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Secure File Storage. Nathanael Paul CRyptography Applications Bistro March 25, 2004. Choosing an Encrypted File System (EFS). Require kernel patch? root needed How much control is root given? Swap space Key management Backups and recovery options - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Secure File Storage
Nathanael Paul
CRyptography Applications Bistro
March 25, 2004
Choosing an Encrypted File System (EFS)
• Require kernel patch?
– root needed
• How much control is root given?
– Swap space
• Key management
• Backups and recovery options
• Very few files need encryption or entire file system?
• Sharing options?
Multitude of solutions
• Linux Crypto API
• Windows EFS
• CFS
– Early UNIX implementation
• SiRiUS
• Steganographic file systems
– not ready for use
• ppdd
– Encrypts root partition, and swap space?
CFS
• Early implementation by Matt Blaze
– First free UNIX EFS
– Client NFS server listening on localhost interface
• Key for each directory
– Uses passphrases
• Implemented in user-level
Accessing filesmain() {
…
read();
…
}VFS
NFS
LocalFileSys
Network
CFS (a.k.a. /crypt)
VFS
CFS
LocalFileSys
…Mount points
CFS
NFS Encrypt/Decrypt
VFS call (e.g., read())
call VFS again, but go to file on storage media
Accessing filesmain() {
…
read();
…
}VFS
CFS
EncryptedLocalFileSys
…
CFS Advantages/Drawbacks
• Key for each directory
– Usability?
• Implemented in user-level (slow)
– Makes it simpler
– RPC calls
– But most EFSs are slow
• Not possible to have different files under different groups in same directory
– IV is stored in group id field in inode
Stackable v-nodes: CryptFS
Linux CryptoAPI
• File system mounted on loopback device which is mounted on directory mount point
• Loopback device intercepts kernel commands
So why SiRiUS?• Assumes file server untrusted
– No change to file server
• Distinguishes read/write access
– Sharing
• Only a few keys needed
• Like CFS, users run user-level daemon
• Good for sharing among small groups
• Timely revocation
– Rollback attacks
main() {
…
read();
…
}VFS
SiRiUS
LocalFileSys
Network
SiRiUS Overview• Intercepts NFS requests
– Process requests and send to NFS server
• Could mimic CFS
– Process requests and send to VFS of local file system
• SiRiUS faster with NFS (compared to CFS), since requests go straight to NFS server and not through VFS to regular NFS client on machine
Files in SiRiUS• Files stored in 2 parts
– md-file: file metadata• Access control
– d-file: file itself• Encrypted with unique symmetric File Encryption Key
(FEK)
• Signed with a unique File Signature Key (FSK)
– To read, user needs FEK
– To write, user needs FSK
md-files
Encrypted Key Block (Owner)
Encrypted Key Block (User 1)
Encrypted Key Block (User n)
… FSK
Metdata last modified timestamp
filenameOwner’s hash of metadata
MSK used
MEK
Encrypted Key Blocks
Username
(or keyID)
FEK
FSK public key
Plaintext
Encrypted with MEK of user
read/write
read
Username
(or keyID)
FEK
Plaintext
Encrypted with MEK of user
Freshness Guarantees• Prevent rollback attacks
– Alice replaces new md-file with an older saved md-file
• mdf-file: metadata freshness file
– One in each directory of user’s file system
– Stamped with unique Master Signing Key (MSK) of user
– Contains root of hash tree of all md-files in current directory and mdf-files in immediate subdirectories
Creating mdf-files1. Apply SHA-1 hash on each md-file in current
directory (verifying md-file signatures as you go)
2. Concatenate resulting hashes together with mdf-files of immediate subdirectories and apply SHA-1 hash to concatenation
3. Place final hash and directory name in mdf-file
Note: Timestamp used before final hash of concatenated hashes on root mdf-file
Verifying a file• Files are guaranteed up to timestamp on root mdf-
file
• Verifying a file in root directory
– Compute mdf-file hash and check timestamps
• Verifying a file not in the root directory
– Apply first 2 steps of creation of mdf-file recursively up to root directory comparing each mdf-file in its subdirectories
• Requires checking many hashes
– What happens if a file in a non-related subtree’s hash doesn’t match up?
File swapping attack• Bob wants access to Alice’s /home/alice/secret.txt,
but Bob only has read access to /home/alice/readme.txt
• Bob switches filenames with secret.txt and readme.txt
• Would work if filename not included in md-file
• Directory included in mdf-file to prevent directory swapping
Creating a file• Generate random DSA signature FSK
• Generate random AES FEK
• Generate encrypted key block
• Owner’s hash of metadata
• Create md-file
• Encrypt file data
– Use FEK
– Apply SHA-1 to encrypted data and sign with private key of FSK. Append hash to data.
• Update root mdf-file
File Sharing, Reading, Writing• Use IBE (or other PKI)
– Will need public key of those that will have shared access to create their encrypted key blocks
– Will need public key of owner to verify signature and freshness of md-file
User keys• MSK, MEK
– Can be used without SiRiUS
• Revocation
– Read: change FEK, remove user’s key block, update other key blocks with new FEK, reencrypt and sign d-file, update md-file signature, update root mdf-file
– Write: same as read except create new FSK, and sign with new key (write implies read access)
Performance (ms)Test File Size Kernel NFS DumbFS SiRiUS
File Creation
0 0.4 3.4 14.5
File Deletion
0 0.3 0.4 1.1
Sequential Read
8 kb 0.9 1.4 18.0
Sequential Write
8 kb 1.1 2.0 21.9
Sequential Read
1 Mb 96.7 97.8 223.8
Sequential Write
1 Mb 100.0 102.7 632.9
Performance• Caching and optimizations pay off on larger files
• If working on smaller files, it’s much slower
• Read/Write
– Encrypt data (decrypt for read), verify 3 signatures (2 for file integrity, one for freshness), generate a signature (not for a read)
Conclusions• Encrypted file systems throw normal performance
out the window
• Read/write capabilities of SiRiUS are nice
• Single user with just a few critical files
– Program to manually perform encryption is probably sufficient
How to really protect your data…• Burn it at 3,000 degrees...