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Security Metrics What Can We Measure? Zed Abbadi The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board

Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

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Page 1: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Security MetricsWhat Can We Measure?

Zed AbbadiThe Public Company Accounting Oversight Board

Page 2: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

What is a “Metric”A metric is a system of related measures enabling quantification of some characteristic. A measure is a dimension compared against a standard.*Security metric is a system of related dimensions (compared against a standard) enabling quantification of the degree of freedom from possibility of suffering damage or loss from malicious attack.*

*QoP’ 06, Oct. 2006

Page 3: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Do We Really Need Metrics?"If you cannot measure it, you cannot

improve it."

Lord Kelvin

"In physical science the first essential step in the direction of learning any subject is to find principles of numerical reckoning and practicable methods for measuring some quality connected with it. I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the state of Science, whatever the matter may be." [PLA, vol. 1, "Electrical Units of Measurement", 1883-05-03]

“You cannot manage what you cannot measure"

Page 4: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Drivers For Metrics

Money mattersAsset vs. liability

Governance You claim it is a science?

Do as good as math, physics and astrology

Decision aidHow are we doing with security

Page 5: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Good Metrics. vs. Metrics

QuantitativeObjectiveBased on a formal modelHas a time dimensionUniversally acceptableHas ground truthInexpensiveObtainableRepeatable

Page 6: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Data Collection

Vulnerabilities, exploits and attacksOrganization vs. industry vs. everyone elseDisclosure PoliciesAccuracyStatistical Significance

Page 7: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Attempts at Measuring SecurityTCSEC (Orange book)ITSEC (Europe’s Orange book)CTCPEC (Canada’s Orange book)Common Criteria (everyone’s Orange book)

Framework rather than a list of requirements

SSE-CMMNIST FIPS-140 seriesNIST SP 800-55

Page 8: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Security Metrics Types

Process Security MetricsNetwork Security MetricsSoftware Security MetricsPeople Security MetricsOther

Page 9: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Process Security Metrics

Measure processes and procedures Imply high utility of security policies and processesRelationship between metrics and level of security not clearly definedCompliance/Governance drivenGenerally support better securityActual impact hard to define

Page 10: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Examples

No. of Policy Violations% of systems with formal risk assessments% of system with tested security controls% of weak passwords (non-compliant)No. of identified risks and their severity% of systems with contingency plans

Page 11: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Network Security Metrics

Driven by products (firewalls, IDS etc)Readily availableWidely usedGives sense of controlNice charts and interfacesCan be misleading

Page 12: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Examples

Successful/unsuccessful logonsNo. of incidentsNo. of viruses blockedNo. of patches appliedNo. of spam blockedNo. of virus infectionsNo. of port probesTraffic analysis

Page 13: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Software Security MetricsSoftware measures are

troublesome (LOC, FPs, Complexity etc) “Laws of Physics” are missingMetrics are context sensitive and environment-dependentArchitecture dependentAggregation may not

lead to strength

Page 14: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Examples

Size and complexityDefects/LOCDefects (severity, type) over timeCost per defectAttack surface (# of interfaces)Layers of securityDesign Flaws

Page 15: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

People Security Metrics

RelevanceUnique characteristics

Risk perception skewed “optimism Bias”Limited memory and attention spanBehavior modeling is difficult

Awareness training?

Page 16: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Reliability vs. Security

Similar but differentWe care more about reliabilityDifferent adversary model

Reliability models exist, but…Security is a moving target

Page 17: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Most Common Security Metric

Risk- We love this thing!Source for profit

Where is the data? Non monetary consequencesAdversary behavior modelsAccuracy against ground truthMission/system/support models

Dynamic in nature

Page 18: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring

Future Of Security MetricsConsumers demand better security metricsGovernment involvement is increasedScience evolves to provide better measuresVendors volunteer (forced to) develop universal accurate metricsSome vendors cheat, a watchdog is createdSecurity problems continue, no change in level of risk

Page 19: Security Metrics What Can We Measure?€¦ · exploits and attacks Organization vs. industry vs. everyone else Disclosure Policies Accuracy Statistical Significance. Attempts at Measuring