National Defence University

Securityand defenceQuarterly

No 2

warsaw 2013

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE

ChairmanMajor General Bogusław Pacek, Assoc. Prof.,National Defence University, Warsaw, POLAND

Members- AUSTRIA - Lieutenant General Erich Csitkovits, National Defence Academy, Vienna- BALTIC DEFENCE COLLEGE - Major General, Vitalijus Vaikšnoras, Tartu, Estonia- CROATIA - Lieutenant General Slavko Barić, Croatian Defence Academy “Petar Zrinski”,

Zagreb- CZECH REPUBLIC - Brigadier General, prof. Ing. Bohuslav Přikryl, PhD, University of

Defence, Brno- HUNGARY - Prof. Dr. András Patyi, National University of Public Service, Budapest- ROMANIA - Lieutenant General Teodor Frunzeti PhD, “Carol I” National Defence University,

Bucharest- SERBIA - Major General Mladen Vuruna, PhD, Military Academy, Belgrade- SLOVAKIA - Brigadier General Assoc. Prof. Dipl. Eng. Boris Ďurkech PhD, Armed Forces

Academy, Liptovsk˘ Mikuláš- SLOVENIA - Colonel Associate Professor Dr. Tomaž Kladnik, Command and Staff School,

Maribor

EDITORIAL COMMITTEEEditor in Chief – Dr Małgorzata GosScientific Editor – Dr habil. Andrzej Glen, Associate ProfessorEditorial Team – Anita MilikEditing of papers – Jeremy Wysakowski-Walters ISSN 2300-8741

Address: Poland, 00-910 Warszawa 72 al. gen. Antoniego Chru�ciela 103, blok 2Antoniego Chru�ciela 103, blok 2 tel.�fa�: �48 22 �81 44 78tel.�fa�: �48 22 �81 44 78 e-mail: a.milik@aon.edu.pl

Typesetting, printing and binding: Publishing House of National Defence University,order 192�14, edition of 200 copies

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TaBLE OF CONTENTs

INTErNaTIONaL sECUrITY

The operationalization of culture for the military – a pre-deployment training draft ...................................................................................................................... 7Kamila Trochowska, PhD, National Defence University, Poland National Security Department The Institute of State Security

The development of the �uropean �nion �ounter-�errori�m �rame�or�� of the �uropean �nion �ounter-�errori�m �rame�or�� ........... 38Ivica Stehlíková, M.A, Defence Policy Section, Ministry of the Defence of the Slovak Republic

NaTIONaL sECUrITY

Military police a� an important actor of the ne� �ecurity environment. The experience� of the Poli�h Military‘� Gendarmerie from it� ISA� mi��ion in Afghani�tan ...................................................................................................................... �1Major General Bogusław Pacek, Assoc. Prof, National Defence University, Warsaw

�reating the ba�i� for �ecurity of the Republic of Poland III - Inauguration lecture on the opening of ND� Security �orum, 7th, November, 2012 .................. 72President Lech Wałęsa

The evolution of the Hungarian �ecurity policy thin��ing bet�een 1���-1���,bet�een 1���-1���, �ith a �pecial vie� on the Hungarian Defence �orce� a �pecial vie� on the Hungarian Defence �orce� .............................................. 93Dr. József Lajos Németh, PhD, Adjunctive Professor National University of, Adjunctive Professor National University of Public Service Budapest

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sECUrITY aND DEFENCE – HIsTOrICaL PErPsECTIVE

�volution of the �S PSYOP product�’ effectivene�� during Vietnam War 1�65-1�6� .......................................................................................................................109Marcin Górnikiewicz, PhD, Stanislaw Staszic College of Public Administration in Bialystok

TECHNOLOGICaL DEVELOPMENT

Military Innovation .......................................................................................................129Lieutenant General Slavko Barić PhD, Croatian Defence Academy “Petar Zrinski”, Zagreb

Simulation technologie�: implication� for �ecurity management and training .....149Prof. Dipl. Eng. Pavel Necas, PhD, University of Security Management in Kosice, SlovakiaDipl. Eng Matus Grega, Armed Forces Academy of Gen. M. R. Stefanik, Liptovsky Mikulas, Slovakia

rEPOrTs aND rEVIEws

�xamination� and �ertification in the �eaching of Language for Specific Purpo�e� in NA�O Armed �orce� in Relation to �uropean Language Policy ................................................................................................................................1�3Małgorzta Gos PhD, National Defence University, Warsaw

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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ThE OpERATIONALIzATION Of CULTURE fOR ThE mILITARY – A pRE-dEpLOYmENT TRAININg dRAfT

Kamila TROChOwSKA, phdNational Defence University, Poland

Abstract

With the emergence of population-centric operations, an urgent need for considering the cultural factors of the Area of Operation emerged, and the missing link between the awareness of the cultural aspects of threats, and operational plans that consider them, has not yet been found and fully utilized in military planning and conducting of operations. Therefore, we face a need for the skill of the operationalization of culture, understood as the identification of features of the culture of any object of the activity, which are vital for military activities, and integrating such knowledge and skills into the processes of shaping security in the AOO.

The main purpose of the article then, is to outline a draft model of the operationalization of culture for the military, based on theoretical research and results of surveys conducted by the Author in US Army War College, the Coalition and Central Planning Group Multinational Teams at US Central Command, and the Turkish Air Force Command. The interviews were performed with a total of 20 people of different nationalities that were engaged in operations and the operationalization of culture processes, including from the USA, Italy, Germany, Armenia, Nepal, Romania, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, South Korea, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Australia and Canada, the majority of whom were engaged in ISAF and Iraqi Freedom operations�, in July 20�2. Combined with chosen modeling and social science theories, the research results enabled the creation of a general model of the pre-deployment operationalization of culture at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Key words: population-centric operations; operationalization of culture in COIN and state-building, pre-deployment training.

�  Apart from that, also Desert Storm and Viet Nam veterans were included.

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Operationalization of culture

Socio-cultural factors have played a major role during the majority of military operations that NATO’s armies have been engaged in since the end of Cold War. The emergence of the concept of population-centric operations (such as the Afghan or Iraqi missions), has raised a demand for the profound understanding of the cultural factors of the area of operation. In the conflicts in question, we are facing a shift of the center of gravity towards the area of operation population (the “human terrain”), whose support must be won to achieve the operation’s goals, as the enemy is hiding and operating among them, and a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants is no longer possible�. The complexity of those operations can be best summarized by the following graphic:

Source: Wunderle, William. Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries. Combat Studies Institute Press: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 200� (p. 25).

Picture 1: Contemporary military operations environment

�  Gentile, Gian. A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army. US Navy, �009. www.public.navy.mil/usff/Documents/gentile.pdf (p. 5).

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Due to the wide spectrum of cultural and societal factors influencing the operational environment, those operations gave priority to non-kinetic military activities, such as psychological operations (PSYOPS), information operations (INFOPS) or the significance of civil-military cooperation components (CIMIC), which are based on an in-depth understanding of the cultural aspects of the reality they work in. The culture of the area of operation population’s, however, affects and is affected by all the aspects of military operations.

Therefore, contemporary operational success can only be achieved when the situational awareness of the operational environment is full and in-depth, and the cultural awareness of the area of operation is a vital component of the overall situational awareness. Also NATO nations have understood the significance of that fact, which reflected in the shape of the Multinational Experiment 6 (�008-�010), in particular in the objective 4.3, which focuses specifically on cultural aspects. The major gaps and cultural issues within contemporary operations have been outlined in Multinational Experiment 6. Baseline Assessment 2008, which has stated that: • The ability to understand the dynamics of the operational environment,

accounting for the social, cultural, political, legal, economic, and physical conditions is crucial when facing irregular threats.

• Few personnel outside of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community are educated in Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency, or receive cultural awareness training.

• Cultural awareness at the macro and micro level are of equal importance and it is necessary to develop guidelines to accommodate cultural differences and avoid offensive and ineffective communication.

• Forces must train in foreign languages, cultural intelligence, negotiation, and dispute resolution.

• An effective interagency framework for building partner capacity rooted in a deep understanding of the indigenous culture that the threat has emerged from; a unity of effort among the various agencies involved, and sustained interaction and relationships with the host country over time is required.

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• Commanders need to appreciate the underlying interagency issues (such as institutional cultures, policies, resources, and differences in procedures) in order to effect real integration for waging Irregular Warfare3.

Still, although a variety of efforts was undertaken to cater for the need of cultural knowledge and competence while conducting operations, there still seems to be a gap between operational plans, the training of the forces and proper cultural conduct and inclusion of cultural factors into military operations in the field. This was also confirmed by the Author’s research performed among military officers from �0 countries4, who, answering the question: Do you think there is still a gap between cultural, ethnographic knowledge (from reach back centers/advisers/other units engaged in the collection and analysis of such data in the field) and operational plans?, the majority (91%) claimed that indeed the gap is still there and it does influence operational effectiveness. Moreover, some of those interviewed added precious remarks on the issue: • Cultural mistakes completely undermine the many months of good work by

the unit and the authority of the forces. • The “gap” might always be there, as it is hard to use the - usually strictly

theoretical - knowledge you get during pre-deployment training in stress conditions, where nothing is predictable or constant.

• Minimizing the gap would be possible if there was continuity in the exchange of experiences between deploying and returning units.

• It’s very difficult to support both sides: cultural issues and operational plans. Even though we fully understand the culture, sometimes we cannot follow the rules due to security procedures, and other operational or strategic purposes.

To begin our deliberations on the effective operationalization of culture in military operations, we must first answer the very essential question: what is

�  Pamplos, Francesco and Jacinto Pena. Ed. Cross-Cultural Awareness: Analytical Concept. MNE 6 Goal 4.3. Draft Version. SP TRADOC Directorate for Research, Doctrine and Materiel. Granada, �010 (p. 18-19)�  This part of research work focused on Afghanistan, where possible also Iraq for comparative analysis. Any other operations’ reflections were welcomed. A total of �� surveyed (military professionals from major to general engaged in military operations and operationalization of culture processes) from �0 countries have been interviewed according to the survey questions. Due to the limitations of the article subject, not all of the research results have been included.

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culture? Having analyzed a variety of military definitions5, which in the majority of cases are not sufficient for proper application to the operational environment, the Author has decided on a wider, anthropological understanding of the phenomenon that illustrates its complexity and dynamics. Culture, is hereby understood as fundamental, yet not the only factor that motivates and determines human behaviors, modes of thinking and interpreting the world, which provides the frames and methods of knowledge acquisition and giving meaning to the environment one lives in. It manifests in artifacts and non-material creations such as language, values, norms, institutions, religious beliefs, legends, ideologies and ideas; symbols and taboos, clothing and dining forms, modes and the attitudes towards other cultures. It is not objective, hence both the researcher and the research subjects change in the process of mutual interactions. Of course, all of those constitutive parts of a given culture are realized differently by individuals, considering psychological and societal differences within one culture. And, last but not least – culture is dynamic, similarly to a complex adaptive system reacting and evolving constantly due to internal and external stimuli6.

This vital issue was neglected in the majority of the solutions in the field of the operationalization of culture. Culture is most of all a pattern of reactions and adaptation schemes towards the changing environment. That was the part that was not taken into account in the majority of existing endeavors of the operationalization of culture, and the knowledge of the culture of the area of operation was drawn from sources that were created before the deployment of the forces; which might indeed give us some hints on the nature of the threat we

�  Military definitions of culture analyzed for the purpose included those in: U.S. Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-0�. DoD: Washington, �011 (p. 91), NATO Standardization Agency. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. AAP-6. NSA: Brussels, �010 (p. �-c-�0), Bados, Victor i in. Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations. Best Practices. SP TRADOC Directorate for Research, Doctrine, Organization and Materiel, Granada, �010, p. 7, Salomoni, Barak i Paula Holmes-Eber. Operational Culture for the Warfighter. Marine Corps University: Quantico, �008 (p. 35-37), FM 3.�4 and 3.�4-�, Afghanistan Country Handbook: A Field-Ready Reference Publication. DoD: Washington, �008 and others. �  The definition of culture was coined after reviewing existing definitions of culture found among others in: Kroeber, Alfred i Clyde Kluckhohn. Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. Vintage Books: New York, 195�, Barnard, Alan i Johnatan Spencer. Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology. Routledge: London and New York, �00�, Nowicka, Ewa. Świat człowieka-świat kultury. Antologia tekstów klasycznej antropologiiklasycznej antropologii. PWN: Warsaw, �007.

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will be facing, but constant and professional monitoring of the social changes and shifts of the behavioral aspects of given entity is needed. We must realize that no society we study is set in stone, and a society which comes into contact with any kind of external influence, will change vastly. The presence of uniformed formations along with a threat posed by irregular warfare are definitely an altering factor, and the knowledge of a population’s behavior modes that we have gained before the deployment, and that is so important operationally, might no longer be relevant. We must also remember that our own culture and behaviors are pre-determined in the same way as of the area of operation’s population’s. Hence, considering cultures in isolation, and not understanding our own cultural biases, might lead to the inability to internalize an adversaries culture – which is a crucial step towards higher operational culture skills, the cultural competence and genuinely effective use of the operationalization of culture.

This leads us to another conclusion that is hardly ever mentioned in military literature pertaining to the culture of the AOO: conflict and post-war societies, in particular with the presence of external armed forces in the region, are not subject to the same mechanisms that societies in a state of peace and relative balance. In any kind of research on such societies then, the anthropology of post-war societies should be additionally applied7. Only then is the operationalization of culture understood as all the processes and skills concerning the identification of features of culture of any object of the activity (so either the AOO/AOR population, the “enemy” or allied forces) which are vital for military activities and integrating such knowledge and skills into planning, pre-deployment preparation and the conducting of operations8 be truly effective.

�  Anthropology of war and post-war societies is a branch of social anthropology. More about its methods, processes and mechanisms in, among others: Lubkeman, Stephen. Culture in Chaos. An Anthropology of the Social Condition in War. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, �008; Snyder, Jack. „Anarchy and Culture. Insights from Anthropology of War.” International Organization. Volume 56, Number 1, Winter �00� (p. 7-45) or Bhathia, Michael. Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict. Routlege: New York, �008.�  Definition based on Bados, Victor. Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations. Best Practices. SP TRADOC Directorate for Research, Doctrine, Organization and Materiel: Granada, �010 (p. 7).

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The influence of cultural factors on operational effectiveness

We must also consider, which cultural factors and the processes taking place in the AOO have the greatest influence on military effectiveness. It will of course be all the aspects of the aforementioned definition of culture, but the experiences gathered during the Author’s research indicate that the major obstacles to operational effectiveness in cultural aspects are a lack of preparation of the soldiers to culturally different conditions, their despising approach towards the local population and a lack of understanding of the religious factors that are one of the basic determinants of the behaviors of the people in the AOO. The remaining factors which hinder most the operational effectiveness have been depicted in the following chart:

Source: Own elaboration.

Chart 1: Intercultural factors causing most problems during operations between military forces and local population

Moreover, the interlocutors indicted the following issues: • “We sometimes seem not to understand that people in the AOO want their

enemy (which is sometimes not who we find as enemy) gone. But more often they just want the military units gone” (Vietnam ’7�).

• „In Saudi Arabia during our deployment, due to the local law they were arresting female American military personnel for driving, as it is forbidden for

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women there. Our commanders reacted strongly to that, but they should have know that before. (Iraq ’91).

• „Before we got the specialists, until the HTS advisors arrived, they didn’t know who to refer to (tribal and other power brokers/ local structures were unclear) to get things done. We also tried to teach the Iraqi governmental procedures, liberties of an individual, rights and duties, which was almost impossible, as their understanding of those issues was completely different from ours” (Iraq ‘07).

• „Saving face and honor obvious for Eastern cultures were contradictory to our values of honesty and the ability of admitting to a mistake, which they don’t value” (Iraq ‘05).

• “Some of the Muslims do not touch dogs as they find those animals unclean. And then the ISAF forces do seizures with dogs, which is humiliating from the Afghan point of view (Afghanistan ‘09).

We must also remember that cultural factors influence not only the non-kinetic aspects of operations, since they are interwoven in all the processes of planning, preparation, execution and assessment of military activities. The influence of cultural factors of operational effectiveness can be observed in the following aspects of operations: • Force Preparation in the aspects of the training, exercising, educating of the

forces and doctrine formation,• Battlespace Awareness, by the collection of relevant data and Intelligence,

Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities,• Force Application in all kinds of maneuvers to influence and provide security

to the population and infrastructure,• Logistics, where the movement and sustainment of the forces and operational

contract support will also have its cultural variables• Command and Control activities,• Mission’s Structure Organization and Cooperation with other engaged actors,

such as civilian components or NGOs, where perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities of a partner, adversary and relevant populations are of major significance,

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• Network-Centric sustainment, where detecting, analyzing and responding to events must be undertaken in concordance with vital the cultural factors of the Area of Operation9.

It is then not only the CMIC or PRT components that should undergo cultural training, but to a proper extent, all those engaged in the operation. The above has been confirmed by the results of the interview. Answering the question: What is the influence of cultural factors on the conduct and effectiveness of the operation at the tactical and operational levels?, all of the surveyed agreed that they have a great impact, in particular at the tactical level where specific tasks are being implemented. Hence, it is crucial to train lower-rank soldiers in cultural awareness and skills, as usually it is them that have the most contact with the local population, and their behavior influences the local perception of military activities as such. Also at the operational level where campaign plans are designed, the commanders without proper preparation can create plans and objectives that are counter-effective in a given specific cultural reality. Similarly to the previous question, the respondents underlined the importance of understanding the culture of the AOO, a non-judgmental approach, respect towards traditions different than their own and refraining from imposing one’s own cultural perspective as the only proper one10.

We must understand, though, that cultural factors are present in a variety of ways at different levels of the operations. “Cultural awareness”, the term that NATO has designated to all levels of the operationalization of culture in the initiallevels of the operationalization of culture in the initial operationalization of culture in the initial period of the MNE 6, is not an all-covering skill for deployed personnel, since the influence of cultural factors on the mission’s overall success will be different at each of its levels, and a different set of skills pertaining to cultural competenceand a different set of skills pertaining to cultural competence set of skills pertaining to cultural competence will be demanded. At the strategic/political level, the cultural aspects of the arealevel, the cultural aspects of the area aspects of the area of operation and the awareness of them by the decisive components, will be theand the awareness of them by the decisive components, will be the the decisive components, will be the major determinant in shaping the political goals and the strategic aims of thedeterminant in shaping the political goals and the strategic aims of the the political goals and the strategic aims of the operation. Improper inclusion of the cultural factors in the planning processes might render the goals difficult or hard to achieve. At the operational level, cultural factors shape the chain of command decisions and impact the level of

�  Bados, Victor. Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations... Op.cit. (p. 11-1�).�0  It was particularly stressed by respondents from countries where Islam is a dominant religion.

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security in the area of operation, as a wrong inclusion of the cultural data hinders, as a wrong inclusion of the cultural data hinders inclusion of the cultural data hinders gaining the local population’s support, lowering hence the effectiveness of both support, lowering hence the effectiveness of bothof both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. At the tactical level, where the forces. At the tactical level, where the forces have most contact with the culturally diverse environment, even minor cultural mistakes and misunderstandings might lead to a negative perception of the forcesto a negative perception of the forces perception of the forces by the local population, whose support, as previously mentioned, must be gained.support, as previously mentioned, must be gained., must be gained. Not to mention the fact that any cultural blunders at the higher levels of planning and command, will be passed on to lower levels of the operation, creating a spiral of mistakes.

Another point to consider is that the perception of the culture of the AOO willof the culture of the AOO will of the AOO will be always influenced by one’s own cultural perspective. As the research results have shown, 91% of the respondents have confirmed that their own culture, and specific features of their military culture does influence operational effectiveness,features of their military culture does influence operational effectiveness, culture does influence operational effectiveness,culture does influence operational effectiveness, influence operational effectiveness, both positively and negatively. The factors that were indicated as those that have meaning operationally are: • A liberal understanding of gender roles and a focus on individual rights thatA liberal understanding of gender roles and a focus on individual rights that of gender roles and a focus on individual rights thatroles and a focus on individual rights that on individual rights that

makes cooperation with traditional and conservative societies difficult (USA). with traditional and conservative societies difficult (USA).• Religion – it is easier if either the religion of the AOO is the same as the units,

or the unit can display enough religious tolerance and sensitivity. (Afghanistan,enough religious tolerance and sensitivity. (Afghanistan, tolerance and sensitivity. (Afghanistan, South Korea)

• An openness, respect and tolerance towards other cultures (Australia,An openness, respect and tolerance towards other cultures (Australia,, respect and tolerance towards other cultures (Australia, Pakistan).

• A willingness to create friendly relations with the local population to maintainA willingness to create friendly relations with the local population to maintain to create friendly relations with the local population to maintain harmony (South Korea).

• A tradition of multiculturalism in one’s mother society (Australia, Germany,A tradition of multiculturalism in one’s mother society (Australia, Germany, of multiculturalism in one’s mother society (Australia, Germany, Singapore, Canada).

The danger of misunderstanding the cultural dynamics of the area of operation one is involved in, that hinders both a full situational awareness and a perceptionboth a full situational awareness and a perception situational awareness and a perceptionand a perception of the enemy and irregular threat, was already noticed centuries ago by the Chinese classic of strategic thought, Sun Tzu. As he stated: „Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy, but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle

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to be in peril”11. The particular significance of the self-awareness and the ability to internationalize an adversaries’ culture in facing any asymmetric opponent, was also expressed in the U.S. Marine Corps manual Operational Culture for Deploying Personnel. As it claims, the purpose of the double, in-depth awareness is to keep the deployed personnel “in the same ballpark and the same sport as the enemy, who is able to control this aspect of the game because it is his country, his culture, and his language. The insurgent gets to define who he says he is, not the foreign army who is fighting him. In other words, you have to defeat him on his cultural terms, not yours”terms, not yours””1�.

Levels of the operationalization of culture

To systematize the levels of the operationalization of culture, and the range ofof the operationalization of culture, and the range of of culture, and the range of knowledge and skills demanded from different components engaged in a givenin a given operation, we must remember that, paradoxically, the lower the operational level, the higher the responsibility. Let us then begin from a basic division, bearing in mind that the popular concept of cultural awareness, that in most of the military literature covers all levels, is only the first stage of the operationalization of culture.stage of the operationalization of culture. of culture. The range of cultural information and intercultural skills required from the forcesforces will vary at different levels of the operation. The most comprehensive model of vary at different levels of the operation. The most comprehensive model of the type of skills demanded at various levels of the operation is based on Bloom’s Taxonomy for Cognition, recommended in the executive report of the �008-�010,�010, NATO’s Multinational Experiment No 6, goal 4.3. devoted to shaping cultural Multinational Experiment No 6, goal 4.3. devoted to shaping cultural awareness for the purpose of military operations:

��  Tzu, Sun. The Art of War: The Denma Translation. Schambala Publications: Boston, �00�.��  CACOL USMC. Operational Culture for Deploying Personnel. Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning of the U.S. Marine Corps, Training And Education Command: Quantico, �009 (p. 87).

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Source: Bados, Victor. Operationalization of culture.... Op. cit. (p. �).

Picture 2: Bloom’s Taxonomy for Cognition: Levels of operationalization of culture

The importance of Bloom’s hierarchy rests on the creation of a scale to portray levels of a staff’s abilities to use culture operationally. At the base of the scale stands the ability to identify and describe a given culture, which equals culturaldescribe a given culture, which equals cultural culture, which equals cultural awareness (cultural understanding). Further on lies the ability to internalizeFurther on lies the ability to internalize ability to internalize culture, i.e. the skill of taking the investigated object’s point of view as one’s own for a better understanding of certain phenomena and threats, and for providing an understanding of certain phenomena and threats, and for providing an, and for providing an accurate prediction. Over cultural understanding we find the ability to use cultural prediction. Over cultural understanding we find the ability to use cultural information across Lines of Operation (LOOs), which demands high-level cultural competence. Bados provides a perfect example of the application of the taxonomy on a battlefield situation: “a team may benefit from being trained to understand that certain cultural ideas or terms apply to an operational environment. They may be able to recognize some of these terms and use them in the development of operational plans: to understand, apply, and repeat back. It does not necessarily mean that the team is capable of performing in-depth analysis and evaluation that permit them to determine the operational relevance of certain bits of culturaldetermine the operational relevance of certain bits of cultural operational relevance of certain bits of culturalrelevance of certain bits of cultural bits of cultural information. Without analysis and evaluation, it is difficult to determine second and third level effects, or to break previous inaccurate perceptions. If they are unable

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to do this, they may be incapable of progressing to the highest step in Bloom’s hierarchy, to create innovative plans that achieve the appropriate effect”13.

We must also bear in mind that those categories do not embrace merely cultural knowledge – the higher the level, the higher the demanded cultural knowledge range. Using the American Psychological Association’s 3 domains needed forAssociation’s 3 domains needed for domains needed for effective intercultural cooperation, which are: cultural self-awareness, cultural awareness (knowledge) and cross-cultural skills than enable the use of the knowledge and awareness one mastered in interpersonal relations14, we come to the division between cultural knowledge (specific) and intercultural skills that are universal and enable a swift adaptation to a culturally new environment, even if theenable a swift adaptation to a culturally new environment, even if the adaptation to a culturally new environment, even if theto a culturally new environment, even if the new environment, even if the ethnographic knowledge range is limited. Yet, they are hardly ever trained before deployment. Which is a mistake, as those skills are „strategic skills that enable effective activity from a strategic to tactical level. Specific cultural knowledgefrom a strategic to tactical level. Specific cultural knowledge to tactical level. Specific cultural knowledge serves only one operation”15. The problem is that, as was mentioned, in most of the, as was mentioned, in most of the contemporary cultural training it is the specific knowledge that is being focused cultural training it is the specific knowledge that is being focused on, although in stress conditions, in constantly shifting environment, most of the knowledge cannot be used without proper enablers. However, the militaryenablers. However, the military military operations reality today, might force us to join an operation to which there will be not much time to prepare, in which case those skills will be invaluable.

Cross-cultural competence for the military

In �009, the US Army implemented The Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS), the aim of which is to integrate various levels of cultural knowledge and skills in not only pre-deployment, but also life-long officer career development. It outlines specific and general cultural knowledge and skills domains. It outlines specific and general cultural knowledge and skills domains and general cultural knowledge and skills domains

��  Bados, Victor. Operationalization of Culture… Op. cit. (p.9). ��  Aghop Der-Karabetian, Christopher T.H. Liang, Glenn C. Gams. Handbook of Multicultural Measures. “Multicutural Competence Measures”. Sage Publications Inc: Black Oaks, �011. www.sage-ereference.com. ��  Glicken-Turnley, Jessica. Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF are. JSOU Report11-1. Joint Special Operations University: Tampa, �011.

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that the Army needs to function effectively in all circumstances16. The domains that the document describes for general cultural skills development are:document describes for general cultural skills development are: general cultural skills development are: • Knowledge: understanding one’s own cultural determinants, the ability to useuse

the tools to analyze intercultural relations and the influence of cultural factors tools to analyze intercultural relations and the influence of cultural factorstools to analyze intercultural relations and the influence of cultural factors to analyze intercultural relations and the influence of cultural factors on operational conduct and effectiveness.

• Skills: interpersonal skills, adaptability, cross-cultural communication skills and the ability of modifying one’s behaviour to given situationsof modifying one’s behaviour to given situations behaviour to given situationsgiven situations

• Attitudes: non-judgmental, an open and tolerant approach, empathy, thejudgmental, an open and tolerant approach, empathy, the and tolerant approach, empathy, the ability to internalize other cultural patterns17.

Concerning the regional competence that is needed for a specific operation competence that is needed for a specific operationfor a specific operation operation and enabling the effective adaptation to culturally different environment, those the effective adaptation to culturally different environment, thosethe effective adaptation to culturally different environment, those adaptation to culturally different environment, those domains will be as follows: • Knowledge: key historical, cultural, political and religious aspects of the given

country, terrain, AOO or specific social group of interest • Skills: the ability to take up different cultural perspectives and regulating one’s

own attitudes, behavioural means of communication and expression according, behavioural means of communication and expression according of communication and expression according to the given situational context

• Attitudes: a positive attitude towards local population, willingness to learn: a positive attitude towards local population, willingness to learn attitude towards local population, willingness to learn a new culture18.

Having outlined initial considerations about the operationalization of culture,about the operationalization of culture, of culture, let us focus on the range of knowledge and skills demanded at various levels of operations. Basing analysis on Bados’s taxonomy and conducted research, theanalysis on Bados’s taxonomy and conducted research, the taxonomy and conducted research, the Author has created the following division19:

Level of operationalization of culture Cultural skills

CULTURAL AWARENESS

1. basic cultural do’s and don’ts �. basic cross-cultural awareness (how cultures work in general) and the specific knowledge pertaining to the AOO (history, mentality, customs...)

��  U.S. Army HQ. Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy. U.S. Army HQ: Washington, �010 (p. 9). ��  U.S. Army HQ. Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy... Op. cit. (p. 30-3�). ��  Ibidem (p. �0-��). ��  Universal cultural skills that have to be focused on are underlined.

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Level of operationalization of culture Cultural skills

CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING/ INTERNALIZATION

4. the ability to understand one’s own culture and how it influences our perception of different cultures 3. the ability to internalize culture (taking up a different cultural perspective and understanding the world through it)

INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE

5. deeper understanding of culture that enables effective cooperation with the population and the implementation of operational goals 6. the ability to integrate AOO cultural specificity in operational plans and conduct 7. cultural expertise

Source: Own elaboration.

Table 1: Universal cultural skills

Still, the question is how to distribute that knowledge and skills domains betweendistribute that knowledge and skills domains between and skills domains between various ranks, at different operational levels. Part of the research conducted by the Author was focusing specifically on this issue. According to those surveyed, theto those surveyed, the, the division will be most effective when lower rank soldiers and NCOs will be trained in basic cultural awareness and specific cultural knowledge, but also of importanceknowledge, but also of importance for them is self-cultural awareness and internationalization of culture skills. The them is self-cultural awareness and internationalization of culture skills. The officers should be equipped, apart from the above, with a deeper understandingwith a deeper understanding understanding of culture that will enable the effective cooperation with the population and theculture that will enable the effective cooperation with the population and thee cooperation with the population and theand the implementation of operational goals, plus the skill of integrating the cultural of operational goals, plus the skill of integrating the culturalintegrating the cultural cultural specificity of the AOO in operational plans and conduct. The commanders then, having mastered the above skills, must possess also a high extent of culturalmastered the above skills, must possess also a high extent of cultural, must possess also a high extent of culturalalso a high extent of cultural of cultural expertise, to be able to understand second- and third-degree effects of their actions, whereas from civilian specialists, a full cultural expertise is demanded.specialists, a full cultural expertise is demanded. cultural expertise is demanded. The proportions might be best summarized by the following chart�0:

�0  The chart has been prepared by the Author on the basis of interviews performed during field work in U.S. military institutions. Number of surveyed: ��, multiple choice closed question.

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Source: Own evaluation.

Chart 2: Cultural skills demanded at various levels of command

We see that the universal cultural skills previously mentioned are equally importantskills previously mentioned are equally important equally important for all ranks engaged in given operation – if not more important than specific cultural knowledge. Moreover, those surveyed have stressed in their answers that, those surveyed have stressed in their answers that have stressed in their answers that focus on training higher-rank soldiers, instead of lower ones is a mistake, as the, as the latter are the ones who put the foot forward for the whole component, and usually put the foot forward for the whole component, and usually are the ones that have most contact with the local population, and that respect have most contact with the local population, and that respect for other culture is the very basis of any cultural understanding and successful interaction. To end with the issue of civilian specialists, having civilian specialistsspecialists, having civilian specialists civilian specialists working on bridging the gaps in cultural knowledge for the whole unit in the field bridging the gaps in cultural knowledge for the whole unit in the field is no answer, as they don’t seem to have relevant operational experience. If they interpret a certain culture, they might not focus on the operationally needed data certain culture, they might not focus on the operationally needed data – which later hinders planning and conducting operations. We see then, that theconducting operations. We see then, that theoperations. We see then, that thethat the proper cultural training of all components engaged in operation is crucial. cultural training of all components engaged in operation is crucial.

While seeking for the answer to which universal skills should be taught for the for the answer to which universal skills should be taught for thewhich universal skills should be taught for the be taught for thetaught for the effective operationalization of culture, during the stay in US CENTCOM, the operationalization of culture, during the stay in US CENTCOM, the

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Author came across another piece of research performed on the same surveyedanother piece of research performed on the same surveyed piece of research performed on the same surveyed sample by Helena Wallenberg-Lerner, PhD from the University of South Florida in March �01�. The subject of her research were the behaviours, attitudes andthe behaviours, attitudes and attitudes and skills needed for effective intercultural cooperation in a multicultural, globalizedcooperation in a multicultural, globalized multicultural, globalized environment�1. The results were as follows:

1. Behaviours identified by those surveyed as essential for effective cooperationidentified by those surveyed as essential for effective cooperation as essential for effective cooperation in any intercultural interaction are:

• Respect towards other cultures (34% of the respondents) • Social skills (��%)• Ability to listen (17%)• Openness and empathy (14%)• Intercultural skills (14%)

�. Skills: • Knowledge of local language (37%)• Intercultural communication skills (36%)• General cultural mechanisms knowledge (19%)

3. Attitudes: • Openness to new experiences, tolerance (56%)• Social skills (31%)• Self-confidence (�5%)• Respect (��%).

What are then the theoretical military models that incorporate those skills intoskills into training? A sample set of knowledge and skills trained at various levels of theof the operationalization of culture has been outlined in a Canadian publication. Military Cross-Cultural Competence: Core Concepts and Individual Development. It does not specify to which operational level the division pertains, hence it is treated aslevel the division pertains, hence it is treated as hence it is treated as inner division within each of the operation level:

��  The research was made available to the Author courtesy of general Jens Prestegard form US CENTCOM, and has not been published yet. More about the project of Helena Wallenberg at http://www.lemshaga.se/helena/.

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Source: Selmeski, Brian. Military Cross-Cultural Competence: Core Concepts and Individual Development. Royal Military College of Canada: Kingston, 200� (p. 41).

Table 2: Universal cultural skills according to Brian Selmeski

Another theoretical model of dividing cultural knowledge and skills based onbased onon the tactical, operational and strategic levels division has been created by Jennifer Chandler from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. She suggests a three-the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. She suggests a three-Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. She suggests a three-stage model of intelligence preparation for the forces, focusing thus more onfocusing thus more on on region- specific knowledge rather than the skills, but it does outline well thewell the ranges of knowledge that should be distributed during pre-deployment training of knowledge that should be distributed during pre-deployment training��. The list provided is a very detailed outline of the ranges of cultural knowledge demanded at a basic, intermediate and advanced level of cultural understanding,at a basic, intermediate and advanced level of cultural understanding,, intermediate and advanced level of cultural understanding, and was used in creating knowledge bases for each level of command.

To sum-up, in the search of an effective operationalization of the cultureof the culture model, we are not attempting to create an army of passionate anthropologists or ethnographers, but seek for a proper level, in relation to the operational for a proper level, in relation to the operational environment, and a functioning set of knowledge, skills and attitudes that willand a functioning set of knowledge, skills and attitudes that will of knowledge, skills and attitudes that will enhance operational effectiveness in culturally diverse environments. As theenvironments. As the the research proved, they are an indispensable toolkit for today’s soldiers, and the surveyed have outlined that a proper level and proportions of cultural knowledgethat a proper level and proportions of cultural knowledge level and proportions of cultural knowledge

��  Chandler, Jennifer. Why Culture Matters: An Empirically-Based Pre-Deployment Training Program. Naval Postrgraduate School: Monterey, �005 (p. 58-69).

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and skills, makes the conduct of operations easier, enables the effective adaptationenables the effective adaptation adaptation of the soldiers to the environment, thanks to which the stress and PTSD levels are vaguely diminished. Other benefits mentioned by the respondents can be summarized in the following chart�3:

Source: Own elaboration.

Chart 3: The influence of cultural knowledge and competencies of the soldiers on operational effectiveness

Of course, those skills are not the only aspect that enables operational success,skills are not the only aspect that enables operational success, the only aspect that enables operational success, but in population-centric operations they are a key one, since armed forces that do not respect local rules and fail to understand cultural dynamics are not only undermining the effectiveness of the operation – they are also a cultural threat to the local population�4. And this fact completely contradicts their basic function nowadays: providing security, as it is widely understood.security, as it is widely understood. understood.understood.

��  The chart has been prepared by the Author on the basis of interviews performed during field work in U.S. military institutions. Number of surveyed: ��. ��  Cultural threats category includes among others violating human rights and basic freedoms, cultural and religious prejudices, ethnic/religious/civilizational discrimination, imposing cultural schemes and the destruction of native cultures. They usually occur due to low level of cultural education and xenophobia. Jakubczak Ryszard and J�zef Flis. (Ed.)Jakubczak Ryszard and J�zef Flis. (Ed.) Bezpieczeństwo narodowe Polski w XXI wieku: Wyzwania i strategie. Ch. 3.�., �III and �IV.Ch. 3.�., �III and �IV. Bellona: Warsaw, �006.

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Application: pre-deployment solutions draft

To systematize the above considerations, we can characterize stages of theof the operationalization of culture through the division of competences, knowledge and skills levels demanded at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operational planning and conduct�5.

At the strategic level, where an operation’s strategic and political goals arewhere an operation’s strategic and political goals are strategic and political goals are determined, and the size of the force and methods of its application are specified, the political and military components need a wide range of geo-strategic knowledge. Not only the global environmental dynamics should be understood,environmental dynamics should be understood,ynamics should be understood, along with the nature of contemporary threats, but also the specific regional situation of the area in which the operation will be conducted. It is also crucial to take into account the nature of threats in the future AOO, as it is the prerequisiteprerequisite to a proper assessment of the kind and size of the military force to be deployed. assessment of the kind and size of the military force to be deployed.of the military force to be deployed. force to be deployed.deployed. A profound analysis of political and strategic and security culture, along with socio-cultural dynamics is demanded at this level, as otherwise the strategic goals dynamics is demanded at this level, as otherwise the strategic goals set might be completely unrealistic, as it was in the case of Afghanistan, where the political system that was to be built, was utterly contradictory to the culturalcontradictory to the cultural realms of the region�6. We must also be able to predict the second- and third-predict the second- and third-- and third-order effects of our actions in political, economic and social spheres for the region – the whole global security environment. Moreover, the ability to predict andand analyse the new potential social movements and phenomena that will result from new potential social movements and phenomena that will result from those decisions is also demanded, as alternative lines of action can be prepared, in case negative phenomena of this nature should occur�7.

��  The division by strategic, tactical and operational level is based on the outlines given in NATO Allied Joint Doctrine, AJP-01. NATO Standardization Agency: Brussels, �010. ��  Methods of analysis of political, strategic and security culture have been outlined in, among others, Lewellen, Ted. Political Anthropology: An Introduction. Praeger: Westport, �003; Johnson, Jeannie. Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum Project. Science Applications International Corporation, Fort Belvoir: Virginia, �006; Kim, Yiyul. Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy. Letort Papers Series. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle, �009. ��  Theories that will be of use to support this issue would be Merton’s adaptation to anomie theory (Merton, Robert. “Social Structure and Anomie”. American Sociological Review. Vol. 3, No. 5/October 1938 (p. 67�-3), social movement theory (Chandler, Jennifer. „The Explanatory Value of Social Movement Theory”. Strategic Insights. Volume V No. 5/�005). http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD

2�

Concerning universal cultural skills, intercultural competence is demanded, as it enables a profound analysis of the socio-cultural aspects of the operationalenables a profound analysis of the socio-cultural aspects of the operational analysis of the socio-cultural aspects of the operationalof the socio-cultural aspects of the operational-cultural aspects of the operational environment, complemented by intercultural creativity that enables coining knowledge and actions into a strategic effectactions into a strategic effect strategic effect�8. Other inevitable skills will be: understanding the complexity of cultural contexts, the ability to create a perspective enabling effective operation in a complex environment and usingin a complex environment and using complex environment and using cultural symbols in direct and media communication to create a common groupcreate a common group common group identity with the recipients.

Therefore, during cultural training at this level the advanced knowledge templatelevel the advanced knowledge template advanced knowledge template created by Jennifer Chandler can be of use�9:

AdVANCEd LEVEL TEmpLATE (STRATEgIC LEVEL)

• Intermediate Level JIPOE Template • Seminar / Panel Discussions / Scenario Discussions on Strategic Analytical

Issues, Impact on Mission, �nd and 3rd Order Effects and Consequence Management

• Strategic Issues and Analysis • Civil Military Relations Concepts and Frameworks and Debates • Comparative Politics Concepts and Frameworks and Debates • International Relations Concepts and Frameworks and Debates • Political Economy Concepts and Frameworks and Debates • Use of Violence • Tactics (reasons for use, suicide bombings) • Spiral and desensitization • Discriminate vs. indiscriminate use and effects • Use of religion

A5�1540) or cultural trauma theory (Sztompka, Piotr. „Cultural Trauma: The Other Face ofcultural trauma theory (Sztompka, Piotr. „Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of„Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of Social Change”. European Journal of Social Theory 3(4). Sage Publications: London, �000). ��  More about shaping strategic skills in: Simmons, Anna. Got Vision? Unity of Vision in Policy and Strategy: What It Is, and Why We Need It. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College: Carlisle, �010��  Chandler, Jennifer. Why Culture Matters... Op. cit.

2�

• Motivating interests • Historical Analysis and Debates • Post conflict and reconstruction issues and concerns • Nation building issues and concerns • Democracy debates • Colonial era lessons learned • Building legitimacy and the local level • Counterinsurgency Concepts / Frameworks / Debates • Modernization / Globalization and Impact on Identity Development • Religion and Political Ideology • Media and IO and Influence Issues • Current Events and Situation Dynamics • Planning assumptions, political objectives versus U.S. interests versus

political and military realities, operational effectiveness measure.

It is advisable to complete it with programs shaping the previously mentionedthe previously mentionedd general cultural skills listed by the Author of the article, Brian Selmeski and Helena Wallenberg-Lerner, to enhance an open, creative attitude within the decisive political and military spheres at this level.

Concerning the operational level, where campaign plans are shaped, the proper situational assessment is the basis of implementing effective solutions to achieve established strategic goals. Profound analysis first of strategic, then the military/strategic, then the military//organization culture of either the state or target group is demanded30. Secondly,, a deep understanding of socio-cultural dynamics will be of use, to predict the understanding of socio-cultural dynamics will be of use, to predict thepredict the most serious problems that might occur while working with the local population, serious problems that might occur while working with the local population, gaining its trust, separating it from the enemy, and state building activities. The aforementioned ability to analyse new socio-cultural phenomena, along withanalyse new socio-cultural phenomena, along with socio-cultural phenomena, along with methods of enemy-component-culture investigation should be implementedenemy-component-culture investigation should be implemented investigation should be implemented here31. It is also crucial to create alternative modes of action, as the situation will

�0  Guidlines on military and organizational culture analysis can be found, among others in NATO, RTO. Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors. RTO, November, �008. http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA496055. ��  At this point, the influence of socio-cultural factors on operational effectiveness should be taken into account, along with methods such as Root Cause Analysis, SWOT or intercultural marketing targeting analysis. More about those in: Okes, Duke. Root Cause Analysis: The Core of Problem Solving and Corrective Action. Milwaukee: Quality Press,

2�

be constantly changing, and so will therefore the plans and solutions we will beso will therefore the plans and solutions we will be plans and solutions we will be implementing at this level. It will be also useful while adopting aid projects, which, as Afghan and Iraqi operational experiences show, seem reasonable from a forces’erational experiences show, seem reasonable from a forces’experiences show, seem reasonable from a forces’from a forces’ cultural point of view, but completely inadequate to the reality of the AOO.

Concerning universal cultural skills at this stage, it will be most visible whether the cultural aspects of the AOO have been integrated into operational plans. Hence, the internalization of cultural skills are a must, to be able to understand internalization of cultural skills are a must, to be able to understandcultural skills are a must, to be able to understand a must, to be able to understand how military activities will be perceived by the local population, whose trust must be gained. Moreover, Selmeski’s advanced level skills will be indispensable, completed with the division presented by the Author in Chart �, as here the hierarchicalization will start.

While creating training programs at this stage, Jennifer Chandler’s intermediatestage, Jennifer Chandler’s intermediate Chandler’s intermediate level knowledge template will be most suitable, including:be most suitable, including::

INTERmEdIATE LEVEL TEmpLATE (OpERATIONAL LEVEL)

• Current Situation and Mission • Conceptualization of the Operational Environment • Introduction of a General Geographic Orientation and Overviewof a General Geographic Orientation and Overview Geographic Orientation and Overview • Social Organization and Culture – Mission-Relevant Aspects • Density and Distribution of Population/Demographic Groups • Social Structure and Organization • Public Health • Religion • Economic Organization and Dynamics • Political Organization and Dynamics • Law and Justice • Media Analysis • What Government Services are Vital to Mission Success

�009; O.C. Ferrel and Michael Hartline. Marketing Strategy. Cengage Learning: Mason, �011 ; Usunier, Jean-Claude and Julie Lee. Marketing Across Cultures. Pearson Education: Harlow, �005.

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• Detailed Analysis of Opposition Groups • Analysis of Key Leaders (Government, Elite, Opposition Groups) • Analysis of Administration / Bureaucracy • Analysis of Political Programs or Resources that Might Generate FavourableGenerate Favourable

Support, Stabilize Neutral Groups or Neutralize Potential Threats • Elites • Regional Issues • Military or Paramilitary and/or Security Force Organization and Dynamics • Historical Dynamics and Analysis • Cross Cultural Communication • Some of this may be incorporated into other areas • Motivation: Why Study and Historical Examples of Failures • Ethnocentrism Issues and Examples and How this Impacts the MissionHow this Impacts the Mission • Weaver’s CCC Comparison • Social Structure • Philosophic Outlook • Psychological Orientation • Thought Patterns • Basic Values • Perception • Interaction • Protocol / Customs and Courtesies • Greetings • Gestures and hand signs • Visiting • Negotiations and business • Displays of affection • Dating and marriage • Gifts • Expectations / Do’s and Don’ts • Clothing • Food/Diet/Eating • Work and recreation • Monuments and Historical Buildings / Sites Overview • Names (if needed)

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• Negotiation Training (as needed) • Language Basics (as needed) • Current Events Discussion • Sources and Resources3�.

The range is, however, also dependent on the command level and function, and must be complemented with the development of universal skills, attitudes and enablers.

Lastly, at the tactical level, where most of the interaction with the local populationwith the local population population takes place, a more detailed and profound knowledge about the AOO is needed, including the enemy’s organizational culture and the military culture of given enemy’s organizational culture and the military culture of givenand the military culture of given culture of given state – in case local security forces should be trained. Moreover, understandingunderstanding one’s own and allied military cultures, along with the organizational culture of and allied military cultures, along with the organizational culture of non-military components working in the AOO is necessary for the armed forces as therefore the cooperation will be more effective. The same pertains to the cooperation will be more effective. The same pertains to the socio-cultural dynamics of the AOR of given components, since they should be operationalized by higher command positions, both for the planning andboth for the planning and and execution of kinetic and non-kinetic tasks. Lower-rank components that have contact with the local population should be moreover well trained in interculturalwith the local population should be moreover well trained in intercultural communication and proper cultural behaviour. It indeed makes their adaptation behaviour. It indeed makes their adaptationbehaviour. It indeed makes their adaptation indeed makes their adaptation into the environment easier, and the forces will be better perceived by the local population. Otherwise, as already mentioned, the improper behaviour of a singleas already mentioned, the improper behaviour of a single behaviour of a singlebehaviour of a singlef a single soldier can ruin the whole component’s months of work.

The universal cultural skills needed at this level and are indispensable for thelevel and are indispensable for the indispensable for theindispensable for the proper use of the above knowledge range are first of all the ability to understand use of the above knowledge range are first of all the ability to understand one’s own cultural perspective and internalize other cultural schemes with more ease. Then we can understand how the local population will perceive our actions, and there will be a greater chance to avoid the enemy using our mistakes for hisbe a greater chance to avoid the enemy using our mistakes for his chance to avoid the enemy using our mistakes for hisoid the enemy using our mistakes for his advantage. Moreover, the intermediate and advanced skills outlined by Selmeski will be of use here, such as the ability to interpret cultural symbols and behaviours,behaviours, the skills of effective cooperation with culturally diverse groups, and the flexibility skills of effective cooperation with culturally diverse groups, and the flexibility to adapt our behaviours to the context, as only then would reaching our goalsbehaviours to the context, as only then would reaching our goalso the context, as only then would reaching our goalsonly then would reaching our goals

��  More detailed categories can be found in Chandler, Jennifer. Why Culture Matters... Op. cit.

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be more probable. Also the ability to present our own cultural background and more probable. Also the ability to present our own cultural background and values will be demanded, as it is good to familiarize the local people with another culture in a way, and through behaviours that do not violate or offend anybody.behaviours that do not violate or offend anybody.hat do not violate or offend anybody. They should be stratified, though, completed with the division presented by the Author as the result of the multinational survey in Chart �.of the multinational survey in Chart �. survey in Chart �.

During the cultural training for that level, cultural knowledge and skills should be integrated with operational demands – instead of serving raw sets of abstract ethnographic knowledge. The basic template created by Jennifer Chandler can becreated by Jennifer Chandler can be a good source of knowledge, including the following knowledge fields:including the following knowledge fields:

BASIC LEVEL TEmpLATE (TACTICAL LEVEL)

• Current Situation and Mission • Conceptualization of the Operational Environment • Broad Country Orientation • Keep this tailored to mission relevant aspects of each topic • Geography / Terrain • May or may not want to include this – can leave it to Intel to do • National / Regional / Local AOR intro – towns, cities, rural areas, big picture

look • History • Overview • Historical ties impacting or influencing current situation • Regional Issues • Interests in influences of other foreign powers • Demographics & Societal Look • Transportation • Religion • Continuum of beliefs • Concepts of war • Significant Religious and Historical Dates • Economics • Political and Military Overview

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• Contentious Politics / Opposition Continuum • Threats / Local Issues / Narratives • Based on mission and unit location • Views of U.S. and Use of Media / PA Issues / IO Concerns • If not covered by PA and Ops/Intel folks • Protocol / Customs and Courtesies • This sections depends on deploying location of support personnel, they may

or may not need this • Greetings • Gestures and Hand Signs • Visiting • Negotiations and Business • Displays of Affection • Gifts • Expectations • Do’s and Don’ts • Clothing • Diet • Monuments and Historical Buildings / Sites Overview • Names (if needed) • Cross Cultural Communication • Motivation: Why Study and Historical Examples of Failures • Modified Klein’s Cultural Lens Model • Identity (similarities and differences) • Time Horizon • Achievement vs. Relationship • Locus of Control • Tolerance for Uncertainty • Power Distance • Hypothetical vs. Concrete Reasoning • Attribution (Root Cause vs. Systems Approach) • Differentiation vs. Dialectical Reasoning • Ethnocentrism Issues and Examples and How Impacts Mission • Placed in the context of unit deployment location and missionin the context of unit deployment location and mission of unit deployment location and mission

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• Placed in the context of problem solving issues: problem definition, planning,the context of problem solving issues: problem definition, planning, of problem solving issues: problem definition, planning, prediction, coordination, and training

• Military relevant solutions • Short vs. Long term goals and needs • Discuss U.S. versus local interests • Initial Language Basics (if needed) • Related to mission duties • Sources and Resources33

The list must be completed with the skills stratification that has been createdwith the skills stratification that has been created stratification that has been created by the Author along with Brian Selmeski’s initial and intermediate cultural skillsAuthor along with Brian Selmeski’s initial and intermediate cultural skills Selmeski’s initial and intermediate cultural skills checklist. It is also vital that at this level, the training focuses on practical skills rather than theoretical knowledge34.

Conclusion

The presented conception of the operationalization of culture is only a draft baseof the operationalization of culture is only a draft base of culture is only a draft base to be completed, and it pertains rather to pre-deployment training than the life-than the life--long cultural education of the armed forces, which is the end goal of the project.the armed forces, which is the end goal of the project., which is the end goal of the project. It has the potential, though, to be developed in that direction. Although it has not been yet implemented in the majority of European militaries, the US Armyin the majority of European militaries, the US Army majority of European militaries, the US Army already began implementing the Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy,implementing the Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy, Culture and Foreign Language Strategy, ACFLS) in �009, which aims at developing a comprehensive model of cultural training during life-long officers’ career development35. The draft project is as follows36:

��  Chandler, Jennifer. Why Culture Matters... Op. cit.��  In this place, many of the tasks created by the Peace Corps can be applied, also for self-study Peace Corps Culture Matters. http://wws.peacecorps.gov/wws/educators/enrichment/culturematters/ch6/fourlevels.html or websirtes such as Kwintessential http://www.kwintessential.co.uk/culture-vulture.html. Of course, Advanced Distributed Learning platforms can be of use here too, for instance Introduction to Cultural Awareness ADL Course created for Individual Training and Education Developments NATO Training Group available from the Polish National Defense University website www.adl.aon.edu.pl. ��  U.S. Army HQ. Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy. U.S. Army HQ: Washington, December, �010. ��  Ibidem (p. 9).

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Source: Holiday, Todd. “Cross-Cultural Competency Training.” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. PB 34/11/1 January-March 2011 (p. 3).

Picture 3. US Army cultural training in life-long career development

The above outlines are already realized by the U.S. Army War College and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth, which specializes in educating senior officers and commanders. One of the basic modules that have to be realized by all candidates within Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Common Core is a 34-hour course on strategic military environment analysis (C-200 Strategic Environment Theme). Its main goal is to have the participants understand the cultural influences on the environment and master cross-cultural communicationskillsbothduringplanningcommunication skills bothduringplanning during planning and conducing operations37. Elements of skills and differences between military and civilian organizational cultures and between allied military and strategiccultures and between allied military and strategicnd between allied military and strategic cultures that have an influence on cooperation in the field are also realized during C300 Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) Capabilities Theme, where more than 80% is devoted to the issue of cross-cultural and cross-organizational cooperation38. Moreover, a good understanding of their own, a good understanding of their own understanding of their ownof their own military culture is provided during F�00 Managing Army Change course, where

��  U.S. Army Command and General Staff School. Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Common Core Syllabus. CGSS: Fort Leavenworth, �011 (p. 37). ��  Ibidem (p. 45-47).

36

the sources of American approaches towards warfare are analysedalysed39. Of course, a wide spectrum of courses and trainings pertaining to the cultural aspects of theto the cultural aspects of the cultural aspects of theof the operational environment are also held at the unit, and it prepares commanders environment are also held at the unit, and it prepares commandersenvironment are also held at the unit, and it prepares commanders held at the unit, and it prepares commanderscommanders to achieve effective cooperation in the contemporary multicultural environment cooperation in the contemporary multicultural environmentin the contemporary multicultural environment multicultural environment of military operations40. And that is the future direction that armies should take – instead of ad-hoc operational training, cultural skills should be developed as a long-term career orientation, to prepare them better to the demands of the �1stdemands of the �1st century military security environment.

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3�

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Development. Royal Military College of Canada: Kingston, �007.Simmons, Anna. Got Vision? Unity of Vision in Policy and Strategy: What It Is, and Why

We Need It. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College: Carlisle, �010.Snyder, Jack. „Anarchy and Culture. Insights from Anthropology of War.” International

Organization. Volume 56, Number 1, Winter �00� (p. 7-45).Sztompka, Piotr. „Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of Social Change”. European Journal

of Social Theory 3(4). Sage Publications: London, �000.Tzu, Sun. The Art of War: The Denma Translation. Schambala Publications: Boston, �00�. U.S. Army Command and General Staff School. Intermediate Level Education (ILE)

Common Core Syllabus CGSS: Fort Leavenworth, �011.U.S. Army HQ. Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy. U.S. Army HQ: Washington,

December, �010.U.S. Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-0�. DoD:

Washington, �011. Usunier, Jean-Claude i Julie Lee. Marketing Across Cultures. Pearson Education: Harlow, �005.Wunderle, William. Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed

Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries. Combat Studies Institute Press: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, �007.

The project was funded by the Polish National Science Center, grant No. DEC-2011/01/N/HS5/00��1.

The author would like to express the highest gratitude for the support of the research to all the multinational coalition representatives at US CENTCOM.

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The developmenT of The european union CounTer-Terrorism framework

ivica sTehlíková, m.a Defence Policy Section, Ministry of the Defence of the Slovak Republic

abstract

Despite long experience with terrorism, homegrown and exogenous, Europe has only recently developed a comprehensive legal and institutional framework for counterterrorism. The first truly supranational European counter-terrorism (CT) legal measures were developed after 1992, with the ratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), now commonly called the Maastricht Treaty. With “Anti-Terrorism Collaboration” now a part of the so-called third pillar of the treaty, terrorism became a joint EU security issue, rather than a domestic problem for the respective member states. The EU’s role in the fight against terrorism is quite limited because the primary responsibility in the fight against terrorism lies with the individual member states. This article deals with the adoption and development of EU antiterrorist measures dating from the U.S terrorist attacks on 9/11 through the Madrid attacks,seen as an accelarator for the EU antiterrorist policy until the London attacks as a final trigger of the EU policy. During this period all main strategies and legal instruments in the fight against terrorism were developed, some of them still waiting for their implementation.

Key words: EU Policy, Fight Against Terrorism, U.S Terrorist Attacks, Madrid Terrorist Attacks, London Terrorist Attacks, Measures, Strategy, Implementation

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inTroduCTion

Despite a lot of experience �ith terrorism, homegro�n and exogenous, Europe �ith terrorism, homegro�n and exogenous, Europe has only recently developed a comprehensive legal and institutional frame�ork for counter-terrorism (CT).

European cooperation in combating terrorism over the period from the late 1950s until the early 1990s resulted in several multinational legal measures for CT, but most of them �ere less than complete solutions, lacking strong legal binding, lacking strong legal binding legal binding po�ers1. The fist truly supranational European CT legal measures �ere developed after 1992, �ith the ratification of the Treaty on European Union, so called the Maastricht Treaty2. With „Antiterrorist Collaboration“ no� a part of the so called third pillar of the treaty, terrorism became a joint EU security issue, rather than a domestic problem for the respective member states. There follo�ed several European CT-related conventions, �hich seemed to herald a bright beginning for European CT legislation. Ho�ever, refinements to the European CT legalrefinements to the European CT legal the European CT legal frame�ork in that time �ere slo� in coming, and the EU’s priority shifted to more pressing developments in the essential institutional legal documents in the 1990s,essential institutional legal documents in the 1990s, legal documents in the 1990s, specially focused on the full functioning of a European single market, �hich includes the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons�.

The EU’s role in the fight against terrorism is quite limited because the primary responsibility in the fight against terrorism belongs to the individual memberbelongs to the individual member individual member states. Ho�ever there are four areas �here the EU adds value. 1) Exchange of best practices and experience among member states; 2) Asisstance in European cooperation, mainly via the Exchange of information among member states; via the Exchange of information among member states; �) Possibility for collective response policy; 4) Support for international cooperation, for example the cooperation �ith other international organisations and third countries, etc.

� Wilkinson P., International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response, Chaillot Paper No. 84 (Paris, France: EU Institute for Security Studies, October 2005).� Europa: Summaries of EU legislation, “Building Europe through the treaties,”, available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm.� European Parliament, “The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties,” available at: http://���.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.1.�.pdf.

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This article deals �ith the adoption and development of EU antiterrorist measures�ith the adoption and development of EU antiterrorist measures and development of EU antiterrorist measures dating from the U.S terrorist attacks on 9/11 through the Madrid attacks, seen anattacks, seen an accelerator of the EU antiterrorist policy, until the London attacks as a final trigger of the EU antiterrorist policy, until the London attacks as a final triggerpolicy, until the London attacks as a final trigger until the London attacks as a final triggertrigger for ne� EU policy. During this period all main strategies and legal instruments policy. During this period all main strategies and legal instruments in the fight against terrorism �ere developed, some of them still �aiting to beterrorism �ere developed, some of them still �aiting to be, some of them still �aiting to beto be implemented.

european CounTer-Terrorism Before 9/11

In the late 1960s a series of terrorist acts took place in various corners of Europe. Acts of indigenous political violence, fuelled by separatist/ethnic ideas4 or left-�ing ideologies5, s�ept across the larger part of the continent. These domestic incidents �ere accompanied by acts of trans-national terrorism of increasing intensity, mostly of Middle Eastern origin. Bet�een 1968 and 1988 WesternMiddle Eastern origin. Bet�een 1968 and 1988 Western. Bet�een 1968 and 1988 Western Europe sa� �629 international terrorist acts, the highest number in the �orld (��, 2% of the total number). The number of casualties �as equally high and this trendcasualties �as equally high and this trend high and this trendtrend continued to the early nineteen nineties. to the early nineteen nineties.to the early nineteen nineties.

Year �968 �97� �974 �987 �990-�99�Number of casualties 241 541 1190 2905 2955

Table n. 1: Number of casualties resulting from terrorist acts in Western Europe between 1968-1993�

4 The most prominent examples are ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna – Basque Fratherland and Liberty) operating in the Basque provinces of Spain and the IRA (Irish Republican Army) in Northern Ireland. These t�o organisations �ere, by far, the most deadly of all West European terrorist groups for the next fe� decades.� Among the most prominent organisations of this type, characterised by anti-US, anti-NATO and anti-capitalist stance, should be mentioned the Italian BR (Brigate Rosse – Red Brigades), the German RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion – Red Army Faction), the French AD (Action Direct – Direct Action), the Greek ELA (Revolutionary People’s Struggle) and the Portuguese FP-25 (Popular Forces of 15 April).6 „Terrorism“ (V4) (October 1990: West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. The Evolving Dynamic, (London: Macmillan Press, 1996) p. 17�.

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Although many European countries gained a lot of counterterrorism (CT) experience �ith homegro�n terrorism throughout the 20th century, the development of a European legal frame�ork for CT as �ell as CT-related institutions only happened �ith the establishment of the European Union. Thus, even the Convention on Extradition (1957), �hich facilitated the early stage of European judicial cooperation, �as ineffective in counterterrorism because one of the articles allo�ed a state to refuse an extradition in a case �here the requestextradition in a case �here the request related to a political offence at a time �hen European terrorism �as thought of almost exclusively as politically oriented7.

The informal cooperation �as much more promising. In the 1970s, amid the uptick in domestic terrorism and the rising threat of Palestinian extremism, European countries formed several different �orking groups and initiatives in order to improve their counterterrorism efforts. Of particular interest is the Terrorism,counterterrorism efforts. Of particular interest is the Terrorism, particular interest is the Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and Political Violence Group (TREVI), established in 1975 by European Community member states. In 1977, the same states introduced TREVI I as a special counterterrorism subgroup counterterrorism subgroup8. Although TREVI did not have official European Community competencies, permanent structures, legal po�ers, or even a budget, until the 1990s, it marked the only European CT success, ho�ever limited, especially in information sharing and cross-border assistance in organized crime and terrorism9. The TREVI group persisted until 199�, �hen the Treaty of European Union (TEU, Maastricht Treaty) �as ratified and became operational.

7 Council of Europe, European Convention on Extradition (Paris, France: Council of Europe, December 1�, 1957), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/024.htm; In 1977, the Council of Europe introduced a Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, �hich unsuccessfully tried (through one article) to improve on the European Convention on Extradition by requiring signatories to “extradite the suspect or bring the suspect before your o�n judicial authorities.”; Wilkinson, International Terrorism,8 These groups included: the Club of Berne established in 1971 by the national security services of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, S�itzerland, Great Britain, Italy, the United States, and Israel; the Club of Vienna established in 1978 by la�-enforcement authorities from Austria, France, Germany, S�itzerland and Italy; the Police Workgroup on Terrorism, established in 1979 by nine member states of the European Community, along �ith Austria, Finland, Nor�ay, and S�eden; and the Quantico Club established in 1979 by Australia, France, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States; Magdalena Grajny, “The European Union counterterrorism policy before and after the 9/11 attacks: to �hat extent does the European Union have an integrated policy to�ards terrorism?”, Terorryzm.com, February 21, 2009, available at: http://���.terroryzm.com/the-european-union-counterterrorismpolicy/.9 Monar, “Common Threat and Common Response?,” p. 292.

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Title VI of the third Maastricht Treaty pillar, “Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA),” advances the most fundamental EU idea, freedom of movement, �hich requires a secure area �here people can travel safely �ithin the Union and enjoy the same protections of life, liberty, and property that they kno� at home. To this end, the JHA follo�ed the lead of the TREVI group and addressed issues suchfollo�ed the lead of the TREVI group and addressed issues such of the TREVI group and addressed issues such as asylum policy, external borders and border control, immigration, drug addiction, international fraud, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, customs cooperation, and police cooperation10. The Maastricht Treaty also called for the establishment of the European Police Office (Europol), but amid the complicated and changing frame�ork of EU institutions, Europol did not take up operations until 1998. Slo�ly but surely, the counterterrorism legislation began to appear,appear, including such measures as the EU Declaration on the Financing of Terrorism in such measures as the EU Declaration on the Financing of Terrorism in 199�; the La Gomera Summit Declaration in 1995, �hich recognized terrorism as a “priority objective among the matters of common interest”; the EU Convention on Extradition in 1996, �hich abolished political exemptions in the case of extradition;exemptions in the case of extradition; of extradition; and the European Judicial Net�ork (EJN), introduced in 1998, �hich speeded up judicial processes among member states11.

Then came the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, �hich introduced the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), �ith �hich the EU promised “to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in �hich the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction �ith appropriate measures �ith respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime”12. The Treaty of Amsterdam made changes in JHA pillar by moving areas of asylum, immigration, and judicial cooperation in civil matters to the first pillar (European Community), and then consolidating the remaining functions into a ne�, more streamlined pillar, no� called Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal

�0 Title VI, Provisions on Cooperation in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs; Maastricht Treaty, Treaty of European Union, February 7, 1992, Eurotreatis.com, available at: http://���.eurotreaties.com/maastrichteu.pdf.�� Grajny M.: “The European Union counterterrorism policy before and after the 9/11 attacks: to �hat extent does the European Union have an integrated policy to�ards terrorism?”, 2009 available at: http://���.terroryzm.com/the-european-union-counterterrorism-policy/.�� Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts, Official Journal C �40, November 10, 1997, European Union, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html.

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Matters (PJCC)1�. After the Treaty of Amsterdam, the third pillar acquired many of the basic provisions that �ould become important for CT, including operational police cooperation (prevention, investigation, data exchange, joint training, liaison officers), Europol (support for national investigations, EU police coordination, assisting in arrangements bet�een prosecuting/investigating officials), judicial cooperation (proceedings, facilitation of extradition, compatibility of rules, prevention of conflicts of jurisdiction), the harmonization of national criminal), the harmonization of national criminal la�s including the provisions on terrorism, opportunities for agreements �ith third countries or international organizations regarding third pillar issues, the unification of standards in carrying out checks on persons at external EU borders, standards in carrying out checks on persons at external EU borders, and unified rules on visas for periods less than three months. Still, PJCC postedperiods less than three months. Still, PJCC posted only limited operational progress, especially in the field of counterterrorism. More broadly, in the period 199�–2000, EU conventions on issues of terrorism did not lead to the introduction of strong CT legal-institutional measures because member states still did not consider CT as an EU issue. They also resisted the demands for increased integration at the expense of sovereignty, especially in a sensitive area such as security. As Argomatiz concludes, “terrorism almost al�ays concludes, “terrorism almost al�ays remained at the bottom of initiatives [and furthermore] in t�o of these eight years–1997 and 2000– there �as not a single legislative instrument, binding or non-binding”14. The EU Commission had to contend �ith insufficient experts in�ith insufficient experts in the JHA Directorate, and Europol �as effectively limited to activities concerned �ith the collection, transmission, and analysis of data provided by national la�-enforcement agencies. (Before 9/11, only seven officers �ere seconded to the CT section)15. The notable–if partial–exception to this record of inactivity on CT inactivity on CT came in 1999, �hen the EU Council met in Tampere, Finland, and agreed on the so the called Tampere milestones, related to freedom, justice, and securityso the called Tampere milestones, related to freedom, justice, and security16.

�� Ibid.�4 Javier Argomaniz, The EU and Counter-Terrorism, Ne� York: Routledge, 2011, 7.�� Jörg Monar, “The European Union’s response to 11 September 2001: Bases for action, performance and limits,” 200�, Albany.edu, available at: http://���.albany.edu/~rk289758/BCHS/col/JHA-TERRORISM-NEWARK.doc; �6 Monar, “The European Union’s response”; Follo�ing the recommendations of the Tampere EU Council Summit in October 1999, the Police Chiefs Task Force (2000) �as established as a coordination group for the reinforcement of Europol (exchange of experiences, evaluations, and planning); the European Police College (2000), as a hub of national la�-enforcement training institutes; and a provisional unit: Pro-Eurojust (2001), in area of judicial cooperation.

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Ultimately, in spite of the fact that terrorist activities in Europe had touched directly or indirectly all European countries before 2001, the joint European CT approach �as mostly declarative, �ithout �illingness to accept terrorism as a European security problem (not only domestic) and to share the security-relatedthe security-related part of sovereignty, let alone to support ne� CT structural initiatives or any kind of terrorism-related intelligence sharing. Still, the basic elements for a unified or at least coordinated CT response �ere formed in this period. this period.

european CounTer-Terrorism afTer 9/11

POST 9/11 RESPONSE

The terrorist attacks on the United States (U.S.) in September 2001 had caused an a�akening in the EU giving it an opportunity to speed up the EU’s efforts in counter-terrorism. By that time there �ere only six Member States (MS) havingMember States (MS) having the counter-terrorism legislation and operational tools capable of combating thistools capable of combating this this phenomenon; cross-border CT support �as negligible17. Ho�ever, shortly after 9/11, Germany and Spain �ere identified as bases for the planning and execution of the attacks, and European officials, in cooperation �ith the United States, undertook many CT operations (79 actions by October 19, 2001) that led to numerous arrests in several EU member states–Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK18.

A European Council meeting took place 10 days after the 9/11 in order to discuss Council meeting took place 10 days after the 9/11 in order to discuss the international situation and the relevant EU response. In its conclusions the Council expressed its solidarity �ith the U.S, the �illingness to cooperate intensively as �ell as its decision to play a more important role in resolving international conflicts (particularly in the Middle East) �ithin the counter-East) �ithin the counter- the counter-

�7 Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom had Counterterrorism legislation in 2001; Grajny “The European Union Counterterrorism Policy.”�8 Grajny M.: “The European Union counterterrorism policy before and after the 9/11 attacks: to �hat extent does the European Union have an integrated policy to�ards terrorism?”, 2009 available at: http://���.terroryzm.com/the-european-union-counterterrorism-policy/.

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terrorism prevention frame�ork. The European council had also agreed the first Action plan on combating terrorism19 The Plan of Actions or the so called CTor the so called CT called CT Road Map �as inspired by the 1999 Tampere Summit conclusions and provided guidelines for the European CT response. It introduced 41 measures/actions in fiveintroduced 41 measures/actions in five main CT areas: (1) enhancing police and judicial cooperation (the development of the European Arrest Warrant and a common EU definition of terrorism, identification of terrorists and their organizations in the EU, the enhancement of Europol’s role in data sharing and special investigation teams); (2) developing international legal instruments (implementing as quickly as possible all terrorism-related international conventions); (�) putting an end to the funding of terrorism international conventions); (�) putting an end to the funding of terrorism (extension of the Council Directive on money laundering and the frame�ork Decision on freezing assets); (4) strengthening air security (threat assessment, training for cre�s, the improved checking of luggage, cockpit protection, qualitycre�s, the improved checking of luggage, cockpit protection, quality of luggage, cockpit protection, quality control of all measures applied by the EU member States); and (5) coordinating the European Union’s global CT action. On October 19, 2001 the European Council adopted a declaration that mainly repeats the European CT position and stronglyrepeats the European CT position and strongly CT position and strongly encouraged the urgent implementation of the measures listed in the roadmap.

In October 2001 the European Council adopted a Declaration �hich repeated theCouncil adopted a Declaration �hich repeated the EU position on combating terrorism and called for the urgent implementation of the roadmap measures20. Although by the end of 2001, the EU Commission and the EU member states agreed on a common definition of terrorism, as the main element of CT legislation, and on the EU list of terrorists and terrorist organizations, six more months of negotiations ensued before the Frame�ork Decision on Combating Terrorism �as adopted21. The Frame�ork Decision forms forms

�9 Council of the European Union, “Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001,” (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, available at: http://���.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140.en.pdf.�0 Council of the European Union, “Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the European Union and the President of the Commission: Follo�-up to the September 11 Attacks and the Fight against Terrorism,” (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, Document SN 4296/2/01 REV 2, October 19, 2001), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/ne�s/terrorism/documents/conseil_gand_en.pdf.�� Council of the European Union, “Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/9�1/CFSP),” Official Journal of the European Communities L�44 (December 28, 2001): 9�-96, available at: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:�44:009�:0096:EN:PDF.

4�

the legal cornerstone of the European CT efforts and, as a part of EU la�, is binding for all member states and EU bodies. “The frame�ork decision harmonizes the definition of terrorist offences in all EU countries by introducing a specific and common definition. Its concept of terrorism is a combination of t�o elements22. a) An objective element, as it refers to a list of instances of serious criminal conduct (murder, bodily injuries, hostage taking, extortion, fabrication of �eapons, committing attacks, threatening to commit any of the above, etc.); b) A subjective element, as these acts are deemed to be terrorist offences �hen committed �ith the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation. The Frame�ork Decision provides also important CT guidelines in areas of terrorism support penalties, policing, jurisdiction and prosecution, protection of victims, implementation regulations, and reporting system2�.

The European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in December 200�, incorporatedincorporated the fight against terrorism into its first strategic objective together �ith the proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), regional conflict, state failure, and organised crime24. The ESS is the first ever strategic document providing long term guidance for the �hole of EU foreign policy and provides providesprovides the opportunity for the further development of different security issue-related sub-strategies, including a CT Strategy. Ho�ever, the promising rhetoric of the ESS proved hard to follo� �ith action, even in the post 9/11 situation. Many. Many legal measures, adopted already in 2001, such as the European Arrest Warrant and the Money Laundering Directives �ere not implemented for another four years. It became evident that 9/11 �as not a sufficient �arning for the EU and itsevident that 9/11 �as not a sufficient �arning for the EU and its not a sufficient �arning for the EU and itsthe EU and its its CT frame�ork �ould have to �ait for the next calamity before it took on more substance.

�� Council of the European Union, Council Frame�ork Decision of 1� June 2002 on combating terrorism (Luxembourg: Council of the European Union, 2002), available at: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:164:000�:000�:EN:PDF.�� Council of the European Union, Council Frame�ork Decision of 1� June 2002.�4 Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 2009), available at: http://���.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC7809568ENC.pdf.

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posT madrid response

During the Madrid morning rush hour on March 11, 2004, ten bombs exploded in four commuter trains. The blasts killed 191 people, injured 1.841, and caused €17.62 million in immediate material damages–plus another €211.58 million in58 million in the estimated related economic cost for Spain25. The bombings �ere reported to be a retaliation, carried out by a Spanish group sympathetic to or affiliated a Spanish group sympathetic to or affiliated �ith al Qaeda, for Spain’s participation in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, yet lateryet later an investigation did not find evidence to decide exactly �ho masterminded the did not find evidence to decide exactly �ho masterminded the attacks26.

The Madrid attacks pushed the EU into an ugent response such, �as theinto an ugent response such, �as the adoption of the Declaration of solidarity �ith Spain, better and faster national of the Declaration of solidarity �ith Spain, better and faster national implementation of earlier adopted CT legal Instruments, the adoption of draft, the adoption of draft CT measures that �ere �aiting on the EU Council table, strengthening the fight on the EU Council table, strengthening the fight against terrorist financing, enhanced operational coordination and cooperation, enhanced dialogue �ith third countries on terrorism, and such other measures as support for the victims of terrorism, health security measures related to bio-for the victims of terrorism, health security measures related to bio-terrorism, community civil-protection mechanisms, etc.27

The European Council reacted quickly, adopting the Declaration on Combatingquickly, adopting the Declaration on Combating Declaration on Combating Terrorism during its meeting on March 24–26, 2004, �hich introduced all the proposed actions from the EU Commission memo, and, in addition, requested urgent �ork on a plan for implementing the ESS; the council established the EUthe council established the EU the EU CT coordinator to facilitate the CT �ork of the EU Council; and mandated the

�� Reinares F., “The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy str. 52, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00�96��100�764629.�6 The Spanish court verdict in 2007 implies „that the attacks �ere carried out by a local group of loosely conneted Islamic radicals �ho linked up �ith a gang of Moroccan drug dealers. In other �ords, 11-M �as a local job executed �ithout outside assistance and funded by a Madrid-based drug dealing racket.“; Soeren Kern, “Spain Faces Difficulties in Judging Islamic Terrorists,” Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos, October 2�, 2007, available at: http://���.gees.org/articulos/spain_faces_difficulties_in_judging_islamic_terrorists_4749.�7 European Commission, “European Commission action paper in response to the terrorist attacks on Madrid,” Europa Press Releases RAPID, March 18, 2004, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/04/66&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.

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preparation of a revised Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism through seven main objectives28.

1. To deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism;

2. To reduce the access of terrorists to financial and economic resources;�. To maximize the capacity �ithin EU bodies and member States to detect,

investigate and prosecute terrorists and to prevent terrorist attacks;4. To protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems

of border control;5. To enhance the capability of the European Union and of member States to deal

�ith the consequences of a terrorist attack;6. To address the factors �hich contribute to support for, and recruitment into,

terrorism;7. To target actions under EU external relations to�ards priority Third Countries

�here counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced29.

The EU Commission, in October 2004, sent to the Council and the European Parliament four important initiatives �ith an aim to make counterterrorism “aninitiatives �ith an aim to make counterterrorism “an counterterrorism “an integral part of general EU policy”: (1) prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks; (2) prevention of and the fight against terrorist financing; (�) preparedness and consequence management in the fight against terrorism; and (4) critical infrastructure protection in the fight against terrorism�0

These initiatives developed important ideas for civil society’s involvement in the fight against terrorism through: defending fundamental rights against violent radicalization; public-private security dialogue; support to victims of terrorism; integrated community CT policies; integrated EU and national rapid alert and civil protection systems; better communications �ith public; scientific and technical

�8 Council of the European Union, Declaration on Combating Terrorism March 25, 2004 (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 2004, available at: http://���.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.�.pdf.�9 Council of the European Union, Declaration on Combating Terrorism March 25, 2004.�0 Europa Summaries of EU Legislation, “Fight Against Terrorism: Prevention, Preparedness and Response,” available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/l��219_en.htm.

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research in the area of security; and effective and integrated cooperation �ith the private sector�1.

In November 2004 the EU Council adopted “The Hague Program: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union,” �hich among many measures, requested integrated CT actions bet�een member states and third states in connection �ith terrorist recruitment, terrorist financing, threat analysis, infrastructure protection, and consequence management�2. Also in November, the Council adopted the Conceptual Frame�ork on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) Dimension of the Fight Against Terrorism, �hich initiates, �hich initiates the use of overall crisis-management and conflict-prevention ESDP capabilities in support of the European CT objectives listed in the March 2004 Council’s CT objectives listed in the March 2004 Council’s Declaration��.

posT london response

On July 7, 2005 the first suicide terrorist bombing in Western Europe took place on the London Public Transport System. Three bombs at three separate locations on the London Underground, and one bomb on a London Bus, �ere detonated by hand. Fifty-t�o civilians and four bombers �ere killed and more than 700 [people] �ere injured�4.

The London attacks again proved the theory that the European CT response has been driven by events, notably terrorist attacks. And like after 9/11 and Madrid, the political momentum to agree on difficult CT issues picked up quickly afterafter

�� Ibid.�� Council of the European Union, “Brussels European Council 4/5 November 2004, Presidency Conclusions,” (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, December 8, 2004), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/civil_protection/civil/prote/pdfdocs/hague_programme2_4.pdf.�� Council of the European Union, “Conceptual Frame�ork on the ESDP dimension of the fight against terrorism,” (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, November 22, 2004, available at: http://���.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/14797Conceptual_Frame�ork_ESDP.pdf.�4 British Red Cross, “London Bombings 2005,” available at: http://���.redcross.org.uk/What-�e-do/Emergency-response/Past-emergency-appeals/London-bombings-2005.

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the London attacks, �hich �as obvious through the more efficient and faster implementation of CT measures. The EU reaction �as fast; an extraordinary EU Council Meeting �as held on July 1�, 2005, and the Council adopted a Declaration condemning the London attacks and promising to “accelerate the implementation of the EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism and other existing commitments”�5. The Declaration highlights the importance of improving capabilities in pursuing and investigating terrorists across borders, preventing people turning to terrorism, protecting citizens and infrastructure, as �ell as improving the ability to manage, as �ell as improving the ability to manage and minimize the consequences of terrorist attacks. Also, the Council requested the rapid introduction and implementation of several important European CT-related legal instruments �hich had been previously prepared , and announced a revie� of all activities in “December 2005, including the national implementation implementation of EU measures in order to ensure that the Union has the right frame�ork for combating terrorism”�6.

More than four years after 9/11 and follo�ing around t�o hundred CT measuresthan four years after 9/11 and follo�ing around t�o hundred CT measures and activities the EU �as still missing a long-term CT policy that could be understood easily by EU citizens and used as a strategic guideline for member states’ governments. Therefore, the UK, during its six-month rotation of the presidency of the EU, joined forces �ith the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator forces �ith the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to develop the first draft of the European CT Strategy. The strategy �as presented on October 21, 2005�7. The draft explains the European CT as a strategic commitment for the long term. It positions itself as a reinforcement of national CT efforts and introduces mechanisms for the political oversight of the strategy andthe political oversight of the strategy and of the strategy and for monitoring progress at the operational level. Tellingly, �hile many previous important EU legal-institutional CT instruments �ere adopted only after delays and long and hard negotiations bet�een the EU Commission and the member states, the draft of European Union CT Strategy �as negotiated very quickly and the strategy �as adopted after only 40 days on November �0, 2012.

�� Council of the European Union, “Press Release: Extraordinary Council meeting Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, 1� July 2005,” (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, July 1�, 2005), available at: http://���.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/8570�.pdf.�6 Council of the European Union, “Press Release: Extraordinary Council meeting Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, 1� July 2005”.�7 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

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Through the CT Strategy, “the commitment of the Union is to combat terrorism globally �hile respecting human rights, and to make Europe safer, allo�ing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice”�8. The strategy organizes previously adopted CT-related measures and actions under four pillars–prevent, protect, pursue, and respond – as �ell as summarizing all previous CT legal,respond – as �ell as summarizing all previous CT legal, summarizing all previous CT legal, institutional, and operational documents of the EU. The strategy emphasizes a need to: (1) prevent “people [from] turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes �hich can lead to radicalization and recruitment, in Europe and internationally,” (2) protect “citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attack, including through improved security of borders, transport and critical infrastructure,” (�) pursue and investigate “terrorists across our borders and globally; to impede planning, travel, and communications; to disrupt support net�orks; to cut off funding and access to attack materials, and bring terrorists to justice,” (4) “prepare ourselves, in the spirit of solidarity, to manage and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack, by improving capabilities to deal �ith: the aftermath; the co-ordination of the response; and the needs of victims”�9.

In November 2005 the EU Council simultaneously adopted the European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism. This strategyCombating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism. This strategy focuses on the fight against radicalisation and recruitment into terrorist groups of the al Qaeda type or those inspired by this type of terrorism, representing a main threat for the EU as a �hole. In the strategy, the EU promises to: “disrupt the activities of the net�orks and individuals �ho dra� people into terrorism; ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism; promote yet extremism; promote yet more vigorously security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all” 40.

Since the end of 2005, dozens of ne� legal and institutional instruments haveinstruments have been introduced. The EU Counterterrorism Coordinator (CTC) has reported to the Council t�ice a year on the implementation of the CT Strategy, on the Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, and on the implementation of European CT-related

�8 EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, “Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism,” (Brussels, Belgium: EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, Document 9416/1/08 Rev 1, May 26, 2008), available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st09/st09416-re01.en08.pdf.�9 EU Council, EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005.40 EU Coucil, Strategy of the European Union for combating radicalisation and recruitment, 2005.

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legislation in member states; additionally the office has published occasionally has published occasionally EU CT Strategy discussion papers �ith updates and recommendations on the European CT legal institutional frame�ork.

Scheme n. 1

Since 2006 a fe� specific action plans have been adopted dealing �ith the CThave been adopted dealing �ith the CT adopted dealing �ith the CT Customs activities, Chemical Biological and Radio-Nuclear (CBRN) activities, critical infrastructure protection or explosives protection. In February 2010, the Council had added the Strategy on EU Internal Security to the existing EBS. ItInternal Security to the existing EBS. It mentions terrorism as a priority among the main security challenges. This strategy contains so called guidances for the EU to react on the mentioned challenges, integrating existing strategies and conceptual approaches41.

4� EU Council, EU Internal Security Strategy: To�ard the European Security Model, 2010.

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The role of The european union in CounTer-Terrorism

As the primary responsibility is �ith the individual member states (MS) the EU’s role in the fight against terrorism is quite limited. Nevertheless, there are fe� areas �here the EU adds value.

First of all, it is in strengthening national capabilities by using best practicesnational capabilities by using best practices and sharing kno�ledge and experiences. This is usually done, not�ithstanding regular �orking groups meeting �ithin the EU institutions, by organising various seminars, training events and conferences. Such activities allo� MS to learn from each other. MS having less experience in the counter-terrorism can find it useful to apply at their national level some of the good practices identified in other MS, identified in other MS, having more experience in the field.

Secondly, the EU plays a role in facilitating European cooperation mainly by sharing information securely bet�een MS and institutions. It has established and evaluated mechanisms to facilitate cooperation including bet�een police and judicial authorities, through legislation �here necessary and appropriate.

Thirdly, the added value of the EU is in ensuring the EU level capacity to understandunderstand and make collective policy responses. It has created various common platforms as e. g. Europol for the exchange of police information and the facilitation of police cooperation; Eurojust for judicial cooperation; Frontex for analysing threats to the EU’s external borders and SITCEN – the joint situation centre cooperating situation centre cooperating �ith intelligence services of MS.

Fourthly, it plays an important role in promoting international partnership �hich means mainly �orking �ith others beyond the European Union, in particular, the United States (U.S) and other international organizations as e. g. Council of Europe (CoE), Organisation for security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE), etc. and also to assist key third countries to build their capacities and strengthen cooperation to counter terrorism42.

4� Council of the EU: EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Brussels, 2005.

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Scheme n. 2

ConClusions

The terrorist attacks on the U.S in September 2001 caused an a�akening in the EU giving it an opportunity to speed up the EU’s efforts in CT. At that time there �ere only six MS �hich had the CT legislation and operational tools for combating this phenomenon; cross-border CT support �as negligible. Taking into account the very slo� implementation of adopted measures, it became evident that 9/11 �as not a sufficient �arning for the EU and its CT frame�ork �ould have to �ait for �ould have to �ait for the next calamity before it took on more substance.

The Madrid terrorist attacks in March 2004 served as an accelerator of the EU CT policy starting a real common European approach to combating terrorism. T�o important CT tools �ere adopted shortly after�ards: The Declaration on Combating Terrorism and the establishment of the EU Counter-Terrorism the establishment of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to facilitate the CT �ork of the EU Council.

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It �as mainly after the Madrid attacks that the EU had adopted many ne� CTafter the Madrid attacks that the EU had adopted many ne� CT measures, activities and legal documents. Ho�ever, the continuous absence of a binding EU strategy to combat terrorism as �ell as the very slo� implementation of adopted legislation �as undermining the final results of the EU efforts. Since the Madrid attacks there �as an increasing effort to link various EU instruments, used mainly for combating organised crime, illegal migration or financial crime,, illegal migration or financial crime, �ith the fight against terrorism. By using such a link their importance had beenfight against terrorism. By using such a link their importance had been emphasized and it had speeded up their adoption. These efforts �ere not seen only in the JHA area but also in areas such as civil protection or critical infrastructure protection. Moreover, more funds had been allocated for CT activities, so a search for the CT link �as understandable.

It �as the London attacks �hich brought the EU Strategy for the fight against�hich brought the EU Strategy for the fight against terrorism, adopted in November 2005. The aim of this strategy �as to explain to EU citizens and the public as a �hole the steps the EU �as taking in the CT area. Through the CT Strategy, “the commitment of the Union is to combat terrorism CT Strategy, “the commitment of the Union is to combat terrorism globally �hile respecting human rights, and to make Europe safer, allo�ing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice.” The strategy organizes previously adopted CT-related measures and actions under four pillars–prevent, protect, pursue, and respond–as �ell as summarizes all the previous CT legal,respond–as �ell as summarizes all the previous CT legal, CT legal, institutional, and operational documents of the EU.

Until the Lisbon treaty’s entrance into force in 2009, the EU CT policy �as influenced by the cumbersome decision-making process concerned �ith the policedecision-making process concerned �ith the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, as it had to required the unanimity of all Member States. There �ere significant shortcomings in the implementation of adopted measures. The Lisbon treaty brought certain improvements, mainly certain improvements, mainlyimprovements, mainly in bringing the qualified decision-making process into the JHA area. It also created an improved balance of adopted measures �ith individual rights and freedoms as the EU Court of Justice gained the competence of control, as �ell as the interpretation and re-evaluation of individual acts in the FSJ area. Thisevaluation of individual acts in the FSJ area. This competence should ensure greater judicial control and protection �ithin the EU.

5�

references

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Wilkinson, P: International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response, Chaillot Paper No. 84 (Paris, France: EU Institute for Security Studies, October 2005).

Europa: Summaries of EU legislation, “Building Europe through the treaties,”available at:http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm.

European Parliament, “The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties,” available at:http://���.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.1.�.pdf.

Grajny, M.: “The European Union counterterrorism policy before and after the 9/11 attacks: to �hat extent does the European Union have an integrated policy to�ards terrorism?”, 2009

Council of the European Union, “Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001“.

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Council of the European Union, “Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the European Union and the President of the Commission: Follo�-up to the September 11 Attacks and the Fight against Terrorism,”

Council of the European Union, “Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/9�1/CFSP),” Official Journal of the European Communities L�44 (December 28, 2001): 9�-96,

Council of the European Union, Council Frame�ork Decision of 1� June 2002 on combating terrorism (Luxembourg: Council of the European Union, 2002), available at:http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:164:000�:000�:EN:PDF

Council of the European Union, Council Frame�ork Decision of 1� June 2002 Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 2009), available at:http://���.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC7809568ENC.pdf.

Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 2009), available at:http://���.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC7809568ENC.pdf.

Reinares, F: “The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy str. 52, dostupné na:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00�96��100�764629.

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European Commission, “European Commission action paper in response to the terrorist attacks on Madrid,” Europa Press Releases RAPID, March 18, 2004.

Council of the European Union, Declaration on Combating Terrorism March 25, 2004 (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 2004.

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Council of the European Union, “Conceptual Frame�ork on the ESDP dimension of the fight against terrorism,” (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, November 22, 2004.

Council of the European Union, “Press Release: Extraordinary Council meeting Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, 1� July 2005,” (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, July 1�, 2005).

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Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy.EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, “Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to

Combat Terrorism,” (Brussels, Belgium: EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, Document 9416/1/08 Rev 1, May 26.

EU Council, EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005EU Council, Strategy of the European Union for combating radicalisation and recruitment,

2005EU Council, EU Internal Security Strategy: To�ard the European Security Model, 2010Szabo, S., Linek, M.: Interconnection of Constructive Simulation With Command and

Control System. In.: Distance Learning, Simulation and Communication 201�, Brno Czech Republic, May 201�, ISBN 978-80-72�1-919-0. pp 172-178

Necas P., Kelemen, M., Jurcak, V.: The challenges of NATO-UN interoperability to better fight against terrorism In: Defence against terrorism revie� - DATR. - ISSN 1�07-9190. - Vol. �, No. 1 (2010), p. 89-96.

Khalmyradov, B., Necas, P.: General aspects of female terrorism In: Bezpečnostné fórum 2012 : zborník príspevkov z V. medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie v Banskej Bystrici 8.-9. februára 2012 : 1. zväzok. - Banská Bystrica : Fakulta politických vied a medzinárodných vzťahov Univerzita Mateja Bela, 2012. - ISBN 978-80-557-0��1-2. - pp. 118-12�.

NATIONAL SECURITY

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MILITARY pOLICE AS AN IMpORTANT ACTOR Of ThE NEw SECURITY ENvIRONMENT. ThE ExpERIENCES Of ThE pOLISh MILITARY‘S GENdARMERIE fROM ITS ISAf MISSION IN AfGhANISTAN

Major General Bogusław PACEK, Assoc. ProfNational Defence University, Warsaw, Poland

Abstract

The paper deals with the core activities of the military police/gendarmerie. It is mainly based on the actions of the Polish Gendarmerie forces connected with the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Firstly, the changing nature of the security environment is described, focusing on the new threat picture, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Secondly, the new roles played by the armed forces are described, especially related to stability and reconstruction operations. The specific and important role of the Polish Gendarmerie is also described, especially as far as the ISAF mission is concerned. Lessons learned are shown. The international cooperation in this regard is also underlined, setting an example to follow.

Key words: Security environment, the armed forces, military gendarmerie, capabilities, ISAF

Introduction

The reality we face in the second decade of the ��st century is directly connectedthe ��st century is directly connected is directly connected with security issues, and in particular the ways of providing security, both in its particular the ways of providing security, both in its

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current and future dimension. The reasons are not only the revolutionary changes in science and technology, but possibly first of all, the characteristics of the alreadycharacteristics of the already diagnosed and existing threats and forecasted challenges for the global security environment, for which we have not yet found sufficient responses. Although we do live in times when the threat of a full-scale global conflict has been, as it may seem, eliminated, the new phenomena, issues and events that appear havehave a significant impact on sustaining and creating genuine international stability in impact on sustaining and creating genuine international stability in the future. Those phenomena include, among others, crises (economic, social, political, ethnic etc.), political instability and failed states, transnational organized crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, ethnic, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, ethnic, ethnic conflicts or ecological and climate disasters. Those phenomena, however, are not only limited to one state or region as it used to be, therefore a state as a sole agent of creating its security is no longer efficient. The phenomena and threats are interwoven and multi-dimensional, and their occurrence is usually rather ofof a systematic nature. Identified external threats, and also potential challenges, for nature. Identified external threats, and also potential challenges, for instance political ones, imply those of an economic and psychological character,of an economic and psychological character, and psychological character, those, consequently, lead to internal ones, creating a chain reaction of interrelated phenomena.

Additionally, it should be noticed that for more than two last decades there has been an evolution concerning the use of the armed forces. This evolution – in spite of a broader spectrum of experiences – began with the involvement– began with the involvement of outside forces in finding a solution to the conflict in the former �epublic of conflict in the former �epublic of Yugoslavia. It was the first operation in which front-line troops with operational tasks took part. Nevertheless, it was the experience gained in Iraq, Afghanistan and Chad that was the foundation for taking action towards the improvement oftowards the improvement of of capabilities focused on an expeditionary profile: the mobility and capability toon an expeditionary profile: the mobility and capability to profile: the mobility and capability toprofile: the mobility and capability to the mobility and capability to conduct operations, which up to now were focused on defending the territory of their country in remote areas of the world. The next point is to widen thewiden the capabilities of cooperation with the civilian society environment, as well as other actors active within the area of operation, towards an approach that combines alltowards an approach that combines allapproach that combines all aspects of the redevelopment of a specific country or a fallen state.

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Which roles are to be �la�ed b� the ar�ed forces�roles are to be �la�ed b� the ar�ed forces� �la�ed b� the ar�ed forces�

The armed forces should possess a wide range of capabilities, both militaryshould possess a wide range of capabilities, both military and non-military, which will enable them to be involved into a wide range of range of operations. Within these capabilities we should create task forces adequate for solving particular crisis situations, characterized by high mobility, an ability forsituations, characterized by high mobility, an ability for redeployment, self-sufficiency, taking advantage of modern technology and the capability to operate in a joint multinational civilian and military community. multinational civilian and military community. These forces should take into consideration the support of the host country only to a small extent; moreover, often at the beginning of the operation they should be able to operate without its full support.without its full support. full support.

The key tasks drawn from the analysis of the operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Chad are as follows: (�) providing and/or maintaining control over key facilities in the area of operation e.g.: airports, seaports, main lines of communication or political centers, (�) controlling urban areas and other key areas that are necessary for the success of the operation; (3) deterring and showing particular behavior patterns in the areas of responsibility (in accordance with the aim of the operation and �oE), (4) maintaining law and order in the chaos-stricken areas, (5) protecting and rescuing the civilian population; (6) separating the parties of the conflict, (7) providing support for the distribution of humanitarian aid, and support in case of a natural disaster.

In this regard, the most important tasks and missions should be focused on participation in the stability and reconstruction operations. In this regard, special roles are to be played by all the entities of the Polish military subsystem, for example the Military Gendarmerie (MG), having, according to the Polish law, opportunities to participate in international operations organized by international participate in international operations organized by international organizations. The ISAF operation in Afghanistan is the best example.

Which role for the Militar� Gendar�erie�

The Military Gendarmerie of the Polish Armed Forces is a separate, independent and specialized formation. It is not a separate service but on the other hand, it

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is directly subordinated to the Minister of the National �efence. Its tasks and to the Minister of the National �efence. Its tasks and competencies are defined in the Act on Military Gendarmerie and Military Law Enforcement Bodies from �4th of August �00�. The basic task of the Military Gendarmerie, in times of peace, crisis and war, is to prevent violations of, in times of peace, crisis and war, is to prevent violations of military discipline and public order by military personnel outside their region of accommodation, and effectively response to these violations by the detection of crime in the armed forces and the criminal prosecution of the perpetrators. of the perpetrators.

The task of the Military Gendarmerie is also the protection of life and property from illegal military attacks, the protection of security and public order, property, the protection of security and public order, property and individuals. Important tasks are performed not only within Poland, but also abroad, during peacekeeping, stabilization and reconstruction operations and operations and missions.

�uring the previous missions of the Polish Armed Forces, Military Gendarmerie soldiers were part of the Polish Military Contingents (PKW) creating separate sections. They were also sent to the multinational structures, taking positions mainly in the structures of the international police.

There’s a possibility to divide the main tasks realised within these missions into eight points: (�) the protection of the PKW soldiers and the civilian personnel, (�) prevention of crimes and offences by the disclosure of offenders, (3) searchingand offences by the disclosure of offenders, (3) searching for lost property of the PKW, (4) ensuring the compliance with the local law by members of the PKW, (5) establishing and maintaining communications with elements of the MG and other contingents, including the allied forces and local the MG and other contingents, including the allied forces and local police, (6) securing traffic control, identifying the conditions of the roads andsecuring traffic control, identifying the conditions of the roads and informing about threats, (7) transportation protection, and (8) VIP protection.

This type of tasks have been conducted by the Military Gendarmerie units under the UN flag for many years, previously within the UN�OF missions in Syria, UNIFIL in Lebanon, and IFO�, SFO�, EUFO�, KFO� in the Balkans. With the advent of stabilization operations, the Military Gendarmerie faced new challenges and tasks. In the first part of the operation, in which the military actions are similar to those during a war, the role of the MP is reduced to protecting the armed forces. However, on the next stages of the stabilization mission, the role ofer, on the next stages of the stabilization mission, the role of the military factors decreases. The importance of the stability activities increases, and simultaneously, the importance of the gendarmerie forces increases.

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An important feature of the stabilization operations is the preparation of thethe preparation of the local police to be able to control the safety and public order in the respective country. Therefore, when the Polish Armed Forces had been sent to the first major stabilization operation - Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, Military Gendarmerie for the first time received an important task, namely to train the New Iraqi Police. Thus it was the essence of the stabilization operation in this country.

These tasks were carried out by properly prepared units and teams from the Special Units of the Military Gendarmerie. Part of the task force were the gendarmes - police officers prepared to train the Iraqis and also involved into the protection teams. While conducting Operation Iraqi Freedom, the number of tasks carried. While conducting Operation Iraqi Freedom, the number of tasks carried out by the Military Gendarmerie training group was growing. Another stabilization operation engaging the Military Policy was the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. This operation, engaging the Polish Military Gendarmerie in combat tasks, has been realised under conditions of extreme danger. For the first time in its history, the Military Gendarmerie was used to protect armed forces units realizing mandated tasks. In Afghanistan, as part of the ISAF operation, the MG took over the job in a wide range of protective activities. For the first time the weapons of the Special Forces of the Military Gendarmerie were fired in combat.

At first the Military Gendarmerie received typical police tasks in the ISAFfirst the Military Gendarmerie received typical police tasks in the ISAF operation. Like in other missions, policemen were responsible for assisting the commander of the Polish Military Contingent in the field of law enforcement and military discipline of the soldiers. These core tasks, although performed within a stabilization mission, was oriented rather at the war-like actions than on a peacekeeping operation. �uring the first six rotations, the main tasks realized in Afghanistan by the MG were those related to the investigation and prevention of crime. From the seventh change, in �0�0, the Polish Armed Forces sent to Ghazni area ten Advisory Groups - Police Liaison Teams (Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams - POMLT). They consisted of the Military Police Soldiers from both units - Special Forces and Military Gendarmerie. POMLT’s task was to train and prepare the Afghan National Police to ensure law and order in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the ISAF and coalition forces.

The Afghan policemen trained by POMLT were to support the ISAF forces, even during the mission - thus increasing security in the area of Ghazni. Each POMLT consisted of about 40 soldiers, trainers and those who covered their performance.

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Three to six vehicles were allocated to each POMLT. All POMLT-led training was based on the same programme - done through the all Afghanistan. Advisory Teams, made up mostly by MG, were deployed in the various units of the Afghan units of the Afghan police, on the various levels. The very presence of policemen in the districts, provinces or regions motivated the Afghan police to work. Moreover, although it was a great risk, no one has invented a better form of training than the common action of an experienced police officer with the novices.

In Afghanistan, there are three different types of police. The first one is the Afghan Uniformed Police. This is a typical formation. It deals with law enforcement and establishes order. Most of the tasks relate to patrolling and traffic control. Thispatrolling and traffic control. This police force is also able to detain and arrest criminals. The second one is the Afghan Border Police. Its tasks are similar to the Polish Border Guard. It also deals with the protection of their country borders, prevents illegal border crossings and the smuggling of goods. It works at airports and border crossings. Its role is involves a visa service for immigrants. The third one is the Afghan National Civil Order Police. It works across Afghanistan as organized battalions and brigades organizing patrols, providing law enforcement, and preventing crime in public places. It tackles the dissemination of terrorism. dissemination of terrorism.

A Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (POMLT) does not replace the local police, but helps to train it and conduct practical training. It also performs advisory tasks. What is most important is that the Afghan National Police has achieved the highest level of skills and activities, both individual and in teams. Apart from the realization of its core tasks, POMLT also fulfils the role of a bridge of a bridge between Afghan security forces and ISAF forces. This makes it possible to increase support for the detection of improvised explosive devices, or to recognize the enemy‘s intentions.

It is worth mentioning that the POMLT soldiers are trained to manage medical evacuation and independent action in the risk zone. They can also close an airport during a time of risk. Experience shows that the process of training the Afghan police is not easy. Aside from their typical training, the credibility of the Afghan people is essential. It is possible that some of the trainees work with the Taliban, and even they have been directed to training. Furthermore, it is feared that by training they would try to get to know the coalition armed forces. It has to be remembered that some of them have trained as police officers who then go to

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the opposite side. The big problem is corruption in Afghanistan. It concerns all sectors of society, the military and the police inclusive. POMLT’s problem is on the one hand to prepare the Afghan police to fight against corruption, while on the other hand to eliminate corruption in the ranks of the police itself. police itself.

To train the Afghan police is in a small way like typical training activities. It islike typical training activities. It is done by instructors/translators, with whom it is often not easy to work every every day. Potential police officers are not educated people, there is a need to learn everything from the beginning. To ensure the right future of the Afghan police, it is crucial to prepare, first of all, the instructors, who then would train their subordinates. The best prepared Polish MG instructors trained the Afghan police.Polish MG instructors trained the Afghan police. What is particularly difficult and dangerous within the operation of Advisory Teams - Police Liaison Committee, is to train the Afghan local police anti-terrorist-terrorist branch.

POMLT realized this task together with the Special Forces soldiers. Besides the above-mentioned groups that work in the particular changes of the operation,operation, the ISAF Military Police also performs common military police tasks. The Polish Military Contingent Commander has the Military Police �epartment at his disposal. Its composition is as follows: (�) Head of the �epartment - in FOB is as follows: (�) Head of the �epartment - in FOB Ghazni; (�) �eputy Head of the �epartment - in FOB Ghazni; (3) Senior Inspector of Investigation - Investigators - BAF Bagram; (4) Guide of the drug detection dog - BAF Bagram;(5) Investigation Section - investigation - FOB Ghazni; (6) �og guides Section - FOB Ghazni; (7) Investigation Section - FOB WA��IO�. The structure of the �epartment of Military Police and the specific deployment of its components results from the contingent needs and previous experience with the operation. Gendarmes from different sections, depending on the tasks, travel to other bases. A typical police task obliges the MG to clear action against the. A typical police task obliges the MG to clear action against the perpetrators of violations of discipline or the crimes committed by soldiers of the or the crimes committed by soldiers of the Polish contingent. Many times it also happens that the MG soldiers assist Polishthe MG soldiers assist Polishsoldiers assist Polish soldiers and support them in difficult situations.

With regards to the numbers. Since the beginning, �,�66 soldiers of the Military Police have participated in the mission in Afghanistan. Taking into accounthave participated in the mission in Afghanistan. Taking into account in the mission in Afghanistan. Taking into account the involvement of the Military Gendarmerie soldiers, the maximum level was achieved in the year �0�0/�0�� (the eighth and ninth shifts), when the number of the Military Gendarmerie soldiers increased to about �50 (the number changed

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depending on the individual rotations during the mission). Taking into account the reduction of the quota, due to the process of transferring power to the Afghantransferring power to the Afghan to the Afghan authorities in the area, there is a �40 person component of the Military Gendarmerie that hands over its duties to the ��th shift (�3� person component).

The range of tasks that are done by the Military Gendarmerie soldiers is closely related to the structure of the component. At first, the Military Gendarmerie soldiers participation was mainly related to the protection of the contingent inof the contingent in in terms of prevention and investigation. Currently, the responsibilities are much wider and the main emphasis is put on state police and training. The componentand training. The component of the Military Gendarmerie works not only in the Polish Military Contingent. The units are as follows: (�) �epartment of Military Police; (�) Police Training Centre Afghan Ghazni; (3) Afghan Police Training Centre �ushmore; (4) a team of specialists Mazar-e-Sharif / the ��th shift will be passed to the ANCOP; (5) a team of specialists Adraskan EGF (6) Police Advisory Team, (7) Military Advisory Board / Military Advisory Team, (8) National contributions to the Commands and Staff, who conduct research in the field of arms and explosives (specialist Paladin Labs and Counter IE�).

The tasks are closely related to the typical structure of the military police, and include mainly the following areas: (�) �epartment of the Military Police: (a). preventive and investigative security operations; (b). preventive actions focusing on crimes, offences, drug offences and disciplinary and alcohol consumptionconsumption offences, as well as the oversight of arms, means of combat and equipment; (c). supporting the commander in maintaining discipline in the contingent. In commander in maintaining discipline in the contingent. In addition, within this department there were two soldiers on duty as part of theon duty as part of the of the team dealing with the forensic techniques.

The main task of the Afghan Police Training Centres is to train police personnel from the primary level through improving skills, ending with conducting specialized courses.Teams of Police Advisory Training (PAT), Military Advisory Police Advisory Training (PAT), Military Advisory Teams (MAT) - the main task is to advise, supervise and support the ANSF in the performance of its tasks.of its tasks. tasks.

PAT specific objectives include: a) ANP inspire the creation of new posts, b) advising the ANP in selected districts in which to carry out tasks, c) advising the ANP in thedistricts in which to carry out tasks, c) advising the ANP in the tasks, c) advising the ANP in the scope of the current policing in the province and districts, d) advising the ANP

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in the coordination of planned activities with other ANSF units, e) advising theother ANSF units, e) advising the e) advising the ANP in the planning of ISAF security operations in the provinces and districts, f ) advising the ANP in the planning and management of materials and equipment, and logistics. MAT specific objectives include advising under the MAT (Military Advisory Team) at ANA brigade in the section on military police duties.

Of importance is also cooperation within the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF).also cooperation within the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF). This formation was established on the �7th of September �004 in Noordwijk, the Netherlands. Poland has had the status of a partner since �007. The creation since �007. The creation of the EGF should be seen within the framework of the European Security and �efence Policy and as a contribution to safety, respect for rights and justice. EGF forces are available to the European Union, there’s a possibility to conduct the European Union, there’s a possibility to conductconduct simultaneous actions under the auspices of the UN, OSCE, NATO and other international organizations or coalitions of states. In the ISAF operation, the operation, the European Gendarmerie Force consisted of six countries of the European Union. In cooperation with the forces of the European Gendarmerie Force, from �0�0, �0 soldiers of the Military Gendarmerie had been sent to the Mazar Sharif andto the Mazar Sharif and Adraskan Military Police training centres.

In connection with the transfer of the area of Mazar-e-Sharif to the hands of Afghanof the area of Mazar-e-Sharif to the hands of Afghan-e-Sharif to the hands of Afghan forces, Military Gendarmerie soldiers will be directed only to the Training Center in Adraskan (6 men). �egardless of the involvement of the Military Gendarmerie in Afghanistan, the involvement in other missions also should be considered. With currently approx. a 3�� commitment throughout the Polish Armed Forces inapprox. a 3�� commitment throughout the Polish Armed Forces in foreign missions, Military Gendarmerie is heading to increase this number. is heading to increase this number.

Conclusions

The participation of the Military Gendarmerie in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan is a large and important effort. The lessons learned should be divided into three groups. The first one, ensuring the security of the Polish military continent meant the proper implementation of the Military investigative function - detection and function - detection and prevention of different types. The second is a wide range of Afghan police training activities as the core of the mission. It is difficult to give a final assessment. On the one hand, a huge effort of Polish policemen was visible, engaging the large

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commitment of Afghan police officers. On the other hand, it must be admitted that in Afghanistan the first phase of the operation has never ended. The insurgent forces have never been defeated. The full training of policemen is possible only. The full training of policemen is possible only after the successful completion of the first phase. The ISAF operation is a difficult experience, and the endeavours to prepare a stable peace are practically impossible.erience, and the endeavours to prepare a stable peace are practically impossible. This could bring a partial success only.

The third group of activities in Afghanistan is linked to the Military Gendarmerie cooperation in the international environment. These effects are among the best. Such effects concern both the Military Gendarmerie officers occupying senioroccupying senior positions in international structures and service in the European Gendarmerie Force formations. They will bring good results also for the future.

It is possible to assess that the operations of the expeditionary forces willassess that the operations of the expeditionary forces will encounter determined countermeasures of their potential enemy – highly motivated and well-equipped. It concerns mainly terrorist organizations andzations and rebels with their irregular way of conducting war, which by connecting advanced technology, modern communications systems and weapon systems together with the tactics used in the previous conflicts can make a determined stand in the areatactics used in the previous conflicts can make a determined stand in the area of operations, as well as strive to move conflict to our territory in order to put pressure on public opinion concerning the engagement in the operation. the engagement in the operation.

The actions of expeditionary forces are much more prolonged, and their main determinant is the political dimension, and only afterwards economic, militaryonly afterwards economic, military or information actions. Lessons learned from the operations in Afghanistan let us say that the operational demands placed on the capacities of the forces should be forces should be interpreted as determining capability for expeditionary operations conducted indetermining capability for expeditionary operations conducted in remote geographic areas of the world, and the ability of these forces to participate the ability of these forces to participate in the framework of a holistic approach represented by different actors (IO, GO and NGO’s). Therefore, the Military Gendarmerie and non-military elements need to be engaged to a greater extent in the planning process and the implementation of the operation which aims at the solution of crisis (both at the state and Alliance levels), and civilian-military cooperation must be improved in a broader meaningimproved in a broader meaning meaning than only CIMIC.

In this context, also the threats to international security must be perceived in a much broader context, in which the military element will not always play the most

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important role. A good example is the employment of weapons of mass effectrole. A good example is the employment of weapons of mass effect example is the employment of weapons of mass effectemployment of weapons of mass effect�. We must also remember that many scientists and researchers, while seeking for solutions and means of the effective use of the armed forces, refer to the formerof the effective use of the armed forces, refer to the former use of the armed forces, refer to the former approaches. Their reflections are limited and not taking into consideration the issue of challenges�, which might not always be related to the current situation.

References

Kozerawski �., Międzynarodowe działania stabilizacyjne w świetle doświadczeń X zmiany PKW Irak w 2008 roku, AON, Warszawa �0�0.

Pacek B., Żandarmeria Wojskowa Sił Zbrojnych RP w misjach pokojowych i stabilizacyjnych. AON, Warszawa �008.

Pacek B., Żandarmeria Wojskowa – komponent Sił Zbrojnych RP. AON, Warszawa �007.Pacek P., Operacyjne Zespoły Doradczo – Łącznikowe ds. Policji. Biuletyn ŻW № 4,

Warszawa �0�0.�ochnowski A., Działalność Wydziału ŻW X zmiany ISAF w Afganistanie. Paper as

manuscript, Ghazni �0��.Tyszkiewicz A., Operacje stabilizacyjne: na podstawie doświadczeń Polskiej Dywizji

Wielonarodowej w Iraku. Bellona, Warszawa �005.Urbańczyk T., Zaangażowanie Żandarmerii Wojskowej w operacji na terenie Afganistanu

– Paper as manuscript, KG ŻW, Warszawa �0��. Czy powinniśmy wyjść z Afganistanu”, �ebate on 0�.�0.�0�0 held at Stowarzyszenie

Euroatlantyckie.

� The notion Weapons of Mass Effect (WME) is used in many contemporary security studies as the specific equivalent of the term Weapons of Mass �estruction (WM�). It is being justified by technological development that allows the conventional armed equipment to attain the effectiveness of the nuclear, bacteriological, chemical and radiological weapons. WME should be perceived as the categ tools of energetic/kinetic and non-kinetic destabilization and disintegration of any info system.� The notion of challenges is here understood as the integral parts of a set of forecasted events, phenomena, conditions, processes and so alike that must be taken into consideration by a subject (organization) should (must) take deeply into consideration in the process of projecting the future course of actions. By their nature, challenges are subjected and objected and they must be seen equally as threats and opportunities. Since they are neither negative nor positive – they are “electrically neutral”, the language of challenges should be the language of prognoses. A challenge, will be then any event that might occur, and which must be taken into account by the subject (organization) when designing its future strategies, attitudes and actions.

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Creating the basis for seCurity of the republiC of poland iii inauguration leCture on the opening of ndu seCurity forum, 7th, november, 2012

president lech Wałęsa

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am truly honored to be the first speaker during the inauguration ceremony of this incredibly apt project. I have to confess here, that I have been waiting for such a long time for this idea to be realized. Why? �ecause almost everyone has�ecause almost everyone has a feeling that we are witnesses to an era of changes.

Not only the centuries or millenniums have changed. Nowadays, it is the change of an era�� from the era of borders, con��icts, wars, tragic divisions, particularly era�� from the era of borders, con��icts, wars, tragic divisions, particularly in Europe, to the era when the borders are removed and we can enter the age of intelligence, information and globalization. For now, these are totally meaningless concepts. Neither good nor bad. It all depends on the content that we assign to them. However, we can do it only when we are wise due to the intellect of all of us, and strong by virtue of the strength of all of us. This can be achieved only during such meetings as this one.

Until the end of the 20th century, the world was organized in programmes andprogrammes and and structures. One can make an attempt to judge if it was right or wrong, still it was organized in structures such as countries. However, today we are obliged to create ‘the country called Europe��� we have to think about globalization. Individually,Europe��� we have to think about globalization. Individually, have to think about globalization. Individually, we do not have good ideas, and if we had, the societies would not support us. They do not believe in the appropriateness of our ideas, which is good because

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we are forced to find still better solutions. The new ideas should be discussed over, protested about, and even be the cause of strikes. Then, in the new era, newprotested about, and even be the cause of strikes. Then, in the new era, new strikes. Then, in the new era, new politicians will emerge who will gather the ideas and suggest a concept. This is why such an initiative is so valuable and indispensable.such an initiative is so valuable and indispensable. initiative is so valuable and indispensable.

I myself am a revolutionist, since this is how you remember me, notice thatmyself am a revolutionist, since this is how you remember me, notice that, since this is how you remember me, notice that any prior generation did not have a chance that we face – a chance for peace, development, and prosperity. However, in order to create the correct picture of the situation, we have to understand that other programmes and structures areprogrammes and structures are and structures are required here. Today I do not find the answers for three important questions – I would like to be the last revolutionist�� and without the answers it will be di���cultrevolutionist�� and without the answers it will be di���cult without the answers it will be di���cult to achieve anything.

The first question is: on what ground do we want to build ‘the country called Europe� today, and ‘a global country� tomorrow? �y meetings on di��erenttoday, and ‘a global country� tomorrow? �y meetings on di��erent global country� tomorrow? �y meetings on di��erent continents lead to a conclusion that there are two di��erent visions of how tovisions of how to to create it. One of the ideas is based on di��erent types of freedom. Freedom of andi��erent types of freedom. Freedom of antypes of freedom. Freedom of an individual, of each of us, freedom of gatherings, free market and law. To cut the long story short – this all must be preserved and provided without any additional regulations and obligations. The second vision, also worldwide, assumes that nothing can be created barely on the basis of freedom.

If we follow the way designated exclusively by the first vision, tomorrow we will have to assign a policeman to each and every person to check if they take proper decisions, or they enter into pacts, are dangerous, steal, deceive, or lie. or they enter into pacts, are dangerous, steal, deceive, or lie.

Thus, we have to seek for foundations which will create a common ground for the two visions. I am convinced that this era poses a prerequisite that all solutions and structures stem from universal values which are agreed by di��erent religions, people who believe and those who do not. If we were able to decide on �0 suchon �0 such beyond�religious and non�religious rules, if they were accepted by everyone, or at�religious and non�religious rules, if they were accepted by everyone, or at least by the majority, we would be able to infer any type of program or structural solution, and the church could say that we bring up people of conscience. If we were able to prepare economic, political and other programmes on the basis ofprogrammes on the basis of on the basis of common values, starting from kindergartens, all types of schools, then throughthen through courts, promotions and sanctions, there is a chance that in the distant future we, promotions and sanctions, there is a chance that in the distant future we would achieve an e��ective and wise solution.

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The second question – if we together were able to answer the first one – is: which economic system should be the basis? As a revolutionist, I am convinced that the present economic system will not withstand this century. There is no chance. With this still higher level of intelligence, and simultaneously with the injustice and di��erences, the masses of people who are not afraid of God because they have undermined Him, who are not afraid of neighbors because no one wants to fight, will head for justice and equality. It all has already started but this is only the beginning. It is only a matter of time until such a revolution starts for good. Theonly a matter of time until such a revolution starts for good. The starts for good. The only consolation in the economy is that generally people do not question the freequestion the free market economy and private property, as I noticed whilst being present in certain places at a time of protest. Having such pillars of capitalistic philosophy, we could have achieved all this a long time ago, but unfortunately it is still somewhere in the this a long time ago, but unfortunately it is still somewhere in thethis a long time ago, but unfortunately it is still somewhere in the future. The present concept of the economic system, more and more ine���cient, is in a clash with the global challenge. with the global challenge.

The third question, which you might be able to answer, is: what should ouranswer, is: what should our our democracy look like? It is obvious that today no one takes democracy seriously, and this is a worldwide tendency. It is better not to ask politicians about their attitude to the topic... Until the end of the 20th century, democracy provided us mainly with rights. The present democracy should supplement the rights with some obligations.�� obligations which vary at di��erent levels of organization. However, in the future we will be able to make wiser and better choices, and technology will be very helpful in the process. We have to prepare for the future and create certain possibilities in order for democracy to match the conditions oforder for democracy to match the conditions of to match the conditions of the new age.

These are the three tasks and questions which we strive to answer, being happy at the same time, that we live in time which gives us a chance to answer them.

The elder people present here probably remember that before we had subtly and peacefully got rid of a system which hindered development and did not stick tohindered development and did not stick to and did not stick to the time, there was not a single person who believed in our victory. The interests, weapons and preparations were set in such a confrontation that the idea of change in this area was commonly rejected. ‘Only nuclear war� – this was the answer that I heard when I asked the most prominent people in the world if any change was possible.

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I think you remember what happened. At the time of hopelessness and lack of faith and believe, a Pole became the Pope. A year later John Paul II came to Poland. The whole world turned its attention to Poland and asked: what was happening in theturned its attention to Poland and asked: what was happening in the to Poland and asked: what was happening in the country which had been communist for 50 years?

Almost the whole country participated in meetings with the Holly Father. Of course John Paul II did not carry out a revolution�� he did not intend to. He only gathered�� he did not intend to. He only gathered us to pray, since as you remember, the system of that time had a rule: do not allow anyone to organize any meetings and give a chance to count the individuals. organize any meetings and give a chance to count the individuals. He also said: ‘don�t you notice that there are over 200 thousand soviet soldiers in Poland and over million of them around the country, that the neighboring countries have nuclear weapons at their disposal?� If we dared to organize someweapons at their disposal?� If we dared to organize some disposal?� If we dared to organize some demonstrations they were suppressed by saying: what kind of demonstration was it, who was there? Take as the example our demonstrations organized on � �ay or during other holidays! We were humiliated and disregarded so strongly that many of us gave up and believed in it, making it di���cult to get organized. The Pope onlybelieved in it, making it di���cult to get organized. The Pope only making it di���cult to get organized. The Pope only gathered us to pray by saying ‘�e not afraid and change the image of the Land�.image of the Land�. This word was very fruitful since it was accepted by people and turned into reality. A small opposition was able to transept the meetings and run them. You know the outcome. The correctness of my words is confirmed by the fact that John Paul II of my words is confirmed by the fact that John Paul II managed to organize people even better in �uba. Nothing happened there onlybetter in �uba. Nothing happened there only. Nothing happened there only because there was no one to lead the people to victory, no one who would change the words into actions.

I mention it only because today many people claim that it is impossible to buildbecause today many people claim that it is impossible to build many people claim that it is impossible to build a stable, full European unity. ‘Globalization? Integration? That is impossible!� I was also told that there is no chance, nothing can be done here, only nuclear war... and still I managed to do it. Now, when we aim at building ‘the country called Europe�, when we strive for globalization, we should remember what was then the key to success. Not thanks, no missiles but the awoken values turned out to be muchthe awoken values turned out to be much stronger and helped us win. win.

Thus, now building ‘the country of Europe� we should include values and everythingcountry of Europe� we should include values and everything we should include values and everything will be possible. Obviously it cannot be done in a day. However, there is a chance to achieve it through such discussion.

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In fact, we do not have any choice. Technology, in its good and bad meaning, is at such a stage that we cross the borders of our countries. It is especially visible in Europe. Thus, there is no question whether to enlarge the structures but there is a question of how to do it. There is also a question of what requires to be enlargedquestion of how to do it. There is also a question of what requires to be enlarged and what should be left the way it is. it is.

Until today we even have not listed the topics or areas of security which should be expanded, combined, or ignored. There is such a topic, which you probably heard many times, which I will not allow to be globalized, i.e. my wife �anuta. I willallow to be globalized, i.e. my wife �anuta. I will wife �anuta. I will strongly protect this topic.

As far as your topic is concerned, the military or defence issues... In the past,defence issues... In the past, issues... In the past, when I was trying to broaden the structures, when I made an attempt to introduce Poland into NATO, I believed that we were increasing the NATO block but onlyincreasing the NATO block but only in order not to leave a place for confrontation, in order to avoid a situation when NATO had at its disposal �00 tanks and the other side has only �0. There wouldhe other side has only �0. There would be nothing left and yet there would still be power here.nothing left and yet there would still be power here.

Technological development may result in other processes of change in the militaryprocesses of change in the military the military structures, which we have to deal with and even take benefit from. Here, I ambenefit from. Here, I am, I am talking about the reduction of the Army, restructurization and redundancies. It isrestructurization and redundancies. It is and redundancies. It is important here to transform the structures and adjust them to the new conditions and needs. The technology is very advanced and at the same time potentially dangerous, thus the well prepared and organized forces must stay alert and ready to protect the country. Reliable and well trained people are necessary to realize those tasks.

Ladies and Gentlemen, these are only a few topics which we should deal with.only a few topics which we should deal with. which we should deal with. As a beginning I only wanted to draw your attention to the issues that we tacklewe tackle here and which I discuss while being invited to di��erent countries on di��erent which I discuss while being invited to di��erent countries on di��erentdiscuss while being invited to di��erent countries on di��erent invited to di��erent countries on di��erent continents, the issues that almost everyone agrees with but on which the discussion is insu���cient. This, consequently leads to crisis situations.

All crisis situations can be foreseen. They only stem from the fact that we are badly organized for this era and we have the wrong programmes. It is best illustratedfor this era and we have the wrong programmes. It is best illustrated by the example of the bank crisis. It seems to be a prerequisite that bank activities that bank activities were regulated globally and with global liability. Since, whoever undermines the trust of a bank no matter where it is located, spreading untrue informationtrust of a bank no matter where it is located, spreading untrue information

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and speculations, will ruin the bank in a di��erent place and trigger a crisis. This in a di��erent place and trigger a crisis. Thistrigger a crisis. This. This is another proof for my idea to decide on dangerous topics which need global perspective and global protection.

I hope that our generation managed not only to end the malfunctioning system inonly to end the malfunctioning system in malfunctioning system in a sophisticated way but with our experience is now able to organize and suggest better structures, better programmes. Then, we will gain appreciation not onlyprogrammes. Then, we will gain appreciation not only. Then, we will gain appreciation not only for victories, not only for destruction but also for building something new. Until now I participated in destruction – and I think it is now time for me to take partthink it is now time for me to take part is something di��erent. I was excellent, but in destruction. I would like to have my part in creating a wise Europe – peaceful, safe and prosperous. and prosperous.

If we manage – which I believe is possible – to build quickly the united states of Europe consisting of all the countries, then we will have to rush to createto rush to create a federation with the USA and invite �hina to participate in a serious dialog. If we do not do this, �hina will not talk exclusively either with Europe nor with will not talk exclusively either with Europe nor withexclusively either with Europe nor with with Europe nor with the USA�� but with Europe and the USA – yes. I am a friend of �hina, but when I look at the present situation I am afraid that the future generation, along withgeneration, along with the whole of Europe, will be absorbed by �hina. What is more, it will be done in be absorbed by �hina. What is more, it will be done in a democratic way through referendum... Numbers take their advantage...

Please, take part in the discussion. The discussion on the past and on the future. I am obliged to participate in the discussion on the past because I played a part in some significant processes, protests, I had to take decisions and support the decisions of others. The consequences of the latter ones are still noticed today and will be still visible in the future. This is why I have to explain why they were such and not di��erent ones. �ut today I feel appreciated – as you hear, my obituaryyou hear, my obituary will be so long with all the prizes and honors. I also feel obliged to talk about the things that should be done today – what is possible and what is impossible.

Thank you for your attention. I invite you to the discussion, where we can together find interesting topics to avoid monologs�� because, of course if you are not tired,monologs�� because, of course if you are not tired, I am ready to continue my monolog for at least an hour. However a monolog, naturally – does not have to be interesting... have to be interesting...

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Discussion with President Lech Wałęsa in the national de�ence uni�ersit��de�ence uni�ersit�� uni�ersit��

�oderators:

Retired �ol. Prof. Jacek Paw�owski, the representative of the academic sta��. Prof. Jacek Paw�owski, the representative of the academic sta��

�ol. �ieczys�aw �alec, the representative of military students

Piotr K�os, the representative of civil students

Prof. Jacek Pawłowski:

�r. President, at the beginning of the ���0s you were taking strategic decisionsof the ���0s you were taking strategic decisions were taking strategic decisions which had a huge in��uence on the security of Poland. One of them concerned huge in��uence on the security of Poland. One of them concerned leading the Russian Army out of Poland. How do you judge that decision from the perspective of the time passed, taking into consideration the fact that some of us present here were born at that time. Please, be so kind and share with us your memories and thoughts connected with that period of time.

President Lech Wałęsa:

I was extremely lucky. And maybe it was because I presented common arguments. Not the theoretical ones because I did not study. �ue to that my arguments could not be rejected, because the person who would dare to do it would have to say: ‘No, because no.� This is also the reason why the talks were so di���cult. �ut I was �00% devoted to the case, I was not afraid of the obstacles. At the same time Yeltsin was a person who was open to easy, common arguments. I explained to him thatexplained to him that it did not matter that they had their soldiers and military equipment and vehicles in Poland, after all in the face of danger every second would not work. I said that, after all in the face of danger every second would not work. I said that they would not be able to do anything. It was a time of technology and not ofanything. It was a time of technology and not of a stagnant army. I also added that they had all the cities in Poland occupied by occupied by Soviets and I explained that it was surely not their intention to take single soldiers from units for years. I suggested a di��erent solution: choosing one of the most comfortable bases. I told them that they had worked hard in Poland for 50 years, so they should choose the best base and I would change the rest into factories,

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places of economic development. He accepted such documents one by one and I was making another step forward. Later there was some struggle, they wanted to change the bases into something weird. I remembered a base in Szczecin, so I said: ‘�r. President, look, they want us to make concrete blocks there. �o you know what a concrete block is? It is something made of sand with the size of 50 cmthe size of 50 cm by 25 cm. And do you know that there is no sand? It is necessary to transport the sand from a place 200 km away, and every second day to dig a well because a lot of water is needed, too. Obviously, the concrete blocks would be more expensive than if they were made of gold. You know what? Let�s write something di��erent in our agreement. The cooperation between Poland and Russia would be twenty times bigger than the wise men had written in the agreement, because it would be chosen by the economy and professional people, and not imposed by theory�.

I was in a tragic situation because when I was leaving Poland, I asked all important people to give me a chance for concluding a good agreement with Russia and with Yeltsin. �ecause my role was in fact to sign the agreement and not to negotiate, but I was aware that the agreement prepared earlier was terrible for Poland. I begged Geremek and the prime minister Olszewski. I said to the prime minister: ‘I will definitely not sign the agreement because it is not a good one, I will surely bring a better one, just let me do it�. He did not say anything. When the talks started I found my solution. I prayed in a chapel for the whole night, we took with us the painting of the �other of God and we prayed how to start the negotiations in a situation when they had been closed: we only were to sign it. I managed to do it.closed: we only were to sign it. I managed to do it. only were to sign it. I managed to do it. And at that moment I received a cryptogram from Olszewski in which the prime minister forbade me to sign anything. It was my personal drama because I knew at that moment how to do it! And I said: ‘Has Yeltsin already seen it? �ecause it is important. If he has read it, we are in trouble.� Yeltsin said several times that if I had problems with the government, we should go for a drink or go hunting, and let them lead negotiations. I think the negotiations would last up to now and we would have never got rid of the Russian Army.

The trick was to take by them surprise, settle, withdraw and everything would betake by them surprise, settle, withdraw and everything would be, settle, withdraw and everything would be possible. As you know, when I was going to Russia to sign the agreement there were some claims, whereas everything was done in a very simple common�sensesimple common�sense way, although maybe not diplomatic. And the rest – passing and making the order – was not done by me but by other groups. We did it, we were lucky that there

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was Yeltsin. Now I have pangs of conscience because with Yeltsin I could have of conscience because with Yeltsin I could have achieved more in the Polish�Russian relationship. �ut I left it for the second terms of my presidency. I was unlucky that I did not have a chance to do it and my programme was stopped halfway. Half was realized and the second half was left was stopped halfway. Half was realized and the second half was left for the next presidency. Then I did not have the possibility to finish it and due to that there was a change. Kwaśniewski already had a di��erent plan concerning the issue and everything was stopped, and we failed to achieve more...

Prof. Jacek Pawłowski:

We have recently heard so much from professor �rzeziński, and in particular Georg Friedman who very clearly describes his stand concerning the future of the Republic of Poland in this place, in Europe, in the light of the changing American strategy. It reminds us, the Poles, where we are and how we should find ourselvesreminds us, the Poles, where we are and how we should find ourselves in the situation. �r. President, what is your opinion, on this topic? opinion, on this topic?

President Lech Wałęsa:

�y opinion is known because I have been expressing it clearly for a long time. This is how I see it: until the end of the 20th century, especially in Europe, we generally had small needs – have something to eat, a place to live, get dresses, we were people attached to land, and this land was the most important. This is why we were moving borders, fighting for land and the basic needs. With the beginning of the 2�st century we entered the age of Internet, information and globalization. In the meantime we changed from an average person into consumers. Nowadays we spend more on technology, intellectual products, than on food and otherproducts, than on food and other needs. In this era the whole nation could be eliminated because they were a kind of an obstacle, because they occupied some place, just like in the case of the first people. And today every customer, no matter who it is should be treated with proper respect. �ustomers are valuable because they buy the e��ects of our work. Today I have heard that the Poles buy more �ercedes cars than the Germans, so are we more and more valuable for the world? It is not profitable for anyone to make us weaker. Fighting in the old style is possible only in places which are not developed, where people are still land�bound. The higher level of civilization the less probable it is to fight in this way. �ut this is the begging of a new era, the

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era of loosening the attachment to land. Still we need to order the basic issues and structures and our way of thinking. That�s why we need to stay alert, waitingalert, waiting for the moment when everyone understands it. Fighting in the old style is not profitable and in the future it will disappear. We are doomed for peace in this part of the world since we are consumers, and none of us can be ignored. Of course in this new arrangement there is a place for well prepared structures and militaryis a place for well prepared structures and military for well prepared structures and military forces to guarantee security and order. The more advanced the technology, theadvanced the technology, the more people are needed to provide security, protection, logistic solutions and transport. New democratic and civilizational structures are placed on new tracks which can lead to dangers of a new type.a new type. type.

This is how I perceive the developments, especially in Europe. Of course it is possible to have some local dispute, like being involved in a brawl. However afterdispute, like being involved in a brawl. However after involved in a brawl. However after that we will have to come back to the things suggested today, so the only aftermath of a fight would be bruises and unnecessary losses since we will still have to return would be bruises and unnecessary losses since we will still have to return on the path which is set by our development. We should be happy because of the fact that we can notice a peaceful development of the world. It is tragic that in Europe after the disappearance of formal borders we have di��erent social conditions, taxes, etc. While we should keep in mind and follow the example of the road tra���c. Look – in the whole world, definitely in Europe – everyone of us can drive their own car. Why? �ecause cars are very similar and road regulations are very alike so we can drive without any problems. And if we want to ‘move around� di��erent topics we should take the example of road regulations and it will also be possible. Somebody might say that we cannot a��ord such clarification and unification. Thus, we should make a list of the things we can a��ord, what will be tomorrow, the day after, let every resident of Europe see what we are doing, where we are heading for, and what it will look like when we achieve it.and what it will look like when we achieve it. like when we achieve it. And today we know nothing, neither the goal nor the reason. Instead of thinking that the interest of Europe is the most important, every country wants to get the most for themselves. This is not how it should be. It is impossible to build peace, development and prosperity on this ground. Only unity and solidarity are the best answers to the changes in global attitudes and political direction of the world powers. Only such a Europe can be taken into account by the world.such a Europe can be taken into account by the world. can be taken into account by the world.

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Mieczysław Malec:

�r. President I would like to refer to the second question made by you... I would like to emphasize that I do not intend to find the answer but I will try to add emphasis to your question by another one. You have formulated a thesis that we cannot avoid revolution, it is only a matter of time. While on the international scene, but also in our country, there is an ongoing discussion on the size of the armed forces. In Poland it is enough to say that during your presidency we had about 350 thousand soldiers. Today we have about �20 thousand i.e. a reduction by 70%. �ut on the other hand we observe a significant improvement when it comes to the quality, up�to�date equipment, the level of education and training, the newest e��ective structures, professionalization, percentage professionalization, lack of conscripts, I will stop the enumeration of the advantages at that point. �y question to you as the former head of the armed forces is the following: is there any bottom limit of the armed forces reduction which cannot be exceeded in the search for quality? If so, how would you formulate a such limit?a such limit? limit?

President Lech Wałęsa:

I would ask a di��erent question: what are the dangers which demand such ansuch an organizational structure? If in the period of time mentioned by you the Army was structure? If in the period of time mentioned by you the Army was so numerous it means that the situation was di��erent. I always give this example, probably heard by you, about my father who in ��45 returned from a camp, so exhausted that he soon died. If I had a chance to talk with him and tell him: dad, do you know that there are no borders in Europe? �o you know that there are no soldiers between Germany and Poland? I would not be able to finish. He wouldHe wouldwould probably have a heart attack. It is hard to believe that this kind of danger existing for such a long time could be eliminated in the whole Europe! Thus, we still have to define the dangers and prepare adjusted forms of protection. You are experts in this field. I said that the Army and the forces can be increased in numbers, only other up�to�date topics must be added. Thus, military forces were, are and will be in the future, but they should correspond with di��erent challenges at di��erent periods of time. In the future the Army will have totally new tasks, otherother than those now, because there will be totally new hazards. So, I will not answerse now, because there will be totally new hazards. So, I will not answer your question on the dangers for Poland today, dangers which required military

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support and protection. �efinitely, we do not need old cars which are di���cult to start... Today we need technology adjusted to the dangers.

Mieczysław Malec:

There is a discussion on the international scene concerning the future character of the Armed Forces. Should they have a purely defensive character, or the characterhave a purely defensive character, or the character defensive character, or the character which is the response to the alliance requirements and the so called alliance reliability. What is your opinion?

President L. Wałęsa:

If I were to answer this and many other questions I should be awarded anotherbe awarded another Nobel prize. It is impossible not only for me but also for many of us even much better sited to answer such a question. We must still observe and introduce answer such a question. We must still observe and introduce changes taking into consideration our membership in NATO structures. They are such because now we follow the old regulations, set for the Warsaw Pact with some amendments. Thus, we have to reorganize it first, only then can weamendments. Thus, we have to reorganize it first, only then can we. Thus, we have to reorganize it first, only then can wecan we find the places and topics which should be safeguarded not only for Poland, but the places and topics which should be safeguarded not only for Poland, but generally for Europe. We have not done it yet, so be more active in making the record of dangers and ways of solving them with the participation of Poland. If I had something to say I would organize it like this. I believe that this initiative leads there.

Piotr Kłos:

�o you have some vision, a cure for the crisis of values, democracy, the crisis of civil society?

President Lech Wałęsa:

As I have already said today, everywhere in the world its fifty�fifty. Half of the Half of the people say: freedom to everyone, we are all free, and it must be our right. Then, everyone of us can organize themselves as they wish: ‘across and lengthwise�, they can assume anything. Additionally, we have free market and law regulations and

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courts have to keep everything in order. There is also an opposite concept saying that nothing can be build this way. It is only a matter of time to face obstacles, cunning, demagogy, populism. It is all doomed to collapse. The rich will not yield to the poor, and generally it is no use to count on solidarity, since this is the real face of the world today. �ue to that you have to agree on the values for you and for the development. �onscience is much cheaper and more hermetical. Of course at. Of course at the beginning it will be di���cult. �ut if for example a politician will backslide and�ut if for example a politician will backslide and will backslide and we will be able to prove it, then he and his family members will not be able to take part in elections for at least 20 years. Today we can equip every politician with a chip asking them if they want to be politicians. If yes, then their every second of life, who they sleep with and what they do is recorded on this very small butrecorded on this very small but capacious memory drive. Of course I will not watch them, but I will check them Of course I will not watch them, but I will check them and they should keep in mind that if they are caught red handed then they and their families can forget about politics for the next 20 years. When the election comes we can choose proper data that we need and the computer shows us who is who. It is already possible today. We cannot watch the politicians all the time, we cannot prove they did anything and here everything is clearly visible. If we followprove they did anything and here everything is clearly visible. If we follow anything and here everything is clearly visible. If we follow this path, in 30 or 50 years� time, we will have developed a person of consciencehave developed a person of conscience of conscience who is aware from the earliest years that it is not allowed and not profitable to break the rules. Our generation must make this chance. Either we will followOur generation must make this chance. Either we will follow the first route... which looks nice but I am convinced even today that we will be deceived, cheated, robbed. It is impossible to avoid it. I believe in the concept based on values. And it does not mean that we have to go to church every day. It is about the application of rules which will bring us justice, wisdom which can be proved – because everything can be checked and proved. I believe in this concept, but we have to discuss everything and agree on it. This is the only way to achieve it. No matter who would suggest this solution they would not listen to them. We must try to achieve it, we must give those examples: look what is happening, how they cheat, it is impossible! We choose a decent person and he or she turns out to be worse after the elections... In my opinion we do not have any choice. Let�s take this technology, which is already good enough, to help us overcome the dangers.

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Piotr Kłos:

�y second question will also refer to a vision but the one from the past... You hadrefer to a vision but the one from the past... You had but the one from the past... You hadYou had a vision, you postponed it for the second term of your presidency. What kind of, you postponed it for the second term of your presidency. What kind ofWhat kind of vision was it? I would like you to share this with us. I would like you to share this with us.

President Lech Wałęsa:

Ladies and Gentlemen my tragedy resulted from the fact that I could not say aloud what I was doing and what I was heading for, because the outcome would not be positive. Until that day nobody believed me that I did not want to be the president, really. I did not want to, maybe you believe me. It clashed with me asme. It clashed with me as me as a revolutionist and union member. �ut when I looked at the e��ects of the Round Table negotiations it was obvious that we were on the losing side. �emocracy is or is not. Just as it is impossible to be a little pregnant it is not possible to be a little democratic. So this compromise was defective. I am fearful thinking how it would be if I did not decide to become the president. You know that today I meet General Jaruzelski just like any other human being, in a �hristian manner, I do not blame him, but for him as the president it would be not honorable to leave the Warsaw Pact and turn to the West. �orally I did not feel good with the fact that I had to breach the decision of the Round Table negotiations, but I had to do something to gain full democracy. What is more, doing it I had to pretend that it was my ambition. I was mad with my colleagues who were disturbing me but if they were not doing it probably I would not survive, if I told them what I wasI told them what I was I was doing to end with communism. �ould I say it? It seemed to be necessary. I hadnd with communism. �ould I say it? It seemed to be necessary. I had communism. �ould I say it? It seemed to be necessary. I had�ould I say it? It seemed to be necessary. I had a similar situation in many issues – I had to do something and pretend that I did not know what it was all about. It is very di���cult. So I was predestined to play such a part and I must say that I played it as well as I could, and I think not so badly... We are a fully democratic country. And it was my vision. country. And it was my vision.

Professor Jacek Pawłowski:

�r. President, thank you. It was a form of a warm�up, now I would like to give theto give the ��oor to the audience. Please feel free to ask questions. to the audience. Please feel free to ask questions.

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Gen. Stachowiak:

A retired General, �r. President...

President Lech Wałęsa:

�e, too. �orporal.

Gen. Mieczysław Stachowiak:

I am the first generation in my family who did not take part in a war. �ut I also have a memory of World War II and earlier con��icts which split the nation. Partmemory of World War II and earlier con��icts which split the nation. Part II and earlier con��icts which split the nation. Part of the society was perceived as ours and part as not. �r. President, you say that we should reach some compromise on an international scale... If we are not able to do it in our own country, how is it possible to do it internationally? And something recent: President Obama won the elections but the opponent does not feel defeated, he congratulates the President, will pray for him and wishes all the best for the country. �r. President, do you have a recipe of how to develop a unity?recipe of how to develop a unity? to develop a unity?to develop a unity? unity?

President Lech Wałęsa:

As you know, I myself did not shake hands but tripped them up, so I did the things that I should not. �ut our reality is a little bit di��erent. We use methods which are not used there. They have been learning democracy for ages, there is equality, every person has the same chance. While in Poland it is di��erent. Let us take as the example my con��ict with Kwaśniewski, which was so visible during the famous TV debate. The election sta��s agreed that everybody comes to the TV studio, The election sta��s agreed that everybody comes to the TV studio, and the current president comes last. He, as you remember was late on purpose, as we know today, and he threw to me, the president, some file. He treated me as a servant boy, so being a person who reacts immediately I said: ‘listen, you have not even said hello and when the cameras are on you shake hands with me?�said hello and when the cameras are on you shake hands with me?� when the cameras are on you shake hands with me?� I should not have done it, but I am a simple man thus my reaction in��uenced the result of the elections, because people having no knowledge about the details of the situation said that I did not know how to behave correctly.

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Today it is very di���cult for me not to lose my temper when I see that things do not go according to a plan. Why is it so? I am sure that you know that we were betrayed in ��3� and in ��45 and that we are still torn apart by others. Until the end��45 and that we are still torn apart by others. Until the end are still torn apart by others. Until the end of the 20th century we cursed our location between Germany and Russia because it was terrible, on the bullet track. Today we also spot some problems. Even the case of the plane remaining in Smoleńsk... Keeping it there for such a long time isremaining in Smoleńsk... Keeping it there for such a long time is Smoleńsk... Keeping it there for such a long time is obviously a game, this provides the opponents with arguments of di��erent type. It is true that our neighbours are changing gradually their previous habits, but theyneighbours are changing gradually their previous habits, but they are changing gradually their previous habits, but they still play with us, deceive us, use the old divisions. So, if this arguments are not used any more, we will not di��er from others. Now, logically if this type of fightinglogically if this type of fighting type of fighting will not take place and nobody will suggest this kind of solution, our location will be blessed – it is the closest, the most comfortable option here. We will regaincomfortable option here. We will regain We will regain many things which are already possessed by other nations because it was build in di��erent reality. Thus, everything, even the bad things that are observed today, will be eliminated or reduced. Everything indicates that we will bless our location and possibilities, we will do good business, because this place makes it possible. Of course, we lack some of the things possessed by other countries, due to the fact that summer lasts not longer than three months it is not probable to earn on summer tourism. How can people sunbathe when the temperature is minus twenty? We have to take into consideration all the things given to us by God and use it wisely, multiply it. Let�s make use of our conditions, history and make profit on this ground.

Prof. Jacek Pawłowski:

Thank you very much... colonel �arsza�ek, the ��oor is yours...

President L. Wałęsa:

Already a colonel?

Col. Marszałek:. Marszałek:

Unfortunately, this is dissonance but I hope that someday in the future it will be possible to make up for it.

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President Lech Wałęsa:

I can guarantee that, when I become the president.

Col. Marszałek:

Thank you, I will give my vote to you together with my whole family. �r. President, today we have talked a lot about the EU and NATO, but we should remember the di���cult time when we were not a member of either EU nor NATO, the Warsawmember of either EU nor NATO, the Warsaw EU nor NATO, the Warsaw Pact was destroyed and you were the president. �id you sleep well? �id you have scenarios: what would I do, how would I do it if it turned out that it was time to protect the borders of our country? �id you take into consideration such scenarios? �id you have solutions ready to use?

President Lech Wałęsa:

Of course, I took such alternatives into consideration, but it was nothing to worryalternatives into consideration, but it was nothing to worry consideration, but it was nothing to worry about because we were in such a hopeless situation. �ut what I was counting on?such a hopeless situation. �ut what I was counting on? situation. �ut what I was counting on? We had the Pope! Simultaneously, the USSR were undergoing changes – �rezhnev, Andropov, �hernenko, Gorbachev. Each of them destabilized the system. What is more, the one who came next to power looked around and notice that the previous colleague was already dead. Each subsequent one said that there was nodead. Each subsequent one said that there was no subsequent one said that there was nosubsequent one said that there was no that there was no use taking risks, he was afraid to take decisions. We managed to take advantagerisks, he was afraid to take decisions. We managed to take advantage was afraid to take decisions. We managed to take advantageWe managed to take advantage of this all. We were really lucky. Of course, as a very religious person I believe person I believe that we were coming to the end of a two thousand year period of �hristianity andthousand year period of �hristianity and of �hristianity and we were given a gift from God, I am not obsessed believe me, it was Pope Johnwas Pope John John Paul II who woke us up and encouraged us to take action, the rest was done byencouraged us to take action, the rest was done by, the rest was done by ourselves. It was a dangerous time so we could not a��ord to be too courageous and quarrelsome, nor to get on the Soviet�s nerves, watch out for provocation.the Soviet�s nerves, watch out for provocation.Soviet�s nerves, watch out for provocation. When it come to courage, at the beginning everyone is afraid, everyone, I do not believe that there is anybody who is not. And the longer you are an activist, the less afraid you are. Finally you notice that your fear is of no use. If they have plans to destroy you, they will do it. It does not matter if you are good or bad, there is nothing that can protect you. You were too naughty to get away with that. Thus, you act not thinking about it. What helps me is also the faith. I am sinful, very sinful but I take religion very seriously. At moments of di���culty I said: �ear. At moments of di���culty I said: �ear of di���culty I said: �ear

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God, I have done everything, The �other of God, Queen of Poland I have done everything, it is time to go to bed, everything is in Your hands. Everyone was surprised and said: here it is so dangerous and he falls asleep. Atheists said: ‘ofhere it is so dangerous and he falls asleep. Atheists said: ‘of dangerous and he falls asleep. Atheists said: ‘of course he has somebody to blame�, the religious ones said that it was good that I believed and I would get God�s help. I accepted it all. We can talk about greatwould get God�s help. I accepted it all. We can talk about great help. I accepted it all. We can talk about great luck. Very important things took place, we were united. No matter where we were the spirit of freedom and patriotism was in us. As a result we were able to take wise decisions. Today we do not observe it because of the ongoing big discussion. Exactly the three questions... �ut very little depends on us, more on �russels. The discussion is carried out on substitute areas, because it is not possible on the others. One wants to be more patriotic, wiser than the other, and this results in One wants to be more patriotic, wiser than the other, and this results in such behaviour. When we manage to organize Europe, and it is likely, Poland willbehaviour. When we manage to organize Europe, and it is likely, Poland will. When we manage to organize Europe, and it is likely, Poland will change a lot. All the behaviour that we complain about will be gone because webehaviour that we complain about will be gone because we that we complain about will be gone because we will talk on the proper topics and not the substitute one.

Piotr Gawliczek:

�r. President, I have realized that you are the first Nobel prize�winner that has visited the National �efence University. We were witnesses to very important�efence University. We were witnesses to very important University. We were witnesses to very important events here but this is the first time that such a respectable and dignified guestthat such a respectable and dignified guest and dignified guest is present here. If you were a one person council awarding the Nobel Prize, who would be honored to receive it from you �r. President?

President Lech Wałęsa:

There is not such an answer because today there are many masters but in di��erent areas. It is impossible to indicated one. I know that the Nobel Prize in my case was a form of saying thank you for a beautiful peaceful fight and at the same time kind of an incentive for taking further steps. �ecause it was a perfect time for the award! Our ship was weak at that time, our sails were dropping down and the Nobel Prize was like a blow of wind for the sails. It made me immortal because there are many electricians, leaders as well, but an electrician and a leader of a union, moreoverof a union, moreover, moreover a Nobel Prize�winner, it is something big, I deserved some respect. It is hard to enumerate the wonderful wise people operating in the background that I havewonderful wise people operating in the background that I have people operating in the background that I have met in my life. And how many of the people on top positions who should not beof the people on top positions who should not be on top positions who should not be

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there? I have wondered how they managed to get on the top since they should not be there, they were not good enough, they must have used some weapon or something like that to help themselves, otherwise they could not be there.

Thus, I would have to think deeply who should get the prize and where: in �hina, or maybe �elarus. I believe that the Nobel Prize should go to president Szuszkiewicz, they dissolved the USSR. And if you want to know how exactly it looked like then ask, it is worth listening. Ask how many glasses were broken there, how the information was passed to Gorbachev, how he dropped the receiver when he heard that at night they had dissolved the USSR. I have many people whom I would give the Nobel Prize if I had such a chance, but I would have to know more about them and some proof that I am not mistaken. And so far, every year, I award a prize of my own name to those who are people of merit for peace and freedom. The judges in this case take to consider even several dozen of candidates�case take to consider even several dozen of candidates� several dozen of candidates�

Mr. Flis:

�r. President, my name is Flis, also retired. �uring your speech you said that you have a feeling, and as it is visible your intuition has usually been perfect, that the present system will not last up to the end of this century. �uring the numerous meetings, have you found a supporter of this way of thinking who, as you, believessupporter of this way of thinking who, as you, believes way of thinking who, as you, believesthinking who, as you, believes that it is falling apart and that the process would be even enforced in time? it is falling apart and that the process would be even enforced in time?

President Lech Wałęsa:

Ladies and Gentlemen, all the protests in Africa, and even the anti�bank ones in theones in the USA, if you listen carefully is directed against capitalism. The only comfort is that this is not against free market, private ownership – this is not questioned by the protesters. Thus, such injustice is not acceptable. It is impossible that some people have money and the others not. I have been in Kuwait, there were also protests. I have got acquainted with some sheikhs and I told them: ‘gentlemen, sooner or later they will destroy your system�. It happened that someone screamed ‘so�, led them to the palaces, they got in, tore everything o�� the walls, stole what was possible togot in, tore everything o�� the walls, stole what was possible to everything o�� the walls, stole what was possible to take and damaged the rest and walked away. The owners seeing this all escaped in their cars or planes and have never come back. This is what masses of people do, people who are furious, hungry, those who see gold. For that reason I say: listen tolisten to

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old Wa��sa because the system will not survive, I think you see it. �ommunism took Wa��sa because the system will not survive, I think you see it. �ommunism took everything from the capitalists and that was a mistake. I suggest a di��erent system: all that you have in excess please give for the creation of new places of work. To give people work. Please do not tell me that there is no work. There is no work in the old theory with the rat race, when one country wants to prevail over the other, oneprevail over the other, one other, one wants to dominate the other. In this concept there is no work. �ecause today we do not want any rat race, let�s reject those who favour races, let�s leave them aside,favour races, let�s leave them aside, races, let�s leave them aside, they will manage. All new programmes and any new solutions should be createdprogrammes and any new solutions should be created and any new solutions should be created for the average people and for those who were left behind in the old system – to put it brie��y, for the losers. What should be done to force them to work? The richbrie��y, for the losers. What should be done to force them to work? The rich for the losers. What should be done to force them to work? The richlosers. What should be done to force them to work? The rich. What should be done to force them to work? The rich should think about it, since the money will be taken away from them. I do not take it away from you, I only ask to gather the money together and build new places of work. After all, you are experts in this field. Good work can be organized not by theAfter all, you are experts in this field. Good work can be organized not by the, you are experts in this field. Good work can be organized not by the unionist, not by the politicians but only by the owners of capital goods. If we do not do it today, a day will come when they will take it by force and chase you away. I thought that I was understood by the majority, but now I am not sure what they are doing. �aybe they are waiting for next revolution...

Someone might say that there is no work. I would say that even if the population was twice as much, there is so much work, that still we will not be able to do it all even for the next one hundred years. Look at our cities, even Warsaw, every ten meters there is a red light. It is impossible to live here because everythingis a red light. It is impossible to live here because everything light. It is impossible to live here because everything was build on the basis of di��erent rules, we wanted to live as close to work as possible so we extended the cities by force. Today the Italians are building one hundred cities which are collision�free and ecological. Everyone can leave a city, there are no tra���c jams, and this all is due to the fact that there is under� andthere is under� and over� access, not a direct one. So the cities build on the ground in line with the previous concept must be destroyed and new ones must be build to match the concept must be destroyed and new ones must be build to match the present and future time and only history should be left untouched. There is soand only history should be left untouched. There is so should be left untouched. There is so much work here! Someone might say that we do not have money. This is true. �o we have money for unemployment? We have to pay for that. If we focus on work everyone will make profit out of it. �ut only in the peaceful way, and not in the rivalry which we have observed up to now. Now they say ‘let�s unite Europe, fast�. So, do we want to compete with �hina, with anyone? For about twenty years I have said: let�s create the Unite States of all the European countries as fast as possible, let�s have a federation with the USA, let�s invite �hina into discussion onhave a federation with the USA, let�s invite �hina into discussion on the USA, let�s invite �hina into discussion on

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the future image of globalization. It should not be done against �hina, not in war. Globalization is only possible through a compromise. Thus, it is necessary to talk about it, to provide arguments. The world with this generation, the technology, intellect is able to enter the road we are talking about.

Rector-Commander::

Ladies and Gentlemen, I know that you would like to ask many more questions but this is the beauty of a lecture, there is always the feeling of insu���ciency. And we are left with this feeling since �r. President goes back to Gdańsk today.with this feeling since �r. President goes back to Gdańsk today. feeling since �r. President goes back to Gdańsk today.President goes back to Gdańsk today. to Gdańsk today.

President Lech Wałęsa:

Let me add two more sentences, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to finish with a request... As I have said, no other generation had such a chance, but this requires your participation. �o not say: they will manage without me during elections, it is only one vote. No, ladies and gentlemen, there are moments in the history of nationsmoments in the history of nations of nations which are decisive and we are in such a moment. We decide here about the image of Poland, about our position, about the image of Europe, the face of globalization. We need here the participation of wise patriots. �ring here the opponents, let them tell you about their way of thinking, their vision in order to be able to chose wisely. Tomorrow our grandchildren will say: dad, grandpa, you have been so smart and what have you done? To avoid this, please participate in the process, I strongly believe that being hardened by war we are able to change the world in accordance with a certain programme and structure. This is what the world is waiting for. programme and structure. This is what the world is waiting for.programme and structure. This is what the world is waiting for. and structure. This is what the world is waiting for.

Rector-Commander:

�r. President, the Great Pole, Nobel Prize�winner, you are not only awarded Honoris �ausa at many universities, you are honored to receive di��erent titles, orders, medals, because Poland, Europe and the world know your name – Lech Wa��sa – today a symbolic one. Today you receive one more title – the chapter of Rectors, �eans and �ommanders of the Training �entres of the National �efence�entres of the National �efence of the National �efence�efence University has decided to award you with the title of the �an of Great Knowledge, decided to award you with the title of the �an of Great Knowledge, Honour and Wonderful Heart. and Wonderful Heart.

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The evoluTion of The hungarian securiTy policy Thinking beTween 1989-1999, wiTh a special view on The hungarian Defence forces”

Dr. József lajos nÉMeTh, phDAdjunctive Professor, National University of Public Service, Budapest, HUNGARY

abstract

Hungarian security policy thinking went through basic and crucial changes in the last two decades. As a result, we can see a kind of ‘evolution’, which starts from a former Soviet satellite state status through to a period of looking for a role to a period of being an active member of the Trans- and Euro-Atlantic community. One of the most significant security and defence policy changes can be seen in the shaping and restructuring of the Hungarian Defence Forces.

This paper seeks to explain this evolution in the period of 1989-1999 with the support of the Janos Bolyai Scholarship awarded by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Key words: Hungary, security policy, armed forces, regime change, Warsaw Pact, NATO

introduction

Nowadays Hungary has got professional defence forces, which ha�e to ful��l threehas got professional defence forces, which ha�e to ful��l three ful��l three basic tasks based on the Basic Law (see: Constitution): to defend Hungarian territory in the case of any aggression��defend Hungarian territory in the case of any aggression�� territory in the case of any aggression�� to ful��l the tasks deri�ing from the different collecti�e security (United Nations-UN), collecti�e defence (North Atlantic Alliance-NATO), complex (European

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Union-EU), cooperati�e security (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-OSCE) and other (for example Visegrad Four-V4) memberships�� to participate in “other task”, which are basically disaster managementment operations�.

In other words, the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) ha�e to ful��l peace missions ful��l peace missions and missions which are differing from these (non-peace).from these (non-peace).-peace).

In order to ful��l the international tasks Hungary has dedicated an ambitiousHungary has dedicated an ambitious number of ���� military personnel, which is pro�ided by a relati�ely small ���� military personnel, which is pro�ided by a relati�ely small���� military personnel, which is pro�ided by a relati�ely small which is pro�ided by a relati�ely smallsmall force (around ��.��� persons in ����) ��.��� persons in ����)�. Hungarian soldiers are ser�ing on three continents as peacekeepers, military obser�ers, ad�isors, trainers or in crisis response operations. Of course, the Hungarian national military representati�es are working in administrati�e positions in NATO or in the EU, and they arepositions in NATO or in the EU, and they are or in the EU, and they are ful��lling many military diplomacy tasks as well.

The Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) work under the political guidance and ci�il political guidance and ci�il control of the Ministry of Defence, led by the Chief of the �eneral Staff. HDF�sChief of the �eneral Staff. HDF�s Staff. HDF�s tasks are ful��lled through the so called “Joint Operational Command” which contains combat, combat-support and ser�ice-support organizational elements.ser�ice-support organizational elements..

Based on the “snap-shot” brie��y described abo�e we can raise the �uestion ofshot” brie��y described abo�e we can raise the �uestion of which steps led to the current situation. In other words, what were the changes, led to the current situation. In other words, what were the changes,to the current situation. In other words, what were the changes,anges, obstacles and in��uencing factors which formulated the Hungarian Defence ForcesForces in the last two or more decades, but especially up until Hungary became NATO, but especially up until Hungary became NATOespecially up until Hungary became NATO became NATO member in ����?

� Magyarország Alaptörvénye (Basic Law of Hungary), �5 April ����, Article 45.� Dr. Habil Kiss Zoltán László: A Honvéd Vezérkar főnök előadása a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem biztonság- és védelempolitika szakos hallgatóinak (Speech given for the students of the National University of Public Service by Hungarian Chief of General Staff), �5 May ����, in: http://www.hon�edelem.hu/container/��les/attachments/3����/�ezerkarfonoki_eloadas_nke_����_�5�5.pdf, downloaded: �� May ���3, p. ��.

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hungarian armed forces in the warsaw pact era

Basically the same happened with many Central and Eastern European countries after WWII: they became hea�ily in��uenced by the So�iets, who �uickly createdwho �uickly created the Warsaw Pact (��55), which ga�e the military framework and content for eachw Pact (��55), which ga�e the military framework and content for each member state regarding all security efforts. The so called “military policy” started security efforts. The so called “military policy” startedsecurity efforts. The so called “military policy” started “military policy” started to e�ol�e on both sides, based on the fact that in this era a nuclear weapon centredera a nuclear weapon centred military might and strong belie�e in the ��nal de�astating clash (Third World War) belie�e in the ��nal de�astating clash (Third World War) were shaping both political and economical thoughts and e�en basic daily lifeshaping both political and economical thoughts and e�en basic daily life3.

In these times Hungary was suffering under So�iet suppression and as result a short and dramatic re�olution happened in ��56, in which the Hungarian army played a crucial role through supporting the freedom ��ghters. It was a clearthrough supporting the freedom ��ghters. It was a clearsupporting the freedom ��ghters. It was a clear and dramatic message for them (So�iets): it was time to reshape, rethink and reorganize many things in Hungary, including the Hungarian People�s Army. It started �uickly and Janos Kadar expressed in ��5�� at a military conference that��5�� at a military conference that “the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party is trusts the People�s the People�s Army”4.

When the Warsaw Pact started to work it didn�t seem that there would be sostarted to work it didn�t seem that there would be so many tensions among the partners. One of the possible reasons for these laid in the centralized and Moscow led politico-military directi�es, which �� at least and Moscow led politico-military directi�es, which �� at leastand Moscow led politico-military directi�es, which �� at least theoretically �� had to be accepted and executed by each member states. But the problem with this “guidance” was that it was “too big or too large” for those who were supposed to ful��l the So�iet military expectations, especially those especially those which planned huge military technology de�elopments based on the ���e yearsplanned huge military technology de�elopments based on the ���e years planning system: a kind of full rearmament and modernization (!). Among them was Hungary, which used all kinds of opportunities to oppose or at least slow down the hea�y pressure arri�ing from the So�iet �� at the empire le�el thinking �� generals5.

� At this point it is important to add, that the “military policy” in the So�iet (Eastern) military sciences was similar to the term “security policy” used in the West. Later this term almost disappeared and nowadays the term “defence policy” is the closest to its original meaning.� Kádár János: Béke, függetlenség, honvédelem, Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, Budapest, ����5, p. ��3.� Kárpáti Ferenc: Puskalövés nélkül, Duna International, ����, p. 5�-���.

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As time passed and the �����s arri�ed many things changed in internationalpassed and the �����s arri�ed many things changed in international relations: basically the détente experienced in the ‘��s had disappeared and many internal and external tensions started to boil on both sides. During these years the Hungarian People�s Army reached the characteristics of a “mass army”: it meant People�s Army reached the characteristics of a “mass army”: it meantmass army”: it meant ha�ing a peace strength which was too high�� using both old and new military technology at the same time�� excessi�e expectations for costs, materials and soldiers�� following the So�iet military doctrine�� and seasonal works made in and works made in and for the national economy6.

This meant huge pressure for the already suffering Hungarian economy andhis meant huge pressure for the already suffering Hungarian economy and as a result the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party decided to launch a military reform in order to build a more ade�uate military force to match the existing economical possibilities, the country�s geographical location, the “real” role of Hungary in the Warsaw Pact and the �uick and crucial changes happening in military technology�.

The changes �� under the code name “RUBIN” �� came into force on �st Marchinto force on �st March ����� and as a result, the earlier di�ision le�el structure decreased to brigade le�el. This step was against the existing So�iet military doctrine, who expressed their existing So�iet military doctrine, who expressed their re�ulsion but they didn�t refuse it. At this moment it is crucial to mention that this “peaceful” approach was more related to the policies called “glasnost” andpolicies called “glasnost” and “perestroika” launched earlier by �orbache� than to the “kindness” of the So�iet generals. In the second part of the ����s we can see a series of such decisions, which were supposed to throw into relief some “national” characteristics of the Hungarian armed forces (for example: national tricolour in the Buda castle, changes in uniforms and daily o���cial greetings, etc.). uniforms and daily o���cial greetings, etc.).

This “openness” led also to the breakthrough in �����, when the Warszaw Pact forces shared openly their force power: in the case of Hungary the armed forces amounted to �55,��� persons (including ci�ilians) in peace time��. In January, ����� �� somehow as a result of what was happening in contemporary international relations �� it was announced that the Hungarian People�s Army will

� Dr. Szántó Mihály: A Magyar Honvédség a rendszerváltástól a NATO tagságig, egyetemi jegyzet, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzet�édelmi Egyetem, Budapest, ����, p. �6.� Ibid.� Ibid. p. ���.

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ha�e a reduction through �����-���� of �%�. The changes were en�isioned to be executed in three steps: the ��rst was made at the end of �����, when the political-go�ernmental and the command and control tasks were separated: the ��rst ��eld mo�ed to the umbrella of the Ministry of Defence and the second became the responsibility of the Commander of the Hungarian People�s Army.

The second step was o�erwritten by many unexpected international and social changes, and in No�ember ����� Prime Minister Miklós Németh expressed thatNo�ember ����� Prime Minister Miklós Németh expressed that as well as the �% reduction planned earlier there will be more, a ��-�5% cut in manpower and the armed forces need to change their characteristics for a nation-defending role��. Howe�er some experts were arguing that his step was more some experts were arguing that his step was more related to the expectations that the armed forces needed to be �uarantined and make an impact for the upcoming democratic elections (����) and it would ser�e much better the Communist Party�s political campaign efforts��. If it is true, we can raise the �uestion of where the trust expressed by Janos Kadar in ��56 in the Hungarian People�s Army had gone by the end of the ����s.

The end of the ����s was a �ery intensi�e period for the Hungarian military: the �uestion of the stationing of So�iet nuclear missiles in the Bakony mountains needed to be sol�ed��Hungarian political leaders initiated the So�iet troops withdrawal, which ended at the end of June ������Hungarian armed forces ga�e assistance and support for the refugees escapingrefugees escaping Ceausescu-led Romania�� in a domestically and internationally crucial moment �� in May-June ����� �� Hungary remo�ed the so called “Iron Courtain”, and in September opened itsHungary remo�ed the so called “Iron Courtain”, and in September opened its the so called “Iron Courtain”, and in September opened itsthe so called “Iron Courtain”, and in September opened its border for many East-�erman citizens, which basically ga�e a huge boost for thecitizens, which basically ga�e a huge boost for the upcoming changes, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall (No�ember, �����).

Meanwhile deep changes happened in Hungarian society too: the so calledhappened in Hungarian society too: the so called “Roundtable Talks” started to e�ol�e and created a semi-democratic sphere�� on �3rd October ����� Hungary became a “Republic” and on �st March ����, the

� Ibid. p. ��.�0 Ibid. p. ��.�� Jeffrey Simon: NATO and Hungary: Problems in Civil-Military Relations, Rowman and Little��eld Publishers INC, Oxford, ���3, p. ��.

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Hungarian People�s Army got back its old name: the “Hungarian Defence Forces” People�s Army got back its old name: the “Hungarian Defence Forces” (Magyar Hon�édség)��.

As we look back to this year, we can ha�e a sense of “euphoria”, but we shouldn�t forget that the So�iet Union and the Warsaw Pact still existed…

a new political system, old equipment - new defence forces

The democratic transition in Hungary happened in a similar way to the Polishhappened in a similar way to the Polish one, it was “a transition through extrication”, which means that the leading regime was participating in the system change negotiations, but not in a decisi�e role as if it would be a “transition through transaction” (for example in the case of be a “transition through transaction” (for example in the case of Romania)�3.

In autumn, ���� the ��rst democratic elections happened in Hungary after the communist system collapsed. As a result, the six party member Parliament started toParliament started to build the elements of the rule of law, market economy, etc., and soon the go�erning party �� the Hungarian Democrat Forum (HDF-Magyar Demokrata Fórum) �� expressed the opinion that the Ministry of Defence has got strategic importance�4.

In parallel, huge efforts were put into the problem of how to abandon the Warsaw Pact, and some Hungarian experts were arguing that it needed to be eliminated by internal efforts, not by jumping out�5. Finally, the WP was abolished on �� April ����, but this decision was made earlier on the Political Consultati�e Meeting inion was made earlier on the Political Consultati�e Meeting in Budapest on �5 February, �����6.

�� Dr. Szántó Mihály: A Magyar Honvédség a rendszerváltástól a NATO tagságig, egyetemi jegyzet, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzet�édelmi Egyetem, Budapest, ����, p. ��.�� Jeffrey Simon: NATO and Hungary: Problems in Civil-Military Relations, Rowman and Little��eld Publishers INC, Oxford, ���3, p.��.�� Csendes László: Hadseregtörténet, in: Új Hon�édségi Szemle, Különkiadás, �����, p. �3��.�� Dr. Németh József Lajos: Irányított interjú Deák Péterrel az MTA Bolyai János Kutatói Ösztöndíj támogatásával, in: Hadtudományi Szemle, ���3, VI/�. szám, Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, Hadtudományi és Hon�édtisztképző Kar, p. �33.�� Makk László mk. vezérőrnagy: A haderő átalakítása a hidegháború utáni korszak biztonsági kihívásainak tükrében, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzet�édelmi Egyetem, PhD értekezés, �����, p. �6.

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At this moment, the Hungarian Defence Forces became a really national and independent entity, which �� at the same time �� had to face �ery serious external�� at the same time �� had to face �ery serious external and internal challenges. Based on the latest ��ndings and research results, it seems when the Warsaw Pact was abandoned, then not just a military alliance disappeared, but the support, maintenance and military industry created earlier also disappeared: as a result, many people lost their jobs and the national economy suffered hea�y losses.

After these changes Hungary became suddenly alone and when the pre�iousalone and when the pre�ious security umbrella disappeared a so called “security �acuum” was generated. In this situation the country had to face the fact, that the earlier allies had become independent too, and the former commonly shared interests turned out to be indi�idual or e�en the re�erse. In this situation not just the bilateral relations were needed to be restarted, but Hungary�s future foreign policy priorities were under huge debate and many times became a part of the daily political debates. Basically, in the years of �����-���� there were six possible scenarios: neutrality�� full independence�� regional cooperation�� joining the European security system�� security system�� Euro-Atlantic integration-Atlantic integration����keeping up a more ��exible alliance with the So�iet Union (but this idea was �uickly more ��exible alliance with the So�iet Union (but this idea was �uickly dropped, recognizing the international and domestic reality)���.

As we can see, in all of the abo�e mentioned cases the Hungarian Defence ForcesForces had to play a crucial role, but it was still o�ersized, o�erloaded, not effecti�ely working, with little support form society and struggling with serious ��nancial problems.

In June ���� Slo�enia �� after the declaration of its independence �� was attacked bywas attacked by Yugosla�ian forces and after this so called “��-day-war” the Balkan Wars started to take place in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzego�ina, and in Serbia up until ���5.

�� A kilencvenes évek eleje, in: http://biztpol.cor�inusembassy.com/?module=cor�inak&module_id=4&cid=���, downloaded: �� April ���3.�� Tíz éve a NATO-ban, szerkesztette: Szenes Zoltán és Tálas Péter, Zrínyi Kiadó, ����, p.��.

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Because the former Yugosla�ian states were direct neighbours of Hungary, the Hungarian Defence Forces had to face a serious challenge: not just to secure theForces had to face a serious challenge: not just to secure the homeland territory but at the same time a�oid any escalation in these con��icts.

In these circumstances it became more and more clear that basically four parallel external tasks had to be ful��lled by the Hungarian Defence Forces:tasks had to be ful��lled by the Hungarian Defence Forces: be ful��lled by the Hungarian Defence Forces:to establish and maintain the elements of an independent homeland defence system��to ful��l the security and defence re�uirements which stem from the Euro-Atlanticwhich stem from the Euro-Atlantic from the Euro-Atlantic integration��to participate in the process of con�entional weapon reduction in Europe��in the process of con�entional weapon reduction in Europe�� of con�entional weapon reduction in Europe��to gi�e ade�uate answers for the regional security challenges (including the neighbouring states, NATO, the collapse of the So�iet Union, Balkan Wars, etc.)��.

Of course, these tasks could be ful��lled by a strong and legitimate legalcould be ful��lled by a strong and legitimate legal by a strong and legitimate legal background, which were laid down in the New Constitution (�����), in the Law on Homeland Defence (���3/C�) in the Basic Principles of Security Policy (March,Defence (���3/C�) in the Basic Principles of Security Policy (March,���3/C�) in the Basic Principles of Security Policy (March, ���3) and in the Basic Principles Homeland Defence (April, ���3). Additionally, the �o�ernment Program �� which was accepted in September, ���� �� ga�e some important guidelines related to the upcoming defence restructuring tasks.

One of the most remarkable changes of the Hungarian Defence Forces was �isible in manpower reduction, which is shown in the following table:

Year ���� ���0 ���� ���� ����Manpower �55��� �43��� ������ ��4��� ������Reduction related to ����� - ��% ��% 33% 36%

Source: Dr. Szántó Mihály: A Magyar Honvédség a rendszerváltástól a NATO tagságig, egyetemi jegyzet, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem, Budapest, 2002, p. 26.

Table 1. Manpower reduction in the Hungarian Defence Forces between 1989 and 1993

�� Makk László mk. vezérőrnagy: A haderő átalakítása a hidegháború utáni korszak biztonsági kihívásainak tükrében, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzet�édelmi Egyetem, PhD értekezés, �����, p. ���.

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As we can see the le�el of manpower reduction by ���3 was 36% as related to the% as related to the to the size of the Hungarian Armed Forces in �����. The most dramatic change happened in the case of the conscript soldiers: their number dropped by 43% (from ����� in ����� to 5�34� by ���3)��.

The military spending between �����-���4 was as follows:���4 was as follows:

Year ���� ���0 ���� ���� �����DP% 3,�� 3,� �,4 �,3 �,�

Source: World Bank, in: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?page=4, accessed 27 April 2013.

Table 2. Military spending in Hungary in GDP% between 1989 and 1993

As we can see the budget for defence was decreasing continually, but mostdecreasing continually, but most dramatically from ����-����.����-����.

In the ��rst go�ernmental period (����-���4) the internal changes in the HDF affected the following ��elds:organization, structure and dislocation��the direction of training: from attack to acti�e defence��de-politicizing and strengthening the national characteristics��introducing new military components (such as airborne battalion, electronic

battle capable regiment)��struggling with the decreasing �uality of the existing military technology��growing moral problems of the continuous restructuring efforts��creating the elements of human resources��growing acti�ity in military diplomacy��reshaping the military educational system��ful��l the tasks stemming from the international crisis response and peace-keepingtasks stemming from the international crisis response and peace-keepingom the international crisis response and peace-keeping

operations (such as in the �ulf War-������ Balkan Missions�� etc.)struggling for ade�uate social support��

�0 Dr. Szántó Mihály: A Magyar Honvédség a rendszerváltástól a NATO tagságig, egyetemi jegyzet, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzet�édelmi Egyetem, Budapest, ����, p. �6.

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creating new elements in order to ful��l the constitutional re�uirement related to the freedom of conscience��

building the ad�ocate system for the military personnelcreating and adjusting to ci�il control.adjusting to ci�il control. control.

Developments in 1994-1998

After the spring elections in ���4 the Hungarian Socialist Party gained a majoritygained a majority in the Hungarian Parliament. The old-new socialist leadership (the go�ernmentleadership (the go�ernment was led by Prime Minister �yula Horn) basically followed the pre�iously started Minister �yula Horn) basically followed the pre�iously startedMinister �yula Horn) basically followed the pre�iously started basically followed the pre�iously startedbasically followed the pre�iously started integration procedure into the Euro-Atlantic security system. Its main and central Euro-Atlantic security system. Its main and central goal was to join to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The ��rst stepstep had already been made in ����, when the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council, when the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council was created “as a forum for dialogue and cooperation with NATO�s former Warsaw Pact ad�ersaries”��.

In February ���4 Hungary �� among many other countries �� joined to theFebruary ���4 Hungary �� among many other countries �� joined to thegary �� among many other countries �� joined to the framework contract of the Partnership for Peace Programme issued by the Headsby the Heads Heads of State and �o�ernments participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on ��-�� January ���4��. This step from one side made it possible for the HDF to take a look inside NATO at how the Alliance works and what are the how the Alliance works and what are theworks and what are the basic re�uirements, from the other side it helped to strengthen regional security. security. This last effect was extremely important especially taken into consideration thethe fact that in the surrounding countries many changes had happened in the last few years, for example Hungary�s neighbouring countries raised from ���e to se�en. Hungary�s neighbouring countries raised from ���e to se�en.

In spring ���5 Hungary started to participate in the Planning and Re�iew Processspring ���5 Hungary started to participate in the Planning and Re�iew Process started to participate in the Planning and Re�iew Process (PARP), which goal “is to pro�ide a structured basis for identifying partner forces

�� The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (archived), in: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoli�e/topics_6�344.htm, downloaded: �5 April ���3.downloaded: �5 April ���3.�� Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Head�uarters, Brussels, ��-�� January ���4, in: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/4�-�5/c�4����b.htm, downloaded: �5 April ���3.

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and capabilities that could be a�ailable to the Alliance for multinational training, exercises and operations”�3.

On �� January, ���6 Hungary expressed its will to join NATO and after more thanto join NATO and after more than one year and a series of different professional talks NATO expressed also its will to in�ite the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to be its members. In order to strengthen the national will there was a referendum held on �6th No�ember, there was a referendum held on �6th No�ember,there was a referendum held on �6th No�ember, ������ 4�% of eligible �oters participated and ��5,33% of them supported NATO membership�4.

Finally, on 4th April ����, Hungary signed the joining contract among with the earlier mentioned two states.

At this point it is important to mention, that parallel to the abo�e mentioned procedures many integration steps were being taken towards the European Unionintegration steps were being taken towards the European Union (EU) too, and Hungary became an EU member in ���4. (It is important to add the processes taken for/by the western members of the European Union too.)

In these years, the HDF had to learn, understand and apply the terms ofHDF had to learn, understand and apply the terms of “interoperability” and “compatibility”, in order to pro�e its ability and creditability as a NATO member candidate. At the same time NATO had to recognize the the Hungarian force structure, military thinking and many other things.

In ���4 a study was launched by NATO in order to gi�e and get the necessaryby NATO in order to gi�e and get the necessary order to gi�e and get the necessary information about the enlargement procedures for all participants�5. This study contained many important answers and re�uirements, howe�er the ��nancial cost of joining was hidden (or at least handled at minimum le�el) by the politicianshandled at minimum le�el) by the politicians le�el) by the politicians until ����, when the defence spending started to grow again for the ��rst timestarted to grow again for the ��rst time the ��rst time after the collapse of the communist system�6.

�� Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process, in: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoli�e/topics_6�����.htm, downloaded: �� April ���3.�� Dr. Szántó Mihály: A Magyar Honvédség a rendszerváltástól a NATO tagságig, egyetemi jegyzet, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzet�édelmi Egyetem, Budapest, ����, p. 45.�� Study on NATO Enlargement, �3 September ���5, in: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoli�e/o���cial_texts_�4�33.htm, downloaded: �5 April ���3.�� Tíz éve a NATO-ban, szerkesztette: Szenes Zoltán és Tálas Péter, Zrínyi Kiadó, ����, p. ��.

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The tasks mentioned for the ��rst go�ernmental period on the one handperiod on the one handand became more sophisticated (such as the legal background, military diplomacy, restructuring the command and control elements, etc.) and on the other handand on the other hand new elements e�ol�ed such as the acti�e participation in the peaceful solution of elements e�ol�ed such as the acti�e participation in the peaceful solution of the Balkan crisis. This included many different efforts: sending troops for the Implementation Force (IFOR) and afterwards for theand afterwards for the the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in ���5-�������to pro�ide host nation support (for example at the Taszar airbase)��to pro�ide engineer support (for example in Okucani).

Parallel to the abo�e mentioned changes the manpower reduction of HDF continued:

Year ���� ���� ���� ���� ����Manpower �� �4�� ��� �66 66 ���� 6� ��� 6� 5��

Source: A honvédelem négy éve: 1994-1998, Zrínyi Kiadó, 1998, p.79.

Table 3. Manpower reduction in the Hungarian Defence Forces between 1994 and 1998

The military spending showed the same reduction as in the earlier go�ernmentalreduction as in the earlier go�ernmental earlier go�ernmental period, but in ���� and ���� we can see some growth, which is related to the upcoming NATO accession.accession.

Year ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� �����DP% �,� �,6 �,5 �,� �,5 �,�

Source: World Bank, in: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?page=3, downloaded: 27 April 2013/

Table 4. Military spending in Hungary in GDP% between 1994 and 1999

An interesting and �ery remarkable result happened in HDF�s training and education system, when the Zrinyi Miklos National Defence Uni�ersity (ZMNDU) was established in ���6, following the US example in Washington DCWashington DC of the National Defence Uni�ersity. In its uni�ue educational system ci�ilian and Defence Uni�ersity. In its uni�ue educational system ci�ilian and

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military students were trained at the same time and in ���� the so called “expertstrained at the same time and in ���� the so called “experts of security and defence policy” branch was launched full time with a ���e-year- time with a ���e-year-with a ���e-year-long study period period��.

conclusions

It is still debated today whether the Hungarian Defence Forces were restructured,debated today whether the Hungarian Defence Forces were restructured,, reshaped or re-edi��ed. It is a fact, howe�er, that many changes occurred in the period of �����-���� and as a result the basics of the currently operating militarythe currently operating military military system were laid down.

In this period the international security framework was dramatically changedchanged and this in turn affected deeply Hungarian security-policy thinking. As one of affected deeply Hungarian security-policy thinking. As one ofaffected deeply Hungarian security-policy thinking. As one of thinking. As one of the results, the HDF changed its earlier operating Eastern-Western directions to a nation-characterized and NATO compatible force.

references

A kilenc�enes é�ek eleje, in: http://biztpol.cor�inusembassy.com/?module=cor�inak&module_id=4&cid=���, downloaded: �� April ���3

Csendes László: Hadseregtörténet, in: Új Hon�édségi Szemle, Különkiadás, �����, p.�3��.Dr. Habil Kiss Zoltán László: A Hon�éd Vezérkar főnök előadása a Nemzeti Közszolgálati

Egyetem biztonság- és �édelempolitika szakos hallgatóinak (Speech gi�en for the students of the National Uni�ersity of Public Ser�ice by Hungarian Chief of �eneral Staff), �5 May ����, in: http://www.hon�edelem.hu/container/��les/attachments/3����/�ezerkarfonoki_eloadas_nke_����_�5�5.pdf, downloaded: �� May ���3, p. ��.

Dr. Németh József Lajos: Irányított interjú Deák Péterrel az MTA Bolyai János Kutatói Ösztöndíj támogatásá�al, in: Hadtudományi Szemle, ���3, VI/�. szám, Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, Hadtudományi és Hon�édtisztképző Kar, p. �33.

Dr. Szántó Mihály: A Magyar Hon�édség a rendszer�áltástól a NATO tagságig, egyetemi jegyzet, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzet�édelmi Egyetem, Budapest, ����, p. �6.

�� This branch is still existing in the framework of the National Uni�ersity of Public Ser�ice.

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Dr. Szántó Mihály: A Magyar Hon�édség a rendszer�áltástól a NATO tagságig, egyetemi jegyzet, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzet�édelmi Egyetem, Budapest, ����, p. ��.

Jeffrey Simon: NATO and Hungary: Problems in Ci�il-Military Relations, Rowman and Little��eld Publishers INC, Oxford, ���3, p.��.

Kádár János: Béke, függetlenség, hon�édelem, Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, Budapest, ����5, p. ��3.

Kárpáti Ferenc: Puskalö�és nélkül, Duna International, ����, p. 5�-���.Magyarország Alaptör�énye (Basic Law of Hungary), �5 April ����, Article 45Makk László mk. �ezérőrnagy: A haderő átalakítása a hidegháború utáni korszak biztonsági

kihí�ásainak tükrében, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzet�édelmi Egyetem, PhD értekezés, �����, p. �6.

Partnership for Peace Planning and Re�iew Process, in: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoli�e/topics_6�����.htm, downloaded: �� April ���3

Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Head�uarters, Brussels, ��-�� January ���4, in: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/4�-�5/c�4����b.htm, downloaded: �5 April ���3

Study on NATO Enlargement, �3 September ���5, in: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoli�e/o���cial_texts_�4�33.htm, downloaded: �5 April ���3

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (archi�ed), in:in: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoli�e/topics_6�344.htm, downloaded: �5 April ���3

Tíz é�e a NATO-ban, szerkesztette: Szenes Zoltán és Tálas Péter, Zrínyi Kiadó, ����, p.��.

SECURITY AND DEFENCE – HISTORICAL PERPSECTIVE

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EVOLUTION OF THE US PSYOP PRODUCTS’ EFFECTIVENESS DURINg VIETNAm WAR 1965-1969

marcin góRNIkIEWICz, PhD, Stanislaw Staszic College of Public Administration in Bialystok

Abstract

The article presents an analysis of a few selected PSYOP products. However, for this work I checked all the products available during the Vietnam War, the National Catalogue of PSYOP Materials Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, BACM Research. I have also analyzed the source texts as well as the opinions of professionals involved in psychological operations conducted during the Vietnam War. I estimated the impact of these products on the subconscious and conscious levels. In this way I could evaluate the effectiveness of these products and their adaptation to the cultural values of the Vietnamese. This allowed me to analyze the effectiveness of a methodology for creating these products. In my opinion, U.S. PSYOP product development and methodology were imperfect, and the cost of the war in Vietnam would be much lower if this methodology could have been adapted to cultural values of Vietnamese.

Key words: PSYOP products; psychological operation, psychological warfare,

A human being is the most advanced intellectual creature that lives on the earth. According to research by J. Still, on day 43 of pregnancy the developing foetal brain constantly emits its very first brain waves. From now on, we can talk about the existence of primordial consciousness�. Japanese scientists Y. Okamoto and T. Kirikae confirmed during their research that as early

� J.W. Still, Journal of Washington Academy of Science, �969, vol. 59, pp. 46.

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as the fourth month of pregnancy, the fetus can react to different states of consciousness. This means that it acquires the ability to control the different states of consciousness from the early stage of foetal development�. According to Dominic Purple3 foetal consciousness arises between the �8th and 3�nd weeks of gestation. Then the information is collected and transmitted to the brain along the neural connections. However, the cerebral cortex is developed enough to maintain awareness and provide a basis for thought, memory and emotion4; developing the following senses in the coming months: touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing. The foetus’s memory begins to work during the 7-8 months of pregnancy. Mainly storing memories associated with strong emotional experiences5.

The foetal body is a series of transformations which is a product of evolution. During prenatal development progresses begin at the tail. Later, the tail disappears, before the first spine is formed: the notochord. Man is the result of a long process of evolution. As a result, the connection between the highly developed mind, and our body is the most complex and unresolved of the creatures that inhabit the earth. A human being is still a mystery. It’s worth asking how the most effective methodology influences the mental process in such a way as to control human behaviour. The American doctrine of psychological operations has been properly developed since the late nineteenth century, but rapidly began to develop only during the First World War. Despite over one hundred years of experience, the Americans have failed to develop the question - why? From a scientific point of view, the operations in Vietnam in the majority were not well planned, prepared and implemented. American methods of psychological operations are often repeated the same errors during subsequent wars. During the First and Second World War, the U.S. unit responsible for carrying out psychological operations duplicated errors without using the lessons learned from previous wars.

� Y. Okamoto, T. Kirikae, Electroencephalographic studies on brain of fetus, of children of premature birth and new-born, together with a note on reactions of foetus brain upon drugsfoetus brain upon drugs brain upon drugs, “Folia Psychiatrica et Neurologica Japonica”, �95�, vol.v5, no. �, pp. �35-�46.� Dominik Purpura – editor of the journal “Brain Research”, a professor at Einstein Medical College and director of the section of brain research at the National Institutes of Health.� T. Verny, J. Kelly, The Secret Life of the Unborn Child, New York �98�.� W. Fijałkowski, Dar rodzenia, Warszawa �983, pp. 7�, �06.

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Paul. M. A. Linebarger6 indicated that if he used methods elaborated during World War I, he won’t repeat the same mistakes. If employers of US Army PSYOP units during World War II had learned from mistakes of the past, operations could have been more effective7. The situation repeated itself during the Korean War. Then in Vietnam, US Army PSYOP specialists didn’t realize that a man brought up in a different culture will profess different values and thought using other categories resulting from other mental programming8.

Before getting into the analysis of American propaganda during the war in Vietnam, it is worth paying attention to the outstanding series directed

� Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger - was born 11 July 1913 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He was only twenty- three when he earned his Ph.D. in political science at Johns Hopkins University, where he was later Professor of Asiatic politics for many years. Shortly thereafter, he graduated from editing his father’s books to publishing his own highly regarded works on Far Eastern affairs. After graduating from Johns Hopkins, Linebarger taught at Duke University from 1937 to 1946, but he also served actively in the Army during World War II as a second lieutenant. Pierce writes that “As a Far East specialist he was involved in the formation of the Office of War Information and of the Operation Planning and Intelligence Board. He also helped organize the Army’s first psychological warfare section.” He was sent to China and put in charge of psychological warfare and of coordinating Anglo- American and Chinese military activities. By the end of the war, he had risen to the rank of major. In 1947, he became professor of Asiatic Politics at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. Pierce writes, Dr. Linebarger turned his wartime experiences into Psychological Warfare, still regarded as the most authoritative text in the field. As a colonel, he was advisor to the British forces in Malaya, and to the U. S. Eighth Army in Korea. But this self- styled “visitor to small wars” passed up Vietnam, feeling American involvement there was a mistake. Travels around the world took him to Australia, Greece, Egypt, and many other countries; and his expertise was sufficiently valued that he became a leading member of the Foreign Policy Association and an advisor to President Kennedy. Died 06 August 1966. – Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger, Arlington Cemetery, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/linebarg.htm, 3�.07.�0�3.� Paul M.A. Linebarger, Walka Psychologiczna, Biuletyn Informacyjny, Seria Psychologii i Pedagogiki Wojskowej nr ��, printed by Zarząd Propagandy i Agitacji GZP, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa �959, pp. ��8-�30.� Software of the mind according G. Hofstede is patterns of thinking, feeling and acting (which were learned throughout a lifetime). Hofstede’s definition of culture is “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another.” It is important to note that he believes that culture is learned and not inherited. He continues with a brief discussion on the 3 levels in human mental programming: 1. Human nature (universal; inherited); 2. Culture (specific to group/category; learned); and 3. Personality (specific to individual; learned and inherited). – Gerard Kroese, Monumental piece of work on differences in cultures, http://www.amazon.co.uk/Cultures-Organisations-Software-Successful-Stategist/dp/�86�975430, 3�.07.�0�3.

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by Steven Spielberg’s “Falling Skies”9. The series is about an alien invasion of earth. Aliens not only have very different biological organisms, but are mainly characterized by their different patterns of thought, behaviour and perception. The point is that if we want to influence the behaviour of aliens we need to understand their way of thinking, acting and emotional filings. To control their behaviour it’s necessary to have a complete model of their cultural patterns. Only then it’s possible to try plain operations. From a psychological point of view it’s quite simple, because without this kind of knowledge it’s impossible to conduct highly successful psychological operations. If PSYOP unit members want to control someone’s behaviour, they need to try and look at this person as a alien. They can’t put any hypotheses or assumptions until they begin using the scientific research methods to determine the cultural values of the interaction object.

During all the wars there was perpetrated one fundamental mistake that always resulted a failure to significantly to streamline the operation. Involuntarily assumed that the object if it is a human being, thinks, acts and feels emotionally like the U.S. PSYOP specialists. But the truth is that these patterns for each person brought up in a different cultural environment - even within the same society, but in a smaller social group - could be radically different. Similarly, in the case of the Vietnamese. In my opinion at all can be influenced. However, in the first instance it’s necessary to understand the cultural patterns of object interaction better than the object does. Only then it’s reasonable to plan any psychological operation. According to the Chinese art of war - know your enemy better than he knows himself�0.

It would seem that this time, based on experience in conducting psychological operations against a many culturally diverse nation, the

� Falling Skies - is an American science fiction television series about Alien Invasion on the Earth created by Robert Rodat and executive produced by Steven Spielberg. The aliens in the series are mighty, mysterious and merciless. They are highly intelligent and use military-like tactics which make them an overwhelming force against the human forces. There are few types of aliens that are very different – also on the mind, emotional and biological body levels. To defeated or cooperate with each kind of them It’s necessary to understand them better then they understand themselves. �0 S. Tzu, Sztuka wojny czyli trzynaście rozdziałów, pp.7, http://comma.dt.pl/e-books/BingFa/Screen/SCREEN.pdf, 3�.07.�0�3.

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American art of psychological operations will reach the desired level. The Vietnam War showed, however, that the military PSYOP specialists learned understandably slowly. It is fair to say however that these operations were better thought out and executed than during the two World Wars and the Korean War. Alas they still contained a lot of unnecessary mistakes should not be present at all. The following presents a selection of U.S. PSYOP products together with an analysis of strengths and weaknesses.

One of the leaflets from Jul �968 entitled “Freedom of Religion”. At the front and rear is presented the following content��:

FRONT

Do you know that South Vietnam is enjoying prosperity and freedom while the war is still going on? There is plenty of food, money and clothes on the South’s markets and citizens are free to

�� Vietnam War, National Catalog of PSYOP Materials Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, BACM Research, pp. �6

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buy what they want to. That is the result of the free and democratic regime of the South. If you have the chance to get in touch with people, you will realize this fact.

Why continue to waste your youth in hardship while people in South Vietnam do not need your struggle? Return to the people, rebuild a prosperous life for yourself and contribute to the making of peace for your country.

BACK

The South Vietnamese enjoy freedom of religion. All religions are developed beautifully.

According to G. Hofstedego’s study, the Vietnamese has an extremely collectivist orientation, long-term and low uncertainty avoidance��. This means that slogans offering to satisfy the selfish needs of the individual will not reap the expected result. The content should include the good of the family or clan. For example, a Chinese piece of propaganda had used this knowledge to construct their messages during the war with the Japanese. They treated well prisoners of war, knowing that they will talk with their colleagues about Chinese “captivity”�3. Incidentally, the same manoeuvre was used by the Russians during the battles with the Germans on Staliningrad�4.

Returning to the present leaflet, the presence of U.S. troops in Vietnam was treated as temporary. This meant that any negotiations with the US Army in the long term does not make sense. The enemy would have to offer something that would be of real value for the Vietnamese - for example, welfare and safety of the family, a successful future for the country, a long-term vision with almost certain advantages. Specific Vietnamese cultural values shaping their way of thinking, acting and feeling and affecting their ability to take risks, but in a broader sense initiating thoughts. In other words, the Vietnamese were ready for any risk and sacrifice, because sooner or later they realized their goal which was “paradise on earth”. In summary the leaflet was getting the wrong value system for the Vietnamese.

�� G. Hofstede, G.J. Hofstede, Kultury I organizacje, printed by Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, Poznań �007, pp. �5-47.�� Paul M.A. Linebarger, op. cit., pp. �37.�� A. Nowak, Działania psychologiczne w konfliktach zbrojnych, printed by Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa �007, pp. 69.

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Another “masterpiece” of American propaganda art is the leaflet entitled “Questions For The People In The Liberated Areas” in Jun �966 years�5:

TEN QUESTIONS FOR PEOPLE IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

Remember the promises of the National Liberation Front?

Ask yourself:1. Has the Front brought a better life to your family?- No2. Do the people or the Front cadre get the benefits of Front rules?- Cadre3. Has the Front lowered taxes to make living easier?- No4. Does the Front help your hamlet with money from the rice it sellsin Cambodia?5. Has the Front brought peace or war to Vietnam?- War6. Is the Front winning or losing the war it started in Vietnam?- Losing7. Are the Front’s cadres sent away to fight and die, or does theFront send the sons of the people away to fight and die?- Sons of the people

�� Vietnam War, National Catalog of PSYOP Materials Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, BACM Research, pp. �7.

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8. Does the Front bring families together or separate families?- Separates families9. Does the Front build or destroy in Vietnam?- Destroy10. What shall we do to save ourselves and our families from the VC?Cooperate with the Armed Forces of the GVN when they come to drive out the VC

The Vietnamese did not expect that during the war their standard of living will improve. In addition, because of the long-term education in culture Vietnamese were prepared for a long wait for any positive results. This attitude stemmed from the belief in victory. Cultural values, appropriate for Vietnamese, dictated absolute loyalty to the government, which in the eyes of most of the population was the Communist Party�6. The same value is responsible for the understanding of the privileges reserved for people holding high positions in society. For questions regarding winning or losing the war, even if the public targets of this survey agreed that the front is losing, it also was aware that he had not lost or still has the right to rule. The call for cooperation with the Armed Forces of the GVN would make sense if people would be located under the effective authority of South Vietnam.

To sum up, the population of the area until recently controlled by the Vietcong was so brought up to obey the current government, accepting and understanding that any betrayal will be met with severe punishment. The mechanism of obedience was not based on fear of the punishment, only an inner conviction of the rightness of loyalty towards the state authorities which have legitimacy in the eyes of society. The same applied to the understanding of self-sacrifice in the defence of the country. This was also the understanding of sending the younger generation to the army. In fact, as long as the war lasted, for most of the Vietnamese society - communists had the legitimacy to rule. On the other hand, these factors also explain why the majority of the population of South Vietnam was loyal to the pro-American authorities. Unfortunately, as a result, the same factors were responsible for the massacre of civilians made in Hue during the Tet Offensive. In this situation, the propaganda efforts could focus on reducing the authority of the Communist

�� G. Hofstede, G. J. Hofstede, op. cit., s. 57.

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regime by encouraging a government strong enough to promote alternative - preferably based on Vietnamese history, tradition and culture. In the case of the Vietnamese society this policy could be more effective than a naive attempt by American propaganda at hitting the Vietnamese cultural values.

Another leaflet entitled “Chieu Hoi Appel to NVA: Death vs Family” from Oct �965 clearly indicates a lack of understanding of the Vietnamese way of thinking�7.

FRONT

Do you want to die and be buried in an unmarked grave or come back to your family and enjoy the government’s protection?

BACK

It is your choice, either this or that.

�� Vietnam War, National Catalog of PSYOP Materials Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, BACM Research, pp. �8.

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This kind of propaganda was like attempting to bribe or intimidate a child, not trying to understand what is important for this kid. On the one hand you can offer your child candy in exchange for cooperation or a slap in the case of reluctance, but the other person didn’t know that the child does not like sweets and the slap does not impress him. He loves toy cars and is afraid of a monster living in the wardrobe. Not knowing the value system of object interaction is like being really blind, and success is in fact a work of serendipity.

Another leaflet entitled “ Chieu Hoi Appeal to NVA Troops in SVN” from Nov �966 is unfortunately further evidence of such an unprofessional approach to influencing the behaviour of the enemy and the civilian population�8.

FRONT“Are these your enemies”Before you came South you were told that you would fightAmericans, to save the nation, that you would liberate the restof the land that is occupied by the American invaders. Butwhat did you see here? -- Everywhere people are determined tofight the Communists, and you yourselves are forced to killinnocent Vietnamese, including women and children. Your

�� Vietnam War, National Catalog of PSYOP Materials Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, BACM Research, pp. �0.

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enemies are the VN people in hamlets, villages, districts. etc.They don’t need your “liberation” because they are livingpeacefully and happily without you. That is why they do not“welcome” you, but are determined to fight against all Northerntroops to the end. With the strong support from powerful AlliedNations, not only American, but Australians, New Zealanders,Koreans, Thais, and Filipinos, they will certainly defeat you.

BACKYour cause has been lost, and the Northern troops don’t haveenough strength to resist the people’s forces assisted by theinexhaustible resources of their powerful allies. Your causeis hopeless!The only way for you to survive and have peace for yourconscience is to return to the GVN, and together with the peoplein South Vietnam rebuild your life in freedom and happiness.

The last sentence of the flyer’s second part is proof of the total incompetence of those responsible for the preparation of the presented content. Aside from the cultural context described above, it should be noted that the vast majority of combatants in the ranks of the Vietcong wholly or partly believed in the rightness of their cause. Offering “life in freedom and happiness” to people who consciously opted to fight seems to be the peak in naivety. The first paragraph contains a basic error which was avoided even by the ancient Greeks. Saying to the opponent’s face, “You are hopeless! Surrender!” rather motivate them to fight than surrender. The intended effect can be achieved by presenting the military power of South Vietnam and its allies and legitimacy to rule over the whole Vietnam. Then it’s possible to highlight the desire for peace and common security. The content of the leaflets discussed not only does not coincide with Vietnamese cultural values , but it contains unacceptable errors of basic knowledge about the psychology of persuasion.

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I would like to point out that among the numerous PSYOP products during the war in Vietnam, there was also some really valuable items. Here is one of them, entitled “Letter From A female captain” of May �967�9:

Dear Friends,

I am Huynh Thi Tan, alias ilEa Thanh”, former Assistant Commander of the 558thRegional Company, operating in Tan Chau and An Phu, An Giang Provillce. I foughtin the ranks with you before, but I have left for reasons which all of you must know.You, as well as 1, have been fighting for many years, but our struggle has beenexploited. We have been caught in the Communist propaganda net. They regardus as mere instruments, serving the Party’s red ideology and imperialist ambitions.

�� Vietnam War, National Catalog of PSYOP Materials Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, BACM Research, pp. �3-�4.

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We have suffered all kinds of hardships and many of our friends have died shamefullyfor a meaningless cause. For us women, we have sacrificed the love of our familiesand children in order to serve the Party. We have suffered tremendously without anyconsolation.

I made up my mind to leave the Viet Cong and rebellion and return to the land of freedom with the assistance and leniency of the Government. I have found my happiness andconfidence in the future again. I Sincerely hope that you, especially my fellowfemale cadre, will find an opportunity to rally to the National Cause. I know theGovernment and the people are always waiting for you.Hope to meet you again soon!

Signed

It is worth noting that such a letter had to make an impact for several reasons. First, it was written by a person mentally closer to Vietnamese. Secondly, the Russians and the Chinese were indicated indirectly as the source of evil, not members of the Viet Cong or the Vietnamese communists. Thirdly, it points to the shared experience of military actions, common pain from the loss of loved ones. Thus, it created a good emotional basis to provide further content. Unfortunately, it was worse then. In my view, however, the content would be much better if it pointed to the legitimacy of the communist regime, praised the right ideas and aspirations, but also pointed to the devastating submission to the elites in Moscow and Beijing. In this way it could be possible to lead an internal split in the Communist Party and Vietcong.

In the overall assessment there is a very good beginning to the described flyer. Unfortunately, the second part of the letter contains a call to join the South Vietnamese. This call reduces the credibility, and therefore the value of the entire message because it could trigger a negative emotional response in recipients. It is as if the communist government in Poland wanted to recruit members of Solidarity by proposing the acquisition of Russian citizenship. If you want someone to win you must create an offer that will be attractive to the specific person or group of people. Americans which were responsible for PSYOPs in Vietnam couldn’t understand this obvious truth . Therefore, even when they created a pretty good product, they were

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at some point guilty of culpable errors. It should also be remembered that the captain speaks from the position of a traitor, and should therefore give morally justified reasons for leaving the party, and above all to emphasize their continued loyalty to the ideals of communism. Then the credibility of the media would be much higher.

Included in the high level of collectivism and power distances it could be worth indicating mutual friends, who also understand “what is the true communism” and who stopped fighting too in the name of the private interests of elites in Moscow and Beijing. On one hand, referring to family and clan ties, on the other hand indicating the recognized authorities who “understand their mistakes and chose its own true path to communism.” The Vietcong used the aspect of family ties and ancestry. For example, in the evenings at the stations of South Vietnam soldiers, girls sung rural songs. Girls told through loudspeakers about what has happened in the home villages of soldiers. This relied on mutual friends and family, encouraging them to leave Americans and return to the village, where there is waiting for them a plot of a rice field ready for planting. The repetition of such actions gave an electrifying effect. Forty-five thousand soldiers of the South Vietnamese fled to the north of the country�0. Simply, Vietnamese know best how to manipulate the Vietnamese, unlike the Japanese during World War II who didn’t have the slightest idea how to manipulate Americans, evidenced by the content of Japanese propaganda leaflets��.

As in the previous wars in Vietnam’s case, PSYOP units miss the cultural context in the operation planning process. It seems that U.S. experts stubbornly avoided carrying out, prior to these operations, a reconnaissance of culture. This would have allowed them to understand the cultural patterns and mechanisms that govern them. Understanding the cultural patterns responsible for thinking, acting and feeling emotional allows them to understand the perceptual and mental systems of the interaction object. In combination with the knowledge of the impact on the people at the conscious and unconscious level, this allows for planning highly

�0 A. Nowak, op. cit., pp. 8�.�� Paul M.A. Linebarger, op. cit., pp. �6, �65.

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effective psychological operations. In the case of Vietnam, the operations carried out could not be effective because the PSYOP staff did not have the basic knowledge of how to influence the cognitive and mental process of the Vietnamese. The proof of that is the content of the “Psychological Operations U.S. Army Doctrine” FM 33-� from June �968 printed by Department of the Army Field Manual. In section III of this document the authors wrote��:

PSYOPs include the planned use of propaganda and other measures to influence people so that they will behave in a desired manner.

a) Propaganda is any form of communication designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.

b) Other measures are actions – military, political, economic, social, or other – which assist in accomplishing, the PSYOP objectives. They may be employed alone or in conjunction with other PSYOPs and may be implemented by any element of the command.

Propaganda

a) General. Propaganda is used to communicate persuasive messages to selected target audiences and is most effective when used to exploit existing attitudes and opinions which may cause the target audience to respond immediately.

b) Classification. Propaganda is classified according to source as white, grey and black. White propaganda is overtly disseminated and acknowledged by its true source. The source of grey propaganda is not identified but is left to the imagination of the audience. Black propaganda purports to emanate from a source other than its true source. Classification as white, grey or black has no relationship to the validity of the content.

c) Propaganda Task. Propaganda tasks have several objectives

�� Psychological Operations U.S. Army Doctrine, FM 33-�, printed by Department of the Army Field Manual, June �968, pp. 4-5.

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(1) To gain and maintain the attention of the target audience. (…)

(2) To establish credibility with the target audience. This is accomplished by the presentation of factual or believable information.

(3) To influence the emotions, attitudes, or opinions of a target audience to achieve the desired behaviour at an appropriate time. To do this, the audience must know what actions to take and when, where and how to take them.

d) Propaganda Development. The end product of propaganda development is the final propaganda text ready for production. Propaganda development is based on:

(1) Requirements stated in PSYOP objectives.

(2) Detailed research and analysis of target audiences.

(3) Availability of production and delivery capabilities. (…)

It is worth mentioning what the white, gray and black propaganda is. It is a set of methods which have been refined from World War I to influence the behaviour of people. The problem is that these methods mainly impact on the conscious level of people who grew up in Western culture�3. For example, on the one hand Paul M.A. Linebarger wrote about the need to collect detailed information about the object of interaction, but then cites numerous examples of selection methods that would have worked against the people of the Western cultural sphere, not the Japanese, to which these

�� ������ �ro�����d������� �ro�����d� is false information and material that purports to be from a source on one side of a conflict, but is actually from the opposing side. It is typically used to vilify, embarrass or misrepresent the enemy. – L. Doob, Goebbels’ Principles of Nazi Propaganda. The Public Opinion Quarterly �, Vol. �4, No. 3, pp. 4�9–44�.Grey �ro�����d� is propaganda without any identifiable source or author. A major application of grey propaganda is making enemies believe falsehoods using straw arguments: As phase one, to make someone believe “A”, one releases as grey propaganda “B”, the opposite of “A”. In phase two, “B” is discredited using some strawman. The enemy will then assume “A” to be true. - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grey_propaganda#grey, 0�.08.�0�3.White �ro�����d� is propaganda which truthfully states its origin. - http://usmilitary.about.com/od/glossarytermsw/g/w68��.htm, 0�.08.�0�3.

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methods were addressed�4. The bottom line is - the methods used during World War II and the Vietnam War differed, in most cases, in only the language of the propaganda messages. For example, for anthropologists, it is clear that the Japanese, Koreans and Vietnamese represent distinct cultures, and thus differing cultural patterns.

With reference to the studies conducted till now, I support the hypothesis that the level of psychological operations in the period referred to above was very low. Based on studies conducted so far it is difficult to list the reasons for such a low level of planning of U.S. psychological operations during the Vietnam War. Because the studies were of a general nature and preliminary, I believe that further research in this area could allow one to confirm or deny the hypothesis formulated above and indicate the reasons for this state of affairs.

�� Paul M.A. Linebarger, op. cit., pp. �67-�05.

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

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MILITAry INNOVATION

Slavko Barić, PhDCroatian Defence Academy “Petar Zrinski”, Zagreb

Abstract

The process of military innovation- changes in military organization aimed at adapting to the new operational conditions- today, as well as in the future, is the key factor that determines the success or failure of a military organization in carrying out its tasks. This paper provides a definition of military innovation and gives an overview of theoretical approaches to the study of military innovation. The key factors identified as necessary for the success of the military innovation are grand strategy (a clear definition of the national foreign policy goals) and the existence of an innovative military culture within military organization.

Key words: transformation of military organization, military innovation, revolution in military affairs (RMA), grand strategy, military culture

Finding an explanation for t�e processes of c�anges �it�in military organization for t�e processes of c�anges �it�in military organizationfor t�e processes of c�anges �it�in military organization �as al�ays been an objective of t�e researc� of social sciences. Providing ans�ers to t�e question of ��y some military organizations are successful in adapting to t�e ne� operational conditions ��ile ot�ers are not, contains not only a t�eoretical meaning, but if a military organization does not conduct its transformation military organization does not conduct its transformationtransformation successfully t�is may result in serious consequences. A number of examples from military �istory s�o� t�at neglecting c�anges leads to defeat in �ar. The Frenc� defeat of 1940 is a �ell- kno�n example. The German victory over France �as not t�e result of t�e use of more advanced �eapons system (actually France �ad better tanks and as equally good combat planes as Germans) or larger German manpo�er (t�e Frenc� and Britis� �ad t�e numerical advantage over t�e Germans). �t �as over t�e Germans). �t �as

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t�e result of t�e German implementation of a ne� doctrinal concept t�at utilized all t�e advantages offered by t�e ne� �eapons system (aircraft, tanks) ��ic� �as not t�e case �it� t�e opposite side. Anot�er more recent example is t�e failure of t�e U.S. military organization to abandon t�e concept of conventional �arfare and adapt to t�e conditions of asymmetric �arfare.

An array of ot�er examples can be listed to confirm t�e t�esis t�at a military organization refusing to adapt to t�e ne� c�allenges usually ends up �it� serious consequences and t�at successful adaptation is t�e critical factor in �inning t�e �ar. �f �e study suc� examples, a logical question arises: W�ic� factor or factors are important for t�e successful res�aping of a military organization�� of a military organization�� Suc� a simplified explanation as t�at military innovation is based solely upon t�e adaptation of a military organization to t�e introduction of a ne� �eapons system or t�e implementation of ne� tec�nology, �as today been generally abandoned. There is a �ide range of factors affecting a military organization’s transformation: from country’s foreign policy goals, civil-military relations and resources to t�e c�aracteristics of a particular military organization. The experience of military transformation s�o�s t�at t�ere is a direct conflict bet�een bureaucratic sluggis�ness and defence of t�e self interests of t�e bureaucratic structures inside of t�e self interests of t�e bureaucratic structures insidet�e self interests of t�e bureaucratic structures inside t�e military organization, and a ne� vision of its future operation ��ic� questions t�e existing structures, t�eir adaptation to ne� conditions.

A �ide range of questions need to be ans�ered concerning t�e process ofans�ered concerning t�e process ofprocess of transformation of military organization: - W�at is t�e level of risk if a military organization does not adapt to t�e ne�if a military organization does not adapt to t�e ne� organization does not adapt to t�e ne�

situation�� - W�ic� capabilities does it need to develop in order to perform its role in t�e

future��- W�at is t�e cost of developing an operational concept for using ne�developing an operational concept for using ne� concept for using ne�

capabilities��

The c�ange also calls into question institutional interests �it�in a military organization and its relations �it� ot�er organizations.

Be�ind t�ose dilemmas is a fundamental question: W�at �ill t�e future �ar bea fundamental question: W�at �ill t�e future �ar beamental question: W�at �ill t�e future �ar beW�at �ill t�e future �ar be like�� Many military organizations fall into t�e trap of preparing for future �ars military organizations fall into t�e trap of preparing for future �ars based on experience gained from previous �ars, regardless of t�e fact t�at it is, regardless of t�e fact t�at it is it is

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not very likely t�at c�aracteristics ��ic� determined one �ar �ould repeat in t�e future. Military organizations need to prepare for a different �ay of �ar and not to insist only on solutions t�at proved successful in t�e past. The future, �o�ever, is not al�ays certain so instead of a clear vision, �e �ave a situation marked by uncertainly and risks.

This dilemma still exists today as it did in t�e past. �n t�e last t�ree decades, t�e process of global military transformation kno�n as a Revolution in Militaryas a Revolution in Military in Military Affairs (RMA) �as c�anged t�e met�ods of combat operations defined duringduring World War ��. �nstead of conventional �arfare, various forms of asymmetric War ��. �nstead of conventional �arfare, various forms of asymmetric �arfare prevail today. �n t�e post- Cold War era suc� a situation led to a gro�ingsuc� a situation led to a gro�ing led to a gro�ing interest in studying t�e process of military innovation or military organization transformation in an attempt to find �ays of adapting military organizations to to find �ays of adapting military organizations tofind �ays of adapting military organizations to of adapting military organizations to t�e ne� conditions.

Definition of military innovation

To t�is day a �idely accepted definition of t�e process of military innovation �as not been provided. Nevert�eless, t�ere are many available definitions.

American political scientist Step�en Rosen defines major innovation as c�anging t�e �ay of �ar in one of t�e main services of t�e armed forces, or alternatively, or alternatively t�e creation of a ne� military service. �nnovation involves c�anging t�e concepts�e creation of a ne� military service. �nnovation involves c�anging t�e conceptsconcepts be�ind conducting operations (ideas t�at manage t�e �ays of using force in operations (ideas t�at manage t�e �ays of using force inof using force in force in order to �in a campaign), c�anging t�e relation bet�een service branc�es and abandoning or diminis�ing t�e significance of previous concepts of operations1.

Anot�er definition says t�at military innovation is „a c�ange in operational practice t�at produces a significant increase in military effectiveness as measureda significant increase in military effectiveness as measuredignificant increase in military effectiveness as measured by battlefield results”�.

� Rosen, Step�en Peter. (1944) Winning t�e Next War: �nnovation and t�e Modern Military. Cornell University Press, pp. 7-8.� Grissom, Adam. (�006) „The Future of Military �nnovation Studies.” The Journal of Strategic Studies �9(5), p. 907.

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According to M. J. Meese, military innovation is t�e process of replacing part of organizational routine procedures �it� ne� procedures, tactics or strategy. But, if t�ose c�anges can fit into t�e existing strategy, t�en �e are not talking about innovation�.

Definitions of military innovation encompass a broad area. � �ill quote, �o�ever, a definition offered by t�e study made by RAND: „To a specific military organization, innovation manifests itself as a development of ne� concepts of �arfare and/ or ne� �ays of tec�nology integration (c�anges in military doctrine, tactics, support and training met�ods)4. This broad definition includes various c�anges �it�in a military organization (introducing ne� tec�nologies, defining ne� met�ods of conducting armed conflict or a combination of bot� factors) t�atconflict or a combination of bot� factors) t�at of bot� factors) t�at make military innovation.

Most definitions of military innovation include t�e t�ree factors:1. Military innovation leads to c�anges in t�e met�ods of battlefield operations.

Military innovation involves only t�ose met�ods directly affecting combat operations. This means t�at some administrative measure (c�anges in t�eges in t�ein t�e process of acquiring military equipment) cannot be considered an innovation unless t�ey enable a c�ange in t�e conducting battlefield operations.enable a c�ange in t�e conducting battlefield operations. in t�e conducting battlefield operations.

�. Military innovation �as a strategic impact. �f affects t�e acceptable �ay in ��ic� �ars are foug�t. Minor c�anges in military organization t�at do notorganization t�at do not �ave suc� an impact cannot be considered a military innovation. cannot be considered a military innovation.

�. Military innovation increases t�e army’s combat effectiveness.increases t�e army’s combat effectiveness. army’s combat effectiveness.

Common features of various definitions s�o� us t�at military innovation and tec�nological innovation are not t�e same. �t is possible (and very common) t�at military innovation involves t�e development and deployment of a �ig�-of a �ig�-- tec�nology system, but it is not al�ays t�e case. Sometimes military innovation involves a different use of existing tec�nologies by defining creative operational concepts and t�eir operationalization. This opens t�e possibility of ac�ieving victory over a numerically or (even) tec�nologically superior adversary. Theover a numerically or (even) tec�nologically superior adversary. Thenumerically or (even) tec�nologically superior adversary. The

� Meese, M. J. „�nstitutionalizing Maneuver Warfare: The Process Of Organizational C�ange.” publis�ed in Hooker, R. D. (199�) Maneuver Warfare: An Ant�ology. Novato: Presidio Press, pp. 19�- �16. � �saacson, Jeffrey, Layne, C�ristop�er and Arquilla, Jo�n. (1999) Predicting Military �nnovation. Santa Monica: RAND, p. 8.

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Battle of Britain5 in 1940 is an example of suc� innovation. Suc� understanding of military innovation is present today in t�e People’s Republic of C�ina.

�n certain cases, t�e application of ne� military tec�nology can give results, t�e application of ne� military tec�nology can give results of ne� military tec�nology can give results ��ic� are completely opposite to t�e expected outcomes. �f t�e role of t�e ne� tec�nology is interpreted incorrectly and �ays of its use are defined based on a �rong assessment of its potential, t�e result can be a catastrop�ic defeat. Thiscan be a catastrop�ic defeat. This catastrop�ic defeat. This �appened in France in 1940 due to t�e erroneous assessment of t�e role of tanks in modern �arfare.

Military innovation cannot be directly compared �it� military transformationbe directly compared �it� military transformation military transformation or reduced only to tec�nological innovation. Military innovation is a means of ac�ieving t�e goals determined by visions of c�anges. This visions includes principles of military transformation (t�e definition of a desired state andtransformation (t�e definition of a desired state and of a desired state andand a transformation roadmap for ac�ieving t�is state) roadmap for ac�ieving t�is state)6. So �e can say t�at military innovation is part of a �ider process of military transformation, and tec�nological innovation is only a means for operationalizing t�e goals t�at define t�e t�oonly a means for operationalizing t�e goals t�at define t�e t�o means for operationalizing t�e goals t�at define t�e t�o previous processes.

From t�e above mentioned examples it can be concluded t�at t�e process of be concluded t�at t�e process of military innovation cannot be limited only to c�anges caused by t�e emergence of a ne� �eapons system, as t�e military innovation used to be interpreted t�roug�out t�e �0t� century. The AirLand Battle doctrine of t�e 1980s is an example t�at over emp�asizes t�e tec�nological aspect of military innovation.over emp�asizes t�e tec�nological aspect of military innovation. t�e tec�nological aspect of military innovation.

Alt�oug� tec�nology plays an important role in t�e process of military innovation it cannot define t�e entire process of military innovation. Suc� t�inking is still present and supported by a position t�at t�e invention of t�e GPS navigationof t�e GPS navigation navigation system �as c�anged t�e U.S. military organization, state organization and civil society, and t�at t�e U.S. Army �as c�anged t�e c�aracter of land �arfare by

� �f �e observe t�e level of tec�nological development of t�e radar, �e can see t�at Germany �ad t�e advantage at t�e start of t�e Battle of Britain. Ho�ever, before WW�� t�e Commander of RAF Fig�ter Command, General Hug� Do�ding, developed and operationalized t�e concept of t�e Britis� radar organization t�at enabled t�e successful use of RAF fig�ters outnumbered by Luft�affe fig�ters, ��ic� eventually led to Germany’s defeat. � McNerney, Mic�ael. (�005) „Military �nnovation During War: Paradox or Paradigm��” Defence & Security Analysis �1(�), pp. �01-�0�.

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combining ne� tec�nologies and innovative operational concepts7. This is an example of giving too muc� importance to ne� tec�nological equipment, ignoringtec�nological equipment, ignoring t�e fact t�at tec�nological progress only enables t�e more effective performanceenables t�e more effective performance effective performance of existing tasks. �nvention of t�e railroad �as replaced t�e transportationof t�e railroad �as replaced t�e transportation of goods by cart ��ile gro�ing use of t�e �nternet and mobile p�ones �as goods by cart ��ile gro�ing use of t�e �nternet and mobile p�ones �asand mobile p�ones �as �as diminis�ed t�e importance of traditional met�ods of communicating messages (postal s�ipments, landlines, etc.). Therefore, it �ould be an overstatement to say t�at ne� tec�nological advancement is a decisive factor ��ic� revolutionized relations and t�e development of civil society and neit�er caused t�e emergenceand t�e development of civil society and neit�er caused t�e emergence of civil society and neit�er caused t�e emergenceand neit�er caused t�e emergence of ne� �ays of �aging �ars in t�e U.S. nor at t�e global level. �t �as only enabled more effective performance of existing tasks.

�ntroducing a ne� �eapons system or pieceofequipment isnotmilitary innovation,piece of equipment isnotmilitary innovation,uipment is not military innovation, alt�oug� t�e existing operational capabilities of a military organization �ave been existing operational capabilities of a military organization �ave been improved to a certain extent. Clause�itz �as �ell a�are of t�is fact. �n �is famous �ork „On War”, �e �ardly mentions t�e tec�nological factor, alt�oug� �e �as �ell a�are of it (t�e impact of t�e �ndustrial Revolution on �ar- making). �nstead of focusing on t�e tec�nological factor, von Clause�itz placed an emp�asis on t�e intellectual basis for t�e study of �ar. His analysis �as focused on studying t�e �ar- making process and not on military tec�nology and its use (tec�nology is only a means of ac�ieving t�e goals of t�e armed conflict and it c�anges over time). �n t�is �ay, von Clause�itz created an analysis still relevant today and indispensable for t�e study of �ar today as �ell as in t�e future.

The concept of military revolution

Military innovation is a process not limited only to t�e military. �t takes place �it�in a broad frame�ork of political, economic, social and cultural relations �it�in a society. The t�eory of military revolution defined by Britis� �istorian Mic�ael Roberts is accepted today as a �ider frame�ork for military innovation8.

� United States Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation. (�00�) Military Transformation: A Strategic Approac� Was�ington DC, p. 9. � Roberts, Mic�ael. (1967) „The Military Revolution 1560-1660.” publis�ed in Essays in S�edis� History, London, pp. 195- ��5.

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The t�eory of military revolution represents t�e vie� t�at t�e innovation oft�at t�e innovation of of a military organization does not come from introducing a ne� �eapons system or adopting ne� tactics or doctrines. Military revolution is a direct result of �ideradopting ne� tactics or doctrines. Military revolution is a direct result of �ider tactics or doctrines. Military revolution is a direct result of �iderdoctrines. Military revolution is a direct result of �ider Military revolution is a direct result of �ider political, economic and social c�anges in a society. These c�anges lead to c�ange in a military organization and community. The cumulative effect of t�ese c�anges. The cumulative effect of t�ese c�anges cumulative effect of t�ese c�anges is a c�ange in �arfare. Follo�ing t�e c�anges in t�e society it belongs to, a military organization c�anges at all levels, from t�e tec�nology and culture of its membersfrom t�e tec�nology and culture of its members and culture of its members to strategy, tactics, training, doctrine and logistics9.

A military organization’s adaptation to c�anges caused by t�e �ndustrial organization’s adaptation to c�anges caused by t�e �ndustrial Revolution in t�e 19t� century is a good example of t�e influence of �ider political and economic c�anges on military organization transformation. Tec�nological novelties t�at revolutionized �ar- making in t�e 19t� century (small arms and artillery �eapons, railroad as a means of faster transportation, telegrap�, etc.) �ere a result of ne� mass- production tec�niques combined �it� ne� uses of suc� tec�nological ac�ievements. The invention of t�e steam engine and telegrap� started t�e process of economic globalization in t�e 19t� century (steamboat and telegrap� as a fast means of communication). Economic globalization influenced political relations bet�een states (t�e race for colonies) and all t�ose factors contributed to t�e transformation of military organizations.to t�e transformation of military organizations. of military organizations.

The Prussian military transformation served as a model for military transformation Prussian military transformation served as a model for military transformation in t�e second �alf of t�e 19t� century. On t�e one �and, t�e Prussian Army fully understood t�e advantages of t�e modern small arms and artillery �eapons, so it adapted its met�ods of operating to t�e ne� conditions (dispersed battle lines instead of rigid lines, t�e use of railroads for t�e quick transportation of troops,, t�e use of railroads for t�e quick transportation of troops, of railroads for t�e quick transportation of troops,railroads for t�e quick transportation of troops, quick transportation of troops, dispersion of troops and force concentration before t�e battle). �n addition to all t�ese c�anges, t�e Prussian Army under�ent a radical organizational c�ange- ne� military tec�nology and ne� �ays of operating required a ne� organizationne� �ays of operating required a ne� organization of operating required a ne� organization of �ork in t�e armed forces. Therefore, Prussia introduced t�e process of detailed planning for combat operations and emp�asized t�e gro�ing significance of tec�nical expertise in t�e armed forces.

� Murray, Williamson. (1997) „Thinking About Revolution in Military Affairs.” Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 16, pp. 69- 76.

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T�o American �istorians, McGregor and Knox, distinguis� bet�een t�e follo�ingbet�een t�e follo�ing six periods of military innovation from t�e 14t� century to t�e end of t�e �0t� of military innovation from t�e 14t� century to t�e end of t�e �0t� century10.

1. The Military- Technical Revolution in the Late Middle Ages. The c�anges in �arfare resulted from t�e use of several ne� inventions (t�e Englis� longbo�, gunpo�der, �eavily armoured cavalry and ne� infantry tactics) t�at occurred in t�e early 14t� century England. These c�anges resulted in t�e establis�ment of t�e first standing army financed by t�e Englis� Cro�n and t�e introductionby t�e Englis� Cro�n and t�e introduction and t�e introduction of regular military training. These c�anges, �o�ever, are not taken as a militaryas a military revolution because t�ey resulted from military tec�nological progress and not from radical political and economic c�anges t�at took place in England.

�. The Early- Modern Military Revolution (��00- ��00). The main factors influencing t�e development of military organizations in Europe at t�at time �ere political and economic c�anges associated �it� t�e break- up of t�e feudal system and t�e development of capitalism. The creation of modern state. The creation of modern state of modern state organizations in combination �it� t�e countries’ economic gro�t� led to t�e establis�ment of permanent standing armies t�at �ere trained and subjected to military discipline. This increased t�e army’s loyalty to state leaders�ip (t�at �asn’t t�e case �it� mercenary forces). �n t�e field of military tec�nology development, t�e massive use of t�e firearms occurred (small arms, mobile t�e massive use of t�e firearms occurred (small arms, mobile artillery), ne� types of fortifications appeared as �ell as ne� met�ods of siege �arfare. Suc� c�anges triggered t�e development of tactics (t�e use of military forces in battle) and strategy (creating conditions to �in t�e battle) in an attempt to increase t�e effectiveness of military organization.

�. The Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution (late ��th and early ��th century). The end of t�e transformation process of Europeanof t�e transformation process of European process of European state organizations (state sovereignty, democratic political order and national sentiment as t�e fabric of society became t�e basis of state po�er) led to t�e creation of massive standing armies manned by conscription. �n t�e field of military tec�nology development, t�e existing types of �eapons (small arms and cannons) became more sop�isticated. Military revolution involved

�0 Tatalović, Siniśa. (�006) National and �nternational Security. Zagreb: Politićka kultura,pp. 1�1- 1��.

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equipping massive standing armies �it� modern �eapons and equipment (as a result of t�e �ndustrial Revolution). This caused a radical c�ange in t�e �ay of �ar ��ic� included t�e gradual emergence of total �ar requiring t�e completeincluded t�e gradual emergence of total �ar requiring t�e complete emergence of total �ar requiring t�e complete�ar requiring t�e complete complete mobilization of t�e entire society. All t�ose tendencies �ere visible during t�e Napoleonic Wars and t�e American Civil War (1861- 1864).

4. World War I (����- ����). The continuous development of military tec�nology t�roug�out t�e 19t� century (small arms and artillery development in order to increase precision and density of fire) made defence easy anddefence easy and and attacks more difficult. The use of railroads for t�e quick transportation ofrailroads for t�e quick transportation of transportation of troops and t�e development of a reliable communication system (telegrap�,of a reliable communication system (telegrap�, communication system (telegrap�, radio communication) improved t�e effective command over large militaryimproved t�e effective command over large military command over large military formations (coordinated operations over t�e large territory). Bot� factors in combination �it� t�e gro�ing economic strengt� of great po�ers and t�eir mobilization potential meant t�at t�e idea of a decisive battle of anni�ilationpotential meant t�at t�e idea of a decisive battle of anni�ilation of a decisive battle of anni�ilation �it� t�e aim of utterly destroying t�e adversary’s forces in one key battle became obsolete. The c�ange �as ignored by t�e European military po�ers t�at still insisted on fig�ting a s�ort- lived �ar t�at �ould exclude t�e adversary from combat (as �ad �appened during t�e Napoleonic War). World War � s�o�ed during t�e Napoleonic War). World War � s�o�edWar). World War � s�o�ed War � s�o�ed t�at it �as impossible to fig�t suc� a type of �ar, and t�e ne� �eapons systemsuc� a type of �ar, and t�e ne� �eapons system of �ar, and t�e ne� �eapons system appearing at t�e time (fig�ters, tanks and submarines) marked t�e potential for t�e big c�anges in �arfare t�at �ill occur t�o decades later. c�anges in �arfare t�at �ill occur t�o decades later.

5. World War II (����- ����). World War �� represented a military revolutionWar �� represented a military revolution a military revolution because in t�is conflict military organizations of belligerent parties accepted t�e results of political and economic c�anges t�at took place in t�e Western industrialized countries in t�e second �alf of 19t� century (t�e total �ar concept). The acceptance of t�ese c�anges �as evident in t�e process of military innovation in t�e period bet�een 1919 and 19�9. �n t�e field of military tec�nology, t�ree strategic novelties (t�e development of manoeuvremanoeuvre �arfare, t�e crucial role of air po�er in combat operations, t�e use of aircraftarfare, t�e crucial role of air po�er in combat operations, t�e use of aircraft, t�e crucial role of air po�er in combat operations, t�e use of aircraft crucial role of air po�er in combat operations, t�e use of aircraftoperations, t�e use of aircraft of aircraft carries and submarines in naval �arfare) radically c�anged t�e �ay of �ar.

6. The Nuclear Revolution (post-���� period) is marked by t�e continuedt�e continued development of processes t�at began in WW� and WW��. Nevert�eless, if �eevelopment of processes t�at began in WW� and WW��. Nevert�eless, if �e consider only t�ese c�anges, t�e period of t�e Nuclear Revolution could not be categorized as a military revolution, but only as t�e Military- Tec�nical

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Revolution. Ho�ever, t�e development of nuclear �eapons and c�anges t�at occurred in t�e area of international politics and international security (t�esecurity (t�e nuclear arms race bet�een superpo�ers) justify its classification as a military arms race bet�een superpo�ers) justify its classification as a military revolution.

The period from t�e 1980s till t�e present day can be c�aracterized as t�e latest military revolution. Alt�oug� t�e c�anges in �arfare in t�is period are often reduced to t�e use of �ig� tec�nology and its results (concepts of net�ork-centric �arfare and effect based operations, t�e use of precisions guided �eapons, etc.),, t�e use of precisions guided �eapons, etc.), of precisions guided �eapons, etc.), t�ose trends �ere t�e outcome of global political and economic c�anges t�at began in t�e 1970s (electronic miniaturization and t�e information revolution, t�e �orld economic development culminating in t�e process of globalization, neoliberal development paradigm, end of t�e Cold War, collapse of t�e Soviet Union, etc.). The �idespread employment of t�e met�ods of asymmetric �arfare.). The �idespread employment of t�e met�ods of asymmetric �arfare employment of t�e met�ods of asymmetric �arfare is t�e consequence of t�ese processes. The RMA as t�e current military revolution. The RMA as t�e current military revolution RMA as t�e current military revolution creates t�e frame�ork for conducting current processes of military innovation.

Theoretical approaches to studying military innovation

Given t�e scope of researc� concerning military innovation t�ere are a lot ofresearc� concerning military innovation t�ere are a lot of military innovation t�ere are a lot of t�eories dealing �it� t�e question of military organization transformation andand t�e broader impact of suc� transformation and on t�e political and economic broader impact of suc� transformation and on t�e political and economicon t�e political and economic and economic development of state organization and society as a ��ole. Suc� t�eories study t�e influence of t�ese processes on international relations and t�e international order.and t�e international order. order. Theories of military innovation can be divided into t�ree groups. The first group includes t�eories dealing �it� t�e impact of military organization transformation on t�e political and economic development of a state organization as �ell as and economic development of a state organization as �ell as as �ell as society as a ��ole and t�e effect of suc� processes on international relations and international order. An example of suc� an approac� is t�e consideration of t�esuc� an approac� is t�e consideration of t�e is t�e consideration of t�eis t�e consideration of t�e consideration of t�e influence of military innovation on t�e transformation of Western Europeanon t�e transformation of Western European of Western European countries from 15t� to 18t� century, or t�e consequences of military revolution ofor t�e consequences of military revolution of of military revolution of t�at time on t�e consolidation of Western European countries and t�e expansiontime on t�e consolidation of Western European countries and t�e expansion consolidation of Western European countries and t�e expansionand t�e expansion of global po�er of t�e West. The c�anges in �arfare (t�e creation of massive and�arfare (t�e creation of massive and creation of massive and permanent armies, t�e disappearance of mercenary forces, consequences for, t�e disappearance of mercenary forces, consequences for disappearance of mercenary forces, consequences for

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military organization and society arising from t�e development of ne� �eapons) are associated �it� political and economic c�anges of state organizations (t�eorganizations (t�e development and rise of t�e nation state, t�e increase of t�e state’s economic and rise of t�e nation state, t�e increase of t�e state’s economicstate, t�e increase of t�e state’s economic of t�e state’s economic po�er). Military innovation in t�is period is also considered in t�e context of relations bet�een European po�ers and non-European countries.

The Britis� �istorian Brian Do�ning argues t�at t�e need for t�e sustainment �istorian Brian Do�ning argues t�at t�e need for t�e sustainmentfor t�e sustainment of massive and permanent armies forced European countries in t�e 17t� and 18t� centuries to replace t�eir decentralized institutions in�erited from medieval times �it� centralized state apparatus. These countries developed autocratic forms of government t�at �ere necessary to ac�ieve t�e complete mobilization of a society. Ho�ever, countries in ��ic� suc� military revolution did not take place (countries t�at found alternative �ays to finance �ar- making �it�out greatly burdening t�eir citizens and t�us t�ose in ��ic� medieval institutions survived)and t�us t�ose in ��ic� medieval institutions survived) t�ose in ��ic� medieval institutions survived) laid t�e foundations basis for t�e development of modern liberal democracies (in �is opinion medieval constitutionalism is t�e basis for modern democracies)- t�e balance of po�er establis�ed bet�een t�e king, gentry, clerics, peasants and property rig�ts created a predisposition to t�e development of democratic political institutions in Europe �it� t�e arrival of capitalism11.

Historian Bruce Porter associates t�e industrialization of �arfare and t�eand t�e mobilization of t�e entire population �it� t�e emergence of a collectivist state�it� t�e emergence of a collectivist state of a collectivist state1�. He argues t�at a collectivist state �as really t�ree states intert�ined in one: a regulatory state (c�aracterized by extensive state intervention in t�e national economy); a mass state (in ��ic� political participation �as divorced from class or economic status); and a �elfare state (assuming direct responsibility for t�e �ell-being of its citizens). To t�e greatest extent, centralization �as based on securing conditions for successful �arfare- as t�e �ars became more complex and more expensive, only t�e most po�erful rulers could afford to pay t�e price of successful �arfare. �n Europe t�is process led to t�e formation of po�erful states- France and Spain, and later Germany and �taly. At t�e same time, t�e centralization, t�e centralization caused by t�e military factor contributed to t�e development of t�e nation state

�� Do�ning, Brian. (199�) The Military Revolution and Political C�ange. Princeton: Princeton University Press.�� Porter, Bruce. (1994) War and t�e Rise of t�e State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics. Ne� York: The Free Press.

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by t�e bureaucratization and centralization of t�e entire state apparatus. This and centralization of t�e entire state apparatus. This �as a response to international conflicts and civil �ars. The process resulted in t�e creation of t�ree groups of states- absolutist states (France and Spain), countries t�at managed to resist absolutist tendencies t�anks to its geograp�ic position (natural barriers) and establis� t�e po�er- limiting mec�anisms (Great Britain, S�itzerland), and ot�er countries t�at �ere frequently invaded ��ic� consequently induced even stronger centralization turning into totalitarianism (Russia and later Germany).

Geoffrey Parker considers t�e impact of military transformation in t�e West bet�een t�e 16t� and 19t� century period and t�e global expansion of t�e West’s and 19t� century period and t�e global expansion of t�e West’sWest’s po�er. He argues t�at military revolution in t�e West (t�e creation of massive. He argues t�at military revolution in t�e West (t�e creation of massiveWest (t�e creation of massive of massive armies and tec�nologically advanced �ars�ips, t�e role of firearms) gave Western�ars�ips, t�e role of firearms) gave Western role of firearms) gave Westerngave Western po�ers a decisive advantage over t�e countries on ot�er continents and enabled t�e rise of t�e West’s global dominanceWest’s global dominance dominance1�.

The question of t�e cause of Western dominance is again in focus due to t�ecause of Western dominance is again in focus due to t�e dominance is again in focus due to t�eagain in focus due to t�e due to t�e fact t�at t�e analysis of military revolutions in Early Modern Europe �as been associated �it� t�e current revolution in military affairs �it�in ��ic� is considered t�e dominance of Western military organizations based on t�e use of �ig� tec�nology �eapons system and especially on t�e application of information tec�nology. The question is ��et�er Western global dominance �ill continue.

As is evident from t�eories described above, t�e study of military innovations from t�eories described above, t�e study of military innovations at t�e strategic level does not deal �it� causes t�at initiate military organization transformation. �t deals �it� t�e political and economic consequences of t�ese�it� t�e political and economic consequences of t�eselitical and economic consequences of t�ese c�anges at t�e national and global level.

Anot�er group of t�eories examines t�e causes of military innovation, or identifies t�e factors t�at induce military organization to�ards innovation and t�e factorsorganization to�ards innovation and t�e factors and t�e factors t�at prevent military innovation. Emp�asis is placed on finding t�e ans�er to t�e question of ��at causes military innovation by trying to analyse similarities and differences bet�een innovations t�at take place in military and non- military organizations.

�� Parker, Geoffrey. (1996) The Military Revolution, Military innovation and Rise of t�e West 1500- 1800. Cambridge University Press.

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American political scientist Barry R. Posen uses structural t�eory to explain t�e causes of military innovation. Based on t�e development of t�e military doctrine ofof t�e military doctrine of doctrine of t�ree European po�ers bet�een 1919 and 19�9 (Germany, France, Great Britain)14. Posen combines organization t�eory (relations �it�in t�e military organization) and t�e concept of t�e balance of po�er in international relations (external concept of t�e balance of po�er in international relations (external incentives for innovation). He argues t�at a military organization resists t�e process of innovation because every innovation increases operational uncertainty. According to Posen, military innovation is often initiated by civilian leaders (triggered by external t�reats and t�e need to adapt t�e military organization toadapt t�e military organization to military organization to meet t�ese t�reats) �it� t�e �elp of military „mavericks”. A military organization”. A military organization organization can also initiate t�e process of innovation, but only if practical examples s�o� t�at t�ere is a need for innovation (for example, t�e successful use of ne� tec�nologyexample, t�e successful use of ne� tec�nology use of ne� tec�nology in combat, or defeat in �ar).

�n most cases, Posen’s argument t�at civilian leaders initiate military innovation is discarded by Step�en P. Rosen ��o also rejects Posen’s argument t�at a defeatt�at a defeat in �ar or civilian leaders�ip intervention are necessary to initiate military civilian leaders�ip intervention are necessary to initiate military innovations in t�e military organization15. According to Rosen, t�e ones t�at play t�e key role are senior officers ��o define a military organization’s ne� tasks anddefine a military organization’s ne� tasks and tasks and �ays of t�eir implementation as �ell as �ig�- ranking civil officials ��o support t�em (internally- driven model of military innovation). �n t�is �ay, key c�anges occur in t�e adoption of ne� military strategies and doctrines. Bot� approac�esin t�e adoption of ne� military strategies and doctrines. Bot� approac�es of ne� military strategies and doctrines. Bot� approac�es s�o� t�at t�ere is a conflict bet�een t�o sc�ools of military-innovation t�eories:military-innovation t�eories:: one argues t�at military innovation is externally motivated and t�e ot�er t�at itexternally motivated and t�e ot�er t�at it t�e ot�er t�at it is internally induced.

�n t�e mid- 1990s t�ere appeared anot�er group of researc�ers regarding t�e1990s t�ere appeared anot�er group of researc�ers regarding t�e anot�er group of researc�ers regarding t�e t�eses of previously mentioned aut�ors (and some ot�er) as a form of correction,as a form of correction, stating t�at t�ey s�ould be integrated into a �ider frame�ork since t�ey related t�ey s�ould be integrated into a �ider frame�ork since t�ey related

�� Posen, Barry R. (1984) The sources of Military Doctrine- France, Britain and Germany Bet�een t�e World Wars. Ne� York: Cornell University Press.�� Rosen, Step�en Peter. (1994) Winning t�e Next War: �nnovation and t�e Modern Military. Cornell University Press.

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only to certain cases. American military �istorians Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett are t�e most famous advocates of suc� an integrated approac�suc� an integrated approac� integrated approac�16.

The t�ird group of military innovation t�eories includes t�e ones t�at do not deal �it� causes of military innovation. These t�eories are focused on practice and deal primarily �it� finding a direct ans�er by military organizations to ne�ans�er by military organizations to ne� organizations to ne� t�reats (t�e first t�o groups of military innovation t�eories deal �it� t�e causes of military innovation ��ile t�e t�ird group of t�eories focuses on �o� t�e process of military innovation occurs under certain conditions and ��et�er its results are successful or not).

An example of t�is approac� is Bruce Gudmundsson’s study of German innovation in infantry tactics during World War �17. Gudmundsson analyses a c�ange in tactics initiated in t�e German Army in order to break t�e status quo on t�e Western battlefield (trenc� �arfare). The outcome �as t�e development of assault tactics�as t�e development of assault tactics development of assault tactics and special units t�at used t�ese tactics (Stosstruppen) in combination �it� t�eused t�ese tactics (Stosstruppen) in combination �it� t�e tactics (Stosstruppen) in combination �it� t�e factors t�at led to Germany’s success being o�ed to t�e decentralized commandled to Germany’s success being o�ed to t�e decentralized command Germany’s success being o�ed to t�e decentralized commandGermany’s success being o�ed to t�e decentralized command command (giving responsibility for t�e development and execution of operational plan tofor t�e development and execution of operational plan to development and execution of operational plan to company and battalion commanders based on general guidelines issued by �ig�er commands), t�e development of ne� �eapons system support and successful), t�e development of ne� �eapons system support and successful development of ne� �eapons system support and successful coordination bet�een infantry and artillery support.

Anot�er example is t�e �ork of Jo�n A. Nagl describing t�e development of counter-guerrilla tactics in t�e U.S. and Britis� Army tactics in t�e U.S. and Britis� Army18. The aut�or compares t�o counterinsurgency campaigns- t�e Britis� campaign in Malaysia (1948- 1960) and t�e U.S. campaign in Vietnam (1965- 197�). He analyses t�e reasons for t�e successfor t�e success of t�e Britis� counterinsurgency doctrine and t�e failure of t�e U.S. doctrine. counterinsurgency doctrine and t�e failure of t�e U.S. doctrine.and t�e failure of t�e U.S. doctrine. of t�e U.S. doctrine. According to Nagl, t�e key factor is t�e existence of different organizationalfactor is t�e existence of different organizational different organizational cultures �it�in bot� military organizations- t�e Britis� military organization �as open to t�e adoption of ne� concepts ��ile t�e U.S. organization �as not. This of ne� concepts ��ile t�e U.S. organization �as not. Thisof ne� concepts ��ile t�e U.S. organization �as not. Thise� concepts ��ile t�e U.S. organization �as not. This led to t�e U.S. failure in counterinsurgency �arfare in Vietnam.

�� Murray, Williamson and Miller, Allan R. (1996) Military �nnovation in t�e �nter�ar Period. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.�� Gudmundsson, Bruce. (1995) Stormtroop Tactics: �nnovation in t�e German Army, 1914- 1918. Westport: Praeger.�� Nagl, Jo�n A. (�005) Learning to Eat Soup �it� Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaysia and Vietnam. C�icago: The University of C�icago Press, C�icago.

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Factors influencing the process of military innovation

The most significant of all t�eoretical approac�es to studying military innovation previously described is t�e second approac� aimed at identifying factors t�at induce a military organization to�ards innovation and factors t�at preventinnovation and factors t�at prevent military innovation.

Military innovation t�eoreticians list a range of factors t�at influence innovation in military organizations. Despite different met�odologies, t�ese factors can be divided into external (factors outside t�e military organization) and internal factors (factors inside t�e military organization).

A country’s grand strategy- its realistic foreign and security policy goals- is critical for successful military innovation. �f military and political leaders make a �rong estimate of t�e situation and do not formulate an ac�ievable grand strategy t�enstrategy t�en innovation is affected. This involves t�e ability to combine t�ree basic elements of ability to combine t�ree basic elements of national po�er (political - projecting t�e values of t�e country’s political system;projecting t�e values of t�e country’s political system; of t�e country’s political system; economic - ensuring prosperity; military - t�e use of t�e country’s military po�er)military - t�e use of t�e country’s military po�er) use of t�e country’s military po�er) in order to protect t�e country’s political sovereignty and territorial integrity, and realize national interests.

The key internal factor is t�e existence of suc� an organizational culture of militarysuc� an organizational culture of military culture of military organization (or its military culture) t�at enables organizational openness to ne� ideas. Lately, t�e second and t�ird groups of military innovation t�eories �ave been paying more attention to t�e significant of organizational (military) culture, and its influence on be�aviour and t�e formulation of responses to c�angingand t�e formulation of responses to c�anging formulation of responses to c�anging situations in t�e military organization. Military culture consist of internalized identity, standards and values t�at determine t�e military organization’s �orldvie�, its role and functions19. Military culture is an integral part of military training, military practice and t�roug� t�eir execution is expanding and en�ancing insideinside t�e military organization. Military culture s�apes t�e identity of t�e military organization. Military culture s�apes t�e identity of t�e militaryidentity of t�e military organization.

�� Cassidy, Robert M. (�008) „Counterinsurgency and Military Culture: State Regulars versus Non- State �rregulars.” Baltic Security & Defense Revie�, Vol. 10, p. 54.

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A military organization’s conservatism and resistance to c�ange are t�e and resistance to c�ange are t�e c�aracteristics of many military organizations. Many examples of a militaryexamples of a military organization’s rigidity and inflexibility can be found t�roug�out �istory, suc� as and inflexibility can be found t�roug�out �istory, suc� asas t�e refusal to make t�e necessary c�anges in t�e �ay of �ar. On t�e ot�er �and, to make t�e necessary c�anges in t�e �ay of �ar. On t�e ot�er �and,. On t�e ot�er �and, ot�er �and, t�ere are numerous examples to t�e contrary s�o�ing t�at military organizations can and must c�ange despite t�eir traditionalism, especially ��en suc� c�ange is part of greater political and social c�anges. �nnovative military culture is an indispensable factor in all examples of successful military innovation�0.

Successful combination of t�o factors - a realistically and clearly definedfactors - a realistically and clearly defined and clearly defined grand strategy and innovative military culture - results in successful military innovation. Bot� factors are important in formulating military doctrine. They reveal s�ortcomings of existing doctrine. Based on suc� analysis t�ey also enable t�e development of appropriate mec�anism for evaluating ne� doctrines (simulations, exercises, manoeuvres)�1.

The development of aircraft carries and t�e U. S. Naval Air Force in t�e period bet�een WW� and WW�� and t�e development of t�e German doctrine of armoured �arfare are examples of successful military innovation combining bot� factors. Out of t�e t�ree naval po�ers developing aircraft carriers after WW� ( t�e United States, Japan and Great Britain), only t�e United States used t�e full potential of t�e Naval Air Force. Alt�oug� Great Britain �ad a significant advantage in t�e development of aircraft carries, quite soon it gave up its leadingcarries, quite soon it gave up its leading it gave up its leading role in favour of t�e U. S. and Japan. The main reason be�ind t�e Britis� setback �as an unclear and undecided grand strategy t�at didn’t set clear goals for t�e and undecided grand strategy t�at didn’t set clear goals for t�et�e development of all t�ree branc�es of t�e Britis� armed forces. Consequently, t�elopment of all t�ree branc�es of t�e Britis� armed forces. Consequently, t�e, t�e Britis� Royal Navy did not recognize t�e full potential of aircraft carriers. The U. S. Navy �as quick to see t�e potential of aircraft carriers as t�e main capital to see t�e potential of aircraft carriers as t�e main capital s�ips t�at �ould assume t�e role of battles�ips. The Britis� concept of t�e use ofof t�e use of of aircraft carriers, �o�ever, �as very conservative. From t�e Britis� point of vie�, t�e role of aircraft carriers in t�e 19�0s �as reduced to detecting enemy vessels

�0 For t�e analysis of military culture and its influence on military organizational innovation, see Barić, Slavko. (�010) Asymmetric Warfare and Military Organizational Transformation: Adaptation of Military Doctrines and Met�ods of Operation in Response to Asymmetric Threats. P�. D. t�esis. Zagreb: Faculty of Political Science, pp. 1�4- 14�. �� �bid., p. 180.

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and directing battles�ip fire. Ne� concepts of t�e use of aircraft carriers could notriers could notcould not be developed due to t�e fact t�at t�e lack of financial resources led to an inability to replace old aircraft carriers �it� ne� improved models. Keeping t�e old aircraft carriers in service also prevented t�e consideration of ne� doctrinal concepts. �nprevented t�e consideration of ne� doctrinal concepts. �n consideration of ne� doctrinal concepts. �n t�e U. S. Navy t�e situation �as different. The United States clearly identified t�eir future adversary at t�e strategic level (Japan). On t�at basis t�e U. S. Navy establis�ed a link bet�een strategic, operational and tactical levels (t�e strategiclevels (t�e strategic planning for naval �arfare assigning t�e strategic role to aircraft carriers; definingassigning t�e strategic role to aircraft carriers; defining role to aircraft carriers; defining operational concepts for t�e development and use of aircraft carriers; conductingfor t�e development and use of aircraft carriers; conducting education based on doctrinal concepts; validating and c�anging concepts based on operational experience and exercises). The organizational culture created in t�e U. S. Navy �as based on t�e stimulating innovation and synergy among t�ree levels of operation, including t�e connection bet�een defining ne� doctrinal concepts and education��.

Anot�er example of successful military innovation is t�e development of t�e German armoured �arfare doctrine in t�e period bet�een 1919 and 19�9. Germany successfully defined t�e armoured �arfare concept, ��ic� served as t�e basis forconcept, ��ic� served as t�e basis for integration of armoured �arfare �it� mobile and decentralized battles. The first factor enabling t�e successful integration �as a clearly defined grand strategy (avoid a �ar on t�o fronts and in case of a t�o- front �ar, ac�ieve a quick victory over France). German military organizational culture after WW� �as important for a successful military innovation. General Hans von Seeckt, German Army c�ief of staff from 19�0 to 19�6, started t�e process of analysing t�e experience gained in WW� as part of t�e Reic�s�e�r revitalization. Suc� extensive analysis resulted in t�o doctrinal studies adopted in 19�� and 19�4 ��ic� served as t�e basis for t�e furt�er doctrinal development of t�e German Army. Bot� studies emp�asized t�emy. Bot� studies emp�asized t�e need for t�e decentralization of command and t�e need to give junior officers (att�e decentralization of command and t�e need to give junior officers (at company and battalion level) freedom and responsibility for conducting military operations at t�e tactical level. Anot�er significant result �as t�e integration of infantry, artillery and tactics or t�e development of t�e combined arms doctrine adopted by all services of t�e German Army. The doctrine emp�asized mobile �arfare (fast exploitation of t�e breakt�roug�) requiring armoured units to

�� �bid., pp. 149- 160.

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operate in coordination �it� ot�er services of t�e German Army. These doctrinal assumptions �ere validated in practice. The doctrine development process and its validation in practice led to t�e development of an innovative German military organizational culture. �t encouraged continuous education, innovation and t�e adoption of measures t�at proved to be successful and useful. This approac� started a ne� cycle of innovation processes processesprocesses��.

The U. S. and German examples s�o� t�at t�e development of military doctrine as a response to t�e c�anging circumstances t�at military organizations encounter must be based on clearly defined goals set by t�e grand strategy; integration of t�e process of defining ne� concepts; t�eir validation in practice and continuing education present in previously mentioned processes. The adoption of a ne� military doctrine does not imply t�at t�e entire process is completed. �t can give results opposite to t�ose expected, e. g. belief t�at t�e perfect solution �as been found. At t�is point ne� doctrines become dogmas, so it is necessary to become dogmas, so it is necessary to continually evaluate t�e adopted doctrine and continue t�e process of military innovation.

Conclusion

The subject of military innovation is still important today. �ts importance is increasing because military organizations need to adapt to conditions t�at �ave c�anged significantly since t�e Cold War. The end of t�e Cold War marked t�e end of a relatively clear- cut situation. �nstead of preparing for �ig� intensity conventional conflict, military organizations are facing t�e c�allenge of finding a �ay to operate ��ile carrying out a �ide range of non- traditional missions t�at up to no� �ere not t�e centre of t�eir attention, from participation in �umanitarian assistance to post- conflict stabilization, and in certain cases, combating terrorism and combating organized crime. These tasks pose a great c�allenge to military organization. This is evident from t�e experience of t�e Britis� Army in combating t�e �ris� Republican Army from 197� to 1998 and t�e current engagement of t�e Mexican military units in combating organized

�� �bid., pp. 160- 175.

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crime. The situation �as become more complicated in t�e area of conventional �arfare due to t�e global spread of cutting-edge military tec�nology in t�e last t�o decades. This opened up t�e possibility to successfully counter tec�nological superiority of military organizations and t�us t�ey are faced �it� t�e need to develop ne� capabilities and ne� �ays to use t�ese capabilities �it� insufficient financial resources ��ile great uncertainty exists in t�e �ay of �ar.�ar.

Under c�anged circumstances, military innovation cannot be reduced solely to t�e introduction of a ne� �ig�- tec�nology system. This paper describes t�o factors necessary to ac�ieve success in t�e process of military innovation. One factor includes setting clear foreign and security policy goals (a country’s grand strategy). Defining potential future adversaries and securing t�e resources needed to neutralize t�e adversary depends on t�is factor. Anot�er factor is a military organization’s openness to innovation, or t�e existence of an open or closed military culture. Successful innovation is not possible if t�e military organization does not enable t�e creation and development of an institutionalized process of analysis. For t�is �e need an innovative military culture representing t�e basis for t�e process of learning because organization adapts to ne� operational conditions. An innovative process of learning and analysis, �o�ever, must be continued- t�e of learning and analysis, �o�ever, must be continued- t�e end of innovation cycle does not mean t�e end of t�e process.

references

Barić, Slavko (�010). Asymmetric Warfare and Military Organizational Transformation: Adaptation of Military Doctrines and Methods of Operation in Response to Asymmetric Threats. P�. D. t�esis. Zagreb: Faculty of Political Science

Cassidy, Robert M. (�008). „Counterinsurgency and Military Culture: State Regulars versus Non- State �rregulars.” Baltic Security & Defense Review, Vol. 10.

Do�ning, Brian. (199�) The Military Revolution and Political Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Grissom, Adam. (�006) „The Future of Military �nnovation Studies.” The Journal of Strategic Studies �9(5), pp. 905- 9�4.

Gudmundsson, Bruce. (1995) Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914- 1918. Westport: Praeger.

�saacson, Jeffrey, Layne, C�ristop�er and Arquilla, Jo�n. (1999) Predicting Military Innovation. Santa Monica: RAND.

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McNerney, Mic�ael. (�005) „Military �nnovation During War: Paradox or Paradigm��” Defence & Security Analysis �1(�), pp. �01- �1�.

Meese, M. J. „�nstitutionalizing Maneuver Warfare: The Process of Organizational C�ange.” publis�ed in Hooker, R. D. (199�) Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology. Novato: Presidio Press., pp. 19�- �16.

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Simulation technologieS: imPlicationS for Security management and training

Prof. dipl. eng. Pavel necaS, Phd University of Security Management in Kosice, Slovakiadipl. eng. matus grega Armed Forces Academy of Gen. M.R. Stefanik, Liptovsky Mikulas, Slovakia

abstract

Globalization and the spread of Simulation Technologies will combine to put increasing strain on the concept of the state and its Security Oriented Community, but will not alter the geographical dimension that remains a key parameter. After due consideration of the levers impacting the future strategic environment, together with an analysis of the trends of key factors such as resources, economies and populations, the resultant is likely to be a scenario of states linked by common interests, cultures, expectations and ambitions, that rotate around pivotal states acting as regional attractors. An additional level of complexity arises due to the dynamic interaction between the geographical and virtual dimensions, possibly inducing centrifugal forces as individual nations cluster around pivotal states.

Key words: Globalization, Simulation and Modeling, LVC means, Dynamic Information, Security Education and Training, Security Oriented Community, Simulation Technologies.

introduction

Simulation has long been utilized to improve education and training, develop doctrine, tactics and materials and improve combined and joint coordination. The ability to develop a versatile simulation centre that can evolve with standards and tools has always been a challenge. This challenge was successfully overcome

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in Slovakia. Since the end of the cold war, Security Oriented Communities (SCO) have been dealing with a new challenge: the rapid deployment of forces in usually hostile territories in order to participate in peacekeeping or force projection operations or to assist international organizations and non-governmental organizations engaged in human relief operations. These types of operations widely addressed as Peacekeeping Operations (PO) or better yet Peace Support Operations (PSO), especially in the settings of an urban environment, are posing significant challenges in the entire decision making, mission planning and mission execution cycle. The characteristics that affect the aforementioned cycle are; the Operational Area, which is characterized by complex, ambiguous, and, at times, uncertain situations that may have some or all of the following features: asymmetrical threats, failed states, absence of rule of law, gross violations of human rights, collapse of civil infrastructure or presence of displaced persons and refugees. The second characteristic, the Risk Management, is a key topic. Leaders at every level must endlessly assess the risk to their forces and take appropriate actions to mitigate that risk. In addition, during the early stages of deployment, SCO units may be required to conduct non-traditional security based operations which are unique, having their own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic and cultural characteristics.

modelling and Simulation tools in education and training

The Modelling and Simulation (M&S) concept dates back thousands of years to the ancient Egyptians and the famous Chinese war strategist Sun Tzu. Notwithstanding these initial attempts to replicate ancient battlefields, current day machine-based M&S found its roots in the early 20th century. During this dawning era, the majority of M&S efforts were carried out in isolation. It is a fact one may not find so surprising considering the fundamental definition of a model: a representation of an element of the real world for a specific purpose. Working in isolated domains on specific applications, M&S developers created bespoke solutions to precise problems, but with the evolution of networks and networked computer systems where modelling and simulation has undergone a significant maturation process over the past few decades. Early on, the M&S realm represented only a very small portion of the real world. Systems such as flight simulators, and

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Operational Analysis (OA) models, although based on real world requirements, had no direct physical connection to real world domains. Technology growth led to an expansion within the M&S realm, allowing practitioners to address a larger subset of real world applications with more comprehensive and complex representations.

Components of the Live, Virtual and Constructive Simulation (LVC) can be divided into two categories: those associated with the science and technology of simulation itself and those more closely related to the human and cultural aspects of the M&S community. Considering the science and technology of simulation modelling, the Urban Battlefield environment is the most important challenge, especially thanks to the existence and modelling of buildings, which remain by far the most important feature in the urban environment. Urban terrain is a complex, man-made environment unlike the terrain in which soldiers have traditionally trained for combat. It is characterized by three subsystems: physical, functional and social.

Physically, urban terrain comprises of angular forms laid out in a grid pattern with a lot of cover and frequent, regular, channeled fields of fire and killing grounds. Buildings may be of many styles within one urban centre. It is three-dimensional space, where the vertical dimension is of great importance. The vertical dimension not only provides extreme barriers to assault, but it also provides the defence with a man-made form of high ground and often also with a subterranean level for combat by way of cellars and sewers. Modern cities have formal subsystems characterized by centralized administration, industrial or post-industrial technologies, links and nodes. Whereas, primitive cities normally contain informal decentralized subsystems in which primitive or adaptive technology predominates, with patterns of individual and small group activity. If there are any nodes in primitive cities, they are highly decentralized. The social subsystem represents the human dimension, the culture, demographics, religion, and history of the urban setting. This is perhaps the most difficult subsystem to grasp because it is usually such a complex, interwoven network of factors. Culture is a particularly powerful influence. Culture relates to the way in which definable groups of people interact with their social and physical environment. It helps to define a group, especially in relation to other groups.

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This presents the potentially stressful prospect of operating in a complex, unfamiliar physical, political and social environment, perhaps a long way from home, and among a large population of non-combatants. Sometimes the non-combatants might be unfriendly. Often it may be difficult to identify friend from foe in the close-quarter encounters that might occur in urban areas. The structure of urban terrain provides good cover and many observation posts. These, together with the presence of a large number of non-combatants have a significant restricting influence on the soldiers’ traditional approach to fire and movement during the assault.

Urban terrain amplifies the ease and effectiveness of deception and leads to short range engagements with little time for preparation. It makes it difficult to identify friend from foe, thus increasing the likelihood of fratricide. Casualty rates are very high, and ammunition and other supplies are consumed at a very high rate. The use of some weapons, designed for open space deployments, may be problematic in urban terrain, e.g. barrel depression or elevation on armoured vehicles and artillery. The coordination of air attacks, either for dislodgment of forces or fire support may also be difficult. GPS may be blocked and radios will only work over shorter ranges making coordination and navigation difficult. Urban warfare is dangerous and exceptionally fatiguing (both physically and mentally). It provokes highly destructive, stressful, high intensity close combat, which often leads to significant logistical and medical challenges.

In most of the cases, even in advanced simulators, a building’s resolution and representation is not adequate for enhanced perception of the environment, especially when dealing with multi-level building and subterranean structures. Referring to the human and cultural aspects of the urban environment, in most of the cases existing simulators do not support complex interactions with civilians and crowds during simulations, and therefore the impact of urban warfare on the friendly personnel is not gauged with regards to the fact that urban warfare is exceptionally fatiguing both physically and mentally, as well as dangerous and it provokes highly destructive, stressful, high intensity close combat that leads to significant logistical and medical challenges.

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Standard concepts Proposed

An approach has been identified to meet this challenge through modular, open-architecture Standard Simulation and Training Centers (SSTC). The SSTC will provide a robust combined arms environment where tactics, equipment, and training development can be addressed. The combined arms battlefield includes ground (air defence, mounted and dismounted infantry, logistics and artillery), aviation (fixed and rotary wing), and intelligence components. The SSTC is capable of battalion and below exercises, and will include pre-loaded scenarios with real world databases. The SSTC can be enhanced through the addition of Virtual Simulators, digital communications, and the tailoring of behaviours and equipment applicable for each country. The SSTC Concept was successfully implemented and established in Slovakia over the last 13 years.

The standard concept establishes an education and training simulation facility with a modular design that allows the interchange of equipment, software, tools, and protocols without requiring significant development. The SSTC is equipped with standard simulation tools and equipment that are necessary in the planning, execution, and review phases of an exercise. These tools support education and training for the Security Oriented Community and the development of doctrine, training, tactics, and equipment. The SSTC contains a Simulation Software Engine (SSE), Stealth Viewer, Virtual Simulator, Data Logger, and an After Action Review capability. Additional SSTC features include Video Tele-Conferencing (VTC), a Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) capability, and a migratory path to continually evolving computer technology. All functions are satisfied with commercial hardware and software that are compliant with industry practices and standards. The SSTC’s performance can be enhanced by the incorporation of host specific weapons effects, vehicles and behavioural characteristics into SSE. Virtual and Live training systems can also be included to increase the realism of the combined arms battlefield. The SSTC is capable of incorporating available virtual simulations (weather, chemical effects, equipment performance, etc.) and simulators (M1, Bradley, T-72, etc.). The SSTC can be tailored to meet command requirements and still be interoperable with other DIS and High Level Architecture (HLA) compliant federations or simulations.

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The key objective of the Standard Simulation and Training System is the development of an integrated environment for mission planning, training and rehearsal for both staff and field personnel on a tactical and operational level suitable for the modem Asymmetric Warfare using Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) technology. Having considered the incoherent present simulation and training conditions and platforms, we proposed the following modification and improvements in order to set up comprehensive integrated simulation and training system comprising of these elements:• An integrated scenario building environment allowing for the implementation

of the concept of the User Defined Operational Picture (UDOP), which should be a consistent tool in the simulation toolbox of elements. Through a customized user interface, the user will be able to determine the "What/When/How" of the presentation of available information. Most importantly, this environment will allow users to combine high-resolution imagery, real-time asset tracking, geospatial analytic tools, live video feeds and many other operationally relevant capabilities into one common 3D visualization interface, saving the user critical minutes "lost" in switching between applications inherent in current real and simulated Command and Control systems. The envisaged engine will be the starting point for interacting with other integral engines.

• The proposed simulations engines, should allow for the selection of different Man Machine Interfaces/Human Machine Interface (MMI/HMI) to demonstrate and test different interfaces and test their suitability and effectiveness during training in asymmetric environments.

• Modelling of Simulated entities as crowd, friendly, enemy personnel, weapons, explosions, will make it possible to review existing models of the aforementioned entities and will integrate them to both Virtual Reality and the Operational Network environment.

• Communication and Interaction between entities at different simulation environments as C2, augmented reality, and war gaming interface will investigate the use of real communication and sensing equipment over suitable connectors. This approach provides significant advantages because the users work with equipment which is exploited in real actions on real terrain and there is no need for modelling traffic sources to deal with real data transfers between participants.

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• A unified environment for After Action Reports (AAR) will allow the investigation of the trainees and or plan performance against predefined targets. The debriefing environment will support multilevel views and replays of the scenario played during the simulation. Furthermore the engine will provide instructors and trainees with meaningful reports considering their performance.

These elements should encompass a C2 and mission planning environment empowered by a 3D GIS environment (3D buildings) with blue and red tracking capabilities, a scenario building Engine, an Augmented Reality platform for enhanced situation replication, a Virtual World Multiplayer environment capable of the realistic virtual representation of participants based on behaviour modelling (representing soldiers, coalition forces, terrorists, OPFOR, and non-combatants, crowd), real-time communication between participants such as staff-field, vehicles, aircraft, and weapons, health management, computer-generated entities to populate the environment, environmental effects and an after action review system.

To this aim, the measurable improvements within the user-friendly simulation environment needed to deal with to the harsh requirements of urban operations are forecast as being primarily in the following areas such as Scenario Building Environment, Human Machine Interface, Interaction and Description of Ambient Entities/Environment, Modelling of Simulated entities (Crowd, friendly, enemy personnel, weapons, explosions, etc), Interaction/Communication between entities at different simulation environments (C2, augmented reality, and war gaming interface) and Fusion of Information gathered from sensors.

Step forward: education and training on a Blended Simulation

The SSTC package provides a Training Support Plan (TSP), hardware (when required), and software necessary for a complete site operation. The SSTC also includes a site survey and planning activities necessary to transform regular classrooms or training facilities into a computer-aided training and exercise

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facility that is tailored to meet the requirements of the host element. The TSP will provide an Exercise Planning tool to develop training exercise materials and manage exercise data at the collective training task level. An example is the Training Exercise Development System (TREDS) tool that is useful when developing exercises in any collective training environment – Live, Virtual, or Constructive. TREDS develops the Operations Order (OPORD). The OPORD is then inputed into the constructive simulation. Such training provides the tools and experience to plan an exercise, develop the scenario, implement it in SSE, and execute the exercise.

The TSP also includes training using provided simulation tools, exercise planning and execution, data recording and implementation into an After Action Review and hardware operation. The provision of this training package establishes a resident knowledge base and channels it into the operation and functions of all SSTC systems. It is also the key to rapid and the successful establishment of each centre. SSTC exercises start with small, simple exercises and then develop into large complex exercises utilizing all of the SSTC tools and simulation equipment, greatly reducing the time required to make a simulation facility function effectively. The basic SSTC hardware is commercially available computer workstations. Individual site requirements and their current hardware and software tools are considered prior to determining the SSTC hardware requirements for a new location. This allows the SSTC costs to be controlled through the use of existing hardware and software and tailoring the size of the simulation capabilities. Currently, the SSTC simulations and exercise development tools are DIS compliant or have migrated to the HLA standard.

Each SSTC contains Semi-Automated Force (SAF), Stealth, Virtual Simulator, Data Logger and After Action Review (AAR) capabilities. These functions are needed to provide basic simulation components necessary to execute a combined arms exercise. The SSTC utilizes Personal Computer (PC) based simulations and tools to offer the highest performance at the lowest cost approach. This PC workstation approach provides flexibility, low cost maintenance, the ability to perform multiple functions, easy upgrade potential and utilizes existing computer operator skills. The SSE provided is a more automated version of Computer Generated Force (CGF) that provides automated behaviours for modelled equipment and behaviours. The SSE is capable of generating the terrain, threats, and models with

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appropriate behaviours. The SSE also supports operations in either a DIS or HLA environment. Host specific tactics and equipment performance can be tailored into the SSE through coordination with each individual host.

The SSE provides the models and behaviour characteristics for most Security Forces and a variety of other manufactured equipment, Air Defence functions, and Logistics functions. The SSE provides over 200 models of vehicles, weapons effects, tactics, and threats. The models of NATO and other forces include ground vehicles, artillery, tank platoons, dismounted infantry, mines, and fixed wing assets. The behaviour characteristics modelled into the SSE have been verified and validated. This ensures that the models and behaviour do not provide an unreal performance edge to any type of equipment or behaviour that could affect the exercise results. The SSE provides a user-friendly interface that supports the utilization of a host specific language through its user interface. The SSTC contain several terrain and SSE databases. Terrain databases are usually in the CTDB and Open Flight format, and for Stealth equipment in the MDX format. The terrain databases are correlated with the SSE databases and support the stealth and virtual simulator functions in a SSE exercise. Additional databases may be developed from geo-specific terrain data through coordination with the requesting host. A Stealth viewer capability allows the exercise managers to view any area of the battlefield without impacting on the conduct of the exercise. The stealth vehicle can be attached to any equipment to provide that perspective of the operation. A Data Logger captures exercise events during execution and supports playback for mission evaluation. The After Action Review capability utilizes the data logger information to review critical points in the exercise and discuss “What if ” alternatives. The AAR allows the exercise commander to criticize the performance of all functions and establish the preferred response. This leads to improved mission performance.

Through the use of selected commercial equipment and software simulation tools, the SSTC is designed to support evolving capabilities and missions. The basic SSTC is HLA/DIS compliant without significant investments in equipment or software. The modular approach of the SSTC may be utilized to provide future capabilities in the areas of Digital Data Communications, incorporation of live exercises, and Security Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). The SSTC can be further advanced through the incorporation of digital communications,

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evolving CGF capabilities, new databases, and the integration of virtual and live simulations. This capability may be expanded to higher-level security operations whenever new simulations are developed, released, and approved for distribution. The SSTC can also be expanded to include additional cells consisting of either site-specific virtual and live simulators or workstations for additional comprehensive operations.

conclusions

Today, the Education and Training of Security Oriented Communities, leveraged by a Modelling and Simulation paradigm has achieved an overlap with the real world wherein simulation information is viewed simultaneously with the real world. Customarily, the Security Oriented Community has used simulation technologies as a one of the primary means of education and training. Mainly due to the high costs of such education and training and the growing shortage of adequate space for its conduct, constructive simulation and, more recently, virtual simulation have become increasingly important. The convergence of Live (real people and equipment but simulated results), Virtual (Real people but simulated equipment and environment) and Constructive (Simulated people, equipment & environment, stimulated by real people) training, known as LVC simulation, provides a Security Oriented Community (and others) with the ability to “mix and match” simulation methodologies to meet both the education and training objectives of the managers and the constraints (time, space, cost) imposed by the education and training context. The advances and growth referred to above have resulted in a virtual explosion in the elements and components associated with the Simulation Technologies embedded in the Slovak Republic at present.

references

ADAMčík, F. 2006. The simulation technologies in a computer based training of flying personnel. In: Trans & MOTAUTO`06. 13. International scientific-technical conference: 25. - 28. 10. 2006, Varna, Bulgaria. Sofia: Scientific-Technical Union of Mechanical Engineering of Bulgaria, 2006.

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BUčkA, P., ANDRASSy, V., GREGA, M. 2012. Blended simulation - not only as an effective military training commanders and staffs in ICM operations] In: Výstavba, rozvoj a použití AčR 2012: tvorba a rozvoj operačních koncepcí. - Brno: University of defence, Czech republic. 2012. - ISBN 978-80-7231-909-1.

CORRELL, J. 1998. War in Cyberspace. Air Force Magazine, No. 1, January 1998, p. 32.GREGA, M. 2012. Efektívna príprava manažérov krízy, Mladá veda 2012 - Veda a krízové

situácie IX. medzinárodná vedecká konferencia mladých vedeckých pracovníkov a doktorandov. Žilina: FŠI, Žilinská univerzita, Slovak republic, 2012. - ISBN 978-80-554-0575-9.

kELEMEN, M., OLEJNík, F. 2004. Development of simulation technologies at the Air Force Academy in košice. In: Zeszyty naukowe. ISSN 1641-9723. No. 2 (6) (2004), p. 105-109.

kELEMEN, M., SOUŠEk, R. 2006. The development of the Slovak Air Force´s air transport capabilities for joint logistics support operation. In: Acta avionica: vedecký časopis. ISSN 1335-9479. Roč. 8, č. 12 (2006), pp. 114-117.

kURHAJCOVá, L. 2009. key competence of managers. In: Review of the Air Force Academy: the scientific informative review. ISSN 1842-9238. – č.. 2(15) (2009), pp. 51-54.

kOVáčOVá, L., TyRALA., P. 2011. Methodology of Security Education. In. Metodológia bezpečnostného vzdelávania. košice: VŠBM, 2011, 159 s. ISBN 978-80-892-69-2.

OLAk, A., kOZACZUk, F., kRAUZ, A. 2011. Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa. Ostrowiec Św.: Nauka Edukacja Rozwój, 2011, pp. 256. ISBN 978-83-89466-35-8

SEDLák, V., LOŠONCZI, P., kISS, I. 2008. Security IT. Bezpečnostné informačné technológie. košice: VŠBM, 2008. ISBN 978-80-89282-26-5

SUN TZU.: The Art of War. (New york: Delacorte Press, 1983).TEREM, P. 2004. Globalisation and its Environmental Dimension. Siwek,T.-Baar,V.(ed.):

Globalisation and its Geopolitical, Cultural, Economic and Ecological Context. 8.-10. 10. 2003 University of Ostrava, 2004, ISBN 80-7368-022-X, pp.304-314.

TOMáŠEkOVá, L. 2012. Bezpečnostné prostredie Slovenska. In Interoperabilita 2012: Zborník príspevkov z medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie. Liptovský Mikuláš: Akadémia ozbrojených síl gen. M.R. Štefánika. 2012. pp. 38-47. ISBN 978-80-8040-449-9.

REPORTS AND REVIEWS

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ExAmINATIONS AND CERTIfICATION IN ThE TEAChINg Of LANguAgE fOR SPECIfIC PuRPOSES IN NATO ARmED fORCES IN RELATION TO EuROPEAN LANguAgE POLICy.

Małgorzta gOS, PhDNational Defence University of Poland

INTRODuCTION

The aim of this paper is to compare standards, methods, procedures and language proficiency levels used in language testing within both NATO, according to the standard described in STANAG 6001, and in the European Union, on the basis of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, teaching, assessment.

The article is based on the results of a research project which I conducted in the years 2010-2012. Its major aim was to develop a language testing unification programme for all NATO member states. The research was based on the documents describing language standards published by NATO and the Council of Europe, as well as tests prepared on the basis of the standards. To create a reliable document, I also conducted a survey and interviewed Polish examiners for NATO in order to take their attitudes, opinions and expectations into account while preparing the guidance on STANAG 6001 examination procedures.

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In the article I will discuss two major questions, which underlay my research:1. To what extent are language proficiency levels and examinations described

by NATO and the Council of Europe similar and to what extent are they different?

2. What can be done to unify military language testing in all NATO member states?

Military Language Standards and the European Language Policy

The document which regulates international military standards for all language issues, including language training and examinations, is STANAG 6001. It is ‘a scale that provides NATO Forces with a description of language proficiency levels, which were adopted by the members for the purpose of:a. meeting language requirements for international staff appointments.b. comparing national standards through a standardised table.c. recording and reporting, in international correspondence, measures of

language proficiency (if necessary by conversion from national standards). (NATO, 2003:1).

The scale contains a set of descriptors for proficiency skills broken down into six levels, coded 0 through 5. In Annex A to STANAG 6001, Edition 3 (NATO, 2009: 2) they are defined as follows:

• Level 0 - No practical proficiency • Level 1 - Survival • Level 2 - Functional• Level 3 - Professional • Level 4 - Expert • Level 5 - Highly-articulate native

A proficiency level that exceeds base skill levels 0 through 4 but still does not meet all the criteria for the next level is marked with a ‘plus’. A series of plus (+) descriptors was introduced in Appendix 1 to Annex A to STANAG 6001 Edition 3,where it is stated that ‘“Plus level” proficiency (...) is understood as language proficiency that

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is more than halfway between two base levels’ (NATO, 2009: 1-A-1). It is believed, that the introduction of this solution will result in the relatively easy identification of persons whose language skills require a somewhat small supplement to achieve a target level of proficiency. This, in turn, will allow these persons to be sent on refresher / remedial language courses. Interestingly, although Level 0 means ‘no proficiency,’ Level 0+ was introduced and described as ‘memorised proficiency.’ According to the description given in the Appendix, candidates at this level are able to recognise some isolated words and high frequency phrases and to use some memorised and rehearsed utterances to satisfy immediate, basic needs.

The idea of the “Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment” (CEFR) appeared during the Intergovernmental Symposium on “Transparency and Coherence in Language Learning in Europe: Objectives, Evaluation, Certification” held in Ruschilkon, Switzerland in November 1991. It was stated that:

It is desirable to develop a Common European Framework of Reference for language learning at all levels, in order to:• promote and facilitate cooperation among educational institutions in different

countries;• provide a sound basis for the mutual recognition of language qualifications;• assist learners, teachers, course designers, examining bodies and educational

administrators to situate and co-ordinate their efforts; ... (in CoE, 2003: 13)

On that recommendation the CEFR and the scale of defined language proficiency levels were developed between 1993 and 1996 and “officially approved by the representatives of all Council of Europe member states in April 1997 during the final conference of the medium term programme on ‘Language Learning for European Citizenship’” (CoE, 2003: 13).

According to Grenfell (2002: 211), at the moment “the Common European Framework of Reference offers us a state of the art description of key issues connected with the teaching and learning of second languages. Essentially it is an assessment framework with which EU member states can review and revise the content and levels of linguistic competence against which their learners are judged.”

In the article I will discuss two major questions, which underlay my research:1. To what extent are language proficiency levels and examinations described

by NATO and the Council of Europe similar and to what extent are they different?

2. What can be done to unify military language testing in all NATO member states?

Military Language Standards and the European Language Policy

The document which regulates international military standards for all language issues, including language training and examinations, is STANAG 6001. It is ‘a scale that provides NATO Forces with a description of language proficiency levels, which were adopted by the members for the purpose of:a. meeting language requirements for international staff appointments.b. comparing national standards through a standardised table.c. recording and reporting, in international correspondence, measures of

language proficiency (if necessary by conversion from national standards). (NATO, 2003:1).

The scale contains a set of descriptors for proficiency skills broken down into six levels, coded 0 through 5. In Annex A to STANAG 6001, Edition 3 (NATO, 2009: 2) they are defined as follows:

• Level 0 - No practical proficiency • Level 1 - Survival • Level 2 - Functional• Level 3 - Professional • Level 4 - Expert • Level 5 - Highly-articulate native

A proficiency level that exceeds base skill levels 0 through 4 but still does not meet all the criteria for the next level is marked with a ‘plus’. A series of plus (+) descriptors was introduced in Appendix 1 to Annex A to STANAG 6001 Edition 3,where it is stated that ‘“Plus level” proficiency (...) is understood as language proficiency that

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As Morrow (2004: 6) points out, primarily “the aim was to provide a means of developing language teaching in Europe by finding a way to compare objectives and achievement standards of learners in different national (and local) contexts.” However, the project not only met the above aim but also resulted in a much wider document. It is a descriptive Framework – and not a set of guidelines, suggestions or recommendations that “provides a common basis for the elaboration of language syllabuses, curriculum guidelines, examinations, textbooks, etc. across Europe. It describes in a comprehensive way what language learners have to learn to do in order to use a language for communication and what knowledge and skills they have to develop so as to be able to act effectively (...) The Framework also defines the levels of proficiency which allow learners’ progress to be measured at each stage of learning and on a life-long basis.” (CoE at. al., 2001: 1)

According to the Council of Europe, the Framework describes ‘the levels of proficiency required by existing standards, tests and examinations in order to facilitate comparisons between different systems of qualifications. For this purpose the Descriptive Scheme and the Common Reference Levels have been developed.’ (CoE at. al., 2001: 21)There are six Common Reference Levels, which can be presented in a graphic form:

5

Figure 1. CEFR Levels (CoE, 2001: 23)

The descriptors at each level are given for all the language skills – listening, reading, writing and speaking (divided into spoken interaction and production). However, as Morrow suggests, ‘these global descriptors can in themselves be no more but

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indicative.’ On the other hand, he agrees that ‘... there is evidence from the work of North and Schneider (1998 in Morrow, 2003) that they are meaningful, and that descriptors of performance in specific areas, e.g. reading or writing, or of specific competencies (...) can be reliably ‘calibrated’ against these level descriptions’ (Morrow, 2003: 10).

STANAG 6001 Examinations in Relation to the CEFR

1. The Manual

Considering the fact that one of the main aims of the CEFR is ‘to help partners to describe the levels of proficiency required by existing standards, tests and examinations in order to facilitate comparisons between different systems of qualifications’ (CoE, 2001: 21), it is not surprising that language examination providers began to use the six language proficiency levels given in the document to place their tests at one of them. In fact, ‘the growing acceptance of the standards presented in the CEFR has created a situation in which public bodies, examination institutes, language schools and university departments concerned with the teaching and testing of languages are increasingly interested in relating their curricula and examinations to the Common Reference Levels. A problem that arises in this regard is the question of assuring a consistent interpretation of the levels in different contexts’ (CoE, European Centre for Modern Languages, 2009: 193).

In the situation described above, the need arose to link the examination levels to the CEFR levels. In response, the Council of Europe developed a draft Manual: Relating Language Examinations to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, teaching, assessment (CEFR), first published in 2003. The purpose of the document is clearly stated in North et al.

The primary aim of the Manual is to help the providers of examinations to develop, apply and report transparent, practical procedures in a cumulative process of continuing improvement in order to situate their examination(s)

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in relation to the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR) (North et al. 2010: 6-7).

The process of relating an examination to the CEFR comprises of a set of activities to be carried out. There are five inter-related sets of such procedures in the Manual (CoE, 2009: 9) which should be followed:1. Familiarisation2. Specification3. Standardisation training / benchmarking4. Standard setting5. Validation

Familiarisation is the first stage of the process and ‘is meant to ensure that the judges are familiar with the content of the CEFR and its scales before proceeding further in the linking process’ (Papageorgiou, 2009: 2). A similar description of the familiarisation procedures is given by North et al. but they also point out that ‘in terms of validation, these procedures are an indispensable starting point. An account of the activities taken and the results obtained is an essential component of the validation report’ (North et al., 2010:7).

Specification can be described as a stage in which the content of the test is analysed. North et al. call it ‘a self-audit of the coverage of the examination (content and task types) profiled in relation to the categories presented in the CEFR’ (North et al., 2010:7). To analyse a test or an examination paper, there are three types of ‘CEFR-based tools’ suggested in the Manual:• The tables and forms in the Appendices to this Manual• Content Analysis Grids that offer the possibility to work at the more detailed

level of individual test tasks, classifying them by standard criteria• Reference works for different languages: especially useful for linguistic

specifications (CoE, 2009: 28).

Standardisation training and benchmarking have a significant role in the process of relating examinations to the CEFR. They ‘enable a categorisation of test takers in terms of the proficiency levels of the CEFR, in such a way that this categorisation reflects in a truthful way what is meant by the CEFR. If a student is categorised as B1, one has to be quite sure that this student is well characterised by the “Can Do”

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descriptors for this level. This is the basic question of validity and the procedures to be followed are referred to as standard setting’ (CoE, 2009: 36).

Standard setting could be defined as formalised procedures of ‘group decision making: the kind of judgements made by the panellists, the kind of information they have available and the way their judgements are treated and aggregated to arrive at single or multiple cut scores’ (CoE, 2009: 58).

Validation is the final procedure to relate an examination or test to the CEFR. The importance of the validation process is highlighted in Chapter 7 of the Manual, where it is stated that

Linking an examination to the CEFR is a complex process involving many steps, which all require a professional approach. Validation concerns the body of evidence put forward to convince the test users that the whole process and its outcomes are trustworthy. (...) Validity is not a question of all or nothing, but a matter of degree. A report on validity requires attention to be given to the many facets involved, putting forward well considered arguments and empirical evidence to underpin any statements and claims to generalisability. For this reason, it is indispensable for a good validation study to have all activities carefully documented (CoE, 2009: 90).

2. STANAG 6001 Examinations in relation to the CEFR

As STANAG 6001 examinations are prepared according to the military standards provided by NATO, there is a need to relate them to the CEFR in order to recognise military personnel’s linguistic abilities in civilian society, as well as to provide a framework for military institutions operating in NATO countries. Thus, there is a need to verify whether the tests written according to STANAG 6001 at particular levels correspond with the CEFR standards.

To complete the task, I decided to use the first ‘CEFR based-tool’ suggested in the Specification process - that is to complete the tables and forms provided in the Manual. The forms and tables were first thoroughly analysed with regard to their suitability for military language testing.

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There are 23 forms available in the Appendix, which allow one to estimate the overall CEFR level of the test / examination, as well as to report the specification process in detail. The outcome of the whole process is shown ‘as a graphic profile of the examination coverage in relation to the most relevant categories and levels of the CEFR’ (CoE, 2009: 28). However, due to the fact that the aim of the study was to determine whether STANAG 6001 examinations at particular levels correspond to the CEFR requirements, and NOT to get involved in the whole process of test preparation, distribution and assessment, the following forms were rejected in the initial phase of the research:A2. Test DevelopmentA3. MarkingA4. GradingA5. Reporting ResultsA6. Data AnalysisA7. Rationale for Decisions

The other forms provided in the Appendices to the CEFR Manual were carefully completed for STANAG 6001 examinations taken in Poland (sample tests 2011) at levels 1, 2 and 3.

- Form A1 is the General Examination Description and includes such pieces of information as the name of the exam, language tested, examining institution, information about the version of the test analysed, the type of the exam and its purpose, as well as the target population and the number of test takers. The overall aim and more specific objectives are to be described in general. The form also includes queries about which communicative activities are tested, the weighting of the subtests in the global result and their structure, and types of tasks in the subtests. There is also a question about the availability of the information published both for candidates and teachers. Finally, the last table is dedicated to the test results and to what and how it is reported.

- Form A8 – Initial Estimation of Overall CEFR Level includes the information at which language proficiency level the test is supposed to be.

- Forms A9 – Listening Comprehension, A10 – Reading Comprehension, A11 – Spoken Interaction, A12 – Written Interaction, as well as A13 – Spoken Production and A14Written Production consist of five queries each, concerning the context in which the candidates are supposed to show their abilities, the

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communication themes they are expected to handle, the tasks, activities and strategies used in the test, and the text types and their length. The final part of the charts includes justification of at which level of the scale the test is placed.

- Forms A15 and A16 – Integrated Skills Combinations and Integrated Skills show which combination of skills occur in the subtests. Form A16 follows the same questions as A9 – A14 but also includes a question on skills combination in the examination. As STANAG 6001 examination papers include only separate tests on Reading, Listening, Writing and Speaking, forms A15 and A16 were taken under consideration during the studies.

- Forms A17 and A18 – Spoken and Written Mediation were not taken into account as mediation, in which ‘the language user is not concerned to express their own meanings, but simply to act as an intermediary between interlocutors who are unable to understand each other directly’ (Council of Europe, 2003: 87), is not tested in the STANAG 6001 examinations.

- Forms A19 - A21 – Aspects of Language Competence in Reception, Interaction and Production deal with questions concerning linguistic, socio-linguistic, pragmatic and strategic competence. Form A22 - Aspects of Language Competence in Mediation is not taken into account as mediation is not tested in the STANAG 6001 examinations. The CEFR scales, which are referred to in this section, include the following features presented in the form of a table below (Figure 2).

- Form A23, called Graphic Profile of the Relationship of the Examination to CEFR Levels, should be completed at the end of the whole process of Specification and shows the level of the individual components of the test.

- The whole process of relating a test to the CEFR finishes with Form A24 – Confirmed Estimation of Overall Examination Level, and includes a short rationale, as well as a reference to the documentation.

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RECEPTION INTERACTION PRODUCTIONLi

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e General Linguistic Range General Linguistic Range General Linguistic RangeVocabulary Range Vocabulary Range Vocabulary Range

Vocabulary Control Vocabulary Control

Grammatical Accuracy Grammatical Accuracy

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Socio-linguistic Appropriateness

Socio-linguistic Appropriateness

Socio-linguistic Appropriateness

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Cohesion and Coherence Turn taking Thematic DevelopmentPropositional Precision Spoken Fluency Cohesion and Coherence

Propositional Precision Spoken FluencyPropositional Precision

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e Identifying Cues / Inferring Turn taking PlanningCooperating CompensatingAsking for Clarification Monitoring and RepairCompensatingMonitoring and Repair

Figure 2. Aspect of Language Competence in the CEFR Manual (based on the Council of Europe, 2009: 142-151)

3. The results

Considering Form A1 – General Examination Description, STANAG 6001 examinations at levels 1, 2 and 3 are carried out in authorised examination centres. The tests are to confirm candidates’ language abilities in listening, speaking, reading and writing at particular levels according to NATO standards and they have an institutional and national character. The examinations are organised for professional soldiers and civilian employees of the Polish Armed Forces. However, students of military universities can also take the exams with the consent of the Rector. Each examination consists of four separate parts / subtests testing language skills separately. These include listening comprehension, reading comprehension, spoken interaction and production, and written interaction and production. Each subtest is assessed separately and the results are reported as separate grades – grades per subtest. Candidates and teachers can find a lot of

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information on the examination including overall aim, sample test papers, sample answer papers, marking and grading schemes and sample certificates. These are available in test centres, on a website (http://www.wsnjo.wp.mil.pl), and on request from the institutions.

After completing and analysing the other relevant forms provided in the Manual, I prepared the graphic profile of the STANAG 6001 examinations at levels 1, 2 and 3 in relation to the CEFR levels, which is presented in the chart below.

According to my research, the overall CEFR level for STANAG 6001 examination at Level 1 is A2. As it is presented in Form 23 below (blue colour), more parts (11) of the STANAG 6001 examination at level 1 are placed at A2 level according to the CEFR. These are: Reading Comprehension (Form A10), Spoken (A13) and Written (A14) Production, Socio-linguistic and Pragmatic Competence in Reception (A19), Linguistic, Socio-linguistic and Pragmatic Competence in Interaction (A20) and also Linguistic, Socio-linguistic and Pragmatic Competence in Production (A21). The other – 7 parts of the examination are placed at the A2+ level, according to the CEFR, as candidates are supposed to present slightly higher language abilities than the ones described for A2 level. For example, they are expected to use professional language (ESP), not mentioned in the description for A2 level, or to demonstrate abilities to deduce the meaning of words or whole sentences on familiar topic from the context – elements described for the B1 level. These include: Listening Comprehension (A9), Spoken (A11) and Written (A12) Interaction, Linguistic and Strategic Competence in Reception (A19), Strategic Competence in Interaction (A20) and Strategic Competence in Production (A21).

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As far as STANAG 6001 at Level 2 is concerned, the overall CEFR level for this examination is B1+. This is due to the fact that more parts (10) of the exam (yellow colour in Form A23) are placed at B1+ level. These are: Written Interaction (A12), Spoken (A13) and Written (A14) Production, Linguistic and Pragmatic Competence in Reception (A19), Linguistic and Pragmatic Competence in Interaction (A20) as well as Linguistic, Pragmatic and Strategic Competence in Production (A21). Here, candidates are supposed to show abilities which definitely exceed the ones provided for level B1 according to the CEFR, e.g. respond to or write on professional issues, give information, express views and suggest some solutions to a problem. Some parts (7) of the test, however, are situated at level B1: Listening (A9) and Reading (A10) Comprehension, Spoken Interaction (A11),Socio-linguistic Competence in Reception (A19), Socio-linguistic and Strategic Competence in Interaction (A20). The test did not provide data to evaluate the CEFR level of Socio-linguistic Competence in Production (A21).

The overall CEFR level for STANAG 6001 examination at Level 3 is B2+. Here, most parts (10) of the examination are placed at B2+ level according to the CEFR (red colour in Form 23). It is mainly due to the fact that candidates are supposed to use military terminology successfully, which definitely exceeds the description provided for the B2 level by the Council of Europe. The test parts placed at B2+ level are as follows: Written Interaction (A12), Spoken (A13) and Written (A14) Production, Linguistic and Socio-linguistic Competence in Reception (A19), Linguistic and Socio-linguistic Competence in Interaction (A20) and Linguistic, Socio-linguistic and Pragmatic Competence in Production (A21). The parts (8) which are equivalents of the B2 level, according to the CEFR include: Listening (A9) and Reading (A10) Comprehension, Spoken Interaction (A11), Pragmatic and Strategic Competence in Reception (A19), Pragmatic and Strategic Competence in Interaction (A20) and Strategic Competence in Production (A21).

The results of the research presented above enabled me to prepare a comparison of language levels according to STANAG 6001 and the Common European Framework of Reference in a graphic form – Figure 4.

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SCALESSTANAG 6001Standardised Agreement 6001NATO & BILC

CEFRCommon European Framework of ReferenceCOE

5Native / Bilingual4+Expert+

C2Mastery

Proficient User4Expert C1

Effective Operational Proficiency

3+Professional+ B2+

Vantage+

Independent User3Professional B2

Vantage

2+Functional+

B1+Treshold+

2Functional B1

Treshold

1+Survival+

A2+Waystage+

Basic User

1Survival A2

Waystage

0+Memorized Proficiency

A1Breakthrough

0Unscaled

Figure 4. STANAG 6001 Language Levels in Relation to the CEFR

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NATO Examination Format – the Examiners’ Perspective

While analysing sample tests and / or documents containing detailed descriptions of the STANAG 6001 tests structure, the procedure of the test delivery and the assessment criteria at various proficiency levels taken in selected NATO member countries, I noticed that although they are based on the same document and the same level descriptions, they vary a lot.

First of all, the structure of the examination papers is different and the differences include such basic test features like time provided for the exam, number of tasks and number of items in each task. There is also different amount of ‘military language’ included in the tests at particular levels. Secondly, while in some countries multiple testing techniques are used in particular examination papers – at least one or two, in other countries only one testing technique (e.g. multiple-choice) is used to check candidates’ abilities to read or understand the recordings for the Listening part. What is more, in some countries, positioning tests (BAT – NATO Benchmark Advisory Test) have been introduced to assess candidates’ language abilities. Thirdly, the assessment criteria in all NATO member countries are based on STANAG 6001 document, however, the approach to formulating the descriptors is different. Thus, they do not always cover exactly the same area and the language in the descriptors does not always correspond.

Considering the facts mentioned above, I decided to conduct research designed to find out what Polish examiners and teachers preparing candidates for the exam think about the structure of the examination papers and what they expect / need the BILC Testing Working Group to do to make their work more effective.

To find out about the attitude, opinions and expectations of the people involved in the STANAG 6001 examinations I designed a survey conducted among Polish examiners of English language for NATO. The questionnaire provided qualitative data concerning the examiners attitude to the contents of STANAG 6001 examination papers and the need to relate them to the CEFR, as well as their need to be regularly trained on the examination structure and procedures. I also interviewed the examiners to find out their opinion on the structure of STANAG 6001 examinations in Poland in comparison to the ones taken in other

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NATO countries. The aim of the interview was, among other things, to find out whether the positioning tests are accurate and relevant, and what the advantages and disadvantages of that kind of testing are.

1. The result of the survey

In Poland, the group of language ‘testers’ for NATO is relatively small, nevertheless, I managed to get feedback from 19 examiners.

The survey was conducted in November 2010 and as all 19 persons who responded to the questionnaire were Polish, it was designed in their native language. It consisted of 12 questions divided into two groups: for questions 1 – 5, the respondents were supposed to choose from the answers YES, NO, DON’T KNOW or OTHER – with the space provided for their response. For questions 6 -12, the respondents were expected to circle one of the answers A, B, C, D or E. In the case of choosing answer E, they were asked to express their opinion in the provided space. The questions were as follows:1. Do you think that STANAG 6001 examination papers should have the same

structure (number and type of questions) in every NATO member country?2. Do you think STANAG 6001 examination papers should include one more

part – Language in Use, to check the candidate’s knowledge of lexical and grammatical structures?

3. Do you believe that very clear and detailed guidelines on the test structure (number and type of tasks and number of questions in tasks) and assessment should be included in the STANAG 6001 document?

4. Do you think, the responsible NATO structures / units should provide training, on preparation of examination papers according to STANAG 6001, to all persons taking part in the process of creating the tests?

5. Do you think, the responsible NATO structures / units should provide training on examining and assessing examination papers to all language examiners according to STANAG 6001?

6. In your opinion, the examination papers according to STANAG 6001 should:A. be in line with the CEFR levels (A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2)

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B. correspond to the CEFR levels but also contain elements of ESP adapted to particular proficiency levels

C. include only ESP at a particular levelD. include only general EnglishE. other

In questions 7, 8 and 9, the respondents were asked who should prepare the examination papers according to STANAG 6001 at particular levels – 1, 2 and 3. They could choose one of the following answers stating that the tests should be placed / prepared:A. centrally for all member countries of NATOB. by the central committees in each country for all the examination centresC. by each examination centreD. by the teachers preparing candidates for the examsE. other

In questions 10, 11 and 12, the respondents were asked who should carry out the examinations according to STANAG 6001 at particular levels – 1, 2, and 3. They could choose from the following answers stating that the exams should be carried out by:A. international commissions appointed by the authorized bodies of NATOB. the central committees in each countryC. each examination centreD. the licensed teachers preparing candidates for the examsE. other

The results of the survey are presented in the tables below.

As presented in the table above, the majority of examiners – 11 out of 19 believe that STANAG 6001 examination papers should have the same structure in every NATO member country.

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Question YES NO DON’T KNOW

OTHER

1. STANAG 6001 examination papers should have the same structure in every NATO member country

11 4 4

2 STANAG 6001 examination papers should include one more part – Language in Use

5 11 2 – level 31 –levels 2, 3

3 very clear guidelines on the test and assessment should be included in STANAG 6001 document

16 1 2

4 NATO units should provide training on preparation of examination papers to all persons taking part in the process of creating the tests

19

5 NATO units should provide training on examining and assessing examination papers to all language examiners

17 2

Figure 5. The results of the survey – questions 1 – 5

The same number of respondents think that there is no need to introduce a Language in Use component to the STANAG 6001 examination papers.

As many as 16 respondents strongly believe that very clear guidelines on tests and assessment should be included in the STANAG 6001 document.

All examiners agree that NATO units should provide detailed training on the preparation of examination papers to all persons taking part in the process of creating the tests, and as many as 17 respondents think that NATO units should provide training on examining and assessing examination papers to all language examiners.

Another worksheet was prepared for questions 6 -12:

Question 6: In your opinion, the STANAG 6001 examination papers should:A. be in line with the CEFR levels 6B. correspond to the CEFR levels but also contain elements

of ESP adapted to particular levels10

C. include only ESP at a particular level 2D. include only general EnglishE. other 1- be in line with international

exams +ESP

Figure 6. The results of the survey – question 6

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As seen above, most of the respondents, 10 examiners, agree that STANAG 6001 examinations should correspond to the CEFR levels but should also contain elements of ESP adapted to particular levels. As many as 6 of them believe that the tests should be in line with the CEFR standards. Two examiners decided that STANAG 6001 examinations should include only ESP at a particular level and one of them believes that although the tests should be in line with international exams they should also include ESP.

Questions 7, 8 and 9: The STANAG 6001 examination papers at particular levels should be prepared:

LEVEL 1 LEVEL 2 LEVEL3A. centrally for all member countries of NATO 9 9 15B. by the central committees in each country for all the

examination centres8 9 3

C. by each examination centre 1D. by the teachers preparing candidates for the exams 1 1 1E. other

Figure 7. The results of the survey – questions 7 - 9

According to the respondents, the examination papers produced according to STANAG 6001 at particular levels should be prepared by different organisations. For Level 1 the tests should be prepared either centrally for all member countries of NATO (9 respondents) or by the central committees in each country for all the examination centres (8 respondents). One examiner decided that the tests should be prepared by examination centres and one of them specified that they should be prepared by the teachers preparing candidates for the exams.

As far as Level 2 is concerned, the same number of respondents - 9 persons believe that the tests should be prepared either centrally for all member countries of NATO or by the central committees in each country for all the examination centres. Only one person thinks that they should be prepared by the teachers preparing candidates for the exams.

The majority of the respondents, 15 examiners, agree that the tests at Level 3 should be prepared centrally for all member countries of NATO. Only 3 of them state that the examination papers should be written by the central committees in

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each country for all the examination centres, and one of them thinks that they should be prepared by the teachers preparing candidates for the exams.

Questions 10, 11 and 12: The exams according to STANAG 6001 at particular levels should be carried out byA. international commissions appointed by the authorized bodies

of NATO1 5

B. the central committees in each country 10 9 8C. each examination centre 6 8 6D. the licensed teachers preparing candidates for the exams 3 1E. other

Figure 8. The results of the survey – questions 6 - 12.

Most of the examiners, 10 respondents, decided that the STANAG 6001 Level 1 examinations should be carried out by the central committees in each country, 6 of them believe examination centres should be responsible for that, and 3 of them think that the exams should be carried out by the licensed teachers preparing candidates for the exams.

Also for Level 2, it is believed by 9 respondents that the exam should be carried out by the central committees in each country or by each examination centre: 8 respondents. One person decided that the exams should be organised by international commissions appointed by the authorized bodies of NATO, and one of them stated that the exams should be carried out by the licensed teachers preparing candidates for the exams.

As far as Level 3 is concerned, still the majority of respondents, 8 examiners, believe that the exam should be carried out by the central committees in each country. However, 6 of them state that examination centres should be in charge of organising the tests, and 5 respondents see the need for the examinations to be organised by international commissions appointed by the authorized bodies of NATO.

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2. The results of the interview

The aim of the interview was to obtain data concerning the examiners’ attitude to the contents of STANAG 6001 examination papers and the format of the test, as well as their opinion on the introduction of positioning / benchmarking tests to the examination schedule. As previously mentioned, the group of language examiners for NATO in Poland is limited, and only 9 of them agreed to take part in the interviews.

The interviews were conducted in February 2011 and took about 20 – 30 minutes per examiner. I talked to each interviewee individually and as all the examiners were of Polish origin, all the conversations were conducted in their native language.

Each examiner was asked the same 4 main questions:1. What do you think of the structure and contents of the STANAG 6001 language

examinations conducted in Poland and is there anything you would like to change?

2. Is there anything you would change in the procedure of examining candidates and / or the process of assessment?

3. How much English for Specific Purposes, military English, should be used in the examination papers at each level of proficiency?

4. Do you think introducing the NATO Benchmark Advisory Test (BAT) instead of the ‘traditional’ STANAG 6001 examinations is a good idea? Why / why not?

As far as question 1 is concerned, the respondents noticed the following inconveniences in the structure and contents of the examinations taken in Poland:

Suggested changes to the structure and contents of STANAG 6001 examinations conducted in Poland.

Number of interviewees

1 L1 – in general, there is lack of military language; 42 L2 Speaking – instead of follow-up questions of “Have you ever..?” type,

there should be a longer utterance by the candidate e.g. a kind of mini-presentation, a short speech, etc.

3

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3 L3 Reading – the questions should be more precise and not so complex; answers to the questions should be directly based on the text; sometimes more than one answer is correct – only one possibility according to the key;

3

4 L3 Writing – candidates should write a typical report and not a report in the form of an essay or an essay in the form of a report;

1

5 there should be more real life / useful language instead of adapted texts; 76 cultural component should be added to check abilities to communicate in

natural / real world conditions;6

Figure 9. Changes to the structure and contents of STANAG 6001 examinations conducted in Poland

From the table above (Figure 9), it is clear that for most examiners the language used in the examination papers sounds artificial and they would change it into more useful and practical language. During the interviews they suggested using more authentic / real-life material and not ones adapted.

The interviews also showed how important the cultural component is – many of the respondents believe that it is necessary to introduce it into STANAG 6001 examinations. What they mean by ‘cultural component’ is not the knowledge of history and culture of English-speaking countries but the abilities to communicate naturally in the language. The examiners point out that candidates often have problems with correct responses in certain situations and instead of using ‘real language’ they use literal translation from their native languages, which often does not make any sense. For instance, while checking the attendance list it is common to hear ‘present’ instead of ‘here’ used in English-speaking countries, or ‘I finished’ at the end of a longer speech. Thus, it is essential to check whether candidates are able to respond properly in both social and professional situations and if their linguistic habits are used effectively.

Some of the interviewees noticed the ‘lack’ of ESP in examination papers at Level 1 and they believe it definitely should be changed.

Three of the respondents do not like questions that follow the role-play part in the Speaking test at Level 2. They believe that ‘Have you ever...?’ questions are not adequate, as in many cases the candidate’s answer is ‘No, I haven’t.’ They do not check candidates communicating abilities but rather creativity as they often have to make up a story ad hoc. The examiners suggested that candidates should

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present a longer utterance e.g. mini-presentation, description of a place or a thing, giving instructions on how to use something, etc.

Also the same number of respondents believe that the multiple-choice answers provided for L3 Reading are too complicated and they are not obvious from the reading text.

One person suggested that in the case of the L3 Writing part, candidates should write a typical military report and not a report in the form of an essay or an essay in the form of a report.

The interviewees also notices some shortages in the procedure of STANAG 6001 examinations and the process of assessment.

Suggested changes to the procedure of examining candidates and the process of assessment of STANAG 6001 examinations conducted in Poland.

Number of interviewees

1 instruction at all levels should be given in English, as also at L1 they help candidates to use appropriate vocabulary;

8

2 candidates should be allowed to use dictionaries while writing longer pieces of text, especially at L2 and L3 – it is natural to use them in real life situations;

4

3 in Speaking tests, the main focus should be on communication and functionality of the language used by candidates and not grammar;

5

Figure 10. STANAG 6001 - changes to the procedure of examining candidates and the process of assessment

Almost all examiners decided that all instructions provided for the tasks during the examination should be given in English at all levels – Level 1 should not be an exception. They believe that, first of all, instructions given in English not only check understanding but also provide useful vocabulary and structures candidates might use during the exam. Another point is to enable candidates from other NATO countries to take STANAG 6001 examinations in any other member country.

Over half of the group state that the main focus in Speaking tests should be on communication. Thus, interactive abilities and fluency should take priority over grammar and accuracy.

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Many of the respondents agree that candidates should be allowed to use monolingual dictionaries during their Writing test and especially while writing longer pieces of text at Levels 2 and 3. They point out that it is natural to use dictionaries in the form of a book or on-line ones while preparing correspondence, article, reports, etc.

As STANAG 6001 examinations are provided for military personnel, all examiners agree that ESP – military language must be present at all levels of proficiency (see Figure 11 below). What is more, over a half of the respondents believe ESP should be extended to the language of politics, economics and social affairs.

English for Specific Purposes in STANAG 6001 examinations conducted in Poland.

Number of interviewees

1 at L1 basic military terminology should be tested; 92 at L2 general language with elements of ESP should be included; 93 at L3 ‘general-military’ language should be used; 94 apart from military English, ESP should also cover general ideas connected

with the economy and socio-political situation;5

Figure 11. English for Specific Purposes in STANAG 6001 examinations

As far as the NATO Benchmark Advisory Test (BAT) is concerned, the examiners do not want it to replace ‘traditional’ STANAG 6001 examinations and nobody believes that introducing it in Poland is a good idea. The reasons given by the majority of respondents who definitely said NO to the test are presented in the Table 12 below. However, a few of them would agree to introduce the test on the condition that the questions are prepared / constructed in a way that gives a chance to good communicators who might occasionally make basic grammar mistakes at lower levels.

Surprisingly, some of the examiners would use the test to classify a candidate to an appropriate language course – most of the respondents would recommend it to be taken on demand by military staff who do not have STANAG 6001 certification at particular level(s) and need to confirm their knowledge of a language.

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Introducing NATO Benchmark Advisory Test (BAT) instead of ‘traditional’ STANAG 6001 examinations

Number of interviewees

1 YES -2 NO

- The test might not be reliable;- As the test is computer-based, technical problems might occur;- There is not enough equipment for all candidates in the examination

centres in Poland;- There are more possibilities to cheat as the candidates are on-line while

taking the test;

7

3 CONDITIONALLY- if the questions are prepared / constructed in a way that gives a chance

to good communicators who might occasionally make basic grammar mistakes at lower levels;

2

4 OTHER- The BAT should be used to check candidates’ knowledge of language

before relegating them to a preparatory course according STANAG 6001;

8

- The BAT could be taken on demand by military personnel who do not have STANAG 6001 certification at particular level(s) and need to confirm their knowledge of language before being delegated to international operations, peace-keeping missions, trainings, etc.

9

Figure 12. NATO Benchmark Advisory Test (BAT) instead of ‘traditional’ STANAG 6001examinations

During the interviews, it occurred that many examiners share the same or similar views on the matter of STANAG 6001 examinations, and that they often would like to change similar aspects connected with the structure, contents and procedure of the tests.

Conclusions

While relating STANAG 6001 examinations to the CEFR, I came to the following conclusions:– Both STANAG 6001 and the CEFR use a scale from no or little language ability

to a highly articulate language user to describe the abilities of the candidates (see Table 4).

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– Both systems check candidates’ language abilities in listening, reading, writing and speaking skills. However, in some examinations (e.g. Cambridge ESOL FCE), one more part – Use of English is included into the examination papers, which is not provided in comparable the STANAG 6001 Level 3 test.

– The primary users of STANAG 6001 are employers and administrators, while the CEFR scales are dedicated to teachers and students.

– The STANAG 6001 tests at particular levels correspond with the CEFR standards. However, in many cases, language abilities required in STANAG 6001 examinations slightly exceed the ones which are needed to fulfil the CEFR requirements at particular levels. This is mainly caused by the fact that language examinations, according to NATO standards, are mainly occupational in nature, thus language for specific purposes is necessary, while examinations according to the CEFR standards, e.g. Cambridge ESOL, concentrate mainly on general English.

After conducting the survey among Polish STANAG 6001 examiners for NATO and interviewing some of them, I analysed the data obtained from them and came to the following conclusions:– STANAG 6001 examination papers at particular levels should have the same

structure in all NATO member countries.– Very clear and detailed guidelines on the test structure and assessment should

be provided in the STANAG 6001 document published by NATO.– It is absolutely necessary to provide detailed training on the preparation of

examination papers for all people taking part in the process of creating the tests. Appointed structures / units of NATO should be responsible for organizing and conducting the training.

– Examiners should be trained on examining in line with STANAG 6001 and assessing the examination papers. Detailed instructions and training should be provided by appointed structures / units of NATO.

– STANAG 6001 examination papers should correspond to the CEFR standards and levels of proficiency but, at the same time, they should contain the right proportions of English for Specific Purposes – military language.

– English for Specific Purposes should be extended to elements of the language of politics, economics and social affairs.

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– Examination papers at Levels 1 and 2 should be prepared centrally for all member countries of NATO, or possibly by the central committees in each country.

– Examination papers at Level 3 should definitely be prepared centrally for all NATO member countries.

– STANAG 6001 examinations at Levels 1 and 2 should be organised and carried out by the central committees or by the entitled examination centres in each NATO member country.

– STANAG 6001 examinations at Level 3 should be organised and carried out by the international commissions appointed by the authorised bodies of NATO, or the central committees in each NATO member country.

– There is no need to introduce an English in Use component into STANAG 6001 examinations. However, a part checking the knowledge of ‘general-military’ English should be added to the test.

– A cultural component should be introduced to STANAG 6001 examinations to check candidates’ abilities to communicate / respond naturally in the language in both social and professional situations.

– The language tested on the examination should be useful and practical, thus more authentic and real-life materials should be included in the test, instead of adapted ones.

– The main focus of the Speaking test should be on communication, thus interactive abilities and fluency should take priority over grammar and accuracy.

– All instructions provided during the test should be given in English – even at Level 1.

– Candidates at Levels 2 and 3 should be allowed to use monolingual dictionaries during the Writing test.

– The NATO Benchmark Advisory Test (BAT) should be used to classify a candidate to the appropriate language course.

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References

Brindley G., 1998, Assessing Language Abilities, [w:] <<Annual Review of Applied Linguistics>>, t. 18, Cambridge, s. 171-191.

Council of Europe, 2001, Common European Framework of Reference for Languages:Learning, Teaching, Assessment. Cambridge University Press.

Council of Europe, 2001, Europejski system opisu kształcenia językowego: uczenie się,nauczanie, ocenianie. Warszawa CODN.

Council of Europe, September 2003, Relating Language Examinations to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment (CEF). Manual. Preliminary Pilot Version. Strasbourg: Language Policy Division.

Council of Europe, European Centre for Modern Languages, 2009, Languages for social cohesion: language education in a multilingual and multicultural Europe. Council of Europe.

Gos, M, 2009, English for Specific Purposes in NATO Armed Forces, [w:] <<Komunikacja Specjalistyczna>>, t. 2, KJS UW, Warszawa, s.122-130.

Grenfell, M., 2002, Modern Languages Across the Curriculum. Routledge.Morrow, K., 2004, Insights from the Common European Framework. Oxford University

Press.NATO, 1976, NATO Standardization Agreement. NATO.NATO, 2003, Annex A to NATO Standardization Agreement (Edition 2). NATO.NATO, 2009, Annex A to NATO Standardization Agreement (Edition 3). NATO.North, B., 2004, Relating assessments, examinations and courses to the CEF. in Morrow, K.

Insights from the Common European Framework. Oxford University Press.Papageorgiou, S., 2009, Setting Performance Standards in Europe: The Judges’ Contribution

to Relating Language Examinations to the Common European Framework of Reference. Peter Lang GmbH.