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  • PREPAREDBY:

    AtulDave(500530985)ShaukatRaza(500543780)SimranveerBrar(500468450)

    ComputerNetworkSecurity(EE8213)

    GUIDE&MENTORBY:

    Dr.CungangYang

    1SecureInternetPaymentSystems

  • IncorporatethePaymentFunctionsinInternetWorld

    PaymentMethods

    CashCreditCardChequeCredit&DebitTransfer

    INTRODUCTION

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 2

  • SecureElectronicTransaction(SET)ProtocolforImplementingCreditCardPaymentElectronicChequeSystemforSupportingChequePaymentElectronicFundTransfer&ElectronicCashSystemforEmulatingPhysicalCashPaymentOtherMethodsi.eMicropayment&SmartCardPayment

    CREDITCARDBASEDMETHODS:CREDITCARDOVERSSLSETELECTRONICCHEQUES:

    NETCHEQUEANONYMOUSPAYMENTS:

    DIGICASHCAFEMICROPAYMENTS

    SMARTCARDS

    MAJORINTERNETPAYMENTMETHODS

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 3

  • ANONYMITY:WHETHERTHEPAYMENTMETHODISANONIMOUS

    SECURITY:WHETHERTHEMETHODISSECURE

    OVERHEADCOST:THEOVERHEADCOSTMUSTBECOMPETENTENOUGH

    TRANSFERABILITY:WHETHERTHETRANSACTIONCANBEDIVIDEDINTOARBITRARYSMALLPAYMENTSWHOSESUMISEQUALTOTHEORIGINALPAYMENT

    ACCEPTABILITY:WHETHERTHEMETHODISACCEPTEDGLOBALLY

    FEATURESOFSECUREPAYMENTMETHODS

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 4

  • PAYMENTMETHODSHOULDBE

    VERYSECURE

    LOWOVERHEADCOST

    TANSFERABLE

    USERFRIENDLY(GLOBALLYACCEPTED)

    DIVISIBLE

    ANONYMOUS

    4CPAYMENTMETHODS

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 5

  • 4CPAYMENTMETHODSCOMPARISONS

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems

    METHODS/FEATURES

    CASH CREDITCARD

    CHEQUE CREDIT/DEBIT

    ANONYMITY YES,INGENERAL

    NO NO NO

    SECURITY GOOD GOOD GOOD GOOD

    OVERHEADCOST

    LOWEST,INGENERAL

    HIGHERTHANCASH&

    DEBIT

    HIGHEST,INGENERAL

    LOW

    TRANSFERABILITY

    YES NO NO NO

    DIVISIBILITY NOTCOMPLETELY

    YES YES YES

    ACCEPTABILITY

    YES,INGENERAL

    YES,INGENERAL

    NO,INGENERAL

    NO,INGENERAL

    6

  • THECREDITCARDISTHEMOSTCOMMONLYUSEDPAYMENTMETHODGLOBALLY.

    BEFORETHEINTRODUCTIONOFSETPROTOCOLTHESECURECREDITCARDPAYMENTWASUSUALLYCARRIEDOUTOVERANSSLCONNECTION.

    SETPROTOCOLFORCREDITCARDPAYMENTMETHOD

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 7

  • ADVANTAGEOFSSL:ITENSURESTHESECURETRANSMISSIONOFCREDITCARDINFORMATIONOVERTHEINTERNETDISADVANTAGEOFSSL:ITISNOTACOMPLETECREDITCARDPAYMENTMETHODFOREXAMPLE:ITCANNOTSUPPORTONLINECREDITCARDAUTHORIZATION

    SETISSPECIALLYDEVELOPEDTOPROVIDESECURECREDITCARDPAYMENTOVERTHEINTERNETITISNOWWIDELYSUPPORTEDBYMAJORCREDITCARDCOMPANIESINCLUDINGVISAANDMASTERCARD.

    PROS&CONSOFSSLV/SSET

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 8

  • SETNETWORKARCHITECTURE

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 9

  • SETAIMSATSATISFYINGTHEFOLLOWINGSECURITYREQUIREMENTSINTHECONTEXTOFCREDITCARDPAYMENT:

    CONFIDENTIALITY:SENSITIVEMESSAGESAREENCRYPTEDSOTHATTHEYAREKEPTCONFIDENTIAL

    INTEGRITY:NEARLYALLMESSAGESAREDIGITALLYSIGNEDTOENSURECONTENTINTEGRITY

    AUTHENTICITY:AUTHENTICATIONISPERFORMEDTHROUGHAPUBLICKEYINFRASTRUCTURE.

    SECURITYREQUIREMENTSSETPROTOCOL

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 10

  • SETNETWORKPARTICIPANTS

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems

    HenricJohnson 11

    A SELLER ,WHICH IS CONNECTED TO AN ACQUIRER

    A REGISTERED HOLDER OF THE CREDIT CARD WHO IS A BUYER

    THE BANK THAT ISSUES THE CREDIT CARD TO A CARD HOLDER

    THE BANK THAT SERVES AS AN AGENT TO LINK A MERCHANT TO MULTIPLE ISSUERS.

    THIS IS TYPICALLY CONNECTED TO THE ACQUIRER THE PAYMENT GATEWAY IS SITUATED BETWEEN THE SET SYSTEM AND THE FINANCIAL NETWORK

    11

  • SETDIGITALCERTIFICATESYSTEM

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 12

  • INTHEPHYSICALCREDITCARDSYSTEMTHEPAYMENTINSTRUCTIONS(PI)INCLUDINGTHECARDHOLDERSCREDITCARDNUMBERANDSIGNATUREARENOTKEPTCONFIDENTIALDATAINTEGRITYCANBASICALLYBEENSUREDBYUSINGPRINTEDRECEIPTSCARDHOLDERSAUTHENTICATIONRELIESONSIMPLESIGNATURECHECKINGONLY

    INANELECTRONICCREDITCARDSYSTEMTHEORDERINFORMATION(OI)ANDPICANBEDIGITALLYSIGNEDTOENSUREDATAINTEGRITYTHESENSITIVECREDITCARDINFORMATIONMAYSTILLBEDISCLOSEDTOOTHERPEOPLE

    SETINTRODUCESANOVELMETHODCALLEDTHEDUALSIGNATURE(DS)TOENSUREDATAINTEGRITYWHILEPROTECTINGTHESENSITIVEINFORMATION

    DUALSIGNATUREGENERATION&VERIFICATION

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 13

  • SETNETWORKARCHITECTURE

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems

    H(OI))]||)(([ PIHHEDScKR

    =

    14

  • SETPROTOCOLFORCREDITCARDPAYMENT

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems

    FLOWCHARTOFTHEPROCESS

    15

  • THEMERCHANTISPROVIDEDWITHOI,H[PI],ANDDSTHEDUALSIGNATURECANBEVERIFIEDASFOLLOWS:

    STEP1:THEMERCHANTFIRSTFINDSH[H[PI]||H[OI]]STEP2:HETHENDECRYPTSTHEDIGITALSIGNATUREWITHTHECARDHOLDERSPUBLICSIGNATUREKEYASFOLLOWS:DRSA[DS|KEYPUBLIC_SIGN,CARDHOLDER]WHERE,KEYPUBLIC_SIGN,CARDHOLDERPUBLICSIGNATUREKEYOFTHECARDHOLDER

    STEP3:FINALLY,HECOMPARESTHETWOTERMSH[H[PI]||H[OI]]ANDDRSA[DS|KEYPUBLIC_SIGN,CARDHOLDER]

    THEYSHOULDBETHESAMEIFTHETRANSMITTEDDSHASNOTBEENCHANGED;OTHERWISETHEORDERISNOTVALID

    HOWTHEMERCHANTANDPAYMENTGATEWAYVERIFYTHEDS?

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 16

  • THEPAYMENTGATEWAYISPROVIDEDWITHPI,H[OI],ANDDS

    BYUSINGTHEDUALSIGNATUREMETHOD,EACHCARDHOLDERCANLINKOIANDPIWHILERELEASINGONLYTHENECESSARYINFORMATIONTOTHERELEVANTPARTY

    IFEITHERTHEOIORPIISCHANGED,THEDUALSIGNATUREWILLNOLONGERBEVALID

    HOWTHEMERCHANTANDPAYMENTGATEWAYVERIFYTHEDS?

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 17

  • DIGITALENVELOPE

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 18

  • ARANDOMDESKEY(KEYRANDOM)FIRSTGENERATEDTOENCRYPTTHEMESSAGE,I.E.EDES[MIKEYRANDOM]KEYRANDOMISTHENENCRYPTEDBYTHEVBS'SPUBLICKEY_EXCHANGEKEY,SAYKEYPUBLIC_EXCHANGEI.E.ERSA[KEYRANDOMIKEYPUBLIC_EXCHANGE.VBS]EDES[MIKEYRANDOM1ANDERSA[KEYRANDOMIKEYPUHLIC_EXCHANGE.VBSLARESENTTOTHEVBS

    TOOBTAINTHEMESSAGEM,VBSFIRSTOBTAINSKEYRANDOMBYDECRYPTINGERSA[KEYRANDOMIKEYPUHLICEXCHANGE,VBS]I.E.DRSA[ERSA[KEYRANDOMIKEYPUBLICEXCHANGE,VBS1IKEYPRIVATE_EXCHANGE,VBS=KEYRANDOM,WHEREKEYPRIVATEEXCHANGE,VBSDENOTESTHEPRIVATEKEYEXCHANGEKEYOFTHEVBSAFTEROBTAININGKEYRANDOMTHEVBSCANOBTAINMBYDECRYPTINGEDES[MIKEYRANDOM],I.E.TOFINDDDES[EDES[MIKEYRANDOM1IKEYRANDOM]=M

    DIGITALENVELOPE

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 19

  • SETPROTOCOLARCHITECTURE

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 20

  • SETPROTOCOLHASFOURPHASES:INITIATIONPURCHASEAUTHORIZATIONCAPTUREFIRSTTHECARDHOLDERSENDSAPURCHASEINITIATIONREQUESTTOTHEMERCHANTFORINITIALIZINGTHEPAYMENTTHENTHEMERCHANTRETURNSARESPONSEMESSAGETOTHECARDHOLDERINTHESECONDPHASE,THECARDHOLDERSENDSTHEPURCHASEORDERTOGETHERWITHTHEPAYMENTINSTRUCTIONTOTHEMERCHANTINTHETHIRDPHASE,THEMERCHANTOBTAINSTHEAUTHORIZATIONFROMTHEISSUERVIATHEPAYMENTGATEWAYFINALLY,THEMERCHANTREQUESTSAMONEYTRANSFERTOITSACCOUNT

    SETPROTOCOLPHASES

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 21

  • THEMERCHANTNEEDSTOOBTAINPAYMENTAUTHORIZATIONFROMTHEACQUIRER

    THEAUTHORIZATIONREQUESTCONSISTSOF:TRANSACTIONIDAMOUNTREQUESTEDMESSAGEDIGESTOFORDERDESCRIPTIONOTHERTRANSACTIONINFORMATION

    THEAUTHORIZATIONREQUESTISENCRYPTEDBYUSINGKEYB(PRIVATEKEYOFMERCHANT).

    KEYBISTHENENCRYPTEDBYUSINGPUBLICKEYEXCHANGEKEYOFTHEPAYMENTGATEWAYTOFORMTHEDIGITALENVELOPE

    PAYMENTAUTHORIZATION

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 22

  • THEMERCHANTSENDSTHEFOLLOWINGTOTHEPAYMENTGATEWAY

    THEENCRYPTEDAUTHORIZATIONREQUESTANDTHEENCRYPTEDKEYBCARDHOLDERSANDMERCHANTSCERTIFICATESTHEFOLLOWINGINFORMATIONASRECEIVEDFROMTHECARDHOLDER:

    PI+DI+H[OI](ALLENCRYPTEDUSINGKEYA)KEYA+CARDHOLDERINFORMATION(ALLENCRYPTEDUSINGTHEPAYMENTGATEWAYSPUBLICKEYEXCHANGEKEY)

    AFTERRECEIVINGTHEAUTHORIZATIONREQUEST,THEPAYMENTGATEWAYPROCESSESITASFOLLOWS

    OBTAINKEYBBYMEANSOFDECRYPTIONANDUSESITTODECRYPTTHEAUTHORIZATIONREQUESTVERIFIESMERCHANTSCERTIFICATESANDDIGITALSIGNATUREONTHEAUTHORIZATIONREQUESTOBTAINKEYAANDTHECARDHOLDERINFORMATIONBYMEANSOFDECRYPTIONUSESKEYATOOBTAINTHEPI,DSANDH[OI]VERIFIESTHEDSACCORDINGLY

    PAYMENTAUTHORIZATION

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 23

  • THEPAYMENTGATEWAYALSOVERIFIESTHATTHERECEIVEDTRANSACTIONIDISTHESAMEASTHEONEINTHEPI

    BYCHECKINGTHEORDERDESCRIPTIONINTHEAUTHORIZATIONREQUESTMESSAGE,ITCANBEVERIFIEDTHATTHEORDERHASBEENACCEPTEDBYTHECARDHOLDERANDTHEMERCHANTUPONALLSUCCESSFULVERIFICATIONS,THEPAYMENTGATEWAYFORWARDSTHEAUTHORIZATIONREQUESTTOTHEISSUERVIATHECURRENTPAYMENTSYSTEM

    AFTERTHERECEIVINGTHEAUTHORIZATIONFROMTHEISSUERTHROUGHTHECURRENTSYSTEM,THEPAYMENTGATEWAYSENDSANAUTHORIZATIONRESPONSETOTHEMERCHANT

    PAYMENTAUTHORIZATION

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 24

  • THEPAYMENTGATEWAYSENDSTHEFOLLOWINGTOTHEMERCHANTSIGNEDAUTHORIZATIONRESPONSE(ENCRYPTEDBYKEYC)

    KEYC(ENCRYPTEDBYMERCHANTSPUBLICKEYEXCHANGEKEY)SIGNEDCAPTURETOKEN(ENCRYPTEDBYKEYD)KEYD+CARDHOLDERINFORMATION(ENCRYPTEDBYPAYMENTGATEWAYSPUBLICKEYEXCHANGEKEY)

    AFTERRECEIVINGTHEAUTHORIZATIONRESPONSEFROMTHEPAYMENTGATEWAY,THEMERCHANTOBTAINSKEYCBYDECRYPTIONANDUSESITTODECRYPTAUTHORIZATIONRESPONSETHEMERCHANTVERIFIESTHEPAYMENTGATEWAYSCERTIFICATEANDTHEDIGITALSIGNATUREONTHEAUTHORIZATIONRESPONSEAFTEROBTAININGTHEAUTHORIZATION,THEMERCHANTTHENCOMPLETETHEORDERACCORDINGLY

    PAYMENTAUTHORIZATION

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 25

  • TOBEGINWITHTHEPAYMENTCAPTUREPROCESS,THEMERCHANTGENERATESCAPTUREREQUESTTHATINCLUDESTRANSACTIONID,CAPTUREAMOUNTANDOTHERINFORMATIONABOUTTHECAPTUREREQUEST

    THECAPTUREREQUESTISFIRSTSIGNEDBYUSINGTHEPRIVATEKEYOFTHEMERCHANTANDTHENENCRYPTEDWITHARANDOMSYMMETRICKEYE

    EISTHENENCRYPTEDBYUSINGPUBLICKEYEXCHANGEOFTHEPAYMENTGATEWAYTOFORMTHEDIGITALENVELOPE

    PAYMENTCAPTURE

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 26

  • THEMERCHANTSENDSTHEFOLLOWINGTOTHEPAYMENTGATEWAY:

    SIGNEDCAPTUREREQUEST(ENCRYPTEDBYUSINGKEYE)KEYE(ENCRYPTEDBYUSINGPAYMENTGATEWAYSPUBLICKEYEXCHANGEKEY)SIGNEDCAPTURETOKEN(ENCRYPTEDBYUSINGKEYD)KEYD+CARDHOLDERINFORMATION(ENCRYPTEDBYUSINGPAYMENTGATEWAYSPUBLICKEYEXCHANGEKEY)MERCHANTSDIGITALCERTIFICATES

    AFTERRECEIVINGTHECAPTUREREQUEST,THEPAYMENTGATEWAYOBTAINSKEYEBYDECRYPTIONANDUSESITTODECRYPTCAPTUREREQUEST

    THEPAYMENTGATEWAYALSOVERIFIESTHEDIGITALSIGNATUREOFTHECAPTUREREQUESTBYUSINGMERCHANTSPUBLICKEY

    PAYMENTCAPTURE

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 27

  • THEPAYMENTGATEWAYOBTAINSKEYDBYDECRYPTION,USESTHEKEYTODECRYPTTHECAPTURETOKEN,ANDVERIFIESTHECAPTURETOKEN

    AFTERSUCCESSFULVERIFICATIONTHEPAYMENTGATEWAYSENDSAPAYMENTTRANSFERREQUESTTOTHEISSUERVIATHECURRENTSYSTEM

    THECAPTURERESPONSECREATEDBYPAYMENTGATEWAYISSIGNEDBYUSINGITSPRIVATESIGNATUREKEYANDISENCRYPTEDBYRANDOMSYMMETRICKEYF

    FISENCRYPTEDBYUSINGMERCHANTSPUBLICKEYEXCHANGEKEYTOFORMTHEDIGITALENVELOPE

    PAYMENTCAPTURE

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 28

  • THEPAYMENTGATEWAYFORWARDSTHEFOLLOWINGINFORMATIONTOTHEMERCHANT:

    SIGNEDCAPTURERESPONSE(ENCRYPTEDBYKEYF)

    KEYF(ENCRYPTEDBYPUBLICKEYEXCHANGEKEY)

    PAYMENTGATEWAYSDIGITALCERTIFICATES

    AFTERRECEIVINGTHECAPTURERESPONSE,THEMERCHANTDECRYPTSITACCORDINGLYANDVERIFIESTHEDIGITALSIGNATURE.

    PAYMENTCAPTURE

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 29

  • ANINTERNETPAYMENTMETHOD.FIRSTGENERATIONSMARTCARDSCREDITCARDSANDBANKCARDS.SMARTCARDSAREINTELLIGENTINTERACTIVEANDINTEROPERABLE.

    SMARTCARD

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 30

  • CENTRALPROCESSINGUNIT:8BITMICROPROCESSORTHATCONTROLSTHEOPERATIONOFTHESMARTCARD.

    RAM:USEDTOSTORETEMPORARYDATA.

    EPROM:USEDTOSTORELONGTERMDATALIKECRYPTOGRAPHICKEYS.

    ROM:USEDTOSTOREPERMANENTDATASUCHASTHEOPERATINGSYSTEM.

    I/OINTERFACE:ITPROVIDESDATAINPUT/OUTPUTFUNCTIONS

    SMARTCARDCOMPONENTS

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 31

  • LEVERAGESTHECHECKPAYMENTSSYSTEM,ACORECOMPETENCYOFTHEBANKINGINDUSTRY.

    FITSWITHINCURRENTBUSINESSPRACTICES

    WORKSLIKEAPAPERCHECKDOESBUTINPUREELECTRONICFORM,WITHFEWERMANUALSTEPS.

    CANBEUSEDBYALLBANKCUSTOMERSWHOHAVECHECKINGACCOUNTS

    DIFFERENTFROMELECTRONICFUNDTRANSFERS

    SMARTCARDCOMPONENTS

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 32

  • EXACTLYSAMEWAYASPAPER

    CHECKWRITER"WRITES"THEECHECKUSINGONEOFMANYTYPESOFELECTRONICDEVICES

    GIVES"THEECHECKTOTHEPAYEEELECTRONICALLY.

    PAYEE"DEPOSITS"ECHECK,RECEIVESCREDIT,

    PAYEE'SBANK"CLEARS"THEECHECKTOTHEPAYINGBANK.

    PAYINGBANKVALIDATESTHEECHECKAND"CHARGES"THECHECKWRITER'SACCOUNTFORTHECHECK.

    HOWDOESELECTRONICCHEQUEWORK?

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 33

  • ANONYMOUSEPAYMENTPROCESS

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems

    1. WITHDRAW MONEY:CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY ENCODED

    TOKENS

    2. TRANSFORM SO MERCHANT CAN CHECK VALIDITY BUT IDENTITY HIDDEN

    3. SE

    ND TO

    KEN A

    FTER

    ADDIN

    G

    MERC

    HANT

    S IDE

    NTITY

    4. CHECK VALIDITY AND SEND GOODS

    5. DEPOSIT TOKEN AT BANK.IF DOUBLE SPENT REVEAL

    IDENTITY AND NOTIFY POLICE

    CUSTOMER MERCHANT

    34

  • Stateoftheartinelectronicpaymentsystems,IEEECOMPUTER30/9(1997)2835InternetprivacyThequestforanonymity,CommunicationsoftheACM42/2(1999)2860.Hyperlinks:

    http://www.javasoft.com/products/commerce/

    http://www.semper.org/

    http://www.echeck.org/

    http://niiserver.isi.edu/info/NetCheque/

    http://www.eceurope.org/Welcome.html/http://www.zdnet.com/icom/ebusiness/

    Drew, G. Using SET for Secure Electronic Commerce. Prentice Hall, 1999Garfinkel, S., and Spafford, G. Web Security & Commerce. OReilly and Associates, 1997

    SETCo(documentsandglossaryofterms)DataSecurityforeTransaction.RetrievedonApril12th2008,fromWeblink:

    http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~jervis/cs3235/set.html

    REFERENCES

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 35

  • QUESTION&ANSWER

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 36

  • THANK YOU

    SecureInternetPaymentSystems 37

    SECURE INTERNET PAYMENT SYSTEMSSlide 2Slide 3Slide 4Slide 5Slide 6Slide 7Slide 8Slide 9Slide 10Slide 11Slide 12Slide 13Slide 14Slide 15Slide 16Slide 17Slide 18Slide 19Slide 20Slide 21Slide 22Slide 23Slide 24Slide 25Slide 26Slide 27Slide 28Slide 29Slide 30Slide 31Slide 32Slide 33Slide 34Slide 35Slide 36Slide 37