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SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR

SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

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Page 1: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

SECURITY GOVERNANCE

SEMINAR

Page 2: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Subjects 1. Global security governance

United Nations in:

1. Yugoslavia

2. Somalia

3. Rwanda

4. East Timor

5. Sierra Leone

6. Congo

7. Cote d’Ivoire

2. Regional security governance

1. ECOWAS in Liberia

2. African Union in Sudan

3. African Union in Somalia

4. NATO in Kosovo

5. NATO in Lybia

6. EU-NAVFOR Atalanta

7. EUTM Somalia

8. EUTM Mali

9. EU in Kosovo

Page 3: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Subjects Date Student+Topic

7th October 2014

21st October 2014 Groza Diana-Sierra LeoneBorse Iulia-UN in Somalia

4th of November 2014 Vadas Adam-UN in CongoBlondel Guillaume -EUTM Somalia

18th of November 2014 Kelemen Imola-UN in RwandaBarna Cristina-NATO in Kosovo

2nd December 2014 Popa Salome-EU in KosovoBaila Cosmin-AU in SomaliaUmut- NATO in Libya

16th of December 2014 Orbai Andrei-United Nations in YugoslaviaSim Lena-AU in SomaliaBan Roxana- AU in Sudan

January 2015 Nimo Bashir-UN in Cote d’Ivoir

Page 4: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

INTRODUCTIONWhat is security governance?

• According to Emil Kirchner security governance can be defined as an intentional system of rule that involves the coordination, management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, interventions by both public and private actors, formal and informal arrangements, and purposefully directed towards particular policy outcomes.

• While traditional security policy used to be the exclusive domain of states and aimed at military defense, security governance nowadays is performed by multiple actors and is intended to create a global environment of security for states, social groups, and individuals.

Page 5: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Non-traditional hybrid challenges of the 21st century

Page 6: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Security governance

Regional security governance focus expresses the inherent territoriality of contemporary international security, but also provides the contexts that give meaning to local security problems and issues, as well as widening the analytical focus to (potentially) incorporate actors other than states. Regional security governance can be self-standing or connected with the UN. The UN encourages member states to make ‘every effort’ to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements to keep the SecurityCouncil informed of their activities and seek its authorization to conduct enforcement measures

Global security governance consists of the disconnect between the distribution of authority within existing intergovernmental institutions and the distribution of military power internationally

Page 7: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Structures of security governance according to the role of governments

Governance by government refers to institutionalized forms of cooperation

between states, for example organizations or regimes

Governance without government refers to the self-regulation of private actors without state interference (for example through codes of conduct);

Governance with government refers to joint action between state and non-state

actors (for example through public–private partnerships)

Page 8: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Global security governanceUnited Nations

In theory, the UN guarantees mutual security and peace through the cooperation of its members. National states are willing to give up parts of their sovereignty and power to this universal organization to obtain, in return, more security than in a purely anarchic system, since all UN members declare their renunciation of acts of aggression through their endorsement of the UN Charter. This stipulation is supported by the UN’s military means to enforce it supplemented by mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes (UNCharter: Ch. VII, Art. 42)..

A global system of collective security can only function if backed by a strong institutional basis with the coherent guidance of effectively working bodies that are equipped to respond opportunely and successfully to any breaches of international security. This institutional basis was created in 1945 with the United Nations, which also today remains the only organization with a global focus on security.

Page 9: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

The UN Security Council’s right to impose coercive measures against its members under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is at the heart of the collective system of international security. It is the only body in international law legitimized to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ and to respond accordingly (Article 39 UN Charter). However, in practice the Security Council has a rather mixed record to solve problems of global security.

While its mechanisms proved to be effective for instance with regard to Afghanistan (2001), Ivory Coast (2003), and Haiti (2004), it was unable to take collective action against security threats from Serbia (1999), Iraq (2003), Iran and North Korea (ongoing), mainly due to differences among its permanent members. In addition, unilateralism by UN members, whenever supportive to their national interests, has undermined the Council’s authority and ability to deter potential aggressors. And towards non-state actors the UN as a whole has remained largely ineffective

Page 10: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

United Nations interventionismPeacekeeping operations

• Political mechanism that uses military means for the creation of certain conditions which facilitates the regulation of controversies between conflicting parties.

• Is a technique designed for the preservation of peace and security at an international level, numbering between the long range of activities undertaken by the United Nations and other international actors.

• In “An Agenda for Peace” the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali identifies peacekeeping with the launch on field of UN forces, having the consent of the belligerent parties, involving military and/or police and civil personnel of the United Nations

Page 11: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Basic principles of peacekeeping operations

1.

Consent of the parties: every peacekeeping operation must be implemented in a region only after having the approval of the conflicting parties. If this consent is not given, or it is forced out by using some political, economical or military pressure, the operation itself risks becoming active participant of the conflict, this way exceeding its initial intrinsic role of peacekeeping.

2.

Impartiality/Neutrality: is the second pillar of the peacekeeping operations underlining the fact that those empowered with the application of peacekeeping operations always have to be objective and impartial in their dialogue with the belligerent members.

3.

Use of force only for self-defense: this principle refers to the fact that those operations which were entrusted with peacekeeping do not represent enforcement measures; the only way of using force is on tactical level. Although by conferring to peacekeeping operations “robust mandates” the Security Council gave its approval for using all the necessary means to prevent the destruction of the political and peace process, protecting at the same time the civil population from an imminent physical attack, assisting to the maintenance of the rule of law by the local authorities. It is elementary to know that soldiers from the UN peacekeeping mission can use force as a last mean, when every other peaceful enforcement and pressure tools and means have been exploited.

Page 12: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Preventive diplomacy

Peacemaking

Peace-building

Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur

Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations

Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict

Page 13: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Blue helmets were withdrawn from Egypt after the request of the government in 1967

Observation mission in Kashmir between1949-1965; Lebanon 1958, between Iraq and Iran 1988

Page 14: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

• Successful interventions supported by the 5 permanent members of the UN

• Unsuccessful interventions not having the support

Positive Negative

Mozambique

Angola

Sierra Leone

Namibia

Rwanda

Zaire

Bosnia

The efforts of the African Union were useless as well due to the dissension between the members of the organization!

Page 15: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

B. Peacekeeping operations

Egypt 1956

Congo 1960

Cyprus 1964

Lebanon 1978

Namibia 1989

Cambodia 1992

Page 16: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

United Nations CharterConditions when under which force may be legally used

Unilaterally in self-defense

Multilaterally when authorized by the UN Security Council “to maintain or restore international peace and security

Multilaterally by regional collective defense action

Page 17: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Legal basis of UN peacekeeping

• What law provides the legal background to the United Nations that permits the creation and the deployment of such forces in various countries of the world?

• The International Community, together with the UN, affirms the responsibility to use all the necessary diplomatic and humanitarian means, in straight accordance with the 7th and 8th Chapter of the UN Charter to provide help for the local civilian population, protecting them from genocide, war crimes giving birth to the doctrine of responsibility to protect.

• The term “peacekeeping” appears nowhere in the “so called” UN Constitution (or UN Charter), and that the debates regarding its legality have reached to be an important subject on the agenda of the International Court of Justice, which refused categorically to identify a specific article as the legal basis of the peacekeeping operations

Page 18: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Legal basis of UN peacekeeping Art. 2(7)Prohibits the United Nations to intervene in the domestic affairs of one country, but at the same time apparently forgets to describe which these upon mentioned domestic affairs would be

Art 24(1)

Empowers the UN Security Council with the primary responsibility to maintain the peace and international security

Art. 39

According to Art. 39, the Security Council when it intimates a possible threat to peace, violation of peace or act of aggression can apply some means, like total break of diplomatic relations, embargos and even the use of force, if it’s necessary

Art 51.The possibility of deployment of cross-border forces lies in the Art. 51 which even recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in the case of an armed attack against one member of the UN

Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security. While such action should only be taken when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking it is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security.

Page 19: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Peacekeeping missions

• The secretary-general assembles a peacekeeping force for each mission, usually from a few states totally uninvolved in the conflict, and puts it under a single commander. The soldiers are commonly called blue helmets. Peacekeeping forces serve at the invitation of a host government and must leave if that government orders them out.

• Authority for peacekeeping forces is granted by the Security Council, usually for a period of three to six months that may be renewed—in some cases for decades. In one early case, the Suez crisis in 1956, the General Assembly authorized the forces under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, which allowed the General Assembly to take up security matters when the Security Council was deadlocked. In the Congo in 1960, the secretary general took the initiative. But today the Security Council firmly controls peacekeeping operations.

• Funds must be voted on by the General Assembly, and lack of funds is today the single greatest constraint on the use of peacekeeping forces. Special assessments against member states pay for peacekeeping operations. With the expansion of peacekeeping since 1988, the expenses of these forces (over $7 billion in 2012) are several times larger than the regular UN budget

Page 20: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

3 major reports reforming peacekeeping

Page 21: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Boutros Boutros Ghali’s proposal for the creation of

peace-enforcement units Peacekeeping forces have generally been unable to make peace, only to keep it. To go into a shooting war and suppress hostilities requires military forces far beyond those of past UN peacekeeping missions. Thus, peacekeepers are usually not sent until a cease-fire has been arranged, has taken effect, and has held up for some time.To address this problem, the secretary-general in 1992 proposed the creation of UN peace-making (or peace enforcement ) units that would not only monitor a cease-fire but enforce it if it broke down. The secretary-general called for member states to make available, on a rapid deployment basis, 1,000 soldiers each—specially trained volunteers—to create a standby UN army that could respond quickly to crises

Page 22: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

CASE Study:Boutros Boutros Ghali’s proposal for the

creation of peace-enforcement units Not only did the member states refuse the request for soldiers, they shot down the idea of peacemaking altogether. Since then, the UN has authorized member states to provide real military forces, not peacekeepers, when fighting may be required. In an exception that may or may not indicate a trend, the Security Council broadened the mandate of UN peacekeepers in Democratic Congo to let them protect civilians (which UN forces have been criticized for not doing). In 2005, Pakistani peacekeepers killed 50 militia fighters after nine peacekeepers from Bangladesh were killed in an ambush.

Page 23: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Case study:Question

• The former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed (without success) the creation of a standby army of peacemaking forces loaned by member states. This would reduce state sovereignty a bit and increase supranational authority. What are this plan’s merits and drawbacks?

Page 24: SECURITY GOVERNANCE SEMINAR. Subjects 1. Global security governance United Nations in: 1.Yugoslavia 2.Somalia 3.Rwanda 4.East Timor 5.Sierra Leone 6.Congo

Current UN Peacekeeping missions