Securing the sea supply chains - GBV

Securing the sea supply chains

The challenge of terrorism and modern piracy at the Somali coasts

A thesis submitted to the Bucerius/WHU Master of Law and Business Program in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Master of Law and Business (“MLB”) Degree

Efstathios A. Vasileiou July 25, 2014

12,344 words (excluding footnotes) Supervisor 1: Prof. Dr. Stefan Spinler, WHU

Supervisor 2: Cpt. Christos V. Maragos, CVM Ltd.

to my beloved parents and to all those who support me in my quests

Acknowledgements

The author would like to extend his courtesy to Mr. Christos Maragos for his

guidance and support in the realization of this paper. Special thanks to Professor Dr.

Stefan Spinler for the confidence and inspiration he gave from the very beginning to

this assignment. I must thank the members of the administration team of the MLB

program for their patience, their kind, stoical and pious way of dealing with every

last-minute crisis that erupted during the writing of this thesis and the calmness they

inspired to troubled spirits.

Securing the Sea Supply Chains

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

“Securing the sea supply chains, the challenge of terrorism and modern piracy at

the Somali coasts”.

1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………2

2. Recognizing the importance of a secure supply chain in maritime transport

for international trade.

2.1. The importance of maritime transport for the contemporary international

trade…………………………………………………………………………...4

2.2. Sectors of the economy and trade affected by the disruption of a constant flow

of supplies…………………………………………………………………….7

2.3. Dangers perturbing a supply flow and the needs of Risk Management………8

2.4. Modern terrorism and piracy as a challenge for maritime transport………….9

3. Assessing the phenomenon of modern piracy and international terrorism

today.

3.1. The globalization of terrorism and piracy in the 21st century………………12

3.2. Activity in the Horn of Africa……………………………………………….14

3.3. Challenges for the safety of shipping and international trade……………….16

4. Confronting threats and possible security strategies in high-risk sea roads

(Somalia).

4.1. Security measures in port……………………………………………………19

4.2. Self-protection and passive protection onboard……………………………..21

4.3. Military presence in international waters. Results and new suggestions……23

4.4. Information security…………………………………………………………25

5. Revisiting the issue of logistics in a troubled world. Dealing with

contemporary security issues in different types of transport.

5.1. Protection of supply nodes and storage areas……………………………….28

5.2. Cargo tracking centers……………………………………………………….30

5.3. Alternative route evaluating centers…………………………………………31

5.4. Insurances (Means of restitution)……………………………………………33

6. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….35

7. Bibliography…………………………………………………………………….38

8. Appendix……………………………………………………………………….......


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1. Introduction

The writing of this thesis is meant to combine two of my greater interests, security

and marine logistics, into one synthetic assignment that will benefit the community of

maritime trade and supply chain management in view of the challenges of the future.

The idea behind the writing of this thesis was to provide a scientific combination of

my expertise in history, political science focused on security and the understanding of

modern logistics, with an extra analysis on maritime trade and transportation. The last

element came as a result of my experience as a maritime transport ans forward intern.

I chose this particular topic, not only because it combines perfectly my previously

obtained knowledge but also because I identified a gap between marine transporters,

logistics management and security experts. My stand is that a serious security

problem exists nowadays in the Gulf of Aden and in order to deal with it one must

first understand the root causes of this issue.

I found particular satisfaction from the fact that both my supervisors elect has shown

great interest in my views and strong confidence in my abilities to manage the

research. Both of them acknowledge the gravity of the problem and its importance as

an interesting and up-to-date concept. Next, a full four-chaptered structure has been

developed, acknowledging the issue for the importance of modern naval trade, the

problem of contemporary piracy, the ways to combat the phenomenon and the

dangers to international economy should this problem not been addressed in its

completeness.

Piracy constitutes an endemic phenomenon that can have far too great repercussions

to be ignored. Political instability in countries vital for trade routes, namely the

“chokepoints” of the Gulf of Aden, can have extremely serious results on marine

trade: Serious instability in supply chain, loss of life and ships, loss of sense of

security in marine traveling, disruptions of vital product imports, rise of product

prices, room for foul private practices in the margins of international law.


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My scope is that the reader will realize through a comprehensive analysis of how a

political phenomenon (piracy) with clear historical reference in its causes and

confrontation can be and must be dealt with expeditiously.

The root causes of piracy are not resolved exclusively with military or police means,

as they lay predominantly in society and governance. Piracy is an issue far more

global than Aden. Indeed, while international action appears to suppress piracy in that

region, it seems to rise respectfully in West Africa, Central America and especially in

Southeast Asia. It will require much more concrete and perhaps non-violent actions to

produce more permanent results.

Hamburg, 24.07.2014


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2. Recognizing the importance of a secure supply chain in maritime

transport for international trade

2.1 The importance of maritime transport for the contemporary international

trade

More than 32 centuries ago, the signing of the Treaty of Kadesh terminated a long

conflict between the Egyptians and the Hittites (1258 B.C.). It was to be a mutual

agreement of symbiotic co-existence between the two most powerful dynasties of the

known world. Separating the eastern Mediterranean region to spheres of influence, the

two powerful kingdoms would flourish together in peace through trade and organized

production. It was meant to be the beginning of an era of prosperity and stability. The

end of the war, however, brought a demobilization of thousands of mercenary soldiers

from both armies. Pushed by the distress of poverty and rage of their unforeseen

unemployment, those men of violence formed armed groups that began attacking the

caravans and traders in an orgy of robbery, slaughter and terror. History recorded this

as the “invasion of the Sea Peoples”, one of the most enigmatic turmoils ever to bear

witness in the human annals (Robbins, M., 2001). This prolonged insecurity and

fierce fighting caused the destruction of great cities, like Troy and Ugarit, and led the

two empires to their feet. It is perhaps the oldest example of a regional crisis as a

result of the breakdown of trade-links in an economically interconnected environment

of largely urban populations. It would require the full military power of both Egypt

and the Hittite empire and almost a century of cruel and merciless fighting to repel the

threat of this enemy and re-establish an area of security in the region (The History of

the Greek People, 2001).

One may ask, what would be the meaning of contemplating a historical event that

took place in the Bronze Age. In my opinion, it is exactly in history that one must be

exemplified in order to avoid a similar problem in the future. And the nature of a

problem remains the same, be it on bows and arrows or Kalashnikovs and RPGs:

modern urban societies rely on long trade routes of primary and processed goods to


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survive and enhance their wealth. These trade routes are as essential to them as veins

for the body. Once they are cut off, the body suffers, weakens and dies.

In the contemporary world, maritime trade plays a pivotal role in commercial

transport of goods. As the organization of production and the trend of developed

industrial countries of outsourcing towards the less developed ones continues and the

exchange of goods is governed by the rules of globalization, the importance of

transportation take on a central role in the whole process. Indeed, the globalized

economic model that predominate after the end of the Cold War calls for the

specialization in production, economies of scale and the related comparative

advantages on a universal scale, without border or boundaries to intercept the

transportation of parts and end goods to the consumers (Rodrigue et al., 2013, p. 158).

As a result, land, air and sea transportation becomes of the essence for the continuum

of the production and supply chain (see scheme 1).

Globalization is a fact beyond reasonable contest. It has been said that arguing against

that reality is as valid as arguing against the laws of gravity, as reported by the UN

Secretary General Koffi Annan (Corbett & Winebrake, 2008, p.4). World production

has shifted from the western countries to the developing world. The developed

countries retained the scepter of Research and Development and outsourced in an

attempt to lower the cost of production. The consumption of the final products is still

higher in developed countries, although evidence suggests that this is likely to change

in the future. The traditional view that sees the western populations as super-

consumers tends to be mitigated and ultimately overturned by an exponential growth

in the consumer habits of rising economies. In any case, an enormous volume of

products, in raw or processed form, needs to be transported between the areas of

manufacture to the area of consumption (Corbett & Winebrake, 2008, p. 6-7). Study

analyses in Europe and the United States reveal that transport trade has been in a

steady increase since the 1950s and that this development is responsible for the

multiplication of wealth amongst the general population (IHS Global Insight, Inc.,

2009, pp. 2-25 and EUROSTAT, 2014, Maritime transport of goods - quarterly data,

EU ports activity).


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The gradual liberalization of trade rulings and the technological breakthrough in

shipbuilding have resulted in an unprecedented development of maritime trade, a

trend which is expected to continue in the decades to come at an annual rate of 2.4%

(Stopford, Martin, 2010, p.6). This growth, which was became apparent especially in

the seaborne trade, revolutionized the global economy to such a degree that shipping

became synonym to global trade and economic upliftment (EPA, Reducing Air

Pollution from International Transportation, epa.gov). A series of technological

milestones, such as the construction of the steel hull, the introduction of steam and

later diesel engines to sails and the use of freight containers in transportations resulted

to maritime trade being the most important pillar of the world economy. In the words

of Dr. Stopford, director at Clarcson plc in his presentation on “How Shipping

Changed the World” at the Global Maritime Environmental Congress in Hamburg

four years ago: “If shipping stopped for 3 months, so would modern life as we know

it” (Stopford, Martin, 2010, p.6).

According to the International Maritime Organization nowadays 90% of the total

transportation volumes are carried out by sea (IMO, International Shipping Facts &

Figures 2012, p.7). This makes the maritime transport the champion of transport

modes. The reason is simple: seafaring trade is by any comparison the safest, most

reliable and most cost effective way of transportation for passengers and cargo

(International Chamber of Shipping, Shipping and World Trade). The fact that

roughly 72% of the planet is covered by water makes the sea route a tax-free highway

for merchant ships to deliver transported goods everywhere in the world. If those

numbers impress you, one can continue by stating that the transport of fuel alone is

dependable by the sea transport. 26,805 million barrels of oil are transported daily

through the seas (EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints Report, 2012, pp. 6-8). 3,73

million barrels transit every single day through the Red Sea route, between the

“chokepoints” of the Suez Canal and the “Gates of Grief” (Bab el-Mandeb) between

Djibouti and Yemen, 13,9% of the world daily transport of oil (scheme 2). Merchant

ships transport an average of 1.2 tons of cargo for every single person in the world

every year, a number that corresponds to 3 tons for residents of rich countries like in

the E.U. (2009 figures) (Stopford, Martin, 2010, p.2).


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2.2 Sectors of the economy and trade affected by the by the disruption of a

constant flow of supplies

As a system of veins connecting and vitalizing the “organic” structure of production

and consumption, maritime trade becomes essential for the well-being of the

globalized edifice of supply and demand. A possible disruption in the long

interrelated line of links of the supply chain can cause unpredictable developments

that can trigger rolled costs to the rest of the chain. A prolonged turbulence however

can result to the breakdown of the supply chain in all (Long, 2003, p.43-45).

A supply chain bases its success on the constant and predictable sequence of actions

that occur and together they constitute the puzzle of transportation. It is like an

orchestra of different musical instruments that play different tunes in different times

but together constitute a concert of unparalleled harmony any dissonance disturbs the

balance of the song and causes commotion to the whole orchestra. Imagine the course

of a product from the time it is mined as ore, then transported and melted to steel at

the foundry, forged to engine blocks, made into a car engine, assembled to a factory

into a car only to be sold as a final product to the car retailer. In every step, each

sector grants the product some extra value and the output of the final product is

dependable from the whole chain process. And each chain is as strong as its weakest

link. Logistics move the world economy. They escort and support each product from

its primary to secondary and finally to the tertiary sector of the economy. Agriculture,

livestock, mines, industry, distribution, commerce are entirely dependable from

transportations (DHL, The macroeconomic significance of logistics, 2014). The

globalization of the last twenty years and the practices of companies worldwide

distribute their production facilities in terms of efficiency favor the existence of a

thick network of transportations, without which no such endeavor would be possible.

The efficiency of transportation on a world-wide basis, rapidly and interdependently

constitutes the base of global economy, production, employment and social care. It is

because of that network and the service it delivers that we maintain the quality of our

living, the social standards and the existing employment conditions and workplaces

and it is because of the continuous development of this system that we scope to

maintain and enhance them in the future (OECD/WTO, 2013, pp.16-21).


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2.3 Dangers perturbing a supply flow and the need of risk management

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the supply chain is its intrinsic

vulnerability. Stretched as it is, the flow of supplies is exposed to any type of

disturbances, be it natural (e.g. a flood, an earthquake or a volcanic eruption),

accidental (global financial crisis) or intentional (piracy attacks).

The fragility of the supply chain becomes then a question for strong minds amongst

managers, where empowering its resilience to turbulences becomes the issue. The

data most analysts are receiving are nothing but encouraging: in a series of

evaluations performed on the industry sector by Mitroff and Alpaslan in 2003 95% of

them failed the test (Schmitt et al., Leeds). In the context of globalization, the supply

chain becomes ever more stretched and its flank exposed to threats. Its branches ever

more numerous while its performance demands ever more consuming.

Disruptions are translated to a certain cost, depending on the gravity of the break

down, the ability of the chain to absorb the blow, to contain the damage and to sustain

a rhythm of continuation. How much was the loss of profit from the damage? How

great impact did this loss create to another part of the chain? How long will it take to

re-establish the previous rhythms?

In our assessment we will focus on the maritime transport through a specific route, the

Red Sea maritime road from Europe to South East Asia and South Africa and the

danger the rise of piracy and modern terrorism poses to this maritime supply chain for

transporters and commerce at large.

Above all, it becomes clear that the sustainability of a supply chain is a difficult and

crucial task; crucial not only on the breaking point of the chain but in many different

and much more important parts of the chain. Germany did not lose the First World

War because of any conspiracy; the war was lost because Germany was blockaded

from its supplies. Twenty years later they nearly did the same to England, with the

ruthless submarine war. And again the Russian campaign was lost only because of the

collapse in the German army’s supply chain: An unspeakable mistake considering that

Napoleon was driven out of Russia on the same reasons (van Crevelt, 2001).

Modern supply chain flows is a battlefield in any part of the line, where no failure is

easily sustained. The stakes are too high. In order to secure the resiliency of the

supply chain an effective real time risk management is needed. Risk assessments will

provide early warning for any deficiencies in the functioning of the procedures, they


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will reveal aspects in the working routine that are not cost-effective and productive

and will assist the chain section to realize its potentials and short-comings, correct

them and respond to future challenges with greater effectiveness.

2.4 Modern terrorism and piracy as a challenge for maritime transport

Although a common definition of piracy doesn’t exist, the article 101 of the 1982

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides us with the

following definition of piracy:

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed

for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft,

and directed:

(i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons

or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the

jurisdiction of any State;

(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft

with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) Any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-

paragraph (a) or (b).”

(Source: http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Default)

Modern pirates are considered a growing menace from international and regional

organizations that handle matters of maritime transportations and supply chains.

The re-emergence of piracy in certain parts of the world is closely linked with the

political disintegration and the socio-economic unrest in those states. In Somalia,

piracy came about after the shuttering of the land and the sinking of political affaires

into a civil war in the early 1990s.

http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Default


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There are two interesting elements linked to the piracy issue in Somalia: first, piracy

is not the only thing the unrest that dominates the land brought to surface. Drug and

human trafficking is also quite endemic and profitable, especially towards Yemen.

Second, together with piracy, the rise of radical Islam has resulted to strong ties being

forged with regional and international terrorism swooping from the Middle East and

Central Africa (Papandreou, 2011, pp. 26-28). We will address the issue of terrorism

in due course. One of the reasons the phenomenon of piracy prospers in Somalia is the

attitude of neighboring countries towards Somali piracy.

Kenya has undertaken the burden of the legal prosecution of pirates in her

territory but signs of frustration and fatigue have been long obvious.

Seychelles are worried about the consequences on their country being

negatively marked as a popular tourist destination.

Yemen has long been characterized as a “fragile state”. Criminal elements are

co-operating with Somalis in human trafficking (a very lucrative business)

while terrorist cells are endemic in the land.

(http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/01/04/yemen.profile/).

According to Papandreou, Yemen and Somalia constitute the second bipole of

geopolitical instability in the wider Middle East region after India and

Pakistan.

Tanzania and Madagascar, although affected by the piracy phenomenon, do

not seem to pursuit an active part in the issue and chose to wait further

developments.

Egypt, although concerned about the trouble piracy causes to shipping avoids

assuming a more active role. Egypt controls the Suez passage which weights

greatly both in the country’s geopolitical importance and the economic gains

are considerable.

India, despite the fact that pirate attacks have been audacious enough to reach

near her shores, has yet to receive a clear stand.

Ethiopia has been the only border country to take decisive action on the state

of anarchy that dominates in Somalia. In 2006, backed by US consultants,

Ethiopian troops invaded to overturn the ICU regime and its radical islamist

group al-Shabaab, in favor of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

Although a success, al-Shabaab came to re-institute itself soon after the

http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/01/04/yemen.profile/


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withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. Al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab remains a

point of concern among security and policy analysts in the region.

(Papandreou, 2011, pp. 28-29 & Council on Foreign Relations,

http://www.cfr.org/somalia/terrorism-havens-somalia/p9366).

http://www.cfr.org/somalia/terrorism-havens-somalia/p9366


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3. Assessing the phenomenon of modern piracy

and international terrorism today

3.1 The globalization of terrorism and piracy in the 21st century

At first glance, piracy seems like a historical anachronism. The achievements of

modern science and intellect create the illusion that mankind has moved beyond such

violent and hideous practices. Our mind reflectively recalls images of a romantic

figure of fierce freedom and limitless adventure. The truth, however, is different.

Piracy is as endemic in human history as poverty. Emerging in the form of armed

robbery in shallow waters, piracy has always managed to rear its ugly head in times of

extreme poverty, social turmoil and weak political control. It might seem distant but

pirates have been in the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea and the Baltics. Julius

Caesar was captured by pirates in his youth and was retained for ransom. When his

family paid he left the pirate stronghold promising them that he would come back and

crucified them all. It took him some time but one of his first actions as a general was

to suppress piracy in the seas and make the Mediterranean a Roman “Mare Nostrum”.

Ultimately, he defeated his captors and fulfilled his promise. The Aegean Sea, now a

summer paradise was during the late Middle Ages swarming with pirates, looting,

burning and destroying everything. Much of the character of the islands owes their

creation to pirate activity: all the forests were burned and the houses built one next to

another, with thick walls to resist cannonball hits, with windows like loopholes and

narrow streets that no more than three men can walk next to another. This are the old

fortresses built to repel pirate attacks. In northern Europe, Vikings were the most

fearsome and known raiders of villages next to the sea or rivers while only in the late

19th

century, in the shores of today Algerian lied the pirate domain of Barbary coast,

destroyed by the joined efforts of British, French and Americans

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piracy). Indeed, piracy is a reality today as it was a

reality in the not-so-distant past. The fact that the modern man of the West managed

to raise his living standards and cultivate a sense of moral values and knowledge, that

we call civilization, does not mean that the entire world has followed his example.


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In the last ten years, the phenomenon of piracy has re-emerged in several parts of the

world. The most prominent ones are the Malacca strait, in South-east Asia, the Gulf of

Nigeria in West Africa and Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. The latter has been in the

spotlight because of the importance of the route to international shipping and maritime

trade (Scheme 4). Approximately 20,000 ships pass through these waters each year,

meaning to bridge the gap between East and West, carrying millions of tons of food,

fuel, machinery, electronics, ore and construction materials. It is an ever going

treasure “river” bypassing the shores of some of the poorest populations in the world.

As repercussions of a transitional world, piracy has associated with political

instability and the activism of poverty. In the vast coastline of Somalia, hundreds of

fishing villages resort to acts of piracy, hi-jacking merchant ships that dare to

approach their shores to shorten the route just a little. By piracy is meant any act of

“boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft or any other

crime and with the intent or capability to use force” (ICC IMB, 2011, p.3). Together,

another concept was unraveled: the concept of marine terrorist. Terrorism is yet

another “profession” that does not surprise us with its novelty. Yet, it became quite a

trend after the 9/11 attacks on US soil. Some incidents of suicide bombers involving

the United States Navy ship USS “Cole” (DDG-67) on October 2000, the 2004

“SuperFerry 14” bombing in 2004 and the tanker MV M. “Star” in 2010

(http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/11/22/gulf.attacks/) gave birth to the

“marine terrorist”.

In the framework of radical Islam, especially after the 1980s, several areas in the –so

called- wider Middle East, an area almost identical to the Islamic world, reaching

from Afghanistan to West Africa and from the Caucasus to the Gulf of Aden, and

Africa, a series of terrorist organizations took refuge and managed to get organized in

cells (see scheme 3). In those cells the groups increased their numbers, trained

fighters and spies, exercised indoctrination transforming them to fanatic militants.

(Burke, 2004). These cells managed to come in contact with Somali pirates, then in

their first phase of development and shared with them weapons, tactical training,

money and –possibly- information. From that point on it is rather difficult to

distinguish between pirates, who aim at capturing and looting a ship’s cargo, avoiding

harming the crew in scope of extorting ransom and terrorist cells, who aim at special

targets, based on flag, ethnicity etc. in order to destroy. The author is not sure whether

http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/11/22/gulf.attacks/


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the counter piracy actions undertaken by forces already engaged in the “War against

terror” made or cared to make such a distinction between the two groups. Sources

originating from America and the United Kingdom were much less disposed to

commit to such a distinction, naming all as terrorists and confronting them with the

same resent. On the contrary, French and German sources made a greater effort to

realize the phenomenon of piracy in its full context, starting from the history of the

land and recognizing the difficulties of the Somali people. The remarkable thing is

that the two different approaches, despite sharing the same care, the protection of the

maritime commerce and supply line, developed a completely different understanding

and draw different conclusions (Ploch et al. 2009 & DIW: The Advantage of Piracy,

2010).

3.2 Activity in the horn of Africa

Somalia holds a strategic position at the East African continent, overlooking the

mouth of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean is controlling the shortest sailing route

between the East and the West. It shapes like a letter “J” bordering with Ethiopia and

Djibouti to the West, Kenya to the South - South-West, the Gulf of Aden to the North

and the Indian Ocean to the East. Somalia has the largest coastline in Africa; roughly

3,300 km, more than 10.3% of the overall continent. It is a poor country that based its

economy mainly in livestock and fishing (http://www.unsomalia.net/FAO/). In the

past decades the country was faced with accusations of irresponsible and wasteful

fishing methods that are harmful to maritime life and depleting the supplies. Its

economy was heavily dependable to the primary sector, namely the sea and strongly

affected by illegal fishing in its territorial waters. Still, Somalia didn’t lay an official

claim to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) until 2009. The country has been in a

state of emergency in the last 25 years, since the beginning of the Somali civil war

that caused the disintegration of the Somali state and paralyzed any government

control. The power gap that was created, the conflicting tribal and political groups and

the opportunistic practices of bordering parties led the majority of the population to

economic and social crisis.

Sources do not seem to agree as to the root causes of the development of piracy in

Somalia. Some sources talk about fishermen turning to more “profitable” targets due


15

to poverty (Rodrigue, 2013). Others seem to elaborate the scenario of former Somali

navy and coastguard officers defending the territorial sea of Somalia from foreign

fishermen and transit ships entering the unguarded home-waters (Maliti et al., 2009),

while there are some who dig into more conspiracy theories (Abdullahi, 2008). The

fact is that piracy was resurrected from oblivion and posed an especially hot threat to

international shipping after the 2004.

From 2005 to the year of its peak in 2011, piracy grew from a regional phenomenon

to a menace for maritime transit with international repercussions (Schemes 5-6-8).

Modern pirates differ from their historic predecessors in many aspects. Swooping

from shore-based hideouts, usually nothing but a plain fishing village at the coasts of

Somalia, they act in small groups. Their vessel of choice seems to the skiff, a slender

wooden boat, quite usual in those waters (Scheme 7a). Equipped with modern

powerful engines they can turn into high-speed chase-boats that can maneuver rapidly

around a slow and heavy merchant ship and board in minutes. The main problem is

the range of these boats which was not enough to reach deep waters, search and

pursuit their target and return to base before their fuel run out. Thus, in the first years

of the emergence of piracy, the radius of action of the pirates was limited to some

kilometers from the shores. With the merchant ships tackling the threat by avoiding

sailing too close to Somali coasts, the pirates became more bold and resourceful; at

first stage they loaded some boats with fuel tanks, which were used by the skiffs as

floating gas stations (Scheme 7b &c). When the crews were faced with the hardships

of the open sea they employed open-sea fishing vessels as floating bases of operations

(Scheme 7d). From there, pirates could sail in relative comfort, monitor shipping

movement through radar and launch surprise attacks on those who believed to be the

most attractive targets (Papandreou, 2011, pp.45-52). Scheme 8 indicates the

progressive expansion of the Somali piracy operations, which in 2010 reached from

the shores of Somalia to the Hormuz Straits and the territorial waters of India and the

Madagascar.

The pirate vessels are not armed. Their sole purpose is to act as landing crafts for the

boarding teams. Pirates bare the omnipresent soviet-made Kalashnikov family of

weapons, which is very common in Africa and West Asia. It is a sturdy weapon, easy

to use, suitable for the extreme conditions of the sea, firing a powerful projectile. The

Kalashnikovs are not notorious for their accuracy but speeding in a fishing boat at 40


16

knots on open-sea waves doesn’t leave much to marksmanship. Usually pirates reach

at small distance and then fire short volleys of warning shots to intimidate the crew. If

that doesn’t work, spraying the superstructure and portholes will do the trick. Lately,

the widely practice of onboard armed guards and the international naval presence

have made the pirates update their equipment to light machineguns and anti-tank

Rocket launchers (RPG) (Global Security.org/Pirates). The psychological effects are

enormous, especially to the untrained and unarmed crew of merchant ship but even to

the less experienced armed guards (who are not war veterans and therefore cost less to

the ship owners).

3.3 Challenges for the safety of shipping and international trade

In the late years, the evolution of the pirate skills and boldness has taken the

international community by surprise. Perhaps, the origins or the appearance of some

malnourished, half naked men has not impressed the experts of security, who were in

a rush to underestimate them. Several plans and suggestion have been put forward to

tackle the phenomenon of piracy and the methods involved. Despite some success of

these measures that led to a drop of the hijackings, it all depends on the willingness of

shipping companies to undertake the cost of such measures.

Based on the admittance of the importance to protect the route of Aden for the sake of

international trade, we dare to make suggestions on tackling the pirate attacks.

One obvious suggestion would be to avoid passing through such a

“contaminated” route, until the naval task forces manage somehow to suppress

it (Scheme 6). There are two objections to that line. First, the alternative route

from India to Europe and America is around the Cape of “Good Hope”. This

route change adds an extra 5,000 n.miles and another 10 days to the voyage

raising the costs. Second, the Nigerian piracy is also present and in a way of

rise. It is only a matter of time until the Somali piracy is replaced with

Nigerian piracy, especially if diverting close to 20,000 ships yearly through

that passage it will make it a paradise for pirates. Then New naval Task Forces

will be needed (http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/Suez-Canal-

Presentation.pdf).


17

Replace the three different naval task forces (plus the independent

“contributors”, like China, Russia etc. who want to participate but maintain

their freedom of acting). This is a suggestion that would distribute the use of

force much more efficiently and reduce costs in all. Political will is a

prerequisite.

Employ a force under the flag of the United Nations, the only global player

with the legitimacy to take action under humanitarian motive. The

multinational, joint force of warships, aerial means, ground forces and

electronic surveillance, should be in direct contact with the Somali authorities

to police the waters, provide protection to fisheries near the coast of Somalia,

train the coast guard, escort merchant ships and seek for the rise of the living

standards of people in the coastal villages. By providing those people with

food, infrastructure, jobs, training and education, you immediately eliminate

the reasons the Somali piracy ever developed and win the battle for hearts and

minds so that it will never surface again.

Some thoughts about the military branch of the operation would be to employ special

ships. Cruisers and destroyers with a displacement of thousands of tones, armed with

latest technology radar and missiles deployed against skiffs is as sufficient as chasing

a mosquito with a sledgehammer. Small sized, economic patrol vessels with a crew of

20-30 personnel are totally sufficient. If someone talks about the speed of the skiffs,

having a chase boat onboard the vessel is the rule. When the need for pursuit arises a

small crane lowers the boat and the chase begins. There have been no reports so far of

pirates managing to escape the chasing boats of the warships in Aden.

Intelligence is the key, not only to locate but to organize the marine operations.

Satellite screening of the transit corridor and the territorial waters of Somalia is ideal

but more affordable solutions exist: In the past ten years, drone technology or

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) has developed a lot. A remote controlled plane can

stay on air for 8-16-24 or even 48 hours depending on the size and capabilities of the

model. A single operator on a land base or a ship can direct it with a joystick

receiving and transmitting real-time information. Alternatively, zeppelins have

returned undertaking the same role. Slow moving, with low fuel consumption or full

electrical charging their batteries from solar panels they can stay on air for weeks


18

without any need, while their greater size and lift capability allows them to employ

heavier surveillance equipment (Scheme 9).

I find I cannot stress enough that the balance point to overturn the foul phenomenon

of piracy lies not in the big guns but in the hearts and minds. Somali descended to

piracy and thievery because of the poverty of its population. The key to suppress and

utterly eliminate piracy is to help Somalia, a country of extended coastline and in a

geostrategic position to “stand on its feet” and rediscover its character.


19

4. Confronting threats and possible security strategies in high-

risk sea roads (Somalia)

4.1 Security measures in port

Having already analyzed the danger of piracy and terrorism for marine vessels and

crew, it is time to move to secure port establishments. A port is by definition an area

of where an orgasm of overlap different working groups is taking place. Between

administration, warehouses, technical base, load cranes and transport, ships are being

uploaded of their cargo or disembark their passengers; technicians struggle to conduct

repairs and logistical companies to carry on their task.

In the 21st century, a modern port is an area of safety and effectiveness. Modern

management has accomplished the latter and safety regulations have filled the gaps on

the first. Still, in order to continue to see a port as an area of safety in troubled

geopolitical areas such as the Horn of Africa, extra measures need to be taken to

enhance security without encumbering ongoing works.

So far, no terrorist attacks have taken place against major port areas. However, in the

last five years alone there have been five major incidents of terrorism, attacks or

attempts, on airports (Colombo –Sri Lanka 2009, Moscow –Russia 2011, Peshavar –

Pakistan 2012, Wichita –USA 2013, Jinna –Pakistan 2014), a comparably safe

transport and supply chain area. The results of an attack, no matter what the chance or

level of success are too important to ignore. An attack on a port could cause not only

considerable loss of lives and damages worth of millions of dollars but also account

for the disruption of the steady flow of the supply chain of a number of operations for

weeks or months, thus derailing any form of task scheduling on an international level,

if the transit of goods through the port includes the management of international

orders.

Maintaining the fragile balance between security and facilitated movement of goods

and working people within the compounds of the port is not an easy task.


20

Unavoidable compromises on both sides of the scale will have to be made. In terms of

safety and well-conduct, the International Maritime Organization has launched the

International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code), which provides

detailed rules and guidance on keeping the minimum standards of safety in sea and on

dock in the spirit of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

(SOLAS).

On the basis of the ISPS regulations regarding the safety of ports, areas that are

affected by piracy action and terrorist activity should be organized according to the

security standards described on the document; the personnel operating the port

facilities be trained to react to emergency situations and direct certain actions

according to their specialty and function in the port. Regular drills within the port area

will teach the personnel to respond to different scenarios, learn the structure of the

facilities and buildings and cooperate with groups from different professional areas.

The organization of the port in an area of security and control generally calls for

segmentation. The outer perimeter of the port must be clearly signed and fenced.

Regular 24-hour watch is necessary. Observation towers are a little obsolete but

cameras with both day and night vision capacity will work just as much. The inside

area of the port must be divided into areas of different control standards: warehouse

and storage area, passenger, cargo depot, technical and repair base, administration and

monitor. Each area must be accessed from specific gateways, where security controls

will take place. Employees can be equipped with access cards enabling them to move

freely within the areas of interest and restricting them from those where the security

level is higher. All open areas and checkpoints must be adequately lighted and

monitored. A central administration point must exist to coordinate actions and tackle

arising problems. The issue of real-time communications and rapid reaction forces

providing policing, firefighting, ambulance transport or maintenance must be

addressed for an effective control over the whole port area to exist. In short, the new

perspective for a secure port organization is not much different from the picture of a

modern airport.


21

4.2 Self-protection and passive protection onboard

Aside from ports, the protection of ships on sail has been a long and complicated

headache for security analysts since the beginning of the rebirth of piracy. We can

detect four distinct periods of dealing with the piracy threat: the first period 1992-

2002 (period of sporadic attacks), the second period 2002-2008 (escalation of piracy),

the third period 2008-2011 (the “dark” years) and the fourth period 2011-today (the

late years). According to the level of the threat, or at least the perception of the gravity

of the threat by ship owners and masters, confronting the pirate attacks took different

forms.

One must always remember that a master’s first and foremost concern is the safety of

his crew and ship. Everything else comes second. Originally, merchant ships had

neither the means not was the crew trained to tackle an attack and attempt to board

while on sail. Pirates approached in fast moving skiffs, came on the side of the slow

moving vessel, tossed ropes with hooks and climbed the hull. Seizure was over, as

there is none that could oppose a man armed with a battle rifle.

The reaction of ship’s crews was proportional to the threat. Originally, attempters

were hosed down with firefighting equipment available in all vessels. The power of

the water beam was enough to deter or repulse a man without killing him. Provided it

would get him! Soon this practice was proven outdated as pirates learned to avoid

water cannons by approaching from the “blind spots” of the ship. After all,

firefighting equipment is designed to fight a fire onboard the ship and not around it.

Moreover, pirates employed armament taken from the Somali armed forces or

smugglers to impose themselves on the unarmed crew. In response, companies

addressed several “siege” experts, who suggested and to some extend passed

“medieval” technics to repulse the invader. Such were the use of a system of water

hoses overlooking the area around the ship, barbed wire (some suggested electrified)

at the edge of the deck, where the hooks were tossed, net traps for boats and skiffs

lowered with cranes around the ship, Teflon foam to make decks and hull sides

slippery and even more elaborate “non-lethal” weapons such as the optical laser


22

cannon, meant to temporarily blind the attackers or acoustic devices to deaf them

(scheme 9)1.

Some of these suggestions were adopted but their life was short. The dubious legal

grounds regarding the use of force by the crews and the fact that mariners were asked

to fight against determined men armed with combat guns using sonic weapons and

experimental lasers was a little too much. Soon, the employment of armed guards

became the trend for most ship owners to ensure the protection of their fortune and

men. The end of the engagement of the western forces against the anti-terrorist fights

in Afghanistan and Iraq meant there no shortage of trained professionals to escort the

ships through the dangerous seas. Usually, men were screened and asked to sign a

contract of a few days, flew to a nearby port, board and then take the same route back.

The use of armed guards brought the ships for the first time in terms with the pirates

and is responsible for the majority of failed attempts, most of the times without a shot

fired. However, the use of force remains an issue of legal debate, regardless if the

results were encouraging. Civilians are not to use force under circumstances where a

state authority may do so and the IMO opposes such practices (IMO, 2009, PIRACY

AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, §59-61, p.13). The “gap” in the law

could be found in the Chapter XI-2 – regarding special measures to enhance maritime

security. According to Regulation XI-2/8 the Master can exercise his “professional

judgment over decisions necessary to maintain the security of the ship” (International

Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974). In plain words, this

provides the Master of the ship to call if a situation of emergency exists and drastic

measures to safeguard the security of the ship, provided that no help can be provided

in time by a state authority. In order to avoid arbitrary interpretations of the law and

create anarchy in the seas, many states and all international organizations are against

the use of armed guards onboard ships.

In the last period of piracy, general tendencies call for a more passive strategy. Secure

structures are built within the ship in order to protect the crew. In most cases such

structures are called “citadels” and they look like massive safes. After pirates have

penetrated the ship’s defenses the crew is locked in those armored chambers, which

are completely autonomous in power supply, food and water, avoiding contact with

1 The IMO has edited the Best Management Practices (BMP4) document to provide information (pp.3-

10) and suggestion (pp.23-40) to seafarers on how to respond to piracy situations.


23

the pirates and therefore captivity. Deprived of the benefit of hostages to extort

ransom and trained personnel to navigate a ship of that size, pirates are left with no

choice but to abandon the ship before security forces arrive. Citadels and early

warning through electronic surveillance appears to be the latest trend in tackling

piracy (Personal communication with maritime security consultant “FDN Marine”2).

It should be noted that the employment of armed guards despite its effectiveness, has

met with the content of the international organizations and ship-owners owing to legal

reasons and financial costs respectively (The European Institute, Marmon, 2011). The

issue could escalate further if pirates reacted to armed violence by enhancing heavier

firepower (e.g. Rocket Propelled Grenades RPG) or exercised violence to mariners

held in captivity. It could also provoke pirates or terrorists to assault ships to captivate

their weaponry. The issue touches the essence of use of force in international waters

and is potentially insulting both to the international community that deals with the law

of the seas and the regional national governments of Somalia, Saudi Arabia and

Yemen, in terms of disregarding their authority to project jurisdiction. It remains still

a practice in question in many countries (Papandreou, 2011).

4.3 Military presence in international waters. Results and new suggestions

Together with the re-emergence of piracy came the role of national states to provide

protection for merchant mariners from armed threats. To tackle the attacks on the

merchant ships, three different operations have been launched to patrol the dangerous

waters: the multinational Combined Task Force 150 (25 national missions), the

Combined Task Force 151 and the “Operation Atalanta”. Combined Task Force 150

(CTF 150) is a counter-piracy task force set up in the framework of NATO’s

“Operation Ocean Shield”, the naval branch of “Operation Enduring Freedom” in the

Gulf of Aden. Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 151), on the other hand, has a counter-

piracy scope and was set up after the dramatic rise of pirate incidents in 2009. It

includes more than 30 members. “Operation Atalanta” is a military operation

undertaken by the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) in cooperation with

2 “[…] solutions for citadels and covert CCTV and comms.

This is on request from shipping companies. There certainly seems to be a moving away from armed guards and into technology for a number of reasons. […]” Mark Lewis, CEO - FDN Group (14.05.2014).


24

the Security Council of the United Nations to batter Somali piracy and provide

protection in the transit corridor of “Maritime Security Patrol Area” (MSPA) for

merchant and passenger ships. Also, Australia, China, India, Iran, Japan, South Korea,

Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Thailand, and Saudi Arabia have provided naval forces to

patrol the waters either in combination with the aforementioned Task Forces or

independently (Papandreou, 2011, pp.66-121 &

http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/).

Although the presence of armed warships and properly trained crews filled many gaps

in the issue of armed counter-fight against terrorism and piracy in the region and has

undoubtedly provided the necessary sense of security to the seafarer community, it is

far from being a success. The patrol missions of the warships have taken much critic

from government officials and public opinion formers for the cost and utter

effectiveness of the international military. Apart from the obvious fact that pursuing a

wooden pirate skiff or captured fishing boat with a multimillion euro-worth frigate or

destroyer is not cost-effective and the danger to mistake actual fishermen for pirates

(mistakes have been made before: http://go.bloomberg.com/multimedia/piracy-

fishermen/ ), after three years of operations it becomes apparent that sea patrols may

not be enough to bring the phenomenon of piracy to a conclusive end (http://piracy-

studies.org/2012/the-eus-misguided-move-to-fight-pirates-onshore/). What is more, it

is believed that the suppressive action of the strong naval forces and the establishment

of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) for merchant vessels

has forced the pirates to operate further out in the Gulf of Aden and has thus

contributed to the widespread of piracy in the region (ZEUS, “Unravelling the Puzzle

of Piracy”, p. 25).

The answer is provided by Hippocratic medical terms: imagine a man standing in a

room with no windows. A door stays open and cold air is filling the room. The man is

feeling cold. He develops a headache, he chills, he coughs his nose goes wet. Soon, he

develops a fever, his body becomes weak and heavy and eventually his cold turns to

pneumonia and dies. The man can react. He can put on a coat and warm clothes. He

can exercise so that the blood circulation will keep him warm. He can light a fire or he

can resort to medication to battle the fever. Still, according to Hippocrates, all these

measures are in vain. The coat will not keep him warm. He cannot exercise forever.

The fire will go out and ultimately no medication will save him. The man will die. He

http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/

http://go.bloomberg.com/multimedia/piracy-fishermen/

http://go.bloomberg.com/multimedia/piracy-fishermen/

http://piracy-studies.org/2012/the-eus-misguided-move-to-fight-pirates-onshore/

http://piracy-studies.org/2012/the-eus-misguided-move-to-fight-pirates-onshore/


25

will die because the root-causes of his illness have remained unchanged: the door is

open and cold air is still filling the room. Hippocrates urged his students to take time

to understand the nature of the illness, find the root-causes responsible and deal with

them before proceeding to any treatment. The steps the man took to batter the illness

were not wrong. He just had to shut the door first!

It is fortunate that ultimately the European Union reached the same conclusion as

Hippocrates. A mere military operation with a strong force of a large fleet is not

enough to make piracy disappear. After five years of expeditious efforts by the best

navies the phenomenon of piracy shows little signs of decline. Piracy in the Gulf of

Aden has grown as a result of political insufficiency, state disintegration and extreme

poverty. Unless those elements are resolved, piracy will re-emerge as soon as the

warships withdraw. The international community, in the framework of “Operation

Atalanta” has begun initiatives to boost local economies in the coast of Somalia, the

traditional strongholds of piracy and assist the government to re-establish a form of

governance and community relief that will avert young men from resorting to piracy

and thievery3 (House of Lords: Combating Somali Piracy: the EU's Naval Operation

Atalanta”, 2010, §59-64 & Mair, 2011, pp. 37-4). At the same time EUNAVFOR is

assisting regional countries (Djibouti, Seychelles, Kenya and Tanzania) to train their

naval and coast-guard forces to take action on piracy and armed robbery in the long

run through the EUCAP NESTOR and European Union Training Mission (EUTM)

programs.

4.4 Information security

It would seem unlikely but one should consider how the terrorists/pirates receive

information for their targets. How is it possible that a skiff boat from the shores of

Somalia or a pirate mother-ship operating from the middle of the Arabian Sea or the

3 “The EU’s multi-facetted engagement in the Horn of Africa is guided by the “Strategic Framework

for the Horn of Africa”. It defines five priorities for EU action: building robust and accountable

political structures; contributing to conflict resolution and prevention; mitigating security threats

emanating from the region; promoting economic growth, and supporting regional economic

cooperation” Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), http://www.mschoa.org/on-

shore/about-us/eu-operation-atalanta.

http://www.mschoa.org/on-shore/about-us/eu-operation-atalanta



26

vastness of the Indian Ocean can locate, evaluate and attack a loaded commercial

ship?

So far, this question was not given much thought: the area is full of rich commercial

vessels, which never travel empty-load; the circulation through the chokepoints and

the narrow maritime corridors is predictable for a person with limited navigation skills

and, really, how can one miss a 50,000 to 500,000 tones ship in the middle of the sea?

The case of the hi-jack of the MV “OLIB G”, on September the 8th

2010, for the

release of which the pirates demanded the outrageous sum of $15 million (unaware

that the vessel was mortgaged and the company’s abilities to pay were limited), is

typical of the clumsy actions of pirates at their “enterprise”. The ship and her crew of

18 were finally released almost two years later, on late July 2012, after the drop of the

ransom to $9 million with the company finally settling to $3 million (Papandreou,

2011, p.180 & http://somaliareport.com). Still, there have been reports that suggest

that other pirate attacks have been far more selective and accurate (Hansen, 2009, pp.

36-37). In fact so accurate that a form of inside information is needed to make

attackers target specific vessels. This theory rests on some observations:

1. Pirates need to target high-profile targets in order to extort ransom for the

release of the crew, the cargo and the ship;

2. The money paid to the pirates (a considerable sum of approximately $18

billion for 2013 as estimated by World Bank) should have been enough to

create a new status-quo in the whole region, especially considering the low

tech systems employed by the numerically few pirates. Still, Somalia appears

to be a bottomless barrel unable to hold and distribute the loot.

3. Since ship-owners are those who take the greatest hit by the holding of their

ship, crew and cargo, in terms of losses from delays, who is the party that

profits from piracy?

The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) seems to put the blame to the

insurance companies. The danger of pirate attacks has made vessel insurance

premiums to rise considerably, rolling the cost to the shipping companies. In order to

keep costs low, ship-owners tend to disregard security precautions as suggested by

international organizations for maritime transports thus exposing the integrity of the

ship and the crews to dangers. Also, DIW notes that the German security and arms

http://somaliareport.com/


27

industry and private security providers are amongst the benefiters of piracy, resulting

to the paradox: while naval presence of war vessels increased in the last five years,

pirate attacks have intensified (DIW, The Advantage of Piracy, 2010).

Even if we do not consider the above scenario likely to happen, the best way for

pirates to target their loot is by listening to their communications on the radio. That

alone justifies that a form of code of secure communications is established for

merchant marine sailing through pirate infected waters. Modern technology, based on

encrypted communications of the military navy, can offer ready-made systems that

can be fitted to the existing radio communications. Training the crews to the use of

these systems should also be included to the costs. If shipping companies prove

reluctant to undertake the cost (like it is suggested by the DIW), they alone must bare

the responsibility for the conservation of piracy (quod erat demonstrandum).


28

5. Revisiting the issue of logistics in a troubled world. Dealing with

contemporary security issues in different types of transport.

5.1 Protection of supply nodes and storage areas

Remarkable as it is, the maritime sector doesn’t appear to be as sensitive to security

procedures and trends as –for instance- the air traffic one. Although thousands of

years old, the maritime sector is still lacking the security culture that the enfant

aviation developed in only a few decades. In the previous chapter we mentioned how

the maritime ports can be secured by the implementation of some simple methods that

already apply in airports (fences, surveillance cameras, security checks, access IDs).

We also addressed the importance of a sustainable flow of supplies for the sake of

global economy. One should then wonder why is it that the maritime industry is only

now realizing the threat piracy sets for the maintenance of a steady supply chain. The

reason may be that piracy before 2008 was not regarded as a serious threat to

maritime transport and the losses that caused were manageable. However, the rise of

piracy attacks after that year, the widening radius of pirate operatives and the

aggression that came with the resurgence of radical terrorism in the greater area of the

Middle East and central Africa (an aggression that created an impact both in the ways

of pirates and their weaponry) caused the maritime experts to re-evaluate their

positions on security.

Maritime logistics –in a rather simplistic way of looking at it- is like lines of shipping

tours connecting dots all over the world. The dots are, of course, ports, warehouses

and container depot areas, where the sorting and management procedure takes place

unceasingly. After the 9/11 attacks, many people started taking the security of such

installations more seriously. Europe had surprisingly the precedence owing to the

painful lessons from home terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s. A major attack on a

supply node or storage area can be devastating in its effects not only in terms of

damages and casualties but also derailing the ever tighter working and delivery

schedules in the globalized network of transportations. It could also create a serious

blow to other means of infrastructure having to do with the communication, energy


29

and transportation facilities of the greater area, as warehouses and depotes are

conjoint to harbors, airports and railway junctions. In 2005, nuclear weapons analysts

Philipp Bleek, Anders Corr and Micah Zenko of Georgetown and Harvard

Universities published an article of a 9/11 alternative scenario. In that they recognize

the psychological impact of the attacks on the World Trade Center towers but

challenge the strategic impact in comparison to a medium nuclear devise being

triggered for instance in Houston port. A small nuclear attack, triggered by a small-

size bomb smuggled in the country and carried in a backpack could cause damages

worth $200 million in installations and consequent 1 trillion dollars in the long run.

Houston is the largest commercial port for foreign imports the United States and sites

the largest petrochemical complex in the world. The authors state that “[…] fewer

than 5 percent of containers shipped to the United States today are physically

inspected. Fewer than 10 percent of containers are scanned for radiation, x-rayed or

fitted with tamper-resistant locks and electronic tracking […]”

(www.hks.harvard.edu, 2005). Alarmingly, the same situation -if not worse- describes

more or less most ports on a global basis. Time management dictates that goods are

transported quickly and there is no time for security screening of all items shipped in

ports, while many commercial ports simply lack the means to perform such controls.

Regretfully, such a scenario was realized on July 11 2011, when a container load of

arms and ammunition exploded in Mari, Cyprus. The ammunition was part of a

confiscated cargo load destined probably for Syria and the containers were

neglectfully depoted in the compounds of a naval base without any protection from

the high temperatures. As a result, the sealed containers acted as ovens in the Middle

East-proxy Mediterranean island. The explosion killed 13 and injured 62 military

personnel, police and firemen that rushed to the spot after the first explosion. It was

fortunate that military bases are not close to civilian homes and are secluded areas.

However, the vastness of the explosion destroyed the nearby Vasilikos power station

at Zygi, major supplier of electricity for the island, causing chronic power failures for

months to come (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14102253) (Scheme 11).

Enhancing security to harbors and warehouses crucial to the international supply

chain is only the first step towards fortifying them against attacks. The organization of

international airports is a viable model for large harbors and railway stations: guarded

perimeters, segmentation of departments with controlled access between them,

http://www.hks.harvard.edu/

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14102253


30

separate passenger-cargo areas and handling mechanisms, a central security authority

to manage all security concerns and surveillance and check-points in junctions. The

final project offers a balanced area of security and efficient movement, which will

guarantee that there will be no surprises. “Guarantee”, of course to the measure of

plausible: only last June Karachi International Airport was attacked by Afghani

Taliban insurgents (“More than two dozen dead as Taliban assault Pakistan's main

airport”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/09/us-pakistan-airport-attacks-

idUSKBN0EJ0TW20140609) (Scheme 12). Although airport security is designed to

tackle threats from within and not to repel enemy mechanized advances from the

outside, the Karachi attack should be a point of concern for building a buffer against

pirates and terrorists in East Africa.

5.2 Cargo tracking centers

Early warning is the key of every security operative. Having a picture of the

movement and status of means of transportation and cargo would be the need for the

21st century. This time maritime transportation has the lead. Shipping companies

provide customers and forwarding agents with an online application to track their

shipment at any time, simply by filling the container number and the order code.

Another application is providing with live information on the exact satellite location

of a ship (https://www.marinetraffic.com/) even in cases of an unforeseen delay or

weather storm. In land, transporters tend to install GPS (Global Positioning System)

to their trucks to monitor and schedule their movements

(http://www.trackyourtruck.com/). Despite the cost of such systems for land vehicles,

it rises as an ever growing trend and is expected to become a permanent device in the

future because of the advantages it offers. The American Public Transportation

Association has estimated that in early 2009 around half of the buses in the USA were

using GPS tracking device. The National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) highly

regards the system as an important aid in the “battle” against car theft

(Informationweek.com (3/4/2009): “Court asked to disallow warrantless GPS

tracking”, http://www.informationweek.com/architecture/court-asked-to-disallow-

warrantless-gps-tracking/d/d-id/1077257?). On air, however, despite the leading

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/09/us-pakistan-airport-attacks-idUSKBN0EJ0TW20140609

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/09/us-pakistan-airport-attacks-idUSKBN0EJ0TW20140609

http://www.informationweek.com/architecture/court-asked-to-disallow-warrantless-gps-tracking/d/d-id/1077257

http://www.informationweek.com/architecture/court-asked-to-disallow-warrantless-gps-tracking/d/d-id/1077257


31

technology used, evolution has not kept its pace. Recent events revealed that air

surveillance is not what most people believed.

Contrary to popular belief that in a global traffic environment the entity of airspace is

covered by radar, the incident of flight MH 370 proved otherwise. On March the 8th

2014, a Boeing 777-200ER of Malaysia Airlines (Flight 370) lost contact with the

ground control during on a routine flight from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing less than an

hour after its take off. Despite the mobilization of the world’s largest rescue mission

no trace of the 64 meter-long modern aircraft or any of his 239 people on board were

found. The incident revealed that radars cover only a radius of some dozen kilometers

around an airport or an important air-junction (aircrafts, like ships, move to pre-

designated air corridors and move at the command of the traffic controllers). The rest

of the area is “governed” by ground-based air beacons, strategically positioned on air

traffic routes that communicate at regular time intervals with the passing aircraft

transmitting a coded message to the aircraft’s electronic devices (ACARS (Aircraft

Communications Addressing and Reporting System). The aircraft is responding

automatically to the beacon, which in turn notifies the local aviation center of the

verification of the aircraft’s course. Although the case of MH 370 is still covered by a

veil of mystery, the story reveals the need for live-time contact with the aerial

vehicles for managerial and security reasons.

5.3 Alternative route evaluating centers

Piracy and marine terrorism can have grave consequences to the planning of a supply

chain strategy, as we have already assessed on a previous chapter. Ships, aircrafts,

trains and trucks move on prearranged routes that have been chosen for their

efficiency in terms of time, safety and accessibility. Re-arranging these routes require

serious and complex planning and translate to enormous costs. In the marine sector

BMP4 guidelines call that shipping companies are responsible for altering the routes

of ships to avoid High Risk Areas (HRA), in an effort to disclaim responsibility. In

the air sector the International Civil Association Organization (ICAO) can only

provide general guidelines leaving the tactical decisions to the regional offices. Land

operations are even more complex as only national authorities can take responsibility

for organizing land transports through their sovereign soil.


32

Still, the need for a body that will make the necessary regional evaluation and risk

assessment for altering the route of a ship, a truck or an airplane is present, be it for a

natural disaster or for unforeseen HRO due to piracy, war or conflict.

In 2010, the Eyjafjallajökull volcano eruption in Iceland had a tremendous effect on

regional and international aviation. The grounding of all aircrafts and the paralysis of

the aerial transportations, apart from causing extreme delays and physical hardship to

hundreds of thousands of travelers (some of them prestigious world leaders as nature

makes no exemptions), created a cost of €1.3 billion according to IATA

(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8634147.stm), and caused great economic

dismay in Europe, Asia and Africa due to the disturbance of supply chains

(http://www.worldtradewt100.com/blogs/14-wt100-blog/post/iceland-s-volcano-does-

a-number-on-global-supply-chains). All that out of a three-month ban in air transport

in Europe.

It is imperative, I think, for the sustainability of regular supply chain transport without

much disturbance and losses, to establish “regional transportation control centers” on

a global basis. The proposal comes in accordance to the globalization of trade, as

analyzed in chapter one, and the universality of the effects that regional disturbances

have on international transportations. The regional centers must have a uniform

structure and staffed with experts in the fields of transportation management,

economics and national law and international politics. The task of these centers will

be to monitor, manage, and analyze future trends on regular or alternative routes of

any means of transport of passenger and goods. The findings of the working groups of

these centers will be approved by local government authorities and reports will be

send on a regular basis to a general center, in the form probably of an international

organization. Then, the updated measures will be implemented to ameliorate the

procedures, the timing and the performance on a regional level. On a legal level,

authority will have to be taken away from local, national governments in order to

establish these centers; a move that national governments never seem to favor and

will in all probability oppose. Still, I believe that the previous paradigm of IATA on

the field of aviation is a strong precedent for a successful endeavor.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8634147.stm

http://www.worldtradewt100.com/blogs/14-wt100-blog/post/iceland-s-volcano-does-a-number-on-global-supply-chains

http://www.worldtradewt100.com/blogs/14-wt100-blog/post/iceland-s-volcano-does-a-number-on-global-supply-chains


33

5.4 Insurances (means of restitution)

Insurance is another aspect of piracy. The likelihood of an attack and the causing of

damages to the ship, casualties among the crew or worst: the seizure of the whole ship

and the indefinite time of captivity of all elements of the vessel (ship, crew and cargo)

until the payment of ransom caused the insurance fees for ships in transit through the

dangerous waters of the Gulf of Aden to rise dramatically.

The rise of piracy, especially after 2002, made the insurance companies to re-adjust

their policies towards the new phenomenon. While in the past piracy was treated as a

historical relic that had long before extinct from the seas, now the demand of the

shipping industry to extend the covering of insurance to modern-day pirates and

marine terrorists perils made the insurance companies to “stern-way” and provide new

service packages under a handsome price (“Insurers face tougher times as Somali

piracy drops” (Sep. 21, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/21/us-

insurance-pirates-idUSBRE88K0IG20120921). Indeed, older books have a

completely different definition for the word “pirate”, considering the term obsolete

and out-of-date for modern years and preferring a general concept around “war risks”

as reason for coverage against external cause damages (Brown, 1986, pp.112-113).

Instead, the term “terrorist” and “persons acting from a political motive” were still

included in the damages to hull and cargo (Brown, 1986, pp. 172-173).

Nowadays, insurance companies and law firms seem quite familiarized to the modern

trends and despite the conservatism of books (causa proxima non remota spectator)

they seem eager to overcome deficiencies and provide solutions. Three major issues

have risen with the re-emergence of piracy:

i. Hull and Machinery (H&M) and War Risk policies

Under the Institute Time Clauses (Hulls) of 1983 and 1995, and International

Hull Clauses of 2002 and 2003, piracy is covered by insurance claims.

However, modern trends push piracy provisions to be qualified as “war risks”

for vessels entering a “listed area”, meaning –obviously- the Gulf of Aden.

ii. Protection and Indemnity (P&I) policies

Protection and Indemnity cover liability insurance to crew members,

passengers and other third parties concerning loss of life, injuries and loss of

or damage to crew or passenger effects. Special care needs to be taken as such

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/21/us-insurance-pirates-idUSBRE88K0IG20120921

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/21/us-insurance-pirates-idUSBRE88K0IG20120921


34

coverage may be lifted in case P&I damages occur as a result of piracy, with

the use of weapons of war.

iii. Kidnap and Ransom (K&R) policies

A relatively recent addition to insurance and maritime law firms, the K&R

insurance is supposed to bend the provisions of marine insurance. The

payment of ransom is prohibited in some jurisdictions and insurance

companies suggest to their clients to be particularly cautious when expressing

their request. The language used in insurance texts of today’s insurance

providers reveals that companies tend to recognize modern trends and be eager

to cover the demand of ship-owners and co-operate in ransom payment as well

as relative expenses (negotiation and public relation consultants’ fees).

(INCE & Co International Law Firm: Piracy – the insurance implications, pp. 2-10).

In conclusion, maritime insurance remains an imperative asset in the engagement of

maritime transport with piracy. Owing to the increasing demand from the ship-

owners, who value the integrity of their vessels and the well-being of their crews,

insurance companies struggle to maneuver around the restrictions of an insurance map

that more and more seems obsolete to current trends. It is the opinion of the writer

that in view of the re-emergence of piracy in the seas, the employment of heavy

weaponry, the ties with radical terrorism and the violence of seizure, captivity and

ransom, the provisions of insurance policies need to be re-evaluated and change in

order to include provisions of support to companies and seafarers that have been

victims of piracy in the seas.


35

6. Conclusions

This assignment began as an effort to produce a scientific evaluation of the

phenomenon of modern piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the implications of its dynamics

to the maritime trade and in particular the supply chain route that passes through the

corridor of the Red Sea, bypassing the Somali coasts and the Indian Ocean.

In the first chapter, I tried to emphasize the capital importance of maritime

transportation for the international trade in a globalized world. The trends in

production and the organization of economic assets in the post-industrialized world

are utterly linked to the freedom of transportation. Billions of particles produced in all

corners of the globe must be transported in different places to be collated and produce

the final product. In such a world, the role of sustainable supply chains is imperative

for the success of the industrial production. International transportation also sustains

the distribution of food, energy and is the link between primary and tertiary

economies, between countries with developed infrastructure and countries in the

course of further development. In this enterprise, maritime transportation is the

undisputed king among other means of transportation. The enormous carrying

capacity through the “highways of the seas”, the ability to move avoiding the

formalities of national borders and the low cost of trafficking have resulted to 90% of

world trade taking place on board the merchant ships. Merchant navy sustains a

community of hundreds of thousands of seafarers, operating around 50,000 ships that

through adversities of weather and away from their families and social lives work so

that the rest of the people will have no scarcities. The maritime industry is responsible

for creating thousands of working places, assisting the world industry in keeping low

costs and thus increasing the living standards and the wealth of nations.

The fragility of this chain of supplies is more than obvious and the need to secure it is

imperative in order to avoid an economic and industrial breakdown. Natural disasters,

war, accidents menace the sustainability of that vital chain, which must be kept safe

and undisturbed to the degree possible. In this context, the value of risk management

becomes apparent for the protection of commerce and –ultimately- our whole way of

life. It is here that phenomena like piracy and international terrorism appear to

threaten the steady supply chain of global economy and freedom. Growing in areas of


36

outmost importance for the maritime trade, piracy and terrorism appear like the two

sides of the same coin. Aggressive, opportunistic, and dangerous, these pirates of the

21st century do not look as romantic as the known characters from novels and bedtime

stories. They are, however, just as lethal, ruthless and mysterious.

Piracy is not a novelty for the seas but in its modern version it can be just as

disturbing and fierce. In the second chapter I am trying to unravel the nature and

scopes of modern pirates, their connections with the radical terrorists, another plague

of our times, and to portrait the spread of that phenomenon in the Horn of Africa and

the threat they pose for the international marine. A special effort will have to be done

to contemplate about ways to answer to the pirate threat, existing tactics and

technologies that can be used in the fight to suppress that phenomenon.

In the third chapter, an executive report is presented on the ways to confront modern

piracy, the need for more security in general, the ways to fortify and protect our ports

and harbors from attacks from outside or from within, applied tactics for repelling

pirate attacks in the open seas and means to enhance it, the use of armed guards

onboard, results and objections from this application. Finally, I present some thoughts

on communication intelligence and security of information that is needed in modern

maritime navy.

In the fourth chapter, the issue of modern logistics in a troubled world is revisited

under a different scope. The need to protect supply nodes and storage areas, to

establish an international network of cargo tracking centers and a proposal on traffic

controllers that will evaluate and propose alternative routes in times of distress, be it

natural disasters or deliberate actions. Lastly, a sub-chapter dedicated on the relation

of marine insurances and means of restitution in case of loss or damage in connection

to piracy and maritime terrorism.

In conclusion, the resurrection of pirate activists and marine terror from the oblivion

of human history must not surprise us. It is true that modern man believed that in the

modern day 21st century violent practices of dubious morality would have been long

forgotten; hidden in the depths of human history. Still, pirates are here, now to remind

us that the nature of man is not changing so easily. The western man has tried hard –

although not always fair- to surpass his prior misery and ameliorate his life standards.

But at the end he only managed to build a wall between his happiness and other


37

people’s misery. Piracy is blooming in the fields of extreme poverty, watered in blood

and sorrow of a land called Somalia, where no smile is seen in the last 25 years.

Terrorism is no different. You will not find radicalism, fanaticism and men willing to

risk their lives crossing the ocean on a skiff to climb a huge container ship with

barbed wire and armed guards in the West. Only people who feel they have nothing to

lose but misery and death will call for such a life. I want to make clear in every

possible tone, that although I put such an effort to analyze the root causes and

development of piracy, I do believe that –in the long term- all these measures will not

succeed in resolving the problem. Piracy will not disappear so long the original causes

of its creation remain unsolved: poverty, political instability and lack of prospect in

the lives of the Somalis. Much like the man in the cold room, whatever his actions, we

must first “close the door” to the issues that created the problem. Then and only then

will all these measures have some effect. The end of piracy begins at the end of

misery.


38

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APPENDIX OF PHOTOGRAPHS

Scheme 1: Global container traffic between the continents in the last 30 years. The

volumes reveal the heavy dependency between the industrially developed countries of the

West and the rising countries of the East. Any disruption to the transportation flow could cost

a lot in money, time and reliability, which could only skyrocket end-prices. Source:

http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/map_maritime_ranges_traffic.html

http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/map_maritime_ranges_traffic.html

Scheme 2: World chokepoints for shipping. The Red Sea route is defined between the Suez

Canal and the Bab-el-Mandeb straights. Its importance for global maritime trade is

indispensable. Source:


Scheme 3: Terrorist organizations in the wider Middle East and African continent. The

declared relations between Somali pirates and al-Qaeda affiliates al-Shabab has spread great

concern for the course of de-escalation in the Gulf of Aden.


Scheme 4: Map illustrating the global maritime routes. Contrary to popular belief ships

do not move randomly around the seas but follow specific corridors accurately curved in the

maritime maps in order to sail expeditiously and safe. The density of the Suez-Bab-el-

Mandeb route is more than obvious as so much as 8% of the world trade is passing through

that route. Sources: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/egypt/suez-canal.htm,

http://eugeniy.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/access-map.png

Scheme 5: Global Piracy map showing the hostile acts against ships (Red for attacks, yellow

for attempts). It is clear that the Somali coasts represent the greatest threat at this time.

Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/egypt/suez-canal.htm

http://eugeniy.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/access-map.png

Scheme 6: Map indicating the escalation of pirate aggression off the Somali coasts in 2011.

Source: IMB Piracy Reporting Centre.

Scheme 7: Types of modern-day pirate ships, a. & c. Skiff, usual chase boat, b. Whaler

modified as a replenish-tanker, d. A “mother-ship”, a captured open-sea fishing boat used as a

floating base of operations for long-range raids. Source: Reuters, BBC, EUNAVFOR & US

Navy.

Scheme 8: As the successes of pirate attacks grew, so did their boldness. From 2005 to 2011

piracy turned from a localized phenomenon with little consequence to an international issue

Source: EUNAVFOR via http://www.globalsecurity.org/.

Scheme 9: Surveillance option for optimum results. While the use of satellites is somewhat

remote, the use of remote controlled unmanned air vehicles is ideal for 24-hour intelligence

gathering without cost.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/

Scheme 10: An example of a secure port facility according to ISPS standards. Source:

http://whisprwave.com

Scheme 11: Some suggestions regarding security on board. One can see: laser and sonic

weapons, fire-hose cannons, electric fence, slippery foam. Most of these suggestions were not

adopted in terms of complexity, cost and legal restrictions. Source:

http://flashpointsurvival.com

http://whisprwave.com/

http://flashpointsurvival.com/

Scheme 12: Anti-piracy security measures went through many phases, sometimes applying

contestable practices.

Sources: superyachtcareers.com, paulinespiratesandprivateers.blogspot.com, cargolaw.com,

piracy-law.com.

Scheme 13: The explosion of a cargo of confiscated ammunition in Mari, Cyprus in 2011 was

ranked amongst the largest artificial non-nuclear destructions and led to the largest power

station in the island being utterly destroyed. Although as accident, it made some of the worst

nightmares of security analysts come true. Terrorist attacks in supply nodes and storage areas

are not to be taken lightly. Source: cyprusnewsreport.com & turkishnavy.files.wordpress.com/

Scheme 14: Jinnah International Airport in Karachi under attack (June 2014). Although a

failure of the Pakistani intelligent service and security forces, one cannot disregard the

psychological and real impact of militants attacking an 18 million people hub with heavy

weaponry. Source: Reuters.com.