INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF BUCHAREST MODEL UNITED NATIONS (ISBMUN)
4-7 FEBRUARY 2011
SECURITY COUNCIL TOPIC AREA B: THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA
I. SHORT HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT IN SOMALIA From the 7th to the
10th century, Arab and Persian trading posts were established along
the coast of present-day Somalia. Nomadic tribes occupied the
interior, occasionally pushing into Ethiopian territory. In the
16th century, Turkish rule extended to the northern coast, and the
sultans of Zanzibar gained control in the south. After British
occupation of Aden in 1839, the Somali coast became its source of
food. The French established a coal-mining station in 1862 at the
site of Djibouti, and the Italians planted a settlement in Eritrea.
Egypt, which for a time claimed Turkish rights in the area, was
succeeded by Britain. By 1920, a British and an Italian
protectorate occupied what is now Somalia. The British ruled the
entire area after 1941, with Italy returning in 1950 to serve as
United Nations trustee for its former territory. By 1960, Britain
and Italy granted independence to their respective sectors,
enabling the two to join as the Republic of Somalia on July 1,
1960. Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Britain in 1963 when
the British granted the Somali-populated Northern Frontier District
of Kenya to the Republic of Kenya. On Oct. 15, 1969, President Abdi
Rashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated and the army seized power.
Maj. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre, as president of a renamed Somali
Democratic Republic, leaned heavily toward the USSR. In 1977,
Somalia openly backed rebels in the easternmost area of Ethiopia,
the Ogaden Desert, which had been seized by Ethiopia at the turn of
the century. Somalia acknowledged defeat in an eight-month war
against the Ethiopians that year, having lost much of its
32,000-man army and most of its tanks and planes. President Siad
Barre fled the country in late Jan. 1991. His departure left
Somalia in the hands of a number of clan-based guerrilla groups,
none of which trusted each other. Africa's worst drought of the
century occurred in 1992, and, coupled with the devastation of
civil war, Somalia was plunged into a severe famine that killed
300,000. U.S. troops were sent in to protect the delivery of food
in Dec. 1992, and in May 1993 the UN took control of the relief
efforts from the U.S. The warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid ambushed UN
troops and dragged American bodies through the streets, causing an
about-face in U.S. willingness to involve itself in the fate of
this lawless country. The last of the U.S. troops departed in late
March, leaving 19,000 UN troops behind. Since 1991 Somalia has been
engulfed in anarchy. Years of peace negotiations between the
various factions were fruitless, and warlords and militias ruled
over individual swaths of land. In 1991, a breakaway nation, the
Somaliland Republic, proclaimed its independence. Since then
several warlords have set up their own mini-states. Although
internationally unrecognized, these states have been peaceful and
stable. Leaders in the northeast proclaimed the formation of
Puntland in 1998. Puntland's leader, Abdullahi Yusuf, publicly
announced that he did not plan to break away from the remainder
of
the country. In 2001, traditional elders elected Jama Ali Jama
as the Puntland President. Yusuf refused to accept the elders'
decision. Both Yusuf and Jama continued to claim the presidency,
and there were continued efforts to resolve the conflict at year's
end. In addition to Yusuf's and Jama's competing claims on the
presidency, General Adde Musse in April attempted to seize Puntland
with Somaliland support. After intensive mediation efforts by
traditional elders, Musse reconciled with Yusuf. A ban on political
parties in Puntland remained in place. In the northwest, the
Republic of Somaliland continued to proclaim its independence
within the borders of former British Somaliland but did not have
international recognition. Somaliland's Government included a
parliament, a functioning civil court system, executive departments
organized as ministries, six regional governors, and municipal
authorities in major towns. Presidential elections were held on
April 15 and the ruling United People's Democratic Party (UDUB) won
a very close victory in elections determined to be credible and
significantly transparent. In August 2000, a parliament convened in
nearby Djibouti and elected Somalia's first government in nearly a
decade. The Transitional National Assembly elected Abdiqassim Salad
Hassan as Transitional President. After its first year in office,
the government still controlled only 10% of the country. In August
2003, its mandate expired, but, despite the expiry of the term,
both institutions continued to function at year's end. Since
October 2002, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
(IGAD) sponsored a reconciliation conference led by Kenya, in
association with Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Uganda. All major
political and military leaders attended as well as elders,
religious leaders, and members of civil society. There was no
national judicial system. In August 2004 a 275-member transitional
parliament was inaugurated for a five-year term. Parliament
selected a national president in September, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed,
the president of the breakaway region of Puntland. The new
government, however, spent its first year operating out of Kenya
Somalia remained too violent and unstable to enter - eventually
settling in the provincial town of Baidoa. In May 2006, the
country's worst outbreak of violence in 10 years began, with
Islamist militias, called the Somali Islamic Courts Council (SICC),
battling rival warlords. On June 6, the Islamist militia seized
control of the capital, Mogadishu, and established control in much
of the south. Somalia's transitional government, led by President
Abdullahi Yusuf and situated in Baidoa, spent months engaged in
unsuccessful peace negotiations with the Islamic Courts Council. In
the meantime, neighboring Ethiopia, which has clashed in the past
with Somalia's Islamists and considers them a threat to regional
security, began amassing troops on the border. In mid-December,
Ethiopia launched air strikes against the Islamists, and in a
matter of days Ethiopian ground troops and Somali soldiers loyal to
the transitional government regained control of Mogadishu. A week
later most of the Islamists had been forced to flee the country.
Ethiopia announced that its troops would remain in the country
until stability was assured and a functional central government had
been established, ending Somalia's 15 years of anarchy. In January
2007, the U.S. Launched airs trikes on the retreating Islamists,
who they believed included three members of al-Qaeda suspected of
involvement in the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The air strikes were strongly criticized
in a number of Muslim countries, which accused the Americans of
killing Somali civilians. Battles between the insurgents and Somali
and Ethiopian troops intensified in March, leaving 300 civilians
dead in what has been called the worst fighting in 15 years. The
fighting created a humanitarian crisis, with more than 320,000
Somalis fleeing the fighting in Mogadishu in just two months. In
July, a national reconciliation conference opened in Mogadishu but
was quickly postponed when leading opposition figures failed to
appear. The fighting
intensified once again in October. The Alliance for the
Reliberation of Somalia, a coalition of moderate Islamist leaders,
and the transitional government agreed to a cease-fire in June 2008
that called on Ethiopian troops that were propping up the fragile
government to be replaced by UN troops. The future of the deal was
tenuous from the start and was greeted by much skepticism indeed,
it was unclear if the UN could assemble a force willing to be
deployed in the troubled region, and several powerful Islamist
groups did not participate in the negotiations. Al-Shabab, the
militant wing of SICC, began gaining strength in 2007. It allied
itself with al-Qaeda and won the support of many local warlords,
primarily in the south. The group has raised alarms in the U.S.
that its brand of militant Islam would spread throughout eastern
Africa and beyond. The group seeks to return Somalia to an Islamist
state and has intimidated civilians with stonings, by chopping off
hands, and by banning many forms of technology, while continuing to
wage war against the transitional government. Al-Shabab has taken
advantage of the power vacuum and weak transitional government. By
February 2009, the group controlled almost all of southern Somalia.
Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Ghedi resigned in October 2007 after a
protracted feud with President Yusuf. He was succeeded by Nur
Hassan Hussein. President Yusuf dismissed Prime Minister Nur Hassan
Hussein in Dec. 2008, saying Hussein had "failed to accomplish his
duties." It was not clear, however, if Yusuf had the authority to
make such a move. The following day, Parliament passed, 143-20, a
confidence vote in the government of Hussein. Despite the vote,
President Yusuf appointed Muhammad Mahmud Guled Gamadhere as prime
minister. Guled, resigned, however, saying he did not want to be
"seen as a stumbling block to the peace process which is going well
now." President Yusuf also resigned in the power struggle. On
January 31, 2009, Parliament elected Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a
moderate Islamist cleric, as president. Many Somalis greeted the
election of Ahmed as an opportunity to move toward peace and end
the brutal 18-year war. In February, President Ahmed named Omar
Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as prime minister. Parliament approved the
appointment. Observers greeted the appointment with optimism,
saying Sharmarke, a former diplomat and the son of Somalia's second
civilian president, could help generate support both at home and
abroad for the Islamist government. Amid a growing threat from
militant Islamists, Ethiopia began withdrawing troops from Somalia
in January 2009. Al-Shabab formally declared allegiance to al-Qaeda
in February 2010, sparking further concern that the group posed a
global threat. It claimed responsibility for the July bombing at a
restaurant in Kampala, Uganda, that killed about 75 people who were
watching the final game of the World Cup. The bombing was intended
to send a message to countries that have sent troops to support
Somalia's transitional government. Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke,
who has been criticized for failing to defeat the Shabab and who
has been at odds with President Ahmed, resigned in September
2010.
II. CURRENT SITUATION Since Ethiopian armed forces entered
Mogadishu in December 2006, Somalia has suffered an increasingly
brutal conflict that has devastated the country and laid waste to
its capital. Lawlessness and violence have plagued Somalia since
the collapse of its last central government in 1991. But the
magnitude of the crisis facing the country today dwarfs everything
else Somalis have endured throughout the last 10 years.
Ethiopia and Somalia have a long history of bitter conflict and
in 1977 the two countries fought a fullscale war when Somalia
attempted to annex what is now Ethiopias eastern Somali region.
Ethiopia has legitimate security interests in Somalia. But for many
Somalis, the presence of ENDF forces in Mogadishu was an
intolerable development, and tensions built rapidly among the local
population. In 2008 the human rights and humanitarian situation in
Somalia deteriorated into unmitigated catastrophe. Several thousand
civilians have been killed in fighting. More than one million
Somalis are now displaced from their homes and thousands flee
across the countrys borders every month. Mogadishu, a bustling city
of 1.2 million people in 2006, has seen more than 870,000 of its
residents displaced by the armed conflict. All sides have used
indiscriminate force as a matter of routine, and in 2008 violence
has taken on a new dimension with the targeted murders of aid
workers and civil society activists. 1. The issue of human rights
Amnesty International expressed its concern at the widespread
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law,
including war crimes, and the dire humanitarian situation that
civilians face in southern and central Somalia. Civilians are at
high risk of being killed and injured in indiscriminate attacks by
all parties to the internal armed conflict, and as a result of a
situation of generalized violence and collapse of the rule of law.
In addition, certain categories of persons also face targeted
attacks, including unlawful killings, torture and other-ill
treatment, abductions, death threats and harassment. In areas where
there is currently no fighting, civilians bear the brunt of
arbitrary and repressive rules, violating their human rights,
enforced by armed Islamist groups. Conflict and associated human
rights abuses continue to cause massive displacement in Somalia.
According to UNHCR, over 200,000 civilians were estimated to have
fled their homes in Somalia between January and early September
2010, some 1.4 million are currently displaced within the country
and 68,000 have been registered as newly arrived refugees in
neighbouring countries in 2010. Given the difficulties of access to
southern and central Somalia by independent observers, Amnesty
International relies on information provided by local sources to
document the situation, as well as accounts from Somali refugees
who flee Somalia. Amnesty International interviewed hundreds of
Somali refugees who had recently fled their country in March and
June 2010 in Kenya. a) The situation in Mogadishu Somalias capital
Mogadishu has since 2007 been the epicentre of armed conflict
between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and
its allies, and the armed Islamist groups alShabab and Hizbul
Islam. Since 2008, al-Shabab has extended its control to most of
the territory in south and central Somalia, including major towns,
but heavy fighting and attacks continue in Mogadishu. Civilians
bear the brunt of the fighting. No party to the conflict appears to
take the necessary precautions to avoid loss of civilian life and
injury, despite their obligations to do so under international
humanitarian law. Civilians are often caught up in shelling and
cross-fire by all parties to the conflict, resulting in death and
injury to thousands. The fighting provokes massive displacement
within and outside Mogadishu and disrupts access to humanitarian
aid, which is already curtailed by insecurity and the targeting of
aid workers.
Medical records of the Daynile hospital on the outskirts of
Mogadishu for the first seven months of the year 2010 showed that
48 percent of its patients were suffering war-related injuries and
that 38 percent of patients with war-related injuries were women
and children under 14. Between June and July 2010, hundreds of
civilians were killed and injured in Mogadishu in clashes between
armed Islamist groups and the TFG and AMISOM. Some field reports
claimed as many as 50 deaths in one day. The Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated that between the last
week of August and the first week of September 2010, 230 civilians
were killed and 400 injured by fighting. The African Union recently
announced that the number of AMISOM troops will increase to 8,000,
and hopes that AMISOM can be reinforced further in the next few
months. This is likely to result in more attacks against the force
by armed Islamist groups, and more retaliatory shelling by AMISOM
in the capital. b) The level of violence in South and Central
Somalia Al-Shabab has been seizing cities and territory in southern
and central Somalia since 2008 and now controls most of it. However
the region has experienced sporadic fighting in the past year and a
resurgence in the fighting in areas other than in Mogadishu remains
likely. Al-Shabab has severely restricted humanitarian access in
most of southern and central Somalia, putting civilians at risk.
Restrictions have included the banning of UN and international
agencies working in areas under al-Shabas control, and the
arbitrary closure of national organisations, which the group
sometimes accuses of spying for the international community. One
high-profile ban was that of the World Food Programme in early
2010. According to OCHA, humanitarian access in southern Somalia is
at its lowest since the end of 2006. In August 2010, al-Shabab
banned three humanitarian organisations from areas under its
control, claiming that they were spreading Christianity; in
September 2010, three more aid organisations were banned after
al-Shabab accused them of having links with the USA. OCHA reports
that on 23 August 2010, al-Shabab instructed aid agencies operating
in Beletweyne to pay 10,000 USD within 15 days, in order to work
for the next six months, after which agencies should pay an
additional 6,000 USD for another six-month work permit, and
transmitted similar instructions to all aid agencies operating in
Middle and Lower Shabelle, Bay, Bakool, Middle and Lower Juba
regions. Restrictions on the movement of humanitarian supplies are
also imposed. For instance, MSF reported in October 2010 that a
truck containing medical supplies was stopped and that flights
carrying medical supplies have been banned from landing in southern
Somalia. c) Targeted human rights abuses In addition to
indiscriminate attacks and the situation of generalized violence
which put the lives of civilians at risk, certain categories of
people are at risk of being targeted for killings, torture,
harassment and forced recruitment. In 2009 and 2010, armed Islamist
groups have reportedly been responsible for the majority of such
targeted attacks. Persons linked with the TFG are at high risk of
being killed, abducted, tortured and otherwise threatened by armed
Islamist groups; they include members of the government,
parliamentarians,
judges, district officers or former officials. But the
perception of being linked or sympathizing with the TFG, is
sometimes considered enough reason to be targeted: women selling
tea to TFG soldiers have been flogged or otherwise punished by
al-Shabab members , and persons coming from TFG areas in Mogadishu
are sometimes suspected by the armed groups of being spies. Civil
society activists, including human rights activists, aid workers
and journalists are at risk of being targeted for killing,
abduction and torture, because they are suspected of sharing
information on the conflict with outside observers, or because they
have expressed opinions about the human rights situation in
Somalia. Throughout 2009 and 2010, reports of incidents of torture
and unlawful killings carried out by armed opposition groups have
increased. There has been a worrying trend of individuals stoned to
death, publicly shot dead, amputated and flogged on the orders of
quasi-judicial bodies operated by local leaders linked to armed
groups. There is little information about the way the courts of
armed opposition groups operate, but individuals tried under these
bodies do not appear to benefit from any due process guarantees,
including legal representation or possibility of appeal. These acts
violate international humanitarian law, which armed opposition
groups are obliged to respect. Declarations attributed to al-Shabab
local leaders ostensibly claim that such acts are carried out to
impose conformity with their interpretation of Islamic law.
However, several testimonies gathered by Amnesty International show
that many such abuses target persons suspected of opposing
al-Shabab or who refuse to comply with an al-Shabab order. Many of
these acts are carried out in public. Amnesty International
believes that armed groups aim, under the pretext of maintaining
law and order, at intimidating and instilling fear in the civilian
population, through public displays of cruelty and violence, in
order to assert their control over territory. According to the UN,
from April to early July 2010, there were reports of nine
executions by firing squad or stoning in areas controlled by
al-Shabab, on accusations of spying, adultery or murder; five cases
of amputation; some 28 individuals flogged; and seven cases of
beheading, including of five workers allegedly involved in
reconstruction work at the Parliament in Mogadishu. Amnesty
International believes that the number of such abuses remains
under-reported because of the secrecy within which al-Shabab
leaders operate and the dangers associated with circulating
information about the groups actions. Male children, including
sometimes as young as nine years old, and young men are at a high
risk of being forcibly recruited to fight for the armed Islamist
groups. During its last visit to Kenya, Amnesty International
collected information about a widespread pattern of such forced
recruitment, particularly by al-Shabab, in the areas under its
control, including in al-Shabab controlled districts of Mogadishu.
Amnesty International has also received reports of girls being
forced to marry al-Shabab members, or to cook and clean for
al-Shabab forces. Amnesty International has also received
testimonies indicating that al-Shabab has targeted minority group
members for recruitment into their forces. d) Humanitarian
situation in IDP camps and refugee camps in neighbouring countries
According to humanitarian organizations, the situation of the
displaced in camps throughout southern and central Somalia is
critical. The UN Representative of the Secretary-General on the
human rights of internally displaced persons (IDP) reported in
January 2010:
During flight and in settlements, the internally displaced
remain exposed to grave human rights abuses, in particular rape and
domestic violence. Many of their rights and needs, including
shelter, food, water, health care and education, remain
unaddressed. The severe situation of malnourishment, in particular
of children, in camps for internally displaced persons is of deep
concern. Protracted displacement situations in all parts of Somalia
are exacerbated by the influx of new arrivals. Existing
humanitarian assistance is insufficient, because of a lack of
humanitarian access as well as a lack of funds. At the same time,
recovery and development efforts are needed to strengthen the
resilience of the displaced and the absorption capacities of host
communities and to find durable solutions for the displaced where
this is possible. The Afgoye corridor, a stretch of land north-west
of Mogadishu, hosts hundreds of thousands of displaced persons from
Mogadishu, with minimal or no access to humanitarian aid. The
Afgoye corridor is currently under the control of Hizbul Islam and
al-Shabab. Satellite imagery released by UNHCR shows that some
410,000 persons currently reside in Afgoye.
2. Piracy The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
(CGPCS) was established on January 14, 2009 pursuant to United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1851. Its purpose is to
facilitate discussion and coordination of actions among states and
organizations working on suppressing piracy off the coastline of
Somalia. In a statement released in 2009, the Contact noted that
piracy grew significantly over the previous year and that it can be
expected to increase unless enhanced international efforts are
taking place. The pirates have been demanding million-dollar
ransoms for release of the hostages, ships and cargoes. Piracy
disrupts critical humanitarian aid deliveries to Somalia, increases
shipping insurance premiums along one of the worlds most traveled
routes to near-prohibitive levels, damages littoral economies by
forcing the diversion of vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, and
raises the prospect of an environmental disaster as ships fall prey
to hostile intent. Piracy is a symptom of a wider lack of security
and rule of law in Somalia and continues to constitute a threat to
regional stability. As important, piracy is symptomatic of the
overall situation in Somalia including the prevalence of illegal
fishing and toxic waste dumping off the coast of Somalia, which
adversely affects the Somali economy and marine environment. The
CGPCS emphasized the primary role of Somalia itself in rooting out
piracy and armed robbery at sea and the importance of assisting
Somalia in strengthening its own operational capacity to fight
piracy and bring to justice those involved in piracy. The Contact
Group recognized the importance of apprehending and prosecuting
suspected pirates. It called on state parties to implement their
obligations under relevant treaties and applicable international
law, including in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea with respect to suppressing piracy, establishing jurisdiction,
and accepting delivery of suspected pirates, and to discuss, as
appropriate, the applicability of other international instruments
including the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ("SUA Convention"), and
the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The CGPCS identified six related focus areas: improving
operational and information support to counter-piracy operations,
establishing a counter-piracy coordination mechanism, strengthening
judicial frameworks for arrest, prosecution and detention of
pirates, strengthening commercial shipping self-awareness and other
capabilities, pursuing improved diplomatic and public information
efforts, and tracking financial flows related to piracy.
Additionally, participating states affirmed the importance of
attention to financial flows to pirates and their activities;
international bodies that track illicit financial flows were called
upon to examine the question of such flows to pirates and their
operations and to report as appropriate to the CGPCS and other
groups concerned with the issue. During the another meeting of the
Group, it was decided to consider creating a center in the region
to coordinate information relevant to piracy and armed robbery at
sea off the coast of Somalia (the Counter-Piracy Coordination
Center) as soon as possible in 2009.
3. The refugees in the region Kenyas violations of the human
rights of Somali refugees and asylum-seekers are putting thousands
of lives at risk, Amnesty International said in a report released
recently. From life without peace to peace without life describes
how thousands fleeing violence in Somalia are unable to find
refuge, protection and lasting solutions in Kenya, due to the
closure of the border between the two countries almost four years
ago amid security concerns. Continued fighting and horrendous
abuses in Somalia pose a very real threat to the lives of tens of
thousands of children, women and men. No Somali should be forcibly
returned to southern and central Somalia, said Michelle Kagari,
Africa Programme Deputy Director at Amnesty International. Many
Somalis have no option but to cross into Kenya. Kenyas closure of
the screening centre near the border however means no Somali is
registered immediately and that nobody is screened. Inevitably,
this does nothing to address Kenyas national security concerns said
Michelle Kagari. Following a surge in violence in December 2006,
Kenya closed its 682 kilometre border with Somalia, maintaining
that fighters with alleged links to al-Qa'ida might otherwise enter
Kenya and endanger national security. However, because of the
borders porousness, Somalis have continued to flee and seek refuge
in Kenya. The Kenyan authorities have turned a blind eye to the
continuous flow of Somali asylum-seekers across the border, calling
into question what impact, if any, the closure has had on the
security situation. Since the border was closed, Kenyan security
forces have forcibly returned asylum-seekers and refugees to
Somalia; demanded bribes and arbitrarily arrested and detained
them. Somalis are regularly
harassed by Kenyan police at the border areas, in the Dadaab
refugee camps in north-eastern Kenya and in urban areas, including
Nairobi. About half of all Somalis fleeing to Kenya register in the
worlds largest refugee settlement, made up of three overcrowded
refugee camps near the town of Dadaab in north-east Kenya, now
hosting almost 300,000 people. The other half make their way to
Nairobi, Kenyas capital, where very few are able to register as
refugees due to the limited capacity of the government and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In the
camps, police responsible for protecting refugees sometimes detain,
assault, and extort money from them. Police have also failed to
investigate cases of sexual violence between refugees, leading to a
climate of impunity for those responsible. The three Daadab camps
are themselves grossly overcrowded. Originally built to accommodate
90,000 refugees, they now house more than 280,000. This has put
enormous pressure on refugees access to shelter, water, sanitation,
health and education. The Kenyan government has been slow in
allocating more land to host the growing refugee population.
Refugees in the Daadab camps told Amnesty International that the
camps themselves were increasingly insecure and that members and
sympathisers of al-Shabab, an armed Islamist group in Somalia, were
present in the camps or travelled through them and at times
recruited refugees to fight in Somalia. The Kenyan security forces
are also reported to have been involved in recruiting Somali
refugees for military training in late 2009. Kenyas reputation for
hospitality towards Somali refugees is turning sour. Two decades
after they first started to flee the brutal conflict in their
country, Kenya provides asylum to 325,000 registered Somali
refugees and probably an equal number who have not registered. But
the authorities increasing demonization of these refugees - 80
percent of whom are women and children - as a national security
threat has made them among the most vulnerable victims of Kenyas
notoriously corrupt and abusive police force. Police arresting
newly arrived Somali asylum seekers incorrectly tell them they are
unlawfully in Kenya and charge them with offenses under Kenyas
Immigration Act which prohibits entry into Kenya without documents
and a visa. But the Act does not apply to asylum seekers who, under
Kenyas Refugee Act, have 30 days from the moment they enter the
country to register as refugees with the authorities at the nearest
office of the Kenyan Refugee Commissioner. International refugee
and human rights law prohibit refoulement, the forcible return of
refugees to persecution, of anyone to torture and, in Africa, of
civilians to situations of generalized violence. Kenya has every
right to regulate the presence of non-nationals on its territory
and may therefore normally prevent certain people from entering or
remaining in Kenya including those viewed as a threat to its
national security such as members of the Somali Islamist group
al-Shabaab. But Kenya may not close its borders to asylum seekers
and may not deport them, or registered refugees, back to Somalia.
UNHCR (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) has
failed to put in place an effective monitoring system to collect
information on the types of abuses documented in this report. The
UN refugee agency says that a number of factors have affected its
ability to carry out its protection mandate: security concerns that
restrict its work in the camps, a lack of human resources and
financial capacity, and the absorption of its time and resources in
addressing the myriad needs relating to the humanitarian situation
in the chronically overcrowded and underfunded camps.
To help put an immediate end to the widespread abuses described
in this report, the Kenyan authorities, UNHCR, and donor countries
should take a number of urgent steps. 1. The Kenyan authorities
should immediately instruct the police to end their systematic
interception, detention, abuse, deportation, and extortion of
asylum seekers crossing the border from Somalia and instruct them
to allow asylum seekers to safely travel to the Dadaab refugee
camps. 2. The authorities should expedite their plans to open a new
refugee screening center in Liboi to ensure the orderly
registration of all newly arrived asylum seekers and allow all
registered refugees in the camps to freely move throughout Kenya.
3. The authorities should also introduce rigorous monitoring and
supervision of police handling of sexual and gender-based violence
in the camps by creating a national police task force on sexual
violence against refugees in coordination with the National
Commission on Gender and Development. 4. The police should ensure
sufficient police capacity including through the stationing of
female police officers to effectively prevent and respond to sexual
violence.
III. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA The
situation in Somalia was first addressed by the Security Council in
1992 in resolution 733 (1992), upon request from the Somali
government. The Security Council issued a series of resolutions
between 1009 and 1993 addressing the situation in Somalia, which
was labeled as representing a threat to peace and security. After
that, a long period of silence followed. The Council tackled the
issue again in 2001 (Resolution 1356(2001)). Of all the resolutions
that were adopted on the situation in Somalia, one of great
importance is Resolution 733(1992) which establishes a general and
complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military
equipment. Several control and experience-sharing mechanisms have
been established in the following years. Another resolution of
great importance is Resolution 751(1992) which establishes the
United Nations Operation in Somalia(UNOSOM). The same resolution
also established a Security Council Committee on Somalia. As
outlined in the resolution, its purpose was to: seek from all
States information regarding the action taken by them concerning
the effective implementation of the arms embargo, consider any
information brought to its attention by States concerning
violations of the embargo and recommend appropriate measures in
response to violations of the embargo. Moreover, in 2007
(Resolution 1744), the Security Council approved the establishment
of an African Union mission for an initial period of 6 months. The
duration of the mission was extended through subsequent
resolutions. The latest resolution that referred to the matter
extended the mandate until 31 September 2011.
In Resolution 1816(2008) appears the first reference to the
phenomenon of piracy, which is strongly condemned. A series of
resolutions dealing with the same issue followed. In Resolution
1863(2009) the Council expressed its intent to establish a
peacekeeping operation in Somalia. The intention was reiterated in
other resolutions that followed, but it has not been put into
action until present date. Also, please bare in mind the activity
of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751
(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
(http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/).
IV. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ISBMUN 2011 The Security Council
must first make an assessment of the current situation in Somalia.
The measures proposed by the Council must address the main issues
outlined in the previous chapters: the situation of human rights,
the problem of refugees in the region, piracy, but delegates may
also bring into discussion other matters of relevance to the topic.
At the same time, delegates must bare in mind the most important
principle of international law state sovereignty. All measures
undertaken by the United Nations in general and by the Security
Council in particular need to offer sufficient guarantees that the
sovereignty of the state in question shall be respected. However,
like any other general principle, it is left to the interpretation
of parties involved to determine which actions are infringements of
sovereignty and which are not. The United Nations Charter refers to
several means by which the Security Council may taker action. 1.
(art 33) The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call
upon the parties involved in a dispute which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, to settle
their disputes by peaceful means (negotiation, inquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements and other peaceful means of their choice).
2. (art 34) The Security Council may investigate any dispute or any
situation which might lead to international friction or give rise
to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the
dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security. 3. (art 36) The Council may make
recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment of a
peaceful nature at any stage of a dispute. Note: However, legal
disputes should, as a general rule, be referred to the
International Court of Justice. The security Council is one of the
entities that may refer issues to the ICJ. 4. (art 39) The Security
Council is responsible for the maintenance of international peace
and security. For this purpose, it is entitled to determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression; moreover, it may make recommendations in order to
restore international peace and security. 5. (art 41) The Security
Council shall take measures not involving the use of armed force in
order to give effect to its measures. These are the so-called
sanctions that the SC may impose and they have natures (general
economic sanctions, trade embargoes, freezing of assets, travel
bans on individuals etc). It also may call upon member states to
apply these measures. These measures recommended by the SC are
mandatory to member states. All the other UN bodies may only adopt
measures that are left at the discretion of countries, they may not
impose mandatory measures or establish sanctions directly for the
countries that do not implement
them. Also, the previous types of intervention of the SC
(recommendations for the parties to a dispute art 36) also has a
optional character for the parties involved. However, the
intervention under art 41 is mandatory for all member countries of
the UN. A state that does not enforce these measures or acts
against them may be the subject of sanctions (adopted also by the
Security Council). 6. The Council may also also take actions by
air, sea or land forces: demonstrations, blockades and other
operations. All member states of the United Nations have to make
available to the SC, on its call and in accordance with a special
agreement or agreements armed forces, assistance and facilities.
Therefore, these measures are also mandatory to the states. It is
important to understand that there are certain rules governing the
actions of the SC. When first facing an international issue, the
Council must first make recommendations to the party/parties
involved. Only if these recommendations repetitively fail in
solving the situation it may move to mandatory measures. Out of
these measures, priority must be given to those of a peaceful
nature (art 41). Military actions are the last solution the Council
may resort to, if all the other peaceful means of addressing the
issue have failed. Please mind Chapter III of this study guide that
deals with the measures the Security Council has already undertaken
in the case of Somalia. Delegates must analyze them and determine
those that proved effective and those that were not effective.
Delegates must understand the reasons why the latter category
proved inefficient and avoid them in the future resolution or find
means to correct them. Moreover, delegates are highly encouraged to
come up with their own creative measures to tackle the situation in
Somalia.
FURTHER RESEARCH reports of the HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH:
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/12/08/so-much-fear-0
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/06/17/welcome-kenya-0
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/03/29/horror-hopelessness
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/07/13/hostages-peace-0
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/04/13/harsh-war-harsh-peace
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 733 (1992):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/010/92/IMG/NR001092.pdf?OpenElement
746 (1992):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/011/05/IMG/NR001105.pdf?OpenElement
751 (1992):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/011/10/IMG/NR001110.pdf?OpenElement
755 (1992):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/410/10/IMG/N9241010.pdf?OpenElement
767 (1992):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/342/21/IMG/N9234221.pdf?OpenElement
794 (1992):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/772/11/PDF/N9277211.pdf?OpenElement
814 (1993):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/226/18/IMG/N9322618.pdf?OpenElement
837 (1993):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/332/32/IMG/N9333232.pdf?OpenElement
865 (1993):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/513/77/PDF/N9351377.pdf?OpenElement
878 (1993):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/591/87/PDF/N9359187.pdf?OpenElement
885 (1993):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/639/14/PDF/N9363914.pdf?OpenElement
886 (1993):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/646/08/PDF/N9364608.pdf?OpenElement
1356 (2001):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/417/27/PDF/N0141727.pdf?OpenElement
1407 (2002):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/366/07/PDF/N0236607.pdf?OpenElement
1425 (2002):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/488/79/PDF/N0248879.pdf?OpenElement
1519 (2003):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/658/82/PDF/N0365882.pdf?OpenElement
1474 (2003):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/314/33/PDF/N0331433.pdf?OpenElement
1558 (2004):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/461/98/PDF/N0446198.pdf?OpenElement
1587 (2005):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/271/33/PDF/N0527133.pdf?OpenElement
1630 (2005):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/554/12/PDF/N0555412.pdf?OpenElement
1676 (2006):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/343/85/PDF/N0634385.pdf?OpenElement
1724 (2006):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/633/52/PDF/N0663352.pdf?OpenElement
1725 (2006):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/646/11/PDF/N0664611.pdf?OpenElement
1744 (2007):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/245/31/PDF/N0724531.pdf?OpenElement
1766 (2007):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/434/17/PDF/N0743417.pdf?OpenElement
1772 (2007):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/485/62/PDF/N0748562.pdf?OpenElement
1801 (2008):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/246/98/PDF/N0824698.pdf?OpenElement
1811 (2008):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/322/41/PDF/N0832241.pdf?OpenElement
1814 (2008):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/343/79/PDF/N0834379.pdf?OpenElement
1816 (2008):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/361/77/PDF/N0836177.pdf?OpenElement
1831 (2008):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/465/82/PDF/N0846582.pdf?OpenElement
1838 (2008):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/538/84/PDF/N0853884.pdf?OpenElement
1844 (2008):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/611/31/PDF/N0861131.pdf?OpenElement
1846 (2008):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/630/29/PDF/N0863029.pdf?OpenElement
1851 (2008):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/655/01/PDF/N0865501.pdf?OpenElement
1853 (2008):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/663/27/PDF/N0866327.pdf?OpenElement
1863 (2009):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/211/65/PDF/N0921165.pdf?OpenElement
1872 (2009):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/349/46/PDF/N0934946.pdf?OpenElement
1897 (2009):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/624/65/PDF/N0962465.pdf?OpenElement
1910 (2010):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/222/59/PDF/N1022259.pdf?OpenElement
1916 (2010):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/281/93/PDF/N1028193.pdf?OpenElement
1918 (2010):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/331/39/PDF/N1033139.pdf?OpenElement
1950 (2010):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/649/02/PDF/N1064902.pdf?OpenElement
1964 (2010):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/706/02/PDF/N1070602.pdf?OpenElement
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and
1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea:
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/ for up-to-date news on the
Situation in Somalia, please visit: www.cnn.com www.bbc.co.uk
www.reuters.com http://www.un.org/News/ or other similar
websites
