Security and State - Building in Afghanistan

39

ARAS & TOKTAS: AFGHANISTAN’S SECURITY

© 2008, The Authors Journal Compilation © 2008, Middle East Policy Council

AFGHANISTAN’S SECURITY: POLITICAL PROCESS,STATE-BUILDING AND NARCOTICS

Bulent Aras and Sule Toktas

Dr. Aras is a professor at the Department of International Relations, IsikUniversity. Dr. Toktas is an assistant professor at the Department ofInternational Relations, Isik University.*

Interest in the security of Afghanistanis largely dominated by fear that thecountry’s instability will triggerconflicts in neighboring regions from

Kashmir to Chechnya. It is often arguedthat the key to providing security is tofortify the U.S.-led international trooppositions in Afghanistan and increase thenumber of Afghan security personnel. In asimilar vein, it is estimated that 200,000-250,000 national and international securitypersonnel would be needed. Consideringthe U.S. military involvement in the Iraqiquagmire, the deployment of such a largenumber of troops is neither realistic norpossible. Even in a scenario that assumesthese troops would be deployed in Afghani-stan, it is highly questionable that thesecurity problem would be resolved.Therefore, a change in the security para-digm is needed.

The current situation in the state-building process, based on the guidelinesset forth in the Bonn Agreement, requiresthe precondition of sustained stability,followed by sustained security. In thisarticle, we argue that a new securityparadigm, based on the gradual establish-ment of a political process, state-building

and opposition to narcotics, would have thepotential to address the Afghan securitysituation. This new security understandingneeds to tolerate a certain degree of insecu-rity to achieve progress in state-building andto appropriate an inclusive and integrativeapproach to the reconciliation of both humansecurity and state security. Progress in thepolitical process, mobilization of the massesbehind state-building, and prioritization ofhuman security are all required for rethinkingAfghanistan’s security.

Establishing political authority andconstructing a state instrument wouldincrease trust, which would contribute tostability.1 The lack of political institutionsnecessary for stability encourages theinterference of individuals and groups with“special” interests, at both the state andsocietal levels.2 Stability is not only a prereq-uisite for the development of the politicalprocess and security within the country; it isalso a risk to security, as it would require theinvolvement of groups and factors in thepolitical process that might hinder securityitself. Solving the security-stability dilemmabecomes a precondition for human and statesecurity, despite the difficulties presented inconflict-laden Afghanistan.

40

MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 2, SUMMER 2008

First, we deal with the complicationsencountered during the formation of thestate and its political institutions, as well aswith the narcotics problem. Second, weexplore the possibilities of building securityand stability in Afghanistan. We hold theview that Afghan security could be pro-vided by establishing state institutions,advancing the political process and ad-dressing the narcotics problem. Ourproposal for managing progress in theseprocesses through the critical thresholdsbetween security and stability will opennew horizons in rethinking Afghanistan’ssecurity.

THE BONN FRAMEWORKThe Bonn Agreement has determined

the political roadmap of Afghanistan sincethe removal of the Taliban from govern-ment in 2001. The Bonn initiative aimed forreconciliation on temporary regulations untilpermanent government institutions could beestablished.3 The meeting was conductedunder the auspices of the United Nations,but the resulting agreement has mostlybeen shaped by the influence of the UnitedStates. The Bonn Agreement first laid outa political authority that would determine atransitional government. The primary taskof this government was to hold the generalelections that would form the assembly andthe government within two and a halfyears.4

The Bonn Agreement is not a peacetreaty between the parties to the civil warin Afghanistan: the Taliban and the Ameri-can-backed Northern Alliance. Rather, ithas been a convention embraced by theAmerican-led Operation Enduring Freedom(OEF) and the parties that won the waragainst the Taliban. In fact, the victoriousparties that participated in the meeting had

been fighting each other in a kind of civilwar since 1989. The Bonn Agreement didnot recognize the Taliban government, nordid it invite reformist groups within theTaliban to the meeting. Additionally, theBonn process did not have an agenda forthe reconciliation of the differences amongvarious adversaries.5

The agreement sets out a time sched-ule for the establishment of politicalinstitutions; yet there are ambiguitiesregarding how steps are to be taken withinthe schedule. The attempts by Afghangroups and external powers to establish apolitical authority in a new country aredefinitely positive. However, the BonnAgreement delegates the task of installingthe institutions to a limited group, and thegroups participating in the Bonn processwould not be sufficient to confer legitimacyon the political authority. Former AlgerianForeign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, therepresentative of former UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan, emphasized the linkbetween representation and the decisionstaken in the meeting — in other words, thelegitimacy issue inherent in the Bonnprocess. Brahimi stated that, upon thefounding of a legitimate and representativegovernment in Afghanistan at the Bonnmeeting, nobody would question whetherthe Bonn Agreement represented theactual Afghan people or even rememberthe participants in the meeting.6 With thismost optimistic appraisal, the nine-daymeeting was certified as the arena forresolution of a conflict that had been goingon for 23 years.

The Bonn Agreement is a state-dominated roadmap for providing securityin Afghanistan.7 Security in this contextrefers to solving political, economic andsecurity problems and sustaining peace

41


through a state-centric approach. Securitywas postponed until the aftermath of state-building, when the newly establishedpolitical authority would deal with it in asystematic manner. In this sense, governingduring the transition period has been hardfor Hamid Kharzai.8 A Qandahari Pashtunfrom an influential family, he returned toAfghanistan with the support of the UnitedStates to unite the country against theTaliban regime. In the Kharzai-led transi-tion period, three important portfolios wereallocated to the most powerful group withinthe NorthernAlliance’s Shura-yiNazar (Supervi-sory Council of theNorth): defense toYunus Qanuni,internal affairs toGen. MohammedFahim and foreignaffairs to AbdallaAbdalla.

The Bonnprocess attemptedto expand repre-sentation as muchas possible. In due course, an emergencyassembly — Loya Jirga — was founded,and Kharzai became the president of theIslamic State of Afghanistan for two years.It was only after long negotiations, on June19, 2002, that Kharzai was able to form acabinet. Many members of the assemblycriticized it for being ineffective in selectingthe new administrative officers. What’smore, the newly founded ruling elite wasnot inclusive.9 The presumption that itslegitimacy problems would be resolvedover time with the implementation of agradual plan actually put the entire processat the risk of a single option for success. In

the fragmented nature of Afghan politics,every group has had different expectationsand reservations regarding the future; nosingle group has had control. This is whynone of the groups have been fully support-ive of the process, and some may havebeen totally against it.

CONSTITUTIONThe current constitution is the sixth

since 1932, when Amanullah prepared thefirst one. It went into effect on January 26,2004, after being ratified by the People’s

Council andapproved byPresident Kharzai.It introduced abicameral presi-dency, an Islamiclegal system,jurisdiction overlegislation by aSupreme Court, astrong centralgovernment andbroad languagerights for minori-ties. As the ulti-

mate objective of the Bonn process wasthe establishment of permanent govern-mental institutions, it was seen as a socialcontract that would provide the stability thecountry needed most.

Only after long and tiresome negotia-tions was the presidential system includedin the constitution. The president wasgranted the authority to appoint cabinetministers who were not members of theAssembly.10 The non-Pashtun Afghans,who had doubts that the presidentialsystem would permit their full representa-tion, were faced with a legislature compris-ing two chambers: the House of Elders

The Pashtuns prefer a strongunitary and centralized state;the Tajiks want to have morepower in the centralgovernment; and the Hazarasand the Uzbeks demanddecentralized regionalgovernment and therecognition of their identities.

42


(Meshrano Jirga), consisting of appointedmembers, and the House of the People(Wolesi Jirga), consisting of electedmembers. The House of the People was toconsist of representatives from variousethnic groups, proportionate to the size oftheir populations. Representing a step backfrom the 1964 constitution, which hadallocated more seats to Pashtun-dominatedregions,11 the make-up of new legislaturereassured the non-Pashtun masses, whoexpected an increase in the seats allocatedto them. In addition, the new constitutionprovided that 25 percent of the members ofthe House of the People and 16 percent ofthe House of Elders would be women, witha quota of at least two women representa-tives per electoral district. The Islamistbloc did not object to the female quota;however, their demand that the presidentbe a man was rejected.12

The new constitution emphasized thatno legislation could contradict the principlesof Islam. It also established a SupremeCourt to certify the constitutionality oflaws, presidential provisions and interna-tional treaties.13 There were fears that theSupreme Court would resemble the IranianGuardian Council, which also interprets theIranian constitution and may reject parlia-mentary bills deemed incompatible with theconstitution. Such authority granted to theSupreme Court involves the risk of block-ing the legislature or decelerating thelegislative process. Another aspect of thedurability and stability of the politicalsystem is the issue of a super-Afghanidentity. No matter what contribution theBonn Agreement and its aftermath havemade to the construction of a nationalidentity, the current situation is far fromdelineating an Afghan identity. Every ethnicgroup has asserted its definition of an

Afghan identity based on its own criteria.Such ethnic assertiveness is also evident inthe competition over the administrativestructure. The Pashtuns prefer a strongunitary and centralized state; the Tajikswant to have more power in the centralgovernment; and the Hazaras and theUzbeks demand decentralized regionalgovernment and the recognition of theiridentities.

Although the new Afghan constitutiondid not involve federalism or regionalauthority in accordance with the demandsof the Hazaras and the Uzbeks, it containsarticles that recognize cultural and linguisticdiversity within the country. The previousconstitution, promulgated in 1963, recog-nized Pashtu and Dari (Afghan Persian) asthe official languages and included anarticle requiring the government to developand promote the Pashtun language.14 Incontrast, the new constitution is a pluralisticone. Article 16 regulates the language to beused in the public sphere. During themeetings to prepare it, attempts to favorPashtu over Dari were met with suspicionamong Dari-speaking Tajiks, who fearedthat the issue of language could be used toremove Tajiks from state offices. Despitethe fact that Article 16 specified Pashtuand Dari as the official languages of thestate from among the various languagesspoken in the country, Pashtu has beenpreferred over Dari in state institutions andpublic offices.15

Some members of the NorthernAlliance wanted Turkic languages (Uzbekand Turkmen) to be recognized as official.These groups also criticized use of theterm “Afghan,” because of its associationwith the Pashtun identity, and offered“Afghanistani” instead. In a similar vein,they demanded that the word “Afghani” to

43


refer to the national unit of currency bechanged. These discussions resulted inArticle 16 setting forth the Turkic lan-guages (Baluchi, Pashai, Nuristani orPamiri) as the third official language inregions where the majority of inhabitantsspeak them. The state was given the roleof adopting and implementing effectiveplans for strengthening and developing allthe languages of Afghanistan. By thesame token, Article 16 allowed publicationsand radio and television broadcasting in alllanguages spoken in the country. As aresult of the provisions regarding linguisticdiversity, the new Afghan constitutionrecognized both ethnic plurality and politicalunity. As Article 4 stated: “The nation ofAfghanistan is comprised of the followingethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara,Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch, Pashai, Nuristani,Aymaq, Arab, Kirghiz, Kizilbash, Gujur,Brahwui and others….The word Afghanapplies to every citizen of Afghanistan…”16

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONSIn post-conflict situations, holding

democratic elections is usually the first taskon the agenda. Free and competitiveelections are of primary importance inlegitimating the new government and itsdecisions, which are assumed to be con-tributory to the environment for peace.17 Itwas in this context that the question ofwhich electoral system would be chosenwas handled. During the lengthy andexhaustive discussions, the proportionalelectoral system was frequently cited asthe most suitable system for Afghanistanbecause it would bring about a stable partysystem and therefore a more balancedrelationship between the legislative andexecutive powers.18 Proponents of thismodel argued that, although elections might

not serve the goals of representation andlegitimacy to the fullest extent, they wouldprovide a mechanism for state-societyrelations. If citizenship is considered one ofthe fundamental components of the bondbetween the individual and the state,elections provide an essential dynamic.During elections, polling is organized,voters are registered and identificationcards are prepared. Through electioncampaigns, a discourse takes place on theimportance of elections, political participa-tion and representation, and civic virtue iscultivated. All in all, the process indirectlycreates a citizenship bond between societyand the state.19

At the beginning of 2004, a closed-party-list, proportional electoral system wasthe method suggested for the 34 historicalelectoral districts of Afghanistan. One ofthe proposals, presented as the best of theworst, was for single nontransferablevoting within the simple-majority systeminherited from British rule. Yet the proposalwas met with suspicion, as it would not besuitable for the situation in Afghanistan.20

Several nongovernmental organizations,international groups and UNAMA (UnitedNations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan)pointed to the negative consequences of asimple-majority electoral system. Forinstance, the International Crisis Groupreleased a report on the deficiencies that asimple-majority system based on singlenontransferable voting may cause for anew democracy.21

On January 17, 2005, 35 of the 40officially approved political parties declaredthat they supported a proportional electoralsystem with party listing. In the samemonth, the three candidates in the presi-dential elections besides Kharzai — RashidDostum, Yunus Qanuni and Mohammed

44


Muhakik — denounced the nontransferablesingle vote and joined with those whosupported a proportional electoral systemwith party listing.22 Despite these denun-ciations, the nontransferable single votewas chosen. This was due to the need fora stable party system, on the one hand, andthe mistrust towards political parties, on theother. It was complemented by suggestionsfor voting for particular candidates ratherthan parties.

The biggest obstacle facing the elec-tions was the security of the electorate. Inthe elections of the Emergency Loya Jirga— the transitional people’s assembly wasformed before the general elections withthe task of regulating the transitional period— serious security problems occurred, andarmed groups occupied some of the ballotcenters. Similar problems were expected inthe general elections. The Bonn Agree-ment envisaged the democratization of thewarlords as the final stage.23 Democratiza-tion, in this context, referred to the resolu-tion of the security-stability dilemma by thearmed groups renouncing violence, dimin-ishing their differences through the politicalprocess, and entering free and competitiveelections.

On September 18, 2005, despite aninsecure environment, nearly 7 millionAfghans used their political right to vote inthe most liberal and just general election inAfghan history. Women were half of theelectorate. In the single-ballot directelections, 249 members of the House ofthe People (Wolesi Jirga) and, throughindirect elections, the House of Elders(Meshrano Jirga) were elected. TheAfghan general elections showed that,even in the midst of the worst securityconditions and other political problems,elections could be held successfully. In the

House of the People, 33 identifiablepolitical parties, groups and alliances arerepresented. Although Kharzai took 55percent of the votes in the 2004 presiden-tial elections, the heterogeneous groupswho supported him in the 2005 generalelections received only one third of theseats.24

The elected assembly reflects thecontemporary Afghan picture very well.25

The groups that form the Islamic bloc took65 of the seats. Although this bloc is unitedunder the idea that the legislative andexecutive powers should be collectivized ina single body in accordance with a conser-vative interpretation of Islam, due to themultiethnic and fragmented structure ofAfghan politics, it is split into variousgroups and subgroups. The groups underthe leaderships of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf andBurhanuddin Rabbani supported Kharzai,but proponents of Yunus Qanuni remainedin opposition. From time to time, the ShiiteHazaras, who follow a more moderateinterpretation of Islam, support this bloc. Inthe Assembly, there are 43 representativeswho define themselves as progressive; 13liberal democrats; and 20 representativesfrom the National Islamic Movement ofAfghanistan, which is a secular-orientedparty under the leadership of Abdul RashidDostum. The same House hosts 24 crimi-nal gang members, 40 commanders whohave relations with the militias, 17 drugsmugglers and 19 representatives whohave been accused of serious war crimes.Almost half the members of the House arecomposed of mujahideen who had foughtagainst the Soviet invasion.26

The 2005 general elections may beconsidered a success story, yet there aredeficiencies to be expected in a post-conflict situation. For example, since

45


literacy rates among the Afghan populationare very low (21 percent for women and51 percent for men), the nontransferablesingle-vote system and the several-pages-long ballot caused difficulties.27 Despite thelow literacy rates, the elections broughtwomen representatives into the assembly.In addition to those women candidates whowere placed at the top of the listings,where their election would be guaranteed,18 other women candidates won seats inthe assembly. For example, in the westernpart of the Herat region, Fauzia Gailaniwon a majority of the votes, far outpollingthe male candidates. In the province ofFarah, Malali Joya, who courageouslystood against the warlords, came in sec-ond. The votes given to Joya can be seenas a reaction to traditional male candidates,who were considered proponents of war orwere involved in corruption.28 Although thepolitical impact of women members of theparliament cannot be measured in the shortterm, their presence illustrates enhancedpolitical participation in sharp contrast tothe Taliban government.

THE NARCOTICS PROBLEMHamid Kharzai has emphasized that

the opium trade has become a worsecancer than terrorism and even worse thanthe 1979 Soviet occupation.29 The opiumbusiness is a widespread phenomenon thatpreviously involved the Taliban and theNorthern Alliance. Except for during 1994and 1995, when the Taliban were fightingfiercely to install a fundamentalist regime,the Taliban government had graduallybecome involved in drug trafficking. At thebeginning of Taliban rule, opium cultivationwas tolerated. Then, a tax under the nameof “Islamic alms,” at a rate of 10-20percent, started to be collected from the

opium farmers. The Taliban governmenthad concluded that it would not be eco-nomically wise to eliminate the opiumtraffic, as it was one of the backbones ofthe economy and was widespread. Evenwhen the Taliban declared drug cultivationillegal in 2000-2001 under internationalpressure, the country’s opium stocks wereso high that their share of GDP would nothave changed for a long time.30

Afghanistan provides 75 percent of theheroin in the global market and 95 percentof the heroin in the European market.Opium cultivation has been increasing inAfghanistan every year. In interviewsconducted with the elderly from the Heratregion, it was commonly stated thatweather was a greater obstacle than legalmeasures against opium cultivation.31 UNstatistics confirm this trend, showing thatopium production increased by 49 percentin 2006 relative to the previous year.32

Assertive policies are needed to assess thereasons behind the widespread cultivationof opium and why the transition to legalagricultural crops is impossible.33

In the post-Taliban period, the recon-struction of the country dominates theagendas of both domestic politics and theeconomy. More than 70 percent of thepopulation still lives below the povertylevel. Theoretically, legal agriculturalgoods such as saffron, fruit and grainproduction can be promoted and subsidizedto combat opium cultivation. Yet, there arestructural factors specific to Afghanistanthat make it a fertile ground for illegalagriculture. These can be categorized intwo ways.34 First, the country’s small-scalebanking credit system operates throughopium agriculture. Opium production,technically, is resistant to weather condi-tions. In addition, it has pricing stability.

46


Having ties with international drug net-works, the local drug traffickers pre-finance opium production by providing allthe farmers’ needs for the following year.Furthermore, they prepay for the nextyear’s harvest with goods, food andclothes, all of which can be worth substan-tial amounts during the cold winters.Second, legal agricultural productionnecessitates substantial pre-financing, asirrigation and fertilizer are quite costly inAfghanistan’s tough geography andclimate. In the case of fruit growing, stepssuch as timely harvesting, storage in coldwarehouses and delivery to the marketwithout price fluctuation are required. Theproduction of opium does not necessitatespecial conditions. Furthermore, since it isa light product in terms of weight, theharvest can easily be transported. Most ofthe time, traffickers purchase opium in theform of raw material directly from thefarmers.35

The number of people involved in drugproduction and trafficking in Afghanistan isunknown. The UN Office on Drugs andCrime estimates that nearly 7 percent ofthe Afghan population directly benefitsfrom drug trafficking.36 This figure includesneither seasonal workers and their familiesemployed by the drug traffickers nor thosewho contribute indirectly (i.e., the import-ers of the vehicles used in production andtransportation), the real-estate agents ormiddlemen, and the pension, coffee-houseand guest-house owners who provideservice to traffickers. A lively economy isclearly visible in the opium-productionareas of Afghanistan, owing to an increasein the demand for real estate and theconsequent rises in prices. This createsinflationary pressure and disrupts theexchange market. Needless to say, the

money derived from drugs creates wealththat can easily be turned into politicalpower, thus endangering the legitimacy ofthe political process.

Who is involved in drug trafficking?The question is vital for the struggle againstgroups related to al-Qaeda and the Taliban.Crime networks receive commissions inreturn for services such as security andprotection, which they provide to the opiumproducers and shippers. Other actors workin the process of transforming opium intodrugs. Another group of actors deals withmoney laundering. In the post-Talibanperiod, it became risky to utilize groupsaffiliated with al-Qaeda in drug trafficking,and there has been a tendency to recruitnew groups outside the al-Qaeda circle fortrafficking and smuggling. Drug bosseshave refrained from drawing a reactionfrom the U.S.-led occupation forces andhave tried to cut links with al-Qaeda, ifthere were any. Still, there are certaingroups affiliated or related to al-Qaeda thattake part in the drug business. For instance,there is evidence that Juma Khan, one ofthe sponsors of al-Qaeda in Beluchistan,owns a shipping fleet for the transportationof Afghan drugs from Karachi to the worldmarket. Additionally, the number-one drugbaron of Afghanistan, Bashir Nurzai,admitted, after being caught in New Yorkin April 2005, that al-Qaeda members wereused in drug trafficking.37 Although this hascertain advantages, considering theorganization’s knowledge and experience inAfghan geography, money launderingsystems and their own international networkbuilding, it is risky. There is a fierce hunt formembers of the organization and the Talibanby the occupation forces, which puts al-Qaeda at a comparative disadvantage.

There are various methods to combat

47


opium cultivation and narcotics problems inAfghanistan. The international pressureduring Taliban rule has been replaced by acombined effort of occupation and localAfghan forces in the post-Taliban period tofight against trafficking. Analysts arguethat a threefold strategy is at stake.38 Thefirst stage is the use of the relationshipsamong the U.S. forces, local warlords andanti-al-Qaeda groups against drug barons.It has to be mentioned, however, thatamong the local allies of the United States,there are some groups that are involved indrug trafficking. The second stage is thedeployment of the anti-narcotics police ofAfghanistan witheffective meansand lethal assaults.The third stage ofthe strategyinvolves thesolution to beobtained at the endof the state-building process.39

This threefoldstrategy is closelyrelated to theobjectives of reinforcing the creation of theAfghan state and its security structure. Inaddition to this strategy, other measures arepossible. For example, with the acknowled-gement of the fact that the narcoticsproblem in Afghanistan cannot be solved inthe short term, the issue can be reframedas a problem of security and development.Barnett Rubin, who suggests revisiting theformer question, proposes measures suchas the development of the rural regions thatgrow opium and other agricultural goods,road construction, installation of ware-houses and cold-storage depots for perish-able goods such as fruit, reforming the

Ministry of Interior and penalizing stateofficials who are involved in drug networkswithout consideration of their political andethnicties.40

RETHINKING AFGHAN SECURITYThe problem of security in Afghanistan

is not caused only by the resistance withinthe country. In the current situation, theincreasing security problems every yearimpair the state-construction process. Forexample, in the year 2005, attacks in-creased by 20 percent, coalition forcescasualties increased from 58 to 129, totalcasualties reached 1500, and new tactics

— such as suicideattacks and re-mote-controlledroadside bombings— appeared.41 Thesituation worsenedin 2006 and 2007.One has tocontextualize thesecurity problem inAfghanistan withinthe broader frame-work of state-

building, regional conflict, international drugtrafficking and intervention by neighboringcountries.

The Afghan people have been dividedinto three groups under the impact of thecomplex security problem. The first groupis living with the threat of the Taliban,which still persists despite Americanattempts to annihilate the regime. It isreported that people living in Kandaharapply to Taliban courts for solutions to theirdisputes. In the southern and southwesternparts of the country, the Taliban continue toexecute “government collaborators.”NATO and coalition forces have not

With the acknowledgement ofthe fact that the narcoticsproblem in Afghanistan cannotbe solved in the short term, theissue can be reframed as aproblem of security anddevelopment.

48


attained any success beyond suggestingthat the people continue to support thegovernment.42

The second group consists of themasses that neither want the Taliban norare satisfied with the existing government.They feel hopeless about the future; theyhave lost their trust in government and donot have confidence in its capacity toresolve persistent problems. They believethat the NATO and coalition forces — thedistrusted foreigners — not only makethings worse in Afghanistan by interventionbut also do not contribute to the state-building process. A majority of thecountry’s population falls into this category.

The third group, formed by those withconfidence in the Afghan government, hasbeen actively participating in the recon-struction of the country. This group iscomposed of state officials, reconstruction-plan executives, and participants in politicalprocesses. Although it is difficult to identifyhomogenous groups in Afghanistan, thispicture represents the security perceptionsof the Afghan people. The most suitableway to win over the people who have losttrust in government and hope for the futureis to make continuous and substantialprogress in state-building and the creationof permanent political institutions within theframework of the Bonn Agreement. Everyfailure damages expectations and hopes,and therefore risks the success of theentire process.

The solution to the dilemma of securityand stability lies in the fact that the majorityof the people in Afghanistan do not wantthe Taliban regime to return. This isillustrated by the active participation of thepublic in the constitutional process as wellas the general elections. Thanks to thisfact, two requisites appear to be vital to

overcoming the obstacles blocking theobjectives of the Bonn process. First, thesecurity problems must be solved, beforethey get worse and make people yearn forthe Taliban period. Second, people mustbecome involved in the reconstruction ofthe country so that they benefit from thestability process, even though backslidingwill occur. This relationship should bedetermined by a balance between hope forthe future and the benefits that the currentsituation may offer for as large a numberof people as possible.

The establishment of an effective statestructure is possible with the end ofconflict, economic development and thereplacement of the opium-based economy.The main task of the Afghan government isto keep this long-term objective on theagenda while retaining the confidence ofthe people. The long-term strategy, whichmay be considered unrealistic forAfghanistan’s current weak institutionalstructure, can be accomplished by politicalmaneuvers that aim at controlling thesecurity-stability dilemma in the short-term.The Afghan government needs to restruc-ture itself to deal with the most vulnerableinstitutions, namely the Ministry of Interiorand the judiciary.43 The lack of trust inthese institutions activates tribal structuresand local legal systems. Additionally, therumors that the Afghan government isengaged in drug trafficking and other illegalactivities and that the judiciary takes bribesto adjudicate decisions cause people toquestion the capability of the Afghangovernment and its legitimacy. The impor-tance of building reliable permanentinstitutions and a functioning politicalsystem and prohibiting illegal networks,local warlords and crime gangs becomescritical at this point.

49


Providing security while trying toestablish stable state institutions is not aneasy mission. Besides the structuralbarriers, there are nomadic and settledtribes living in regions that have not yetbeen encompassed by the political authorityor who want to continue to live outside thescope of state institutions. Historically,there had always been several rulers,small-scale local leaders, tribal confedera-tions, and warlords coexisting in the region.44

In such a context, trying to form a Weberianstate structure that collectivizes the legitimateuse of violence in the hands of the politicalauthority becomes a challenging objective.

The reorganization of the Afghangovernment in accordance with a moreeffective management of the securitysituation would gradually solve the prob-lems of a unitary state structure and wouldlead to the emergence of a state mecha-nism. The common theme among stateofficials at the ministries in Kabul is theirrecognition that a step-by-step approach iskey to state construction. Yet, one of thebiggest problems during reorganization ishuman capital. Currently, it is hard to findqualified personnel and harder to keepthem. Specialists and other qualifiedpersonnel usually choose to work ininternational organizations operating inAfghanistan, as they offer better salariesand working conditions. Those recruited tostate offices encounter ambiguities regard-ing job security since the country’s generalsecurity is under threat. What’s more,most of the labor demanded from stateofficials is merely to save the day — andthe days are very long in Afghanistan’sharsh political and economic conditions.45

As discussed above, there is a need fora strong state in Afghanistan to accelerateeconomic development, increase welfare,

reduce poverty, end violence, strengthenpeace and diminish the interference ofregional actors. Security and good gover-nance are closely related to the country’seconomy. In the current situation, theAfghan economy is functioning with theengagement of a small number of eco-nomic actors and to a large extent byinternational assistance. The politicalprocess encounters difficulties in carryingout economic development. In order toensure societal support, the governmentneeds to include the masses in the game byshowing them how they would definitelybenefit in the post-Taliban period. For this,the masses must be convinced that boththe economic pie and their share of it willgrow over time. Speedy economic develop-ment is the most practical, concrete andconvincing tool. Therefore, the economybased on international assistance should betransformed into sustainable developmentthat incorporates national dynamics.Economic progress and development arealso necessary for the establishment of thesecurity institutions. In the words of thespokesperson of the Afghan Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Mahmoud Saikal, taxesshould increase by three to four times tofinance around 50,000 soldiers as well asan effective police force.46

The reconciliation of security andstability in Afghanistan is possible not onlyby restructuring and reforming governmentinstitutions but also by developing newpolicies that would integrate the majorityinto the political process. The irreconcilablegroups within the al-Qaeda and GulbuiddinHekmatyar groups should be isolated andeliminated while the remaining playerswithin the same groups could be accommo-dated and brought in. It is at this point thatpolitical amnesty appears as an effective

50


tool. Yet, it has to be stated that amnesty isa means that must be used carefully anddelicately. By increasing participation andlegitimacy, a more dynamic and encom-passing structure could emerge. In asimilar vein, some of the problematicgroups — such as the warlords, theentrepreneurs affiliated with them andvarious militias — could be recognized aslegal actors and be recruited into the army.The process begins by providing stabilityand is followed by formation of a securitystructure and steps ensuring that thesecurity institutions behave in accordancewith their primary duty. What is required isthe diffusion of political authority amongthe public. Such diffusion could be opera-tional, recognizing some of the groups aslegitimate actors, integrating them into thepolitical and economic system, and trans-forming them over time.

After integrating opposing, resisting orintimidating groups into the political pro-cesses, a tolerant structure should becreated so that these groups can voicetheir criticisms or exhibit their dissatisfac-tion peacefully within the boundaries of thelegal system. These groups should trans-form within the domain of the constitutionand the legal system, but at the same time,there should be continuous efforts toensure that they do not reverse the pro-gressive process by destruction or rebel-lion. In a similar vein, even partial partici-pation is noteworthy for institutions thatprovide stability. Hesitation to participate orconditional participation has to be acknowl-edged as normal and natural and, moreimportantly, supported. Some groups thatparticipated in the constitutional referen-dum in order not to be left out of the powergame may continue their resistance.Although these groups may see their

participation in the referendum and theircontinued resistance as a strategy of killingtwo birds with one stone, the actualsituation is that they in some way oranother have been attracted to participatein the political processes. Partial participa-tion has started to be seen as an openingfor the reconciliation of differences overtime and as a tool kit for dynamism duringthe formation and preservation of theprocesses.

The above considerations are on theagenda of coalition forces and local Afghansecurity forces. Three auxiliary issueswould help the successful implementationof the agenda strategically.47 First, aug-menting security is possible only after aseries of security-providing actions.Therefore, the endeavors to providesecurity should complement each other;one security measure should not blockanother. Second, before getting in touchwith the warlords, the decision as to whichwarlords are to be isolated and whichstrengthened should be well calculated.Every disorganized or unsystematic contactwith warlords would only empower them.Tentative alliances with warlords should bedesigned in light of a long-term strategy.Third, in a setting where fierce securitymeasures are needed, running securityoperations without supplying adequatesecurity personnel and munitions is anabsolute risk.48

CONCLUSIONThe long-term objective for Afghani-

stan is to strengthen the state structurallyand to set mechanisms in place that wouldprevent it from working only for narrow orfactional interests. It can be argued that astrong state might not always prioritizehuman and societal security but would

51


instead impose an arbitrary government.Such a risk can be minimized by an ap-proach that would safeguard humansecurity along with state security. The caseof Afghanistan illustrates that hard securitypolicies are postponing if not altogetherdestroying stability, which is essential forthe establishment of political authority andhence the state. A new approach is re-quired that will treat security within abroader and more flexible understanding.Within the medium of an enhanced securityconceptualization, short-term insecurity canbe tolerated in the name of stability.

It is of utmost importance to speedilyestablish mechanisms that would build trusttowards the state and political institutions inthe eyes of the masses in Afghanistan.Although this may be too optimistic since

* This article is part of a broader research project funded by TUBITAK and Isik University. We would like tothank TUBITAK, Isik University, the Center for Strategic Studies at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairsand the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ideas expressed here belong solely to the authors.1 Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie and Donald Rothchild, “Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: AnInvestigation of Some Key Variables,” International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1 (March 2001), pp. 183-208.2 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968).3 Kevin K. Frank, “Democracy and Economics in Afghanistan: Is the Cart before the Horse?” MediterraneanQuarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 2006), p. 103.4 United Nations Security Council, Agreement on the Provincial Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending theRe-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, S/2001/1154, December 5, 2001.5 Barnett R. Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 3, (July2004), p. 7.6 Ibid.7 Jonathan Goodhand, “From War Economy to Peace Economy: Reconstruction and State Building inAfghanistan,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1 (October 2004), p. 170.8 Barnett R. Rubin, Ashraf Ghani, William Maley, Ahmed Rashid and Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: Reconstruc-tion and Peace Building in a Regional Framework, KOFF Peacebuilding Reports, 1, Center for Peacebuildingof the Swiss Peace Foundation, Bern, 2001, p. 178.9 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with Wahidullah Furmuli, director of the AfghanMinistry of Foreign Affairs European Section on April 21, 2006, in Kabul, Afghanistan.10 Rubin, 2004, op. cit., p. 12.11 Ibid.12 Ibid., p. 15.13 Ibid.14 The 1964 Afghanistan Constitution, retrievable at http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1964.html

there is little evidence of stability, securityand harmony within the country, there ispotential for the dilemma between securityand stability to be successfully governedthrough critical thresholds. This newapproach on security would forestall crimenetworks or even state authorities frominstituting links with foreign elements anddecrease the tensions and conflicts withinthe country. In the 200-year history ofAfghanistan, what has been lacking hasbeen the above-described understanding ofsecurity. In this sense, handling and gov-erning human, societal and state securitytogether in a holistic way should be persis-tently defended. It is only through suchpolitical will that security can becomepossible and open new ground for break-throughs in Afghanistan.

52


15 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with Yasin Rasuli, senior specialist at the AfghanMinistry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Research Center on April 22, 2006, Kabul, Afghanistan.16 The 2004 Afghanistan Constitution, retrievable at http://www.afghanan.net/afghanistan/constitutions/constitution2004.htm.17 Beatrice Pouligny, “Promoting Democratic Institutions in Post-Conflict Societies: Giving Diversity aChance,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2000): pp. 17 - 35.18 Andrew Reynolds, “The Curious Case of Afghanistan,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April 2006),p. 116.19 Pouligny, op. cit.20 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with Prof. Dr. Hamidullah Faruki, president ofthe Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce, on April 19, 2006, in Kabul, Afghanistan.21 International Crisis Group, Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections, Asia Report 88,November 23, 2004.22 Reynolds, op. cit., p. 110.23 Thomas H. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War,”Central Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 1-2 (March - June 2006), p. 13.24 Reynolds, op. cit., p. 114.25 Ibid., p. 112.26 Ibid.27 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with Ambassador Aziz Arianfar, director of theAfghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Research Center, on April 22, 2006, in Kabul, Afghanistan.28 Reynolds, op. cit., p. 114.29 John Lancaster, “Karzai Vows to Combat Flourishing Afghan Opium Trade,” Boston Globe, December 10,2004.30 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism,” WashingtonQuarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), p. 56.31 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with a security specialist at UNAMA, whowants his name to be kept confidential, on April 23, 2006, in Kabul, Afghanistan.32 Barnett R. Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1 (January - February 2007), p. 65.33 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with Prof. Dr. Hamidullah Faruki, president ofthe Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce, on April 19, 2006, in Kabul, Afghanistan.34 Felbab-Brown, op. cit., p. 57.35 Ibid.36 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004 World Drug Report Vol 2: Statistics, 2004, p. 206.37 Felbab-Brown, op. cit., p. 60.38 Felbab-Brown, op. cit., p. 68.39 Ibid.40 Rubin, 2007, op. cit., p. 68.41 Operation Enduring Freedom, “Coalition Military Fatalities by Year: Operation Enduring Freedom,” 2007,retrievable at http:icasualties.org/oef.42 Goodhand, op. cit., p. 164.43 Rubin, 2007, op. cit., p. 76.44 For a similar argument, see Christian Parenti, “Afghanistan: The Use and Abuse of a Buffer State,” NewPolitical Science, Vol.30, No.1 (2008).45 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with Hikmet Cetin, who served as NATO’ssenior civilian representative in Afghanistan, on June 14, 2007, in Istanbul, Turkey.46 From the interview that co-author Bulent Aras conducted with the spokesperson of the Afghan Ministry ofForeign Affairs Mahmoud Saikal on April 19 2006 in Kabul, Afghanistan.47 Larry P. Goodson, “Bullets, Ballots, and Poppies in Afghanistan,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 1(January 2005), p. 27.48 Goodson, op. cit., p. 27.

Documents

Security and State - Building in Afghanistan