperation with NewZealand and/or Australia wherein Australia and New Zealand mainly providedsupport to maritime surveillance capabilities in the Pacific or training.15

14 Tonga had the Tonga Defence Service (TDS). This was a 450-person force withheadquarters, platoon and a light infantry and coastal naval unit. Their mission was toassist in the maintenance of public order, to patrol coastal waters and fishing zones and toengage in civic action and national development projects. Fiji had a force that hascontributed to UN peacekeeping with about 600 soldiers and police overseas in the MiddleEast, East Timor and Iraq.

15 ,http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Pacific/index.php., ,http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/02-03/dar/02_06_05defcoop.htm..


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It is unlikely that the fear of an indirect threat following from coalitionparticipation has had a decisive role in the respective decisions of the states toparticipate or not. An indirect threat in the form of terrorism would most likely bedirected against symbols of American presence in the microstates (for example,US military bases or embassies) or against other targets likely to create attentionoutside the microstates (for example, tourist attractions). Three of the microstatesparticipating in the coalition faced an indirect threat from participation: theRepublic of the Marshall Islands (US bases and a US embassy), Federal States ofMicronesia (US bases and a US embassy) and Palau (a major tourist industry).While only two of the non-participating states—Fiji (US bases, US embassy and amajor tourist industry) and Samoa (a major tourist industry)—faced an indirectthreat from participation.

The 11 Pacific microstates generally faced a low-level of external threat duringthe formation of the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition in 2002–2003, bothregionally and sub-regionally. Regionally, the main potential conflict was theTaiwan issue. China has gradually increased its diplomatic, economic andmilitary activities in the region and used diplomatic and economic sticks andcarrots to increase its influence. Taiwan has ‘bought’ diplomatic recognition fromsome of the Pacific microstates, including the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and theSolomon Islands (Henderson and Reilly 2003, 101–102). All of the states had takena clear stand on the Taiwan issue by cooperating with either Taiwan or China.Four of the 11 Pacific microstates had formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan:Tuvalu, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Palau and the Solomon Islands.16

This is striking because only 27 of the world’s 195 countries had formal diplomaticrelations with Taiwan. Furthermore, one of only four embassies maintained by theMarshall Islands was in Taiwan,17 and Taiwan had the only resident embassy inTuvalu and one of the only two diplomatic missions in Nauru. Tonga, Kiribati andNauru had shifted between having ties to China and diplomatic recognition ofTaiwan in attempts to achieve better benefits and aid.

Despite the prominence of the China–Taiwan conflict in the foreign relations ofthe 11 Pacific nation states, affiliation with either China or Taiwan appears to havehad little effect on membership of the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition. China mayhave constituted a threat at the regional level due to its military capabilities, closegeographical proximity and increased foreign policy activism, but no generalpattern of coalition membership follows from close ties with either China orTaiwan. Pacific microstates, it seems, played the ‘China card’ pragmatically ‘in anattempt to revive declining post-Cold War Western interest and aid payments’(Henderson and Reilly 2003, 94). Hence, their doing so appears unrelated tocoalition participation. For instance, Micronesia and Tonga had official ties withChina and not Taiwan but still participated in the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition,whereas Tuvalu had ties with Taiwan but opted not to participate.

Sub-regionally, the significance of the level of sub-regional threat for the choiceof the microstates to participate in the coalition does not appear to have beendecisive. Only one of the 11 states—the Solomon Islands—had been involved in

16 ,http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/brief/info04_7.html. , accessed21 August 2008.

17 The other three are situated in the US, Fiji and Japan.


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recent armed tensions with neighbouring states. The Solomon Islands has hadtense relations with Papua New Guinea due to attacks on some of the northernSolomon Islands by elements pursuing Bougainvillean rebels. A peace accord wasconfirmed in 1998 which removed the armed threat, and border operations wereregularized in 2004.

Balancing internal threats by external bandwagoning with the US could seemhighly plausible, as many of the states have faced internal political instability: forexample, assassination attempts, coups, secessionist movements and domesticfragmentation. For instance, among the participating states, the Solomon Islandshad faced economic and social problems leading to lawlessness, extortion andnational bankruptcy in 1998–2003.18 Tonga has faced severe economic and socialproblems leading to riots in 2005–2007, and the pro-democracy movement hasposed an increasing challenge to the King and nobility.19 Thus, the authority of thepolitical elite has been challenged in both countries by domestic opposition.

Among the non-participating microstates, Fiji’s political situation had beendominated by coups and riots in the 1980s and 2000s. In Vanuatu, the governmentleadership changed frequently due to unstable coalitions between 1995 and 2004. InNauru, political turmoil had increased in recent decades, and economic failures andno-confidence votes were commonplace.20 In sum, both the participating and non-participating states in the coalition had faced severe internal threats to politicalstability. Thus, there was no clear indication that omni-balancing played a decisiverole in the respective decisions of microstates as to whether or not to join the coalition.

All of the CFA states—for whom the US had the full responsibility for securityand defence—participated in the coalition (see Table 1). This indicates that USsecurity and defence guarantees played a decisive role in the decisions of therespective Pacific microstates as to whether or not to join the coalition.21

In contrast, it did not appear to be significant whether the states had defencecooperation with New Zealand or Australia. Furthermore, responses to indirectexternal threats from Iraq, regional or sub-regional conflicts, or omni-balancingplayed only marginal roles in the decision.

Hypothesis 2. Coalition participation provides economic gains

Microstates have limited economic resources. Even though some microstates havesuccessfully exploited their status as secluded islands to increase tourism andbrand their products as pure and untouched by the negative effects of civilization(for example ‘Iceland’ and ‘Fiji’ are increasingly popular brands of bottled mineral

18 In 1998, there was fighting between two rival militias; in 2000 an attempted coup inwhich the Prime Minister was taken hostage and forced to resign; in 2000 a broad peaceagreement treaty brokered by Australia, and unarmed peacekeepers from Australia andNew Zealand were deployed; in 2001 the Marau peace agreement was signed; in 2001 aprominent rebel leader was murdered; in 2002 economic and social problems worsened,some peace monitors withdrew, lawlessness rose and a government minister was shotdead. A multinational force, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands(RAMSI), headed by Australia, has been in the Solomon Islands at the invitation of thegovernment since 2003 in order to help restore order and stability.

19 Since 2006, the country has been in a state of emergency following politicaldemonstrations and riots.

20 In 1997, Nauru had four different presidents in as many months.21 This is consistent with the findings in Tago (2007).


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water in Europe and the US),22 and other microstates have taken advantage oftheir limited capabilities to provide ‘niche products’ such as banking services (forexample, Luxembourg, Lichtenstein and the Cayman Islands), microstatesdepend on the actions of other states for their economic vitality.23

Coalition participation is often a source of advancing not only military but alsoeconomic resources for the participants. As argued in a seminal study by JackLevy and Michael Barnett, states not only participate in alliances as a response toexternal security threats but also as a means to secure scarce resources for nationalneeds (Levy and Barnett 1991, 373ff). Starting from our realist point of departure,arguing that the primary goal of states is to survive and that states are cost–benefitsensitive and rational, we hypothesize that economic benefits will play aparticularly important role for coalition participation when there is economicvulnerability, since this induces coalition participation for economic reasons. Thisis particularly important if the coalition leader is willing and able to support orpunish coalition members economically.

The US has actively used economic carrots to induce other states to joinmilitary coalitions and alliances both during and since the Cold War. Prominentexamples include the Marshall Plan, which helped solidify transatlantic militarycooperation against the Soviet Union after World War II, and bilateral economicsupport for states supplying troops to the American-led coalitions in Vietnam inthe late 1960s and in the Persian Gulf in 1990–1991 (see Newnham 2008, 185;Hansen 2000, 15, 153). Furthermore, the US has used trade sanctions againstnations opposing American foreign policy.24 For poor countries, the US power topunish is exacerbated because the superpower is the only state with veto power inthe World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and because the US has ahistory of exploiting aid as a political instrument to reward allies and punishadversary states.25 The substantial dimensions of the American economy providea convincing tool to pressure impoverished microstates. We would thus expect theUS to offer economic incentives to join the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalitionand/or to threaten the states choosing not to participate with economic sanctions,and we would expect economically weak microstates to be likely to accept such anoffer. When states are experiencing internal unrest and instability, coalitionparticipation may provide them with the economic resources necessary to restore

22 On the successful marketing of Fiji water relating the brand to its place of origin, seeConnell (2006).

23 Due to their limited resources, most microstates choose to brand few issues. However,Qatar has followed a more encompassing branding strategy, including diplomatic,economic and cultural factors. See Peterson (2006).

24 For instance, the US administration prolonged the Congressional approval of thebilateral negotiations with Chile on North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)inclusion from 2002 to 2003. Chile was a non-permanent member of the UN SecurityCouncil and had not confirmed its position on the invasion of Iraq. Moreover, the US liftedthe economic sanctions on Pakistan—invoked after Pakistani nuclear testing in 1998 and the1999 military coup—after Pakistan supported the US offensive against Taliban after 9/11and received more than US$1 billion in US assistance.

25 For example, the American initiative the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act(AGOA), starting in 2000, grants preferential access to US markets to sub-Saharan statesthat meet a list of criteria. One of these is a demand that the state is ‘not engaged inactivities that undermine United States national security or foreign policy interests’(,http://www.agoa.gov . , accessed 11 November 2009).


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Table

1.

Co

alit

ion

par

tici

pat

ion

of

Pac

ific

mic

rost

ates

(1)

Sec

uri

ty(2

)E

con

om

y(3

)L

esso

ns

of

the

pas

t

Def

ence

Dir

ect

thre

atIn

dir

ect

thre

at

Su

b-

reg

ion

alth

reat

sIn

tern

alth

reat

sS

ever

eec

on

-o

mic

pro

ble

ms

Fo

reig

nai

dC

olo

nia

lex

per

ien

ce

Sta

tes

that

par

tici

pat

edin

the

coal

itio

nin

Iraq

20

03

Mar

shal

lIs

lan

ds

US

bas

es,

mil

itar

yai

dan

dtr

ain

ing

,C

FA,

no

ow

nfo

rces

No

Yes

No

No

Dep

end

ent

on

US

bil

ater

alai

dG

erm

any,

Jap

an,

US

,S

pai

n

Mic

ron

esia

US

bas

es,

mil

itar

yai

dan

dtr

ain

ing

,C

FA,

no

ow

nfo

rces

No

Yes

No

No

Dep

end

ent

on

US

bil

ater

alai

dS

pai

n,

Ger

man

y,Ja

pan

,U

S

Pal

auU

Sri

gh

tto

pu

tu

pb

ase,

mil

itar

yai

dan

dtr

ain

-in

g,

CT

BT

,C

FA,

no

ow

nfo

rces

No

Yes

No

No

Dep

end

ent

on

US

bil

ater

alai

dS

pai

n,

Ger

man

y,Ja

pan

,U

S

To

ng

aO

wn

forc

es,

CW

,N

ewZ

eala

nd

and

Au

stra

lia,

US

war

ship

agre

emen

t

No

No

No

Yes

2006

Fin

anci

alsc

and

al,

ban

k-

rup

t20

03

US

bil

ater

alai

dU

K(W

orl

dW

arII

:N

ewZ

eala

nd

,U

S)

So

lom

on

Isla

nd

sP

oli

cefo

rce,

CW

,U

Sm

ilit

ary

aid

and

trai

nin

g

No

No

Pap

ua

New

Gu

inea

Yes

Ban

kru

pt

2003

Aid

Au

stra

lia,

New

Zea

lan

d,

Eu

rop

ean

Un

ion

,Jap

an,C

hin

aan

dU

S(l

imit

ed)

UK

(Wo

rld

War

II:

Jap

an,

US

)

Sta

tes

that

did

not

par

tici

pat

ein

the

coal

itio

nin

Iraq

in2

00

3

Fij

iO

wn

forc

es,

CW

,A

ust

rali

a,C

hin

aan

dU

K,

US

tro

op

s,U

SP

eace

Co

rps

No

Yes

No

Yes

Mu

ltil

ater

alU

Sai

d,

Ch

ina

UK

Kir

ibat

iN

oo

wn

forc

es,

Tre

aty

of

Fri

end

ship

wit

hU

S,

New

Zea

lan

dan

dA

ust

rali

a,U

SP

eace

Co

rps

No

No

No

No

Aid

Jap

an,

Eu

ro-

pea

nU

nio

n,

Au

stra

lia,

New

Zea

lan

d,a

nd

Ch

ina,

US

mu

ltil

ater

alai

d

UK

,(W

orl

dW

arII

:U

S,

Jap

an) (con

tin

ues

)


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Table

1.

(con

tin

ued

)

(1)

Sec

uri

ty(2

)E

con

om

y(3

)L

esso

ns

of

the

pas

t

Def

ence

Dir

ect

thre

atIn

dir

ect

thre

at

Su

b-

reg

ion

alth

reat

sIn

tern

alth

reat

sS

ever

eec

on

-o

mic

pro

ble

ms

Fo

reig

nai

dC

olo

nia

lex

per

ien

ce

Sam

oa

New

Zea

lan

d,

Au

stra

-li

a,n

oo

wn

forc

es,

US

Pea

ceC

orp

s

No

Yes

No

No

Sev

ere

fin

an-

cial

pro

ble

ms

Au

stra

lia,

lim

ited

US

aid

Ger

man

y,N

ewZ

eala

nd

Tu

val

uN

oo

wn

forc

es,

CW

,T

reat

yo

fF

rien

dsh

ipw

ith

US

,A

ust

rali

a

No

No

No

No

US

maj

or

rev

enu

eso

urc

e,A

ust

rali

a,N

ewZ

eala

nd

and

UK

UK

,(W

orl

dW

arII

:U

S)

Van

uat

uN

ofo

rces

,U

SN

oN

oN

oY

esA

idN

ewZ

eala

nd

,A

ust

rali

a,U

K,

Ch

ina

and

Fra

nce

Fra

nce

,U

K(W

orl

dW

arII

:U

S)

Nau

ruN

ofo

rces

,A

ust

rali

a,S

pec

ial

mem

ber

of

CW

No

No

No

Yes

Sev

ere

eco

n-

om

iccr

isis

Aid

Au

stra

lia

Ger

man

y,A

ust

rali

a,U

K,

New

Zea

lan

d,

Jap

an

No

tes:

CT

BT

,C

om

pre

hen

siv

eN

ucl

ear

Tes

tB

anT

reat

y;

CW

,C

hem

ical

Wea

po

ns

Co

nv

enti

on


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domestic order. Our analysis starts by identifying the economic vulnerability ofthe 11 Pacific microstates, and is followed by an assessment of the positive andnegative sanctions employed by the US towards building the Operation IraqiFreedom coalition.

The Pacific microstates have generally had difficulty securing stable andpositive economic development. Almost all of the Pacific microstates suffer fromsevere fiscal problems as a result of poor economic performance over the pastthree decades. Among the 11 countries under investigation, both Nauru and theSolomon Islands have had economic difficulties that have compromised theirability to provide their populations with ‘basic services such as primaryeducation, health care, and personal security’ (Chand 2003, 4); Samoa and Tongahave experienced similar problems. Moreover, the future looks bleak for most ofthe states; rising water levels deplete fresh water supplies and reduce the area ofarable land. Furthermore, the region is subject to earthquakes, cyclones anddrought. The long-term political and economic problems of the Pacificmicrostates are exacerbating the consequences of these problems.

Long-term economic problems have led to increasing public debt and politicalunrest in several of the countries, combined with insufficient environmental rulesand regulations resulting in pollution and environmental depletion. The remote-ness from global markets also has a negative impact on the economic performanceof small states (Armstrong and Read 2006). Accordingly, the economies of thePacific microstates are highly vulnerable, and the 2009 East Asia and PacificRegional Overview from the US Agency for International Development (USAID)perceives the region as ‘an enormous opportunity for the US to protect and advancefundamental US interests’.26

Economic support from strong, wealthy countries is often vital for theeconomy of a microstate, and increasing the level of aid typically ranks among themost important microstate foreign policy priorities (Mohamed 2002, 13). Amongthe five states participating in the coalition of the willing in Iraq, the Federal Statesof Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau were all economically dependent onUS aid when the coalition was formed in 2003.27 None of the three states had theirown currency; they use the US dollar instead. Economic growth in Micronesia andthe Marshall Islands was slow in spite of high levels of economic aid (see Friberget al 2006). Accordingly, neither of these microstates had any prospect of escapingfrom dependence over the coming decades. Palau’s economy was stronger and,despite being hit hard by the East Asian financial crisis (1998–1999), has beengrowing steadily in recent years. Tourism was Palau’s most important industry,and most tourists came from Taiwan, Japan and the US. Palau gained itsindependence in 1994, was awarded US$450 million in assistance over 15 years,and became eligible to participate in more than 40 US federal programmes from1994 to 2009. Direct aid ended in 2009, but the CFA has created a trust fund worthUS$175 million (in 2007), which will ensure continuing economic support.28

26 ,http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/101439.pdf., accessed 12August 2008.

27 CIA World Fact Book, ,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. and ,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tn.html., accessed 6 August 2008.

28 ,http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1840.htm., accessed 11 August 2008.


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According to the IMF and Asian development assessments, ‘Palau’s economyremains heavily dependent on US assistance’ (Magick 2006).

All of the CFA states participated in the coalition of the willing and had a majoreconomical incentive to do so due to their dependence on bilateral economic aid.Furthermore, the renegotiation of the CFA for the Republic of the Marshall Islandsand the Federal States of Micronesia had considerable economic consequences inthe period 1999–2003. Palau’s agreement was not renegotiated. In the renegotiatedCFA, the Republic of the Marshall Islands will receive at least US$57 millionannually until 2023. This is of vital importance for the country’s economy, andconsequently direct US aid accounted for 60.2 per cent of the Marshall Islandsbudget in 2007.29 A jointly managed trust fund was set up, and the Marshallesewill continue to have access to many US programmes and services. In return, theUS was allowed to use the Kwajalein Atoll (US Army Kwajalein Atoll, USAKA)missile test range. Before the renegotiations, the Atoll was rented until 2016, but thelease has now been extended to 2066 with an option to extend the lease further until2086. The test range is currently a vital part of the US missile defence shield tests.Between 1986 and 2001, the Federal States of Micronesia received US$2 billion ingrants and services from the US as a consequence of the CFA. After therenegotiations for the period 2004–2023, it was awarded US$100 million annuallyin direct assistance and a trust fund was established. In addition, the countryreceived US$35 million annually in US federal grants, and the US remained itslargest trading partner.30 According to one estimate, the extension of the CFA willamount to US$3.4 billion over 20 years in economic aid to Micronesia and theMarshall Islands (Friberg et al 2006, 123).

In addition to their direct economic interest in a continuation of US aid, theFederal Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federal States of Micronesia bothhosted American bases, and Palau had expressed interest in hosting a US base on itsterritory. American military bases are important, particularly in small economies,due to the economic benefits that arise from hosting them, including the USprovision of security (reducing the country’s own defence spending) and the boostto the economy in the form of local spending by the base and its employees.

The two remaining coalition members, Tonga and the Solomon Islands, werenot as closely tied to the US economically as the CFA states. However, more than athird of Tonga’s exports were to the US (2006).31 More than half of Tonga’spopulation lived abroad—mainly in the US, Australia and New Zealand—and theeconomy depended extensively on remittances.32 Moreover, the US was a majordonor of bilateral economic aid to Tonga, and Tonga had expressed interest inhosting a US military base on its territory. The 2009 budget overview from USAIDspecifically cites Tonga’s contribution to international peacekeeping and itsdeployment of troops in Iraq as important reasons for economic support.33

The Solomon Islands depended on economic aid from Australia, and enjoyed

29 ,http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26551.htm., accessed 11 August 2008.30 ,http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm., accessed 11 August 2008.31 ,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tn.html.,

accessed 11 August 2008.32 ,http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/16092.htm., accessed 11 August 2008.33 ,http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/101439.pdf., accessed 12

August 2008.


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only limited economic aid from and trade with the US.34 The Solomon Islandsinitially protested when the US listed the country as part of the coalition(Perrott 2003). However, after a domestic political debate focusing on the role ofthe US as a major ally to the country, the Solomon Islands decided to join thecoalition. In addition, as noted above, Tonga and the Solomon Islands both had ahighly unstable domestic political environment.

The economic dependence of coalition members on the US (with the exceptionof the Solomon Islands) contrasts with the economic conditions of the six stateschoosing not to join the coalition. None of the non-coalition members was directlyeconomically dependent on the US. Thus, none of the non-participants receivedbilateral American aid. The US contributed multilateral aid to non-participants,but all six states had other primary aid benefactors and trading partners. Some ofthe non-participants depended on aid from Australia, one of the closest Americanallies in the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition, but this did not sway their decisionto stay out of the conflict.35

Samoa and Kiribati were highly dependent on aid from and trade withAustralia. In addition, Kiribati received rent payments for a military base,substantial economic aid and infrastructure redevelopment from China(Henderson and Reilly 2003, 100). Vanuatu and Nauru shared such dependenceon Australia; Nauru depended on aid, whereas Vanuatu was economicallydependent on aid and tourism from and trade with both Australia andNew Zealand. Both Vanuatu and Samoa benefited from high-profile Chineseconstruction projects (Henderson and Reilly 2003, 102). In addition, Vanuatureceived substantial economic aid from China.36 Tuvalu depended mainly onremittances from Tuvalu seamen working on merchant ships abroad as well asincome from a trust fund established in 1987 by Australia, New Zealand and theUnited Kingdom (UK). Fiji depended less on foreign aid than the other states,relying mainly on sugar and garment exports, remittances from overseas Fijiancommunities, and tourism.37 However, Fiji received economic support fromChina, for example in the form of a sports stadium for the 2003 South PacificGames (Henderson and Reilly 2003, 102). Paradoxically, Fiji has benefitedeconomically from the war in Iraq despite its refusal to join the coalition. Personalremittances from Fijians living overseas now contribute more to the economy thando the traditional sources of income, such as sugar and garments; moreover, asprivate military recruitment for the Middle East has increased, so has the numberof Fijians joining private security companies as well as the British army, assoldiers, security guards, drivers, et cetera. The government of Fiji has supportedthis as a legitimate means to reduce unemployment and provide a source ofincome (Maclellan 2007, 50).

34 On aid, see ,http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/101439.pdf. , ontrade ,http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2799.htm. , accessed 11 August 2008.

35 On the development of Australian aid to the Pacific microstates, see AUSAID AnnualReport 2006 – 2007, Appendix C (,http://www.ausaid.gov.au/anrep/rep07/pdf/anrep06_07.pdf. ).

36 ,http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/asia-oceania/vanuatu. , accessed 22 August 2008.

37 CIA World Fact Book, ,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. , accessed 6 August 2008.


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Like other states participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom, all five coalitionmembers were listed as eligible to bid on Iraq relief and reconstruction contracts in2003 (Hildreth et al 2003, 45), whereas none of the six non-participating statesappeared on the list. As a consequence of their economic structure, however, thePacific microstates were unlikely to be successful in such competition. Instead, thecontinuing importance of remittances in microstate economies means that theymay benefit from the successful bids from other states. It does not matter whowins the contracts; what matters is whom the winners employ on the ground. Thisreduces the economic benefits of coalition participation, because working forcontractors in Iraq is not restricted to citizens from coalition countries.Remittances may be even more important in the future, when reduced levels ofaid force states such as the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the FederatedStates of Micronesia, where remittances have not been substantial thus far, tosearch for alternative sources of income (see Friberg et al 2006).

Economy and survival were closely connected for the Pacific microstates. Forsome of them, foreign aid constituted the main post on the state budget. All 11 of thePacific microstates discussed here were economically vulnerable. In addition, mostof them were stuck in long-term economic dependence with little prospect of self-sufficiency in the coming decades. However, economic vulnerability anddependence cannot alone explain why some chose to join the coalition while otherschose not to. Even though it is not uncommon for Pacific microstates to trade theirvotes in international organizations such as the UN to secure foreign aid (Chand2003, 3), and even though the US used both economic carrots and sticks whenassembling the coalition, six of the 11 microstates analysed here still chose not to join.

To the extent that economic considerations influenced the decision on whetheror not to join the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition, the most important types ofeconomic factors were direct economic dependence on American bilateral aid andthe imminent renegotiation of agreements (see Table 1). In addition, as exemp-lified by Fiji, the remittance economy typical of Pacific microstates, combined withthe privatization of military security, may open up new economic opportunitiesfor microstates in relation to international conflicts. Even though Fiji was not amember of the coalition, the country nevertheless benefited economically from theIraq conflict due to Fijians joining the British army and private securitycompanies. Likewise, the lack of competitiveness in international bids forcontracts, combined with the continuing importance of remittances in most Pacificmicrostate economies, means that all 11 Pacific microstates may benefiteconomically from Iraqi reconstruction as a consequence of the participation oftheir citizens in projects originating in other countries.

Hypothesis 3. Coalition participation reflects the lessons of the past

An important consequence of the lack of a monopoly of violence in internationalaffairs is the constancy of unpredictability and insecurity (see Waltz 1979). Foreignpolicy decision-makers in microstates suffer even more acutely from a lack ofinformation than foreign policy decision-makers in other states, because theirlimited diplomatic resources render it difficult to collect and analyse information,and their structures for making foreign policy tend to be ‘institutionally weak andcentralised’ (Mohamed 2002, 36). Lessons of the past provide decision-makerswith tools to cope with uncertainty: the positive and negative experiences of the


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past may be used as a guide to foreign policy when information about the presentis limited (see Levy 1994, 291–294). Learning from the past is no guarantee of apositive outcome, as decision-makers tend to overlook the historic peculiarities ofpast successes and underestimate the differences between then and now. Asargued by Robert Jervis, ‘nothing fails like success’ (Jervis 1976, 278–279).

Based on our realist understanding of international affairs, our first and mostfundamental assumption about the effect of the lessons of the past on securitystrategy is that ‘continuity follows success, while innovation follows failure’(Reiter 1994, 490). States wish to maximize their chances of security and survival.They therefore adopt strategies that they think will enhance their chance ofsuccess. When they possess limited information about the present, the successfulstrategies of the past may be viewed as the best guide to future action.

We assume two types of historical lessons to be of particular importance tomicrostates. First, we expect the colonial experience of microstates to influenceforeign policy, as it has influenced the political structures of Pacific microstates ingeneral (Anckar 2004; see also Levine and Roberts 2005). Despite a number ofpolitical differences between Pacific microstates (Fraenkel and Grofman 2005;Goldfinch 2005, 41), one shared characteristic is ‘their historical relationship withone or more of the European colonial powers’ (Mohamed 2002, 7). The limitedresources of microstates induce selectivity in the use of diplomatic resources. Theysubsequently tend to focus on states in their immediate vicinity, major worldpowers and their former colonial powers (Mohamed 2002, 18; see also Plischke1977, 58). We therefore expect the colonial past of Pacific microstates to be ofimportance for the foreign policy of the present. Second, we expect past existentialthreats, typically wars, to play a particularly important role in the lessons of thepast learned by both foreign policymakers and the general public.

The absence of a legitimate monopoly of violence induces risk aversion in thebehaviour of all states, but this effect of anarchy is particularly strong onmicrostates, because they are always the weaker state in asymmetric relationships.Rather than seeking to maximize benefits, microstates will therefore attempt toavoid risks and reduce costs. For this reason, we expect microstates to allythemselves with the great powers that protected their security in the past and toengage in alliances against the great powers that previously threatened them orpreviously failed to come to the rescue when survival was at stake. Thisexpectation is consistent with the coalition patterns of smaller European statesduring Operation Iraqi Freedom, in that a number of smaller European coalitionmembers linked their participation explicitly to the debt that they allegedly owedto the US for support during World War II and the Cold War (see Mouritzen 2006).

How do our theoretical expectations fit with the historical experiences of thePacific microstates? Oceania is occasionally divided into three sub-regionsreflecting ancient, and to some extent colonial, history: Melanesia, Micronesia andPolynesia (see Fischer 2002, 23–81). Of the 11 states examined here, Fiji, theSolomon Islands and Vanuatu belong to Melanesia; the Republic of the MarshallIslands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Kiribati and Nauru belong toMicronesia; and Tuvalu, Tonga and Samoa belong to Polynesia. As is evident fromthis list, these dividing lines are not reflected in whether or not the states chose tojoin the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition, since each sub-region includes bothmembers and non-members of the coalition.


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Three of the five Pacific microstates participating in Operation Iraqi Freedomhave a more recent history as territories governed by the US, and two have ahistory of close political ties to the UK, the closest American ally in Operation IraqiFreedom. The Marshall Islands were claimed by Spain in 1874 but became aGerman protectorate in 1885, before coming under Japanese control in conjunctionwith the outbreak of World War I. They remained in Japanese hands until 1944, atwhich time the US drove the Japanese troops from the islands. From 1947 untilindependence was achieved in 1979, the Marshall Islands were controlled by theUS under the auspices of the UN as part of the Trust Territory of the PacificIslands. Micronesia was colonized by Spain in the 16th century before comingunder German control from 1899 until 1914. It then fell under Japanese controluntil the end of World War II, when it became part of the US-controlled UN TrustTerritory of the Pacific Islands until independence was granted in 1979. Palau’swas governed by Spain (until 1899), Germany (until 1914) and Japan (until 1947);after World War II, control was handed over to UN trusteeship as part of theTrust Territory of the Pacific Island administered by the US until Palau’sindependence in 1994.

Missionaries began arriving in the Solomon Islands in the mid 19th century,and in 1893, following a series of massacres and problems with labour trade, theUK declared a protectorate over part of the Solomon Islands, which was expandedin subsequent years. After World War II, British colonial rule was re-established,but more and more power was handed over to Solomon institutions untilindependence was finally achieved in 1978. The Solomon Islands remains amember of the Commonwealth. Finally, Tonga was a monarchy when it signed atreaty of friendship and protection with the UK in 1900. The treaty meant that theUK would take care of foreign affairs and defence, although Tonga remainedindependent. Tonga achieved full independence in 1970 and remains a member ofthe Commonwealth.

The US administration of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau was aresult of the US victory over the Japanese occupiers during World War II and thesubsequent ambition ‘to make an American lake out of the Pacific Ocean’(Lattimore 1945, 313), which eventually led to ‘the projection of US powerthroughout the region’ (Fischer 2002, 210). Moreover, the Solomon Islands werethe scene of fighting between American and Japanese troops, and the massivepresence of American troops after the Japanese withdrawal in 1943 resulted inclose ties between the two countries. During World War II, Tonga cooperatedclosely with New Zealand and the US. During the Cold War, all five states hadtheir national security underpinned by the US, which pursued a policy of‘strategic denial’, ensuring US presence in order to minimize the Soviet influencein the region (Henderson and Reilly 2003, 94).

The six Pacific microstates declining to participate in the Operation IraqiFreedom coalition did not all share the three lessons learned by the coalitionparticipants. However, their history reveals few lessons pointing in the directionof coalition opposition, and Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Kiribati share some remarkablehistorical similarities with the Pacific microstate coalition members. Tuvalu was aBritish colony until it became independent in 1978 and remains a member of theCommonwealth. The US built bases and stationed thousands of troops on Tuvaluduring World War II, and Tuvalu signed a treaty of friendship with the US in 1979during the Cold War period. Vanuatu was the subject of Franco-British competition


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for control in the late 19th century. As of 1906, however, the two countries agreed toadminister Vanuatu jointly until independence in 1980. American troops werestationed in Vanuatu during World War II and the US continued to provide militarysupport in the post-war period. Kiribati became a British colony in 1916 following agradual development of increasing British control over the islands since 1892.Kiribati was the scene of intense fighting between American and Japanese troopsduring World War II. Kiribati achieved independence and signed a treaty offriendship with the US in 1979 within the context of the Cold War.

The development of Nauru and Samoa as independent states was closely tiedto relations with Australia, one of the most ardent supporters of Operation IraqiFreedom, and New Zealand, which also supplied troops to the coalition (thoughonly for a brief period in 2003–2004), and relations between these countriesremain close. Nauru was under German control from 1886 until it was captured byAustralia in 1914. After World War I, the UK, Australia and New Zealand jointlygoverned the island until 1942, when it was occupied by Japan, which deported alarge number of Nauruans to work in the Caroline Islands. After the war, theisland became a UN Trust Territory administered by Australia until independencewas achieved in 1968. Nauru is a special member of the Commonwealth. Itmaintains close ties to Australia, which maintains a refugee centre in Nauru, usedmainly for refugees unwanted in Australia.

Samoa was under German control until 1914, when New Zealand assumedcontrol and administered it for the League of Nations after World War I and forthe UN until 1962, when Samoa gained its independence. Relations withNew Zealand have remained close since independence, and the two countriesagreed on a Treaty of Friendship allowing Samoa to request New Zealand supportin both diplomatic affairs and in regard to security and defence issues. Samoa alsohas close relations with China. Its most high-profile foreign policy issue has beenthe protests over French nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific. Of the sixstates declining to participate in the coalition, only Fiji has a history of conflictwith major coalition members. A British colony from 1874 until independence in1970, Fiji was expelled from the Commonwealth in 1987 following a military coupand has since cultivated diplomatic relations with a number of Asian countries,including China and India, while being subject to sanctions from the US, Australiaand New Zealand.

In sum, the lessons of the past appear to play no independent role in thedecisions of Pacific island microstates as to whether or not to join the coalition.This is surprising, because a colonial past is part of the recent history of most ofthese states and because World War II and the Cold War security environmentwere important conditions for their independence (see Table 1). The lessons of thepast have played an indirect role for the CFA states in particular, as their strongrelationship with the US dating back to World War II and the Cold War has led totheir present dependence.38 The lack of a more direct role for the lessons learnedduring World War II and the Cold War may be accounted for by the most recentpast of Oceania. The reduction of US diplomatic, military and economic resources

38 A related point is made by Tago (2007), who points to the importance of ’sharedlanguage’, a proxy for historically shared culture. However, our definition of the presenceof the past and historical ties with the US is quite different from Tago’s ‘shared language’.


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allocated to the region, in particular in the first decade since the end of the ColdWar, has taught Pacific microstates that the US is less committed to the region thanin the past. Accordingly, ‘it can no longer be taken for granted that Oceania willremain a relatively benign “American lake”’ (Henderson and Reilly 2003, 95).

Conclusion

Two overall conclusions can be derived from our analysis. First, even though theprobability of conflict facing Pacific microstates was generally low, securityinterest played a major role in the choices made by the microstates. In particular,US security and defence guarantees played a decisive role in the decisions of therespective Pacific microstates as to whether or not to join the coalition. In contrast,security and defence guarantees from Australia or New Zealand, omni-balancing,response to indirect threats from Iraq, and regional or sub-regional threat-balancing played only marginal roles in the decision. Second, considerationsabout economic gains were important to the extent that the US was in a position toincrease or decrease aid or trade benefits. Thus, all of the states receiving bilateralAmerican aid participated. Conversely, we found no indication that financialcrisis or low GDP influenced the decision to participate. Lessons of the past playedonly an indirect role.

Three implications for microstate security policy follow from our analysis.First, the increase in ad-hoc coalition-making provides microstates with newopportunities to ‘sell’ political support and legitimacy in return for security andeconomic benefits. Participation in a ‘coalition of the willing’, such as the coalitionin Iraq in 2003, cost the microstates relatively little, as they only contributed withdiplomatic support (with the exception of Tonga), and the increased threat relatedto coalition participation was minor. The US aimed for quantity more than qualitywhen forming the coalition. The main issue for the US was to increase thelegitimacy of the invasion by making the coalition as inclusive as possible; not byadding more specific capabilities to the practical conducting of the invasion.Second, the privatization of international security means that even if a microstatedoes not participate in a security conflict, it may still benefit economically, throughremittances. Finally, being a microstate does not necessitate compliance ininternational relations. Even though bilateral dependence severely restricted theroom for manoeuvre for some of the states, other states were surprisingly free tochoose whether they wanted to join a coalition. For Pacific microstates inparticular, Chinese foreign policy activism in the region may increase their foreignpolicy leverage by reducing their dependence on the US. In conclusion, theoverall—and surprisingly optimistic—finding of our analysis is that the presentsecurity order represents as much of an opportunity as a challenge to microstatesecurity policy.

These findings suggest at least two avenues for future research. First, furtherempirical analyses and testing are needed in order to determine whether theresults of our study are supported by the security strategies of microstates incoalitions of the willing other than Operation Iraqi Freedom. In this regard ourfindings may provide the basis for generating hypotheses to be tested on a muchlarger dataset expanding the spatial and temporal scope of the present studyconsiderably. Second, whereas we do not present an alternative to general


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explanations of why states choose to join US-led military coalitions, our studymay provide the basis for more specific hypotheses in the future. For instance,using Tago’s study of US economic and military aid policy towards coalitionforces (non)participants as a point of departure (Tago 2008), our findings may beused for specifying hypotheses in order to further explore how punishment andrewards affect coalition participation by different types of states.

Notes on contributors

Anders Wivel (PhD) is an Associate Professor in the Department of PoliticalScience, University of Copenhagen. He has published articles in a number ofjournals including the Journal of Common Market Studies, Security Dialogue,Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Cooperation and Conflict and the Journalof International Relations and Development. He is co-author (with Birthe Hansenand Peter Toft) of Security Strategies and American World Order: Lost Power(Routledge, 2009).

Kajsa Ji Noe Oest received her PhD from the University of Copenhagen in 2009.

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Documents

Security, profit or shadow of the past? Explaining the security strategies of microstates