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Security issues in Europe: An Asian perspectiveChung Min Lee aa Yonsei University , KoreaPublished online: 07 Apr 2008.
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GLOBAL ECONOMIC REVIEW 97Vol. 29, No. 1,2000, pp. 97-118
SECURITY ISSUES IN EUROPE: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE
Chung Min LeeYonsei University, Korea
The future of European and Asian security can no longer be separated owing topervasive globalization, the rise of East Asia as a new geopolitical hub, and theincreasing web of interests that binds the United States, the European Union (EU),and East Asia together. Of the three key relationships-the transatlantic, thetranspacific, and the Eurasian-the latter remains the weakest owing to a combinationof historical, political, and economic reasons. Improving this relationship from thestrategic, economic, and conceptual dimensions will bring significant dividends to thetwo regions. Operationalizing this challenge, however, is going to be cumbersomeand time consuming given the historical lack of strategic interaction between EastAsia and Europe.
1. THE RELEVANCE OF 'EURASIAN' SECURITY
The future of European and Asian security can no longer be separated owing topervasive globalization, the rise of East Asia as a new geopolitical hub, and theincreasing web of interests that binds the United States, the European Union (EU),and East Asia together. As Zbigniew Brzenzski has noted, 'Eurasia is home to mostof the world's politically assertive and dynamic states' and that collectively, Eurasia'spotential power overshadows even America's (Zbigniew 1997).' Of the three keyrelationships-the transatlantic, the transpacific, and the Eurasian-the latter remainsthe weakest owing to a combination of historical, political, and economic reasons.Improving this relationship from the strategic, economic, and conceptual dimensionswill bring significant dividends to the two regions. Operationalizing this challenge,however, is going to be cumbersome and time consuming given the historical lack ofstrategic interaction between East Asia and Europe. But a potential redistribution ofpower in the Eurasian landmass (notably, the rise of China), and the need to jointlyaddress 'out-of-area' security issues in order to minimize fallout in their respective
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regions means that Europe and East Asia has to begin the process of a genuinesecurity partnership.
From the middle of the 19th century when East Asia first collided with theEurocentric world order until the fostering of a postwar order after the Second WorldWar, these two major geostrategic theaters remained essentially apart. By the dint ofgeographic distance, the history of European colonialism in the region, contrastinglevels of national development, and a very different security milieu, a commondenominator never really existed. To be sure, Europe's initial foray into East Asiacan be traced back to the Silk Road era and the commercial-driven expansion thatfirst began in the 16th century but one which accelerated from the 1830s and 1840s.But ironically, it was only after the ebbing of Europe's global influence after WorldWar I and the accelerated emergence of Pax Americana in the post-World War II erathat the concept of Eurasian security really became operational. Paradoxically, thepower that began to bring Europe and Asia together, at least from the perspective ofgrand strategy, was also the power that was neither European nor Asian.
Compared to East Asia's experience with Europe over the last century and ahalf, the single biggest difference is that East Asia has emerged as the third pivot orhub of geopolitics and geoeconomics. For the first time, East Asia has acquiredcapabilities which enables it to exercise influence beyond its immediateenvironment.1 Equally, if not more important, it also means that East Asia must learnto effectively manage great power dynamics and attendant responsibilities:preventing the outbreak of major conflicts, addressing nuclear proliferation threats,environmental security, enhancing military transparency, and elevating economiccooperation at a higher level than at any other time since the end of the SecondWorld War. In essence, East Asia can no longer separate capability withresponsibility and it is here that lessons can be derived from Europe's securitymanagement in three key areas: overcoming historical legacies and fostering aprocess of intra-regional political socialization; retaining core national interests whilestriving for more common foreign and security policies; and maintaining nationalsovereignty within the confines of common institutions.
The rise of new powers in East Asia stands out as one of the most significantdevelopments of the postwar era. The high concentration of traditional nationalpower attributes-population, industrial output, and military capabilities-in NortheastAsia compared to other sub-regions, suggests that it may exercise greater influencein the shaping of regional, if not global, politics and economics. This is so becausethe region has made unprecedented economic progress over the last three decades.Although the economic crisis of 1997-1998 could have fundamental long-termrepercussions (Katz 1997), East Asia could harbor the greatest concentration ofeconomic wealth over the next two to three decades. Estimates vary on the size ofthe future scale of the East Asian economy but the Asia Development Bank (ADB)noted in the spring of 1997 that from 40 percent of the world's GDP in 1992, over 60percent of the world's GDP will be centered in the Asia-Pacific region over the next
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fifteen years (Asia Times, 12th May 1997).Other studies project that by the year 2020 the center of global economic
activity will shift from North America to the Asia-Pacific region since 80 percent ofthe world's largest economics will be located along the Pacific and the Indian Oceanrim. Moreover, if China's accelerated growth continues over the next two decades,its economy could become 40 percent larger than that of the United Sates (Krulak1997).
These figures are mentioned primarily for illustrative purposes and shouldnot be construed to mean the demise of Pax Americana or the inevitable weakeningof Europe. To the contrary, the current preeminence of the United States as the solesuperpower and Europe's march toward greater economic unity very much illustratesthe continuing viability of the Euro-American global partnership and the key role itwill play in shaping a new world order. For the foreseeable future, no other singlepower has the capability to replicate the role of the United States or to replace it asthe sole superpower. Nonetheless, for the first time since East Asia ventured into themodern international system, it has become a viable new power center.
But Asia's strategic rise only tells one part of the story since the region faces anumber of important challenges in an era of uncertainty. No other region depends sohighly on major power cooperation, among the powers themselves and with otherregional actors, than East Asia for stability and prosperity. The post-Cold War erahas resulted in some tangible benefits as illustrated by improved Sino-Russianrelations and the growing importance of the Sino-American relationship (Perry1997).2 But within the region, bilateral and multilateral ties continue to beconstrained by layers of historical enmity and political discord.
To be sure, key improvements have been made such as the June 13th-15thinter-Korean summit and enhanced Korean-Japanese ties under the Kim Dae Junggovernment. How the North Korean missile issue, and indeed, the South-Northmilitary situation, will be resolved ultimately remains uncertain although the first-ever inter-Korean summit between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong II on June 13th-15th in Pyongyang has raised hopes of significant improvements in inter-Koreanrelations and a concomitant dilution of the North Korean military threat. On June21st North Korea extended its earlier pledge to the United States that it would stopflight-testing its long-range missile so long as talks were underway with the UnitedStates (Perlez 2000; U.S. Department of State 2000).3 While the ROK and theUnited States remain optimistic that on-going talks may result in further assurancesfrom Pyongyang on controlling its long-range missile program, North Korea has notyet agreed to address such related issues as engine testing and improvements intarget acquisition systems and launch sites.
While the strategic impact of the South-North summit will not be knownuntil key follow-on measures such as the institutionalization of a viable CBM oreven an arms control regime actually materialize, the potential for substantiallyreduced military tensions on the Korean peninsula has also colored the on-going
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debate on the need for a U.S. national missile defense (NMD) as well as a theatermissile defense (TMD) system, as well as the future status of U.S. forces (Lancaster2000). At the same time, the summit has generated intense debate within SouthKorea, and in particular, its national security and defense policy communities, onhow to read North Korea's overall strategic calculus. For instance, post-summitdiscussions in South Korea have focused on whether North Korea should continue tobe perceived as the principal source of threat or whether the South should make a'great leap forward' by a 'softer' and neutral perception of the North (Chosun Ilbo,22nd June 2000).4 Notwithstanding prospects for accelerated confidence buildingmeasures between the two Koreas and progress on curtailing North Korea's missileprogram, the summit has not fundamentally altered the context of the missile debate,nor has it resulted in a significant revamping of estimates on North Korea's offensivemilitary capabilities.
That said, political confidence among the East Asian states remains at a muchlower level compared to increasing economic cooperation. At the domestic politicallevel, intra-regional stability and cooperation could be threatened by uneven orvolatile transitions. For example, while three of the Northeast Asian states aredemocratic-Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea-the sub-region is also home to Chinaand North Korea, the most populous and the most isolated communist states. Indeed,how North Korea and China evolve over time will have a crucial impact on EastAsian security.
In forecasting the region's potential paths, a key consideration is that in theabsence of a viable, multilateral security framework, what capacity do the regionalpowers have to overcome outstanding legacies and to what degree can compatibilityand cooperation be sustained among its member states? Having accumulatedcapabilities over the last two to three decades, the key challenge lies in exercising itwith a vision that goes beyond narrowly defined national interests and maintainingparochial strategic advantages. A fundamental prerequisite lies in creating andsustaining a viable security regime that enhances and institutionalizes a 'cooperativeculture.' Without progress on these two fronts, East Asia is unlikely to assume acentral leadership role in the international community even as its capabilitiescontinue to grow. If the regional states continue to acquire economic, military,political, and technological capabilities without genuine and reciprocal securitycooperation, regional stability could be impaired. This is particularly so incontingencies that could quickly erupt into a major regional crisis.
Thus, a decade after the end of the Cold War, Europe and Asia have yet todevelop a comprehensive strategic roadmap although some key trends can beidentified. On both fronts, the threat of major wars has receded: Europe no longerlives under the threat of a pronounced Russian military threat and the chances ofmajor power conflict in East Asia have receded significantly. But these two majorgeostrategic theaters continue to face a litany of security challenges. For Europe,responding to post-Soviet dynamics has consumed the lion's share of its political and
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economic attention. The insecurities of a reforming but weakening Russia, NATOenlargement, the threat posed by entrenched ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia(as illustrated by NATO's air campaign in Kosovo) and maintaining militaries in theabsence of an overarching threat are some of the new issues that continues toconfound policy planners throughout Europe's major capitals.
Conversely, while East Asia has also been affected by the dissolution of theSoviet Union, it has been more concerned with essentially traditionally securityissues. The promises and perils of a 'Greater China,' tension on the Korean peninsulaand the Taiwan Straits, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)are some of the more pronounced challenges confronting East Asia. One notableexception is in the area of economic security. For nearly three decades, the newlyindustrialized economies of the region registered double-digit growth with profoundpolitical and social implications. Politically, performance legitimacy served as abuffer for key state institutions and policies. But the outbreak of the 1997 financialcrisis in Thailand engulfed much of the region and indeed, the global economy wasalso affected by the regional economic crisis. Over the last two years, South Koreaand Thailand have made significant economic improvements. Nevertheless, thecrisis also acutely illustrated the growing vulnerability of the regional economies toglobal financial forces. As these economies become even more interconnected withthe global economy through the accelerated proliferation of informationtechnologies, structural reforms resulting in greater transparency, and growingpenetration of foreign firms and investments, East Asian governments have toconstantly monitor the impact of global economic forces.
2. THE END OF HEGEMONISM IN EUROPE?
Throughout most of this century, European security has been dominated by theactions of two anti-status quo powers: Germany during the two world wars and theSoviet Union until the end of the Cold War. Reduced to its essential core, theaccelerated decline of Europe's classical balance of power going into World War I,the attempt to forge a collective security system during the interwar years, andNATO-bandwaggoning in the Cold War era were all driven by the rise of aggressivehegemons. Barely two generations ago, Europe was engulfed in history's mostvicious war and just a decade ago, NATO's war plans were premised, by and large,on a potential Warsaw-Pact invasion across the Fulda Gap. Nevertheless, Europe isno longer consumed by the potential reemergence of an aggressive Germany and amilitarily bellicose Russia. What Germany failed to achieve through two devastatingwars-to be accepted as the preeminent power in Europe-has finally been achieved byits dominance as an economic power. And a Germany that was at once democratic,unified, and firmly anchored in the EU and NATO finally laid to rest the muchdebated German Question (Zelikow and Rice 1996).5
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To be sure, Europe continues to grapple with the consequences of post-Sovietturmoil. Endemic political and economic instability in the Russian Federation, thepotential revival of Russia's neo-imperialistic ambitions, 'ethnic cleansing' in theformer Yugoslavia, and the problems associated with expanding NATO and theEuropean Union are but some of the more pronounced and complex challengesconfronting Europe. The absence of a 'unifying' Soviet threat has also brought to thefore the need for a viable raison d'etre not only in maintaining the Atlantic Alliancebut to also ensure that the "Europeanizatiori of European security can proceed on thebasis of a commonly shared strategic vision. The debate on the pros and cons ofNATO enlargement, the level of synergy between NATO and the Western European,Union (WEU), the future role of the EU in the European security nexus, and therevamping of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OCSE) willtake several more years, if not decades, before they are settled.
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to suggest that the absence of either acommon security threat (i.e. the possibility of a Soviet invasion during the ColdWar), or a viable post-Cold War strategic vision, axe likely to severely impedeEuropean stability. For it remains that all of the fundamental goals that NATOsought to achieve have been achieved without a single shot being fired against eitherthe Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. Notwithstanding an increasing web of securitychallenges confronting Europe, 'security policy is thus considered a contextual,rather than a defining issue' in the development of a new Europe (Laird 1998). To besure, differences should be allowed for Western and Central Europe to the extent thatthe nation-states that are in the latter category are still coming to grips with post-socialist transitions. For Central Europeans, the most ominous threat is thepossibility, however limited, of the potential resurgence of an aggressive Russia andany major fallout from the on-going conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Perhaps moreimportant, the inability of the 'Central European states themselves to join the Westand participate fully in the multilateral institutions associated with the economic andpolitical and progress of Western Europe' consumes the lion's share of CentralEurope's concern (Laird 1998).
How Central Europe becomes more fully integrated into the Western coreremains to be seen. The initial inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republicinto NATO and the possibility of enlarging the EU stemming from the AmsterdamTreaty will provide tangible dividends although the demands fostered by anexpanding EU and NATO will constrain, at least in the short to mid-term, the abilityto sustain a common security and foreign policy (CSFP). Nevertheless, the factremains that Europe's center of gravity is unlikely to be fractured, at least into theforeseeable future, by the actions of an aggressive, anti-status quo great power.
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3. POST-SOVIET CHALLENGES AND EUROPE'S RESPONSE
But nearly a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russia factor continues toloom over Western and Central Europe not for its aggressive, imperial ambitions ofyears past but owing to the uncertainties of a weakening, fractured,, and disarrayedRussia. In particular, four key areas are crucial: (1) whether the Russian leadershipwill choose a pro-Western security and economic policy over the long haul; (2)whether military reforms will ultimately succeed; and (3) whether Russia will be tofoster non-imperialistic policies to its near-abroad; and (4) whether Russia can play aconstructive role outside of Europe (e.g. in Central Asia and East Asia). AlthoughRussia has made impressive political gains when compared to the dictatorship underthe Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Russia is by no means afunctioning democracy. The strength of Russia's civil society remains tenuous, thepromise of rapid economic transformation has largely been unfulfilled, and no singleleader or party can claim effective nation-wide leadership. Its military, once theprincipal cause of alarm in the West and the primary recipient of the CommunistParty's attention and resources, has come to resemble, in certain respects, the bitterarmed forces of Weimar Germany. In the foreign policy arena, the former SovietUnion ultimately grudgingly accepted German unification and while Russiacontinues to voice selective opposition, NATO enlargement has proceeded.
These developments would have been impossible without the dissolution ofthe CPSU and the Soviet empire (e.g. former constituent republics of the SovietUnion minus Russia and former members of the Warsaw Pact). Having lost itssuperpower status but not necessarily its imperialistic ambitions, Russia's search forself-identity will have a major impact on how Moscow chooses to prioritize itsstrategic objectives. On what basis will Russia make its central strategic choices? AsRichard Pipes has written, 'it is impossible at this time to foresee which path Russiawill choose, pro-Western or anti-Western (Pipes 1997).' If Russia understands that itcan never really cover its superpower status unless it fully joins the global economicorder dominated by the industrial powers, then more stable relations with the Westwill prevail. On the other hand, Russian elites could choose to rely on the onlytraditional source of power it had-military capability-coupled with 'rapprochementwith countries that for one reason or another are hostile to the West (Pipes 1997).'Should Russia emphasize the latter option, it is highly unlikely to reach economicparity with Europe, much less China. As Zbigniew Brzezinski has written:
"Russia is more likely to make a break with its imperial past if the newly independentpost-Soviet states are vital and stable. Their vitality will temper any residual Russianimperial temptations. Political and economic support for the new states must be anintegral part of a broader strategy for integrating Russia into a cooperativetranscontinental system (Brezinski 1997)."
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In the post-Soviet era, Russia no longer confronts 'hostile imperialistic' forces. Sovietexperiences in the two world wars created a siege mentality that for better or forworse, dominated strategic planning throughout the life of the USSR. After the endof the Second World War, however, the notion of encirclement was contrived andexaggerated since the regime's very survival depended on constant vigilance againstthe West, and after the early 1960s, vis-a-vis China. Throughout the Soviet era, themilitary forces of the Soviet Union played a key role in buttressing andimplementing key elements of Soviet strategy. Today, inept political leadership,declining economic resources, and ineffective military reforms have created a newproblem for the West and Russia's fledgling civilian leadership: the growing appealof nationalistic, anti-democratic, and an anti-Western military (Arbatov 1998). Ifmilitary reform in Russia ultimately fails, it will have tremendous repercussions fordomestic politics (such as the resurgence of communism or extreme nationalism),but equally important, for European and even Asian security. Such moves as theelimination of the Russian ground forces as an independent branch of the armedforces is encouraging. Nevertheless, tremendous resources are needed to implementRussia's military reforms. Given the current and projected state of the Russianeconomy, the government is unlikely to increase defense spending as a percentage ofGNP above the current level of about 3.5 percent. It also means that withoutfinancial resources, Russia's compliance with major arms control treaties is at stake.Consider, for example, that the estimated aggregate cost for implementing majorarms control treaties and agreements between 1996 and 2006 is estimated at US$ 20billion: US$ 7.4 billion on START I and US$ 3 billion on START n, US$ 5 billionfor the Chemical Weapons Convention, US$ 1.4 billion for the CFE Treaty, US$ 2billion for 'Open Skies,' and another US$ 2 billion for indirect collateral eliminationof weapons and equipment (Arbatov 1998:116).
Beyond the need to ensure the successful reform of Russia's still significantmilitary forces and its gargantuan defense industrial base, Russia's ability to proceedwith the denuclearization process and its capability to retain credible command andcontrol over its nuclear forces and to manage its civilian nuclear power program areadditional sources of security concern. The major task is whether the Ministry ofAtomic Energy, the relevant regulatory agencies, and the Ministry of Defense will beable to carry out the responsibilities 'assigned to them on the schedule envisioned,while preventing leakage of nuclear weapons, materials, and technologies topotential proliferators (National Academy of Sciences 1994).' While Russia so farhas been able to maintain central command and control over its nuclear forces, fourmain danger areas need to be carefully monitored: 'breakup,' or the emergence ofmultiple nuclear-weapon states arising from the former Soviet Union; 'breakdown,'or a significant erosion of government control over nuclear weapons and materials;and 'breakout,' or the repudiation of arms reduction agreements and pledges andembarking on a concerted nuclear weapons buildup program (National Academy ofSciences 1994).
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Security Issues in Europe: An Asian Perspective 105
The fate of Russia's nuclear program and its plutonium cities (Chelyabinsk-65, Tomsk-7, and Krasnoyarsk-26) has critical implications for Western and globalsecurity. For its part, the West can consider a number of options such as a dedicatedprogram with a focus on Russia's plutonium cities, stressing the importance ofnuclear safeguards, enhancing defense conversion programs with Westernbusinesses and governments, and paying greater attention to the disposition of fissilematerials from weapons. But critics argue that that a major Western effort 'would bewasted and the effort stalled by Russian lawlessness and corruption' and at worst,'Western assistance would free Russia's internal funding, thereby allowing it tocontinue advances in the area of weapons of mass destruction (Bukharin 1997).'These security contours of a post-Soviet Russia are unlikely to be resolved anytimesoon. Indeed, the absence of domestic political stability and viable institutions,coupled with conflicting parochial interest groups suggests that it will take at least adecade for Russia to become truly stable.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, one of the mostcontentious security debates has been centered on the pros and cons of NATOenlargement. Forged in the aftermath of World War II to defend Western Europeagainst possible Soviet/Warsaw Pact aggression, NATO's mission has becomingincreasingly politicized over the last decade. As the 1999 Kosovo crisis has shown,NATO's post-Cold War responsibilities have been expanded including peacekeepingin the Balkans. A senior European diplomat recently commented that 'whether welike it or not, NATO has become the sheriff of Europe's Wild Southeast' but thealliance's ambitious aims to 'project stability to the eastern and southern parts of theEuropean Continent' also carry significant risks (Drozdiak 1998). According to theEconomist:
"NATO intervention [in Kosovo] is fraught with risks. Not least of these is that
bombing without the explicit authorization of the UN Security Council would badly
damage relations with Russia, and divide Europe. President Boris Yeltsin says that air
strikes would be most unfavorable for world peace ••• Western governments are
betting that the Kremlin's bark will be worse than its bite. But Russia could still
register unhappiness with NATO in subtle ways-for example, by exacerbating the
tension between Turkey, Syria, and Greece (The Economist, 10th October 1998)."
The NATO enlargement debate that began in the early 1990s entered a new stagewith the incorporation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic with thepotential for more members from Central Europe going into the 21st century. Threemajor reasons have been given for NATO enlargement. First, to provide the CentralEuropean countries an opportunity to integrate more fully into the Western Europeandomain and thus, to expedite membership in the EU as well as NATO. Second, toprovide a security anchor for a potentially unstable Central Europe (e.g. against apotentially resurgent Russia). And third, to create a new 'security space' that will
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enable Western Europe and the EU to forge a more common security and foreignpolicy and as a major preventative measure to ensure that Mittel Europa is notengulfed by strategic instability in adjacent areas (Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee1995). Expanding NATO, however, is not without its detractors. They argue thatNATO was created for a specific purpose, namely, to deter Western Europe from aSoviet invasion. In the post-Soviet era, NATO should continue to be maintained butprincipally as a restructured multilateral defense alliance, and not as the new'multinational policemen' of Western and Central Europe. Additionally, expandingNATO eastward also means that it could result in a more anti-Western stance byRussia, precisely the opposite goal that the Western Alliance has sought to achieve inthe post-Cold War era. Finally, opponents argue that the cost of managing NATOenlargement could run as high as US$ 13 billion or even more than US$ 40 billion(Permutter and Carpenter 1998; Brown 1995).
Nevertheless, there are sound strategic reasons for supporting NATOexpansion. Russia's sensitivities continue to be addressed but perhaps the biggerissue is that unless the United States and Europe are able to successfully reintegratethe Central European states into the West, long-term stability in Europe cannot butsuffer. Beyond the question of NATO expansion, Europe has also sought to enhanceits security profile by building a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) thatwould be able to provide it with a greater degree of autonomy in security anddefense issues within the broader framework of NATO. Some of the key elements ofthis strategy includes: (1) receiving full NATO support for the development of ESDIwithin NATO by providing NATO assets and capabilities for WEU operations; (2)providing support of WEU-led operations as an element of the Combined Joint TaskForce (CJTF) coricept; (3) creation of forces that are capable of operating under thepolitical control and strategic direction of the WEU; (4) arrangements for theidentification of NATO assets and capabilities that could support WEU-ledoperations and arrangements for NATO-WEU consultations; (5) commitment to fulltransparency between NATO and the WEU in crisis management; and (6) involvingthe WEU in NATO's defense planning process (De Puig 1998).
The process of Europeanizing' European security can be traced back to thefounding of the CSCE process in the early 1970s (since renamed as the OSCE) anddespite the cumbersome nature of the OSCE's modus operandi, it has served as oneof the most successful multilateral security regimes in the post-World War II era. Allthree main pillars of European security-NATO, the WEU, and the OSCE-havesurvived well into the post-Cold War era. Although significant challenges remains,the European approach will continue to have relevance owing to the increasingpoliticized nature of security challenges within Europe and its adjacent areas. Thestrength of the OSCE such as inclusive membership, emphasis on comprehensivesecurity, commitment to democratic values and principles, its pragmatic approachand consensual decision-making process, and unique experience in the field ofconflict prevention and resolution are perhaps unique in that no other multilateral
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Security Issues in Europe: An Asian Perspective 107
organization has been able to duplicate the roles and missions of the OSCE (Peterson1997). The OSCE's major success has been in the area of preventive diplomacy sothat many of its key achievements have been out of the public's view. However, themonitoring of elections in Chechnya, Albania and Bosnia, enhanced engagement inCroatia, and the facilitating of meetings in Moldova and Tajiskistan, for example,stand out as important confidence building measures that most likely would not havebeen carried out by other security organizations.
4. THE RESURGENCE OF GEOPOLITICS IN EAST ASIA
To the extent that geography has accorded Russia the status of being the world's onlyterritorial Eurasian power, post-Soviet tremors have also registered in East. Asia.Historically, when Russia confronted a setback in one of its frontiers it has shifted itsattention to another 'and the pattern seems to be repeating itself: feeling rebuffed byEurope, Moscow is turning to the Middle East and East Asia (Pipes 1997).' TheSino-Soviet dispute during the Cold War has been replaced, at least in form, by astrategic partnership between these two former adversaries as illustrated by theirjoint statement of November 1997:
"The positive actions China and Russia have taken to build a multipolar world •••have received widespread acknowledgement from the international community, andhave exerted a healthy influence on the international situation as the turn of thecentury approaches ••• China and Russia believe that the time when countries forgedalliances and engaged in strategic integration targeted against a third country haspassed. All countries, especially major powers, should comply with the developmenttrend towards multipolarization, develop relations based on the principle of mutualrespect, equality, being beneficial to all parties ••• (Xinhua, 11th November 1997)."(Emphases added)
Prior to the enunciation of the joint statement, a high-ranking Chinese PLA officerstated that military cooperation between Russia and China was not directed against'any third country (Xinhua, 5th June 1997).' Nonetheless, by emphasizing theemergence of a 'multipolar' world order, both China and Russia illustrated theirunease with the role of the United States as the sole superpower in the post-ColdWar era. Nevertheless, prospects for any wide-ranging strategic convergencebetween these two former adversaries are likely to be curtailed. For the very reasonthat may have compelled Russia to 'tilt' towards China, Russian influence is unlikelyto increase significantly in East Asia: the hollowness of Russian power at a time ofincreasing power politics in the region (Cooper 1993).6
If Europe's external security consideration is focused principally on the pathsof a reforming Russia and the threat posed by a severely weakened domestic
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infrastructure, the primary issue in East Asia is the emergence of a great powercomplex and the resurgence of geopolitics. As one analyst wrote some years ago,what appears to be taking shape in the region is a 'race between the dynamics ofmultipolarity, which could increase conflict, and the growth of mitigating factors thatshould tend to dampen them and to improve the prospects for a continuing peace(Freidberg 1993).' Or as Gilbert Rozman has written, the key challenge lies in how toexamine the collective weight of the 'undisputed great powers of non-Western origin'and how this 'mighty and unstable triangular relationship' comprising Japan, Chinaand Russia will be integrated into the 'geometry of any new world order (Rozman1995).' Other factors that are likely to influence the shaping of East Asia's futureorder includes on-going gestations in major power interactions, the potential for amajor spill-over on the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Straits, the proliferation ofmore lethal and longer-range weapons systems, more fluid and less transparent armstransfers, and the rise to the fore of selective territorial disputes (Sullivan and Jordan1996).7 Thus, compared to Western Europe's post-Cold War security transformationthat emphasizes the revamping of existing security institutions, architectures, andregimes, East Asia is being challenged by a revival of great power politics. Or as oneU.S. scholar has written:
"In Asia, the end of the Cold War and China's spectacular growth have ushered in anew 'era of three kingdoms.' It is the first time in history that China, Japan, and theUnited States have all been strong Asian powers at the same time ••• [We] cannotafford a conflict between these three nations because each now has awesome militarypower at its disposal, or the technology and skills to develop it. Peace and prosperityin East Asia are possible only if China, Japan, and the United States reach a stablebalance of power and achieve a high level of cooperation to deal with the dangers tothe region (Vogel 1998)." (Emphasis added)
To be sure, the onslaught of the East Asian economic crisis cannot be ignored inprojecting the future of Northeast Asia since it could have fundamental long termrepercussions including less investments into the defense sector (Biers 1998; Ignatius1996; Katz 1997).8 But East Asia has the potential to harbor the greatestconcentration of economic wealth over the next two to three decades, withcorresponding implications for more advanced power projection capabilities.
Although it is far too early to predict how the regional economic crisis willaffect the long-term strategic postures of the major actors in East Asia, manyregional actors have acquired selective power projection capabilities. Throughoutmuch of the Cold War, no East Asian country, other than China after it became anuclear power, had the capability to inflict significant military damage to anotherstate based on significant air power, naval platforms or ballistic missiles. Even in thecase of China, while nuclear weapons provided it with a 'great power' status itsnuclear capability was far behind that of the United States and the Soviet Union. It
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did not have ICBM capabilities during the Cold War although it currently has 17ICBMs (7 DF-5 and 10 DF-4).
While the current air power inventory of the Northeast Asian militaries variesquite significantly from country-to-country, combat aircraft, helicopters, SAMs, andballistic and cruise missiles have already emerged as important regional airpowermodernization components. Today, only Russia, China, and North Korea possessballistic missiles and it is Pyongyang that poses the greatest missile threat. Other EastAsian countries only have limited missile capabilities: Mongolia only has a limitedSAM arsenal (SA-7), South Korea has the Nike-Hercules II SAMs but no SSMswhile Japan has some 70 Type-88 coastal SSMs and 120 Patriot SAMs(International Institute for Strategic Studies 1997; Spector and McDonough 1995;Blackwill and Carnesale 1993).9 But Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all have thepotential to embark on fairly sophisticated ballistic missile programs. In the long run,the rationale for maintaining a large ground force by most of the East Asian powersis likely to recede, on account of reduced land-based threats, changing militarydoctrines that increasingly emphasizes operational jointness, and advanced militarytechnologies that will decrease the need for large standing ground forces. Obviously,there are exceptions such as the Korean peninsula until unification and China ishighly unlikely to downgrade the operational value of its ground forces given the on-going conflict with Taiwan. Notwithstanding the need for China to maintain arequisite level of ground forces, it is also not going to ignore air powermodernization. For example, while PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has a huge inventoryof some 4,000 aircraft, it is perhaps the least modernized service, especiallycompared with its neighboring countries. For example, the 3,000 J-6s (the Chineseversion of the Soviet MiG-19s) that are the backbone of the PLAAF are based on1950s and 1960s technologies (Kim 1998). Nonetheless, given the current Chinesestrategic emphasis on 'limited local wars,' rapid mobility and firepower for bordercontingencies are likely to be stressed by the PLAAF. The key problem, however, isthat while the PLA recognizes the need to upgrade its power projection capabilities,particularly naval, air, and ballistic missile capabilities, there is a significant gapbetween its current aircraft inventory and future doctrinal and operationalrequirements. For this reason, air force modernization has received a high priority inChina's foreign weapons and technology acquisitions, especially those from Russiabut also from Israel and other sources (Kim 1998).
The perceived need for more advanced air powers projection capabilitiesstems largely from intra-regional features such as the declining likelihood of large-scale ground wars (with the notable exception in the Korean peninsula) and thecorresponding shift towards overcoming gaps imposed by geography (Tellis 1996).Although these two factors can be construed as necessary conditions for acquiringmore advanced power projection capabilities, they are not, strictly speaking,sufficient conditions. If the following developments materialize, however, they couldbe construed as sufficient conditions although all of the scenarios noted below are
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highly situation-specific:First, limited success or ultimate failure in containing or freezing North
Korea's WMD program, including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Inparticular, if the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework ultimately collapsesand the North refuses to join other counterproliferation regimes such as the MTCR,it would result in a significant security dilemma for South Korea, in addition toJapan and even the United States. A concerted regional TMD program could be onepossible response option but if North Korea unequivocally breaks the nuclear accordand embarks on an extensive ballistic missile program, South Korea, and perhapseven Japan, would come under increasing domestic political pressure to seriouslyconsider an indigenous ballistic missile option. If South Korea and Japan were toembark on their own ballistic missile programs, such a development would severelycomplicate the political and military fabric of the U.S.-Japan and ROK-U.S.alliances, including the possibility of a severe downturn in these two centraltranspacific alliances.
Second, a concerted effort on the part of China to undertake a comprehensiveair power expansion program including accelerated replacement of its combataircraft arsenal, sustained modernization of its SRBM, MRBM and ICBM (such asMTRVs) assets, buildup of its amphibious forces, and deployment of cruise missilesand advanced air munitions. Moreover, if China successfully develops and deployssea-launched cruise missiles with nuclear and non-nuclear warheads, it would createsevere operational constraints for U.S. naval platforms throughout much of thePacific theater. Assuming for the moment that China would be able to afford such amajor force improvement program and further, that there is a clear politicalconsensus within the CCP and the PLA to support such a move, China will emergeas a significant theater peer with corresponding implications for the United States'strategic posture in the region.
Third, however unlikely at the present time, widespread resurgence ofauthoritarianism in Russia with a concomitant balanced shift in its strategic attentionto the Far East If an extremely conservative and anti-status quo regime gains fullpower in Russia and pursues a more aggressive foreign and defense policies, it willhave significant implications for U.S., Chinese, Japanese, and Korean strategiccalculations. Increased deployment of MRBMs and ICBMs in the Russian Far East,refurbishing of the Russian Pacific Fleet, and concerted efforts to expand Russia's'strategic space1 in Northeast Asia would have major repercussions for all of the otherregional acton. At a minimum, such a turn of events would result in a second ColdWar between Moscow and Washington and a new 'strategic triangle' consisting ofthe United States, China, and Japan although Chinese responses to a more aggressiveRussia could ignite Japanese and Korean efforts to bolster air and seapower assets.
Fourth, a significant drawdown in the U.S. military presence in East Asiaincluding the withdrawal of the USFK and a significant diminution of the USFJcoupled with the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If Korea is unified and
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domestic pressures in the United States and Korea results in the withdrawal of U.S.forces based in Korea and Japan, and further, that the United States also curtails itssecurity linkages with other allies in the region such as Australia and New Zealand,the resulting security vacuum could only result in enhanced instability. The politicalincompatibility between China and other East Asian actors delimits the possibility ofany meaningful Pax Sinica and in turn, independent security strategies andcapabilities would be stressed by most of the actors in the region. A unified Koreacould opt to tilt towards China but such a move would entail a significant dilution ofits strategic maneuverability, not to mention that Japan would perceive a Sino-Korean entente as the most pronounced source of military threat
It should be noted that these examples are provided as potential rather thanprobable developments. In order for any of these scenarios to actually emerge in thereal world, significant triggering events would have to take place. Nevertheless, evenif these scenarios do not actually materialize, flexible capabilities-based defenseplanning requirements by the East Asian armed forces are likely to boost the need tofield more sophisticated air power projection capabilities. In part, this is so becausethe post-Cold War strategic environment differs substantially from Cold Warrealities. The absence of more focused threats, the need to respond effectively andrapidly to ballistic and cruise missile threats, and the narrowing of the traditionalbattle space owing to accelerated advances in transportation and firepower anddelivery capabilities among other factors means that 'we are moving into an era inwhich our ability to achieve desired military goals will depend on qualityinformation to an ever-increasing degree (Lambeth 1996).'
Finally, none of the East Asian powers today have the capability to fieldinterconnected elements of projecting power, the ability to destroy targets from asafe distance, and enhancing situation awareness (Lambeth 1996). Among the manyassets that would provide such a comprehensive capability, three key areas need tobe stressed. First, long-range transportation and lift capabilities. Currently, whileChina and Japan have advanced interests in fielding more robust airlift capabilities,significant lift assets would be required to have strategic implications, e.g., thepotential for extended ground operations or the intent to undertake more sustainedmilitary operations. Second, air-to-air refueling capabilities including dedicatedtankers that would extend the operational range of combat aircraft and increased airsorties without replenishment from home or friendly air bases. And third, advancedcombat aircraft and munitions and sophisticated employment doctrine (Tellis 1996).In addition, four related categories would also be required to field a moretechnologically and operationally advanced air power projection capability: (1)combat support platforms; (2) munitions and other advanced disabling mechanisms;(3) sensors and related situation awareness aids; (4) information processing andcommunication systems (Lambeth 1996).
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5. FUTURE PROSPECTS
As Europe and East Asia head into the 21st century, a key challenge is to strengthenthis 'weak strategic link.' More progress is being made such as the launching of theASEM process and greater economic cooperation between the two regions. But inthe security arena, active dialogue and cooperation remains Limited. Enlarging thescope of security exchange between East Asia and Europe can be envisioned alongfour main paths. First, the two regions will continue to face an increasing menu of'out-of-area' security challenges that will directly and directly affect their security.The Indo-Pakistani nuclear test of May 1999 and North Korea's launching of theTaepodong-l missile in August 1998 (and sales of ballistic missiles to the MiddleEast as well as transfer of WMD technologies) has implications for European as wellas Asian security. Nonetheless, the extent to which Europe and East Asia can seeeye-to-eye on WMD proliferation depends highly on the political contexts. Thus,specific steps to promote horizontal nuclear and WMD proliferation are likely to beconstrained within the bilateral context although broader commitment to existingglobal nonproliferation treaties and regimes can achieve similar aims. Second,accepting the geopolitical differences between Europe and East Asia, the multilateralsecurity approach that has, for the most part, performed successfully in Europe couldalso be applied in the East Asian context The ARF process and track-two dialoguessuch as the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) remain farbelow the level of the OSCE but to the extent that a multilateral security process hasbegun in East Asia, Euro-Asian cooperation could be enhanced in this front.
Third, while the role of the United States has remained largely unmentionedin this paper, this is not to suggest that the U.S. role in European and East Asiansecurity will decline. To the contrary, the U.S. role has served as the critical 'securityglue' throughout the post-World War II era. But just as Europe is slowly movingtowards greater security autonomy within the broader framework of the AtlanticAlliance (Ruhle and Williams 1996), a process of 'Asianization' of Asian securityhas already begun. To be sure, East Asia's ability to forge an intrinsically 'Asian'security approach is currently constrained by widely different political heritages andsecurity concerns. While cooperative measures have been taken such as the four-party talks involving the two Koreas, the United States, and China as well as theKEDO process (which, incidentally, includes the participation of the EU), activemultilateral security cooperation in East Asia remains limited. However, given theresurgence of geopolitics in East Asia and the acquisition of more sophisticatedpower projection capabilities, it is critical for the East Asian states to seek ways toenhance military transparencies and intra-regional defense cooperation.
Fourth, the future of the major powers in East Asia, principally the UnitedStates, China, and Japan will have decisive impacts on Asian-Pacific security, wellinto the 21st century. The United States, for reasons mentioned above, is theprincipal power that will serve to maintain a Eurasian balance but China's strategic
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role in the Eurasian balance will become increasingly important as Beijing'sinfluence grows. In sharp contrast to Russia, China's evolution since the late 1970shas fundamentally transformed its economy without major political disruptions.Tiananmen notwithstanding, the CCP remains in power and for the foreseeablefuture, no alternative power base is visible. But taming China's own imperialisticambitions is going to emerge as a key regional security challenge that will involve allof the major powers, Korea and Europe to the extent that an aggressive and anti-status quo Greater China will significantly disrupt Eurasian stability. This centralstrategic goal should be kept in mind as East Asia and Europe ponders the virtues ofcloser security cooperation.
Fifth and finally, the recent move towards reconciliation between the twoKoreas could have significant repercussions not only in the context of the inter-Korean strategic balance, but for regional stability as well. If the two Koreas are ableto overcome their entrenched difficulties and institute a range of CBMs (includingarms control mechanisms), strategies and policies of the major powers cannot butchange. In particular, the specter of a unified Korea, while officially supported by thegreat powers, also could become new sources of concern. What type of a securityposture will a unified Korea assume? What role, if any, will WMD play in theconstruction of a unified Korea's strategic posture? Under which conditions will theROK-U.S. alliance be sustained? How can Seoul and Washington reconfigure theroles and missions of U.S. forces going into and after unification? These and otherquestions pertaining to future strategic choices such as the possibility of a Korean tilttowards China is just beginning to enter into the looming strategic debate.
Until such time that the ROK continues to confront a serious military threator robust offensive military capabilities from the North, the ROK's overall defenseplanning attributes and capabilities will remain fairly constant. Clearly, somechanges could occur, particularly if Pyongyang chooses to accelerate its ballisticmissile program and opts to operationally deploy long-range missiles such as theTaepodong-1. If significant internal disruption occurs within North Korea such asregime collapse coupled with a significant denigration of the KPA's command andcontrol, a range of outcomes could occur with military repercussions. But since thesescenarios are premised on internal disruptions in North Korea, South Korean andU.S. policy responses could be significantly curtailed. To be sure, in the event ofsubstantial disarray in the North with a breakdown in central political authority,Seoul and Washington have to be very careful on what types of signals it sends toPyongyang. However, in the absence of real-time and highly accurate all-source andsingle-source intelligence (particularly in a rapidly evolving political and militarysituation within North Korea), it would be difficult to take an active position untilsuch time that central political authority is restored. Nevertheless, despite thedifficulties imposed by political turmoil in North Korea, the ROK NationalCommand Authority and adjacent organizations have to be prepared for such acontingency. Given that the ROK has to meet a spectrum of defense needs
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depending on contrasting calibrations of the North Korean threat, the followingguidelines could be considered for emerging force requirements.
First, greater awareness ad preparedness for non-linear scenarios. Lessonsfrom Korean and foreign counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations couldbe drawn to formulate a more realistic strategy although by definition, they vary incharacter in overall scope as well as more specific strategic and tactical lessons.However, four basic elements can be identified in augmenting or strengtheningcounterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations: (1) an effective overall commandand coordination structure; (2) confidence building or 'legitimizing' measures andappropriate executive or legislative action; (3) coordination within and betweenintelligence services and other government organizations; and (4) foreigncollaboration among governments and security forces (Hoffman and Taw 1992). Inthe ROK's case, strategies and policies towards the North will undoubtedly reflectenvironmental changes such as North Korea's responses to ROK and U.S. initiatives,reactions to specific North Korean moves, coordination of strategy with the UnitedStates and Japan, and domestic politics.
Second, actively preparing for the post-unification era. Looking into thepost-unification era, the ROK will be confronted with defense planning requirementsin the absence of a North Korean threat. This factor alone will result in significantchanges in the ROK's strategy, doctrine, force structure, and weapons acquisitionchoices. Nevertheless, shaping and building a post-unification military will entailsignificant challenges. Assuming that the demobilization of the North Koreanmilitary proceeds relatively smoothly, much of the hardware the KPA possesses willnot be integrated into a unified force. Deactivation of North Korea's WMD assets,including the potential for nuclear warheads, its ballistic missile arsenal andchemical and biological weapons will also require significant investments on the partof the ROK and the United States. Once immediate post-unification tasks such as theKPA's demobilization is completed, the ROK military can turn its attention to layingthe grounds for long-term planning. While alternative post-unification forcerestructuring options cannot but arise, the ROK should consider the creation of a"baseline force' based on the two basic guidelines.
Third, the need to build an information-dominant armed force. While theextent to which RMA technologies and strategies will be employed remains to beseen, deterrence and defense missions going into the 21st century will requireadvanced information capabilities. To the extent that a unified Korea will shareborders with China and Russia, sufficient ground forces should be maintained. Butfor the ROK, 'situation awareness' requirements in the post-unification era willmultiply significantly vis-a-vis the regional powers, and the primary responsibilityshould rest with the air force and the navy. Absent a focused and pronouncedground-based threat, the ROK Army after unification cannot but be significantlyrestructured. Mechanized forces, heavy artillery, and division-centered operationalstructures will have to be revamped. Conversely, however, if the ROK is to create an
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information-dominant force structure, the ROKAP and ROKN, but especially theformer must assume the leading role. All three services will place a heavier emphasison information technologies and RMAs but resource allocation priorities should bematched with strategic priorities with an emphasis on creating a more streamlinedbut more technologically capable air and naval assets.
Fourth, a strategic decision should be made going into unification tomaintain a force that will have sufficient counter-air and counter-sea capabilities. Inthe post-unification security environment, the ROK will be strategically 'exposed'absent a North Korean 'buffer' vis-a-vis China but also in a broader context since allof the regional powers will pay greater attention to the type of military capabilities aunified Korea opts to acquire. The ROK should therefore have selective air powerprojection capabilities such as advanced combat aircraft, enhanced airlift, airrefueling tankers, AW ACS, maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfareaircraft. Resource allocation constraints could be overcome, in part, by a significantreduction in the size of the ROK's ground forces and redistribution of those sourcesto the air force and the navy. Air defense upgrades and short to medium-rangeballistic missiles should also be emphasized. It should be noted here that while aunified Korea should not pursue the nuclear option, it should have the ability tomaintain surface-to-surface missiles beyond the current inventory of outdated short-range Nike-Hercules I-II SSMs although the range should conform to MTCRceilings. Maintaining the ability to forge an information-dominant force coupledwith the need to undertake counterair and countersea missions means that the ROK'sfuture defense strategy has to be reconfigured going into the unification era. The keychallenge lies in transforming the ROK's force structure even as it continues to face arange of threats from the North. As the ROK ponders its long-term strategic options,it has to shift its military orientation to a more expanded battle space with a premiumon air power. In the strategic environment of the 21st century that is going to beincreasingly influenced by information warfare dynamics, the ROK military has todevelop a proactive deterrence and defense strategy that will enable it to meetemerging regional as well as existing and emerging peninsular challenges.
Notes
1 While post-Meiji Japan (after 1868) was the only Asian power to successfully modernize itseconomy by emulating the West, the region on the whole was woefully unprepared for theonslaught of Western encroachment. Compared to East Asia's ill-fated exposure to theinternational system from the 1870s until the 1900s, the region's unprecedented economicdevelopment and military modernization since the 1960s and 1970s has implications farbeyond the East Asian region.
2 Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry proposed a six-nation defense ministers'
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meeting in East Asia in 1996 although the initiative did not materialize. But the need forpreventive defense in the region has garnered growing attention after the end of the coldwar.
3 North Korea's announcement coincided with a significant lifting of U.S. sanctions on NorthKorea under the Trading With the Enemy Act, the Export Administration Regulations, andthe Defense Production Act which have been in place since the Korean War. However, theClinton Administration also noted that 'this easing of sanctions does not affect our counter-terrorism or nonproliferation controls on North Korea, which prohibits exports of militaryand sensitive dual-use items and most types of U.S. assistance.'
4 The Ministry of Unification announced a few days after the summit that henceforth, NorthKorea should no longer be characterized as the 'main enemy' as has been referred to in mostdefense-related announcements and reports. Subsequently, however, this statement wasrebutted by the Minister of National Defense Cho Sung-Tae who stated that 'so long ascredible threat remains, the ministry sees no immediate need to change our threatperception.'
5 As Phillip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice note in their major work on German unification,the division of Europe had been healed with an end to the partition of Germany. The ColdWar was over, and Europe was whole and free. The terms of the final settlement werecomplete. At a CSCE ministerial meeting in New York two weeks later, the governmentssigned the declaration suspending Four Power rights at the moment of German unification.The declaration took effect on 3rd October 1990. Germany was sovereign again.
6 Russia still has formidable nuclear assets coupled with a weakened, but significantconventional forces. Economic disarray, political uncertainty, and the inability to effectivelytransform the defense industries among other factors have severely impacted the readinessof Russia's military forces.
7 Significant agreements have been reached between China and Russia over a range of borderdisputes although the Northern Territories dispute between Japan and Russia remainsunresolved. The long running Tokdo or Takeshima Island dispute between Korea and Japanas well as contending claims on the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands between Japan and Chinaalso stand out as major points of dispute. The Senkaku Islands and three reefs aresurrounded by rich fishing grounds and potentially lucrative reserves of oil and natural gaswhich has, in turn, generated significant posturing by China, Japan, and Taiwan. In contrast,Tokdo Island has very limited, if any economic value although it is a highly-chargedpolitical issue between Korea and Japan.
8 Numerous studies and reports continue to appear on the East Asian economic crisisalthough there is a general consensus that the downturn may become a prolonged one basedon such factors as the limitations of exporting their way back to economic health,overcapacity in Asia's leading industries, and the huge debt-burden of most regionaleconomies.
9 Since the North Korean nuclear weapons program surfaced as a major issue in the early1990s, significant literature has appeared on the state of North Korea's nuclear and otherWMD programs.
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